[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 15]
[Senate]
[Pages 23092-23103]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

                                 ______
                                 

TREATY WITH RUSSIA ON MEASURES FOR FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF 
                  STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS--Continued

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the New Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty that we call New START. I believe New START is 
deeply flawed and is a dangerous step toward undermining our national 
security. I believe it does not strengthen verification or transparency 
of Russia's nuclear arsenal. We negotiated this treaty with Russia when 
our time may have been better spent focusing on nuclear threats posed 
by other nations. I believe the treaty is virtually unverifiable. 
Simply put, it is the wrong approach to both reducing the arms race and 
reaching the ideal of living in a nuclear-free world.
  Many people have expressed the numerous shortcomings of this treaty. 
This evening I would like to touch on three.
  First, New START restricts the future of our missile defense. 
President Obama campaigned against missile defense and has 
systematically cut funding for it. It should not be a surprise to 
anyone in America that the administration lacks commitment to a robust 
missile defense system, but that does not mean the Senate needs to 
support it. New START links offensive reductions with missile defense. 
I believe these must be decoupled. Why? The treaty limits launch 
vehicles and restricts the conversion of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles for missile defense purposes. Converting nuclear 
intercontinental ballistic missiles to conventional missiles is also 
restricted in the proposed treaty. Most egregiously, statements made by 
senior Russian officials insist that the treaty's language prohibits 
the United States from developing an antiballistic missile defense 
system without Russian consent. This is completely unacceptable.
  Unfortunately, Russia is not the only threat the United States faces 
in this world. It is inconceivable that the administration would agree 
to a treaty that imposes such restrictions on our national security.
  Secondly, we have reached the point where we cannot make reductions 
in our nuclear arsenal without viable plans for a strong, long-term 
strategy for modernization. Again, Russia is not our Nation's only 
threat. Without modernizing our nuclear arsenal, the cuts necessitated 
by the New START treaty would likely encourage Iran and other 
proliferators to build up their own arsenals rather than discouraging 
them as we would like.
  The United States cannot maintain a credible deterrent or reduce the 
number of weapons in our nuclear stockpile without ensuring that we 
have reliable warning, command, and control systems, and that we put an 
emphasis on the land and sea-based delivery vehicles that give us the 
confidence we need for protecting ourselves should the worst occur. The 
reduction of our nuclear-capable bombers and land or submarine-based 
missiles from 1,600 to 700 gives the Russians an immense advantage. 
Delivery vehicles are just one aspect of our nuclear triad, but they 
are a critical component to being able to deter adversaries and should 
not be restricted under the New START treaty.
  By some estimates, Russia maintains thousands more small tactical 
nuclear warheads that can be delivered by way of artillery shells, 
cruise missiles, and aircraft. Yet the treaty before us, which freezes 
missiles at 700 for each side, willfully ignores the massive Russian 
advantage in tactical weapons.
  Finally, the most serious and immediate flaw is weakened verification 
requirements which are vastly less robust than those we had under START 
I. It is puzzling why they would do this. Under START I, 600 
inspections were conducted. New START requires just 180 inspections 
over the life of the treaty, hardly enough to ensure Russian 
compliance. The Russians will be able to encript telemetry from missile 
tests. This makes it harder for us to know for certain what new 
capabilities the Russians are developing.
  One might ask why did we agree to such. Under New START, there will 
no longer be onsite monitoring of mobile missile final assembly 
facilities. Before the expiration of START I, the United States used 
this monitoring or verification because satellites do not provide the 
exact information on mobile weapons systems. Verification requirements 
are too weak to reliably verify the treaty's 1,550 limit on deployed 
warheads. These measures will neither give us confidence in the process 
nor the assurances we need to assess the integrity of it.
  Russia has a long history of nuclear duplicity or cheating. Yet New 
START has substantially weaker verification mechanisms than START I.
  Perhaps the clearest reason to suspect the true motivations behind 
the treaty is the inexplicable rush to ratify it now. The shortcomings 
of New START are numerous, substantial, and serious. The Senate should 
have the time to examine the treaty's compliance provisions and ensure 
that loopholes are closed and deficiencies amended.
  I believe the Senate has a responsibility to the American people to 
ensure that first and foremost our country's negotiations have not 
unilaterally hampered in any way our national security. I will not 
support subordinating

[[Page 23093]]

U.S. national security to an untrustworthy partner, and neither should 
the Senate as a whole.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 4833

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it is my understanding in 45 minutes we 
are going to be having a couple votes, one on amendment No. 4833 and 
one on the Thune amendment No. 4841, having to do with delivery 
systems; mine having to do with verification. That would mean we would 
have 45 minutes to talk about this.
  We have already covered it pretty thoroughly. I think we need to have 
an understanding of what we are talking about in terms of verification.
  There are only 180 inspections that are authorized by the New START 
treaty, and that is over a 10-year period. So we are talking about 18 
per year versus the 600 inspections over 15 years in START I. If you do 
your math, that would be 40 a year in START I, and down to 18 a year in 
New START.
  One of the arguments for that is that we have fewer sites to inspect, 
and for that reason we do not need to have as many inspections. I would 
disagree with that pretty strongly. One thing all the experts seem to 
have in common and agreeing to is that once you get down to fewer 
sites, the verification becomes more important.
  John Bolton, on the 3rd of May, said: ``while [verification is] 
important in any arms-control treaty, verification becomes even more 
important at lower warhead levels.'' I think they all agree. Brent 
Scowcroft said the same thing. He said: ``Current force levels provide 
a kind of buffer because they are high enough to be relatively 
insensitive to imperfect intelligence and modest force changes. . . . 
As force levels go down, the balance of nuclear power can become 
increasingly delicate and vulnerable to cheating''--``to cheating''--
``on arms control limits, concerns about `hidden' missiles, and the 
actions of nuclear third parties.''
  So he is saying the same thing. James Baker said the same thing. He 
said, when testifying recently, that the New START verification program 
``does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the 
numerous and diverse treaty obligations and prohibitions under START I. 
This complex part of the treaty is even more crucial when fewer 
deployed nuclear warheads are allowed than were allowed in the past.''
  Do your math, and it figures out. If you have 10 warheads that you 
are going to be inspecting, and they hide 1, that is just 10 percent of 
them. If it gets down to 2, and they hide 1, that is 50 percent of 
them. That is what they are saying, that we need to have more, not 
less. Of course, this is less. In fact, if you do the math a little bit 
further, as was said by the Senator from Massachusetts--he said: So I 
think it is one thing to ask our strategic forces to do that 10 times a 
year, or less than once a month. It is another thing for them to be 
waiting for 30 inspections a year. Again quoting him: We have two 
submarine bases, three bomber bases, and three ICBM bases. On the other 
hand, Russia has 3, 3, and 12. So they actually have 18, and we would 
have 8, which means, if you do the math further, they would be able to 
inspect one site every 2 years, while we would only be able to inspect 
every 2 years. They would be inspecting it every 1 year.
  That is the reason we should be doing this. The other thing is--and 
people keep forgetting about it because it is not fun to talk about 
it--but the fact is, they cheat and we do not. Everyone has talked 
about this. We have something that was set up to try to measure who is 
cheating, who is not cheating.
  We had the START treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
That commission reported--they actually had two reports. One report was 
in 2005; one in 2010. In the report in 2005 that was on the Biological 
Weapons Convention, the State Department concluded--and I am quoting 
from the report of 2005--``Russia maintains a mature offensive 
biological weapons program and that its nature and status have not 
changed.'' That was after it had been in force for 5 years. That was in 
2005.
  In 2010, that same Commission comes back, and the report states: 
Russia confidence-building measure declarations since 1992 have not 
satisfactorily documented whether its biological weapons program was 
terminated.
  Again we have the Biological Weapons Convention reports in 2005 and 
2010, saying they are not complying. In other words, they are cheating. 
If you sign an agreement and do not do it, then you are cheating. That 
makes sense. On the Chemical Weapons Convention, the same thing. In 
2005, the State Department assessed that ``Russia is in violation of 
its Chemical Weapons Convention obligations because its declaration was 
incomplete with respect to declaration of production and development 
facilities.'' So that is what they said in 2005, that they are cheating 
on the Chemical Weapons Convention obligations they made, their treaty 
obligations.
  In 2010, still talking about the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 
State Department again stated: There was an absence of additional 
information from Russia, resulting in the United States being unable to 
ascertain whether Russia has declared all of its chemical weapons 
stockpile, all chemical weapons production facilities, and all of its 
chemical weapons development facilities.
  Again, they stated in 2010 that they are still cheating. So it is 
always difficult, when you look at these. The Senator from 
Massachusetts said: Well, wait a minute now. We have to do the same 
thing they have to do, and in your amendment, if we are going to have 
three times as many inspections, then we have to do three times as many 
and they have to do three times as many. We have to prepare for them 
here. I said: Yes, that is my point. We need to have more inspections. 
We want these inspections to take place. And we want to be sure that 
the Russians also adhere to their commitment for inspections, which 
they have never done in the past.
  When you look at this, we see there are problems with this. When you 
talk about using the argument that we cannot change something because 
you are changing the treaty, I think that is what we are supposed to 
do. We are supposed to be involved in the treaty. The Senator from 
Massachusetts was talking about the number of people who were involved 
in this thing--the military and all these others in putting this thing 
together. Well, guess who was left out? Us. And that is what the 
Constitution, under article II, section 2 says, that we in the Senate 
are supposed to ratify--advice and consent. Well, we have been advised, 
but we have not consented yet. That is what this is all about. The 
process works this way.
  If we do pass an amendment such as my amendment that will be voted on 
in a few minutes to triple the number of inspections, that will change 
the treaty, and I understand that. That means it will have to go back 
to the Duma in Russia, and they then would have to look at the treaty 
and decide whether they would agree with it, and, if not, have them 
make a change, and then it comes back to us. It goes back and forth, 
and this is what our forefathers had anticipated would happen. Because 
of all the people who they talk about, the Senator from Massachusetts 
talks about, who were drafting this, the thing they all have in common 
is, they are not answerable to the people. We are. I say to the 
Presiding Officer, we were both elected. I say to the Presiding 
Officer, he was elected and I was elected; and, therefore, we are the 
ears and the eyes in the confirmation process for the public, and I 
think that is our constitutional obligation. It is very clearly stated.
  So we do have serious problems. One thing that is kind of in the 
weeds and is a little bit complicated is, when you talk about that my 
amendment triples the number of inspections under New START from the 
types under the

