[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 15]
[Senate]
[Pages 23454-23470]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




TREATY WITH RUSSIA ON MEASURES FOR FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF 
                  STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS--Continued

  Mr. ISAKSON. Madam President, I wish to take an additional minute, if 
I might--the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is on the 
floor--to say, in addition to my statement I made 2 days ago in a 
speech on the floor with regard to the START treaty, that I wish to 
thank the chairman and the ranking member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee for the accommodating process from day one in April until 
today, where the treaty will ultimately pass on the floor of the 
Senate.
  Legislation is about improving ideas and making sure the interest of 
the American people and the United States of America is protected. 
Through the work of Senators Lugar and Kerry, we have been able to 
craft amendments to the resolution of ratification on the START treaty 
that ensure missile defense and modernization--the two contentious 
points on this legislation which came from the committee--are not only 
taken care of, but they are buttoned down and they are clear. And I 
thank the chairman and the ranking member for their willingness to do 
so.
  I want to let everyone who is listening and those who will read the 
reports of this debate know that this has been a 7-month process, not a 
9-day process, and it has been a detailed process. It has been the work 
of the will of the people of the United States of America, and the U.S. 
Senate has worked its will. When it is ratified today, it will be a 
step forward in the future for my children and grandchildren.
  During my campaign when I ran for reelection this year, I made the 
following statement: The rest of my life is about doing everything I 
can do to see to it that the lives of my children and grandchildren are 
safer, more secure, and as affluent as my life has been because of my 
parents and grandparents. Today, in this ratification, we are ensuring 
that we will be strong in our strength, we will trust but we will 
verify. We will make sure we can fight, if necessary, but we will also 
make sure we are accountable. And most important of all, with regard to 
the biggest threats we face--terrorism and loose nuclear materials 
falling into the hands of a rogue nation--we will be a safer country 
because of this, and I thank the chairman and ranking member because of 
it.
  I thank the chairman for his time, and I yield back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. KIRK. Madam President, I rise to oppose the START treaty because 
it recognizes limits on U.S. missile defenses in return for marginal 
reductions in the Russian arsenal. At the moment when the U.S. and 
allies must build missile defenses to protect against Iran, this treaty 
generates Russian pressure for America to go slow or risk Russia's 
departure from the agreement.
  If you take the President's Senate missile defense letter at face 
value, then America would deploy defenses that will trigger a Russian 
treaty exit. I am concerned that to prevent a Russian treaty 
withdrawal, the United States will move slower on building defenses 
against Iran just when we need to move faster.
  The most important duty of the Federal Government is to defend 
Americans against foreign attack, and the most important mission under 
that duty is to protect American families from the most dangerous 
nations that could carry out such an attack.
  In the mid-20th century, we agreed that the Soviet Union represented 
a clear and present danger to America. Our Cold War Presidents--Truman 
through Clinton, Republicans and Democrats--backed policies of a strong 
defense, with alliances with our friends and diplomacy with the 
Soviets. But much has changed since the 20th century ended over a 
decade ago. While the Russians still have an impressive arsenal, they 
are shadows of their former shadow, dropping from 290 million people to 
140 million people and from a gross domestic product of $2.6 trillion 
in 1990 to $2.1 trillion in 2010. The nuclear national security threat 
for the new 21st century moved beyond Russia to include Iran and North 
Korea, soon to be armed with nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver 
them.
  While the Russians are heavily armed, they present a relatively 
stable face to the outside world. They have the capability to attack, 
but they currently lack the intent. On any given year, their leaders 
appear adverse to risk and unready to commit national suicide. The same 
cannot be said for Iran, North Korea, and other nations that present a 
far less rational face to the international community. Looking at such 
potentially irresponsible leaders, it is incumbent on us to go beyond

[[Page 23455]]

idealistic diplomacy and mount a defense against an attack which may be 
leveled against our people or our allies. The lives of millions and the 
cause of freedom depend on our assessment of this threat and how we 
respond.
  Recall that nuclear technology represents the science of the 1930s, 
missile technology from the 1960s. Since the laws of physics cannot be 
classified, countries bad and good will all one day have the means to 
develop powerful arsenals based on the last century's science. It is 
the sacred mission of the democracies to understand this change, to 
measure its danger, and to eliminate an attack should one of these 
smaller, less rational countries attack.
  In such an environment, an agreement to limit the nuclear arms of the 
United States and Russia is helpful but does not concern the new danger 
emerging against the people of the West. If we can lower nuclear arms 
to levels where we still maintain a devastating counterpunch against a 
rational opponent who is uninterested in national suicide, then a 
nuclear war with that country remains unlikely and the cost of our 
armaments is reduced. If that agreement also causes us not to build 
defenses against an irrational opponent who may attack anyway, then we 
have committed a grievous national error.
  I initially favored the goals of the START treaty. The treaty is an 
echo from the 20th century and had a marginal utility in improving the 
defense of the United States. Unfortunately, the negotiations to 
produce this treaty took a turn that was not well perceived by the 
press or public. The Russians used these negotiations intended to 
improve the defense of the United States as a means to preserve their 
ability to attack.
  Surprisingly, American negotiators formalized a link in the protocol 
between limiting defenses against missile attack and maintaining forces 
to carry out such a strike. Perversely, this agreement now stands for 
two principles: No. 1, the United States and Russia should reduce their 
nuclear arms, on which we all agree, and No. 2, the United States 
should recognize policies to maintain the viability of a Russian 
attack. This second principle turns the purpose of the treaty on its 
head. It weakens the future defense of our Nation. The treaty would 
support a policy that we must not improve our defenses to such a degree 
as to defeat a Russian attack.
  Much of this has had little impact on actual defense plans regarding 
Russia. Russia presents a relatively stable, status quo face to the 
international community. It also maintains a nuclear force which would 
quickly overwhelm any planned system of defense. But a policy of 
limiting missile defense has a tremendous impact on our ability to 
thwart an attack from less responsible powers, such as Iran or North 
Korea. Given the actions of Iranian and North Korean leaders, I would 
argue these countries represent the more important danger to the future 
of the United States and our allies in this new century.
  In the 20th century, the argument about the defense of the Nation 
against an attack by missiles took on a divided and partisan tone. 
President Reagan proposed ``missile defense,'' while congressional 
Democrats opposed ``Star Wars.''
  Much of the disagreement ended in the late 1980s and 1990s when Iraq 
attacked Iran and then Israel with missiles.
  Over time, careful observers noted that missile defense was important 
not just to the health of Israel but to its survival.
  When Russia attacked Georgia, it used a great number of missiles to 
deliver blows against that little country. As this century winds on, 
more countries will see these realities of the 21st century, eventually 
including the United States.
  The administration's unsteady missile defense plans also concern me. 
I am concerned about the missile defense actions taken by the current 
administration. When it took office, it cancelled plans to enhance the 
missile defenses of the United States itself that were based in Alaska 
and California. To the great embarrassment of our allies in the Czech 
Republic and Poland, it cancelled plans to deploy radars and two-stage 
ground-based interceptors (GBIs). I would note that history has been 
unkind to Western leaders that abandon Poland.
  The administration also began an effort to cancel funding for the 
``Arrow III'' interceptor being jointly developed with Israel. Thanks 
to the late Chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Committee, 
Jack Murtha, the effort to kill Arrow III was reversed and full-funding 
came to the Arrow III program despite the President's early wishes.
  Once the negative reaction of our hurt Polish allies was known, the 
administration responded with a four-part plan to calm Europe using 
systems inferior to the GBI anti-missiles originally proposed by the 
last administration and current Secretary of defense. The inartfully 
coined European ``Phased-Adaptive'' approach involved anti-aircraft 
systems patched together in a rather ad hoc fashion. We now plan to 
begin by sailing U.S. Navy Aegis cruisers near European coasts followed 
by a decade and the possible deployment of a to-be-built Navy missile 
interceptor that does not yet exist, called the ``Standard Missile 3, 
block IIA''.
  I contacted our Missile Defense Agency and asked if the originally 
planned GBIs for Poland could have stopped an attack by Iran against 
the United States. They answered yes.
  We checked if any one of the new ``Phased-Adaptive'' stages could 
stop a similar intercontinental attack by Iran against the U.S. They 
answered Phase I could not, Phase II could not, and Phase III could 
not.
  In fact the only phase that could engage a missile launched by Iran 
against the U.S. was not until Phase IV by the IIB missile that did not 
yet exist that would be deployed far later than the original GBIs 
proposed.
  The problem goes deeper. I asked the MDA to compare the capabilities 
of the originally proposed two-stage GBIs to hit an Iranian missile 
against the future final Phase IV SM-3 JIB. The MDA replied with this 
graph. It shows that the original, longer range GBIs would have a full 
4-minute window to hit and destroy an incoming Iranian missile bound 
for New York City. The SM-3 IIB, which has a shorter range, would have 
only 3 minutes. In short, the administration's new proposed missile has 
25 percent less time to defeat an incoming Iranian attack than the 
originally proposed missile. No wonder our Polish allies supported the 
original plan.
  I worry that some of these changes were made to curry favor with the 
Russians. I am concerned that the preamble to the START treaty would be 
used to reduce or block the efforts of the Congress to upgrade the 
defenses of the United States. In short, I am worried that while this 
treaty reduces the smaller threat of attack by Russia, it creates a 
Russian block for plans to eliminate the larger threat from Iran. The 
Russians clearly stated that if we mount defenses that could defeat 
their attack, they would pull out of the treaty. The problem is that to 
eliminate the threat from Iran and North Korea, we will have to do so. 
In this case, what is the value of the treaty? It clearly helps the 
Russians but if it blocks or delays our effort to protect against Iran, 
does it help us? I am also concerned with other aspects of this treaty, 
like an end to full-time compliance monitoring inside Russia.
  There are also details of the treaty itself that concern me. Under 
previous treaties, the United States had a full-time monitoring 
presence in Votkinsk. This was eliminated. We will no longer have full-
time monitors in Russia.
  Also, an end to telemetry from new Russian missiles. Under previous 
treaties, the United States and Russia shared all the information 
transmitted by their test missiles in flight, called telemetry. While 
our spy satellites, planes and ships can gather some of this 
information, there is nothing like getting it straight from the 
missile's mouth. Telemetry is key to understanding the capability of a 
new missile, especially its maneuvers to drop off one or more nuclear 
warheads.

[[Page 23456]]

