[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 15]
[Senate]
[Pages 23000-23019]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

                                 ______
                                 

TREATY WITH RUSSIA ON MEASURES FOR FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF 
                        STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senate will proceed to executive session to resume consideration of the 
following treaty, which the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and 
     Limitation of Strategic Offensive arms.

  Pending:

       Risch amendment No. 4839, to amend the preamble to the 
     treaty to acknowledge the interrelationship between 
     nonstrategic and strategic offensive arms.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask that the time be divided as follows: 
I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to proceed for 10 minutes 
and then reserve the remainder of our time; the Senator from Idaho will 
control the time of the Republicans. They will proceed to use up all 
but 10 minutes of their time. I will come back and respond, at which 
point they would have 10 minutes held at the back end.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?
  Mr. RISCH. That is agreeable, Mr. President.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me begin very quickly. First of all, I 
wish to thank the Senator from Idaho for his amendment. I appreciate 
the thought he has put into the consideration of this treaty and his 
role on the Foreign Relations Committee and the work he has done over 
the 4 days, and now the fifth day of consideration of this treaty on 
the floor of the Senate.
  The amendment the Senator proposes to put into the treaty is an 
amendment to the preamble. So we have the same problem we had 
yesterday. I would just say that up front. But that said, we have great 
agreement with the substance of what he is trying to put forward in 
terms of the need to deal with tactical nuclear weapons. We will say 
more about that afterwards.
  If the Senator would be willing, I think we can find a way to 
incorporate into the resolution of ratification a genuine, meaningful, 
adequate statement with respect to this linkage between tactical 
nuclear weapons and overall strategic understanding. I would like to do 
that, but I know the Senator wants to proceed with this amendment 
first. I just want him to have that understanding, that we are prepared 
to say something important, and I think substantive, about tactical 
nuclear weapons.
  I wish to use a couple of minutes, if I may, to respond to a couple 
of comments made this morning by the minority leader on one of the 
morning television shows.
  First of all, obviously, I regret he will not support the treaty 
itself. We had an understanding that was probably going to be the case. 
It is not a surprise. But I find it disappointing, given the entire 
Republican foreign

[[Page 23001]]

policy, national security, experienced statesmen group who are sort of 
emeritus for our Nation today--including former Secretary of State 
Larry Eagleburger, former Secretary of State Colin Powell, and former 
Secretary of State Jim Baker, as well as the list of all of the former 
Secretaries of State from the Republican side, including former 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice--all support this treaty.
  The military supports this treaty. The leader of the Strategic 
Command, current, and the past former seven, support this treaty. The 
national intelligence community supports this treaty.
  So I hope that in these waning days of this session, as we approach 
this holiday season which is so focused on the concept of renewal and 
hope and peace, that we could find the ability in the Senate to embrace 
in a bipartisan way the security interests of our country.
  Particularly with regard to the notion about more time on this 
treaty, we are now on the fifth day of debate on this treaty. Let's 
debate today. Even if we had the cloture filing tonight or something, 
we would still have 2 days more of debate before that ripens and a vote 
on it, after which we then have 30 hours of debate providing it will 
pass.
  So we are looking at the prospect of having more days of debate on 
this treaty, a simple building block on top of the START I treaty. We 
are looking at having more days of debate on this treaty than the START 
I, START II, and Moscow Treaty all put together.
  So I think the Senate, which is appropriate, has time to focus on 
this treaty. I thought we had a good debate yesterday. The President 
said:

       Regardless of Russia's actions, as long as I am President 
     and as long as the Congress provides the necessary funding, 
     the United States will continue to develop and deploy 
     effective missile defenses to protect the United States.