[[Page 23094]]

START I treaty, we had two types of inspections. This is critical. Type 
one refers to inspections of the ICBM bases, submarine bases, air 
bases--these are the delivery systems--to demonstrate very clearly that 
we are going to be able to look at those sites and see if they are 
carrying out those obligations under the treaty.
  But type two refers to inspections at formerly declared facilities. 
They say we have more inspections right now. That is because we did not 
even have type two facilities in the START I treaty, because when you 
talk about formerly declared facilities, we are talking about 
facilities that are closed down. So we want to inspect to make sure 
they are closed down. So the test they use to see whether they are 
closed down is--they talk about debris. That is how you satisfy to see 
whether type two sites have been treated properly. Well, they can have 
debris left over from closing one site, and then leave five open that 
are supposed to be closed and scatter the debris around to use it 
again. There has been testimony that is what they would do.
  I would be glad to yield, since we are going to have two votes coming 
up at 6 o'clock on the Thune amendment as well as my amendment, if the 
Senator from South Dakota wishes to talk about his amendment, and then 
I would be glad to resume my discussion.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time until 
6 p.m. today be for debate with respect to the pending Inhofe amendment 
No. 4833 and pending Thune amendment No. 4841, with the time divided 
between the leaders or their designees, with no amendments in order to 
either amendment; that at 6 p.m., the Senate then proceed to vote in 
relation to the Inhofe amendment; that upon its disposition, the Senate 
then proceed to vote in relation to the Thune amendment, with 2 minutes 
of debate, equally divided as provided above, prior to the second vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota.
  Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma for 
yielding some time. We are going to vote on his amendment and on the 
amendment I have offered. Both address important subjects in the 
treaty. The Senator from Oklahoma is dealing with the issue of 
verification and pointing out the shortcomings in the treaty with 
regard to that very important issue. The amendment I will have voted on 
deals with the issue of delivery vehicles, which, in my judgment, is a 
critically important element in this treaty as well.
  As I have said earlier today on the floor, what this amendment does--
it is very straightforward and it is very simple--is it just increases 
the number of deployed delivery vehicles, which are the bombers, the 
submarines, and the ICBMs allowed for in the treaty from 700 to 720.
  In terms of background about why that is important--and I want to 
inform my colleagues in the Senate about why it is important we get 
that number up to 720--I asked at an Armed Services Committee hearing 
at what point between the range of 500 and 1,100 delivery systems that 
GEN James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
would be comfortable and where we would avoid making our triad into a 
dyad.
  He said: ``I would be very concerned if we got down below those 
levels about midpoint,'' meaning that he would be concerned if the 
negotiated number fell below about 800 delivery vehicles. They have 
made a distinction--the administration has--between deployed and 
nondeployed, that there are 800 there. And he has subsequently said he 
could live with a 700 deployed number. But the fact of the matter is 
that the concern that was voiced initially about dropping down below 
that midpoint level suggests that we need to at least increase up to 
where the administration's I guess you would call it their nuclear 
force structure plan settled, and that was 720 delivery vehicles.
  So the amendment raises from 700 to 720 the number of delivery 
vehicles. As I said earlier in my remarks, if you look at what the 1251 
report says, it says up to 60 nuclear-capable bombers, up to 420 
deployed ICBMs, and 240 deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
on 14 submarines.
  If you add up, up to 60 bombers, up to 420 ICBMs and 240 deployed 
SLBMs, you get a number of 720 delivery vehicles. That is what the 
nuclear force structure plan calls for. Yet the treaty specifies 700 
delivery vehicles. So there is a 20-delivery vehicle cap there, which I 
think is important.
  Frankly, if you ask the question about where would those reductions 
come from, obviously it would come from either ICBMs or bombers. People 
have suggested it doesn't have to come out of the bombers, but if you 
did take it out of the bombers, if you reduce the number of bombers 
from the 60 that is specified in the nuclear force structure plan to 
get down under 700, you would have to take the bombers from 60 down to 
40.
  As I said earlier today, we have about 96 B-52 nuclear bombers, about 
20 B-2 nuclear bombers, and those are total deployed and nondeployed, 
the number we have in our inventory arsenal. We have about 94, I think, 
that are combat ready. But in any case, we are talking about a 
significant reduction in the number of bombers we could deploy at any 
given time under the treaty if you get it down to the 700 number.
  The question as to whether that would come out of ICBMs or whether it 
would come out of bombers to get from 720 down to 700, it could be some 
combination of both. But the thing that concerns me about this is we 
have a bomber fleet that is aging. Most of our bombers today are pre-
Cuban missile crisis-era vintage bombers--about 47 percent of them are. 
We need a follow-on, a next-generation bomber that will fill that role, 
that will be survivable in the types of modern-era defenses we are 
going to encounter, sophisticated air defense systems that are being 
employed by some of our potential adversaries around the world. So if 
you think about what we need in terms of a next-generation bomber, we 
need a field bomber and we need to do it sooner rather than later and 
it needs to be nuclear.
  But when asked the question about whether the next bomber would be a 
nuclear bomber, the military and the administration have been very 
ambiguous on that point. They haven't been able to answer clearly, with 
any degree of certainty, about whether the next bomber, the follow-on 
bomber, would, in fact, be a nuclear bomber, which would suggest to me 
the commitment to the bomber wing of the triad is a lot less than it is 
to perhaps the other two legs of the triad.
  That being said, let's assume for the moment that if we have up to 60 
bombers, we have up to 420 ICBMs, and we have 240 submarine launchable 
ballistic missiles, we are talking about a 720 number, not a 700 
number. So that is why I think this debate is important and why we are 
trying to be insistent in getting those two numbers to match.
  The other point I wish to make is with regard to delivery vehicles in 
the treaty. We start out right now with about 856 delivery vehicles, if 
you add up ICBMs, submarine launchable ballistic missiles, and heavy 
bombers. We will end up down at 700. So we are going to take about 156 
of our delivery vehicles, reduce that, retire those, and get down to 
that 700 number. The Russians, on the other hand, start at about 620. 
So they are already well below the 700 number called for in the treaty. 
It has been suggested that through attrition they will probably get 
down to somewhere in the 400s in delivery vehicles. So this particular 
provision in the treaty costs them nothing. We give up 156 delivery 
vehicles. They give up nothing. In fact, they can come up to the 700 
number. They could increase the number of delivery vehicles they 
currently have to come up to that 700 number.
  So I think it is important to point out the difference that exists 
today and the disparity that exists between the Russian number of 
delivery vehicles and the number the United States has at our disposal 
and the number called