  Under this new treaty, this data was lost. The Russians will not 
provide telemetry from their new missiles under this treaty. Their only 
obligation is to share telemetry from five missile flights a year and 
they will likely pick old missiles to do this.
  We are told we lost the capability to collect the telemetry of new 
Russian missiles because while the Russians are developing many new 
models, we are not. Given that telemetry would report mainly on new 
Russian developments and not American, our negotiators gave up.
  They should not have given up. The collection of telemetry from new 
Russian missiles had long been enshrined in arms control treaties. This 
precedent was well established and should have been continued.
  There are inspections, but only 18 per year. We are told that the new 
treaty will offer the unprecedented inspection of actual missile 
warheads. This is true. Under the old treaties, we simply counted the 
number of missiles the Russians had using our spy satellites and 
assumed each missile was packed with as many warheads as the missile's 
flight tests and telemetry showed.
  Now we will get to inspect actual missiles--but only 18 per year. The 
Russians have hundreds. At the rate the treaty allows, the full 
inspection of the Russian arsenal of 800 launchers would take over 40 
years.
  I asked administration officials how many hours notice the Russians 
would have before Americans conducted an actual warhead inspection. In 
all cases, they would have 24 hours or more notice that the Americans 
were coming. After extensive briefings on Russian cheating against 
previous arms control treaties--most flagrantly the treaty banning 
biological weapons--it should give you pause that the United States 
gave up collecting telemetry on the flight of every Russian missile in 
return for the inspection of 10 missiles per year and that only after a 
full day's notice.
  We are also told that this treaty is needed to improve Russian 
international behavior. In my view, a treaty should only be signed to 
reward good behavior, not to encourage it later.
  I was most inclined to support the intent of this treaty to improve 
relations between the United States and Russia on the subject of 
collapsing the Iranian regime and its nuclear weapons program. 
Undoubtedly, the administration earned good marks in getting the 
Russians to cancel the delivery of one key piece of air defense 
equipment--an anti-aircraft missile battery called the S-300--to Iran. 
This was an unqualified success.
  Unfortunately, there are many more failures where the press paid 
little note. We believe the Russians are still delivering other pieces 
of air defense equipment to the Iranians. That is why the Russians 
insisted on exempting such deliveries from the new U.N. sanctions 
against Iran. Russian equipment will likely be used to defend Iran's 
nuclear sites, the very programs we are most worried about that violate 
Iran's commitment to the U.N. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  What is most surprising is the actions of the Russians since the 
negotiation of this treaty. They know we, the Europeans and Israelis 
are most worried about the nuclear program of Iran. Despite these well-
publicized concerns and numerous U.N. resolutions against the Iranian 
nuclear program, the Russians chose this year and this country to 
provide nuclear fuel to the Iranian reactor at Bushehr. As that Russian 
reactor begins operation, plutonium production will begin inside Iran. 
While the Russians promise that the Iranians will not be able to use 
this plutonium in Iranian bombs, can we be assured that these promises 
will be honored? Would not it have been better to never begin plutonium 
production in Iran at all?
  I am also concerned about new ideas coming from the administration on 
missile defense and the Russians. Long ago, President Clinton proposed 
U.S-Russian cooperation in space. That cooperation led to a dependence 
so that soon, the U.S. will lack any way to launch astronauts. We 
cannot send our own astronauts to our own space station without the 
permission of the Russians.
  In discussions regarding this treaty, I learned that the 
administration is now planning to bring the Russians inside the missile 
defenses of NATO. Russia is the very nation that used missiles to 
attack Georgia--a country applying for membership in NATO. I am sure 
the Georgians would be uncomfortable at best seeing Russians manage the 
missile defense of their little nation.
  The U.S. offer to bring the Russians into NATO's missile defenses was 
embodied in an offer at the recent NATO conference in Lisbon. Nearly 
all Americans are fully aware of Russian spying against the United 
States military for the last 70 years. We know that Russia has one of 
the most active cyber-attack networks on the planet operating against 
U.S. networks. It would seem that a proposal to bring the Russians into 
the missile defense system of NATO would introduce powerful new 
opportunities for espionage against us, as well as a greater 
understanding of our defense capabilities and weaknesses.
  Imagine a Russian officer in a NATO missile defense center. He will 
soon learn when our system is alerted, how it processes information, 
what our response times are and the estimated accuracy of our 
interceptors. These are the things he would learn during his first week 
inside our operations center. We can only imagine what else he would 
learn over the coming years.
  Remember that the warning information from NATO is critical to the 
defense of the United States. If the Russians managed to spoof or block 
critical NATO missile warning data, then U.S. commanders defending our 
homeland would become weaker, not stronger due to Russian presence in 
NATO missile defense centers.
  Recall that missile combat is the ultimate ``come as you are'' 
affair. In a struggle between continents, the battle will be joined 
within 30 minutes. When submarine or medium-range missiles are 
employed, battle can start in as little as 10 minutes. If we have 
Russians in the system who found American weaknesses or deployed 
problems, U.S. commanders will have only minutes to diagnose and fix 
those problems before the gravest consequences befall our people and 
allies.
  The next Congress will favor missile defense programs to a far 
greater degree than this one. I plan to encourage this body and 
especially the House with legislation to deny funding for any effort to 
bring Russians into the missile defenses of NATO or the United States.
  I respect the opinions of Senators on both sides of this question. It 
is my judgment that safety of the American people is better off if we 
work to eliminate the new dangers of the 21st century rather than focus 
on the old agreements of the 20th century. In my view, the growing 
dangers of Iran and North Korea threaten the American people most. 
Therefore, the missile defense programs of the United States and our 
allies take precedence over an agreement whose protocol limits our 
defenses by acknowledging the need to preserve the ability of Russia to 
attack the United States.
  While most of us were born in the 20th century and we loved black and 
white TV, the ``Ed Sullivan Show'' and the ``Honeymooners,'' we 
recognize that time has passed and we must adapt to the new world of 
the Internet, Ipad and Ichat. The 20th century doctrine of nuclear 
Mutually Assured Destruction against the Soviet Union is part of our 
past and not part of a future involving Taepo Dong II missiles from 
North Korea and Shahab III missiles from Iran.
  I would urge the administration to devote the time and attention of 
our able diplomats to ending the Iranian nuclear program rather than 
this agreement that, while laudable in its very modest goals, went awry 
at the negotiating table.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, on April 8, 2009, President Obama and 
President Medvedev concluded negotiations, which had begun under 
President Bush, and signed the New START treaty. This new treaty is a 
key part of the reset of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Even though the 
Cold War ended 20

[[Page 23457]]

years ago, this relationship has been unclear; Russia is not an 
adversary but neither is it an ally. There have been divides and 
disagreements even though we share many common goals and interests. 
President Obama is rightly intent on moving the relationship in a more 
positive direction. Ratification of the New START treaty is an 
important part of this process.
  On May 13 of this year, President Obama submitted the New START 
treaty to the Senate. In carrying out its responsibility the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Service Committee and the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence held a total of 20 hearings and 
4 briefings. Seven hearings and three briefings were held by the Armed 
Services Committee. Even before the new treaty was submitted to the 
Senate, the Department of State provided the Senate National Security 
Working Group multiple briefings on the status of and issues discussed 
during negotiations.
  It is now time for the Senate to provide its consent to ratification. 
As Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said 
about the START treaty on December 12, ``this is a national security 
issue of great significance and the sooner we get it done the better.'' 
The Director of National Intelligence is also eager to get this treaty 
finished and restore the insight into Russian nuclear forces that this 
treaty will provide and that is so important for the intelligence 
community. Director Clapper said, ``the sooner, the better. From an 
intelligence perspective, we are better off with the Treaty than 
without it.'' Retired General Brent Scowcroft, the National Security 
Adviser for both Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, and a 
supporter of the Treaty, said, ``to play politics with what is the 
fundamental national interest is pretty scary stuff.''
  Some have suggested that this new treaty should not be taken up in 
this lameduck session of the 111th Congress. I couldn't disagree more. 
Almost as soon as this session of Congress began, the President 
announced his intent to complete negotiations on the new strategic arms 
agreement to replace the START I treaty. Various Senate committees of 
this Congress and the Senate National Security Working Group of this 
Congress were briefed on numerous occasions by the negotiating team on 
the new treaty. This Congress got the updates on the progress and the 
issues and this Congress provided guidance along the way. The 
committees of this Congress held 20 hearings and briefings on this new 
treaty. This Congress hosted several all-Member briefings including one 
such session with the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, 
to get his views on the importance of the treaty. The next Congress 
will not have the benefit of all that work and insight. It is in fact 
the obligation and the duty of this Congress to take up this treaty.
  When President Obama submitted the START treaty to the Senate for 
consideration he made six key points.
  The treaty will enhance the national security of the United States.
  The treaty mandates mutual reductions and limitations on the world's 
two largest nuclear arsenals.
  The treaty will promote transparency and predictability in the future 
strategic relationships of Russia and the United States.
  The treaty will enable each party to the treaty to verify that the 
other party is complying with its obligations through a regime of 
onsite inspections, notifications, comprehensive and continuing data 
exchanges, and provisions for unimpeded use of national technical 
means.
  The treaty includes detailed procedures for elimination or conversion 
of treaty accountable items, and
  The treaty provides for the exchange of certain telemetric 
information on ballistic missile launches.
  Equally important to this discussion is what the START treaty does 
not cover.
  It does not limit U.S. missile defense plans and programs.
  It does not limit U.S. conventional prompt global strike programs.
  It does not provide authority within the treaty to modify the terms 
and conditions of the treaty without the advice and consent of the 
Senate.
  It does not constrain in any way the ability of the United States to 
modernize the nuclear weapons complex, modernize, maintain, or replace 
strategic delivery systems, or the ability to ensure that the stockpile 
of U.S. nuclear weapons remains safe, secure, and reliable.
  It also does not cover nonstrategic nuclear weapons--often referred 
to as tactical nuclear weapons. The START treaty covers, as have all 
previous nuclear arms reduction treaties, strategic offensive nuclear 
arms. Dealing with tactical nuclear weapons is certainly an area of 
arms control that needs to be addressed but has proved elusive to 
previous administrations, Democratic and Republican. It remains to be 
addressed.
  The START III treaty was to have covered these weapons but when the 
START II treaty, which was signed by President George H.W. Bush and 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1993, was not ratified, any hope of 
addressing tactical nuclear weapons in a START III treaty died along 
with the START II treaty. 17 years later President Obama is trying to 
get nuclear arms reductions back on track, by resuming discussions with 
Russia and signing the START treaty. Hopefully, entry into force of 
this START treaty will allow the United States and Russia to discuss an 
agreement on tactical nuclear weapons. While getting an agreement to 
limit tactical nuclear weapons will be very difficult, without 
ratification of the New START treaty, it will be impossible.
  Because this treaty does not require any significant reductions in 
either U.S. nuclear weapons or delivery systems, it is a fairly modest 
treaty.
  The so-called Moscow Treaty, which was signed in 2002 by President 
George W. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, limited both Russia 
and the United States to a range of operationally deployed nuclear 
warheads by the year 2012. Under the Moscow Treaty, each side could 
have between 1700 and 2200 total operationally deployed nuclear 
weapons. Russia has already met this goal and the United States is very 
close. Under the START treaty, each side will have no more than 1550 
deployed nuclear weapons, a reduction of just 150 weapons below the 
Moscow Treaty. The START treaty does not limit the number of 
nondeployed nuclear weapons, an issue of importance to the Commander of 
the U.S. Strategic Command, GEN. Kevin Chilton.
  The limits in this treaty were agreed to after careful analysis by 
U.S. military leadership, particularly GEN Kevin Chilton, the Commander 
of the U.S. Strategic Command and the man responsible for these 
strategic systems.
  At a hearing before the Armed Services Committee on July 20, 2010, 
GEN Chilton stated that the force levels in the treaty meet the current 
guidance for deterrence for the United States. That guidance was laid 
out by President George W. Bush

       The options we provided in this process focused on ensuring 
     America's ability to continue to deter potential adversaries, 
     assure our allies, and sustain strategic stability for as 
     long as nuclear weapons exist. This rigorous approach, rooted 
     in deterrence strategy and assessment of potential adversary 
     capabilities, supports both the agreed-upon limits in New 
     START and recommendations in the Nuclear Posture Review 
     (NPR).

  The strategic deployed forces allowed under the treaty will ensure 
the retention of the nuclear triad--all three delivery legs of the 
triad, bombers, SLBMs, and ICBMs. On that point GEN Chilton was very 
clear, saying ``We will retain a triad of strategic nuclear delivery 
systems.''
  Secretary of Defense Gates has also been very clear that the nuclear 
triad will be maintained. In an op-ed in May in the Wall Street 
Journal, Secretary Gates said the New START treaty ``preserves the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal as a vital pillar of our nation's and our allies' 
security posture. Under this treaty the U.S. will maintain our powerful 
nuclear triad . . . and we retain the ability to change our force mix 
as we see fit.''
  Some have said that the United States will have to make significant 
reductions to reach the force levels under the treaty and that the 
Russians

[[Page 23458]]

will have to make no reductions. According to GEN Chilton this argument 
is a distraction. At an Armed Services Committee hearing GEN Chilton 
commented on the lower level of Russian forces and said:

       New START limits the number of Russian ballistic missile 
     warheads that can target the United States, missiles that 
     pose the most prompt threat to our forces and our nation. 
     Regardless of whether Russia would have kept its missile 
     force levels within those limits without a New START Treaty, 
     upon ratification they would now be required to do so.

  While the START treaty will also not require significant reductions 
in the number of U.S. strategic delivery systems, there will be some 
reductions but not for 7 years. More importantly the START treaty will 
provide certainty for both Russia and the United States as to the size 
of the deployed nuclear force of the other. This is particularly 
important to the United States because Russia is now below the proposed 
delivery system limits of the START treaty, but has plans to build the 
number of strategic delivery systems. It is very much in the interest 
of the United States to have a cap on that build-up. An unrestrained 
build up would quickly bring back the ghosts and burdensome costs of 
the Cold War.
  Under this new treaty, Russia and the United States will each have a 
total of 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, 
and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, and 700 deployed 
ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear 
armaments. The treaty does not limit nondeployed nuclear warheads, 
nondeployed ICBMs, nondeployed SLBMs, or heavy bombers that are not 
equipped for nuclear armaments. This is particularly important for the 
B-1B bomber fleet, as those airframes have not been in nuclear service 
for many years and will not be counted under the START treaty when 
simple modifications are completed.
  This START treaty brings a practical approach to strategic systems 
and counts real delivery systems and real warheads. Over the years, the 
old START I treaty had resulted in exaggerated nuclear force numbers. 
For instance, under the old START I treaty, the four Ohio class 
submarines that have been converted to conventional use, were still 
counted as 96 deployed SLBMs and 768 deployed nuclear warheads. These 
exaggerated force structure levels have led to uncertainties for 
military planners and increased costs for the United States. Under this 
treaty they will not be counted.
  One of the additional benefits of this START treaty is that the 
treaty provides a clear mechanism to remove systems from being counted 
under the treaty. The ability to clearly and easily remove systems, 
such as heavy bombers from under the treaty, is also of great 
importance to General Chilton, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic 
Command.
  For example the United States currently has 76 B-52 bombers and 18 B-
2 bombers, a total of 94 nuclear capable bombers. Under the current 
plan for implementing the treaty there will be up to 60 nuclear capable 
bombers. The remaining 34 can be converted to conventional only 
capability and will no longer count under the treaty. They do not have 
to be destroyed. I think this fact is often misunderstood and there may 
be an impression that the 34 bombers will have to be destroyed under 
the treaty. That is not the case.
  This past May, Secretary of Defense Gates wrote an op-ed in the Wall 
Street Journal. Drawing on his long history and involvement with 
strategic arms control agreements, which dates back to 1970, Secretary 
Gates said that the question is always the same for each treaty: ``Is 
the United States better off with an agreement or without it?'' With 
respect to the START Treaty Secretary Gates' answer to the question is 
unequivocal: ``The United States is far better off with this Treaty 
than without it.''
  That is also the issue now before the Senate. Is the United States 
better off with this START treaty? The 20 hearings and 4 briefings have 
clearly demonstrated that it is.
  In that same op-ed, Secretary Gates emphasized the current state of 
affairs that has existed since the end of December 2009 when the START 
I treaty expired. Since that time, there has been no verification and 
inspection regime, no visibility into the Russian strategic programs, 
and no limits on delivery vehicles. As the Secretary said:

       Since the expiration of the old START Treaty in December 
     2009, the U.S. has had none of these safeguards. The new 
     treaty will put them back in place, strengthen many of them, 
     and create a verification regime that will provide for 
     greater transparency and predictability between our two 
     countries, to include substantial visibility into the 
     development of Russian nuclear forces.