  So I hope our colleagues will give credence to the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of State, the military, the President of the 
United States, and to the budget. The chairman of the Appropriations 
Committee informed me yesterday they have fully funded the 
modernization, once again, in the CR, just as we did in the previous 
CR--a sign of good faith of the direction in which we are going.
  So all I can say is we have bent over backwards to meet the concerns 
of our colleagues in a completely nonpolitical, apolitical, totally 
bipartisan, substantive way that meets the security concerns of the 
country. I hope we can find reciprocity with respect to that kind of 
action in the Senate.
  So I reserve the remainder of my time. We will respond appropriately 
on the substance of this amendment at the appropriate time.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, first of all, I wish to thank the chairman 
of the committee and the ranking member of the committee for the 
cooperation we have had throughout this matter. As I said when I 
started my debate on this amendment, I believe everyone is working in 
good faith, in the best interests of the United States, to attempt to 
develop and ratify a treaty that will be in the best interests of the 
United States.
  I was particularly encouraged this morning to hear the chairman of 
the committee indicate he believes the substance of what we are talking 
about is an important issue, and I know he believes that. I know the 
intelligence community believes it. I know a lot of other parties that 
are involved believe this is a very important issue. We are going to 
talk about why this is an important issue as we go forward. After all, 
when we are dealing with a subject such as this, we are talking about 
the security of the people of the United States of America. It is not a 
partisan issue. It is not a win or a loss for anyone. It is developing 
the best we can possibly do to protect the American people.
  I am nonetheless disappointed by yesterday's vote regarding missile 
defense. I am going to talk about that a little bit when I get into the 
substance of tactical weapons, but the issue of missile defense, just 
like the issue of strategic versus tactical weapons, is one that has 
been around for a long time.
  It is not new. It is one of a couple of issues that were around 40 
years ago when the people who originally brought us to the table with 
the Russians to do the work that they did. As I said before, those 
people were real heroes. They were patriots and did a great job of 
getting us to the table with the Russians, at a time when nuclear 
weapons was probably the most important issue facing the world.
  A lot of us grew up in an era when we remember having air raid 
drills. I remember going to friends' houses who actually had shelters 
in their homes, so if indeed there was a nuclear war, they could take 
shelter. It is hard to believe that was the situation 40 years ago, but 
it was. Most people today don't have a recollection of what a serious 
issue that was. Those people who brought us to the table were real 
patriots. That was 40 years ago.
  As I said before, the world has changed greatly in 40 years. 
Unfortunately, the dialog regarding strategic missiles has not 
dramatically changed in the last 40 years. We have been focused almost 
exclusively on numbers and to the great credit of those originally 
involved and to the credit of the ranking member, Senator Lugar, who is 
here with me today, those numbers have been dramatically reduced. We 
started out with each side having over 6,000 weapons that could be 
launched on the other side. We have continuously ratchetted that back 
under this treaty to 1,550. I don't want to, in any way, denigrate the 
fact that we have greatly reduced the number of those strategic weapons 
on each side.
  Having said that, one has to wonder what is the difference between 
6,000 and 1,550? If either party pushes the button at 6,000 or at 
1,550, the world is over as we know it. So although it is important to 
talk about numbers, I think that in today's world, because of changing 
conditions, we should be as much focused on a couple of other--well, at 
least two other issues, one being the missile defense issue, which we 
talked about at great length yesterday, and the other is the 
relationship between strategic and tactical weapons.
  Frankly, we have been pacifying the Russians regarding missile 
defense and regarding strategic versus tactical weapons in order to get 
these treaties. I understand that when you are doing treaty work, when 
you are negotiating, it has to be a give-and-take proposition. Having 
said that, these two issues have moved to the forefront and have moved 
to importance, compared to simply the bare number of weapons and the 
verification process. Again, I don't want to denigrate the verification 
process itself; that is important.
  Today, Russia is not the threat to us when it comes to nuclear 
issues, as it was 40 years ago. Indeed, there was no truly great threat 
to us other than Russia 40 years ago. However, today, most everybody 
agrees the likelihood of Russia pushing the button or us pushing the 
button and destroying each other is very unlikely. We have a 40-year 
history, where we have been through good times and bad times. Neither 
party--with the exception of the Cuban missile crisis--has come close 
to or remotely close to or even threatened to push the button and start 
a nuclear war.
  In my judgment, and I think in the judgment of people who deal with 
this regularly, Russia is not the nuclear threat it was 40 years ago. 
But there are threats out there that indeed are as bad and worse than 
what the Russian threat was 40 years ago. How many people believe the 
rogue countries, North Korea and Iran, would not threaten us--at the 
very least threaten us--to push the button if they indeed had the 
ability to immediately do so. We all know it has been reported in the 
press that both those countries are working feverishly to get 
themselves in the position where they can have a nuclear weapon 
mounted, poised, and ready to go, so that when they sit down at the 
table with us, they can look us in the eye and say: Look, we will push 
the button if you don't--fill in the blank.
  Our media today mocks and jokes about Ahmadinejad and Kim Jong Il as

[[Page 23002]]

being dysfunctional people--I think that is the kindest way of putting 
it. But they will not be joking about it if they get themselves in the 
position where they are able to legitimately threaten us with pushing 
the button or pulling the trigger on us with a nuclear attack.
  We need to be focusing on the other aspects, starting with missile 
defense, because if we sit across the table from Kim Jong Il or his 
representatives or Ahmadinejad and the best we have to offer is a 
retaliatory strike, that isn't nearly as effective as having an 
umbrella over the top of us that can knock an errant missile out of the 
sky. We need a robust missile defense system.
  I believe, as we said earlier, that this treaty chills that, because 
no matter what you say, if you read the unilateral statements made by 
the parties, the Russians have said that if we go forward with 
improving, either quantitatively or qualitatively, our missile defense 
system, this is grounds for withdrawing from this treaty. I don't think 
we should have a treaty in place that in any way chills the thinking 
about what we do to protect the American people with a robust missile 
defense system that could knock out of the sky an attack by either 
North Korea or Iran or even an accidental launch by the Russians, 
which, although remote, is a possibility.
  Well, today, let's talk about something we can agree on; that is, the 
importance of tactical weapons in this discussion. As the distinguished 
chairman mentioned in his opening statement, the importance of the 
tactical weapons issue is a matter we should be concerned about and we 
should talk about. I am delighted to hear his offer that, assuming this 
goes by the bye, we can talk about getting something into the 
resolution of ratification as opposed to into the treaty.
  First, for those who aren't daily speaking on this issue, the 
difference between strategic and tactical weapons is important. The 
difference is distance. A strategic weapon can reach your enemy on the 
other side of the ocean. A tactical weapon is a theater or short-range 
weapon that can be used on the battlefield. That is the difference 
between the two. It is a huge difference in a lot of different ways.
  Although we all agree it is an important issue, and we all talk about 
it, nothing is done about it. Indeed, according to the statements that 
have been made, before we ever sat down at the table with the Russians 
on this issue, it was agreed we would do nothing about this issue. I 
hope and I urge that the President, the State Department, and all the 
others involved will pursue this issue aggressively and quickly once we 
have this treaty behind us, one way or the other.
  What I want to do is to amend the preamble to the treaty, once and 
for all, that lays this issue on the table and tells the Russians this 
is an important issue and that we are no longer going to look the other 
way and ignore this issue. They have an advantage on us on this issue. 
Everyone agrees with that. But this is what I want to put into the 
preamble, and it is not extensive. I have heard the chairman say over 
and over again that the preamble doesn't mean anything or very little. 
With all due respect, I disagree with that. I compare it to the 
preamble of the Constitution of the United States, which means a lot 
and is frequently quoted in court cases on constitutional issues.
  This is what I want to put in:

       Acknowledging there is an interrelationship between 
     nonstrategic and strategic offensive arms, that as the number 
     of strategic offensive arms is reduced [as this treaty does] 
     this relationship becomes more pronounced and requires an 
     even greater need for transparency and accountability, and 
     the disparity between the parties' arsenals could undermine 
     predictability and stability.

  That is a factual statement that, on our side, virtually everybody 
agrees to. Obviously, the Russians, I suspect, probably agree to that 
but don't want to talk about it.
  Well, the problem, in its simplest terms, is that we are greatly 
outgunned by the Russians at this time on the tactical front. Right 
now, on the strategic front, according to media sources we have 
approximately 2,100 strategic weapons. The Russians have approximately 
1,100 strategic weapons. From an intelligence standpoint, I am not 
confirming those numbers, but that is what is reported in the press--
assuming those numbers are accurate or modestly accurate. We, 
obviously, are not in parity. We are in a little better shape than the 
Russians from a strategic standpoint.
  When you consider that neither of us believe we will reach for use of 
our strategic weapons, it doesn't make a lot of difference that we have 
1,000 more than they do and probably not that much of a difference if 
either one pulls the trigger. On the tactical side, however, that is a 
very different ball game. As we all know, we have defense treaties. The 
biggest one is NATO, but we have defense partnerships with many 
countries around the world. Under our nuclear defense umbrella, many 
countries take refuge. It is here that the tactical weapons become 
important.
  On these tactical weapons, as I said, the Russians have a 10-to-1 
advantage over us. Just as important, without getting into intelligence 
details, they have a vast array of weapons, not only a delivery system 
but the weapons themselves, which again outgun us and is a serious 
problem.
  Thirdly, just as important, they continue cranking out every day new 
designs, new technology, new development, and new production of these 
tactical weapons--continuing to add to the disparity between us and the 
Russians.
  Well, this disparity in our nuclear posture is very well demonstrated 
by the report Congress commissioned, entitled ``America's Strategic 
Posture.'' It is published in a book and known as the Perry-Schlesinger 
Commission. I am going to refer to that briefly because I think 
probably this, as much as anything, is what people use as a guide to 
describe where we are as far as our posture on nuclear weapons and 
especially on tactical weapons, which is what I am focusing on with 
this particular amendment.
  First, let me say the Russians are relying on more tactical nuclear 
weapons. The Commission report, at page 12, explained that:

       As part of its effort to compensate for weaknesses in its 
     conventional forces, Russia's military leaders are putting 
     more emphasis on nonstrategic nuclear forces [what they call 
     NSNF] particularly weapons intended for tactical use on the 
     battlefield. Russia no longer sees itself as capable of 
     defending its vast territory and its nearby interests with 
     conventional forces.

  So in very short order, they have explained why the Russians are 
doing this, why they have us 10-to-1 on this part of the issue, and why 
they continue to develop it. Well, they do not have the money or the 
resources or the ability, because of the large territory they have, to 
defend with conventional forces, and so they reach for these tactical 
weapons that are smaller and more easily deployed.
  There is a description of the tactical nuclear threat in this 
document at page 13, which, again, I want to quote because I think it 
says it as concisely as it can be said:

       As the Cold War ended, and as noted above, these NSNF--

  That is, nonstrategic nuclear forces, short-range weapons--

     were reduced under the auspices of the PNIs--

  That is, Presidential Nuclear Initiatives--

     and also the Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces of 
     1987. Nonetheless, Russia reportedly retains a very large 
     number of such weapons. Senior Russian experts have reported 
     that Russia has 3,800 operational tactical nuclear warheads 
     with a large additional number in reserve. Some Russian 
     military experts have written about use of very low-yield 
     nuclear ``scalpels'' to defeat NATO forces. The combination 
     of new warhead designs, the estimated production capacity for 
     new nuclear warheads, and precision delivery systems, such as 
     the Iskander short-range tactical ballistic missile (known as 
     the SS-26 in the West), open up new possibilities for Russian 
     efforts to threaten to use nuclear weapons to influence 
     regional conflicts.

  That is at page 13.
  There is a lack of Russian transparency on this particular issue. One 
of the things this treaty does that we are talking about today--and I 
think everyone concedes that this is one of the

[[Page 23003]]

important aspects of this treaty--is it gives us transparency with the 
Russians, at least to some degree. One could argue the degree, but at 
least there is some transparency. Not so with tactical weapons.
  This is what the Commission said:

       Like China, Russia has not shown the transparency that its 
     neighbors and the United States desire on such matters. It 
     has repeatedly rebuffed U.S. proposals for nonstrategic 
     nuclear forces transparency measures and NATO's request for 
     information. And it is no longer in compliance with its PNI 
     commitments.

  So that describes the transparency problem, page 13 of this 
particular report.
  There is a need to have effective deterrence against Russian tactical 
weapons, and again the report points this out.