[[Page 23095]]

for in the treaty and why that disparity is so important.
  Just one final point, if I might, with regard to the nuclear posture 
of the country. We also have to defend not only the United States but 
about 30 other countries around the world that fall under the nuclear 
umbrella, under our deterrence. The Russians have none. So these 
delivery vehicle numbers become even more important, given the 
geographic realities the United States has to deal with in terms of our 
strategic nuclear forces and what they are expected to do in terms of 
providing extended deterrence not only to the United States but to many 
of our allies around the world.
  So I think it is important in this treaty debate--this particular 
part of it--that we get a vote on this amendment. It has been suggested 
that if this amendment gets adopted, we will have to go back to the 
Russians. That is part of our goal of advice and consent in the Senate. 
If it were just consent, we would be nothing more than a rubberstamp. I 
think we have an important role; that is, to look at these critical 
issues, and where there are areas of disagreement, to provide our 
advice. I think, in a very straightforward way, we can vote on an 
amendment that would increase from 700 to 720 the number of delivery 
vehicles specified in the treaty. It is a very straightforward 
amendment and one that would then go back, obviously, to the Russians, 
but it is certainly consistent with the Senate's traditional and 
historic role of advice and consent.
  Former Defense Secretary Schlesinger testified to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on April 29, 2010, that: ``As to the stated context 
of the strategic nuclear weapons, the numbers specified are adequate, 
though barely so.''
  Well, ``barely so'' does not seem to be good enough for me when we 
are talking about the important obligations we have in defending 
America's vital national security interests as well as those of many of 
our allies around the world. I don't think settling for barely enough 
or barely so is sufficient.
  So I hope my colleagues will support this amendment. I think, as I 
said earlier, the triad is critical to our nuclear deterrence and 
maintaining both ICBMs and SLBMs, but then also having a very robust 
bomber component of that is critical. That is why investing in a next-
generation, follow-on bomber that is nuclear is important. I think the 
ambiguity that surrounds the question, the uncertainty that surrounds 
the question about whether a follow-on bomber would be nuclear speaks 
volumes about the commitment to that leg of the triad, but it is also 
important to remember bombers are the best form of extended deterrence.
  If you want to make those who would proliferate nuclear weapons pay 
attention, you send a bomber in. A bomber is very visible, it is 
recallable, it is survivable, and it brings great psychological and 
political advantage to our country when it comes to trying to 
discourage proliferation by other countries around the world.
  So I hope my colleagues will support this amendment. It is an 
important amendment. The delivery vehicle issue is, to me, critical to 
this debate not only in terms of the numbers but also the modernization 
of those various elements of the triad. The triad, over time, has given 
us great survivability, great flexibility, and if ever called upon, we 
want to be as prepared as we possibly can be to encounter any nuclear 
threat that might exist to the United States. I hope my colleagues will 
support this amendment.
  I will reserve my time and yield back now to the Senator from 
Oklahoma, who I think probably wants to continue to talk about the 
verification issues.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, first of all, I concur in everything the 
Senator from South Dakota said, and I join him in encouraging people to 
vote favorably on his amendment. It seems as though the other side has 
had the opportunity to do a lot more testing, a lot more modernization 
than we have, and I am very much concerned about that.
  I wish to elaborate on one thing. The fact that there is--that the 
other side--and I read all the quotes from the previous Commissions 
that took place in 2005 and 2010 to demonstrate very clearly that the 
Russians would sign a treaty and then they will cheat. They would not 
comply with the treaty. We saw it with the chemical weapons treaty and 
the biological weapons treaty and START I. So there is no reason to 
believe they are going to do this. So in terms of verification, we have 
to try to do something where we are convinced, knowing full well in 
advance that they are going to cheat.
  That brings up one issue that I haven't mentioned before in this 
treaty; that is, the length of time we have between notification and 
actually causing an inspection. Under the START I treaty it was 9 
hours, and it has gone up to 24 hours in this treaty. In other words, 
if someone is going to cheat, if someone is going to hide something so 
we would not know where to look and we might not be able to find 
something, why give them three times as much time as we did under START 
I, when we know more today about the fact that they cheat than we knew 
before? The second issue is, it becomes more important--as you get 
closer to the inspections and as there are fewer facilities to inspect, 
each one becomes more important, and we have had an opportunity to see 
that everyone seems to agree with that.
  Former Secretary Harold Brown explained this in his testimony before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That was way back in 1991. He 
said:

       Verification will become even more important as the numbers 
     of strategic nuclear weapons on each side decreases, because 
     uncertainties of a given size become a larger percentage of 
     the total force as this occurs.

  I think I used the example that if you had 10 and you cheat on 1, 
that is 10 percent, but if you have 2 and you cheat on 1, that is 50 
percent.
  That statement is agreed with by John Bolton, who said:

       While [verification is] important in any arms-control 
     treaty, verification becomes even more important at lower 
     warhead levels.

  Again, he agrees.
  Scowcroft, the same thing. He said:

       . . . as force levels go down, the balance of nuclear power 
     can become increasingly delicate and vulnerable to cheating 
     on arms control limits, concerns about ``hidden'' missiles, 
     and the actions of nuclear third parties.

  So I think everyone does understand and does agree that as they 
decrease, then each one becomes more significant in terms of being 
inspected.
  In this amendment, we are changing it from the 180 inspections over a 
10-year period to what they would have under New START versus the old 
one, which was 600 inspections over 15 years. Do the math on that, and 
you come up with 18 inspections a year as opposed to 40 inspections a 
year.
  They are trying to say there are only 36 sites, which means--if this 
is true--we would only get to inspect each site in Russia once every 2 
years, while the math works out that they would be able to do our side 
once every year. So that is something that is very concerning to me.
  We talked a lot about where we are in this process. We have talked 
about our constitutional obligations, about what we are supposed to do 
under the Constitution. We talked about what we are supposed to provide 
for the common defense in article II, section 2 of the Constitution, 
which gives the President the prime role, but we have to advise and 
consent. I saw something recently, just today I think it is, that came 
out--yes, it was just today. It came out from Foreign Minister Sergey 
Lavrov in his statement. He said:

       ``I can only underscore that the Strategic Nuclear Arms 
     Treaty, worked out on the strictest basis of parity, in our 
     view fully answers to the national interests of Russia and 
     the United States,'' Interfax quoted Lavrov as saying in an 
     interview.
       ``It cannot be opened up and become the subject of new 
     negotiations,'' Lavrov said.

  Who is this guy telling us what we can do under our Constitution? I 
find it almost laughable because it is just as if all he has to do is 
say that and we have to follow the course.
  But he said Russian lawmakers would closely examine the U.S. 
ratification resolution and any declarations

[[Page 23096]]

or notes accompanying it to ensure no significant changes were made.
  If changes are made, then they have not kept up their responsibility.
  I would only remind my colleagues that:

       As CRS has outlined in its study--

  And this is a study they did not too long ago--

     on the role of the Senate in a treaty process: Amendments are 
     proposed changes in the actual text of the treaty . . . 
     [They] amount, therefore, to Senate counter offers that alter 
     the original deal agreed to by the United States and the 
     other country.

  If the Senate gives its consent to New START with an amendment to the 
text, the treaty is sent back over to Russia and the Duma meets and 
they decide what they are going to do with it. Then, of course, they 
make changes and then it comes back over here. This is something that 
has been going on for 200 years.
  All of a sudden, why are we in a position where we are not going to 
do it and we look at our constitutional responsibility as something 
that is in the past?
  So I feel we have this obligation, and I know so far every amendment 
that would have amended the treaty has been defeated, and it has been 
defeated on party--well, not necessarily on party lines but, by and 
large, on party lines. This is something very concerning to me.
  The other issue is, when we talk about tripling the number of 
inspections under the New START, we have heard it said several times: 
Well, there are fewer sites. But I would like to suggest that the type 
two--keep in mind type one refers to inspections of ICBM bases, air 
bases, those facilities that are active today.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We have 14 minutes 45 seconds.
  Mr. KERRY. Did my colleague need to finish up a thought? If so, I am 
happy to yield him a minute.
  Mr. INHOFE. No.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma for the 
discussion we had yesterday and again today about verification. I know 
it is an issue he thinks is critical. I think every Senator here is 
absolutely convinced we need to have the strongest verification regime 
possible. The fact is that this treaty, the New START treaty, has 
exactly that. It has an effective verification system. Does it have a 
perfect system? No treaty that has ever been passed or been negotiated 
would be that one-sided and be able to achieve that. It is an effective 
verification system, which is the standard we have used ever since 
President Reagan negotiated those treaties, and Paul Nitze, one of our 
great arms control statesmen, really defined that concept of effective 
verification.
  I wish to quote what Secretary Gates said about this. I don't need to 
remind colleagues, but I guess people in the public who don't 
necessarily focus on it might be impacted to know that Secretary Gates 
was appointed by President George Bush, and he was held over as 
Secretary of Defense by President Obama. By everybody's judgment here 
in the Senate, he is a man of great credibility and distinction who has 
worked through many different layers of American government. He is one 
of the people for whom we have great respect. In a letter he wrote to 
Senator Isakson this summer, he said:

       I believe that the number of inspections provided for by 
     the New START Treaty, along with other verification 
     mechanisms, provides a firm basis for verifying Russia's 
     compliance with its Treaty obligations while also providing 
     important insights into the size and composition of Russian 
     strategic forces.