  This rigorous inspection and verification regime, which when coupled 
with our national technical means, will allow this treaty to be 
monitored and verified. Nevertheless there has been an argument made 
that Russia cheated on the START I treaty and therefore we shouldn't 
ratify the new treaty. According to the State Department that is simply 
not the case.
  In testimony before the Armed Services Committee in July, Assistant 
Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller said, regarding the State 
Department's 2010 Treaty Compliance Report:

       I want to point out that Russia was in compliance with 
     START's central limits during the Treaty's life span. 
     Moreover, the majority of compliance issues raised under 
     START were satisfactorily resolved. Most reflected differing 
     interpretations on how to implement START's complex 
     inspection and verification regime.

  The old START I treaty was a complicated and complex treaty, many of 
the lessons learned from the inspections during the course of that 
treaty have been incorporated into the new treaty. There were issues on 
both sides. According to the 2010 Treaty Compliance Report:

       The United States stated on several occasions to our Treaty 
     partners that the United States was compliant with the 
     Treaty; however as might be expected under a verification 
     regime as complex as START, the United States and Russia 
     developed a difference of views with regard to how the sides 
     implemented certain Treaty requirements.

  This is not the same as cheating.
  Our senior military leaders believe the new treaty can be monitored 
and verified and that if Russia did cheat there is high confidence that 
any cheating could be detected before such cheating rose to a level of 
military significance. General Chilton said during testimony before the 
Armed Services Committee, ``New START will reestablish a strategic 
nuclear arms control verification regime that provides access to 
Russian nuclear forces and a measure of predictability in Russian force 
deployments over the life of the treaty.''
  In a discussion on the ability to detect cheating I asked General 
Chilton, ``In other words, the verification provisions give you 
confidence that Russia cannot achieve a militarily significant 
advantage undetected?'' General Chilton said: ``Yes, that's correct.''
  Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, in her July testimony 
before the Armed Services Committee, made it clear that any cheating 
could be detected before it became militarily significant. She also 
believes that the United States is well positioned to deter cheating as 
well. In that regard she said:

       Deterrence of cheating is a key part of the assessment of 
     verifiability, and is strongest when the probability of 
     detecting significant violations is high, the benefits to 
     cheating are low, and the potential costs are high. We assess 
     that this is the case for Russia cheating under the New START 
     Treaty.

  One of the areas on which we have had substantial discussion is 
missile defense. The U.S. missile defense program isn't covered or 
limited by the New START treaty. It--the missile defense program--has 
nevertheless become a major focus of the debate on the treaty. Our 
missile defense programs and policies are based on developing and 
fielding the missile defense capabilities we need to meet the missile 
threats we face, not on any of these treaty matters. The New START 
treaty does not limit the missile defense capabilities we need.
  Secretary of Defense Gates, in testimony before the Armed Services 
Committee on June 17, said:

       The Treaty will not constrain the United States from 
     deploying the most effective

[[Page 23459]]

     missile defenses possible, nor impose additional costs or 
     barriers on those defenses. I remain confident in the U.S. 
     missile defense program, which has made considerable 
     advancements, including the testing and development of the 
     SM-3 missile, which we will deploy in Europe.

  Secretary of State Clinton, in testimony before the Armed Services 
Committee on June 17 said:

       This Treaty does not constrain our missile defense efforts. 
     I want to underscore this because I know there have been a 
     lot of concerns about it and I anticipate a lot of questions.

  During that same hearing Secretary Clinton went on to say:

       The Treaty's preamble does include language acknowledging 
     the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive 
     forces, but that's simply a statement of fact. It too does 
     not in any way constrain our missile defense programs.

  In a July 20 hearing before the Armed Services Committee, GEN Kevin 
Chilton, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command said:

       As the combatant command(er) also responsible for 
     synchronizing global missile defense plans, operations, and 
     advocacy, I can say with confidence that this treaty does not 
     constrain any current or future missile defense plans.

  Assistant Secretary of State, Rose Gottemoeller, the lead negotiator 
of the Treaty, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations hearing 
on June 10, said:

       The Treaty does not constrain our current or planned 
     missile defense and, in fact, contains no meaningful 
     restrictions on missile defenses of any kind.

  Later, on July 29, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee, 
Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller said:

       There were no--and I repeat--no secret deals made in 
     connection with the New START Treaty, not on missile defense 
     nor on any other issue.

  As the Ballistic Missile Defense Review report made clear, the 
administration is pursuing a variety of systems and capabilities to 
defend the homeland and different regions of the world against missile 
threats from nations such as North Korea and Iran. A good example of 
that is the phased adaptive approach to missile defense in Europe. The 
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended it 
unanimously. It is strongly supported by our NATO allies. The November 
20, NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration says that ``the United States 
European Phased Adaptive Approach is welcomed as a valuable national 
contribution to the NATO missile defense architecture.''
  During the NATO Lisbon Summit NATO announced its own decision to 
build a missile defense system to protect European populations and 
territory against missile attack, consistent with the phased adaptive 
approach. The phased adaptive approach is designed to provide effective 
missile defense capabilities in a timely manner against existing or 
emerging Iranian missile threats. Those are the missile threats faced 
by our military personnel, allies, and partners in Europe.
  As the Secretary of Defense and numerous other officials have made 
clear, the treaty does not limit our missile defense plans or programs. 
The Armed Services Committee also knows that, and our authorization 
bill stated that fact. Section 221(b)(8) of the Ike Skelton national 
Defense authorization bill for fiscal year 2011 that we passed this 
morning in the Senate states, ``there are no constraints contained in 
the New START Treaty on the development or deployment of effective 
missile defenses, including all phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach 
to missile defense in Europe and further enhancements to the Ground-
based Midcourse Defense system, as well as future missile defenses.''
  To be very clear there is one provision in the treaty that prohibits 
each side from using ICBM silos or SLBM launchers for missile defense 
interceptors, and vice versa. But using these silos and launchers are 
not in our missile defense plan and should not be in our plan because 
it would be very much against our interest to use strategic missile 
interceptor silos for ballistic defense purposes. It would be more 
expensive than building new silos, the strategic missile silos aren't 
in the right locations to defend against missiles from North Korea, and 
most importantly, it would be destabilizing to launch ballistic missile 
interceptors from ICBM silos or SLBM launchers.
  Lieutenant General O'Reilly, the Director of the Missile Defense 
Agency, has made clear, we don't want, need, or plan to use such silos 
for missile defense purposes. In a June 16 hearing before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Lieutenant General O'Reilly made it very 
clear saying ``replacing ICBMs with ground-based interceptors or 
adapting the submarine-launched ballistic missiles to be an interceptor 
would actually be a setback--a major setback--to the development of our 
missile defenses.''
  That one limitation has no impact on our plans for missile defense, 
plans that are more effective and less expensive than converting ICBM 
or SLBM silos to missile defense use.
  There is one other area of the many that have been discussed in 
connection with the START treaty that I would like to raise, and that 
is modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and maintaining the 
ability to certify annually that our stockpile remains safe, secure and 
reliable.
  Shortly before Congress instituted a moratorium on nuclear weapons 
testing in the early 1990s, the United States established a stockpile 
stewardship program to design and build advanced scientific, 
experimental, and computational capabilities to enable the annual 
certification process for the nuclear weapons. This program has been 
very successful. Beginning in 2005, however, support for the program 
started to wane and the budgets for nuclear activities started to go 
down. Without enough money the weapons complex was forced to have 
layoffs at the nuclear weapons laboratories and the production 
facilities, to defer maintenance on many important buildings and 
facilities, to delay key acquisitions, and to delay design and 
construction of the last two major new production facilities. President 
Obama, in his fiscal year 2011 budget request and in the plans for the 
future years, has turned this situation around by providing $4.1 
billion more over the next five years than previously planned. This 
level of funding is unprecedented since the end of the Cold War.
  President Obama laid out his funding plan for the nuclear enterprise 
in the November Section 1251 report, a report that would provide an 
additional $1.2 billion over 2 years, a 15 percent increase and a total 
of $41.6 billion for fiscal years 2012-2016 for the National Nuclear 
Security Administration.
  With these amounts has the administration committed enough to 
modernization and sustainment of the complex and the life extension 
programs for the nuclear stockpile? The directors of three nuclear 
weapons laboratories all say yes. In a joint December 1, 2010, letter 
to Senators Kerry and Lugar, the three Directors of the nuclear weapons 
laboratories said that the finding level proposed in the section 1251 
report `` would enable the laboratories to execute our requirements for 
ensuring a safe, secure, reliable, and effective stockpile under the 
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan.''
  The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, 
under both President George W. Bush and President Obama, Tom 
D'Agostino, said, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee in 
July:

       Our plans for investment in and modernization of the 
     Nuclear Security Enterprise--the collection of NNSA 
     laboratories, production sites, and experimental facilities 
     that support our stockpile stewardship program, our nuclear 
     nonproliferation agenda, our Naval nuclear propulsion 
     programs, and a host of other nuclear security missions--are 
     essential irrespective of whether or not New START is 
     ratified.

  The Senate Foreign Relations Committee took the right approach on 
this issue in its resolution of ratification by not making entry into 
force contingent on a certain funding level, but by including a sense 
of the Senate that the United States is committed to a robust stockpile 
stewardship program.
  The list of both Republican and Democratic supporters of this Treaty 
is broad and strongly bipartisan, including eight former Secretaries of 
State--

[[Page 23460]]

Madeleine Albright, Warren Christopher, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, 
James Baker, Lawrence Eagleburger, George Schultz, Henry Kissinger--
four former Secretaries of Defense--Harold Brown, Frank Carlucci, Bill 
Cohen, Bill Perry, and Jim Schlesinger--seven former commanders of the 
U.S. Strategic Command, President George H.W. Bush, President Clinton 
and a long list of national security experts.
  Our NATO allies support this treaty and have urged us to ratify it 
without delay. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rassmussen said at 
the NATO summit in Lisbon in November:

       A ratification of the START Treaty will contribute strongly 
     to an improvement of the overall security environment in the 
     Euro-Atlantic area, and all members of the NATO-Russia 
     Council share the view that an early ratification of the 
     START Treaty would be to the benefit of security in the Euro-
     Atlantic area. I'd also have to say that it is a matter of 
     concern that a delayed ratification of the START Treaty will 
     be damaging to the overall security environment in Europe. So 
     we strongly urge both parties to ratify the START Treaty as 
     early as possible.

