[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 15]
[Senate]
[Pages 23427-23454]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

                                 ______
                                 

TREATY WITH RUSSIA ON MEASURES FOR FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF 
                        STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senate will proceed to executive session to resume consideration of the 
following treaty, which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and 
     Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

  Pending:

       Corker modified amendment No. 4904, to provide a condition 
     and an additional element of the understanding regarding the 
     effectiveness and viability of the New START Treaty and 
     United States missile defense.

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts is 
recognized.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we currently have two amendments, one of 
which I believe we will be able to accept and one of which we are 
working on with the Senator from Arizona to determine whether it would 
need a vote. We should know shortly. We will begin debate on an 
amendment of the Senator from Arizona. Subsequently, the Senator from 
Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman, and the Senator from Tennessee, Mr. Corker, 
have an amendment they want to proceed on with respect to missile 
defense. Those are the only two at this time. We hope to be able to get 
to final passage on this treaty without delay. The Senator from Arizona 
assured me they are trying to work through what that means. So I think 
we will proceed without any attempt to pin that down with a unanimous 
consent agreement at this point. Obviously, for all Senators, we want 
to try to do this as soon as is practical.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona is 
recognized.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, would it be in order for me to call up an 
amendment at this time?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator is recognized for that 
purpose.


                    Amendment No. 4892, as Modified

  Mr. KYL. I call up amendment No. 4892, as modified. The modification 
is at the desk.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment is so modified.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if we could begin the consideration, as I 
mentioned, we are working on that language. I do not want to agree to 
the modification yet until we have had a chance to talk with the 
Senator about it. I am not saying we will not agree to it. I want to 
see if we can get that done. If we can begin on the amendment as 
originally filed, we can interrupt to do it with the modification. I 
want a chance to clear it.
  Mr. KYL. I am not asking at this time there be an agreement. I am 
simply saying that the amendment I want to bring up is the amendment I 
filed.
  Mr. KERRY. I have no objection to the as modified to consider it.
  Mr. KYL. I will describe the modifications. They were made in an 
effort to get agreement. If we cannot, that is fine, but I do think it 
makes it more palatable to Members.
  May we have the amendment read.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4892, as modified.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To require a certification regarding the design and funding 
                         of certain facilities)

       At the end of subsection (a), add the following:
       (11) Design and funding of certain facilities.--Prior to 
     the entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President 
     shall certify to the Senate that the President intends to--
       (A) accelerate the design and engineering phase of the 
     Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) building 
     and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF); and
       (B) request advanced funding, including on a multi-year 
     basis, for the Chemistry and metallurgy Research Replacement 
     building and the Uranium Processing Facility upon completion 
     of the design and engineering phase for such facilities.

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona is 
recognized.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, this amendment has to do with the 
modernization of our nuclear weapons enterprise. It is a subject with 
which we began this debate. As we get toward the end of the debate, it 
remains a piece of unfinished business with which I think we need to 
deal. Remember, the nuclear enterprise we are talking about consists 
primarily of the facilities that are used to work on our nuclear 
weapons, as well as the weapons and importantly the scientists who work 
in those facilities. They represent our National Laboratories, as well 
as other production facilities and related facilities.
  The point I think is important for people to remember is that unlike 
all of the other nuclear powers in the world today, the United States 
does not have an active modernization program for our nuclear 
deterrent, a program which enables us, for example, to remanufacture a 
component of a weapon and replace an existing weapon with that.
  The need for this has been made very clear by all of the people in 
the administration who have considered this, including Secretary of 
Defense Gates. The Secretary, remember, is, in effect, the customer for 
the Department of Energy, which is the Department responsible for 
producing these weapons. The budget we talk about is a Department of 
Energy budget, but it is really to produce weapons for use by the 
Secretary of Defense.
  Here is what he said about the need to modernize the production 
complex, which is what we call that group of facilities, as well as the 
stockpile:

       To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a 
     credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our 
     stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile 
     or pursuing a modernization program.

  Each year, our Laboratory Directors and the Secretary of Energy are 
required to provide a certification to the President that certifies the 
status of the weapons in the stockpile and makes determinations as to 
whether those weapons are safe, secure, and reliable without the need 
for testing.
  Each year, as we discussed in our closed session, there are reports 
about the status of these weapons. I will talk in a moment about the 
material we discussed in the closed session. But suffice it to say here 
that there is a great need for us to move with alacrity to bring up to 
date the weapons that are in our stockpile and that requires 
modernization of the facilities and related equipment to accomplish 
that task.
  This will require a substantial investment over the next decade. 
Unfortunately, over the years, these facilities have been allowed to 
deteriorate, our capacity to atrophy, and our scientists to retire 
without doing what is necessary to bring these weapons up to date.
  The current budget projection, as expressed in the 1251 report 
update, which was dated November 17, 2010, initiates that modernization 
but clearly cannot accurately predict future requirements. This is the 
problem we have dealt with here.
  The report acknowledges that we have a problem and can estimate today 
what we think we can spend over the next few years--say, 5 years--but 
it is

[[Page 23428]]

hard to estimate beyond that as to what the exact cost of this is going 
to be. I try to deal with that in this particular amendment.
  The Laboratory Directors responsible for certifying our nuclear 
weapons recently wrote in a letter:

       As we emphasized in our testimonies, implementation of the 
     future vision of the nuclear deterrent . . . will require 
     sustained attention and continued refinement.

  In other words, each year they can get their estimates more accurate, 
as one might expect, and define more specifically what the exact 
requirements are. In this case, that generally means an increase in 
costs in one area or another. In fact, Vice President Biden, speaking 
to this precise problem, said:

       [W]e expect that funding requirements will increase in 
     future budget years.

  We know that is going to happen. The question is, can we be any more 
particular in the funding that we require. My amendment seeks to be a 
little bit more precise or a little bit more specific than the current 
language.
  At the crux of this modernization program is a need for a firm 
commitment for the construction of two critical manufacturing 
facilities. They are called the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
Replacement, or CMRR, plutonium facility--that is at Los Alamos 
Laboratory--and the Uranium Processing Facility, or UPF at the so-
called Y-12 facility at Oak Ridge, TN. Without these, the capacity to 
perform stockpile maintenance will be lost by 2020 and there will be no 
capability to modernize our aging stockpile.
  For Members to recall briefly, these are, in many cases, facilities 
that go all the way back to the Manhattan Project, the project that 
created the atomic weapons that enabled us to conclude World War II. 
Some of these buildings were built as early as 1942, and they are not 
in good shape. In fact, when I was with one of my colleagues from 
Tennessee visiting the Y-12 facility, I asked one of the people 
responsible for a particular part of the facility what his biggest 
concern was. He said: My biggest concern is keeping this thing going 
for another 10 or 12 years. When you see the facility, you can see 
that. And that is no way to deal with the most sophisticated weapons 
that mankind has ever invented.
  As I said, the current plan is a big improvement over what we had 
just a year or so ago. We got together with the administration and 
asked them to relook at the plan they had submitted and identify areas 
where there were deficiencies in funding or planning. They came back 
with an updated report that revealed funding requirements that had 
previously not been dealt with. There was a little over $4 billion in 
funding added to the first 5 years of the 10-year program we are 
looking at as a result.
  But even there, there was an argument that there were uncertainties, 
they were only at a certain point in the planning of these two large 
facilities, and that those funds would be inadequate.
  To note something for our colleagues and of which the Presiding 
Officer is very well aware, being one of the two Senators responsible 
for the Los Alamos facilities, he will recall both he and his colleague 
and others of us, in visiting Los Alamos, were told about the problems 
of building a facility there where there theoretically could be an 
earthquake in the near vicinity and the costs of construction have 
increased dramatically because of the physical needs to protect that 
facility against any conceivable kind of physical problem. That has 
increased the cost of the facilities, and they are trying to get a 
handle on how much they will actually be. They are pretty clear about a 
ball-park estimate, but a ball-park estimate is not quite good enough 
for these purposes, as we know.
  I will conclude by saying I am a little distressed by the news 
stories. We cannot expect the news media to have gotten into the detail 
required to actually make policy. They put it in a political context 
that the administration put another $4 billion into the pot and why 
shouldn't that satisfy people like me.
  Of course, that is totally beside the point. We are simply trying to 
get a better handle on how much money will be needed and to be able to 
plan for that funding in a way that gets it to the facilities in the 
most expeditious way possible so that, A, we can complete the work that 
has to be done in time and, B, that will save a lot of money, about 
$200 million a year.
  There is every reason to want to understand how much it will cost and 
get it done quickly. It is not about adding $4 billion. That does not 
begin to cover the cost of these items.
  It is not a matter of some kind of negotiation that additional money 
was thrown in the pot and is that not good enough. It is a matter of 
continuing to focus as the cost of these facilities evolves and as the 
requirements evolve, so that Congress, with the administration's 
request in its budgets, can provide the funding that is necessary when 
it is necessary to get these facilities completed as quickly as 
possible in order to achieve our modernization goals.
  There is no dispute about the fact that there will be additional 
money required. It is just a question of what to do about it.
  The updated budget, while committing additional funds to repairing 
these facilities, will not be able to eliminate even over 10 years, for 
example, the more than $2 billion of documented maintenance issues. 
There are some things that are simply outside the budget and need to be 
dealt with.
  My biggest concern in the updated modernization plan is actually that 
it added to the delays. What we should be doing is trying to telescope 
these projects as much as possible so we can meet the deadlines for the 
refurbishing of our weapons--or maintenance of our weapons, I should 
say--rather--than extending the time for the completion of the 
facilities. But unfortunately, that is what the latest report did. 
Instead of accelerating construction of these two most critical 
facilities, the CMRR and the UPF, the updated plan now delays 
completion to 2023 and 2024, respectively, rather than 2020.
  As we recall from the executive session we had a couple of days ago, 
there was information presented as to why these facilities absolutely 
needed to be completed by 2020 in order to accomplish the life 
extension projects for some of our weapons.
  Delay in these facilities will hamper efforts to perform these 
critical life extensions of our warheads and not inconsequentially add 
significant costs, again, primarily to keep these aging facilities 
operational.
  As an example, we have to put a brandnew roof on the facility at Los 
Alamos even though the facility in 10 or 12 years is no longer going to 
be used because it will be replaced. But the roof is so bad that the 
work we have to do in there is affected by the weather, and so we have 
to build a roof. That is an expenditure one hates to make because in 10 
or 12 years that building is not going to be used anymore. But that is 
the state of repair we are in.
  Each year of delay adds to those kinds of maintenance costs. Senator 
Corker and I and Senator Alexander were told at the Y-12 facility that 
it is about a $200-million-a-year cost to keep these aging facilities 
going that we can eliminate if we can complete the construction of 
these two large facilities.
  One-fourth of the newest increase of this $4.1 billion, of which I 
spoke, for the next 4 years does not even go to the buildings or the 
facility. It simply meets an obligation for unfunded pensions that have 
been allowed to accumulate over the years. The only good news about 
that is, I guess, they would probably have stolen the money from one of 
the accounts that directly deals with the modernization of our weapons 
in order to meet those unfunded pension obligations. So I am glad we 
were able to put the billion dollars in there. But when they talk about 
$4 billion more for science work on these weapons, that is not true. 
Fully one-fourth of it goes to meet these unfunded pension obligations.
  There is a need for things outside the science, but clearly the 
science requirements are the key ones we are trying to get money to as 
much as we can.
  The key point also is that the modernization is independent of the 
ratification of the treaty. It is true that as

[[Page 23429]]

we reduce the number of warheads, there is even more of a requirement 
that we know the warheads we have will do their job because we do not 
have a backup warhead sitting in a storeroom, basically in the event 
something does not work if that is deployed right now. It is true that 
as we reduce the number, we have to pay even more attention to whether 
they are all safe, secure, and reliable. But it is also a fact that the 
modernization is independent of the ratification of the treaty.
  During the hearings that were conducted on this treaty, all 16 
experts who provided testimony spoke of the requirement for 
modernization. Many indicated it is a requirement irrespective of 
START. That is a point that has been made by others as well.
  For example, former Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham in an op-ed 
recently said:

       The Obama administration's decision to support increased 
     investment in the maintenance of our nuclear weapons lab and 
     stockpile is correct and long overdue . . . But the fact that 
     the administration has revised its policy for the better is 
     in itself no reason for any Senator to endorse START . . . 
     The START treaty and beefed up funding for our nuclear 
     enterprise are two separate issues that should remain 
     distinct.

  The point was also made by the person responsible for this 
modernization program--Deputy NNSA Administrator Tom D'Agostino. He 
said: ``Our plans for investment in and modernization of the modern 
security enterprise are essential, irrespective of whether or not the 
START treaty is ratified.''
  So this has to be done whether the treaty is ratified or not, and I 
think everybody acknowledges that fact.
  So we believe the resolution of ratification needs to address these 
issues by providing a couple conditions, and we have modified the 
original language in order to try to get an agreement. If we can't, we 
will vote on it and see what happens, but I am hoping my colleagues 
will agree.
  The first is something I know has been agreed to; that is, a 
condition the President will provide an annual update of the section 
1251 report.
  The administration is agreeable to this, and it is the way for 
Congress to be annually advised of the status of this construction, the 
status of the facilities, and what more may need to be done on that. 
Presumably, that will be provided at or about the time the budget is 
sent to Congress from the administration.
  Secondly, a condition the President will certify, prior to entry into 
force of the treaty, that the President intends--so this is not a 
requirement that he has achieved a particular result, but he intends to 
accelerate the design and engineering phase, to the extent possible, of 
the CMRR and UPF.
  In other words, we are not asking the impossible be done, just that 
to the extent we can possibly do it, we accelerate the design and 
engineering of these two facilities so they can get done on time, 
rather than with the delays.
  Third, that the administration--or the President--request advance 
funding, including on a multiyear basis, for these two facilities--the 
CMRR and the UPF--upon completion of the design and engineering phase 
of the planning.
  What that means is, we are not asking them to provide advance funding 
for the entire projects, as is done, for example, when we construct an 
aircraft carrier. We are not asking it be done now, when there are 
still some uncertainties about exactly what these facilities need and 
how much they will cost. Los Alamos is still being tweaked, among other 
things, as I said, because of the need to make it earthquake-proof. 
What we are saying is, upon completion of the design and engineering 
phase of planning, then the administration requests advance funding and 
on a multiyear basis.
  What that means is--and this is frequently done with large Defense 
Department contracts, in order to get them done as quickly as possible 
and as inexpensively as possible--there are multiyear advances of 
funding so the money can be spent, let us just say hypothetically, 
within a 5-year period by the Defense Department for an aircraft 
carrier, for example. Instead of having the Appropriations committees 
each year appropriate a particular amount of money, and the work that 
is done can only be done within the constraints of that particular 
amount of money appropriated in that particular year, what they say 
is--and I am just speaking hypothetically--the cost is, let's say, $4 
billion, and we know it is going to take about 4 years to do this. 
Instead of saying: Well, we are going to do $1 billion of 
appropriations each year, what they say is: All right. You have $4 
billion, and if you can get it done more quickly by spending this money 
more quickly, fine. That will save us money and it will get the project 
done quicker. If you can't, then you can't. But that money is set aside 
in an account for that purpose.
  That is all we are asking be done here too. These two facilities are 
both, in terms of order of magnitude, about $5 billion facilities. They 
might be a little less. They are likely to be a little more--
potentially, in the neighborhood of $6 billion or so. Originally, when 
the administration presented its first 1251 report, the entire 10-year 
program was set at $10 billion. We knew that wasn't adequate. We went 
to the administration, they recalculated everything, brought their 
estimates up to date, and said: That is right, $10 billion is not going 
to be enough. We will add another $4 billion to $6 billion over the 
first 4 to 6 years.
  Undoubtedly, the cost will increase above that, as has been testified 
to. My guess is, just in terms of order of magnitude, you are looking 
at roughly $20 billion over 10 to 12 years. We will know more each year 
this goes forward. But to construct these two facilities, if we could 
advance fund at least some money--let's say, 3 years' worth of the 
money--then it will be possible for the people who are responsible for 
the construction of those facilities, if they can get 15 months of work 
out of the first 12 months and spend more than 12 months' worth of 
money to get that done, that is great. They will have been able to 
accomplish their job more quickly. Each month that goes by adds costs 
to the program. So if we can provide them advance funding of some 
amount--we are not specifying it in here--they can probably get the 
project done more quickly and less expensively, and that should be a 
good thing. I think everybody agrees this would be the way to do it.
  There have been two objections posited, to my knowledge. First, the 
Department of Energy has never done it this way. That, of course, is 
not the way for us to set policy. I saw my colleague on television this 
morning saying what we need is a plan. We are too focused always on 
what is right in front of our face. A lot of times, if we have a basic 
plan everybody knows we are trying to work toward, it is amazing how 
much you can accomplish in terms of the details. Well, this is the 
basic plan.
  The Department of Defense does this every year because they have 
large-cost construction projects. The Department of Energy has never 
done it that way--except I am not sure that is true. Before there was a 
Department of Energy, the Manhattan Project was being built, and GEN 
Leslie Groves, who is sort of the father of the Manhattan Project, 
didn't have any problem at all about advance funding. He went to the 
President and the Congress and said: I need this money. They said: What 
do you need it for? He said: Don't ask questions, it is secret, and he 
got the money. That is an oversimplification, but he got that project 
done in less time than anybody could have possibly imagined because he 
had the resources provided to him to get it done.
  So when they say it has never been done before, well, actually, it 
has been done before on this exact--on this exact--national defense 
item; namely, our nuclear enterprise. It is just that it was back in 
the early 1940s when people were not so, I guess, concerned about each 
year's budget and the appropriations that would accompany those 
budgets.
  Secondly, the argument is made that--and this one may surprise 
folks--well, if we have, let's say, 3 years' worth of funding out there 
and that money is provided to the Department of Energy, the Members of 
Congress who are on the Appropriations Committee will grab that money--
or parts

[[Page 23430]]

of it that are unspent--and apply it to other things.
  Think about that for a minute. The very people responsible for 
funding these projects in the Congress, who know they have to be done 
and who have agreed to the advanced funding in the first place, I think 
are highly unlikely, after that money has been provided, to say: Well, 
we need money for some water projects or something so we will go grab 
some of that money that isn't spent. The whole reason it isn't spent is 
because you have provided multiyear funding for the project for 
efficiency purposes. So I don't think that is a reason for us to not 
advance funds.
  I would like to call to my colleagues' attention--and I will let my 
colleague, Senator Corker, put this in the Record because I think 
either he or Senator Alexander might talk about it--a letter signed by 
Senators Inouye, Feinstein, Cochran, and Alexander, who presumably, in 
the next Congress, will be the chairmen and ranking members of the full 
committee and subcommittees responsible for this funding. This letter 
makes it clear they are committed to the full funding of the 
modernization of our nuclear weapons arsenal and that they are asking 
the President to submit budgets which will provide for the necessary 
funding for this and they commit themselves to support that funding.
  That is important, and I don't think we can attribute a motive to 
Senators like this, who we all know are entirely trustworthy, that 
somehow after this money is advance funded, that Congress or 
appropriators are going to reach back and grab money they have already 
provided because they think there is another purpose they want to spend 
it for right now. So those are the reasons why I don't think that is a 
principled argument for why we shouldn't do this. Having this advance 
funding could complete these facilities on time, rather than with a 2- 
or 3-year delay, and we could save literally hundreds of millions of 
dollars.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
some additional quotations on the need for modernization from former 
laboratory Directors, an Under Secretary of Defense, the current 
Secretary of Defense, the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, 
and there are many more we could produce.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                   Additional Quotes on Modernization

       Former laboratory directors: ``However, we believe there 
     are serious shortfalls in stockpile surveillance activities, 
     personnel, infrastructure, and the basic sciences necessary 
     to recover from the successive budget reductions of the last 
     five years.''\7\
       Secretary Kissinger: ``As part of a number of 
     recommendations, my colleagues, Bill Perry, George Shultz, 
     Sam Nunn, and I have called for significant investments in a 
     repaired and modernized nuclear weapons infrastructure and 
     added resources for the three national laboratories.''\8\
       Under Secretary Joseph: ``New START must be assessed in the 
     context of a robust commitment to maintain the necessary 
     nuclear offensive capabilities required to meet today's 
     threats and those that may emerge. . . This is a long-term 
     commitment, not a one-year budget bump-up''\9\
       Secretary Gates: ``This calls for a reinvigoration of our 
     nuclear weapons complex that is our infrastructure and our 
     science technology and engineering base. And I might just 
     add, I've been up here for the last four springs trying to 
     get money for this and this is the first time I think I've 
     got a fair shot of actually getting money for our nuclear 
     arsenal.\10\


                                endnotes

       \7\Harold Agnew et al., Letter from 10 Former National 
     Laboratory Directors to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and 
     Secretary of Energy Steven Chu. May 19, 2010.
       \8\Secretary Henry Kissinger, Testimony to the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee. May 25, 2010.
       \9\Under Secretary Robert Joseph, Testimony to the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee. June 24, 2010.
       \10\Secretary Robert Gates, Testimony to the Senate Armed 
     Services Committee. June 17, 2010.