       Even as it works to engage Russia and assure Russia that it 
     need not fear encirclement and containment, the United States 
     needs to assure that deterrence will be effective whenever it 
     is needed. It must also continue to concern itself with 
     stability in its strategic military relationship with Russia. 
     It must continue to safeguard the interest of its allies as 
     it does so. Their assurance that extended deterrence remains 
     credible and effective may require that the United States 
     retain numbers of types of nuclear capabilities that it might 
     not deem necessary if it were concerned only with its own 
     defense.

  Again, this provides a description of the serious issue tactical 
weapons puts on the table.
  Well, there is a very substantial concern about the imbalance between 
strategic and tactical weapons. As I said, on tactical weapons we are 
not only balanced, but we probably have an advantage of 1,000, but who 
cares if neither party really believes it is going to be used. So then 
you turn to the tactical weapons, which are obviously very different.
  This is what the Commission says:

       But that balance does not exist in nonstrategic nuclear 
     forces, where Russia enjoys a sizable numerical advantage. As 
     noted above, it stores thousands of these weapons in apparent 
     support of possible military operations west of the Urals. 
     The United States deploys a small fraction of that number in 
     support of nuclear sharing agreements in NATO.

  Let me say that again: The United States deploys a small fraction of 
that number in support of nuclear sharing agreements in NATO.

       Precise numbers for the U.S. deployments are classified, 
     but their total is only about 5 percent of the total at the 
     height of the Cold War. Strict U.S.-Russian equivalents in 
     NSNF numbers is unnecessary, but the current imbalance is 
     stark and worrisome to some U.S. allies in Central Europe.

  And to this Senator personally.

       If and as reductions continue in the number of 
     operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, this 
     imbalance will become more apparent and allies less assured.

  Further in this report, they say:

       The imbalance favoring Russia is worrisome, including for 
     allies, and it will become more worrisome as the number of 
     strategic weapons is decreased.

  Which, of course, is what we are trying to do with this treaty.

       Dealing with this imbalance is urgent and, indeed, some 
     commissioners would give priority to this over taking further 
     steps to reduce the number of operationally deployed 
     strategic nuclear weapons.

  Obviously for the reasons I said because nobody believes we will ever 
reach to the strategic nuclear weapons to use them.
  U.S. policy should seek reductions in Russian tactical weapons. I 
think everyone agrees on that, and that is precisely what I am 
attempting to do with this amendment to the preamble.
  The Strategic Posture Commission says:

       U.S. policy should be guided by two principles. First, the 
     United States should seek substantial reductions in the large 
     force of Russian nonstrategic nuclear forces (Non-Strategic 
     Nuclear Forces). Second, no changes to the U.S. force posture 
     should be made without comprehensive consultation with all 
     its U.S. allies (and within NATO as such). All allies 
     depending on the U.S. nuclear umbrella should be assured that 
     any changes in its forces do not imply a weakening of the 
     U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees. They could 
     perceive a weakening if the United States (and NATO) does not 
     maintain other features of the current extended nuclear 
     deterrence arrangements than the day-to-day presence of U.S. 
     nuclear bombs. Some allies have made it clear to the 
     commission that such consultations would play a positive role 
     in renewing confidence in U.S. security assurances.

  Finally, the Perry-Schlesinger Commission endorsed tactical weapons 
reductions talks.
  The Commission said:

       The commission is prepared strongly to endorse negotiations 
     with Russia in order to proceed jointly to further reductions 
     in our nuclear forces as part of a cooperative effort to 
     stabilize relations, stop proliferation, and promote 
     predictability and transparency. The large Russian arsenal of 
     tactical nuclear weapons must be considered in this regard.

  Well, obviously everyone is concerned. I am not the only one 
concerned. Obviously, the Commission isn't the only one concerned about 
this. Members of this body are and have been for a long time concerned 
about this.
  My distinguished colleague from Maine, Senator Collins, wrote to the 
Secretary of State on December 3, 2010, and she stated:

       The characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons, 
     particularly their vulnerability for theft and misuse for 
     nuclear terrorism, make reducing their numbers important now.

  Senator Collins focused on another aspect of this that we haven't 
really talked about that much, but certainly strategic weapons have 
very little opportunity--in fact, in the United States, no 
opportunity--for access by terrorists. Not so much on the other side. 
But clearly there is a great difference between tactical and strategic 
weapons, primarily because of the way they are deployed.
  Senator Collins also said:

       President Obama's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review echoes the 
     concern of nuclear terrorism. ``The threat of nuclear war has 
     become remote, but risk of nuclear attack has increased. 
     Today's most immediate and extreme danger is nuclear 
     terrorism. Al-Qaida and their extremist allies are seeking 
     nuclear weapons.''