  I believe that the Senate should consent to ratification of the New 
START treaty and that ratification of this treaty is in the national 
security interest of the United States. Ratification of the New START 
treaty will provide predictability, confidence, transparency and 
stability in the United States-Russian relationship. The New START 
treaty will make us safer today, and leave a safer world for our 
children and grandchildren. The Senate should ratify the New START 
treaty now.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, I am very pleased that the Senate is 
about to ratify the New START treaty--I hope and believe with a very 
solid bipartisan vote.
  This really is a historic moment. This is the biggest arms control 
treaty in 20 years, and the most important foreign policy action the 
Senate will take this Congress.
  This is absolutely the right thing to do. It is important to our 
national security and it is critical to uphold America's place in the 
world community.
  As I have said many times, the arms reductions in this treaty are 
modest. New START requires a 30 percent reduction in warheads from the 
limits set out in the Moscow Treaty in 2002 to 1,550 on each side, but 
both the United States and Russia have been reducing their strategic 
stockpiles since then.
  The real importance of this treaty comes from the monitoring 
provisions, confidence-building measures, and the strengthened 
relationship between two of the world's major powers.
  We have not had inspectors at Russian nuclear facilities for 13 
months. We have not had data exchanges on the size and deployment of 
Russian forces. Russia has had the freedom to block our national 
technical means to monitor their forces. Apart from our national 
technical means, we are now blind.
  With this treaty, we will benefit from these measures and others. The 
Senate has discussed the monitoring and verification provisions at 
length during this debate--in open and closed session--and it has been 
made very clear that this treaty greatly strengthens our intelligence 
community's ability to monitor and assess Russian strategic forces.
  As Director of National Intelligence Clapper has said, the sooner we 
ratify this treaty, the better. I am very pleased that the Senate is 
acting now, before the end of the year and the congressional session, 
to give the executive branch these tools.
  With the ratification of this treaty, the Senate also makes clear 
that the United States is willing and able to make good on its foreign 
policy promises and to act in the best interests of our country and of 
the world.
  Following ratification in the Russian Duma, the United States and 
Russia will begin the next round of arms control and transparency.
  I hope and I believe many Senators have expressed their desire, that 
this will lead to further arms control negotiations to reduce further 
the level of strategic arms and to address tactical nuclear weapons and 
other delivery mechanisms.
  The ratification also maintains, and hopefully will build on, the 
improving relationship between our two countries and our two young 
Presidents.
  We have enjoyed strong cooperation this year, over Afghanistan, over 
Iran, and--according to a letter I received from President Obama on 
Monday--over the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula.
  In a world of asymmetric threats, we need friends and allies more 
than ever. This treaty moves us in this direction--with Russia and with 
the Eastern European nations that are strongly in support of the 
treaty.
  Before closing, I want to congratulate and thank my good friend from 
Massachusetts. He has spent an incredible amount of time considering 
this treaty in the Foreign Relations Committee, preparing the 
resolution of ratification and in managing this floor debate.
  He has done a fabulous job, and I really want to thank him for all 
his effort and his cooperation with me through this entire process.
  I would also like to thank the many administration officials for 
their assistance in my consideration of this treaty, all of whom have 
spent time in my office over the past year. They include:
       Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller, our lead negotiator; 
     Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
     General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; 
     Tom D'Agostino, Administrator of the National Nuclear 
     Security Administration; and Director of National 
     Intelligence Jim Clapper.
  Mrs. SHAHEEN. Madam President, today, the Senate has a historic 
opportunity to follow in a long history of strong, bipartisan support 
for reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons around the globe. We 
have a chance to strengthen American national security and restore 
American leadership on the nuclear agenda. I am hopeful that the Senate 
will choose the right path and vote in favor of ratification of the New 
START treaty.
  I want to thank Senators Kerry and Lugar for their tireless, 
impressive work on the New START treaty. Former Secretary of State Dr. 
Henry Kissinger, in explaining his support for the New START Treaty, 
told our committee earlier this year that the Senate's decision on New 
START ``will affect the prospects for peace for a decade or more. It 
is, by definition, not a bipartisan, but a nonpartisan, challenge.'' 
Senators Kerry and Lugar have done everything in their power to make 
this a nonpartisan effort, and I commend them and their staff for their 
excellent work.
  I want to also take a moment to thank the negotiators, Rose 
Gottemoeller, Ted Warner, their colleagues at the White House, and all 
the civil servants responsible for negotiating this agreement. Each of 
them has a lifetime of experience and impressive expertise on nuclear 
issues, and they all worked hard to navigate this difficult treaty 
process. America was well-served by your efforts, and we thank you for 
your leadership.
  At the very beginning of this long process, Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates asked the Senate a very important question: Is the United 
States better off with an agreement or without it? Today, the Senate 
has to answer this specific question.
  We have had a very long, thorough, and vigorous debate, and some 
Senators may not agree with everything in the treaty text before us, 
and some may have problems with the process by which we are here today, 
but let's be clear. The vote today is not about what each of us might 
have done differently. The vote today is not about abstract numbers or 
theoretical point scoring. The historic vote today is simple: Do you 
believe the United States and the world are better off with an 
agreement or without one?
  The Senate--led in a bipartisan fashion by Senators Kerry and Lugar 
has done an impressive job of meeting its constitutional 
responsibilities, and I am proud of the work we have done in giving our 
advice and consent to the New START treaty. The involvement of the 
Senate over the last year and a

[[Page 23461]]

half and the debate we have undertaken have been worthy of the world's 
greatest deliberative body.
  I have heard from many of my colleagues that the Senate should not be 
a rubber stamp in ratifying the New START Treaty--as if to suggest we 
have not taken our constitutional responsibilities seriously during 
this process. This could not be further from the truth.
  First, the Senate's influence can be seen throughout the treaty 
document. A number of Senators met with negotiators numerous times 
prior to the treaty's completion, and some even traveled to Geneva 
during the negotiations. In many respects, from the very beginning, our 
negotiators were operating within a framework and boundaries as set by 
Senators involved in the process. The treaty itself is really a product 
of collective input from both the executive and congressional branches. 
The unique insight and input this Congress has provided throughout the 
negotiation process could not be replicated in any future 
consideration.
  In addition, since we received the treaty, the Senate has done its 
job and has thoroughly considered this agreement. The Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee held 12 hearings and heard testimony from 21 expert 
witnesses. The administration has answered over 900 questions for the 
record. We have also had more floor time for amendments and 
consideration than any other treaty of its kind. Our vigorous debate on 
the floor has added nuance and depth to this already thorough body of 
work.
  It is also important to note that the Senate, in providing its advice 
and consent, actually writes and approves the resolution of 
ratification to go along with the treaty. This is not an insignificant 
document. This is the Senate's opportunity to influence the treaty's 
future interpretation and implementation and our chance to provide the 
declarations, understandings, and conditions to the treaty. The 
resolution succinctly and explicitly expresses the Senate's views on 
New START, and our resolution actually provides some strong statements 
with respect to many of the concerns raised by critics of the treaty.
  For example, on missile defense, the resolution reads very clearly 
that the United States remains committed to missile defense, and the 
New START treaty does not constrain that commitment:

       The New START Treaty and the . . . unilateral statement of 
     the Russian Federation on missile defense do not limit in any 
     way, and shall not be interpreted as limiting, activities 
     that the U.S. currently plans or that might be required . . . 
     to protect U.S. Armed Forces and U.S. allies from limited 
     ballistic missile attack.

  In addition, the DeMint amendment on missile defense in the 
resolution reads:

       The United States is and will remain free to reduce the 
     vulnerability to attack by constructing a layered missile 
     defense capable of countering missiles of all ranges The 
     United States is committed to improving U.S. strategic 
     defensive capabilities both quantitatively . . . and 
     qualitatively and such improvements are consistent with the 
     Treaty.

  On tactical nuclear weapons, the resolution reads:

       The Senate calls upon the President to pursue . . . an 
     agreement with Russia that would address the disparity 
     between tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles . . . and would 
     secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable 
     manner.

  Finally, on strategic-range, nonnuclear weapon systems:

       Nothing in the New START Treaty restricts U.S. research, 
     development, testing, and evaluation of strategic-range, non-
     nuclear weapons . . . [or] prohibits deployments of 
     strategic-range, non-nuclear weapon systems.

  The fact is that the Senate has done its constitutional duty and has 
thoroughly debated and considered this important agreement.
  Adding to our extensive internal debate, countless outside experts 
and former officials have also weighed in on this treaty. New START has 
the unanimous backing of our Nation's military and its leadership, 
including Secretary Gates, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the 
commander of America's Strategic Command, and the Director of the 
Missile Defense Agency. America's military establishment is joined by 
the support of every living Secretary of State--from Secretary Jim 
Baker to Secretary Condoleezza Rice--as well as five former Secretaries 
of Defense, nine former national security advisors, and former 
Presidents Clinton and George H.W. Bush. The overwhelming consensus 
from these foreign policy and national security heavyweights has been 
clear: New START is in America's national security interests.
  I think it is important to take a step back and remember the broader 
picture of the decision before us today. We are no longer talking about 
abstract numbers, intangible ideas or questions of process. We are 
talking about real nuclear weapons. We are talking about thousands of 
the most dangerous weapons in the history of mankind--weapons actually 
aimed directly at American cities.
  Our arsenals are composed primarily of nuclear weapons each yielding 
between 100 and 1,200 kilotons of power. To give you a sense of the 
power of these weapons, the nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima yielded 
around 13 kilotons of power. After New START, the United States and 
Russia will still be allowed an arsenal of 1,550 warheads capable of 
leveling cities more than five times the size of New Hampshire's 
largest city of Manchester.
  Now, I am under no illusions that the ratification of the New START 
treaty will somehow by itself meet the threats posed by nuclear weapons 
around the globe. President Kennedy told us that attainable peace will 
be ``based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual 
evolution in human institutions'' and ``peace must be the product of 
many nations, the sum of many acts.'' He said:

       No treaty, however much it may be to the advantage of . . . 
     all can provide absolute security . . . But it can . . . 
     offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, 
     uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.

  New START is a step away from this ``unabated, uncontrolled, 
unpredictable'' environment.
  As the first Nation to invent and then use nuclear weapons, the 
United States has spent the majority of the last half century trying to 
reduce the risk they pose. Over five decades ago, President Eisenhower 
committed the United States to meeting its special responsibilities on 
the nuclear threat. He said:

       The United States pledges before you--and therefore before 
     the world--its determination to help solve the fearful atomic 
     dilemma--to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way 
     by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be 
     dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.

  Eisenhower's early commitment and America's special responsibility 
have led to unbroken U.S. leadership in the world on the nuclear 
agenda. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--the cornerstone of global 
nonproliferation efforts--was born out of President Eisenhower's 
``Atoms for Peace'' vision. The original START treaty was a culmination 
of President Reagan's entreaty to ``trust, but verify'' Russia and its 
actions. The U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which has led 
to the deactivation of over 7,500 Russian nuclear warheads, was the 
result of two visionary and farsighted Senators named Nunn and Lugar.
  American leadership on the nuclear agenda makes the world safer. 
Period.
  As Secretaries Kissinger, Schultz, Perry, and Senator Nunn told us in 
their seminal 2007 opinion piece:

       The world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous 
     nuclear era . . . Nuclear weapons today present tremendous 
     dangers but also a historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will 
     be required to take the world to the next stage--to a solid 
     consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally 
     as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation 
     into potentially dangerous hands.

  The New START treaty should be the next step on the path of American 
leadership on the nuclear agenda. If we turn our back on this treaty at 
this time, we are turning our back on a generation of bipartisan, 
American leadership in this field, and we cede the field to a more 
dangerous and more uncertain world.

[[Page 23462]]