  Mr. KYL. I thank the Chair, and I will have more to say, but I will 
let other Senators speak.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, as I did yesterday on the floor, I wish to 
say I cannot thank, and I hope the Senate will feel the same way--I 
think our country will when they understand what Senator Kyl has done--
I cannot thank him enough for his thoughtful, dogged, persistent 
efforts as it relates to modernizing our nuclear arsenal. As a matter 
of fact, the Presiding Officer and I accompanied Senator Kyl on a 
bipartisan trip to Sandia and Los Alamos to look at some of the many 
needs we have throughout our complex in our country, which resides at 
seven facilities across the country. It is that foresight that Senator 
Kyl has displayed, beginning years ago but especially focused over this 
last year, that I think has led to incredible results.
  While the Senator and I are obviously going to end up in different 
places, it appears, on this treaty--and there is no question the treaty 
and modernization are two very different things--there is no question 
in my mind that we would not have the modernization commitments we have 
in hand today if it were not for the treaty. So, for me, it is this 
whole body of work that works together, and in my opinion makes this 
decision one that is very easy to make because of the entire body of 
work.
  I wish to say that Senator Kyl, through his efforts, has caused there 
to be two updates to what is called the Defense authorization 1251. 
That is something that is required by our Defense authorization bill. 
It focuses on expenditures to our nuclear arsenal.
  I think people will realize, over the next decade, as a result of 
Senator Kyl's efforts--and Senator Kerry's cooperation and the 
appropriators and the President and others--that $86 billion will be 
invested in modernizing our nuclear arsenal, and $100 billion will be 
invested in those delivery vehicles that relate to our warheads. I 
think people realize that while we are talking about 1,550 warheads 
being our deployed limit, we have 3,500 other warheads that are 
stockpiled all across our country and those also need to be modernized. 
We need to know they are available.
  I think the Presiding Officer and I were able to see where neutron 
generators were going to expire, where the guidance system that guides 
many of our missiles is far less sophisticated than the cell phones we 
have today. In some cases, they still had tubes, such as we had in our 
old black-and-white televisions.
  So I wish to thank the Senator from Arizona for everything he has 
done to cause there to be focus on this and for the fact he has caused 
it to be dovetailed; the fact we have an updated 1251 that reflects the 
needs of our country; the fact that we have four appropriators who now 
have committed to the President they will support this effort; the fact 
the President has said to them--and all this has been entered into the 
Record--that he will ask for these moneys to modernize our nuclear 
arsenal.
  So, again, Senator Kyl has done incredible work in this regard. I 
think he has informed this body, and I think it is due to his efforts 
and those of us who have supported his efforts that have helped to find 
gaps in our modernization program. We have been able to talk to the 
head of the NNSA and the Lab Directors to focus on those gaps.
  The senior Senator from Tennessee has helped tremendously in that 
regard. He and Senator Kyl and Senator Lugar have actually gone through 
other sites--sites I did not go through with Senator Kyl myself. So 
this has been a collective effort led by Senator Kyl.
  Again, I know we will end up in a different place on the treaty as a 
whole, but it is my hope that the administration and Senator Kerry will 
accept the changes Senator Kyl has put forth in his amendment. It is my 
hope that by unanimous consent we can add this to the treaty. Even if 
that does not occur, there is no question that the contributions of 
Senator Kyl to the commitments that are so important to ensuring our 
country is safe and secure by virtue of having a reliable, safe, 
dependable, nuclear arsenal not only will be evident today, but they 
will be evident for generations to come. For that, I thank him deeply.

[[Page 23431]]

  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee is 
recognized.
  Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. President, I came to the floor to express my 
admiration for the Senator from Arizona. I was listening to his address 
and I heard my colleague from Tennessee.
  Senator Kyl's work on nuclear modernization is no surprise to any of 
us who know him very well because his approach to issues is a 
principled one, and once he determines the principle, he is dogged. He 
is a determined person. He basically took this issue of nuclear 
modernization, which is not on the lips of very many people in the 
United States--the question of whether our nuclear weapons are safe and 
reliable, whether they will work--he pulled it out of a trash bin and 
put it on the front page of a national debate.
  He did it in connection with the START treaty, but as he said in his 
own remarks, this should be done whether you are for the START treaty 
or against the START treaty. It is completely independent, in that 
sense.
  In my view, under no circumstances should the START treaty be 
ratified without doing this. That would be like reducing our weapons 
and leaving us with a collection of wet matches. We need to make sure 
what we have left works. But this is sort of the showhorse/workhorse 
Senator distinction. This is an issue on the back burner. It is an 
unpleasant issue. No one likes to talk about making nuclear weapons, 
each one of which could be 30 times as powerful as the bomb that was 
dropped on Hiroshima and ended the war, but it is a part of the reality 
in the United States and in the world today.
  As Senator Corker was saying and as Senator Kyl said when each of us 
visited in different times, different places--Senator Kyl came to 
Tennessee. I was with him there. He has talked to many more people than 
I have on this subject--these weapons are being modernized in 
facilities that are completely outdated. It would be as if we were 
making Corvettes in a Model T factory.
  Worse than that, it is not just an inconvenience to the workers 
there, it is a threat to their safety, and it is a waste of taxpayers' 
money. As the Senator from Arizona said, after a certain number of 
years--I am not sure of the exact number anymore, maybe 15 years, some 
number of years--this pays for itself. The modernization of these 
facilities, the bringing them up to date, means the taxpayers will pay 
just as much to operate these old facilities as they would to spend $5 
billion or $6 billion or whatever it is to improve these two big new 
facilities and the other infrastructure and the other things we need to 
do.
  It ought to be said as well that not one of these facilities is in 
Arizona. This is not home cooking by Jon Kyl. This is a man who, for a 
couple decades, has made our nuclear posture his business and has made 
sure he knows as much about it as anyone and has made sure the rest of 
us paid attention to it when we might be more interested in the issue 
of the moment. So it is an example of a Senator doing his job very 
well. I am deeply grateful for that and I am proud to serve in the 
Senate with such a person.
  I would like to mention the letters I had printed in the Record 
yesterday. They are such an integral part of the remarks of Senator Kyl 
and Senator Corker--the letter to the President of December 16, from 
Senators Inouye and Cochran, the ranking members of the Appropriations 
Committee on both sides of the aisle, and Senator Feinstein and I, who 
are both members of the appropriate subcommittee for dealing with this, 
as well as the President's response of December 20.
  In concluding my remarks, I would like to also congratulate Senator 
Kyl for his comments about advanced funding. We want to do things in an 
orderly way in government, but it makes no sense for us to build 
buildings in the most expensive way, particularly when there is an 
urgent deadline that is in the national interest. So if indeed by 
building these buildings more rapidly and saving the annual maintenance 
costs we could save the taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars at a 
time when we are borrowing 42 cents out of every $1 and every one of us 
is going to be looking for ways to save money, Senator Kyl's suggestion 
about advanced funding, which may not be the way the Department of 
Energy has done it before, ought to be the way we do it now. We didn't 
used to have a big dip like we do now. Let's look for ways to save 
hundreds of millions of dollars. We know we are going to have to 
modernize these weapons, START treaty or no START treaty, as the 
Senator said. We know we are going to have to save money. Let's accept 
the Senator's suggestion about advanced funding of these large 
facilities. As one member of the appropriations committee, I am going 
to do my best to follow his suggestion.
  I am here to congratulate him for a superior, statesmanlike piece of 
work, both on the treaty which he has worked to improve but also on the 
nuclear modernization issue which he single-handedly has put upfront 
before those of us in the Senate and the American people and it makes 
our country safer and more secure.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wish to thank both my colleagues from 
Tennessee for their very kind remarks. Actually, the place we have 
gotten, what we have achieved, is due to the efforts of a lot of 
people. It starts with Secretary Gates in the Department of Defense; 
Secretary Chu; Tom D'Agostino; his Deputy Director of NNSA, Don Cook; 
the Lab Directors who are incredible public servants. We visited with 
them. These are some of the brightest people in the country and the 
folks who work with them, many of whom, almost all of whom are about 
ready to retire, those people who actually designed and developed the 
weapons we now have. There are a lot of people who devoted their lives 
to what very few people know or understand. They are now being asked to 
do a very difficult and complicated job in very difficult surroundings.
  Part of what we are asking for--it is not just a matter of 
convenience, as Senator Alexander said, it is a matter of absolute 
necessity that these facilities be capable of dealing with these 
complex weapons. That is why they are expensive, but they are 
absolutely needed. I thank both my colleagues for having devoted a lot 
of their own time and attention to this issue and in supporting the 
efforts of modernization so we can get this job done properly. I 
appreciate their remarks.
  I also would like to proffer a unanimous consent request. I ask 
unanimous consent to yield 1 hour of the time allocated to the 
Republican leader postcloture to Senator Kyl.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? Without 
objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. I thank my colleagues.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from South Dakota is 
recognized.
  Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I do want to rise in support of the Kyl 
amendment No. 4892 and echo the sentiments expressed by my colleague 
from Tennessee about the good work of the Senator from Arizona. He has 
been a tireless advocate for modernization. It is something that needed 
to happen, irrespective of whether there was a treaty, but it certainly 
became a condition in order to have a treaty. If you are talking about 
reducing the number of your nuclear weapons, you certainly want to 
improve the quality of the ones you have.
  Unlike other nuclear powers, the United States has not had an active 
modernization program for our nuclear deterrent.
  We have heard from people who recognize the importance of modernizing 
our nuclear deterrent. I will not reiterate all of those, but I wish to 
point out, Secretary Gates said recently--he couldn't be any more clear 
that nuclear modernization is a prerequisite to nuclear reductions when 
he said:

       To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a 
     credible deterrent and reduce the numbers of weapons in our 
     stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile 
     or pursuing a modernization program.


[[Page 23432]]


  Similarly, Thomas D'Agostino, the head of the National Security 
Administration or NNSA said nuclear modernization is a prerequisite to 
nuclear reductions, stating: `` . . . as our stockpile gets smaller, it 
becomes increasingly important that our remaining forces are safe, 
secure and effective.''
  In the same speech I just quoted from by Secretary Gates, he pointed 
out: ``Currently, the United States is the only declared nuclear power 
that is neither modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has the capability 
to produce a new nuclear warhead.''
  It is difficult to overstate the dire condition of the U.S. nuclear 
weapons complex. Its physical infrastructure is crumbling and its 
intellectual edifice is aging. The Strategic Posture Commission, 
chaired by William Perry and James Schlesinger, found that certain 
facilities of the nuclear weapons complex are ``genuinely decrepit'' 
and the complex's ``intellectual infrastructure . . . is in serious 
trouble.''
  I met with experts throughout the Senate's consideration of New 
START, and they confirm for me the accuracy of these descriptions. I 
might say to the Presiding Officer, whose State is home to Los Alamos 
and Sandia National Laboratories, we were able to visit those along 
with Senator Kyl, the Senator from Tennessee and others, and had an 
opportunity to observe some of the facilities and buildings which are 
referenced in this amendment. It is absolutely clear, beyond the shadow 
of a doubt, that we have to make the necessary upgrades and 
improvements if we intend to keep our nuclear arsenal modern and 
prepared to deal with the threats we might face in the future.
  The idea that the modernization of the U.S. nuclear complex and 
delivery force is an absolute prerequisite for nuclear reductions 
envisioned in New START has been clear to the Obama administration 
throughout the New START process. In fact, in December of 2009, 41 
Senators wrote to the President and said in that letter:

       Funding for such a modernization program beginning in 
     earnest in your 2011 budget is needed as the United States 
     considers the further nuclear weapons reductions proposed in 
     the START follow-on negotiations.

  Just to be clear, what is modernization? This includes improvements 
to the physical elements of the nuclear weapons complex. It involves 
the warheads and delivery vehicles themselves as well as facility 
infrastructure. Modernization also requires maintenance of the 
intellectual capacity and capabilities underlying that complex; namely, 
the designer and technical workforce.
  The amendment, as proposed by Senator Kyl, makes clear in the 
resolution of ratification how critical modernization is to the United 
States while it is reducing its nuclear arsenal. First, the amendment 
places a condition in the resolution of ratification requiring the 
President to submit an annual update to the section 1251 report. The 
1251 report is something annually that comes up here that gives us an 
update on the nuclear weapons arsenal. Now we will have, thanks to the 
amendment adopted earlier, a certification with regard to the necessary 
investment in delivery vehicle modernization, which is an issue I 
addressed in an amendment earlier in this debate and a critically 
important one. The Senator has already addressed that in a previous 
amendment that was accepted by the proponents of the treaty. That was 
an important step forward.
  This particular amendment deals with the facilities and is also 
critically important. What it will do is require, in the 1251 report, 
that the President, when he submits his 10-year plan with budget 
estimates for modernization of the U.S. nuclear complex, that he also 
presents an accelerated design and engineering plan for the nuclear 
facilities and a commitment to funding those.
  So this amendment, such as the one that would call for modernization 
of the delivery vehicles, is a critical part of the nuclear complex we 
have, of making sure it is reliable, that it works, and that it is 
ready and prepared for whatever challenge may face us in the future. As 
I said earlier, there are many of the experts, and you talk to the Lab 
Directors themselves, who recognize the importance of making the 
investments that need to be made in this if we are going to keep that 
nuclear arsenal ready.
  I wish to read one other quote again. Deputy Administrator D'Agostino 
said:

       Our plans for investment in and modernization of the modern 
     security enterprise are essential, irrespective of whether or 
     not the START treaty is ratified.

  I suspect before all is said and done, the START treaty will be 
ratified. But in any event, this process needed to be undertaken 
irrespective of whether there is a treaty because it is that important 
to the future of our country and our national security.
  Again, if I might point out, very briefly, what this amendment does, 
the resolution of ratification must clearly call for a condition that 
the President will provide an annual update to the section 1251 report 
in that as a condition the President will certify prior to entry into 
force of the treaty that he intends to accelerate the design and 
engineering phase of the chemical facility and the uranium processing 
facility, request full funding for both of those facilities upon 
completion of the design and engineering phase of the plan, and an 
understanding that failure to fund the modernization plan would 
constitute a basis for withdrawal from the START treaty.
  This is, again, a fairly straightforward amendment. The Senator from 
Arizona has done, as has already been noted, a superb job of putting on 
the radar screen of all Members of the Senate the essential and 
critical nature of getting this issue of modernization addressed. He 
deserves great credit for doing that. I appreciate the work of the 
Senator from Massachusetts in cooperating with him in this treaty 
process to have these amendments and this language accepted because it 
is essential.
  I think it will make not only this treaty stronger, but it will also 
make the nuclear complex that much stronger. And that, of course, is 
absolutely essential when it comes to America's national security 
interests.
  So I support the amendment of the Senator from Arizona. I hope it 
will be accepted and adopted in the resolution of ratification, and 
that before this treaty is adopted this essential issue will be not 
only addressed, as it is in the underlying treaty, but addressed--that 
language even strengthened and made more durable by these amendments.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Casey.) The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. UDALL of New Mexico. Mr. President, I yield my hour of 
postcloture time to Senator Kerry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The Senator from 
Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New Mexico very 
much. I do not intend to use that much time, but we will see what 
develops here.
  Let me speak quickly to this amendment. I want to begin by saying 
everyone in this Senate is respectful of how hard the Senator from 
Arizona has worked to bring attention, appropriate attention, to the 
effort to keep up our nuclear deterrent. He has pushed to correct what 
this administration saw as too many years of neglect for the work of 
the nuclear weapons complex. I am glad to say this administration has 
not only heard him, but many other Members of the Senate, from both 
sides of the aisle, have joined in this effort to call attention to the 
modernization needs of our nuclear deterrent.
  The administration has appropriately pushed hard for an unprecedented 
level of funding for this work. In these difficult budgetary times, I 
do not think anybody here would argue that moving a 10-year budget from 
$70 billion to over $85 billion, which they have done, what President 
Obama has done, shows an extraordinary commitment to this enterprise by 
this administration.
  That is why the three directors of the nuclear laboratories told 
Senator Lugar and me, ``The proposed budgets provide adequate support 
to sustain the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of 
America's nuclear deterrent within the limit of 1,550 deployed 
strategic warheads established by the

[[Page 23433]]

New START treaty, with adequate confidence and acceptable risk.''
  That is also why Tom D'Agostino, the head of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration, could say a few days ago, ``Having been 
appointed to my position by President George W. Bush, and reappointed 
by President Barack Obama, I can say with certainty that our nuclear 
infrastructure has never received the level of support that we have 
today.''
  Given all that has happened in the past year, all that has been 
certified and pledged, and all that we know the administration 
absolutely plans to do, it is hard to understand why anyone has a 
question about the nuclear stockpile provision at this point in time.
  This particular amendment, unnecessary therefore in the light of what 
I have just said, does not present fundamental problems in terms of the 
words ``to the extent possible we should accelerate.'' That is exactly 
what they are doing. They are accelerating, to the extent possible.
  But paragraph B presents a number of different issues. Most 
importantly, the amendment itself requires that the treaty not go into 
force until all of the these additional certifications are made. The 
administration has made it crystal clear that it is committed to 
funding these facilities. If you read the update section of the 1251 
report that the administration provided, at Senator Kyl's request, and 
they provided that in November, here is what they say: The 
administration is committed to fully fund the construction of the 
uranium processing facility and the chemistry-metallurgy research 
replacement, and is doing so in a manner that does not redirect funding 
from the core mission of managing the stockpile and sustaining the 
science, technology, and engineering foundation.
  So before we come to this moment, Senators were concerned about 
whether the administration was committed to the facilities. Then the 
administration made it very clear they are committed. The President 
made that commitment as clear as could be in 1251. Now the concern is, 
they are not building the facilities fast enough.
  Well, that runs completely contrary to what the people designing it 
think is happening and want to do. And, incidentally, if you put 
additional funding into hiring additional people, by the time you find 
them and get them, and they are qualified and they come, they are going 
to be finished with the job of the additional design and early 
construction planning.
  If this were a post office we were trying to think about building, 
maybe you could be a little more sanguine about saying, go ahead and 
accelerate it. But we are talking about multibillion-dollar, 
complicated facilities that require very significant, sensitive, 
difficult substances management. They are going to take a certain 
number of years to build. That is a reality. That is how complex and 
challenging the task is.
  The early cost and design estimates are that the uranium facility is 
going to cost somewhere between $4 billion and $6 billion, and the 
plutonium facility is going to cost about the same. So we all remember 
the old saying around here, we have got a lot of Senators who are 
talking about waste in the process of governance. The last thing we 
want to do in this budget, in my judgment, is create an environment of 
haste that does not measure properly what we are doing. We ought to 
listen to the experts on this a little bit, the people who are doing 
the design and the engineering, who tell us it is no simple matter in 
the world of nuclear weapons production. It involves hundreds of 
scientists and engineers working on every single aspect of the plant, 
in order to make sure it is going to work, that it is going to be 
secure, and it is going to be as safe as humanly possible.
  You cannot just throw money at an ongoing design and engineering 
effort and then automatically expect it can accelerate beyond an 
already significant increase. We have gone up $15 billion. If you hire 
a whole bunch of engineers who are new to the project, they do not know 
what they are doing yet. That is a recipe for both inefficiency and 
possibly even the increase of design risks or other kinds of issues.
  The truth is, if you cram all of these billions into a very short 
fiscal period, in addition to that, as this amendment seeks to try to 
force, you could unnecessarily create competition within other nuclear 
weapons activities, such as the ongoing warhead life extension 
programs, and our critical warhead surveillance efforts.
  The bottom line here is there is a place and a way to do this. We 
have an authorizing committee. The Armed Services Committee is the 
committee that ought to be doing this, not some amendment that comes in 
attached to the treaty, and linking the treaty going into force to all 
of these other things being certified.
  I think the Appropriations Committee, as well as the Armed Services 
Committee, would powerfully endorse that notion here on the floor at 
this point in time. We can compel the President to ask for upfront 
funding. But that does not guarantee that the President is necessarily 
going to receive it. And this links it to the notion he can certify 
that he has.
  So I agree with my colleague, the last administration took way too 
long to focus on this issue, and Senator Kyl has done an important 
service to the Senate, to the country, and to this process, to help to 
focus on it. But it makes no sense to use a resolution on a treaty to 
lock the President into doing something he cannot necessarily do 
because of the Congress and other things that are tied to it.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee is 
recognized.
  Mr. ALEXANDER. I ask unanimous consent to have 4 or 5 minutes.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. ALEXANDER. I listened to Senator Kerry's remarks just now. This 
is an excellent discussion. Not only do I applaud Senator Kyl for 
resurrecting the whole focus on nuclear modernization, I applaud the 
President for the updated report that was received on November 17. A 
lot of work was done. This is a lot of money to say we want to make 
sure these nuclear weapons work and we are going to spend $85 billion 
over 10 years.
  The intent of Senator Kyl's amendment, though, is not to tie the 
President's hands, it is to give him more options. I think it is to 
encourage this big, slow-moving government not to waste the money but 
to save money. The language says: The President shall certify to the 
Senate the President intends to accelerate, to the extent possible, the 
design and engineering phase.
  At the Oak Ridge facilities, which Senator Kyl visited, he was told 
that the savings annually to taxpayers of having the new facility 
versus the old facility are in excess of $200 million. So every year we 
do it, every year this is completed, the taxpayers save $200 million. 
So if the President and the Appropriations Committee should decide that 
a 2-year or 3-year advanced funding will save $200 million a year at a 
time when we are all dedicated to trying to save money, we should do 
that.
  You might say, well, why do we need to say this in the Senate? The 
answer is, we have never done it before. And the U.S. Government, if 
you have never done it before, takes a little nudge to pay attention to 
it.
  So Senator Kyl has made an amendment, and if I understand it 
correctly, Senator Kerry amended the amendment a little bit to make it 
softer, to say, the President intends to accelerate, to the extent 
possible. So this is suggesting to the Department of Energy, which has 
never done it this way before, that we think it is a good idea, if it 
is practical, and if it saves money.
  There is also the matter of getting it done on time. Senator Kyl 
talked about that, the dates we talked about in the executive session. 
So I would argue to my colleagues that the Kyl amendment is respectful 
of the President's prerogatives, which he ought to have. He is the 
manager of the government. He is the Commander in Chief. But it says: 
If we can think of a way to do this in a way that saves $200 million a 
year, year after year after year, why should we not do it?