  That probably summarizes as clearly as anything the discussion I had 
at the outset about the difference of 40 years ago versus today and 
underscores what, in my judgment, is so important about moving this 
dialog forward instead of staying in the rut of where we were 40 years 
ago and focusing just on numbers.
  Again, it is not just the Republican side of the aisle. Almost a 
decade ago, the SORT treaty, or Moscow treaty--another nuclear arms 
reduction treaty--was discussed here on the floor of the Senate, and a 
number of my colleagues from the other side of the aisle raised this 
exact question regarding tactical weapons and also underscored how 
important it was to take on this issue. Again, even though we have 
advanced 40 years, nothing has happened, and nothing has happened in 
the last decade. About 10 years ago, the distinguished Members of this 
body underscored how important it was to take this issue on, and 
nothing has happened.
  Then-Senator Biden said on July 9, 2002, in this Chamber:

       My question is, if the impetus for this treaty was going 
     down to 1,700 to 2,200, related to the bottom line of what 
     our consensus in our government said we are going to need for 
     our security, and the rationale for the treaty was in part to 
     avoid this kind of debate that took place over tactical 
     nuclear weapons, then it sort of reflects that this is what 
     the President thinks are the most important things to proceed 
     on relative to nuclear weapons. Does he think that dealing 
     with the tactical nuclear weapons are not that relevant or 
     that important now, or that things as they are relative to 
     tactical nuclear stockpiles are OK? Talk to me about that? 
     You understand where I am going?

  Well, I do, Mr. Vice President, because that is where I am going 
today, but nothing has happened over the last decade.
  My distinguished colleague, Senator Dorgan, said in this Chamber, 
when we were talking about that treaty:

       And this treaty deals with only strategic nuclear weapons, 
     not theater nuclear weapons. There are thousands and 
     thousands of theater nuclear weapons, such as the nuclear 
     weapons that go on the tips of artillery shells. That is not 
     part of the agreement. It has nothing to do with this 
     agreement.

  He was right then, and he is right now as to this agreement.
  Senator Reed, the Senator from Rhode Island, stated:

       The treaty does not specifically address the problem of 
     tactical weapons or MIRV'd ICBMs. The number of Russian 
     tactical nuclear weapons is believed to be between 8,000 and 
     15,000, while the United States has approximately 2,000. 
     Russian tactical nuclear

[[Page 23004]]

     weapons are subject to fewer safeguards and more prone to 
     theft and proliferation. These are the proverbial suitcase 
     weapons, often discussed in the press, which are the ones 
     that are most mobile, most difficult to trace and detect. And 
     the treaty does not deal with these weapons at all.

  Senator Reed was right then on that treaty, and he is right on this 
treaty.
  Regarding that treaty, Senator Conrad stated:

       I was therefore disappointed that a requirement for Russian 
     tactical warhead dismantlement and United States inspection 
     rights were not part of the treaty of Moscow.

  Well, he was right, and I share his disappointment today on this, and 
I think everyone shares that disappointment. That is what I am trying 
to move forward with this particular amendment.
  Senator Conrad went on to say:

       The disconnect between the ability of the United States to 
     maintain current strategic force levels almost indefinitely, 
     and Russia's inevitable strategic nuclear decline due do 
     economic realities, gave our side enormous leverage that I 
     believe we should have used to win Russian concessions on 
     tactical nuclear arms. While I am encouraged that the 
     resolution of ratification before us includes a declaration 
     on accurate accounting and security, it does not mention 
     Russian tactical nuclear reductions. I have prepared a 
     corrective amendment and would welcome the support of the 
     chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations 
     Committee.

  Thank you, Senator Conrad. I expect him to come through the door any 
moment and join me as a cosponsor on this amendment. He had an 
amendment to the last treaty and that is exactly what I am trying to do 
on this treaty.
  Finally, Senator Feinstein, in talking about that treaty, said:

       [T]he treaty does not address tactical nuclear weapons. As 
     my colleagues know, there is a great deal of uncertainty 
     about the number, location, and secure storage of Russian 
     tactical nuclear weapons. Smaller and more portable than 
     strategic weapons, they are vulnerable to theft or sale to 
     terrorist groups. Yet the treaty does not even mention them. 
     This is a glaring oversight and the dangers posed by tactical 
     nuclear weapons--especially now in the post-September 11 
     world of global terrorism--warrants the immediate attention 
     and action by both Russia and the United States.

  She also said:

       This treaty marks an important step forward in the 
     relationship between the United States and Russia and reduces 
     the dangers posed by strategic nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, 
     I am concerned that the treaty does not go far enough and I 
     believe its flaws must be addressed if we truly want to make 
     the threat of nuclear war a thing of the past.

  What has changed in the last 8 years, indeed in the last 40 years, 
when it comes to tactical weapons? Not much. As my colleague said 8 
years ago, we should have had, in these negotiations, tremendous 
leverage over the Russians on this particular issue. We have a 1,000-
warhead advantage on them. They are already under the numbers, and I am 
still not clear what we got when we agreed that the number would be 
1,550, when they were already below it and we had to get down to 1,550. 
I am not sure what we got for that. But it would seem to me at least we 
should have gotten something in that regard and that something should 
have had to do with tactical weapons.
  As I am winding down, let me correct one thing that is out there in 
the public domain and that is the State Department's Web site. The 
State Department has a Web site up that addresses this treaty and deals 
with many questions surrounding this treaty and has answers for the 
public, for the media, and for anyone who wants to go there and learn 
about this particular issue.
  I wish to focus on one particular aspect of that; that is, the part 
that deals with tactical weapons that I am dealing with. The State 
Department Web site posts--I suppose it is under ``frequently asked 
questions,'' the question: ``Why doesn't the New START Treaty cover 
tactical weapons?''
  That is a good question: ``Why doesn't the new START treaty cover 
tactical weapons?''
  It goes on and states that:

       From the outset, as agreed by Presidents Obama and [the 
     President of Russia] . . . the issue of tactical weapons was 
     not raised.