  I know the Senator from Oklahoma is concerned about the number of 
inspections. He has several times raised the question of cutting the 
inspections from the original START to the New START. I want to walk 
through it again so we are absolutely clear.
  Comparing the number of inspections under START I to the number of 
inspections under New START is literally an apples-to-oranges 
comparison for three reasons--one, today we are only conducting 
inspections in one country instead of four. Under START I, we had 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia.
  Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?
  Mr. KERRY. Yes, as long as I don't lose my right to the floor.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time be 
extended by 10 minutes--5 minutes for the Senator from Massachusetts 
and 5 additional minutes for the Senator from South Dakota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. KERRY. Reserving the right to object, I want to make sure because 
people were planning schedules around it.
  We have no objection, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, Secretary Gates said this about the--well, 
let me finish that thought about the difference. So when we had those 4 
countries, we had 70 sites that were subject to inspection. Under this 
treaty, there were 35 sites subject to inspection, but they are all in 
one country--Russia--because all of the weapons were moved to Russia 
after the fall of the Soviet Union.
  Secondly, we are inspecting half as many facilities, and when we 
inspect those facilities, we, thirdly, have a type one inspection and a 
type two inspection, which allows us to be able to go in and look at 
the missile but to also do an update inspection, which is sort of a 
general inspection of the up-to-date status of the various things we 
look at in the course of an inspection, which, in effect, really 
doubles the amount of inspections we have because under START I, if you 
went in and did an update inspection, that was it. You didn't get to do 
the missile inspection or vice versa. We really have a two-for-one 
here. It is disingenuous to reflect that in the comments about how we 
count here. We are talking about a completely comparable inspection 
regime under New START as under START I.
  Finally, we addressed this question of verification in condition 2 of 
the resolution of ratification. That condition requires that before New 
START can enter into force--and every year thereafter--the President of 
the United States has to certify to the Senate that our national 
technical means, in conjunction with New START's verification 
activities, are sufficient to ensure adequate and effective monitoring 
of Russian compliance. So we are going to remain right in the center of 
this issue of verification every year this treaty is in force, and the 
Senate is going to be part of that process.
  Let me briefly turn back to something Senator Thune said earlier. He 
said this treaty was negotiated with the assumption that the Russians 
weren't going to cheat. No, Mr. President, it is not accurate that 
there was any such assumption whatsoever, and that is precisely why we 
have a verification structure here. It is why we are taking this 
discussion so seriously, because we don't take people at their word. We 
have to verify. That is what the verification regime is for.
  Let me also be clear on what Secretary Gates said here. Senator 
Inhofe quoted the Secretary saying that the Russians would not be able 
to achieve any militarily significant cheating under this verification 
regime. That is the judgment of our intelligence community, but it 
doesn't mean that they think or that we think they might not try to 
cheat. It means that if they do, it is going--if it is militarily 
significant, we will see it, we will know it, and we will understand 
exactly what they are doing. So we can respond, as Secretary Gates has, 
by increasing the size of our force, by increasing the alert level of 
SSBNs and bombers, and by uploading warheads on bombers, SSBNs, and on 
ICBMs. There are all kinds of things we can do to respond the minute we 
notice that kind of militarily significant event.
  It is my judgment that this amendment does not give us anything in 
the way of additional confidence, but it certainly will give us months 
of unnecessary and even counterproductive renegotiation of the treaty. 
That means

[[Page 23097]]

that by reaching for three times the number of inspections, we would 
guarantee that for months and months we will have zero, absolutely 
none. That is the tradeoff.
  I think we need to get our verification team back in place, and I 
think that is what is most imperative in terms of the national security 
interests of the country.
  I thank Senator Thune for his amendment. I thank him also for the 
constructive discussion we have had about these numbers with respect to 
missiles and bombers in order to maintain our nuclear deterrent.
  I think this is another place where it is pretty important for all of 
us to listen to our military. They have made the judgments here, and 
they have been very transparent about how they have made those 
judgments. We have been able to query them in the Armed Services 
Committee, the Intelligence Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, 
and the National Security Working Group. They have arrived at the 
judgment--not a political judgment but a military judgment--that the 
treaty's limit of 700 delivery vehicles is perfectly adequate to defend 
our Nation and our allies at the same time.
  As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, GEN James Cartwright, who 
was a former strategic commander, said:

       I think we have more than enough capacity and capability 
     for any threat that we see today or that might emerge in the 
     foreseeable future.

  This amendment seeks to insert sort of our arbitrary judgment that, 
oh, we ought to have 20 additional. I remind the Senators what LTG 
Frank Klotz, the commander of the Air Force Global Strike Command, 
said. That is the command that oversees ICBMs and bombers. Just last 
Friday, he said:

       I think the START Treaty ought to be ratified, and it ought 
     to be ratified now, this week.

  The military came to this conclusion after the Department of Defense 
conducted a very thorough review of our nuclear posture, including 
detailed force-on-force analyses. We shared some of that discussion in 
the classified session earlier. Our nuclear commanders have done the 
math, run the scenarios, and they have concluded that we only need 700 
delivery vehicles.
  General Chilton, head of the Strategic Command, said:

       The options we provided in this process focused on ensuring 
     America's ability to continue to deter potential adversaries, 
     assure our allies, and sustain strategic stability for as 
     long as nuclear weapons exist. This rigorous approach, rooted 
     in deterrent strategy and assessment of potential adversary 
     capabilities, supports both the agreed-upon limits in New 
     START and recommendations in the Nuclear Posture Review.

  I do know the Senator expressed some concern about our ability to 
field Prompt Global Strike systems. It is true that conventionally 
armed ICBMs will count toward the treaty's limits, but again, let's 
listen to what the military says.
  Secretary Gates stated for the record that:

       Should we decide to deploy them, counting this small number 
     of conventional strategic systems and their warheads towards 
     the treaty limits will not prevent the United States from 
     maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent.

  Admiral Mullen said as far back as March that the treaty protects our 
ability to develop a conventional global strike capability should that 
be required.
  I also point to our resolution of ratification, condition 6, 
understanding 3, and declaration 3, all of which go toward preserving 
our ability to deploy conventional Prompt Global Strike forces.
  Finally, the Senator raised the possibility that we are moving from a 
triad to a dyad. I wish to be especially clear on this point. The 
administration has stated forcefully and again today reiterated in a 
letter sent to us by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral 
Mullen, in which he reiterates the administration's commitment to the 
triad. As it said in the ``update'' section of the 1251 report:

       The administration remains committed to the sustainment and 
     modernization of U.S. strategic delivery systems.

  Regarding heavy bombers, that same report says:

       DOD plans to sustain a heavy bomber leg of the strategic 
     triad for the indefinite future and is committed to the 
     modernization of the heavy bomber force.