[[Page 23434]]

  I will bet during the next session of Congress, if we do our job 
properly in this body, we are going to be competing with each other to 
find ways to save $10 million a year, $20 million a year, $100 million 
a year, because of the incredible deficit. We have got bipartisan 
concern about that deficit. We had two Democratic Senators and three 
Republican Senators support the debt commission.
  I would suggest to my friend from Massachusetts it is not possible 
that you have modified the Kyl amendment to the extent it ought to be 
accepted, so that the President can get a signal from the Senate that 
if he thinks he can do this, to the extent possible, that accelerating 
the building of these big facilities by 2 or 3 years, if it would save 
$400, $500, $600 million, that we want to encourage him to do that. 
That is my only thought.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator very much for his 
participation and contribution to this effort. I am trying to work to 
see if--as I have said, there are certain components of this that make 
it difficult to accept, that multiyear piece and so forth.
  But the notion of reaffirming the commitment the President has made 
is not difficult to make. From our judgment, the President has really 
addressed this as significantly as one can by putting the $85 billion 
there, by making it clear they are moving forward, they are going to 
fully fund it, and by helping the Appropriations Committee members to 
provide the letter which speaks to their good faith going forward. All 
of those steps have taken place.
  We just don't want to get into a situation where we are creating 
another hurdle to get over before the treaty goes into effect. If we 
could find a way as a declaration or some way to reframe this 
condition--I am working with the administration to see if we can do 
that--we would be happy to try to restate it.
  Mr. ALEXANDER. I thank the Senator. No one is doubting the 
President's commitment. He has made an extraordinary commitment. I 
congratulate him for that. It is just the suggestion of doing it a 
little differently, if the President thinks it is practical, because it 
might save $200 million a year, year after year after year. A 
suggestion from us like that could make the difference in those 
savings. I thank the Senator for working in that spirit.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. CASEY. I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 15 minutes.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, as we continue to work through the 
amendments, I rise to outline what is at stake in the debate and 
describe what the world would be like without the New START treaty 
accord.
  Every Senator here took an oath to support and defend the 
Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic. We have an 
obligation to support a strong national defense.
  First, a world without New START is one in which more nuclear 
missiles are pointed at Americans. This treaty reduces that number.
  A world without a New START accord is one in which we have no nuclear 
inspectors on the ground in Russia. These inspectors have more than a 
decade of experience inspecting Russian nuclear sites. They were 
involved in the negotiation process to ensure that there are strong 
inspection provisions in the treaty. But without New START, these 
inspectors would not be able to return to work. Furthermore, without 
onsite inspections, our intelligence services will still be required to 
collect information on Russia's nuclear weapons infrastructure.
  On December 20 of this year, ADM Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, wrote to the Senate:

       An extended delay in ratification may eventually force an 
     inordinate and unwise shift in scarce resources from other 
     high priority requirements to maintain adequate awareness of 
     Russian nuclear forces.

  In a world without New START, our intelligence capabilities will be 
stretched, which could give the enemies of our troops on the ground an 
advantage. We cannot allow that to happen.
  These are just some of the direct effects. What about some of the 
indirect effects of a world without New START? The cascade effect on 
U.S. national security interests without New START is substantial.
  A world without New START is one in which the Russians are less 
likely to provide land and air access to supply U.S. troops in 
Afghanistan. The Northern Distribution Network is a crucial supply 
route for our troops in Afghanistan. This means that just as we have 
reached full troop strength in Afghanistan, supply lines would become 
increasingly strained. Today, supply routes through Pakistan are 
increasingly dangerous. Just the other day, two fuel tankers meant to 
supply our troops were attacked and the drivers were killed in 
Pakistan. This is one of the reasons the leadership of our uniformed 
military want New START ratified.
  A world without New START is one in which there is more Russian 
fissile material in existence, material which could be stolen for use 
in a terrorist attack.
  There are many reasons top U.S. counterterrorism officials in the 
International Atomic Energy Agency want New START ratified.
  A world without New START is one in which Russia's Government is 
perhaps less likely to help stop Iran's nuclear weapons program. A 
world without New START is one in which Iran perhaps is given access to 
Russian S-300 missiles, a weapon capable of reaching the State of 
Israel. This is one reason the Anti-Defamation League, B'nai B'rith, 
the American Jewish Committee, and other prominent pro-Israel groups 
want New START ratified.
  In a world without New START, there is no way the Russians will agree 
to decrease their tactical nuclear weapons. Our friends in Eastern 
Europe and those across the continent will be less secure in the 
knowledge that threats to their security are not diminishing but could, 
in fact, be growing. That is the reason 25 European Foreign Ministers 
want this treaty ratified.
  A world without New START is one in which the 1970 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the so-called NPT, the cornerstone of preventing 
nuclear weapons states, is severely threatened. What does this mean in 
practical terms? The New START accord is a clear demonstration that the 
United States is upholding our obligations under the NPT, which in turn 
can help secure support from other countries for a strong arms control 
regime and assistance on other nonproliferation issues. Many countries 
see nuclear terrorism as a problem for the United States and for the 
West. In a world without New START, these countries would seriously 
question our commitment to the NPT. These countries would question that 
right away.
  Without New START, government officials around the world will 
question the U.S. commitment to nonproliferation itself. They will ask: 
If the United States is not seriously committed to arms control and 
nonproliferation, why should we be?
  A world without New START contains many hard realities for the United 
States. Ratification of this treaty is not a political victory for one 
party or another; it is a national security victory for our great 
Nation, for our nuclear security--from nuclear security, to the 
security of our troops in Afghanistan, to the security of our ally 
Israel.
  A world without New START is one in which the enemies of America will 
breathe a little easier. Strained U.S. supply lines make life easier 
for the Taliban. Fewer available intelligence capabilities would make 
life easier for al-Qaida terrorists in Pakistan tribal areas. A 
strained U.S.-Russian relationship makes life easier for the government 
of the regime in Iran.
  A world without New START makes life easier for terrorists 
trafficking in fissile material to travel across borders.

[[Page 23435]]

  A world without New START means no negotiations with the Russians to 
decrease their tactical nuclear weapons.
  The world I just described isn't a world we have to settle for. A 
world without New START is not a world we have to accept. We must give 
the American people some peace of mind as to our national security. 
That is a world with a New START treaty. We must ratify this treaty and 
diminish the number of nuclear weapons pointed at the United States 
today. We must deploy nuclear inspectors to Russia, thus returning 
stability and transparency to our nuclear relationship, and take the 
burden off of our intelligence agencies.
  A world with New START means a more constructive relationship with 
Russia, which is good for our troops in Afghanistan and bad for the 
regime in Iran.
  A world with New START means the beginning of a conversation with the 
Russians on tactical nuclear weapons.
  A world with New START is one in which there is less fissile material 
for terrorists to steal or buy on the black market.
  A world with New START means increased cooperation with countries 
combating nuclear terrorism. The most serious threat to U.S. national 
security is the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists. 
In 1961, at the United Nations, President John F. Kennedy said:

       Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of 
     Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of 
     being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by 
     madness.

  Some have observed that in this post-9/11 era of increased terrorism, 
we may be more vulnerable to a nuclear attack than we were during the 
Cold War. Today, the sword of Damocles still hangs by the slenderest of 
threads, but we have the ability to prevent this threat by minimizing 
access terrorists would have to nuclear material.
  President Obama's nuclear security summit earlier this year was a 
historic event. It helped create a foundation upon which other 
countries will take up the challenge of nuclear security and cooperate 
with the United States to accomplish the President's goal of securing 
all fissile material in 4 years. We cannot do this alone. In order to 
confront this most serious threat to U.S. national security, we need to 
build stronger ties with our allies around the world, and part of 
building that trust is rebuilding our own credibility on 
nonproliferation issues. This New START agreement is a very positive 
step in that direction. It is an essential predicate for fulfilling our 
commitments under the nonproliferation treaty--a key marker for many 
potential allies on a range of nuclear security issues. Upon 
ratification of New START, we must make progress on securing fissile 
material around the world.
  This is a strong resolution of ratification. It passed out of the 
Foreign Relations Committee by a bipartisan vote of 14 to 4. It 
includes strong language on missile defense, verification, and tactical 
nuclear weapons.
  Finally, the American people are watching. According to a November 
2010 CNN poll, 73 percent of Americans support ratification of this 
treaty. They understand the implications of a world without the New 
START agreement.
  In a hurricane of partisan rancor and political battles, the national 
security consensus is as strong as an oak tree in support of the New 
START agreement--all six living former Secretaries of State, five 
former Secretaries of Defense, three former National Security Advisers, 
seven former commanders of the U.S. Strategic Command, the entire Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, our intelligence services, the President, and three 
former Presidents.
  The American people have a right to expect ratification of New START. 
They want New START and will hold us accountable if we do not ratify 
it. Let's vote for New START's resolution of ratification and cast a 
strong bipartisan vote in favor of our national security.
  I close with commendations for both our chairman, Senator Kerry, and 
Ranking Member Lugar and so many others who have worked so hard to make 
sure we can ratify this treaty.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Texas is 
recognized.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, may I inquire, is there any time 
limitation on Senators at this point?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senate is operating 
postcloture, and each Senator has up to 1 hour.
  Mr. CORNYN. I thank the Chair. I assure my colleagues, I will not use 
the full hour, which I am sure is good news.
  Mr. President, I oppose the ratification of the New START treaty for 
the reasons many of my colleagues have articulated and to which I have 
previously spoken. The treaty requires unilateral reductions of the 
United States on strategic nuclear weapons. It fails to address 
tactical nuclear weapons--an area in which the Russian Federation has a 
10-to-1 advantage. This is not an idle or incidental matter.
  GEN Nikolai Patrusheb, Secretary of the Russian National Security 
Council, a body in charge of military doctrine, has declared that 
Russia may not only use nuclear weapons preemptively in local conflicts 
such as Georgia or Chechnya but may deliver a nuclear blow against the 
aggressor in a critical situation, based on intelligence evaluations of 
his intentions.
  I submit also that the verification provisions of this treaty are 
weak, allowing only 18 inspections a year for an arsenal of more than 
1,500 weapons. Obviously, the ability to get more than a sampling of 
Russian Federation compliance would be impossible given the relatively 
few number of inspections permitted under the treaty.
  As we have discussed off and on over the last few days, the preamble 
of the treaty itself is ambiguous and has been construed by the 
Russians themselves as limiting the ability of the United States to 
expand its own missile defense system.
  I realize the President of the United States has submitted a letter 
stating his unilateral opinion of what that treaty obligation means, 
but, of course, treaty obligations are not unilateral declarations, 
they are bilateral agreements. Of course, the consequence of a 
misunderstanding over this important issue of missile defense could 
allow either side to withdraw from the treaty and, indeed, the threat 
of withdrawal from the treaty because of this misunderstanding is 
something that could be avoided in the first instance if, in fact, some 
of the amendments addressing missile defense were allowed and the 
treaty modified to that extent. At that time, the Russians could then 
be asked: Will you agree with this modification, and we would know 
upfront, not on the back end, their sincere intentions.
  But I would say that the New START treaty has flaws when you look at 
it, not only in its various provisions; that is, when you reason from 
the whole to its parts, but I would suggest the treaty also fails when 
you look at it the other way around, when you reason from the parts to 
the whole, when you see this treaty is another example, another 
symptom, of a foreign policy that sends a message of timidity, even 
ambivalence, not only about our own security but about America's 
leadership role in a very dangerous world.
  This larger strategic context is what we need to keep in mind. We all 
know that President Obama has set incredibly high expectations for his 
Presidency in terms of how he would conduct American foreign policy. In 
an early Presidential debate, for example, he promised to meet with the 
leaders of five rogue nations--Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, and North 
Korea--``without precondition during the first year of [his] 
administration.'' Well, we now know that never happened.
  After he won the nomination, you will recall, in his famous speech he 
gave in the city of Berlin, while still a candidate for the Presidency, 
he declared he was a ``citizen of the world.'' Also, he said: ``This is 
the moment when we must come together to save this planet.''
  President Obama was not the only one promoting a grandiose vision of 
his

[[Page 23436]]

Presidency. Remember the Nobel Prize Committee received his nomination 
for the Peace Prize less than 6 weeks after President Obama took 
office. In the citation for the award last year, they said:

       [President] Obama has as President created a new climate in 
     international politics. . . .
       Only very rarely has a person to the same extent as Obama 
     captured the world's attention and given its people hope for 
     a better future.

  You might ask, What relevance does this have to our consideration of 
the START treaty? The relevance is that a big part of this utopian 
dream of a ``new climate in international politics'' has been the 
elimination of all nuclear weapons.
  In that Berlin speech, then-Senator Obama said that one of his 
priorities was to ``renew the goal of a world without nuclear 
weapons.''
  The citation for the Nobel Peace Prize included this observation:

       The Committee has attached special importance to Obama's 
     vision of and work for a world without nuclear weapons.
       The vision of a world free from nuclear arms has powerfully 
     stimulated disarmament and arms control negotiations.

  Indeed, in an op-ed piece, authored by the Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, dated April 7, 2010, in the Guardian, she argues that the 
START treaty is an important step toward a nuclear-free world.
  So you might ask, what is wrong with a vision of the world without 
nuclear weapons? Can't we hope and dream? Of course, even without 
nuclear weapons, we know that in World War I and World War II tens of 
millions of people lost their lives in armed conflict. So it is not as 
if a world without nuclear weapons is a world without war and a world 
without danger for peace-loving nations such as ours and our allies.
  We also know that any number of foreign policy experts have expressed 
serious reservations about indulging in this fantasy of a world without 
nuclear weapons.
  George Kennan has said:

       The evil of these utopian enthusiasms was not only or even 
     primarily the wasted time, the misplaced emphasis, the 
     encouragement of false hopes. The evil lay primarily in the 
     fact that those enthusiasms distracted our gaze for the real 
     things that were happening. . . .The cultivation of these 
     utopian schemes, flattering to our own image of ourselves, 
     took place at the expense of our feeling for reality.

  The President of the United States has not only mused about fantastic 
notions that have no basis in the real world, he has criticized his own 
country on foreign soil so often that some called that particular trip 
``the world apology tour.''
  So what should our competitors and would-be adversaries make of these 
statements of a fantasy world that is nuclear free and a President who 
travels abroad and apologizes for America's strength? Regretfully, I 
can only conclude it sends an impression of weakness and a lack of 
determination to maintain America's leadership in the world. We know 
there are dangerous consequences associated with an interpretation by 
others that America has lost its resolve to lead the world or to 
maintain its own security and to protect its allies.
  President Reagan said famously:

       We maintain the peace through our strength; weakness only 
     invites aggression.

  Experience has proven the truth of those words.
  We should recall that the President of the United States conducted 
YouTube diplomacy by recording a video for Iran's leaders--but then 
withheld comment when those same leaders were brutally crushing a pro-
democracy movement and their own people's hopes for freedom.
  The President has treated several of our allies without the respect 
they deserve. Some have been, like Britain, slighted; others, like 
Israel, have been lectured; and other of our allies have been thrown 
under the bus on missile defense, like Poland and the Czech Republic.
  He has been so idealistic and naive, you might say, about the subject 
of nuclear weapons that President Sarkozy of France remarked about it 
publicly at a meeting of the United Nations Security Council. He said:

       We live in the real world, not in a virtual one. . . .
       President Obama himself has said that he dreams of a world 
     without nuclear weapons.
       Before our very eyes, two countries are doing exactly the 
     opposite at this very moment.

  President Sarkozy said:

       Since 2005, Iran has violated five Security Council 
     Resolutions. . . .

  He said:

       I support America's ``extended hand.'' But what have these 
     proposals for dialogue produced for the international 
     community?
       Nothing but more enriched uranium and more centrifuges.
       And last but not least, it has resulted in a statement by 
     Iranian leaders calling for wiping off the map a Member of 
     the United Nations.

  I fear the New START treaty will serve as another data point in the 
narrative of weakness, pursuing diplomacy for its own sake--or 
indulging in a utopian dream of a world without nuclear weapons, 
divorced from hard reality.
  Last week, I mentioned that Doug Feith, formerly of the Defense 
Department, helped negotiate the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, 
known as the SORT treaty. Mr. Feith said that during the negotiations 
of the SORT treaty, the Russians were constantly trying to get the 
United States to negotiate away our right to defend ourselves from 
missile attacks through a robust missile defense program.
  The Bush administration rightly rejected those Russian demands and--
you know what--we got a good treaty anyway. The Obama administration, 
on the other hand, gave Russia what it wanted--or what it says it 
wanted--among other concessions. But that is not the only concession 
that was given under the New START treaty.
  I would ask my colleagues, Where are the concessions that Russia made 
to us in this treaty? Where are the concessions that Russia made to us? 
And what in the treaty is a good deal for the United States?
  But my colleagues may reply, So what. So what if the Obama 
administration's world view is a little bit naive. So what if the 
Russians negotiated a much better deal for themselves than the Obama 
administration got for the United States. Shouldn't we go ahead and 
approve the treaty anyway? What harm could it do? Couldn't it help 
build a better relationship with the Russian Federation and help 
transform America's reputation in the world?
  Those are actually good questions. But the answers are sobering. The 
administration has long argued that its approach to diplomacy was not 
only good for its own sake, but it would strengthen relationships with 
nations all around the world. I would ask you, how has that worked out?
  Charles Krauthammer reviewed the global response to President Obama's 
diplomatic overtures in this way. He said:

       Unilateral American concessions and offers of unconditional 
     engagement have moved neither Iran nor Russia nor North Korea 
     to accommodate us.
       Nor have the Arab states--or even the powerless Palestinian 
     Authority--offered so much as a gesture of accommodation in 
     response to heavy and gratuitous American pressure on Israel.
       Nor have even our Europe allies responded: They have anted 
     up essentially nothing in response to our pleas for more 
     assistance in Afghanistan.