  I guess that begs the question: Why wasn't it? But nonetheless, the 
question is still out there: Why doesn't it address that? This is what 
they state:

       Deferring negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons until 
     after a START successor agreement had been concluded was also 
     the recommendation of the Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture 
     Commission.

  That is an inaccurate statement. You recall, as I read from the 
Perry-Schlesinger Report, that is an inaccurate statement. Some members 
of the Perry-Schlesinger Commission were disturbed by the fact that the 
Web site said they had recommended they put this off.
  On December 17, 2010, half a dozen members of that Commission wrote 
to Senator Kerry and ranking member Senator Lugar and were protesting 
that particular statement on the Web site. I am going to quote from 
this letter. I am going to put the letter in the Record, but I am going 
to quote some small parts. The letter said:

       As Members of the Strategic Posture Commission, we write to 
     provide our own reality check that this does not resemble the 
     recommendation the commission made on Russian tactical 
     nuclear weapons.

  It goes on to say:

       The Commission specifically said on page 67 of its report 
     that, ``The imbalance favoring Russia is worrisome, including 
     for allies, and it will become more worrisome as the number 
     of strategic weapons is decreased. Dealing with this 
     imbalance is urgent and, indeed, some commissioners would 
     give priority to this over taking further steps to reduce the 
     number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons.

  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the letter of 
December 17 I referred to, to Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar, from 
members of the Strategic Posture Commission.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                December 17, 2010.
     Senator John Kerry,
     Russell Senate Office Bldg.,
     Washington, DC.
     Senator Richard Lugar,
     Hart Senate Office Bldg.,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senators Kerry and Lugar: During Senate consideration 
     of New START, Members of the Senate have rightly raised their 
     concern that New START leaves untouched Russia's ten-to-one 
     advantage in tactical nuclear weapons. The official State 
     Department response to this concern is provided by a document 
     on its web site purporting to be a ``reality check,'' which 
     states that ``Deferring negotiations on tactical nuclear 
     weapons until after a START successor agreement bad been 
     concluded was also the recommendation of the Perry-
     Schlesinger Congressional Strategic Posture Commission.'' As 
     Members of the Strategic Posture Commission we write to 
     provide our own reality check that this does not resemble the 
     recommendation the Commission made on Russian tactical 
     nuclear weapons.
       The Commission was in fact very concerned about Russian 
     tactical nuclear weapons. At page 21 of its report, the 
     Commission noted that the current imbalance in tactical 
     nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia ``is 
     stark and worrisome to some U.S. allies in Central Europe.'' 
     We took note of the ``evidently rising value in Russian 
     military doctrine and national security strategy'' of 
     tactical nuclear weapons, and found that ``there is a clear 
     allied concern about this development.''
       The Commission specifically said on page 67 of its report 
     that ``The imbalance favoring Russia is worrisome, including 
     for allies, and it will become more worrisome as the number 
     of strategic weapons is decreased. Dealing with this 
     imbalance is urgent and, indeed, some commissioners would 
     give priority to this over taking further steps to reduce the 
     number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons.'' 
     (Emphasis added). In addition, page 68 says, ``The United 
     States will need to consider additional initiatives on those 
     NSNF [non-strategic nuclear forces] not constrained by the 
     INF Treaty--i.e., tactical nuclear weapons. U.S. policy 
     should be guided by two principles. First, the United States 
     should seek substantial reductions in the large force of 
     Russian NSNF.'' Second, ``no changes to the U.S. force 
     posture should be made without comprehensive consultations 
     with all U.S. allies.''
       These quotes from the Commission's report demonstrate the 
     error of the State Department's assertion that the 
     administration's approach to New START and tactical nuclear 
     weapons is consistent with the Commission's recommendations.
       As members of the Strategic Posture Commission, we have 
     brought this matter to your attention because we believe that 
     the Commission's recommendations regarding negotiations with 
     Russia remain pertinent and that any reference to the 
     Commission's report should be accurate.
           Sincerely,
     Harry Cartland.

[[Page 23005]]

     John S. Foster, Jr.
     Fred C. Ikle.
     Keith B. Payne.
     James R. Schlesinger,
       Vice-Chairman.
     R. James Woolsey, Jr.
       Commissioner.