  To be clear, our existing nuclear bombers will be in operation at 
least for the next 20 years, and probably at most this treaty could be 
a 10- to 15-year treaty. Our existing bombers will outlive this treaty.
  The administration has also made clear that we are committed to the 
triad in the resolution of ratification, including our nuclear bombers. 
I might add that they have also said they are not going to close bases, 
and they are not going to reduce the total number of bombers.
  I believe there should not be concern on these points.
  This amendment, once again, is one of those that would force 
renegotiation of the entire treaty. I might mention for my colleagues 
that one of the reasons that is so important to all of us--we can all 
remember negotiating around here many times on different bills and 
pieces of legislation. We always begin that negotiation--I can remember 
Senator George Mitchell, when he was majority leader and we did the 
complicated Clean Air Act reauthorization in 1990, he would begin every 
session by reminding people that nothing is agreed upon until 
everything is agreed upon. We negotiate that way here all the time.
  So if all of a sudden nothing is agreed upon and that is the way this 
treaty was negotiated--if nothing is agreed upon until everything is 
agreed upon, when you take one piece out of there and change it 
unilaterally, nothing is agreed upon. At that point, you reopen all of 
the other issues, and some of them are contentious, which are 
difficult, which people may have a different view on, and which will 
affect our relationship.
  If this weren't so substantive and I thought we were buying a pig in 
a poke, I would say I understand why we have to do that.
  But the military, our national security people, our national 
intelligence community--there is not anybody who works at this day to 
day--our Strategic Command, our National Defense Missile Command--all 
of them say: Ratify this treaty. And that is what I believe we ought to 
do as soon as possible.
  I reserve the remainder of our time.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, I wonder if I might engage in a colloquy 
briefly with my colleague from Massachusetts and then propound a 
unanimous consent agreement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Shaheen). The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, there are two votes scheduled on the Thune 
amendment and the Inhofe amendment. Have we locked in the LeMieux 
amendment yet?
  Mr. KERRY. I do not believe so.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. No.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, does my colleague anticipate that it is 
possible there would be a third vote tonight, depending upon whether 
Senator LeMieux is ready to have that vote?
  Mr. KERRY. I suspect the majority leader would be delighted to have 
another vote if we can. I am speaking without authorization.
  Mr. KYL. At some point, just for the benefit of Members, there could 
theoretically be a third amendment tonight if Senator LeMieux is ready 
to have that vote and if there is no objection by any other Member.
  The other point, I inform my colleague, is I have the exact numbers 
of the five amendments I would like to get pending. Let me make that 
request at this time. They are amendments Nos. 4900, McCain amendment; 
4893, Kyl amendment; 4892, Kyl amendment; 4867, Kyl amendment; and No. 
4860, Kyl amendment. These are all proposed amendments to the 
resolution of ratification.
  I ask unanimous consent that it be in order to call up five 
amendments to the resolution of ratification; provided further that 
these be the only amendments in order to the resolution of ratification 
at this time; and I ask unanimous consent that following the 
disposition of the amendments solicited, the Senate then resume 
consideration of the treaty.

[[Page 23098]]

  Before my colleague responds, I will also say this: I believe there 
are only four other amendments pending, and one of them is mine. I will 
agree to waive my right to bring that up. I cannot say for the others, 
and I need to talk with those Members during the vote. I do not know 
whether they would want votes on their amendments. In any event, there 
are no more than three of them. So it is a locked-in number.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, reserving the right to object, I want to 
make clear that as we move to these amendments with respect to the 
resolution of ratification, we are going to preserve the right, then, 
to go back only to those three that are pending. And the Senator has 
agreed to make a good-faith effort to see if that could be reduced to 
simply one; is that accurate?
  Mr. KYL. No. I am saying one is mine, and I would eliminate it now.
  Mr. KERRY. I understand that the Senator, in our conversation 
earlier, was going to try to see if the other two could also make the 
same decision he has made so we, in effect, have one on the treaty 
itself.
  Mr. KYL. If that was the impression, I do not think I can do that. 
But in any event, I did not try to do that. There are four all told. I 
would eliminate my one, and there would be a fixed number--only three 
possibilities after that.
  Mr. KERRY. Could we then say for the record which amendment is being 
withdrawn at this point?
  Mr. KYL. It would be the only Kyl amendment remaining pending to the 
treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator will withhold. There is no Kyl 
amendment pending.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, if I may say to my colleague, the 
majority leader would like to work with us in this process. I think 
what we should do, if I may ask my colleague to do this, I would like 
to take a moment, if we can, to work through this with the majority 
leader. We can do it during the votes, and then at the end of the votes 
we can hopefully propound something that has his engagement.
  Mr. KYL. I can tell my colleague that the amendment I would be 
agreeing not to bring up is amendment No. 4854. I misspoke when I said 
it is pending. It is filed to the treaty.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Senator. That helps us a lot. That clarifies 
it. What I would like to do is work with the majority leader and the 
Senator from Arizona, and I am sure we can come together, and at the 
end of the vote we can propound an appropriate UC.
  Mr. KYL. I am not willing to withdraw my request. What I am afraid 
of, quite frankly, is that we are not going to be able to get unanimous 
consent before a cloture vote on the treaty and we are going to be iced 
out here.
  I have propounded a unanimous consent request. I will be happy to 
read it again. If there is an objection, fine. I want to get agreement 
on this, if at all possible.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator from Arizona could repeat his 
request, that would be helpful.
  Mr. KYL. I would be happy to. Madam President, I ask unanimous 
consent that it be in order to call up five amendments to the 
resolution of ratification; provided further that these be the only 
amendments in order to the resolution of ratification at this time; and 
I ask unanimous consent that following the disposition of the 
amendments solicited, the Senate then resume consideration of the 
treaty.
  Mr. KERRY. Reserving the right to object, I personally am supportive 
of our trying to do that. I have said to the Senator in good faith that 
we need to have some amendments to the resolution of ratification. We 
are working on them. I am confident that we will be able to accommodate 
his request, but I am in a position where I need to have the input of 
the majority leader to do that. I will personally advocate we do it.
  At this moment only, I must object to that request, but I look 
forward to trying to propound it after the votes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, I appreciate the explanation. That 
ordinarily would be information given to the two leaders, and we did 
not do that in this case. I do appreciate this.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota.
  Mr. THUNE. Madam President, it is my understanding that I have a 
minute in which to wrap up debate on this amendment; is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All of the time has been used.
  Mr. THUNE. I ask unanimous consent to have a couple minutes to 
summarize a couple points. I had 5 minutes which I think just got 
burned.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THUNE. Madam President, I will make a couple quick points before 
we vote on the delivery vehicle amendment, and the first one is this 
because it has been observed that this would impact Prompt Global 
Strike. The supporters of the treaty have said it will not impact 
Prompt Global Strike. The fact is that the 700 number of delivery 
vehicles--if, for example, we were to mount a conventional warhead on 
an ICBM to strike a target in some geographic area that is hard to hit 
and we need to get there in short order, the ICBM currently is the best 
way to do that. If we do that, it reduces the number of nuclear 
delivery vehicles we have one for one. If we were to do that on 20 
ICBMs, we would mount conventional warheads on those, and it would 
reduce by 20 the number of nuclear delivery vehicles we would have. 
That is a fact in the treaty.
  The final point I will make about the number 700, because it has been 
pointed out that military personnel in the country support that number, 
but I also want to mention that it is important to recall that General 
Chilton's support for New START levels was predicated on no Russian 
cheating. He testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 
April 22, 2010, that one of the assumptions made was an assumption that 
the Russians in the postnegotiation time period would be compliant with 
the treaty. We all know it has been pointed out many times on the floor 
how Russia is a serial violator of arms control commitments. I think it 
is important, as we discuss the 700 number, that people bear in mind 
that number was agreed upon by our military commanders assuming there 
would be no cheating by the Russians.
  There still is a conflict between the 720 called for in the nuclear 
force structure plan and the 700 in the treaty. All I am simply saying 
is, let's make those two numbers consistent. Let's get the 700 number 
up to 720.
  With that, I yield back my time and ask for the yeas and nays.
  Mr. KERRY. I yield back the remainder of our time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there an objection to asking for the yeas 
and nays? Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question is on 
agreeing to the Inhofe amendment.
  Mr. KERRY. Does Senator Inhofe want to ask for the yeas and nays?
  Mr. THUNE. I also request the yeas and nays on the Inhofe amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk call the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Bayh) and 
the Senator from Oregon (Mr. Wyden) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. KYL. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Kansas (Mr. Brownback).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 33, nays 64, as follows:

[[Page 23099]]



                      [Rollcall Vote No. 285 Ex.]