  And, of course, we could look at the results of the New START treaty 
itself. Russian leaders have responded to American concessions with 
contempt. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said that the 
treaty ``cannot be opened up and become the subject of new 
negotiations.'' Prime Minister Putin has threatened a new arms race if 
Russia does not get its way with this version of the treaty. Russian 
leaders have the temerity to lecture and attempt to intimidate the 
Senate from discharging our constitutional responsibilities. We should 
not succumb.
  In deciding whether to vote for the treaty, I would respectfully ask 
whether some Senators have been asking themselves the wrong question. 
Instead of asking ourselves the question, Why not ratify? What is the 
harm? I would suggest that the better question is, Why should we? I 
would urge my colleagues to vote against this treaty not

[[Page 23437]]

because I do not care about the message it will send to Russia and 
other nations but because I do care about that message, and it is time 
we stop sending a message of weakness that only encourages our 
adversaries.
  I urge my colleagues to vote no on this treaty, to require the 
administration to go back to the negotiating table with the Russians, 
to get a better deal for the United States, and to make clear that the 
era of unilateral American concessions is over.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. VITTER addressed the Chair.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I would simply ask to get a sense of how 
long the Senator thinks he might speak. We might line up the next 
speaker.
  Mr. VITTER. Five minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the 
Senator from Louisiana is finished, the Senator from Florida, Mr. 
Nelson, be recognized for 5 minutes.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank my colleague.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Louisiana is 
recognized.
  Mr. VITTER. Mr. President, I too am opposing the ratification of this 
New START treaty because I think it makes us less secure, not more 
secure, as a nation. Of course, that has to be the ultimate test.
  A toughly negotiated, balanced treaty with Russia which allowed for 
adequate and reliable inspections and data exchange could make us more 
secure. But this is not such a treaty. It is clear to me that President 
Obama went into negotiations willing to give up almost anything for a 
treaty, and that basic posture produced what it always will--a bad deal 
for us.
  The proponents of the treaty suggest as much when they lay out as 
their top arguments for ratification: a better relationship with 
Russia, the help from Russia on other issues that ratification could 
engender, and progress with world opinion.
  I think it is dangerous to count on any of that or to look at all 
beyond the four corners of the treaty--the pros and cons of the details 
and the substance of the treaty itself.
  When I look within the four corners of the treaty, I am particularly 
concerned about four cons of the treaty.
  First, serious roadblocks to missile defense: I think it is a 
fundamental mistake and a dangerous precedent for any treaty on 
offensive arms to even mention missile defense, and Russia has made it 
clear that any major progress on U.S. missile defense will cause them 
to leave the treaty. Particularly with President Obama in office, this 
creates real political obstacles to the full missile defense I support 
and the American people support in great numbers. Indeed, President 
Obama has already abandoned our missile defense sites in Eastern Europe 
to help produce an agreement on this treaty by the Russians.
  Second, fundamentally imbalanced arms reductions: In this treaty, we 
reduce our nuclear arms significantly; Russia stays where they already 
are. Meanwhile, we still aren't getting to the issue of tactical 
weapons, a category where Russia has a huge 10-to-1 advantage. We have 
talked about that for decades, and we still aren't getting there. 
Clearly, when the United States has leverage to commit Russia to reduce 
their tactical nuclear weapons as we do right now before this treaty, 
and those nuclear weapons are the most vulnerable to end up in 
terrorists' hands, we must use that leverage and not throw it away for 
U.S. and global security. Instead, proponents of this treaty argue that 
a further treaty addressing tactical nuclear weapons in the future will 
materialize, but the leverage we have to get there is being given up, 
essentially, with this treaty.
  Third, inability to verify: This treaty does not give us the 
inspections and data we need to verify Russian compliance, and we know 
Russia has cheated on every previous arms control treaty with us. 
Verification is clearly less under New START than in START I, but it 
now needs to be greater because the nuclear deterrent under this treaty 
would be much smaller and thus produce much less room for error.
  Fourth and finally, major but ultimately inadequate progress on 
nuclear modernization: Now, major progress has been made during the 
ratification debate on the administration's commitment and concrete 
plans for nuclear modernization. I thank everyone who has helped 
produce that, particularly the leader in that effort, Senator Jon Kyl, 
for his work which, again, did produce real progress. But, ultimately, 
neither the specificity of the administration's commitment, including 
on the nuclear triad issue, nor the proposed schedule is adequate to 
our security needs, so I will certainly continue fighting to get where 
we need to be.
  So, in closing, I urge my colleagues to look hard at this treaty and 
to ask the only ultimate question: Does it make us less secure or more 
secure? I think clearly for the four major reasons I have outlined, and 
others, it makes us less secure, and we need to do far better.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Florida is 
recognized.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise in support of the New 
START treaty. I wish to make a comment. I was raised in a time that 
when the President of the United States went abroad, he spoke for our 
country and there was no partisanship when that occurred.
  It is troubling to this Senator to hear comments about our President 
when he goes abroad in an apology tour. I would beg to differ, and I 
think we ought to rise above that partisanship when issues of national 
security are at stake.
  Now to the treaty. This agreement with Russia is going to strengthen 
our national security. Look at all the people in the Pentagon who have 
embraced it--the former Secretaries of State, the former Secretaries of 
Defense, from both sides of the political aisle, and it deserves our 
support too. I expect today we are going to get an overwhelming 
bipartisan vote in favor of this treaty.
  I wish to specifically address the question that has been raised 
about modernization of our nuclear stockpile--an issue I had the 
privilege, as chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee of the Armed 
Services Committee, to be engaged in over a 4-year period. Arguments 
have been made that somehow this treaty is going to interfere with the 
modernization of our nuclear weapons infrastructure. Well, it is 
exactly the opposite. Ratification of this treaty is so important to 
give security and stability to the question of the use of those nuclear 
weapons that it will allow us to spend the needed resources on the 
modernization of our nuclear complex, which is an equally important 
matter.
  As part of this year's Nuclear Posture Review, the administration has 
made a commitment to modernize our nuclear weapons arsenal and the 
complex. We must do so to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent because 
as these weapons in stockpile age, we have to update them and we have 
to modernize them so they are effective, secure, but also safe. We need 
to be sure our nuclear weapons are going to work as designed and that 
they will remain stable and secure.
  In the past, when we maintained a larger and more expensive nuclear 
stockpile, our weapons were developed and tested frequently. That is 
very expensive. By the mid-1990s, we had developed sophisticated 
computer models that can identify and resolve the problems without the 
nuclear testing. Unfortunately, because of lessened funding back in the 
era of about 2006 that research diminished, resulting in the layoffs of 
a lot of the people in our National Labs. I have had the privilege of 
visiting those three National Labs. There is an incredible array of 
talent, but that is what happened back in 2006.
  I think we have, especially in this administration, a new resolve to 
turning the situation around and to modernizing the nuclear complex. So 
what does this modernization entail? The comprehensive plan includes an 
$85 billion investment over the next decade and a $4 billion increase 
over the next

[[Page 23438]]

5 years, and that investment is going to accomplish several things. It 
is going to fund the construction of the 21st century uranium and 
plutonium processing facilities, it is going to spur a reinvestment in 
the scientists and engineers who perform the mission, and it is going 
to enhance the lifetime extension program for our nuclear weapons. By 
the way, it is not only just extending the life of those weapons, it is 
also making them safer.
  Some Senators have expressed concerns about the level of funding for 
this modernization. I believe our President and this administration 
have adequately addressed those concerns, and I would note that the 
Directors of the three labs--Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and 
Sandia--all believe the administration's current plan will allow them 
to execute their requirements for ensuring a safe, secure, reliable, 
and effective stockpile.
  While we move forward with that modernization program, we should also 
move forward--it is a separate issue--with the treaty. Passing this 
treaty is going to safeguard our national security while demonstrating 
to the men and women of our nuclear complex that we have reached a 
national consensus on nuclear sustainability.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that cosponsors be 
added to Corker amendment No. 4904, as modified, as follows: Senator 
Lieberman, Senator Brown of Massachusetts, and Senator Murkowski.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we are awaiting the Senator from Arizona 
who, I know, is working on a couple of things right now. We need to 
clear a couple of things with the Senator, and we are working on the 
possibility of accepting his amendment. We just need to tie up those 
loose ends.
  So I think the Senator from Wyoming may have had a request he wanted 
to make. We can do that now, and then we will see where we are.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on the importance 
of Minutemen III intercontinental ballistic missiles, known as ICBMs, 
and an amendment I intend to offer. The ICBM is just one leg of our 
nuclear triad. The nuclear triad spans sea, air, and land. It relies on 
mobile bombers, hard-to-detect ballistic missile submarines, and ICBMs. 
They all work together to complicate and deter any attempt at a 
successful first strike on our country. Like a stool, if you shorten 
just one leg too much, the stool will become unstable.
  Our nuclear triad is not just a weapons system, it is a deterrent. 
The further we weaken our nuclear forces, the less of a deterrent our 
triad will become.
  Those folks who believe in nuclear zero and arms control seek a world 
without nuclear weapons at any expense--in my opinion, never at the 
expense of our national security. The fact is, for over 50 years our 
ICBM force has deterred a nuclear attack against the United States and 
our allies.
  Some arms control supporters claim our ICBMs are on ``hair-trigger 
alert.'' They believe an ICBM can be launched by simply pushing a 
button. This misleading claim that an unauthorized launch can destroy 
the world in a matter of minutes could not be further from the truth.
  GEN Kevin Chilton, the outgoing commander of STRATCOM, once described 
our nuclear posture as:

       The weapon is in the holster . . . the holster has two 
     combination locks on it, it takes two people to open those 
     locks, and they can't do it without authenticated orders from 
     the President of the United States.

  The Minuteman III ICBM force is the most stabilizing leg of the 
nuclear triad.
  ICBMs are strategically located and broadly dispersed in order to 
prevent them from successfully being attacked. The ICBMs protect the 
survivability of other legs of the triad as a deterrent. They offer an 
umbrella of protection to our most-valued allies. ICBMs also represent 
the most cost-effective delivery systems the United States processes. 
Unlike a bomber, ICBMs ensure a second attack capability.
  As required by section 1251 of the 2010 National Defense 
Authorization Act, earlier this year, the administration submitted its 
force structure plan. The President's 1251 force structure plan 
provides up to 420 ICBMs, 14 submarines carrying up to 240 submarine-
launched ballistic missiles or SLBMs, and up to 60 nuclear-capable 
heavy bombers.
  We are being asked to ratify this treaty without knowing what our 
force structure will actually be. We are being told: Pass the treaty, 
and then we will tell you what the force structure will actually look 
like.
  The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review laid out our force structure in plain 
view, while the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review is silent on the force 
structure.
  This report also laid out the administration's plan to modernize and 
maintain our nuclear delivery vehicles.
  With respect to the next generation of ICBMs, the update states:

       While a decision on an ICBM follow-on is not needed for 
     several years, preparatory analysis is needed and is in fact 
     now underway. This work will consider a range of deployment 
     options, with the objective of defining a cost-effective 
     approach for an ICBM follow-on that supports continued 
     reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons while promoting stable 
     deterrence.

  The amendment I plan to offer has no impact on the treaty. It simply 
requires the President to certify that further reductions in our land-
based strategic nuclear deterrent will not be considered when reviewing 
the options for a follow-on ICBM. This is something I have worked on 
with Senator Conrad. He has a second-degree amendment to mine, and it 
is something we both support.
  LTG Frank Klotz, the new commander of Global Strike Command, was 
quoted last year at the Air Force Air and Space Conference and 
Technology Exposition here in Washington, DC, as saying:

       Continuously on alert and deployed in 450 widely dispersed 
     locations, the size and characteristics of the overall 
     Minuteman III force presents any potential adversary with an 
     almost insurmountable challenge should he contemplate 
     attacking the United States. Because he cannot disarm the 
     ICBM force without nearly exhausting his own forces in the 
     process, and at the same time, leaving himself vulnerable to 
     our sea-launched ballistic missiles and bombers, he has no 
     incentive to strike in the first place. In this case, numbers 
     do matter . . . and the ICBM thus contributes immeasurably to 
     both deterrence and stability in a crisis.

  The force structure of our nuclear triad is critical to maintaining 
an effective deterrent.
  In 2008, Secretary Gates coauthored a white paper titled ``National 
Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century.'' This paper argued 
for a strong nuclear deterrent. The forward stated:

       We believe the logic presented here provides a sound basis 
     on which this and future administrations can consider further 
     adjustments to U.S. nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and 
     force structure.

  The white paper by Secretary Gates recommended a U.S. strategic 
nuclear force baseline that includes 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, 14 Ohio 
class submarines, and 76 bombers, 20 B-2 and 26 B-52 bombers, for a 
total of 862. The administration cannot explain how the threat 
environment has changed since the 2008 recommendation to maintain 862 
delivery vehicles. They cannot explain what has changed to allow our 
nuclear deterrent to be reduced to 700 delivery vehicles.
  It sounds to me as if this administration has been a little too eager 
in negotiating the treaty.
  James Woolsey, in a recent Wall Street Journal article, described his 
experiences negotiating with the Russians. He said:

       The Soviets taught me that, when dealing with Russian 
     counterparts, don't appear eager--friendly, yes, eager, 
     never.

  I think Mr. Woolsey would know; he was involved in the SALT I treaty 
in 1970 and many more arms control agreements with the Russians before 
he took over as the Director of Central Intelligence.

[[Page 23439]]

  I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 4880, a Barrasso-
Enzi amendment, and then a second-degree by Senator Conrad.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, as the Senator knows, we had a discussion 
about this, and I am constrained to object. I think he understands why. 
I welcome further debate if he would like, but I must object.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Objection is heard.
  Mr. BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for the issue, as it is 
important. I understand its importance to the part of the country where 
those particular weapons are housed today. I am confident--and I know 
this--that the administration, because we have talked about it, has a 
plan that I think will meet with the consent and approval of the 
Senators' concern, but they need to go through the further evaluation 
and analysis of all of these decisions. Decisions have not yet been 
made, and it would be inappropriate at this time to constrain the 
latitude they need in order to be able to make those judgments. It is 
an important issue, but I think it is inappropriate for us to constrain 
them and particularly to do so in the context of the treaty itself.
  Mr. President, we are working with our friends on the other side of 
the aisle to really try to get the final agreement as to how we are 
going to proceed. I believe it is going to be possible for us to work 
out the issues with Senator Kyl and his amendment. So I hope we will 
not need any other votes other than the final vote on the treaty. That 
is our hope at this point. We will try to work through that over the 
course of the next few minutes.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, knowing that we are getting to that moment 
at which point we are going to have an understanding of how we are 
proceeding forward and knowing that because of the 30-hour limitation, 
no matter what, we are getting toward the end, rather than chew up time 
for Senators later on, I thought I would take a moment now to say thank 
you to a few folks involved in this process. Before I do that, I also 
will reserve some time, as I will for Senator Kyl and Senator Lugar--
and this, I assume, will be part of the agreement we are going to 
reach--to speak to the substance of the treaty at the appropriate time 
before we vote.
  It has been an incredible team effort by an awful lot of people over 
the course of a lot of months. I wish to thank all of them for their 
involvement.
  Senator Lugar has been an unbelievable partner and a visionary with 
respect to these issues but, importantly, just a very steady, wise, and 
thoughtful collaborator in the effort to get the treaty to where we are 
today. It hasn't always been easy for him because there were times when 
he was a lonely voice with respect to those who were prepared to 
support this treaty. I wish to pay tribute to his statesmanship and his 
personal courage in steadily hanging in there with us.
  I thank President Obama for his determination to make certain that 
this was the priority that he felt it was and that I think it is. He 
and so many folks in the administration have been helpful in this 
effort.
  I will reserve some comments later more specifically, but I think the 
Vice President has been, at the President's request, an invaluable 
collaborator in this effort. He has talked to any number of colleagues, 
made any number of phone calls, been involved in any number of 
strategic choices here, and I am deeply grateful to him for taking his 
prior stewardship of this committee and being as thoughtful as he has 
been in the way he has approached this particular treaty.
  Secretary Clinton likewise has dedicated herself and her staff to the 
effort to work through unbelievable numbers of questions, to make 
themselves available and to make herself available to talk with 
colleagues.
  This has been a tremendous team effort with Secretary Gates, 
Secretary Chu, Admiral Mullen, General Chilton, LTG O'Reilly, and 
others. None of these things can happen if there isn't a team pulling 
together to answer questions and deal with the issues colleagues have.
  At the State Department, Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller has 
been unbelievably available, patient, thoughtful, and very detailed in 
her efforts to answer the questions of Senators and be precise about 
this negotiation. She led a tremendous team and worked very closely 
with Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Rich Verma, 
who likewise helped coordinate and pull people together to deal with 
the issues we faced. Dave Turk, Terri Lodge, Paul Dean, and Marcie Ries 
have all been key members of that team, and we thank them for their 
amazing commitment of hours and the dedication they have shown to the 
effort to try to get us to where we are today, to this final vote.
  Likewise, at the Pentagon, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Jim 
Miller; the chief Defense Department representative on the negotiating 
team, Ted Warner; Marcell Lettre; Eric Pierce; Michael Elliott; and 
Chris Comeau--all of them, together with the State Department, provided 
the kind of linkage we needed and the consistent effort to answer 
questions and deal with their principals in order to get the 
information necessary for Senators to be able to make good judgments.
  At the Energy Department, Tom D'Agostino and Kurt Siemon were also 
constantly available.
  At the White House, I thank Pete Rouse, chief of staff, and Tom 
Donilon, the National Security Adviser, and I especially thank Brian 
McKeon, Vice President Biden's National Security Deputy, who has just 
done an extraordinary job of helping to provide the bridge between 
various agencies, as well as strategy, and has been consistently 
available to us. Louisa Terrell and Jon Wolfsthal have been part of 
that team. We are very grateful to all of them.
  On the Foreign Relations Committee, it has been a great team effort 
with Senator Lugar. The chief of staff of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Frank Lowenstein, has worked countless hours on this treaty, 
together with Doug Frantz, Ed Levine, and Anthony Wier. These two 
gentlemen, Ed Levine and Anthony Wier, are unbelievable veterans of 
this kind of effort. They worked with Senator Biden for years. I am 
delighted they were willing to stay over and continue with the 
committee.
  In the case of Ed Levine, he lost his dad during the course of this 
debate a few days ago and, nevertheless, hung in there with us and 
stayed right at it. The wisdom and experience he has brought to this 
task is invaluable, together with his collaborator Anthony Wier. Peter 
Scoblic, Andrew Keller, Jason Bruder, and Jen Berlin have been enormous 
contributors to this effort. I am grateful to all of them.
  On the Republican side, Ken Myers--Ken brings so much experience and 
wisdom to this task. He has been with Senator Lugar for a long time. 
What he has done to help us bridge the divide is immeasurable. Tom 
Moore and Mike Mattler worked with him.
  Our staff in S-116, which has sort of been headquarters for us, Meg 
Murphy and Matt Dixon have put up with strange hours and interruptions. 
We are eternally grateful to them.
  Obviously, nothing happens in the Senate without the floor staff, the 
folks who put in these long hours. Jessica Lewis and Tommy Ross on 
Senator Reid's staff have been invaluable to us. Lula Davis, Tim 
Mitchell, and Stacy Rich are invaluable on every issue here. The Senate 
would not work without them. We are deeply grateful to all these 
people.
  I am glad the schedule allows us a moment where we can actually thank

[[Page 23440]]

them all publicly. They do a service for our country that many people 
in the country never have a sense of. They do not see it. Government 
gets a lot of criticism, but let me tell you, these folks work as hard 
as any people I know anywhere, and a lot of things could not happen 
without them.
  As I said, I wish to speak to the substance of the treaty before we 
vote, but for the moment I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I wish to seize the moment, along with my 
distinguished chairman, because we are indebted to all the great people 
he has enumerated, to embellish his congratulations by mentioning that 
we are grateful, first of all, that the President invited Senator Kerry 
and me to be part of conversations on two occasions during the 
negotiation of the treaty. That, we thought, was very valuable and gave 
us some insight as to where the negotiators were headed and to offer 
what counsel we could about those issues we felt were important and 
those issues we were certain all Senators would feel were important as 
we sought ratification of the New START treaty.
  Likewise, those conversations were carried on rigorously by the Vice 
President, our former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Joe Biden, who has worked with Senator Kerry and with me 
over the course of three decades or so of active participation and 
several arms control treaties. Vice President Biden has a very good 
idea of how the ratification process works and what counsel he can 
give, not only to us but to all Members and colleagues with whom he has 
worked so well in the past.
  I am especially pleased, likewise, that Rose Gottemoeller, who headed 
the negotiation team, has been very available to Senators throughout 
the time of the negotiation abroad and during her trips to Washington 
and certainly throughout the hearings the Foreign Relations Committee 
held.
  We are indebted, in fact, to all the witnesses who came before our 
committee in the 16 hearings that have often been enumerated in 
conversation on the floor. The witnesses were generous with their time, 
very forthcoming with their testimony and followup questions the 
Senators had. Because of that testimony, there is a very solid block of 
support for the treaty based upon these distinguished Americans who 
have had enormous experience, not only with arms control treaties but 
the actual implementation of these with the former Soviet Union--and 
now with Russia--in the past.
  I am indebted, as John Kerry is, to Ken Myers, Tom Moore and Mike 
Mattler of our staff and to Marik String and Corey Gill. I cite these 
five members of a very devoted staff who have devoted extraordinary 
talents and time and devotion to the treaty formulation and to the 
counsel they have given me, for which I am very much indebted.
  Finally, I thank all the members of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee for their diligence and attendance at hearings and their 
questioning of each other, as well as the witnesses and the discussions 
we have had both in informal and formal sessions. We have had a 
difference of opinions. Our views were not unanimous in the 14-to-4 
vote by which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent this New 
START treaty to the floor. But I respect deeply each of those views, 
and I respect the ways in which members of the committee have 
participated during this very important debate.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I say Merry Christmas to all my 
colleagues. We never expected to find ourselves here this time of year, 
but obviously there are very important issues to discuss.
  On November 2, Americans made a pretty historic statement. After 2 
years of many things being crammed down their throat that they did not 
like, they made historic changes in the House and the Senate. I think 
all expectations were that the new Congress would come in and begin to 
change things. Very few Americans--and I think very few of us in the 
Senate--actually thought we would use the time between that election 
and the swearing in of the new Members of Congress to continue to cram 
through more things America does not want.
  Most businesses have learned that if they ever have to make the 
difficult decision of firing someone, it is very important that person 
be sent home right away because getting fired usually makes people 
angry and less loyal to the company that fired them. Instead of dealing 
with all the mischief that might occur, the fired employee is sent home 
right away.
  We are a fired Congress in a lot of ways. America has sent us home. 
Many people who set the policies for the last 2 years have been 
unelected. Some have retired. But the decisions that are being made now 
in this Congress are decisions being made by people who have either 
retired or who have been turned out of office. So much is being pushed 
through because of the fear that if we actually let the newly elected 
Congressmen and Senators be sworn in before we take up these important 
issues that they will actually reflect the opinions of the American 
people and stop what we are doing.
  We have decided to use this lameduck session to push many items 
through. It is a very unaccountable Congress. We tried to push through 
a huge omnibus spending bill with thousands of earmarks, exactly the 
thing about which Americans have said no more. Thankfully, Republicans 
stood together to stop that bill.
  We needed to extend our current tax rates, but even in order to get a 
temporary extension, we in the minority had to agree to more deficit 
spending. In this lameduck session, we have pushed our political 
correctness on to our military by repealing don't ask, don't tell 
without the proper studies, without the proper phase-in time, and no 
rational approach to this. It was just check the box of another 
political payback.
  In another check the box of amnesty, the DREAM Act, which was brought 
up and fortunately Republicans stood against something that again 
avoided the big issue of border security. This Congress has 
continuously rejected the idea of carrying through on our own law to 
complete the double-layer fencing we put into law to protect the 
southern border. Thousands of people are being killed on the border 
because we refuse to take action. Yet we are continuing to try to 
expand the problem with more amnesty and citizenship and public 
benefits to those who came here illegally.
  The threat is now to keep us here until Christmas or beyond to pass 
what we are calling a 9/11 bill. Every Member of this Chamber--
Republicans and Democrats--wants to do what is right for the first 
responders who may have been injured after 9/11. But we owe it to the 
American people to be accountable to how we spend money. To put a bill 
on the floor, in an unaccountable lameduck Congress, that has not been 
through hearings, when we do not know how the millions of dollars have 
been used that we have already given to the same cause certainly is 
worth a few weeks of committee hearings and understanding exactly how 
to spend taxpayer money effectively in a way we know will help the 
people who have been injured.
  But, no, we have to push that through in a fired, unaccountable 
Congress. Of course, now the big issue of the day is somehow, in a time 
of economic recession and so many people being out of work, that we 
want to use this lameduck, unaccountable Congress to push through a 
major arms control treaty with Russia. Somehow that ended up on the top 
of our priority list, using Christmas as a backstop to try to force us 
to pass this bill.
  It is pretty interesting how this has progressed. The treaty had no 
chance of ratification until the President agreed to billions of 
dollars in modernization of our nuclear weapons.
  We have to stop and ask ourselves: Why should we have to have 
backroom trading going on to modernize our nuclear weapons? That should 
be something the President is committed to,