  Mr. RISCH. Let me conclude. Here we are, 40 years later and, indeed, 
a decade later than our most recent foray into this. Other than the raw 
reduction of numbers of strategic weapons, not a whole lot has changed. 
But the world has changed dramatically and I urge and I suggest our 
approach with Russia on these very important issues needs to, likewise, 
change--and it has not.
  Once again, in this Senator's humble opinion and that of a number of 
other Senators also, we have been bested by the Russians on the missile 
defense issue. They have convinced us that if we even think about 
improving, either quantitative or qualitatively, missile defense 
issues, they will withdraw.
  Once again, they convinced us before we ever sat down at table that 
they would not talk about nuclear weapons.
  That is wrong. That is wrongheaded thinking. It was wrong to approach 
this treaty with that type of thing on the table. So when we are all 
done and the high-fiving starts and the champagne bottles are opened 
and the fancy documents are signed, before everybody gets all worked up 
about what a great and glorious thing this treaty is, I would say it is 
missing some important things. No. 1 is missile defense, and I guess we 
already crossed that bridge yesterday; but the other is the oh-so-
important issue of tactical weapons.
  Fellow Senators, this is your opportunity. If you want to press the 
reset button with Russia, this gives you your opportunity to press the 
reset button with Russia and take up this issue that is so important 
and, indeed, in the minds of many, more important than the issue of 
strategic weapons.
  I yield the floor to Senator Kyl.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. First, let me thank Senator Risch on a fine statement about 
a very important aspect of this START treaty. He covered the waterfront 
very well. I only wish there were more than two other colleagues on the 
Senate floor to hear this debate. Part of the reason I suggested, a 
long time ago, it was not a good idea to bring up the START treaty just 
before Christmas is Members would be preoccupied, especially if we 
tried to go through Saturday and Sunday. Here we are on a Sunday 
afternoon and there are four Senators, in addition to the Presiding 
Officer, on the Senate floor. This is a shame because it is an 
important issue.
  Yesterday, the Senate rejected an amendment by Senators McCain and 
Barrasso. What they said was that there is some language in the 
preamble of this treaty that states the interrelationship between 
strategic defensive and offensive weapons and that is not a good idea 
based upon how the Russians intend to use that language. The argument 
against it was that it is just a statement of fact, nothing more than 
that. There is an interrelationship between defense and offense. In 
effect, what is the big deal?
  The Risch amendment is also merely just a statement of fact. In fact, 
the language of the Risch amendment is virtually identical to the 
preamble language dealing with missile defenses except it, in effect, 
substitutes tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons for missile 
defense. It states the interrelationship. I cannot imagine anyone would 
deny that interrelationship. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission cited by 
Senator Risch confirms that interrelationship.
  As I said, I can't imagine anyone denying it, and I can't imagine 
anyone denying the fact that as we reduce our strategic offensive 
weapons, then the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons becomes all the 
more important, especially because of the large difference between the 
Russians and everyone else in the world. It is said to be about 10 to 
1--Russia vis-a-vis the United States in tactical nuclear weapons--and 
all the more discouraging because there is no transparency in what the 
Russians have and their military doctrine is to actually use those 
weapons. Our strategic offensive tactical weapons are a deterrent to 
attack. To the Russians, tactical nuclear weapons are a battlefield 
weapon just like artillery. There is clearly an interrelationship 
between the two. It clearly would be to our detriment if we reduce our 
strategic offensive weapons down to the point that these tactical 
nuclear weapons could create an imbalance in power. Because the United 
States has commitments to 31 other countries, it is very important to 
them, especially the European countries that are in the backdoor of 
where the Russian tactical missiles could be most effective.
  Yesterday, we were told we had to defeat the McCain amendment because 
it was simply trying to remove from the preamble this statement of fact 
of this interrelationship. Today, we have the Risch amendment, which is 
simply to insert a statement of fact about an interrelationship between 
the strategic and the tactical. There is no principled argument against 
the Risch amendment. The only argument is the Russians wouldn't like it 
and they would require that we renegotiate the preamble. I can't think 
of a better argument for the Risch amendment. We should renegotiate the 
preamble. All the statements Senator Risch quoted from Democratic 
Senators then--one of the most eloquent by the Vice President, who was 
then a Senator, who said we have to negotiate further any reductions of 
these tactical nuclear weapons of the Russians. We should have done it 
in the 2002 treaty. This was a missed opportunity by the Bush 
administration. That should be our first order of business.
  So the Obama administration, with Vice President--the Obama 
administration, with Vice President Joe Biden, comes into office and 
was that their first priority? No. Was it any priority? No. Did it get 
included in the treaty? No. Why? Because the Russians said nyet. All 
the Risch amendment would do is simply insert the words into the 
preamble. Remember, this is the document that is meaningless, just a 
throwaway piece of paper, so what harm could it be of making this 
statement of fact of the interrelationship?
  As I said, there is no principled argument against this. The only 
argument can be the Russians would require some renegotiation. I say, 
fine, let's bring it on. That should have been negotiated when the 
treaty was negotiated, not now after the fact.
  I appreciated the fact that Senator Risch put into the Congressional 
Record the statement of the six Commissioners of the Perry-Schlesinger 
Commission, who had to correct the State Department Web site, which 
wrongly asserted that they did not believe we should attack this 
problem of the disparity in tactical nuclear weapons. Senator Risch 
quoted from the Commission report that noted the urgency of dealing 
with this problem.
  But did the Obama administration negotiators deal with the problem? 
No. Why? Because Russia didn't want to.
  OK. Sorry. We are sorry about that. But when they asked us to deal 
with missile defense, and we said: No, not in this treaty, they 
insisted we put language about missile defense, and if the 
interrelationship between that and the strategic weapons in the 
preamble and more important, not just language about the 
interrelationship but the fact that as strategic numbers come down, 
then that relationship becomes even more important because defense 
becomes more important--precisely the same point about tactical nuclear 
weapons.
  People should understand one other thing. There is not a huge 
difference between strategic and tactical weapons. The actual explosive 
power of some tactical weapons exceeds that of some strategic weapons. 
The difference is in the delivery mechanism. One is intended more as a 
shorter range kind of weapon and the other is a much longer range, 
ordinarily an intercontinental range. That is the strategic definition.
  I cannot think of a principled argument against this. It is not as if 
we are saying the treaty has to be renegotiated. It is not as if we are 
saying we have to deal with tactical nuclear weapons. Then-Senator 
Biden said:

       After entry into force of the Moscow Treaty [that was done 
     in 2002] getting a handle on

[[Page 23006]]

     Russian tactical nuclear weapons must be a top arms control 
     and nonproliferation objective of the United States 
     government.