  The debate over New START is now over, and the only choice left 
before us is this treaty or nothing. Each of us today will decide--yes 
or no--whether we think we are better off with a treaty or without one.
  I hope we will vote on the side of the overwhelming majority of 
foreign policy and national security experts who have called on us to 
support this treaty. I hope we will vote on the side of our unanimous 
military and intelligence communities. I hope we will vote on the side 
of a legacy of American leadership on the nuclear agenda.
  I am hopeful we will follow in the footsteps of the Senate's strong 
bipartisan history and ratify the New START treaty today.
  Mr. KOHL. Madam President, I rise today to support ratification of 
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START. This treaty 
continues the bipartisan arms control framework first proposed by 
President Ronald Reagan and implemented by President George H.W. Bush 
with the START I and START II treaties. President George W. Bush 
continued this work with the Moscow Treaty. Now President Obama has 
taken another important step to address the dangers of nuclear weapons 
with the New START treaty.
  Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and reducing existing nuclear 
stockpiles is critical to our national security. New START helps 
accomplish this goal by placing responsible limits on nuclear warheads 
and delivery vehicles, while still enabling the United States to 
maintain a credible nuclear deterrent.
  New START also reestablishes regular onsite inspections of Russian 
nuclear facilities, which ended more than a year ago when the previous 
START treaty expired. The potential lack of safety, security, and 
controls of Russian nuclear weapons is a grave security risk, and there 
is no substitute for onsite inspections to address this threat.
  I carefully considered the views of our military and diplomatic 
leaders in evaluating New START, and I am impressed by the breadth of 
bipartisan support for this treaty. The Secretaries of State, Defense, 
and Energy support New START. Our senior uniformed military leaders 
support New START, including the head of the Missile Defense Agency. 
Every living former Secretary of State, Republican or Democrat, 
supports New START.
  I commend my colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 
the extensive work they have done to consider the New START treaty. 
They have produced a thorough record on the merits of this treaty, 
which enables every Senator to cast an informed vote. After reviewing 
this record, I am proud to cast my vote in favor of ratifying New 
START.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, before I begin my remarks on the New 
START treaty, I would like to point out to my colleagues that in 2002, 
I voted in favor of the Moscow Treaty. I was also one of 93 Senators 
who voted in favor of START I in 1992.
  I recognize the importance of maintaining a positive and cooperative 
relationship with Russia. The proponents of the New START treaty argue 
that this treaty is necessary to continue the goodwill between our 
countries and the much-touted ``reset'' in our relations. More 
importantly to me, however, are the merits of the treaty itself. The 
Senate should not simply ratify this treaty to appease Russia or as a 
signal of cooperation with them. The treaty should be considered based 
on its impact on our national security and the security of our allies.
  A nuclear arms control treaty can be evaluated based on the level of 
parity it brings to the two parties. In this regard, I believe this 
treaty falls short. The fact is, while this treaty places new limits on 
warheads, as well as deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles, Russia 
is already below the limit on delivery vehicles. The treaty primarily 
imposes new limits on the U.S., while requiring modest, if any, 
reductions on the Russian side. Also alarming is that this treaty is 
silent on the matter of tactical nuclear weapons. It is believed that 
Russia has a 10-to-1 advantage over the U.S. in terms of tactical 
nuclear weapons.
  The administration has argued that this treaty is necessary to 
provide strategic stability. However, if we are reducing our strategic 
weapons without regard to Russia's overwhelming advantage on tactical 
nuclear weapons, I question whether this reduction isn't weakening 
strategic stability. It should also be mentioned that some proponents 
of the New START treaty were critical of the 2002 Moscow Treaty for 
failing to reduce Russian tactical nuclear weapons. I believe our 
leverage with the Russians to begin placing meaningful limits on 
tactical nuclear weapons existed with this treaty. Now, I see no clear 
path to negotiating reductions in tactical nuclear weapons.
  Like many of my colleagues, I have serious concerns about the 
inclusion of references to and limitations on U.S. plans for missile 
defense. I don't believe there should be a connection between strategic 
nuclear weapons reductions and our plans for missile defense. I am 
equally troubled that Russia issued a unilateral statement at the 
treaty's signing stating that the treaty ``may be effective and viable 
only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative build-
up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States of 
America.''
  It is positive that the Resolution of Ratification makes a strong 
statement that the treaty does not limit the deployment of U.S. missile 
defense systems, other than those contained in article V. It also says 
that the Russian statement on missile defense does not impose a legal 
obligation on the United States. While I would have preferred that this 
treaty not contain any language on missile defense, I appreciate the 
work of the Foreign Relations chairman and ranking member to include 
this language in the ratification resolution. But the fact remains, 
this language is simply our opinion and is nonbinding.
  This treaty reverses the gains made in the Moscow Treaty which de-
linked offensive and defensive capabilities. Although a modified 
amendment on missile defense to the resolution of ratification was 
agreed to today, I am disappointed that the Senate could not agree to 
the amendment offered by Senator McCain which would have stricken the 
language in the treaty's preamble that arguably gives Russia a say on 
our future missile defense plans.
  Finally, I also share the serious concerns related to the issue of 
verification. It has been the subject of much debate, and deservedly 
so. I agree with the sentiment that as our deployed strategic nuclear 
weapons are reduced, it becomes more and more critical that the 
remaining weapons can be relied upon. As the number of weapons is 
reduced, it becomes more important that we know that the Russians are 
abiding by the limits of the treaty.
  After reviewing the classified material presented by Senator Bond, 
ranking member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I have serious 
reservations about the new verification regime contained in the treaty. 
Although former Secretary of State James Baker supports ratification of 
the treaty, he stated that the verification mechanism in the New START 
treaty ``does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that 
verified the numerous and diverse treaty obligations and prohibitions 
under START I.''
  I do regret that without a treaty in place that there is no 
verification regime, and no U.S. inspectors monitoring Russia's nuclear 
arms activities. It's important to point out, however, that the Obama 
administration had the ability to extend the verification regime for 5 
years, as provided for in START I. But the Obama administration failed 
to act. The administration also insisted there would be a ``bridging 
agreement'' to continue verification until the entry into force of a 
successor agreement. This agreement was never completed either.
  I am deeply disappointed that in these areas of concern, the Senate 
is simply being asked to be a ``rubberstamp'' rather than fulfill our 
constitutional obligation to provide our advice on these important 
matters. Had the advice of the Senate on these important issues been 
incorporated

[[Page 23463]]

into the treaty, I believe it would have gained overwhelming bipartisan 
support. Without addressing these areas in a meaningful way, I am 
reluctantly unable to support it.
  Mr. COONS. Madam President, I am pleased to join my colleagues in 
voicing my strong and unequivocal support for New START. I want to 
thank Senators Kerry and Lugar for their leadership on this issue, and 
join them in urging the Senate to support ratification. New START will 
make America stronger and more secure by building on 30 years of U.S. 
global leadership on nuclear arms control and reduction. This is why it 
has been endorsed by national security leaders on both sides of the 
aisle, including every living Republican Secretary of State, 5 former 
Secretaries of Defense, 7 former commanders of the U.S. Strategic 
Command, the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 former Presidents, and all 
27 of our NATO allies.
  We simply cannot afford to postpone the vote until the 112th Congress 
and delay ratification any further. Military planners have confirmed 
that ratification is essential to U.S. security in an increasingly 
dangerous environment, and 73 percent of Americans support ratification 
according to one recent poll.
  As the newest member of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services 
Committees, I did not have the luxury of receiving the wealth of 
information and perspective offered in the 18 public hearings and 
Senate deliberations on this issue. I have, however, received enough 
information from classified briefings to know this is a pressing 
national security matter of the highest order. As we approach a vote, I 
plan on following the strong advice of our military and national 
security leadership, as well as the will of the American people, in 
supporting New START.
  New START will enhance U.S. intelligence gathering and restore 
inspections needed to monitor the Russian nuclear force. For more than 
a year, we have been deprived of such inspections due the expiration of 
the original treaty. While opponents of New START have highlighted the 
reduction in the total number of inspections, those which remain 
comprise the most robust strategic arms inspections regime in history. 
By increasing transparency between the United States and Russia, New 
START will enhance our mutual nuclear deterrent. This is just one 
example of why ratification is in America's best security interest.
  In addition to reducing the total number of both American and Russian 
deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 1550, New START will limit the 
number of deployed delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads to 700. As we 
consider investing more than $85 billion over the next decade into 
modernizing our current nuclear arsenal, we must also consider the 
practical benefit of maintaining a smaller number of strategic nuclear 
weapons. These limits have been endorsed by our military planners 
because they are commensurate with our current and future defense 
needs. Moreover, reducing the number of deployed strategic warheads and 
delivery vehicles better positions us to invest the savings in nuclear 
modernization.
  The United States and Russia share common threats and common 
interests, and, in the words of Vice President Biden, New START is a 
``cornerstone of our efforts to reset relations with Russia.'' Over the 
past 2 years, cooperation between the United States and Russia has 
grown in areas such as supporting sanctions to thwart Iran's nuclear 
development and transferring essential supplies into Afghanistan. At 
this juncture, the Senate's failure to ratify New START could have far-
reaching implications on such progress, including jeopardizing future 
cooperation in these critical areas.
  As some of my colleagues propose altering the treaty, I want to voice 
my strong opposition to all amendments, as they would effectively kill 
the agreement by requiring renegotiation with Russia. In the future, we 
can address some of the issues raised during the amendment process--
including Russia's extensive stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons--but 
these matters exceed the breadth of the treaty before us today. I also 
believe that we can achieve a missile defense cooperation agreement 
with Russia, but reaching an understanding on missile defense will be 
easier once we have established an agreed-upon limit to the number of 
deployed strategic nuclear weapons.
  America must maintain its global leadership on nuclear arms control 
and nonproliferation, and it is our obligation as Senators to act now. 
It is time to look beyond politics and vote on principle, and I urge 
all Senators to join me in supporting ratification of New START because 
it is a domestic and global security imperative.
  Ms. SNOWE. Madam President, I rise today to express my support for 
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as New START, which was 
signed by the United States and Russia on April 8 and transmitted for 
the advice and consent of the Senate on May 13. Since then, Chairman 
Kerry, with the unwavering support of Ranking Member Lugar, has 
navigated the treaty through 18 hearings before the Senate Foreign 
Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence Committees--and I commend 
the chairman for his determination to see this paramount accomplishment 
through to the finish.
  Without equivocation, since his election to the U.S. Senate in 1976, 
Ranking Member Lugar has been an overriding force of nature in reducing 
the threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons--and his work 
with then-Senate Armed Services Chairman Sam Nunn to lay the groundwork 
for the deactivation of more than 7,500 of these dangerous weapons in 
the former Soviet Union is legendary. Throughout the negotiations and 
consideration of New START, Ranking Member Lugar has once again 
demonstrated his incredible depth of knowledge and expertise on these 
issues, which has been of the utmost benefit to the Senate.
  President George H.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev signed 
the original START Treaty on July 31, 1991--5 months before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The agreement represented the culmination 
of more than 20 years of bilateral arms control agreements between our 
two nations.
  Much has changed over what is almost two decades since the original 
START agreement was signed in Moscow. The world has witnessed the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the rise of terrorist organizations 
with nuclear weapons ambitions, and growing threats from hostile 
regimes in such locations as Tehran and Pyongyang. As a result, when 
START expired 1 year ago this month, we found ourselves at a 
crossroads--without the ability to inspect Russian missile silos, 
which, frankly, is unfortunate given that last year Senator Lugar 
suggested that the administration obtain a short-term ``bridging 
agreement'' with the Russians to ensure there was not a verification 
gap between the expiration of START and approval of New START.
  Yet despite this missed opportunity to secure a short-term bridging 
agreement, I believe the debate we have had in this body over the last 
12 months has made clear that it is in our vital national interests to, 
first and foremost, maintain strategic stability between the United 
States and Russia-- the two countries that hold more than 90 percent of 
the world's nuclear weapons--and furthermore to upgrade the original 
START agreement to reflect the new realities of the post-Cold War era.
  On the first point, I have supported New START's goal of reinstating 
a more stable, transparent, and legally binding mechanism based on 
proven methods for monitoring compliance with treaty provisions and 
deterring potential violations. For example, New START requires 
essential data exchanges detailing the numbers, types, and locations of 
affected weapons, mandates up to 18 short-notice on-site inspections 
each year to try and confirm information shared during such exchanges, 
and it calls for the parties to notify each other and to update the 
database whenever they move such forces between facilities.
  Since the early years of nuclear weapons agreements between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, beginning with Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks, known as SALT, in May

[[Page 23464]]