[[Page 23441]]

that we are committed to. We should not have to trade for 
modernization. But now we appear to have enough Republicans who have 
decided this is a good treaty to ratify a few days before Christmas in 
a fired, unaccountable Congress, with the need to push it through 
before America's representatives actually get here the first of 
January. The sense here is if we let the people America just elected 
come, that maybe the treaty will need some modifications.
  There have been many questions expressed about the treaty. I think 
some of them are very legitimate. Clearly, missile defense is a 
problem. The Russians have expressed that Americans cannot develop any 
kind of comprehensive missile defense system under this treaty. We say: 
No, no. We can develop a limited missile defense system. We are going 
through all kinds of convoluted language to put things in nonbinding 
areas of this agreement, to say we are committed or we are going to 
communicate to the Russians that we are committed, but we even were 
unwilling to put it in the preamble that there is no linkage between 
the development of our missile defense system and this treaty 
agreement. Clearly, there is a linkage. The Russians believe there is a 
linkage.
  All the correspondence from the President says ``limited missile 
defense system.'' We obviously have agreed to it. We never could get 
the negotiating records to confirm that, but everything suggests there 
is an implicit and explicit agreement that America will not attempt to 
develop a missile defense system capable of defending against Russian 
missiles. Perhaps capable of defending against a rogue missile launch 
or an accidental missile launch, but the language in this treaty, 
communications from the White House, the hearings all say we will only 
have a limited missile defense system.
  There should be no mistake, there should be no confusion, the 
agreement to this treaty is an agreement for America not to develop a 
comprehensive missile defense system. If that is satisfactory, then 
let's ratify. Clearly, there are holes in the verification process of 
this treaty. The growing and biggest threat is tactical nuclear 
weapons. Shorter range missiles, ground-based, sub-based are not even 
included in this agreement. The Russians are fine with this. They were 
going down to the same long-range missile count we require in this 
treaty anyway. They give up nothing. We don't restrict any of their 
tactical developments. The verification is less stringent than in START 
I, with fewer inspections, and the ability to actually look at things 
such as telemetry are obviously omitted here.
  We can't ratify this treaty with any pretense that America is going 
to be any safer. In fact, I think the biggest problem with this treaty 
is the whole presumption it is built on--that America should be at 
parity with Russia. We have talked about it here in this Chamber, that 
we do not have the same role as Russia in this world. Russia is a 
protector of none and a threat to many. America is the protector of 
many and a threat to none. Over 30 countries live in peace under our 
nuclear umbrella, but we are saying we are going to reduce it, with a 
lot of questions as to whether we are going to modernize it, and we are 
telling our allies that tactical nuclear weapons are not going to be 
restricted in any way, which is probably their biggest concern because 
of their contiguous location to Russia.
  Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. DeMINT. Yes.
  Mr. INHOFE. When you talk about the missile defense aspect of this, I 
wonder if it has occurred to a lot of people that maybe this treaty is 
with the wrong people. We know right now that Iran is going to have the 
capability--and this is not even classified--of a nuclear weapon, a 
delivery system, by 2015. I think one of the worst things for America--
and this President did it--was to take down the sites we were planning 
in Poland that would give us this protection.
  My point I want to make, and then to ask the Senator about, is that 
in the event this is ratified and we are restricted in any way from 
developing further our missile defense system, doesn't that put us 
directly in an impaired position in terms of North Korea, maybe Syria, 
but definitely Iran, that has already indicated and already has the 
capability of reaching us by that time?
  It is interesting that the site would have been in effect to knock 
down a missile coming from Iran by 2015, the same year our intelligence 
community tells us they will have that capability. Isn't that the 
threat we are concerned about, more than Russia?
  Mr. DeMINT. I want to thank the Senator from Oklahoma for bringing 
out another very important point. We are laser focused on this treaty 
with Russia, which obviously restricts our ability to develop missile 
defense. Yet we all seem to acknowledge the greatest growing threat in 
this world is from Iran and North Korea and other rogue nations that 
can develop nuclear technology.
  It is almost like watching a magician at play here, of getting us to 
look at one hand while other things are going on. We are not paying 
attention to the Nation's business here, and I am afraid this is just 
another ``check the box''--a foreign policy victory for the 
administration. If it did not have so many questions related to it, 
that would be fine, but not to jam this through with a fired, 
unaccountable Congress, and rushing it through before the 
representatives America just elected have been sworn in, and doing it 
as part of a list of legislation--a long list over the last 2 years--
that America does not want.
  I want good relations with Russia and countries all over the world, 
but I am afraid this is part of a continued effort of accommodation and 
appeasement; that if we show weakness, other countries will accommodate 
us. We need Russia to cooperate--with Russia and North Korea. Folks, I 
don't think this is the way to get it, and I don't think we are going 
to gain respect for our process of trying to do this under the cover of 
a distraction of a major holiday with a lameduck, unaccountable 
Congress.
  In the way this is being presented, it is a mockery of the debate 
process here in the Senate. We are not amending a treaty. We were told 
at the outset it is ``take it or leave it.'' The Russians are 
negotiating, clearly, from a position of strength, because they said, 
here is the treaty, take it or leave it; any changes and the treaty is 
dead. Is that the way America needs to deal with other countries? Is 
that the way the Senate should debate a major arms control agreement, 
where the majority party is saying, you can go talk about it if you 
want, but we are going to kill every amendment, even though we say we 
agree with a lot of them. There will be no changes in this.
  We are trying to stick some things in here in the areas of the treaty 
that have no binding aspect and say we have covered it, but we are 
making a mockery of the whole debate and ratification processes with an 
unaccountable, fired Congress, under the cover of Christmas, and a 
debate where we have been told ``take it or leave it.'' This is not 
what the Senate is about, this is not what Congress is supposed to be 
about, and certainly we should not be passing major legislation at this 
time of year with this Congress.
  Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to speak. I still hope my 
colleagues will come to their senses and show the American people that 
we are going to act in a responsible way that respects what they told 
us on November 2; that this Congress needs to go, a new one needs to 
come in, and we need to stop cramming things down their throats they do 
not want.
  With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennet of Colorado). The Senator from 
Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we are now in the final throes of getting 
together a unanimous consent request. The leadership has asked us to 
proceed forward on the amendment. Senator Kyl has asked me--I think he 
wanted to be here when we do his amendment on modernization, which we 
are now prepared to accept, with further modification. So I will wait 
for Senator Kyl in order to do that.

[[Page 23442]]

  In the meantime, I understand we also have an agreement on the 
missile defense amendment, and that amendment is now going to be 
cosponsored by Senator Lieberman and Senator McCain. So if the Senator 
from Tennessee wants to talk about that amendment, we are prepared to 
accept it. I think we should have the discussion of that amendment at 
this point in time.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I wish to at this moment ask unanimous 
consent to change the name of the amendment to McCain-Lieberman-Corker.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CORKER. I would also ask unanimous consent to add Senators 
Johanns, Levin, and Bayh as cosponsors.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. KERRY. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                Amendment No. 4904, as Further Modified

  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I would send to the desk the amendment, as 
modified, and as I understand it, this has been accepted by both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the modification?
  Hearing no objection, the amendment is modified.
  The amendment, as further modified, is as follows:

       At the end of subsection (a) of the Resolution of 
     Ratification, add the following:
       (11) Effectiveness and viability of new start treaty and 
     united states missile defenses.--Prior to the entry into 
     force of the New START Treaty, the President shall certify to 
     the Senate, and at the time of the exchange of instruments of 
     ratification shall communicate to the Russian Federation, 
     that it is the policy of the United States to continue 
     development and deployment of United States missile defense 
     systems to defend against missile threats from nations such 
     as North Korea and Iran, including qualitative and 
     quantitative improvements to such systems. Such systems 
     include all phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile 
     defenses in Europe, the modernization of the Ground-based 
     Midcourse Defense System, and the continued development of 
     the Two-stage Ground-based Interceptor as a technological and 
     strategic hedge. The United States believes that these 
     systems do not and will not threaten the strategic balance 
     with the Russian Federation. Consequently, while the United 
     States cannot circumscribe the sovereign rights of the 
     Russian Federation under paragraph 3 of Article XIV of the 
     Treaty, the United States believes continued improvement and 
     deployment of United States missile defense systems do not 
     constitute a basis for questioning the effectiveness and 
     viability of the Treaty, and therefore would not give rise to 
     circumstances justifying the withdrawal of the Russian 
     Federation from the Treaty.
       At the end of subsection (b)(1)(C), strike ``United 
     States.'' and insert the following: ``United States; and
       (D) the preamble of the New START Treaty does not impose a 
     legal obligation on the parties.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I would ask, before we proceed on that--
because Senator Kyl is now here, so we could quickly accept his 
amendment and dispose of that--I ask unanimous consent that we call up 
Kyl amendment No. 4892, as modified--as additionally modified.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  Mr. KERRY. Objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                Amendment No. 4892, as Further Modified

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I believe at the desk now is the Kyl 
amendment, as modified.
  I am sorry about the confusion. Mr. President, I ask unanimous 
consent that we be able to immediately proceed to the Kyl amendment. We 
will come right back to the Corker amendment, but I ask unanimous 
consent to proceed to the Kyl amendment, as modified, with the 
modification that has been submitted at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 4892), as further modified, is as follows:

       At the end of subsection (a), add the following:
       (11) Design and funding of certain facilities.--Prior to 
     the entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President 
     shall certify to the Senate that the President intends to--
       (A) accelerate to the extent possible the design and 
     engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
     Replacement (CMRR) building and the Uranium Processing 
     Facility (UPF); and
       (B) request full funding, including on a multi-year basis 
     as appropriate, for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
     Replacement building and the Uranium Processing Facility upon 
     completion of the design and engineering phase for such 
     facilities.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I believe Senator Kyl wishes to say 
something.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will comment more when I make my concluding 
comments, but what we have just done is to agree to provide a mechanism 
for the President to certify a way forward to fund the two large 
facilities that are part of the nuclear weapons complex in a way that 
we hope will provide for the most efficient way to build these 
facilities and to get them constructed as rapidly as possible.
  The result of this is that, potentially, we could save hundreds of 
millions of dollars and construct the facilities at an earlier date 
than was originally intended. But to be clear, nothing in this 
amendment reduces the President's decisionmaking or flexibility. It 
remains his decision as to how the funding is requested and when it is 
requested.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I agree with the comments of the Senator. 
It does leave the President that important ability, but it also puts 
the question of whether this is a way that is more efficient. It is 
something we should be looking at, and the President intends to look at 
it. We will accept this amendment.
  Mr. President, I don't think there is further debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 4892), as further modified, was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 4904

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank Senator Kyl and the Chair, and now, 
Mr. President, I believe the Corker amendment is the pending business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I wish to again say that we have asked by 
unanimous consent to change this to be the McCain-Lieberman-Corker 
amendment, and we have also added Senators Alexander, Brown of 
Massachusetts,  Murkowski, Johanns, Levin, and Bayh as cosponsors.
  As a matter of tremendous respect and courtesy, I think it would be 
best for Senator McCain to be the first speaker on this amendment that 
he was very involved in developing.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, Senators Lieberman, 
and Senator Corker, I have an amendment at the desk and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, reserving--I believe the Senator is 
referring to the amendment that is pending?
  Mr. CORKER. That is correct.
  Mr. KERRY. It is the pending amendment.
  Mr. McCAIN. First of all, it is probably not too relevant, but I 
would like to say that this should have been the Lieberman-Corker-
McCain or Corker-Lieberman-McCain amendment because of the distribution 
of effort that has been made on this amendment. Be that as it may, I 
think this amendment makes some improvement that will be very helpful.
  It has two parts. The first requires the President to certify that we 
do not recognize Russia's argument that the treaty can only be 
effective and viable

[[Page 23443]]

only in conditions where the United States is not building up its 
missile defenses. The statement would also be transmitted to the 
Russians when the instruments of ratification are exchanged. Second, 
the amendment would include in the instrument an understanding that the 
preamble is not legally binding.
  I think this is a helpful amendment, and I appreciate that it could 
be included by the Senator from Massachusetts, but ultimately it does 
not address my concerns that the Russians believe the treaty could be 
used to limit our missile defense. We should have removed this clause 
from the preamble.
  The message sent by the first part of this amendment is positive, but 
it is not conveyed to the Duma. When we look at the fact--I understand 
why the proponents of this treaty would not want to transmit this 
aspect of the treaty to the Duma for fear of some backlash and perhaps 
problems in the Russian Duma, although it is not a body that is 
renowned for its independence, to say the least. The fact is, it will 
not be transmitted to the Duma. The fact is, if the Russians and the 
United States agreed to a treaty and a part of that treaty was not 
transmitted to the Senate, I think that would be something to which 
most of us would take strong exception.
  I thank Senator Corker. He has worked extremely hard on this issue. 
Joe Lieberman has worked extremely hard, trying to reach a point, 
obviously, that they could agree to support this treaty. Whether they 
eventually do or not is something that I neither know nor would 
predict, but I do think it shows some improvement. I still have various 
concerns, as I have had from the beginning, on the issue of defensive 
missile systems, how it would play, whether it is actually part of the 
treaty and, if so, how enforceable.
  What complicates this more than anything else is the continued 
statements, public statements on American television a short time ago--
Vladimir Putin saying that if we move forward with improving our 
missile defenses, they would take ``appropriate actions.'' Their 
Foreign Minister has made repeated statements--not last year but last 
month--saying one thing and publicly declaring it while on the other 
hand we are assuming this will prevent them from doing what they say 
they will do. That is a contradiction.
  I understand how solemn treaties are, and I understand how binding 
treaties are. I also understand that when the leader of a nation says 
on ``Larry King Live''--God bless you, Larry, for everything you did 
for us--that they will have to take ``appropriate actions'' if we 
improve quantitatively or qualitatively our strategic missile defense 
systems, then obviously you have to give some credence to that, when 
public statements are made. Obviously, in the view of Senator Kerry, 
who has done a masterful job in shepherding this treaty through the 
Senate in the last several days, that is not that meaningful. So we 
just have a fundamental disagreement of opinion. But I can say this: If 
we negotiated a treaty and made certain agreements and the President of 
the United States made public statements on national or international 
television contradicting that, then I think it would give the party we 
are in negotiations with significant pause.
  Not one statement that I have been able to find has a Russian 
leader--either Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, or Prime Minister or 
President--saying they will adhere to the provisions that are in this 
amendment. That is a fundamental contradiction that I am sorry cannot 
be resolved.
  I know what the votes are going to be on this treaty. Again, I 
congratulate Senator Kerry for the incredible job he has done and, 
frankly, his great willingness to talk with me and negotiate with me 
and have dialog and work toward a common goal. He has done that in good 
faith, and I am grateful for the opportunity he has given me to play a 
role, including agreeing to this amendment which I think will improve 
the treaty.
  I wish to say that I know how difficult this has been for Senator 
Corker and other Members on this side.
  I thank Senator Lieberman for the continued hard work he does on this 
issue.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I think it is very 
helpful.
  With that, I yield to my colleagues, cosponsors of the amendment, if 
that is agreeable to Senator Kerry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, Senator Corker and I had a vote--
actually, Senator Corker, Senator McCain, and I had a vote on whose 
name should be first on this, and Senator Corker and I won, 2 to 1. 
Senator McCain's name is first because this is an amendment that 
attempts to deal in a unifying way with our concern that the Russians 
misunderstand the impact of this treaty or the impact of our 
development of missile defenses on this treaty and that it is important 
for us to speak out in unity, in a unified and clear voice, to the 
Russians, and no one has made that point more clearly as the treaty has 
been considered than Senator McCain. In fact, he offered an amendment 
earlier in our deliberations on the treaty which I supported, which did 
not pass, which would have removed the section of the preamble that has 
obviously been put in by the Russians in the negotiations which is 
confusing at best and downright mischievous at worst.
  This is the section that says:

       Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between 
     strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that 
     this interrelationship will become more important as 
     strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current 
     strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and 
     effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.

  That is the end of the quote from the preamble. It strikes me as I 
read it that it will be a topic of consideration in law schools and 
classes on international law. The first question is, What did it mean? 
But I think the Russians had a particular intent in putting it in 
there, and they know what they wanted it to mean.
  What is troubling is that when the treaty was signed earlier in the 
year in Prague, the Russian Federation issued a statement that 
basically made these same points--that the treaty will be effective and 
viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative 
buildup in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States 
of America.
  But these are two separate categories. This treaty, the START treaty, 
is all about reducing the offensive capabilities, nuclear and delivery 
capabilities of both great powers. We are building a missile defense 
system. It started out as a very controversial matter. It started out a 
long time ago--President Reagan, really, initially, and then serious 
consideration in the 1990s when a lot of people argued against it and 
said it was a waste of money and it would never work technologically, 
that you couldn't create a bullet that would hit a bullet. Yet that is 
exactly what we have done. Thank God that we invested the money and 
that our scientists and military leaders have brought it as far it is 
because one of the great threats that will face the people of the 
United States, our national security, will come from missiles carrying 
weapons of mass destruction fired particularly by rogue nations such as 
Iran and North Korea. It would be irresponsible of us not to have 
developed a capacity to defend against those kinds of missile attacks. 
We have done that.
  The Russians keep wanting to link that to this treaty. It is not 
linked to the treaty. Therefore, I regretted that section was in the 
preamble I read. The United States responded through the State 
Department to that statement by the Russian Government when they signed 
the treaty. But it is really important for us, at the same time the 
instruments of ratification are conveyed to the Russian Government, to 
make a clear and direct statement of our understanding of the total 
nonrelationship between the development of our missile defense 
capability and the START treaty.
  That is what this amendment does. I am privileged to cosponsor it 
with Senator McCain, Senator Corker, and a

[[Page 23444]]

number of other Members of both parties. Basically, it says that before 
the New START treaty could enter into force, the President shall 
certify to the Senate--basically, this is certifying what the President 
said in a letter sent to Senator Reid a few days ago--and at the time 
of the exchange of instruments of ratification shall communicate 
directly to the Russian Federation that, No. 1, we are going to 
continue development and deployment of a missile defense system to 
defend against missile threats from nations such as--and I would add 
``not limited to''--North Korea and Iran.
  No. 2, what do we mean by qualitative and quantitative improvement of 
such systems that we are going to be continuing? This is very 
important. We define that here to include all phases of the phased 
adaptive approach to missile defenses in Europe embraced now by our 
NATO allies; second, the modernization of the ground-based midcourse 
defense system; and third, the continued development of the two-stage 
ground-based interceptor as a technological and strategic hedge.
  We are being as direct as we can be here to the Russians. Some of my 
colleagues have said--and the record, unfortunately, shows it--that 
their record for complying with treaties is not a good one. We don't 
want to enter into this one with any misunderstandings or covering up 
the truth. We are saying here loudly and clearly that the United States 
is going to continue to develop all of these different forms of missile 
defense to protect our security and that has nothing to do with this 
START treaty.
  I think the third section here is very important. We say:

       The U.S. believes that these systems [missile defense 
     systems] do not and will not threaten the strategic balance 
     with the Russian Federation. Consequently, while the U.S. 
     cannot circumscribe the sovereign rights of the Russian 
     Federation under paragraph 3 of Article XIV of the [START] 
     Treaty--

  Which is the section that gives nations the right to withdraw under 
extraordinary circumstances--nonetheless, if we adopt this, when we 
adopt it, this amendment, we are saying here:

       The United States believes continued improvement and 
     deployment of United States missile defense systems do not 
     constitute a basis for questioning the effectiveness and 
     viability of the Treaty, and therefore would not give rise to 
     circumstances justifying the withdrawal of the Russian 
     Federation from the treaty.