                                YEAS--33

     Barrasso
     Bond
     Brown (MA)
     Bunning
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Johanns
     Kirk
     Kyl
     LeMieux
     McCain
     McConnell
     Risch
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Snowe
     Thune
     Vitter
     Wicker

                                NAYS--64

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Baucus
     Begich
     Bennet
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown (OH)
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Conrad
     Coons
     Corker
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gillibrand
     Gregg
     Hagan
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     Manchin
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Nelson (FL)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Bayh
     Brownback
     Wyden
  The amendment (No. 4833) was rejected.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is now 2 minutes, equally divided--
  The majority leader.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, first of all, I ask unanimous consent that 
the vote on the Thune amendment be 10 minutes in duration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. No. 2, Senator LeMieux has an amendment that is pending. I 
ask unanimous consent that vote follow the Thune amendment and that 
vote also be 10 minutes in duration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that there be no 
amendments--
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader has the floor.
  Mr. REID. Let me finish my unanimous consent request, and if someone 
does not like it, we can worry about that. I ask unanimous consent 
that--we are going to vote on the Thune amendment; that will be a 10-
minute vote; that is amendment No. 4841--following that vote, we 
consider the LeMieux amendment No. 4847; that prior to the vote, there 
be 4 minutes of debate, equally divided and controlled in the usual 
form; that is, of course, with the Thune amendment and the LeMieux 
amendment; that upon the use or yielding back of the time, the Senate 
then proceed to vote in relation to the LeMieux amendment, with no 
amendment in order to the amendment prior to the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. REID. I would also say, Madam President, that will very likely be 
the last vote tonight. I have had a conversation with Senator Kyl and 
Senator Kerry. They are going to meet early in the morning to see if 
there is a way we can work through some of these issues that are still 
outstanding.
  The one message I wish to make sure everyone gets--I know everyone 
has lots to do this week--but on this most important treaty, no one 
needs to feel they are being jammed on time, as busy as we all are and 
as many things as we want to do in the next few days. So if anyone has 
any issues they still want to deal with, talk to Senator Kerry or 
Senator Kyl or Senator Lugar, who is the comanager on the other side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Who yields time?


                           Amendment No. 4841

  Mr. REID. Madam President, we yield back the 2 minutes on our side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back.
  The question is on agreeing to the Thune amendment.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Bayh) and 
the Senator from Oregon (Mr. Wyden) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. KYL. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Kansas (Mr. Brownback).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 33, nays 64, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 286 Ex.]

                                YEAS--33

     Barrasso
     Bond
     Brown (MA)
     Bunning
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Cornyn
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johanns
     Kirk
     Kyl
     LeMieux
     McCain
     McConnell
     Risch
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Snowe
     Thune
     Vitter
     Wicker

                                NAYS--64

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Baucus
     Begich
     Bennet
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown (OH)
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coons
     Corker
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gillibrand
     Gregg
     Hagan
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     Manchin
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Nelson (FL)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Bayh
     Brownback
     Wyden
  The amendment (No. 4841) was rejected.


                           Amendment No. 4847

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is now 4 minutes equally divided prior 
to a vote on the LeMieux amendment.
  The Senator from Florida.
  Mr. LeMIEUX. Madam President, this amendment says simply one thing: 
that within 1 year's time of the ratification of this treaty, the 
United States and Russia would sit down and negotiate a tactical 
nuclear weapons treaty. Why do I bring this forward? Because we know--
and we heard a lot about it today in our closed session--that there is 
a tremendous disparity between the number of tactical nuclear weapons 
our country has at 300 and the Russians have at 3,000--10 to 1. If this 
treaty is ratified, the Russians will have 4,500 nuclear weapons. We 
will have 1,800.
  This is not a poison pill. You will hear that; it is not. It does not 
change a material term of this agreement. It just says within a year's 
time, we will sit down and enter into these negotiations. We need to 
put it into the treaty because that is the only way we can make sure it 
will happen.
  If we send this treaty with this amendment back to the Russian Duma 
and they don't approve it, what does that say? It says they know they 
have a significant advantage over us. It is the right thing to do. It 
is something I think all of our colleagues should be able to agree to. 
It is not a poison pill. Let's approve it. Thank you.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I will be very brief.
  I completely agree with the intention of the Senator. I think all of 
us agree we have to negotiate a tactical nuclear weapons treaty with 
Russia. Unfortunately, this, according to our NATO allies, according to 
our national security representatives, will actually prevent us from 
getting to the place where we negotiate that because the first thing we 
have to do to get the Russians to the table is pass the START treaty.
  If we pass the New START treaty, we can engage in these discussions. 
If we don't pass it, they have no confidence. We simply go back to 
ground zero and begin negotiating all the pre-START items again before 
we can ever get there. We cannot just pass this unilaterally and order 
them to get there. We have to get them to enter into those 
negotiations. The way to do that is to preserve the integrity of the 
START treaty and then get to those agreements. We have that in the 
resolution of ratification.

[[Page 23100]]

  There is language that urges the President and embraces this notion 
of the Senator from Florida. I congratulate him for wanting to target 
it. It is important to target it, and we will do it in the resolution 
of ratification.
  I yield back any time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
4847.
  Mr. BOND. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Bayh) and 
the Senator from Oregon (Mr. Wyden) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. KYL. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Kansas (Mr. Brownback).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Merkley). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 35, nays 62, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 287 Ex.]

                                YEAS--35

     Barrasso
     Bond
     Brown (MA)
     Bunning
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johanns
     Kirk
     Kyl
     LeMieux
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Risch
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Snowe
     Thune
     Vitter
     Wicker

                                NAYS--62

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Baucus
     Begich
     Bennet
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown (OH)
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Conrad
     Coons
     Corker
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gillibrand
     Gregg
     Hagan
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     Manchin
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Nelson (FL)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Bayh
     Brownback
     Wyden
  The amendment (No. 4847) was rejected.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 
about 7 minutes as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Merkley). Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Grassley are printed in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.


                    Amendment No. 4904, as Modified

  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 
4904 to the resolution of ratification be brought up as pending.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. KYL. Reserving the right to object, I apologize. Did Senator 
Corker ask a unanimous consent request?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, to call up an amendment.
  Mr. KYL. But to return to the treaty upon its disposition; is that 
correct?
  Mr. CORKER. That is what I was just getting ready to say.
  Mr. KYL. Might I ask the Senator from Tennessee whether he talked 
with one of the Senators from South Carolina about this?
  Mr. CORKER. I have not. I attempted to do so. He was off the floor by 
the time----
  Mr. KYL. I do not have any objections as long as we return to the 
treaty so those who have amendments to the treaty will at least have 
their rights protected.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there an objection?
  Mr. KYL. I will not object. I simply note that I think we will need 
an understanding that we will work with our other interested colleagues 
on a way forward on all of these issues. Having expressed that as a 
matter of good faith, I suspect we can do that.
  Mr. CORKER. Absolutely.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to accept the 
modification. It is modified slightly. I want to make sure that is 
acceptable.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object.
  Mr. CORKER. It was a modification that the staff of the chairman 
suggested.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Corker] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 4904, as modified.

  The amendment is as follows:

   (Purpose: To provide a condition and an additional element of the 
  understanding regarding the effectiveness and viability of the New 
            START Treaty and United States missile defenses)

       At the end of subsection (a) of the Resolution of 
     Ratification, add the following:
       (11) Effectiveness and viability of new start treaty and 
     united states missile defenses.--Prior to the entry into 
     force of the New START Treaty, the President shall certify to 
     the Senate, and shall communicate to the Russian Federation, 
     that it shall be the policy of the United States that the 
     continued development and deployment of United States missile 
     defense systems, including qualitative and quantitative 
     improvements to such systems, including all phases of the 
     Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defenses in Europe 
     maintaining the option to use Ground-Based Interceptors, do 
     not and will not threaten the strategic balance with the 
     Russian Federation. Consequently, while the United States 
     cannot circumscribe the sovereign rights of the Russian 
     Federation under paragraph 3 of Article XIV of the Treaty, 
     the continued improvement and deployment of United States 
     missile defense systems do not constitute a basis for 
     questioning the effectiveness and viability of the Treaty, 
     and therefore would not give rise to circumstances justifying 
     the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Treaty.
       At the end of subsection (b)(1)(C), strike ``United 
     States.'' and insert the following: ``United States; and
       (D) the preamble of the New START Treaty does not impose a 
     legal obligation on the United States.