1972; to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, or INF Treaty, in 
December 1987 and the original START agreement in July 1991; our 
nations have gained from the structure and degree of transparency that 
these agreements provide. As former National Security Advisor and 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said in May, New START is ``an 
evolution of treaties that have been negotiated in previous 
administrations of both parties'' and ``its principal provisions are an 
elaboration'' of existing agreements. Secretary Kissinger went on to 
note that the continued absence of this vital agreement would 
undoubtedly ``create an element of uncertainty in the calculations of 
both adversaries and allies'' and have an ``unsettling impact on the 
international environment.''
  In other words, without the comprehensive and overlapping system of 
inspections, notifications, and data exchanges that both the original 
START and New START provide, our strategic commanders and civilian 
leaders may be forced to position their assets in a way that 
anticipates the worst case scenario, which as we witnessed during many 
overwrought days of the Cold War is an incredibly precarious--and often 
more costly--approach in terms of the prioritization of our 
intelligence and defense resources. Therefore, I believe firmly that, 
when combined with our Nation's overhead intelligence assets, remote 
sensing equipment, and other classified methods, the New START 
agreement will provide our government better insight into the accuracy 
of Russia's declarations on the numbers and types of deployed and 
nondeployed strategic offensive arms subject to the treaty, thereby 
engendering greater confidence in our comprehension of the state of 
affairs, enhancing global stability and our security here at home.
  Still, in addition to maintaining the framework of our nuclear arms 
reduction program with Russia, it is crucial that this treaty be 
thoroughly vetted to reflect the reality of the threats we face in the 
21st century. Article II, section 2 of the Constitution states that the 
President ``shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur''--and as such we must make absolutely certain that questions 
regarding our ability to verify Russian compliance with New START's 
limits, to develop and deploy effective missile defenses, and to 
modernize our nuclear weapons complex, have been satisfactorily 
resolved. Senator Kyl, in particular, has brought great value to this 
process--and I extol all of my colleagues for their dedication to 
meeting our constitutional responsibilities.
  Among the most significant questions that have been raised are those 
that deal with our ability to monitor Russian compliance with the 
treaty's limits. As part of its overlapping monitoring and verification 
regimes, New START permits up to 18 short-notice on-site inspections at 
ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases each year. U.S. inspectors 
will use these inspections to help verify data on the number of 
warheads located on deployed ICBMs and deployed submarine launched 
ballistic missiles and the number of armaments located on deployed 
heavy bombers.
  Over the course of this debate, some of my colleagues have questioned 
the utility and effectiveness of New START's on-site inspections. As a 
member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I have worked 
with my colleagues to scrutinize this proposed agreement and have 
closely reviewed the National Intelligence Estimate pertaining to this 
subject as well as a number of other classified reports. It is 
important to understand that we do not depend only on the treaty's 
monitoring and verification provisions to ensure the Russians are 
complying with the warhead limit and other clauses. To the contrary, 
the treaty is but one critical instrument which, as with the 1991 START 
agreement, is intended to augment information collected through our 
overhead assets, and via other technical tools that leverage the larger 
U.S. Intelligence system--known as our National Technical Means.
  Since the treaty was transmitted to the Senate in May, the 
Intelligence Committee has conducted a comprehensive review, and my 
staff and I have questioned key officials, including the Director of 
National Intelligence Jim Clapper, former Secretary of Defense Bill 
Cohen, and Secretary Gates' Representative to Post-START Negotiations 
Dr. Ted Warner. Additionally, my staff has held classified discussions 
with former START inspection team members and delegates to the START 
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
  Consequently, I would underscore two significant areas of advancement 
where New START's verification and monitoring provisions will be 
distinctly different from its predecessor. First, under the original 
START agreement, the treaty database listed the number of warheads 
attributed to a type of ballistic missile, and each missile of that 
type counted as the same number of warheads. Notably, New START 
advances this standard by enabling our inspectors to in fact count the 
actual number of reentry vehicles deployed on the missile to confirm 
that it equals the number designated by the Russians for that 
particular weapon.
  Secondly, New START includes the innovation that unique identifiers--
which mean numeric codes--be affixed to all Russian missiles and 
nuclear-capable heavy bombers. Under the original START agreement, 
unique identifiers were applied only to Russian road-mobile missiles. 
As Ranking Member Lugar has noted, while this does not insure a 
``foolproof'' verification system, it will provide enhanced confidence 
and transparency under the Treaty structure.
  Taken as a whole, I believe the treaty's notification requirements, 
the use of unique identifiers on each ICBM, submarine launched 
ballistic missile, and heavy bomber, and the 18 annual short-notice on-
site inspections, combined with our National Technical Means, will 
further our critical national security objectives by helping us observe 
and evaluate Russian activities--an objective that is fundamental to 
our strategic stability.
  Additionally, when it comes to our ballistic missile defense 
capabilities, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote on 
December 7 that ``The Russians need to understand that the U.S. will 
use the full-range of American technology and talent to improve our 
ability to intercept and destroy the ballistic missiles of hostile 
countries.'' In an effort to make certain that our intentions are 
unambiguous, the U.S. issued a unilateral statement at the signing of 
New START, which affirms that our government ``intends to continue 
improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend 
itself against limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach 
to strengthening stability in key regions.''
  Furthermore, Ranking Member Lugar also worked to ensure that the 
Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification that was approved by 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 16 addresses this 
question by declaring that ``it is the policy of the United States to 
deploy as soon as technically possible an effective National Missile 
Defense system'' and that nothing in the Treaty limits ``further 
planned enhancements'' to missile defense programs. President Obama, 
Secretary Clinton, and Secretary Gates have reaffirmed this commitment 
and the Administration's Ballistic Missile Defense Review, released in 
February, outlines a detailed plan to continue to expand international 
missile defense efforts to defend the United States, our deployed 
forces, and our allies and partners around the world.
  It is also important for the record to reflect that Russia issued a 
similar statement when the original START was signed in 1991, saying 
that the treaty would be viable only under conditions of compliance 
with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which at the time restricted 
ballistic missile defenses. History clearly shows that following 
ratification of START the United States did not restrain its missile 
defense programs or reduce its expenditures on ballistic missile 
defenses

[[Page 23465]]

in an effort to ensure that Russia remained committed to the original 
START Treaty. To the contrary, U.S. spending on ballistic missile 
defense programs increased dramatically following the signing of the 
original START agreement--from less than $4 billion for Department of 
Defense-wide ballistic missile defense funding support in 1991 to 
nearly $10 billion this year. Moreover, in spite of this threat in 
1991, Russia remained a party to START and continued to negotiate 
further reductions on strategic offensive weapons after the U.S. 
withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002.
  Still, despite this precedent and Ranking Member Lugar's considerable 
efforts to make certain that the resolution addresses the issue of 
missile defense, questions have been raised about potential 
restrictions on our ability to deploy effective missile defenses, and 
some of my colleagues have rightly criticized the preamble's 
recognition of an ``interrelationship between strategic offensive arms 
and strategic defensive arms.'' It has been argued--and I agree--that 
this language, when combined with Russia's unilateral statement 
asserting its concern about a United States ``build-up'' in missile 
defense system capabilities, needlessly gives Russia a leverage point 
with which to attempt to compel our government to pull back from our 
missile defense objectives by threatening to withdraw from the Treaty 
if we seek to increase our capabilities. As a result, I supported 
Senator McCain's effort to amend the Treaty to strike any reference to 
the ``interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic 
defensive arms.''
  Finally, when it comes to the modernization of our nuclear forces, 
meaningful concerns have been raised about the deplorable state of our 
deteriorating Manhattan Project-era nuclear laboratories and weapons 
stockpiles. Senators Kyl and Corker should be commended for their 
diligence in shedding light on the undeniable truth that these 
facilities are sorely out-dated, and continue to erode as safety and 
security costs have grown exponentially, maintenance is deferred, and 
layoffs and hiring freezes deprive our government of highly skilled 
scientists and technicians needed to maintain our nuclear deterrent.
  Credible modernization plans and long-term funding for the U.S. 
nuclear weapons stockpile and the infrastructure that supports it are 
central to the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent, and we have 
posed serious questions about the veracity of the administration's 
modernization report that was submitted to Congress with the New START 
agreement on May 13th, pursuant to section 1251 of the fiscal year 2010 
Defense Authorization Act. Specifically, we have sought greater detail 
and assurances regarding the administration's plans to retool and 
sustain our national weapons labs--including construction of the 
vitally important plutonium processing facility, known as the Chemistry 
and Metallurgy Research Replacement nuclear facility, in Los Alamos, 
NM, and the Uranium Processing Facility at Oak Ridge, TN. These two 
projects are essential for meeting our life extension program 
requirements for existing warheads and certifying the safety and 
readiness of the current stockpile.
  On November 17, due in large part to the unyielding persistence of 
Senators Kyl and Corker, the administration released an updated 1251 
modernization report that directly answered many of our concerns and 
elaborated on our modernization objectives by providing more detailed 
10-year timelines and specific budget projections to sustain funding 
for stockpile surveillance at over $200 million over the next 10 years, 
and cost estimates for the plutonium and uranium processing facilities 
at upwards of $5.8 billion and $6.5 billion respectively. In total, the 
administration has now committed more than $85 billion to modernize our 
nuclear weapons complex over the next 10 years--$15 billion more than 
initially proposed by the administration--and I am confident this 
undertaking will ensure continued support for these indispensable 
activities.
  It is now the responsibility of President Obama and his 
administration to, in the months ahead, communicate even more specific 
details regarding any lingering concerns about our Nation's long-term 
modernization programs. The Resolution of Advice and Consent, which is 
currently before the Senate, includes strong language requiring direct 
notification to Congress if at any moment more resources are required--
or if appropriations are enacted that fail to meet our modernization 
needs--and we as a body must hold this government true to these 
commitments.
  In summary, the original START agreement was signed over 19 years 
ago, at a time when we still lived in a decidedly bipolar, and some 
might argue less complicated world. But with the fall of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War, we are now facing new threats from 
volatile governments intent on the proliferation of dangerous weapons, 
and decentralized terrorist groups focused on launching attacks more 
devastating even than 9/11.
  Confronted with these daunting challenges, America must be prepared 
to defend our homeland, our forces in theatre, and our allies--and I 
believe this treaty allows future administrations to meet this 
responsibility, to maintain a safe and effective deterrent, and at the 
same time to continue to reduce the number of deployed and ready to 
launch long-range nuclear weapons. And as former Secretary of State 
James Baker noted in May, a more stable and cooperative relationship 
between Washington and Moscow ``will be vital if the two countries are 
to cooperate in order to stem nuclear proliferation in countries like 
Iran and North Korea.'' Simply put, the ratification of New START, and 
the cooperation and transparency it requires, has the potential to set 
the stage for expanded NATO and Russian collaboration when it comes to 
confronting terrorists and other dangerous proliferators--so together 
we may face those who threaten stability in the post-Cold War world.
  Mr. President, the New START treaty has the unanimous support of our 
Nation's military and diplomatic leadership, Director of National 
Intelligence Jim Clapper, and the endorsement of President George H.W. 
Bush and prominent former national security officials such as Secretary 
of Defense Bill Cohen, and every living Secretary of State--including 
Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. As a member of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, I am convinced that this agreement, when 
combined with our intelligence assets, will enhance global stability, 
and most importantly, our national security. I urge my colleagues to 
join me in supporting the Resolution of Advice and Consent to 
Ratification.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, we cannot end this historic session of 
Congress without taking one more important step to protect the national 
security of the United States. It is time for the Senate to ratify the 
New START treaty.
  This treaty will secure nuclear stockpiles. It will take nearly 1,500 
American and Russian nuclear weapons out of commission. These are 
weapons that, as we speak, are trained on cities like Washington and 
Moscow, St. Louis and St. Petersburg.
  More than a year has passed since American inspectors were on the 
ground monitoring the Russian nuclear weapons arsenal. The sooner we 
ratify this treaty, the sooner we can re-open the window into exactly 
what the Russians are, or are not, doing.
  START will also preserve a strong American nuclear arsenal. Our 
military leaders have analyzed the treaty and determined the number of 
nuclear weapons we need to retain in order to keep us safe here at 
home. The director of the Missile Defense Agency has said the treaty 
will not restrain or limit our missile-defense capacity.
  America and Russia control more than 90 percent of the world's 
nuclear weapons. The transparency this treaty will provide is critical 
not just to our two countries but the entire planet.
  By ratifying the START treaty, we will also increase our ability to 
work with other countries to reduce nuclear weapons around the world, 
and to make sure that those weapons are kept safe and secure. We need 
to work together with Russia to stop the most

[[Page 23466]]