  We are trying to manage our relationship with the Russian Federation 
in a way that is conducive to the security of our country and the 
security of the world.
  We disagree with the Russians on an awful lot of things, including 
human rights and values and freedom of the press--which the current 
government in Russia has so aggressively suppressed. So we want to be 
honest with them and direct with them and not enter into this important 
treaty with any illusions. I believe we have said that clearly. If it 
passes, it will be presented to the Russian Government directly.
  I am very pleased we have a broad, bipartisan group supporting this. 
It is a unified way to conclude our deliberations here before we go to 
vote on ratification, and I urge my colleagues to support the 
amendment.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor to the Senator from Tennessee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to add Senator 
Begich as a cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I am thrilled to join with Senator McCain 
and Senator Lieberman in an amendment dealing with missile defense. 
This is a subject that has been discussed ever since this treaty was 
first presented.
  I cannot think of a better way to end this debate. I thank Senator 
Kerry for having the patience of Job, having worked through this. 
Somebody mentioned deals and where they have been taking place. They 
have been taking place on the Senate floor. We have been working on 
this for a long time. We have gone through intelligence briefings. We 
have gone through incredible numbers of hearings. I think this has been 
done exactly in the right way.
  I thank the Senator for his leadership. I thank Senator Lugar for his 
leadership on nuclear armaments in general. The Senator has been 
pursuing that for years.
  So we have before us an amendment on missile defense. Again, it has 
been discussed in great detail. This says three things. Senator 
Lieberman certainly talked about much of the detail, but the President 
the other day sent us a letter declaring, in very strident ways, his 
commitment to both the phased-adaptive approach to missile defense, 
which will take place in Europe, and our ground-based interceptors. He 
has said that absolutely in strident terms.
  What this amendment does is certifies to Congress--he certifies to 
Congress--that he is going to continue those efforts. He will continue 
those efforts on phased-adaptive approach and ground-based 
interceptors.
  Second, we have been concerned about what Russia thinks as it relates 
to this treaty. When we exchange the instruments of ratification, when 
we exchange the documents when ratifying this treaty, they are going to 
be told that we, in fact, are continuing to pursue our missile defenses 
in every way possible, and that in no way affects our relationship from 
that standpoint as it relates to this treaty. I think that is 
incredibly strong.
  Then, third, we have talked about this preamble, and every one of us 
knows the preamble is nonbinding. But as an understanding of this 
treaty going forward, we are telling the Russians that the preamble 
absolutely is not binding and that we are pursuing these missile 
defense applications that have been discussed. I am proud to join with 
Senator McCain, with Senator Lieberman, two people who care as deeply 
about our national security as anybody in the United States, certainly 
in this Senate. I am proud to have the other Members of the Senate who 
have joined in.
  Let me just say in closing, I think it is absolutely appropriate that 
the last two amendments we address are the Kyl amendment which deals 
with modernization--the President has made incredible investments in 
modernization that have come about through this entire process, a 
commitment to ensure that the nuclear arsenal we have is one that 
operates, that is reliable, that is safe.
  I think people know we have 1,550 deployed warheads--after this 
treaty goes into effect, over a long period of time, we reduce to that 
number, but that we have roughly 3,500 other warheads that, again, will 
continue to be modernized and made available, if necessary.
  So I want to say that in accepting the Kyl amendment and all of the 
things that have come with it--the letter from the appropriators and 
accepting this missile defense amendment--if that ends up being the 
case, and I hope it will be by unanimous consent shortly, I think what 
we have done throughout this entire process has strengthened our 
country's national security.
  I can say: Look, this is called the New START, but I could call this 
the Missile Defense and Nuclear Modernization Act of 2010 because all 
of these things have come into play to make our country safer. I want 
to thank the chairman. I want to thank the administration for walking 
through, over the last 6 months, and helping us cross t's and dot i's. 
I think this treaty is good for our country. I think this treaty 
enhances our national security. I thank the chairman for the way he has 
worked with us to get it into that position, certainly Senators McCain 
and Lieberman for helping take the lead on this amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.


                Amendment No. 4922 to Amendment No. 4904

  Mr. KIRK. Mr. President, I have a second-degree amendment at the 
desk, No. 4922.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:


[[Page 23445]]

       The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Kirk] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4922 to Amendment No. 4904.

  Mr. KIRK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To provide an additional understanding regarding the December 
 18, 2010, letter from President Obama to the Senate regarding missile 
                                defense)

       On page 2, after line 19, add the following:
       (2) Missile defense.--It is the understanding of the United 
     States that the advice and consent of the Senate to the New 
     START Treaty is subject to the understanding, which shall be 
     transmitted to the Russian Federation at the time of the 
     exchange of instruments of ratification, stated in the letter 
     transmitted by President Barack Obama to the Majority Leader 
     of the United States Senate on December 18, 2010, the text of 
     which is as follows:

                                              The White House,

                                    Washington, December 18, 2010.
     Hon. Harry M. Reid,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Reid: As the Senate considers the New START 
     Treaty, I want to share with you my views on the issue of 
     missile defense, which has been the subject of much debate in 
     the Senate's review of the Treaty.
       Pursuant to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 
     (Public Law 106-38), it has long been the policy of the 
     United States to deploy as soon as is technologically 
     possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable 
     of defending the territory of the United States against 
     limited ballistic missile attack, whether accidental, 
     unauthorized, or deliberate. Thirty ground-based interceptors 
     based at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, 
     California, are now defending the nation. All United States 
     missile defense programs--including all phases of the 
     European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense (EPAA) 
     and programs to defend United States deployed forces, allies, 
     and partners against regional threats--are consistent with 
     this policy.
       The New START Treaty places no limitations on the 
     development or deployment of our missile defense programs. As 
     the NATO Summit meeting in Lisbon last month underscored, we 
     are proceeding apace with a missile defense system in Europe 
     designed to provide full coverage for NATO members on the 
     continent, as well as deployed U.S. forces, against the 
     growing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic 
     missiles. The final phase of the system will also augment our 
     current defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles 
     from Iran targeted against the United States.
       All NATO allies agreed in Lisbon that the growing threat of 
     missile proliferation, and our Article 5 commitment of 
     collective defense, requires that the Alliance develop a 
     territorial missile defense capability. The Alliance further 
     agreed that the EPAA, which I announced in September 2009, 
     will be a crucial contribution to this capability. Starting 
     in 2011, we will begin deploying the first phase of the EPAA, 
     to protect large parts of southern Europe from short- and 
     medium-range ballistic missile threats. In subsequent phases, 
     we will deploy longer-range and more effective land-based 
     Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors in Romania and Poland 
     to protect Europe against medium- and intermediate-range 
     ballistic missiles. In the final phase, planned for the end 
     of the decade, further upgrades of the SM-3 interceptor will 
     provide an ascent-phase intercept capability to augment our 
     defense of NATO European territory, as well as that of the 
     United States, against future threats of ICBMs launched from 
     Iran.
       The Lisbon decisions represent an historic achievement, 
     making clear that all NATO allies believe we need an 
     effective territorial missile defense to defend against the 
     threats we face now and in the future. The EPAA represents 
     the right response. At Lisbon, the Alliance also invited the 
     Russian Federation to cooperate on missile defense, which 
     could lead to adding Russian capabilities to those deployed 
     by NATO to enhance our common security against common 
     threats. The Lisbon Summit thus demonstrated that the 
     Alliance's missile defenses can be strengthened by improving 
     NATO-Russian relations.
       This comes even as we have made clear that the system we 
     intend to pursue with Russia will not be a joint system, and 
     it will not in any way limit United States' or NATO's missile 
     defense capabilities. Effective cooperation with Russia could 
     enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of our 
     combined territorial missile defenses, and at the same time 
     provide Russia with greater security. Irrespective of how 
     cooperation with Russia develops, the Alliance alone bears 
     responsibility for defending NATO's members, consistent with 
     our Treaty obligations for collective defense. The EPAA and 
     NATO's territorial missile defense capability will allow us 
     to do that.
       In signing the New START Treaty, the Russian Federation 
     issued a statement that expressed its view that the 
     extraordinary events referred to in Article XIV of the Treaty 
     include a ``build-up in the missile defense capabilities of 
     the United States of America such that it would give rise to 
     a threat to the strategic nuclear potential of the Russian 
     Federation.'' Article XIV(3), as you know, gives each Party 
     the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it believes its 
     supreme interests are jeopardized.
       The United States did not and does not agree with the 
     Russian statement. We believe that the continued development 
     and deployment of U.S. missile defense systems, including 
     qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems, do 
     not and will not threaten the strategic balance with the 
     Russian Federation, and have provided policy and technical 
     explanations to Russia on why we believe that to be the case. 
     Although the United States cannot circumscribe Russia's 
     sovereign rights under Article XIV(3), we believe that the 
     continued improvement and deployment of U.S. missile defense 
     systems do not constitute a basis for questioning the 
     effectiveness and viability of the New START Treaty, and 
     therefore would not give rise to circumstances justifying 
     Russia's withdrawal from the Treaty.
       Regardless of Russia's actions in this regard, as long as I 
     am President, and as long as the Congress provides the 
     necessary funding, the United States will continue to develop 
     and deploy effective missile defenses to protect the United 
     States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. My 
     Administration plans to deploy all four phases of the EPAA. 
     While advances of technology or future changes in the threat 
     could modify the details or timing of the later phases of the 
     EPAA--one reason this approach is called ``adaptive''--I will 
     take every action available to me to support the deployment 
     of all four phases.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Barack Obama.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, on the basis of rule XXII and the question 
of timely filing, I would object to this amendment being considered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The point of order is well taken. The 
amendment falls.
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. President, am I allowed to be heard on the point of 
order?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no debate on a point of order.
  Mr. KIRK. Roger that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I do not want the Senator to not have an 
opportunity to be able to speak to this. I think he should be able to. 
He certainly has that right in the context of his time. I will not 
speak very long at all.
  I want to thank the Senator from Arizona, my long-time friend, for 
his very generous comments. I appreciate them personally. But also I 
thank him for his willingness, under some circumstances that I know 
were tough for him, in terms of how a lot of this played out. He 
nevertheless sat with me, worked through these issues, and obviously I 
wish we had been able to reach an agreement sometime earlier, but I am 
glad he is there now on this amendment. I am glad we are able to accept 
it.
  I thank Senator Corker who has been a straight dealer throughout all 
of this--no histrionics, no politics. I think he has really seen his 
responsibilities on the Foreign Relations Committee in the best way and 
has studied and thought and worked at and tried to find a way to solve 
a problem, not create a problem. So I thank him for that approach to 
this treaty.
  I think this amendment, if I can say--I mean, I was here in the 
Senate. I remember debating the first proposal of President Reagan with 
respect to missile defense, which then was called the SDI, the 
Strategic Defense Initiative, and became what we called Star Wars back 
then. We have traveled a long distance since then. The world also has 
changed significantly since then.
  We no longer live in that sort of bipolar East-West, Soviet-U.S.-
dominated world. We are living in a multipolar, extraordinarily 
complicated and significantly changed world in the context of the 
threats we face. The threats we now face, particularly of a rogue 
state, or of the possibility of a terrorist group stealing or putting 
their hands on some loosely guarded materials and/or weapons, those are 
possibilities that are real. We need to deal with this different kind 
of threat.

[[Page 23446]]

  I believe the President of the United States has been pursuing a 
plan, building on what previous administrations have done; that is, 
pursuing the right kind of approach to try to figure out: How do we 
make all of us safer? Our hope is that the Russians will understand 
this is not directed at them. This is directed at how we together can 
build a structure in which all of us can share in a way that forces the 
Irans and North Koreas and others to understand the futility, indeed 
the counterproductivity of the direction in which they are moving.
  So I think this is a good amendment to embrace within the instrument 
of ratification what the President is doing anyway, what the 
administration has been committed to doing anyway. I personally do not 
think it was necessary--in order to achieve an appropriate 
understanding of where the administration is going--but to whatever 
degree it gives Senators the ability in the advice and consent process 
to believe that we are appropriately putting Russians on notice as to 
this course we are on, I think it reinforces what the President has 
already done and said. I do not think they should view it as something 
new or as an aberration from any course that we have been on. I 
certainly do not view it that way.
  I am confident they will see that we can build on this treaty in a 
way that we share in the future strategies, analyses, perhaps even 
technologies in the long run that will make all of us safer and 
ultimately provide all of us with the ability to deal with the 
realities of a nuclear world. Our goal is to make us safer, and we 
believe this helps us do that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I join with the sentiments just expressed 
by the chairman. I very much appreciate the statements made by Senator 
McCain, Senator Lieberman, and my colleague on the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Senator Corker, who has worked diligently throughout the 
hearings, the markup, and this debate.
  I ask unanimous consent to be added as a cosponsor to the amendment 
that they have offered, 4904, as modified.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Just briefly on the remarks about the missile defense, 
I have served as chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee and 
ranking member and have been involved in it for quite a few years. I 
think the language affirms the continued development of the two-stage, 
ground-based interceptor. Then, I guess, I accept the language that 
says ``as a technological and strategic hedge.''
  But I would just say to my colleagues, the reason we are at this 
point is because, during the negotiations with the Russians concerning 
the New START treaty, the administration, responding to Russian 
objections about missile defense--which were so unfounded and I could 
never fathom--the administration agreed, in September of last year, 
unilaterally, and to the utter surprise of Poland and the Czech 
Republic, to cancel the planned two-stage GBI that was to be deployed 
in 2016 in Poland.
  It was a great embarrassment to our allies. They had been negotiating 
with us for many years on this project. They had stood firm for it, and 
the administration then promised this phase four SM-3 Block 2B. But it 
was not on the drawing board, not under development, and cannot be 
completed until 2020 if we as a Congress fund it over that decade. The 
President certainly will not be in office at that time. So I am uneasy 
about this whole matter of missile defense.
  I think the administration made a colossal error in giving up on the 
planned two-stage strategic policy. But this language is better than no 
language. I thank my colleagues for moving forward with it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I know the Senator from North Dakota wants 
to speak on this a little bit. I thought we might, if he was willing--
we could accept the amendment and then the Senator would have an 
opportunity to speak.
  Mr. President, we are prepared to accept this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 4904), as further modified, was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we have an understanding--while it is not a 
unanimous consent request yet, we have an understanding with Senator 
Kyl that is the last amendment. We are waiting for the agreed-upon 
language from both leaderships in order to arrive at a time for the 
vote. It is our understanding that other issues that were part of the 
equation of when that vote might take place have been resolved. So, as 
a result, I think Senators can anticipate that, hopefully, sometime 
soon that unanimous consent request will be propounded.
  Until then, Senators are free to talk on the treaty and I look 
forward to their comments.
  Can I say one word, Mr. President? I apologize.
  Earlier when I was thanking folks, I meant to, and I neglected to 
because I jumped over to thank Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher.
  As we all know, she was a Member of the House, spent a lot of time on 
separate issues. In fact, she chaired one of the subcommittees of the 
Armed Services Committee. She logged a lot of miles and worked her 
heart out to assist in the evolution of this treaty. She has, as we all 
know, been fighting cancer. She just recently had cancer surgery. We 
wish her well in her recovery and express our gratitude to her for her 
work.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Massachusetts and 
Senators McCain and Lieberman.
  There are probably still some folks making up their minds on this 
treaty. I think most people have debated this at length and discussed 
it at length off the floor.
  Our side has raised a number of questions. We have tried to cross 
every t and dot every i. This has been done in a very methodical way. I 
thank the chairman for the way he has worked with us. I thank Senator 
Lugar for his longstanding leadership in this regard. I thank the 
administration officials who have absolutely bent over backward to try 
to solve every problem that has come up. The administration has not 
only solved problems for people who might vote for the treaty, they 
have tried to solve problems for people who they know will not vote for 
the treaty. We have some Members on our side who I know are still 
making up their minds. I have been involved in this for a long time. I 
enjoyed this. I think this is an incredibly serious matter.
  I have two daughters and a wife I love. National security is 
something that is important to all of us. None of us wants anything bad 
to happen to this country. But to my friends on this side of the aisle 
who still may have some questions, there is no way in the world we 
would have the commitments we have on nuclear modernization if it were 
not for the process of this treaty. Now with Senator Kyl's amendment 
being accepted, we are even fast-tracking that. There is no way in the 
world the unilateral statements that are going to be presented to 
Russia are going to be made regarding missile defense would be 
occurring without this treaty being in place. I don't think there is a 
person in the world who has debated seriously whether 1,550 warheads 
being deployed in any way affects this country's national security.
  To those of you who may still be wavering, I believe every issue that 
has been raised has been answered strongly and legitimately. We have 
put forth what our posture is on nuclear armaments more clearly than we 
have done in recent times. I hope people will come to the same 
conclusion, that this is good for the country.
  I thank all those who have allowed me to be involved the way that I 
have.

[[Page 23447]]

I urge support, whenever the vote occurs, for a treaty that I believe 
absolutely makes our country safer. With all these accommodations, at 
some point, it seems that the right thing to do is to say yes to yes.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, there has been a great deal of discussion 
about modernization this morning. I have listened to much of it and was 
not going to come to the floor, but I do want the record to show 
clearly what the numbers are on modernization. It is important to the 
future for us to understand what has been done and what is being done 
and what will be done.
  I chair the Appropriations Subcommittee that funds nuclear weapons 
activities. I have spoken about this previously. It is very important 
going forward that we all understand what not only this administration 
but the previous administration has proposed with respect to 
modernization. I agree with my colleague from Kentucky. It is 
encouraging, at the end of this debate, that two bipartisan amendments 
represent the conclusion of this very important debate. We often debate 
things that are of lesser importance or of greater importance and 
sometimes don't always see the difference between the two. But this is 
one of those cases where if we ratify the START agreement today, when 
all is said and done, more will have been done than said. That is very 
unusual in a political body.
  When I say ``more will have been done than said,'' it is so 
unbelievably important to try to reduce the number of nuclear weapons 
and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. But there is a subtext to 
all the other things we have discussed, which is why I want to put in 
the record the funding for the nuclear weapons issues. That subtext is 
money, money related to national security. We are a country with a $13 
trillion debt. Modernization is expensive. Yet it relates to our 
national security. National missile defense, which we have heard a lot 
about, is very expensive. I understand that also relates to national 
security. But this issue of getting our debt under control and our 
fiscal policy under control is just as much a part of the national 
security interests of this country.
  The subtext to these discussions--modernization, missile defense--is 
about funding as well and getting this country's economic house in 
order.
  Let me mention the issue of nuclear weapons modernization. In fiscal 
year 2010, we were spending $6.3 billion on the modernization program 
on nuclear weapons activities. In fiscal year 2011, it went to $7 
billion, up 10 percent--so a 10-percent increase for the nuclear 
weapons activities in President Obama's budget request. That 10-percent 
increase was unusual because most accounts were flat or some had cuts. 
But nuclear weapons got a 10-percent increase. The proposal for 2011, a 
$600 million increase but $7 billion total, was actually short-
circuited and put in the continuing resolution. All the other funding 
in the CR is flat funding from the previous year. But the funding for 
the nuclear weapons programs at 10 percent higher was put into the CR. 
Those programs and those programs alone get the higher funding. That $7 
billion was not all that was to be spent. Another $4 billion emerged. I 
heard about that on the radio while driving in North Dakota, that 
another $4 billion had been put into this pot for modernization. The 
additional funding from the 1251 report, which was produced in the 
fall, means 2012 funding would go from $6.3 billion in 2010, $7 billion 
in 2011, to $7.6 billion in 2012. That is a $1.2 billion increase in 2 
years.
  Linton Brooks, the fellow who ran the National Nuclear Security 
Administration and who did a good job in that role, said:

       I would've killed for this kind of budget.