  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that we now 
return to the treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is on the treaty.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the New START 
treaty. Before I begin, I would like to thank Senator Kerry and Senator 
Lugar for their leadership on this important arms control agreement.
  When I first began to consider this treaty, I considered the 
fundamental question of whether we are better off with it or without it 
since the previous START treaty expired a year ago. By reducing the 
number of deployed nuclear weapons in a mutual and verifiable way, I 
believe that this treaty does enhance our security, but it is not 
without flaws.
  Our choice is not, however, between some ideal treaty and the New 
START treaty. It is between this treaty and having no inspection regime 
in place at all since the previous START treaty expired in December of 
2009.
  In evaluating this treaty, I scrutinized several issues including the 
effect on our Nation's security, the need to modernize our nuclear 
deterrent, the effectiveness of verification and inspection regimes, 
and the impact on missile defense.
  These and other issues were fully covered in classified briefings as 
well as in the seven Senate Armed Services Committee hearings that I 
attended that included testimony from Secretary of Defense Gates, 
Secretary of State Clinton, Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and General Chilton, the commander of our nuclear 
forces. We also heard testimony from the three current directors of our 
national nuclear laboratories and a number of former government 
officials and national security experts.

[[Page 23101]]

  I met personally with Rose Gottemoeller, the top U.S. treaty 
negotiator, and sought counsel from GEN Brent Scowcroft, who has served 
as an adviser to four Republican Presidents and was the National 
Security Adviser to President George H. W. Bush.
  I also have met with a wide range of Mainers--foreign policy experts, 
religious leaders, and former members of the military--who expressed 
their views on the treaty to me.
  Clearly, the New START treaty enjoys broad bipartisan support. 
Secretaries of State for the past five Republican Presidents, including 
GEN Colin Powell, support its ratification, as does former Maine 
Senator and former Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen.
  No Member of this body should support a treaty simply because it has 
strong bipartisan support. But neither should we withhold our support 
for a treaty simply because it was negotiated and signed by a President 
from a different political party.
  The fact is that the New START treaty is a modest arms control 
agreement. The treaty does not require the destruction of a single 
nuclear weapon. Under the New START framework, a 30-percent reduction 
in the number of deployed warheads in the arsenals of the United States 
and Russia will be required.
  As such, the New START treaty places the United States and the 
Russian Federation on a path to achieve mutual and verifiable 
reductions over the next 7 years. Failure to ratify a treaty that makes 
modest reductions in the deployment of nuclear weapons would represent 
a giant step backwards in the commitment of the United States to arms 
control. If we cannot reduce the deployed nuclear stockpiles of the two 
countries that hold 9 of every 10 nuclear weapons in the world, how can 
we expect other countries not to seek any nuclear weapons?
  Yet the New START treaty has significance beyond its function as an 
arms control agreement. New START is one component of our bilateral 
relationship with the Russian Federation. In April 2009, I traveled to 
Moscow with the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Carl 
Levin. At that time, I indicated that while I supported the President's 
commitment to reset the U.S.-Russian relationship, it was ultimately up 
to the Russians to see if they wanted to have a stronger relationship.
  Since then, Russia has expanded the use of northern supply routes for 
our military forces in Afghanistan and has cancelled the sale of 
advanced surface to air missiles to Iran. These are positive steps.
  During that same trip to Moscow, Chairman Levin and I sought to 
encourage Russian officials to cooperate on missile defense in Europe. 
And this issue of missile defense raises an important point about the 
U.S.-Russian relationship. Just because our relationship with the 
Russians is important does not mean that we must compromise on an issue 
vital to our national security. One of those issues is missile defense.
  I was troubled when I read the unilateral statements made by Russian 
leaders who sought to make a binding tie between missile defense and 
the New START agreement.
  The Kerry-Lugar resolution of ratification eliminates any doubt that 
the United States will continue to develop missile defense systems. The 
proposed resolution of ratification clarifies that the treaty places no 
limitation on the deployment of U.S. missile defense systems except for 
those contained in article 5. It further clarifies that the Russian 
unilateral statement regarding missile defense ``does not impose a 
legal obligation on the United States.''
  The resolution of ratification goes beyond expressing the position 
that the United States will deploy an effective national missile 
defense system. It declares that the United States is committed to 
improving its strategic defensive capabilities, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively, during the lifetime of the treaty.
  In addition to developing a robust missile defense capability, it is 
equally imperative that the United States maintain a modernized nuclear 
weapons program as we consider further reductions in nuclear arms.
  In March, I traveled with my good friend from Arizona, Senator Kyl, 
to discuss nuclear modernization with our allies. I learned a great 
deal from an in-depth briefing with French physicists about our need to 
modernize our own nuclear arsenal.
  As Secretary of Defense Gates has noted, ``The United States is the 
only declared nuclear power that is neither modernizing its nuclear 
arsenal nor has the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead.'' The 
Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission noted that the nuclear 
weapons complex ``physical infrastructure is in serious need of 
transformation.''
  In response, the administration has made a commitment to invest $14 
billion in new funding over the next 10 years for the nuclear weapons 
complex. As a result, the safety, stability, and reliability of our 
nuclear deterrent can be improved. The new investments will double the 
surveillance within the nuclear stockpile from fiscal year 2009 to 
fiscal year 2011. Finally, the Administration has proposed nearly $9 
billion for our plutonium and uranium facilities, and it has made a 
commitment to request additional funding necessary for those facilities 
once the designs are completed.
  While the New START treaty contributes to reducing the threat of 
nuclear war and strengthens nuclear nonproliferation efforts, it is 
disappointing to me that the treaty reflects an outdated view of one of 
the primary threats to our national security. This treaty does not 
address the significant disparity between the number of nonstrategic 
nuclear weapons in Russia's stockpile compared to our own.
  The Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission reported that 
Russia had an estimated 3,800 tactical nuclear weapons compared to 
fewer than 500 in our own stockpile. By maintaining a distinction 
between the threats of nuclear attack that warrant the ratification of 
a treaty from those nuclear threats that do not simply based upon the 
distance from which a nuclear weapon is launched or the method by which 
such a weapon is launched, we preserve a Cold War mentality regarding 
the nuclear threats facing our country.
  The large numerical disparity in the number of warheads each country 
maintains is not the only reason they warrant a higher priority than 
they were given by either country in this treaty.
  As the ranking member of the Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee, I believe that the characteristics of tactical 
nuclear weapons, particularly their vulnerability for theft and 
potential for nuclear terrorism, make reducing their numbers essential 
to our national security.
  President Obama correctly described the greatest threat facing our 
Nation in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review when he said that ``the 
threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear 
attack has increased . . . today's most immediate and extreme danger is 
nuclear terrorism.''
  Several arms control groups, including the Stimson Center, the Center 
for Nonproliferation Studies, and the Union of Concerned Scientists, 
have each stated that the danger of these weapons rests not only in the 
destructive power of each weapon but also because they are vulnerable 
to theft by rogue nations and terrorist groups.
  Earlier this month, I wrote to Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton 
about my concerns regarding this issue and requested a commitment from 
them to seek reductions in the number of Russian tactical nuclear 
weapons.
  I would like to read a portion of their response for those of my 
colleagues who share my concern regarding this disparity:

       The Administration is committed to seeking improved 
     security of, and reductions in, Russian tactical nuclear 
     weapons. We agree with the Senate Foreign Relations 
     Committee's call, in the resolution of advice and consent to 
     ratification of the New START treaty, to pursue an agreement 
     with the Russians to address them. These negotiations offer 
     our best chance to constrain Russian tactical nuclear 
     weapons, but we believe Russia will be unlikely to begin such 
     negotiations if the New START treaty does not enter into 
     force.


[[Page 23102]]


  The letter further states that:

       With regard to future agreements, we strongly agree with 
     you that the characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons--
     particularly their vulnerability to theft, misuse, or 
     acquisition by terrorists--make reducing their numbers and 
     enhancing their safety and security extremely important.