dangerous nuclear threats, including those from Iran and North Korea.
  One of the greatest and gravest threats we face is the specter of a 
terrorist getting his hands on a nuclear weapon. We have faced nuclear 
threats before--but such a threat from a superpower is much different 
than one from a terrorist.
  A nuclear-armed terrorist would not be constrained by doctrines of 
deterrence or mutually assured destruction. Instead, rogue groups could 
attack and destroy one of our cities--and millions of our people--
without warning. By ratifying the New START treaty, we can help make 
sure this kind of unprecedented tragedy never happens
  We have had a positive, bipartisan process up to this point. That 
should continue today.
  The Senate Foreign Relations Committee overwhelmingly approved the 
treaty with a bipartisan vote of 14-4.
  Our Nation's military leadership unanimously supports it. Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM 
Michael Mullen testified before the Senate and urged us to ratify it.
  Secretaries of State from the last five Republican Presidents support 
the treaty because they know--in their words--``The world is safer 
today because of the decades-long effort to reduce its supply of 
nuclear weapons.''
  And an all-star team of Republican and Democratic national security 
leaders support the treaty, including former President George H.W. 
Bush, Colin Powell, Madeleine Albright, Brent Scowcroft, James 
Schlesinger, Stephen Hadley, Senator Sam Nunn, and Senator John Warner.
  Republicans have been included and instrumental from the beginning. 
At Senator Kerry's urging, the resolution was crafted by Senator Lugar 
to reflect the views of our Republican colleagues. The Foreign 
Relations Committee then adopted additional Republican amendments in 
its mark-up. And we have adopted four additional amendments on the 
floor.
  Senator Kyl raised legitimate concerns about the state of our nuclear 
weapons complex, and the White House responded with an $85 billion 
commitment to upgrade it over the next 10 years.
  We have spent 8 days debating this treaty on the floor--that is 
longer than we spent on the original START--in a bipartisan and 
productive debate. I want to thank Chairman Kerry and Senator Lugar for 
their tireless leadership on this treaty and thank Senators on both 
side of the aisle who have worked hard to get this treaty completed.
  For many Nevadans, the sights and sounds of a nuclear attack are 
familiar. Deep in our desert sits the Nevada National Security Site, 
which until this summer was called the Nevada Test Site.
  Today the site is the center of our fight against terrorism and 
nuclear smuggling. It is on the front lines of our intelligence, arms 
control and nonproliferation efforts.
  But the site was once a critical battlefield of the Cold War, and for 
decades it served as our Nation's nuclear proving ground. A lot of 
Nevadans grew up with mushroom clouds in our backyard. We want to make 
sure the tests that took place in the Nevada desert are the closest we 
come to a nuclear explosion.
  Today we can do that. We can continue our institution's long history 
of bipartisan support for arms control. We can take 1,500 nuclear 
weapons off their launch pads. And we can make the future far safer for 
America and the world.
  This is not just a narrow Senate debate. It isn't just a local issue. 
And it isn't something that can wait another day. The whole world is 
watching and waiting for us to act.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, let me thank my colleagues for working hard 
to get this treaty passed and for being able to achieve that as well, 
people within the administration. I appreciate the cooperation some of 
us have had with the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the 
ranking member and others who have worked hard to try to complete, in a 
very short period of time, what probably should have taken a lot longer 
period of time. But I appreciate their efforts to work with us in that 
regard.
  I would like to, briefly, speak to three things: the process, the 
problems, and some positive results of the consideration of this 
treaty.
  For those who are watching, I can tell you right now there is only 
one thing on the mind of everybody in this Chamber: How quickly are we 
going to get out of here. One colleague said: I have a plane to catch. 
How long are you going to talk? Will I be able to catch it?
  That is understandable because every one of us wants to get home to 
our families. I know there were some snide comments expressed about my 
concern a week or so ago about the fact we were going to be into 
Christmas week. But now the reality is everybody wants to get out of 
here immediately so cut short your comments, put them in the Record, 
and so on.
  When I predicted a couple weeks ago that I didn't think we had time 
to do everything the majority leader wanted to do and do it well, I had 
no idea how many things would be added to the agenda and how difficult 
that would be. Unfortunately, I think my prediction turned out to be 
correct.
  I remember just 1 year ago when we were on the Senate floor doing the 
health care bill, one of the primary criticisms of it was the way it 
was done. I must tell you, with regard to the process of this bill, I 
am concerned about the precedent we are setting in the Senate, taking a 
lameduck session to jam so many things through, frequently without an 
opportunity to provide amendments or, when there are amendments, to 
simply have them all shot down without, I believe, adequate 
consideration.
  We have done the tax legislation, the continuing resolution to fund 
the Government, the DOD authorization bill, the DREAM Act, don't ask, 
don't tell, the 9/11 bill is on the way, some judges, we passed a food 
safety bill almost in the middle of the night by unanimous consent 
without Members being adequately notified, and now the START treaty. In 
many of those situations, there was not adequate time--as I said, no 
amendments even allowed.
  When cloture was filed, I expressed concern we had only dealt with, I 
believe at that time, four amendments to the treaty itself. But we were 
told: Don't worry. We will still give you consent to do resolution-of-
ratification amendments.
  Unfortunately, not all of them were permitted by the majority and, in 
order to get as many as possible together, we had to consolidate 70 or 
so amendments down to a very few.
  The other side announced at the beginning of the debate there would 
be no amendments on the treaty itself or the preamble. It turned out 
the amendments that were offered were all defeated, but we did have 
some amendments on the resolution of ratification. They, too, would 
have all been defeated or were defeated, except for the fact that we 
were willing to water them down and, therefore, had them accepted by 
the majority.
  Now we have very little time to make closing statements because we 
are going to adjourn sine die, meaning this is the end of the Congress. 
We will not have time to actually prepare written statements for the 
Record. This is a very brief statement to discuss primarily some 
positive things because there is not time to lay out all the problems 
that I think those of us who oppose the treaty still believe are 
present in the treaty.
  I agree with the comments the newest Member of the Senate, Mark Kirk, 
made just a moment ago. He is very well schooled in these issues, 
though a new Member of the Senate. I associate myself with a lot of the 
remarks he made. I think later, when we come back next year, we can 
chronicle the things that were said in the debates and have a pretty 
good record of how it all ended. But I fear more for the process 
because of the precedent set that serious matters, such as the ones we 
have debated and dealt with, including the treaty, were done in, to 
some extent, a slipshod way, to some extent in

[[Page 23467]]

 which there was not adequate time to do what the Senate should have 
done.
  I also fear for the precedent set with respect to treaty 
ratification. Essentially, on many of the issues that were raised--and 
I appreciate, I must say, colleagues have been kind to me in their 
compliments. I appreciate that very much. They were complimentary to me 
and my colleagues in saying we were raising important issues that 
needed to be vetted, but in each case this was not the time to do it, 
this was not the place to do it because if we dare change one comma in 
this treaty, it would require that it be renegotiated. There were some 
unspecified horrible results of the fact that we would have to 
renegotiate the treaty because the Russians wouldn't like what we did.
  The precedent we are establishing is that the Senate is a 
rubberstamp. Whatever a President negotiates with the Russians or 
somebody else, we dare not change because otherwise it will have to be 
renegotiated, to some great detriment to humanity, and I don't think 
that is appropriate. I think our Founders, when they wrote into the 
Constitution an equal role for the Senate and the President, they meant 
it. That role is advice and consent. We gave some advice in the last 
Defense authorization bill. We said, for example, don't negotiate 
conventional Prompt Global Strike limitations and don't allow 
limitations on missile defense. Both those things were done against our 
advice. But we are being asked to consent notwithstanding.
  It seems to me, if the Senate is to have a role in the future on 
these kinds of treaties, we better come to an understanding if we are 
going to be able to make some changes. I don't think anybody ever said 
the administration ever got anything 100 percent right. We ought to be 
able to make some changes or else we might as well avoid the process 
altogether because it is just a big waste of time. Eleven years ago 
when we considered the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and rejected that 
treaty, a lot of commentators said the Senate had finally put its mark 
on the process by conclusively demonstrating it would not be a 
rubberstamp and that would be a new era for the administration in the 
future, having to pay some attention to what the Senate said. I hope 
this new START treaty is an aberration, rather than the beginning of a 
new precedent.
  I will just tell you this. If the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is 
brought forward again, there will be a different process. Rather than 
the situation which obtained here, in which I did not urge a single 
colleague to oppose this treaty until the time that cloture was filed 
on it, I will urge every one of my colleagues to oppose reconsideration 
of the CTB.
  So the process is not good. I have to hope that the result of the way 
we handled it this year will not establish a new precedent. The 
problems of the treaty I wish to discuss in detail, but because my 
colleagues want to catch airplanes, I will not.
  Let me focus then on the third and last element here, which is, some 
new things we learned from this treaty, and, frankly, some achievements 
that were obtained as a result of a lot of attention to it--being paid 
to it by our colleagues, a lot of great debate, particularly with 
respect to missile defense, modernization, and future arms control 
agenda.
  One of the things I think we have made some progress on is that this 
may be the last arms control agreement for a while. Maybe we can get 
back to focusing on the real issues, issues of proliferation, of 
terrorism dealing with threats from countries such as North Korea and 
Iran.
  It is fine to have yet another Cold War era type agreement with 
Russia. But the real issue is not between Russia and the United States, 
it is dealing with these other threats. So I suggest we move away from 
the distraction of agreements such as this, and on to what is a more 
contemporary challenge. I think as a result of the debate, that will be 
possible to do.
  I would quote one of our colleagues, Condoleezza Rice, who served 
with great distinction as Secretary of State, and before that as 
National Security Adviser, wrote recently in the Wall Street Journal 
and she said:

       After this treaty, our focus must be on stopping dangerous 
     proliferators, not on further reductions of the U.S. and 
     Russian strategic arsenals, which are really no threats to 
     each other or to international stability.

  Presidential Adviser Gary Samore agreed, saying:

       If Iran succeeds in developing a nuclear capability, that 
     would do more damage to the effort of the President to 
     achieve a nuclear free world than anything.

  That is the real test of where we are headed. So I would hope the 
focus in the future will be on the illicit programs of Iran, of Korea, 
countries such as Syria, and potentially focusing on some of the 
supporters of these countries such as the country of China. These are 
the real challenges. I believe there would be bipartisan support in 
this body to address those challenges next.
  But, secondly, I think as a result of focusing on our nuclear 
arsenal, which we had to do by looking at this treaty, we have also 
learned that we have a very big challenge in this country. And, 
fortunately and parallel with the treaty, we worked on this challenge, 
the issue of how we can modernize our nuclear facilities and nuclear 
force and the delivery vehicles of the triad that would deliver those 
vehicles.
  I think we have all agreed we made significant improvement in that 
regard. The administration, I believe, has made a significant 
commitment to the modernization of our nuclear facilities. And the 
Senate, in various ways in dealing with this treaty, has done likewise, 
as well as through an exchange of letters that have been entered into 
by members of the Appropriations Committee, and we hope to work with 
our colleagues in the House of Representatives with whom we have not 
had enough contact on this issue. But hopefully, as a result of 
everything we have done, we will have an opportunity to fund the 
modernization, as it becomes clear more precisely what has to be done, 
to ensure that all of that is accomplished within the appropriate 
timeframe.
  When we started out, we had a pretty woeful amount of money dedicated 
to the modernization of our nuclear facilities. Now we have a request 
from the administration of a total of about $85 billion over a decade 
to operate our facilities. That includes about $15 billion in new 
modernization spending.
  With the 1251 report coming from the administration each year, we 
anticipate there will be further updates which will demonstrate 
additional progress we can make in the modernization. In addition, I 
mentioned the letter from the four key members of the Appropriations 
Committee in this body. We hope to work with Members in the House of 
Representatives likewise.
  Finally on this matter, one of the last amendments that was adopted 
is a certification requirement, which is a change to the resolution of 
ratification that, to the extent possible, the administration will 
accelerate the planning and design of the two major facilities here 
and, where appropriate, request multiyear funding, of which my two 
colleagues from Tennessee who are, as usual, seated right here 
together, made a very strong point--that we could not only save a lot 
of money every year but also accelerate the construction of these 
facilities so we could complete the life extension programs for our 
nuclear weapons that are so critical.
  A third thing I think we did, which is a very positive result, is to 
focus a little bit also on the other aspect of modernization; that is 
to say, the triad, our nuclear triad of bombers, submarines, and ICBMs.
  The Secretary of Defense had made a decision at the outset of the 
Obama administration that we would cancel the decision on the next 
generation of bomber. It was very unclear whether it was the intention 
of our government to have a nuclear-capable bomber part of the nuclear 
triad.
  Quoting General Chilton, who is the general responsible at Strategic 
Command on this, ``We need service programs that sustain the long-term 
viability of our land-based, airborne, and sea-based delivery 
platforms.''

[[Page 23468]]

  One of the amendments that was adopted, amendment No. 4864, does 
require the President to certify that he intends to modernize or 
replace the triad, a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise missile, 
nuclear capable, an ICBM, and an SSBN and SLBM--in other words, the 
submarine leg, which I believe the administration has already begun to 
move forward on.
  Also it would maintain the rocket motor industrial base necessary to 
support continued production of ballistic missiles. This is very 
important, because even if you modernize the warheads, if you do not 
have modern delivery vehicles to deliver them, obviously you do not 
have a capable deterrent. And, of course, the Russians, who have the 
most capable system other than ours, are modernizing their delivery 
vehicles, especially their ICBMs and, as a result, I think we need to 
do that as well.
  I am very pleased we have been able to resolve this question about a 
nuclear-capable triad. I look forward to clear and unambiguous 
statements from the administration in the future about this, and 
eventually getting a replacement for all three legs of the triad that 
need to be modernized.
  Fourth, there was a lot of discussion here about missile defense. I 
think without the treaty having come up, we probably would not have 
spent the time and raised the issues with regard to missile defense 
that were raised. We had a disagreement here about whether--or the 
extent to which the preamble to the treaty and article V of the treaty 
and the signing statements created a problem with respect to further 
development of our missile defenses.
  But through this debate, I believe, through commitments of the 
President in a letter that he wrote, through an amendment to the 
resolution of ratification and a lot of statements for the record 
during this debate, we are much further down the road in predicting 
that we will be able to deploy the kind of missile defense that is 
necessary to protect not just our allies in Europe, for example, but 
also the continental United States and the American people.
  To conclude this point, any attempt by the Russian Federation now to 
reestablish a link between missile defense and strategic arms control 
will not succeed; that any argument that there is a legal right to 
withdraw from the treaty if we proceed with our deployment plans, as 
they will be communicated to the Russians, will not stand. So our 
friends in Russia do need to understand what we have done here. And we 
are making clear, as President Reagan once did, that U.S. missile 
defenses are simply not open to a discussion. They will not be part of 
future negotiations as well.
  Finally, with regard to the Conventional Prompt Global Strike, I 
think we made some progress there. Very few people had ever heard the 
phrase, knew what it was. The Senate did give its advice in last year's 
Defense bill not to limit it. But, nevertheless, it was limited in the 
treaty. I think our debate about it here has helped to educate Members 
as to the need for this, something both the administration and many of 
us here in the Senate support. It is simply the capability to deliver 
not a nuclear warhead but a conventional warhead by an ICBM at a very 
long distance in a very relatively short period of time, to meet some 
of the new threats we are going to be facing in the future.
  Unfortunately, Prompt Global Strike is limited in the treaty. 
Notwithstanding that unfortunate linkage, as I said, I think we have 
had an opportunity to obtain a more secure commitment from the 
administration on the deployment of the Global Strike capability, 
because the resolution of ratification now calls for a detailed report 
on our CPGS objectives prior to entry into the force of the treaty.
  It will require the administration to consider treaty limitations, 
methods of distinguishing nuclear, nonnuclear systems, which are 
possible and should relieve any concern that the Russians have about 
the potential for a Prompt Global Strike weapon being confused with a 
nuclear weapon.
  Apart from all of the things I just talked about there are other 
things in the resolution of ratification that will add some strength to 
the position that those of us who oppose the treaty have taken, 
including working through the Bilateral Consultative Commission, not 
being undercut by that commission, requiring an annual report 
certifying Russian compliance with the terms of the New START treaty, 
things of that sort.
  I conclude that one of the things we will have to do proactively from 
here on out, in order to achieve some of the objectives that we have 
talked about here, is to work with our House colleagues who have not 
been a part of this process, to share with them the reasons we have 
concluded these things are important, to work together, the 
administration, my colleagues on the Democratic side and our side, to 
convince them each year of the necessary appropriations that will be 
required, among other things, for modernization of both the triad and--
I know my colleagues are anxious to leave. As a result, I will cut my 
comments short to make this point.
  I again close, as I opened, by thanking colleagues for working under 
what are, frankly, very difficult circumstances, to try to compress 
everything into a very short period of time, to be on a START treaty at 
the same time we are parachuting in all manner of other issues and 
trying to get those resolved. This has not been easy.
  For those colleagues who were patient and expressed desire to do 
things on the floor that we did not have time for, I appreciate their 
indulgences and appreciate the courtesies that everyone has extended. 
This has been very contentious, and yet the disagreements between us 
have never risen to any level beyond that which is totally appropriate 
for a serious debate in the Senate, proving again that while we can 
disagree or will disagree, we can certainly do so agreeably. I thank my 
colleagues for their willingness to do that.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I thank the Senator. I know he has 
curtailed his remarks. I have cut mine. But I do want to say a couple 
of things as we try to wind down here. I want to thank the Senator from 
Arizona for helping to get us to a point where we can vote now. I want 
to thank Senator Wyden who, 48 hours after surgery, has made himself 
available to come here and to be able to vote. We are appreciative of 
that.
  As we end our debate on the New START treaty, I believe we can say 
the Senate has done its duty, and done it with diligence, serious 
purpose, and honor. And I am confident that our Nation's security--and 
that of the world--will be enhanced by ratifying this treaty.
  When we began this debate 8 days ago, I quoted Chris Dodd's farewell 
address, in which he reminded us that the Founding Fathers had designed 
the Senate with these moments in mind. I think over the past week we 
have lived up to our moment. Senators have had opportunity to speak and 
debate. The fact is, we have considered this treaty--a less complicated 
or far-reaching treaty than START I--for longer than we considered 
START I and START II combined.
  Admiral Mullen summed up our interests in this treaty in a compelling 
way. He said:

       I continue to believe that ratification of the New START 
     Treaty is vital to U.S. national security. Through the trust 
     it engenders, the cuts it requires, and the flexibility it 
     preserves, this treaty enhances our ability to do that which 
     we in the military have been charged to do: protect and 
     defend the citizens of the United States. I am as confident 
     in its success as I am in its safeguards. The sooner it is 
     ratified, the better.

  I think that is exactly right, and it is important to keep our 
fundamental charge to protect America foremost in our minds.
  But I think there is something more to think about now. In the back 
and forth of debates like this, as we dispute details and draw dividing 
lines, it is easy to lose sight of the magnitude of the decision we are 
making.
  Because sometimes, when we repeat and repeat and repeat certain words 
and phrases they become routine and ritual, and their true meaning 
fades away. When we argue about the difference between 700 delivery 
vehicles

[[Page 23469]]

and 720, we may forget that in the final analysis, regardless of where 
we stand on the START treaty, this is one of those rare times in the 
U.S. Senate, one of the only times in all our service here, when we 
have it in our power to safeguard or endanger human life on this 
planet. More than any other, this issue should transcend politics. More 
than any other, this issue should summon our best instincts and our 
highest sense of responsibility. More than at almost any other time, 
the people of the world are watching us because they rely on our 
leadership and because this issue involves not simply our lives and the 
lives of our children but their lives and the lives of their children 
as well.
  So it is altogether fitting that we have debated and now we decide 
not in a campaign season, but in a season that celebrates and summons 
us to the ideal of peace on Earth. Yes, we have contended about 
schedules. Yes, the constant chatter on cable speculates about whether 
we would approve the treaty in time to get out of here for Christmas. 
But the question is not whether we get out of here for a holiday; the 
question is whether we move the world a little more out of the dark 
shadow of nuclear nightmare. For whatever our faith, the right place 
for us at this time of year, no matter how long it may take, is here in 
the Senate where we now have a unique capacity to give a priceless gift 
not just to our friends and family, but to our fellow men and women 
everywhere. When Robert Oppenheimer left Los Alamos after the atomic 
bomb was dropped, he said, ``The peoples of this world must unite or 
they will perish. This war, that has ravaged so much of the earth, has 
written these words. The atomic bomb has spelled them out for all men 
to understand. . . . By our works we are committed, committed to a 
world united, before this common peril, in law and in humanity.'' That 
is what brings us to this moment.
  Last night, a friend called my attention to the meditation of Pope 
John Paul II when he visited Hiroshima. He said that from the memory of 
those awesome mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki we must draw 
the ``conviction that man who wages war can also successfully make 
peace.'' This month in homes across this land, Americans are honoring 
moments in the history of faith that enshrine the values that guide us 
all regardless of faith. We in the Senate, only 100 of us in a world of 
billions, should be humbled and proud that in this month we have the 
privilege of reducing the risks of war and advancing the cause of 
peace.
  So think of what is at stake here and of the role we now have to 
play, not only in the governing of our country but literally in the 
life of the world. Here more than ever our power to advise and consent 
is more than some arcane procedural matter. The Framers of the 
Constitution created the Senate with a vision of statesmanship, that 
here narrow interests would yield to the national interest, that petty 
quarrels would be set aside in pursuit of great and common endeavor. 
The best of our history has proven the wisdom of that vision. There was 
that defining moment when Senator Daniel Webster stood at his desk in 
this Chamber to address the fundamental moral issue of slavery. The 
words with which he started were stark and simple, and they should 
guide us today and every day. He said: ``I speak not as a Massachusetts 
man, nor a northern man, but as an American.'' This is the very 
definition of what it means to be a Senator. To speak not for one State 
but for one America. To remember that the whole world is watching. So 
it is now, and so it has been across the decades during which so many 
Presidents and Senators of both parties, citizens in every part of the 
country, have struggled and at critical turning points succeeded in 
pushing back the dark frontier of nuclear conflict. The efforts have 
not always been perfect; nothing in life or policy ever is. But as we 
end this debate now, let us take our own step forward for America and 
for the world. As stewards of enormous destructive power, we too can 
become the stewards of peace.
  The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, as the Senate approaches a point of 
decision on the New START treaty, I would like to offer a few 
concluding thoughts.
  My attitudes towards the enterprise of arms control have been 
affected by the time I have spent during the last two decades visiting 
remote areas of Russia in an effort to bolster Nunn-Lugar dismantlement 
operations. When one sees Russian SS-18 ballistic missiles being cut up 
at Surovatikha, or when one witnesses the dismantlement of a Typhoon 
ballistic missile submarine at the SevMash facility on the approaches 
to the Barents Sea, one gets a clear picture of the enormity of the 
problem that confronted us during the Cold War.
  With all the destructive power that was created during that era 
amidst intense suspicion and enmity between the United States and the 
former Soviet Union, we were extraordinarily fortunate to have avoided 
a mishap that could have destroyed American civilization. During the 
last two decades, we have circumscribed the nuclear problem, but we 
have not eliminated it. Our cities remain vulnerable to accident, 
miscalculation, and proliferation stemming from the Russian nuclear 
arsenal. And we still must pay very close attention to the disposition 
of Russian nuclear forces.
  Visiting dismantlement operations in Russia also underscores that 
arms control is a technically challenging endeavor. In these debates we 
generally focus on the balance of nuclear forces, deterrence theories, 
diplomatic maneuvers, and other aspects of high statecraft. But arms 
control is also a ``nuts and bolts'' enterprise involving thousands of 
American and Russian technicians, officials, and military personnel. 
Verification and dismantlement activities require tremendous 
cooperation on mundane engineering challenges, equipment and supply 
logistics, and legal frameworks that allow these activities to proceed.
  Ironically the exacting nature of arms verification and elimination 
may be a blessing. The challenges of this work and the amount of 
information that both sides are required to exchange have improved 
transparency and forced our countries to build productive partnerships 
over time.
  The Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on June 24 in which 
Defense Department officials in charge of verification and 
dismantlement activities in the former Soviet Union testified. These 
officials oversee dismantlement work in Russia that occurs every day. 
Their agencies oversaw verification under START I before the treaty 
expired on December 5, 2009. They would oversee the verification work 
required under the New START treaty.
  They described in detail how verification operations are conducted 
and gave Senators a picture of how the United States and Russia 
cooperate on technically challenging nonproliferation goals. Only five 
members of the committee attended that hearing. I wish that every 
Senator could have attended, because the presentation underscored how 
much the START process links our two defense establishments and how 
critical the START framework is to nonproliferation activities.
  Mr. President, there is a maxim that has been popularized in American 
cinema, variants of which have sometimes been attributed to early 
political philosophers such as Sun Tsu or Machiavelli. It is ``Keep 
your friends close, but your enemies closer.'' I am not suggesting that 
Russia is an enemy. Our relationship with that country is far more 
complex. It is a relationship that is both wary and hopeful. We admire 
the Russian people and their cultural and scientific achievements, 
while lamenting continuing restrictions on their civil and political 
liberties. We recognize the potential for U.S.-Russian cooperation 
based on deep commonalities in our history and geography, even as we 
are frustrated that Cold War sensibilities are difficult to dislodge.
  Although we can and must make situational judgments to engage Russia, 
such engagement is no guarantee that we will experience a convergence 
of

[[Page 23470]]

perceived interests or the elimination of friction.
  But one does not have to abandon one's skepticism of the Russian 
Government or dismiss contentious foreign policy disagreements with 
Moscow to invest in the practical enterprise of nuclear verification 
and transparency. In fact, it is precisely the friction in our broader 
relationship that makes this treaty so important.
  It would be an incredible strategic blunder to sever our START 
relationship with Russia when that country still possesses thousands of 
nuclear weapons. We would be distancing ourselves from a historic rival 
in the area where our national security is most affected and where 
cooperation already has delivered successes. When it comes to our 
nuclear arsenals we want to keep Russia close. There are enough 
centripetal forces at work without abandoning a START process that has 
prevented surprises and miscalculations for 15 years.
  The New START agreement came about because the United States and 
Russia, despite differences on many geopolitical issues, do have 
coincident interests on specific matters of nuclear security. We share 
an interest in limiting competition on expensive weapons systems that 
do little to enhance the productivity of our respective societies. We 
share an interest in achieving predictability with regard to each 
other's nuclear forces so we are not left guessing about equal 
potential vulnerabilities. We share an interest in cooperating broadly 
on keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists. 
And we share an interest in maintaining lines of communication between 
our political and military establishments that are based on the 
original START agreement.
  Over the last 7 months the Senate has performed due diligence on the 
New START treaty. Most importantly, we have gathered and probed 
military opinion about what the treaty would mean for our national 
defense. We have heard from the top military leadership, as well as the 
commanders who oversee our nuclear weapons and our missile defense. We 
have heard from former Secretaries of Defense and STRATCOM commanders 
who have confirmed the judgment of current military leaders. Their 
answers have demonstrated a carefully-reasoned military consensus in 
favor of ratifying the treaty. Rejection of such a consensus on a 
treaty that affects fundamental questions of nuclear deterrence would 
be an extraordinary action for the Senate to take.
  Moreover, the treaty review process has produced a much stronger 
American political consensus in favor of modernization of our nuclear 
forces and implementation of our miile defense plans. This includes 
explicit commitments by the President and congressional appropriators. 
In the absence of the New START treaty, I believe this consensus would 
be more difficult to maintain. We have the chance today not only to 
approve the New START treaty, but also to solidify our domestic 
determination to achieve these national security goals.
  I began the Senate debate on this treaty last week by citing a long 
list of the national security threats that currently occupy our nation 
and our military. Our troops are heavily engaged in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. We are fighting a global terrorist threat. And we are seeking to 
resolve the dangerous circumstances surrounding nuclear weapons 
programs in Iran and North Korea. We are attempting to address these 
and many other national security questions at a time of growing 
resource constraints reflected in a $14 trillion debt.
  In this context the U.S. Senate has a chance today to constrain 
expensive arms competition with Russia. We have chance to guarantee 
transparency and confidence-building procedures that contribute to our 
fundamental national security. We have a chance to frustrate rogue 
nations who would prefer as much distance as possible between the 
United States and Russia on nuclear questions. And we have a chance to 
strike a blow against nuclear proliferation that deeply threatens 
American citizens and our interests in the world.
  I am hopeful that the Senate will embrace this opportunity to bolster 
U.S. national security by voting to approve the New START treaty.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The majority leader is recognized.

                          ____________________