  He is referring to $1.12 billion increase and two 10 percent 
increases, while much of the other budget was flat. We are talking 
about $85 billion for the next decade on these weapons activities, an 
increase of $8.5 billion in the next 5 years over what was portrayed in 
the 2010 budget. We are talking about a lot of additional money that 
has been committed. It shows a commitment to build two nuclear 
facilities that were discussed earlier. I want to mention them because 
it is important to understand what we are doing, the uranium processing 
facility at the Y-12 production complex and the chemistry and 
metallurgy research replacement facility at Los Alamos. There were 
moneys in the 2012 budget in construction funds for these two 
facilities, not as much as some would want in the Senate. But the fact 
is, the design of these two facilities is only 45 percent complete. We 
don't fund things that are 45 percent designed. To come out here and 
say we ought to be providing robust funding for buildings that are not 
even designed just makes no sense. Why, NNSA can't have confidence in 
its funding needs until it reaches about a 90-percent design point and 
that will be in 2013.
  I listened this morning to this discussion and I think what the 
chairman has done and what Senator Kyl has done in reaching an 
agreement is fine. But I want the record to show that this 
administration has proposed robust increases in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 
for a 5-year period in these modernization accounts, life extension 
programs--robust increases. Even that is not enough for some. They want 
to put money into buildings that are not yet designed. That doesn't 
make much sense to me.
  My point is, when we add up all of this, the subtext is how are we 
going to pay for it. Because it is easy to talk about authorizing, to 
talk about appropriating. The question is, Where does the money come 
from at a time when we are borrowing 40 cents of everything we spend in 
this government? The subtext of money and debt is also a significant 
part of this country's national security. If we don't get our fiscal 
house in order, all these debates will pale by comparison. We can't 
lose our economy and have a future collapse of the economy because the 
rest of the world has very little confidence in our ability to make 
smart decisions. We can't risk all that and believe we are going to be 
a world economic power moving forward. If we are going to remain a 
world economic power--and we can, and I believe we will--it will be 
because we start making some smart, tough, courageous decisions. That 
is more than just calling for more money, more spending, which was most 
of this morning's discussion.
  I don't object to the amendment. My colleagues have raised important 
issues. But it is important to understand we have made great progress 
on the modernization funding programs in the past months, and this 
administration has moved very aggressively to meet those needs and meet 
those concerns. That is important with respect to the public record.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I have given a lot of thought to the 
treaty, and having been involved in missile defense and nuclear issues 
serving on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of Armed Services, as 
ranking member and chairman, many of the provisions in the treaty are 
acceptable and should pose no threat to our national security. But 
considered as part of the administration's stated foreign policy and 
strategic policy and in relation to the reality of the world situation 
today, I do not believe the treaty will make us safer. I think that is 
a good test.
  I disagree with my colleagues who are overly confident that this is 
going to make the world safer. I believe the treaty, for that reason, 
should be rejected.
  Some say a defeat for the treaty would harm the United States. I 
think the entire world would see the Senate action as a resurgence of 
America's historical policy of peace through strength and a rejection 
of a leftist vision of a world without nuclear weapons. The negotiating 
posture statements and actions of Russia indicate it is regressing 
sadly into an old Soviet mindset as it views the outside world. This is 
disappointing and indicative of anything but the positive reset we hope 
to achieve with them. It is extremely important for Russian and U.S. 
security and world security, that Russia

[[Page 23448]]

sees its role as a positive force for peace and security. These 
negotiations, however, show the face of the old Soviet Union. They have 
been so relentless in the way they have negotiated.
  Negotiations with any mature power, especially Russia, are difficult 
and serious. This administration began with a naive expectation that a 
treaty could be quickly achieved that would show their leadership 
towards peace and a nuclear-free world. The Obama administration wanted 
to set an example for other nations to reduce their nuclear weapons 
towards a world without any nuclear weapons. We have heard this 
leadership and this setting of an example theme repeatedly from the 
President and the administration. But Russia has not the slightest 
interest in such vague concepts, nor in eliminating all nuclear 
weapons. They have no idea or intention ever of relinquishing nuclear 
weapons. They are focused on their own national interest, on coming out 
ahead in the negotiations for military, political, psychological, and 
hegemonic reasons.
  It seems clear to me that Russia got what it wanted and President 
Obama got a treaty paper which strategically means very little but can 
be touted as a victory for peace.
  So this is what I have concluded during this debate--and the debate 
has been helpful--the debate has caused me to think through a good bit 
of this. A longer debate at a different time of the year, I think, 
could have helped all of our colleagues. I do not believe the success 
in negotiation of the treaty will in any way make the Russians more 
cooperative, as the administration has repeatedly suggested.
  Russia has been inconsistent at best in helping the United States 
with the danger of nuclear Iran and North Korea--the gravest threats to 
peace in the world, with military action being undertaken against our 
ally, South Korea, in recent weeks, and with the real possibility of an 
attack on Iran's nuclear weapons that, hopefully, can be avoided.
  Why has Russia not been more cooperative? They blocked a resolution 
condemning North Korea Sunday in the U.N. Russia attacked Georgia, a 
sovereign nation, and continues to occupy Georgian territory. This 
shocking act of aggression condemned by independent bodies goes without 
any real U.S. response. Georgia is a pro-American, free market, 
independent nation whose attack was calculated and deliberate.
  Russia continues to work to undermine the pro-Western democracy 
movement in the Ukraine. They continue a host of actions that evidence 
a long-term plan to effect a real or de facto reabsorption of these 
three nations into what was the old Soviet Union.
  So these ominous trends, it seems to me, have not been seriously 
considered throughout this quest for the treaty. The events do not give 
me confidence that the treaty, therefore, is a positive step for the 
United States, the world, or for peace.
  Secondly, as I noted, and I will not go into detail now, the 
administration conceded the two-staged, ground-based interceptor site 
that would have been established in Poland, that would provide 
redundant protection to the United States from an Iranian missile and 
protected virtually all of Europe from an Iranian missile. That was 
given away unilaterally by the administration without prior warning to 
our allies in Poland and the Czech Republic. They heard about it in the 
paper. They realized the United States had gone behind them, our 
allies, and made a deal with the Russians. It was a very unfortunate 
event, indeed.
  The plan that has been talked about--the fourth phase of the SM-3 
Phased Adaptive Approach--is not even on the drawing board and is 
unlikely to actually survive. It would be difficult to see it surviving 
in five different budget cycles over the next 10 years it would take to 
develop that system. We walked away from one that could be deployed 
soon.
  I offered a sense-of-the-Senate resolution to make clear the Senate 
does not concur in an ill-conceived vision of the administration that 
would move us to a world without nuclear weapons. I thank Senators Kyl, 
LeMieux, Cornyn, Chambliss, and Inhofe for cosponsoring the amendment. 
While I will not insist on a vote at this hour, this matter will be a 
significant subject for the future.
  Thirdly, I would suggest the treaty is promoted as a step towards a 
world free of nuclear weapons. This is a fantastical idea that goes 
beyond insignificance, it is dangerous. Basing any policy, especially a 
nuclear policy, on an idea as cockamamie as zero nuclear weapons in the 
world can only lead to confusion and uncertainty. Confusion and 
uncertainty are the polar opposites of the necessary attributes of 
security and stability. These are the essentials of good strategic 
policy: security and stability.
  Thus, the Obama policy creates a more dangerous world. Some say the 
President's zero nukes policy is just a distant vision, some vague 
wish, so don't worry. The situation would be much better if that were 
so, but it is not. President Obama has made zero nuclear weapons a 
cornerstone of our defense policy. It has, amazingly, already been made 
a centerpiece of our military policy, being advanced by concrete steps 
today. Presidents, Commanders-in-Chief, have the power to make such 
monumental changes in policy, and this President is certainly doing so.
  The change is seen most seriously in the critically important Nuclear 
Posture Review produced in April 2010 by the Defense Department. This 
document is a formal document produced by the new administration's 
Defense Department. The determination to pursue the zero nuclear 
weapons vision is seen throughout this review. Amazingly, there are 30 
references in that document to a world without nuclear weapons.
  The NPR begins with an introductory letter from Secretary of Defense 
Gates, the second sentence of which says this:

       As the President said in Prague last year, a world without 
     nuclear weapons will not be achieved quickly, but we must 
     begin to take concrete steps today.

  The Executive Summary further drives the issue home. The first 
sentence in the Executive Summary recalls that President Obama, in 
Prague, highlighted nuclear dangers and said:

       The United States will seek the peace and security of a 
     world without nuclear weapons.

  The first sentence in the second paragraph of the NPR is particularly 
ominous and even chilling to me. Posture Reviews are defense reviews, 
and by their nature are bottom-up reports, driven by threat assessments 
and the requirements necessary to defend America. These reviews 
historically are objective analyses from experts, not political 
reports. The troubling line reads:

       The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlines the 
     Administration's approach to promoting the President's agenda 
     for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world 
     without nuclear weapons.

  This statement reveals the whole truth. The NPR is the President's 
policy, sent from the top down, not the bottom up. Stunningly, the 
report lacks a clear focus on the only objective that counts: Securing 
a nuclear arsenal second to none that can, under any circumstances, 
deter attacks on and defend the United States and its allies.
  Fourthly, the Obama vision of a world without nuclear weapons has not 
been well received. Indeed, the breadth of the criticism from experts 
and world leaders is noteworthy.
  Two years ago, Congress adopted an amendment I proposed that called 
for a commission to review the strategic posture of the United States. 
It was bipartisan and chaired by former Secretaries of Defense Dr. 
William Perry and Dr. James Schlesinger. The commission powerfully 
dismissed the idea of a world without nuclear weapons. In somewhat 
diplomatic but clear and strong language, they said this:

       The conditions that might make possible the global 
     elimination of nuclear weapons are not present today and 
     their creation would require a fundamental transformation of 
     the world political order.

  They went on to say this:

       All of the commission members believe that reaching the 
     ultimate goal of global nuclear elimination would require a 
     fundamental change in geopolitics.


[[Page 23449]]


  Maybe the Second Coming.
  Others have dismissed this concept as a wild chimera. French 
President Sarkozy, from one of our European allies, France, said this:

       It [our nuclear deterrent] is neither a matter of prestige 
     nor a question of rank, it is quite simply the Nation's life 
     insurance policy.

  He made clear they had no intention of giving that up.
  Secretary James Schlesinger, back when President Reagan was meeting 
in Reykjavik over nuclear issues, made this wise comment:

       Nuclear arsenals are going to be with us as long as there 
     are sovereign states with conflicting ideologies. Unlike 
     Aladdin with his lamp, we have no way to force the nuclear 
     genie back into the bottle. A world without nuclear weapons 
     is a utopian dream.

  Keith Payne, who served on this nuclear commission, writing recently 
in the National Review, said:

       The presumption that United States movement toward nuclear 
     disarmament will deliver nonproliferation success is a 
     fantasy. On the contrary, the United States nuclear arsenal 
     has itself been the single most important tool for 
     nonproliferation in history, and dismantling it would be a 
     huge setback.

  Remember the commission.
  Jonathan Tepperman, in Newsweek, said:

       And even if Russia and China (and France, Britain, Israel, 
     India, and Pakistan) could be coaxed to abandon their 
     weapons, we'd still live with the fear that any of them could 
     quickly and secretly rearm.

  Gideon Rachman, in Financial Times, said:

       The idea of a world free of nuclear weapons is not so much 
     an impossible dream as an impossible nightmare.

  William Kristol, writing in the Washington Post, in October, said:

       Yet to justify a world without nuclear weapons, what Obama 
     would really have to envision is a world without war, or 
     without threats of war. . . .The danger is that the allure of 
     a world without nuclear weapons can be a distraction--even an 
     excuse for not acting against real nuclear threats. . . .So 
     while Obama talks of a future without nuclear weapons, the 
     trajectory we are on today is toward a nuclear--and missile-
     capable North Korea and Iran--and a far more dangerous world.

  Others have also written about this.
  David Von Drehle, writing in Time Magazine, said:

       A world with nuclear weapons in it is a scary, scary place 
     to think about. The industrialized world without nuclear 
     weapons was a scary, scary place for real. But there is no 
     way to un-ring the nuclear bell. The science and technology 
     of nuclear weapons is widespread, and if nukes are outlawed 
     someday, only outlaws will have nukes.

  Kenneth Waltz, leading arms controller and professor emeritus of 
political science at UC Berkeley, said:

       We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's 
     striking and against all historical precedent that for that 
     substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear 
     states.

  Importantly, the administration's planned further diminishment of our 
nuclear stockpile--further diminishing it from these numbers--and 
President Obama's hostility to the utility of nuclear weapons generally 
has caused a great deal of unease among our non-nuclear allies. These 
nations are not so open about their concerns, but the problem is a very 
real one.
  The American nuclear umbrella, our extended deterrence, has allowed 
our allies, free democratic nations, to remain nuclear free, without 
having nuclear weapons. But if the Obama policy continues, the Perry-
Schlesinger report concludes real dangers may await:

       If we are unsuccessful in dealing with current challenges, 
     we may find ourselves at a tipping point, where many 
     additional states conclude that they require nuclear 
     deterrents of their own. If this tipping point is itself 
     mishandled, we may well find ourselves faced with a cascade 
     of proliferation.

  The nuclear commission--President Obama appointed a number of the 
Members on the Democratic side--said that if our allies who feel they 
have been protected by our nuclear umbrella become uncertain, we could 
be faced with a cascade of proliferation. Is that what we want? I know 
the President wants nonproliferation. I know that is what he wants. I 
am not attacking his goal. Throughout my remarks, I am raising the 
question of whether these goals will be furthered by the actions of 
this treaty and these policies or whether they will not.
  One final concern. The administration has made it clear that this 
treaty's nuclear reductions are just the first step in a long march to 
a nuclear-free world. Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller, who 
negotiated the treaty, said in April:

       We will also seek to include non-strategic, non-deployed 
     weapons in future reductions.

  Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and 
former Ambassador Alexander Vershbow a few weeks ago said that the 
administration, in follow-on talks, will seek further reductions in 
strategic, nondeployed, and nonstrategic weapons. And the President has 
said that repeatedly.
  We Senators, in the end, only have our judgment. My best judgment 
tells me that if our weapons fall too low in numbers, such an event 
could inspire rogue and dangerous lesser nuclear powers to seek to 
become peer nuclear competitors to the United States--a dangerous event 
for the entire world. Thus, I must conclude that the Obama plan is to 
diminish the power and leadership of the United States. Carefully read, 
this is what the goal does. I think this conclusion cannot be disputed. 
The leader of the one nation that has been the greatest force for 
freedom and stability in the world, with our large nuclear arsenal, is 
displaying a naivete beyond imagining.
  Since this treaty is a calculated step in the President's plan to 
achieve dangerous and unacceptable policies, this treaty must not be 
ratified. The treaty and the policy behind it must be rejected.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. We are shortly going to propound a unanimous consent 
request. I have been saying that a couple of times now, but we really 
are shortly going to do it. There are several Senators who wish to 
speak. I would like to see if we could set up an order for them.
  I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Washington proceed for 
10 minutes, then the Senator from Texas for up to 10 minutes, then the 
Senator from North Dakota for 5 minutes. I ask unanimous consent also 
that each of those Senators would allow the interruption for the 
propounding of the unanimous consent request if it comes during the 
time they are speaking.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hagan). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.


                    Defense Level Playing Field Act

  Mrs. MURRAY. Madam President, I rise this afternoon to call on the 
Senate to move and pass H.R. 6540, which is the Defense Level Playing 
Field Act, a bill which was passed overwhelmingly by the House of 
Representatives yesterday.
  This is a bill that is identical to a bipartisan provision I have 
introduced here in the Senate with Senators Brownback, Cantwell, and 
others from States that know the value of American aerospace. It is a 
bill that will require the Pentagon to take into account illegal 
subsidies to foreign companies in our country, and that will finally 
deliver an even playing field in our procurement process.
  But above all, this is a jobs bill. It is about protecting skilled, 
family-wage jobs, manufacturing jobs, and engineering jobs--jobs with 
technical skills and expertise that are passed down from one generation 
to the next; jobs that not only support our families during a very 
difficult economic time but are also helping to keep our communities 
above water. These are jobs in communities in Kansas, in Connecticut, 
in California, and in my home State of Washington. They are jobs that 
support small businesses, they pay people's mortgages, and they create 
economic opportunity. These jobs right now are at risk. Why? Because of 
illegal subsidies that undercut our workers and create an uneven 
playing field for America's aerospace workers.

[[Page 23450]]

  This is a commonsense, straightforward way to protect American 
aerospace jobs from unfairly subsidized European competition. It is a 
bill that specifically targets a major job-creating project--the Air 
Force's aerial refueling tanker contract--as a place where we can begin 
to restore fairness for our aerospace workers. This bill says that in 
awarding that critical tanker contract, the Pentagon must consider any 
unfair competitive advantage aerospace companies have, and there is no 
bigger unfair advantage right now in the world of international 
aerospace than launch aid.
  As my colleagues may know, launch aid is direct funding that has been 
provided to the European aerospace company Airbus from the treasuries 
of European governments. It is what supports their factories and their 
workers and their airplanes. It is what allows them to price their 
airplanes far below those that are made here in the United States and 
still turn a profit. It is what allows them to literally role the dice 
and lose on a product and what separates them from American aerospace 
companies, such as Boeing, that bet the company on each new airplane 
line they produce. In short, it is what allows them to stack the decks 
against American workers.
  In July of this year, the World Trade Organization handed down a 
ruling in a case that the United States brought against the European 
Union that finally called launch aid what it really is: a trade-
distorting, job-killing, unfair advantage. That is what the WTO said. 
It is one of our Nation's most important trade cases to date. The WTO 
ruled very clearly that launch aid is illegal, it creates an uneven 
playing field, it has harmed American workers and companies, and it 
needs to end.
  Specifically, the WTO found that European governments have provided 
Airbus with more than 15 billion Euros in launch aid, subsidizing every 
model of aircraft ever produced by Airbus in the last 40 years, 
including, by the way, the A330--the very model they are now putting 
forward in the tanker competition. The WTO ruled that France and 
Germany and Spain provided more than 1 billion Euros in infrastructure 
and infrastructure-related grants between 1989 and 2001, as well as 
another billion in share transfers and equity infusions into Airbus. 
They ruled that European governments provided over 1 billion in Euros 
in funding between 1986 and 2005 for research and development directed 
specifically to the development of Airbus aircraft. In fact, the 
Lexington Institute states that launch aid represents over $200 billion 
in today's dollars in total subsidies to Airbus.
  Launch aid has very real consequences. It has created an uphill 
battle for our American workers and American aerospace as a whole. 
Because of launch aid, our workers are now not only competing against 
rival companies, they are competing against the treasuries of European 
governments. At the end of the day, that has meant lost jobs at our 
American aerospace companies and suppliers and the communities that 
support them.
  I have been speaking out against Europe's market-distorting actions 
for many years because I understand that these subsidies are not only 
illegal, they are deeply unfair and anticompetitive.
  My home State of Washington is, of course, home to much of our 
country's aerospace industry, and I know our workers are the best in 
the world. On a level playing field, they can compete and win against 
absolutely anybody. But, unfortunately, Airbus and the European Union 
have refused to allow fair competition. Instead, they use their 
aerospace industry as a government-funded jobs program, and they use 
billions in illegal launch aid to fund it.
  So let me be clear about one thing. The objective of this bill that 
was passed overwhelmingly by the House of Representatives yesterday is 
not to limit competition; it is to make sure everyone can compete on a 
level playing field. Airbus has made it clear they will go to any 
lengths to hurt our country's aerospace industry. We need to make it 
clear we will take every action to stop them because this is not only 
about the future of aerospace; it is about jobs right now that will 
help our economy recover. In fact, as we look at ways to stimulate job 
growth and keep American companies innovating and growing, we shouldn't 
look any further than this bill.
  This bill is a commonsense policy. It makes sure U.S. Government 
policy translates to Pentagon policy because the fact is that the U.S. 
Government, through our Trade Representative, has taken the position 
that Airbus subsidies are illegal and unfair. Yet, on the other hand, 
the U.S. Department of Defense is ignoring that position as we look to 
purchase a new tanker fleet, and that does not make any sense--not for 
our country, not for our military, and certainly not for our workers. 
The WTO made a fair decision. Airbus subsidies are illegal and 
anticompetitive. Now the Department of Defense needs to take that 
ruling into account.
  When I go home and talk to our aerospace workers in Washington State, 
I want to be able to tell them we have evened the stakes. I want them 
to know their government is not looking the other way as policies 
continue to undercut their jobs and their opportunities. I want them to 
know that while they are working to secure our country by producing the 
best airplane in the world, their government is doing everything it can 
to make sure fair opportunities are there that will keep them on the 
job.
  It is time to take these job-killing subsidies into account. It is 
the right thing to do for our workers, for our economy, and the future 
of our airspace industry.