  I ask unanimous consent that my letter to the Secretaries and their 
response be printed in the Record at the end of my statement.
  So where does that leave us? Does the New START treaty lead to mutual 
and verifiable reductions in nuclear arms? Does the New START treaty 
renew our Nation's commitment to arms control? Given the commitments by 
the administration, will it reinvigorate our nuclear nonproliferation 
efforts?
  The answers to these questions were most succinctly addressed in a 
statement by the leader who negotiated and signed the first START 
treaty, former President George H.W. Bush. I will conclude by 
associating myself with his comments on the issue, which I will read in 
full: ``I urge the United States Senate to ratify the [New] START 
treaty.''
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                 Washington, DC, December 3, 2010.
     Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton,
     Secretary of State,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Clinton: I want to thank the Administration 
     for making its experts available to discuss the proposed New 
     START and its associated issues, including the importance of 
     modernizing the nuclear weapons complex in light of proposed 
     reductions in our deployed nuclear forces. I support the 
     recent commitment President Obama made to increase the 
     investments for nuclear modernization by $4.1 billion and to 
     fully fund the costs associated with new facilities as the 
     design for these facilities are completed. The Administration 
     has also answered many of my concerns about verification and 
     inspections. Although I believe the verification and 
     inspection requirements of the now expired START treaty were 
     preferable, the explanations regarding the new verification 
     methods have helped to assuage my concerns.
       There is, however, a remaining issue that must be resolved 
     before I can conclude that the treaty warrants my support. 
     The New START treaty does not address the significant 
     disparity between the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons 
     in the stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the United 
     States. By maintaining a distinction between the threats of 
     nuclear attack that warrant the ratification of a treaty from 
     those nuclear threats that do not simply based upon the 
     distance from which a nuclear weapon is launched or the 
     method by which such a weapon is delivered, we preserve an 
     outdated model regarding the nuclear threats facing our 
     country. Any nuclear attack on our country or one of our 
     allies, not just those that are launched quickly from a great 
     distance, would be devastating.
       The characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons, 
     particularly their vulnerability for theft and misuse for 
     nuclear terrorism, make reducing their numbers important now. 
     Several arms control groups, including the Stimson Center, 
     the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and the Union of 
     Concerned Scientists, have stated that the danger of tactical 
     nuclear weapons rests not only in the destructive power of 
     each weapon, but also because they are vulnerable to theft by 
     terrorist groups. President Obama's 2010 Nuclear Posture 
     Review echoes the concern of nuclear terrorism: ``The threat 
     of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of 
     nuclear attack has increased . . . today's most immediate and 
     extreme danger is nuclear terrorism. Al Qaeda and their 
     extremist allies are seeking nuclear weapons.''
       Non-strategic delivery systems are also as capable as some 
     of the strategic delivery vehicles covered under New START of 
     delivering a swift nuclear attack. For example, the Russian 
     Federation is capable of deploying submarine-launched cruise 
     missiles armed with nuclear warheads. According to press 
     reports, a new type of Russian attack submarine capable of 
     launching nuclear-armed cruise missiles is expected to enter 
     service in late 2010. My understanding is that, unlike 
     submarine launched ballistic missiles, these nuclear-tipped 
     cruise missiles would not be counted under New START. In 
     addition, I was troubled to learn of reports in the New York 
     Times that the Russian Federation moved short-range tactical 
     nuclear weapons closer to the territory of our NATO allies 
     and U.S. deployed forces in Europe earlier this year, 
     apparently in response to the deployment of missile defense 
     capabilities there.
       Insufficiently addressing these weapons may make it more 
     difficult to achieve future nuclear arms control agreements. 
     According to the independent Perry-Schlesinger Strategic 
     Posture Commission report, the Russian Federation has about 
     3,800 tactical nuclear weapons and the United States has less 
     than 500 tactical nuclear weapons. If the New START treaty is 
     ratified, the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 
     both countries will be evenly balanced. Absent a significant 
     unilateral reduction in tactical nuclear warheads by the 
     Russian Federation, any effort to reduce the disparity in 
     these weapons may lead to unacceptable concessions regarding 
     U.S. capabilities that are not tied to the size of the 
     nuclear stockpiles maintained by each country, such as 
     concessions regarding missile defense or conventional prompt 
     global strike.
       Including non-strategic weapons in strategic arms 
     negotiations is not unprecedented. On July 31, 1991, the day 
     START I was signed by President George H.W. Bush and Mikhail 
     Gorbachev, the U.S.S.R. publicly committed to providing the 
     United States with annual declarations regarding the 
     deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for the 
     duration of START I. In addition, the Soviet Union committed 
     to deploying no more than a single warhead on each cruise 
     missile and to not exceed the deployment of more than 880 
     nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles in any one year.
       On July 27, 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, former Deputy Assistant 
     Secretary of Defense for foreign policy and a member of the 
     Perry-Schlesinger Commission, testified before the Senate 
     Armed Services Committee that the reason he believed tactical 
     nuclear weapons were not included in the New START treaty was 
     because, ``the Russians did not want to engage in 
     negotiations on their tactical nuclear weapons.'' I think 
     they will be very wary about ever engaging in serious 
     negotiations on their tactical nuclear weapons. I also 
     understand, and would expect, that any reductions of non-
     strategic nuclear weapons in Europe would rest, in part, upon 
     the position of our NATO allies.
       Nonetheless, the concerns I have regarding non-strategic 
     weapons remain outstanding as I consider whether or not the 
     New START treaty warrants my support. As such, I request that 
     you provide, in writing, the Administration's plan to address 
     the disparity between the numbers of non-strategic warheads 
     of the Russian Federation compared to the United States, in 
     order that I may consider this information prior to a vote on 
     the ratification of the New START treaty.
       Thank you for your attention to this matter, and for your 
     service to our nation.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Susan M. Collins,
     United States Senator.
                                  ____

     Hon. Susan M. Collins,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Collins: Thank you for your letter of December 
     3, 2010, regarding the New START Treaty. We believe 
     ratification of the Treaty is essential to preserving core 
     U.S. national security interests.The Treaty will establish 
     equal limits on U.S. and Russian deployed strategic warheads 
     and strategic delivery systems, and will provide the U.S. 
     with essential visibility into Russian strategic forces 
     through on-site inspections, data exchanges, and other 
     verification provisions.
       As you note, the Strategic Posture Commission expressed 
     concern regarding Russian tactical nuclear weapons. At the 
     same time, the Commission recommended moving forward quickly 
     with a new treaty focused on strategic weapons. With the 
     expiration of the START Treaty in early December 2009, for 
     the past year the U.S. has had no inspectors with ``boots on 
     the ground'' to verify Russian strategic forces.
       The Administration is committed to seeking improved 
     security of, and reductions in, Russian tactical (also known 
     as non-strategic) nuclear weapons. We agree with the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee's call, in the resolution of 
     advice and consent to ratification of the New START Treaty, 
     to pursue an agreement with the Russians to address them. 
     These negotiations offer our best chance to constrain Russian 
     tactical nuclear weapons, but we believe Russia will likely 
     be unwilling to begin such negotiations if the New START 
     Treaty does not enter into force. We will consult closely 
     with Congress and our Allies in planning and conducting any 
     follow-on negotiations.
       At the NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010, Allied 
     leaders expressed their strong support for ratifying the New 
     START Treaty now, and welcomed the principle of including 
     tactical nuclear weapons in future U.S.-Russian arms control 
     talks. The U.S. remains committed to retaining the capability 
     to forward-deploy tactical nuclear weapons in support of its 
     Alliance commitments. As such, we will replace our nuclear-
     capable F-16s with the dual-capable F-35 Joint Strike 
     Fighter, and conduct a full scope Life Extension Program for 
     the B-61 nuclear bomb to ensure its functionality with the F-
     35 and enhance warhead surety.
       Your letter notes recent press reports alleging that Russia 
     has moved tactical nuclear warheads and missiles closer to 
     Europe. We note that a short-range ballistic missile unit has 
     long been deployed near Russia's border with Estonia, and 
     earlier this year

[[Page 23103]]

     the Russians publicly announced that some SS-26 short-range 
     ballistic missiles would be located there. Although this 
     deployment does not alter either the balance in Europe or the 
     U.S.-Russia strategic balance, the U.S. has made clear that 
     we believe Russia should further consolidate its tactical 
     nuclear weapons in a small number of secure facilities deep 
     within Russia.
       With regard to future agreements, we strongly agree with 
     you that the characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons--
     particularly their vulnerability to theft, misuse, or 
     acquisition by terrorists--make reducing their numbers and 
     enhancing their safety and security extremely important. That 
     is why when President Obama signed the New START Treaty in 
     April, he made clear that ``going forward, we hope to pursue 
     discussions with Russia on reducing both our strategic and 
     tactical weapons, including non-deployed weapons.''
       Thank you for the opportunity to address the important 
     matters you have raised in connection with the new START 
     Treaty. We look forward to continuing to work with you on 
     this and other issues of mutual interest, and urge your 
     support of New START.
           Sincerely,
     Hillary Rodham Clinton,
                                               Secretary of State.
     Robert M. Gates,
                                             Secretary of Defense.


                           Order of Procedure

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed as in 
legislative session and as in morning business in order to process some 
cleared legislative items.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________