                  Unanimous Consent Request--H.R. 6540

  So I ask, as if in legislative session and as if in morning business, 
unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate 
consideration of H.R. 6540, which was received from the House and is at 
the desk; that the bill be read three times and passed; the motion to 
reconsider be laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate; 
and any statements relating to the matter be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. SESSIONS. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I appreciate the loyalty of my 
colleague from Washington for the Boeing facility that is there. I just 
want to say that other workers are involved, including 48,000 new jobs 
that would be created if the plant in Alabama were to be the one 
selected in this competition.
  As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I would note that we 
voted a number of years ago unanimously to have a competition. There 
are only two companies in the world that can make this kind of 
aircraft. It is a commercial aircraft, not a highly sophisticated 
defense system such as a fighter. The EADS team committed to build that 
in America--bringing jobs not just to Alabama but jobs all over the 
Nation, far more around the Nation than just in Alabama--and to create 
a third major world aircraft facility. Congress asked that the bids be 
competitively let and that these two competitors be given a chance to 
submit the best proposal.
  I am highly convinced that the EADS aircraft is superior--is larger, 
it is newer--and more effective in the role it is asked to fulfill.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Madam President, I would just ask what the order is at 
this point.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator sought recognition after he 
objected.
  Mrs. MURRAY. The unanimous consent agreement was that the Senator 
from Texas would proceed after I had yielded the floor, which I had not 
yielded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. At this time, the Senator from Alabama was the 
only person who sought recognition.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Madam President, I believe there was an agreement that 
the Senator from Texas follow my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There was an order, but there was no 
objection. There was no one who sought recognition.

[[Page 23451]]


  Mr. SESSIONS. I will wrap up, briefly, if I could.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. If the Senator from Alabama wants to finish his 
objection--
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: My understanding is 
that the Senator from Washington had 10 minutes. My understanding is 
she had completed that 10 minutes; am I incorrect on that?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Her time has expired.
  Mrs. BOXER. I didn't hear the Chair say that. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I ask the Senator from Alabama, I thought he was 
objecting on Senator Murray's time, and I was next in the unanimous 
consent. My question is, is he finished with his objection?
  Mr. SESSIONS. I wish 1 additional minute to wrap up, if I could, and 
then I will yield the floor.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Madam President, then I ask unanimous consent for an 
additional minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I have the floor, I believe.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, after this competition has been going 
on for quite a number of years, and both parties have been very 
seriously competing for this contract, it is expected to be awarded in 
March of next year. The Defense Department has considered every one of 
these issues, including the WTO issue. The lawyers talked about it and 
we have talked about it in the Senate and the House.
  At this very last minute, on the eve of awarding the competition, a 
House bill was passed without any debate. We have not discussed it or 
had a hearing on it. It should not be approved. I object.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Madam President, we are asking for a level playing field 
with a bill that passed the House. This is a discussion we have had 
many times. It says that illegal subsidies from any company should be 
taken into account on a deal in front of the Pentagon.
  I will stand anytime and fight for fairness and competition. I am 
sorry this has been objected to, because it meant our country would 
have a fair competition.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, I rise to speak on the START treaty. 
I spoke on the floor Saturday stating my concerns about this treaty and 
the need to address a number of very important issues. I had hoped that 
amendments that had been offered would be able to clarify the 
position--the United States position--on this treaty.
  I have listened to the debate. I have watched many amendments go 
down. The treaty supporters have said that these amendments are deal 
killers, treaty killers. I disagree. I believe everybody has been 
sincere, but I am not persuaded that the Senate's role to advise and 
consent to treaties has successfully finetuned the understanding on our 
part, if we accept this treaty, nor the Russian positions--have they 
been clarified with our objections or disagreements with the Russian 
position.
  I understand it would have made it hard for the administration to 
amend the text. But even amendments that would try to amend the 
preamble, or even the ratification resolution that would clarify the 
United States position, have caused me great pause. For instance, when 
we are talking about missile defense, former Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice, in a Wall Street Journal op-ed, said:

       Russians tend to interpret every utterance as binding 
     commitment.

  She went on to write:

       The Russians need to understand that the U.S. will use the 
     full range of American technology and talent to improve our 
     ability to intercept and destroy the ballistic missiles of 
     hostile countries.

  I am concerned that this treaty still has a lot of misunderstanding 
about the United States missile defense capability. I am concerned that 
our capability, with the understanding of Russians, would be 
restricted. Russia and the United States each have issued unilateral 
statements when they signed the New START that clarified their position 
on the relationship between START and missile defense. Russia stated:

       The treaty can operate and be viable only if the United 
     States refrains from developing its missile defense 
     capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively.

  I think we should state clearly in the resolution to ratify that it 
is not the position of the United States to place any limitations on 
missile defense. The President wrote a letter saying he disagreed with 
the Russian position and, yet, Senator McCain offered an amendment that 
would have stricken language in the preamble of the treaty that would 
have made it clear what the United States position was, and that 
amendment was not adopted by this body.
  As we speak, I don't believe Russia is our enemy. This is a 10-year 
treaty. We don't know 10 years down the road how relationships might 
change. I believe our relationship with Russia is important, but there 
are rogue nations in the world that are hostile to the United States, 
which are working in earnest to get nuclear capability and possibly 
already have it, plus warheads to put those nuclear weapons on.
  With the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran or North Korea, or Pakistan, 
which is our ally, which has a fragile government, or even Venezuela, 
which is working with Iran and is certainly within our hemisphere, it 
would be unthinkable to have any kind of miscommunication about the 
United States capability to control its own defense capabilities. That 
is exactly what the Russian statement said we could not do.
  U.S. planning and force requirements may have to change in the next 
10 years and, frankly, I think they ought to be going forward right now 
to ensure that we can withstand any kind of warhead, nuclear or 
otherwise, that would come in from rogue nations.
  That in itself is enough for me to say we have not fulfilled our 
responsibility under the Constitution for advice to the President on 
treaties. That is our solemn responsibility, and I do not think we have 
been successfully able to do that because we have been blocked on every 
amendment, calling them deal killers.
  I think a strong New START is in our best interest. But I believe 
that this treaty does not address other areas of concern I have voiced 
as well. I believe this treaty could further be improved by increasing 
the number of type one and type two inspections, as was attempted by 
the Inhofe amendment that was defeated yesterday.
  For instance, we know there are loose nukes that have come from 
Russian arsenals in the past, because the Russians have not had a clear 
control, or list of, or don't seem to be totally firm about where all 
of their arsenal is, and they don't seem to have the accountability. So 
the loose nukes, it has been reported, have shown up in other places, 
such as, for instance, North Korea. So I think verification becomes 
more important, to get a true idea of exactly what the Russians have, 
so there can be an accountability going forward to assure that whatever 
number are in whatever place would always stay the same, unless they 
are part of the drawdown.
  I think the verification amendment Senator Inhofe had that was 
defeated would have improved our capability to understand exactly what 
was out there that might loosely go to Iran or North Korea, with whom 
the Russians have relationships, though we do not.
  Former Secretary of State James Baker described the treaty's 
verification regime as weaker than its predecessor. I agree with his 
comment, and I hope we can improve the situation. To

[[Page 23452]]

be fair, Secretary Baker supports the treaty. But he did recognize its 
shortcomings, and I think that should have been addressed by the 
Senate, without fear of what the Russians might say about our 
capability to defend against threats, not from Russia necessarily, 
other than the haplessness of not knowing for sure where your nuclear 
weapons are--I don't think Russia is our enemy. I want a relationship 
with Russia.
  The missile defense we were not able to even clarify in the 
resolution of ratification causes me great concern. The verification 
not being as adequate as I think we need, and then the modernization, 
which we also address in other amendments, I think, are also 
problematic. I believe we must know our nuclear warheads could be used 
in the worst-case circumstance, because I think that is a deterrent.
  Because of these things, I am going to vote no today on the 
ratification of the treaty. I think the Senate could have improved the 
understanding of this treaty. I think we could have strengthened it 
with real amendments that would have strengthened even what the 
President said in his letter to the Senate, saying that he disagreed 
with the Russian interpretation. But then when we tried to put that in 
writing, that didn't pass. So I believe we should not pass this treaty 
today. I think we can fulfill our responsibility for advice and consent 
and have a more bipartisan passing of the resolution. I think we need a 
good relationship with Russia. I think we need to protect, at all 
costs, the United States unilateral capability for missile defense for 
our country against other nations. I don't think Russia is a threat, 
but I do think rogue nations that have nuclear capabilities are. I 
think the symbiotic relationship between Venezuela and Iran is a very 
real threat to the United States. I think we need to start preparing 
more carefully about that.
  I know my time is up. I appreciate the time to state my reasons for 
voting against this and hope that when it passes--which I think it 
will--we will be more firm in clarifying with the Russians our view of 
our national security interests.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, first, if I can interrupt for a moment 
before the Senator from North Dakota speaks, according to the prior 
order. I want to inform Senators that it is now 1:15. We are awaiting 
language which is forthcoming relatively soon on the 9/11 issue. I 
think it is the intention of the majority leader to vote very quickly 
after that unanimous consent agreement comes together. That means we 
could have a vote, conceivably, on the final passage of the resolution 
of ratification on the treaty somewhere--this is a guess--within the 
vicinity of 1:45 to 2 o'clock. That is a guess. Senator Kyl I know 
wanted to speak prior to that taking place. We are trying to preserve 
that within the order. That said, I yield to the Senator from North 
Dakota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, we expect to have the necessary papers to 
complete the consent agreement within the next 15 minutes. It is 1:15 
now, so we hope by 1:30. Sometimes Senate time is not exactly right, 
but we are getting very close to being able to do this consent 
agreement. It has been typed. We are waiting for the papers to come 
from the Hart Building.
  We want everyone to be patient. We know how anxious everyone is to 
complete the business of this Congress. Just everyone understand it 
should be not much longer.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, I was not going to speak again, but I 
was prompted to by my colleague from Alabama, a friend and someone for 
whom I have great respect. The presentation by my colleague from 
Alabama suggested that President Obama is moving in the direction of 
disarming us, the implication is that of injuring our national security 
by proposing that we have fewer nuclear weapons. Let me make a point 
that I think is so important for the record.
  I hope it is not now or ever considered a source of weakness for this 
country to aspire to have a planet with fewer nuclear weapons. It ought 
to be a source of strength that we understand it becomes our burden as 
a world leader--an economic leader and nuclear power--to try to reduce 
the number of nuclear weapons on this Earth.
  This President has not proposed anything that would injure our 
national security. He is not proposing anything that is unilateral. He 
has negotiated and his team has negotiated a very strong arms reduction 
treaty with the Russians.
  I know there has been great discussion about modernization, whether 
there is enough money, about why tactical nuclear weapons were not 
included, the issue of whether it limits us with respect to missile 
defense. All of those issues have been answered. All have been 
responded to.
  The question, it seems to me, for us now and for all Americans, and 
particularly those who serve in Congress in the future, is will we be a 
world leader in pushing for a reduction in the number of nuclear 
weapons on this planet?
  There are some 25,000 nuclear weapons on this planet. The loss of 
just one of those weapons, into the hands of a terrorist or rogue 
nation who might then explode it in a major city on Earth would change 
everything.
  My colleagues are probably tired of hearing me say it, but in my desk 
I have kept a piece of a Soviet Union bomber, a very small piece of a 
wing strut from a Soviet Union bomber. We did not shoot it down. We 
negotiated that bomber down by paying money to saw the wings off.
  Nuclear arms reduction treaties work. We know they work. There are 
Russian submarines that were not destroyed in battle. We ground them up 
and took them apart. The wings were sawed off bombers, and they were 
sold for scrap. Nuclear missiles in silos with nuclear warheads aimed 
at American cities are gone.
  I will give an example. One was in Ukraine. Now sunflower seeds adorn 
that pasture where there was a missile with a nuclear weapon aimed at 
America.
  We know these arms reduction treaties work because we have seen them 
work. Fewer nuclear weapons, fewer delivery vehicles, bombers, 
submarines, missiles--we know this works.
  My colleague seemed to suggest that it would be a horrible thing if 
the entire world were rid of nuclear weapons. I hope that every Senator 
would aspire to have that be the case, a world in which there was not 
one weapon left, for almost surely every offensive weapon on this 
planet has always been used. We need to be very concerned about the 
number of nuclear weapons, the spread of nuclear weapons, the need, the 
desire for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons. That is why these 
treaties and these negotiations on arms reduction are so unbelievably 
important.
  Never has it been more important because now there is a new threat. 
They do not wear uniforms. They do not belong to one country. It is the 
terrorist threat. And they strive mightily to acquire nuclear weapons.
  This treaty negotiated at the start by the previous President and 
concluded by this President, in my judgment, strengthens this country, 
represents our best national security interests.
  I ask the question of anyone who believes that it is a threat for us 
to begin reducing nuclear weapons through arms negotiations with others 
who have nuclear weapons: Who, if not us, will lead the way to do that? 
If not us, who? Is there another country they think will aspire to 
provide leadership to reduce the number of nuclear weapons? If there 
is, tell us the name because we all know better than that.
  This responsibility falls on our shoulders. We are the leading 
nuclear power on this Earth. It is our responsibility, it is this 
country's responsibility to lead. I don't ever want anybody to suggest 
it is some sort of weakness for this President or any President to 
engage in arms reduction negotiations. That is a source of strength.
  This treaty was negotiated carefully. I was on the national security 
working

[[Page 23453]]

group. We had briefing after briefing in top-secret venues. This treaty 
was carefully negotiated. It represents our best interests. It 
represents a reduction of nuclear weapons, a reduction of delivery 
vehicles and represents, in my judgment, another step in reducing the 
nuclear threat. It is not even a giant step, but it certainly is a step 
in the right direction.
  This represents our best national security interests, and this 
President has demonstrated, yes, he wants a world with fewer nuclear 
weapons. He wants a world, as would I, with no nuclear weapons at some 
point. But this President would never allow negotiations or never allow 
circumstances in which this country is unarmed or unprepared or unable 
to meet its national security needs. He has not done that, not in this 
treaty, and will not do it in the future.
  I did want to stand up and say that because of the comments earlier 
by the Senator who suggested there is some sort of weakness for a 
country that aspires to have a reduction of nuclear weapons on this 
planet.
  Let me finally say, I have spoken at length on this floor about the 
severity of losing even just one nuclear weapon. I have told the story 
about a CIA agent code-named Dragonfire who reported 1 month after 9/11 
that a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon had been stolen from Russia and that 
nuclear weapon had been smuggled into New York City and was to be 
detonated. There was an apoplectic seizure in this town about it 
because no one knew what to do about it. They did not even notify the 
mayor of New York.
  They discovered a month later that was probably not a credible piece 
of information. But as they did the diagnosis of it, they discovered it 
is plausible someone could have acquired a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon 
from Russia, it was plausible; if they had done that, they could have 
smuggled it into an American city and if terrorists did that they could 
have detonated it. Then we are not talking about 3,000 deaths, we are 
talking about 100,000, 200,000 deaths.
  The work we have done in so many areas, the work in this 
administration, let me say, to secure loose nuclear materials, 
circumstances where plutonium or highly enriched uranium in the size of 
a liter or, in one case, in the size of a small can of soda, enough to 
kill tens and tens of thousands of people with a nuclear weapon--this 
is serious business. At a time when we debate a lot of issues--serious 
and not so serious--this is serious business.
  I think the work that has been done by the chairman and ranking 
member in recent days--I watched a lot of this and watched it over this 
year--is extraordinary work. But so too is the work by this President, 
by the negotiators. My colleague described the folks at the State 
Department who had a significant role as well.
  Let us not ever think it is a source of weakness to be negotiating 
verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons among those who possess them. 
That is a source of strength, and it is important for our kids and 
grandchildren who can succeed by continuing to do that with treaties 
that make the best sense for this country's national security 
interests.
  I see the Senator from Massachusetts does not yet have a unanimous 
consent request, but I know all my colleagues are anxious to see one.
  I yield the floor, and I expect, as the majority leader indicated, 
within the next half hour or so we will be voting, and I think that is 
good news. I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MERKLEY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                   Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts

  Mr. MERKLEY. Madam President, I rise to discuss and ask unanimous 
consent for consideration of H.R. 6398. I will get to the unanimous 
consent language in a moment, but right now I want to describe what 
this is about. Then I wish to yield to my colleague from Georgia to add 
a little bit of the impact of this issue.
  The issue is this: In all 50 States in America, lawyers have to put 
clients' funds into trust accounts. Under the law, they are not allowed 
to earn interest on these accounts. Over time, an arrangement has been 
worked out whereby the banks pay interest, but it does not go to the 
clients; it goes to fund civil legal services for those who cannot 
afford those services.
  This arrangement is in great jeopardy if we do not pass this bill 
today. I will expand on that jeopardy in a moment, but at this point I 
simply am going to yield to my colleague from Georgia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. ISAKSON. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Oregon. This 
is very important work, and we are in our late hour. Sometimes we do 
our best in the late hour.
  The unintended consequence of the Dodd-Frank legislation with regard 
to IOLTA is it not being extended and we are going to literally have 
thousands of escrow accounts held by law firms and attorneys, real 
estate transactions, dispute resolution transactions, and beneficial 
programs that will have to be spread among many more banks because the 
insurance level, which is now limited, drops to $250,000. It would 
force the transfer of escrow account money out of any number of banks. 
At a time when capital is critical in small community banks, the 
unintended consequence might have been to take them below tier one 
capital requirements and put them in a stress situation.
  I commend the distinguished Senator from Oregon for his work on this 
legislation. I thank the Senator from Louisiana, Mr. Vitter, for his 
consent for us to bring this forward. I give wholehearted support to 
the unanimous consent request.
  I yield back to the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. MERKLEY. Madam President, I appreciate so much the partnership of 
my colleague from Georgia. He has laid out clearly the impact of a 
failure to fix this legislation on our community banks where lawyers, 
exercising their fiduciary responsibilities, would have to move their 
trust accounts out of these special accounts where the interest goes to 
legal services and legal education and into no-interest-bearing 
accounts so that no one gains from that movement. In the course of it, 
they would be moving funds often from community banks to other 
institutions, imperiling these community banks.
  I wish to address the other side of this issue, which is the 
important work these funds do in all 50 States. I will speak 
specifically to the State of Oregon, but there are parallels because 
all 50 States participate with these accounts.
  In Oregon, we have, first, the association of Oregon Legal Services 
Program, its primary source of civil legal assistance available to low-
income Oregonians. To give a sense, if a woman is having a big 
challenge with domestic violence, she can get legal aid through this 
type of assistance. If a family is trying to struggle with a mistake on 
a foreclosure process so they can save their home, they can get 
assistance through this program. They have 20 offices throughout the 
State of Oregon to serve Oregonians living in poverty.
  Second is the Juvenile Rights Project. This provides legal services 
to children and families through individual representation in juvenile 
court and school proceedings to help children who are in 
extraordinarily difficult circumstances.
  A third is Disability Rights Oregon, the Oregon Advocacy Center, 
which assists those who are disabled, who are victims of abuse or 
neglect, or have difficulty acquiring health care or need to exercise 
their rights in regard to special education. They can turn to the 
Oregon Advocacy Center-Disability Rights of Oregon for help.
  In addition, these funds pay for legal-oriented education for our K-
12 students. Let me give an example of three programs in Oregon. These 
programs assist 15,000 students in our State.
  One is the High School Mock Trial Competition. This type of mock 
trial

[[Page 23454]]

competition is an enormous learning exercise for our students in how 
our courts function and how the facts of a case are presented and how 
the principles of law are applied.
  Then we have the summer institute training for teachers so that 
social studies teachers can learn more about the role of law and be 
more effective in conveying that vision to our students.
  Then I also want to mention the We The People Program on the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights. Here in this Chamber, we discuss the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights virtually on a daily basis. 
Virtually every day on this floor, we discuss how these founding 
documents affect how our laws are applied and how freedoms are 
protected in the United States of America. This program helps our 
children learn those fundamental principles. Sort of the heart and 
spirit of the American democratic world are conveyed through this We 
The People Program.
  I also wish to commend a whole host of banks in Oregon that have 
agreed not only to pay interest on these lawyer trust accounts--and 
IOLTA stands for interest on lawyer trust accounts--but to pay 1 
percent, which is above the going rate on most types of transaction 
accounts. They do that because they benefit from the deposits, and they 
know their communities benefit from these services and these programs.
  This legislation will resolve a problem in which lawyers, applying 
their fiduciary responsibilities, would have had to withdraw their 
funds from these accounts and put them in other non-interest-bearing 
accounts, to no benefit to anyone and to a great deal of harm to so 
many.

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