  So why wasn't it a top objective of the Obama and Biden 
administration?
  Let me make some other points and I think there are some other 
colleagues who would like to speak to this and then there are some 
quotations from other people who supported this treaty who said this is 
a problem that needs to be dealt with.
  One of the things that came up during the course of the negotiations 
involved a particular kind of Russian tactical nuclear weapon. These 
are the weapons that could be deployed on submarines. They are 
basically cruise missile weapons, nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
  These could actually reach the United States when deployed on 
submarines, so, insofar as the United States is concerned, it is a 
distinction without a difference as to whether they are tactical or 
they are strategic.
  They could be used against the United States with submarines because 
they are delivered by cruise missiles. These are exactly the kinds of 
systems that were limited in a binding side agreement reached between 
the United States and the Soviet Union during negotiation of the first 
START treaty. Why did the administration forgo a similar agreement in 
New START?
  In other words, you have a precedent, a particular kind of then 
Soviet nonstrategic nuclear weapon was dealt within a side agreement to 
the START I treaty, because we understood its importance. This treaty 
does not inhibit in the least the Russians' ability to deploy a cruise 
missile, submarine-based, nonstrategic weapon, nuclear weapon.
  They did not want us to have the ability to deploy conventional 
Prompt Global Strike, at least not without counting it against the 
vehicles that deliver nuclear weapons. So that got into the treaty. The 
Russians did not want it, so we acceded to their request. When we 
wanted to put something in about the cruise missiles that would be 
delivered by submarine, no, we cannot do that, the Russians said.
  I presume the administration made this argument. I do not know that 
they did in the negotiations. You see, we, the Senate, being asked to 
give our consent to this treaty, have been denied the negotiating 
records. The Russians know what our negotiators said, but we do not 
know. The State Department knows, the Russians know, but we do not 
know.
  I do not even know if the United States tried to get that same 
agreement that was in the START I treaty in this New START treaty. I do 
not know. But it is not in there. So either we did not try--
negligence--or the Russians said no. This is why it is important to 
recognize the relationship somewhere--maybe we will get a letter from 
the President. Maybe he will send another letter to Senator McConnell 
and say something about this, which, of course, does not mean anything 
vis-a-vis the Russians.
  Why do we not do this in the preamble? Well, we have a chance to do 
it now, to correct the problem, by adopting the Risch amendment. A 
final point. The resolution of ratification actually recognizes this 
little problem, not very effectively, but it recognizes the problem by 
calling on the President to pursue an agreement with the Russians that 
would address this disparity in tactical nuclear weapons in the future.
  Well, that is what then-Senator Biden asked to be done in 2002, when 
the last treaty was debated in the Senate. We did not do it. So now the 
resolution of ratification says, well, this is a pretty good idea, 
actually. We ought to do that in the future sometime. Well, our 
bargaining power in the future is gone. This is the treaty to do it in. 
What is the quid pro quo going to be when we go to the Russians next 
and say, now we want to talk about tactical nuclear weapons. They are 
going to say, now we want to talk about U.S. missile defenses. How do 
you like them apples? What is the Obama administration going to say?
  One theory I heard was--and this was from a knowledgeable source--
that the Russians actually would like to move the bulk of their 
tactical nuclear weapons from the European theater to their southern 
border and their eastern border, where they fear some day they may have 
to use these weapons against a potential invasion from China or from 
Muslim states to their south, and that they might agree to a 
concession--if the United States insisted that they move those weapons 
back from the European theater, they might be willing to do that. That 
is exactly the kind of concern we have. The Russians want to do that. 
They are prepared to move their missiles. They know they are going to 
have to do so for their own self-interests. They are waiting, however, 
until we say we wish to bring up this question of tactical nukes. They 
will say: I tell you what, if you will give us something on missile 
defense, we will be happy to move them back from the European theatre. 
That is the kind of thing we are looking at. The Russians are great 
chess players, the best in the world. And they are great negotiators. 
With all due respect to our negotiators--I cannot blame our 
negotiators. I do not know whether it was because of a lack of 
direction from the Commander in Chief or poor negotiation. But one way 
or the other, we got snookered. We got snookered on missile defense, we 
got snookered on conventional Prompt Global Strike, we got snookered on 
tactical nuclear weapons, we got snookered on verification. All of 
these are issues that we want to try to deal with in the Senate now 
during this ratification process.
  But Senator Kerry, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
has said, we are not going to amend the treaty. So what are we doing 
here on a Sunday afternoon? If we are not going to do it, and he has 
got the votes to see that we do not do it, about all we can do is to 
make the case to the American people that this was a flawed process and 
a flawed treaty.
  I hope our colleagues will consider the prospect of making some 
changes here, so that if, in fact, there does have to be some 
renegotiation, we welcome that. I do not know why the other side 
believes the Senate is only here as a rubberstamp. You cannot change 
the treaty, so vote for it. I think that explains this matter of time. 
Why do you need any time to debate this treaty? Let's get it over with. 
We have got to ratify the treaty here. Why are you raising all of those 
objections and questions? We are not going to let you amend it. So why 
do you think we need to take all of this time?
  I think that explains their rationale. I heard one of my colleagues 
on the other side this morning on national TV say, we have been on this 
treaty for 2 weeks. No, we have not. We have been on it for 3\1/2\ 
days. That is interspersed with all of the other stuff we have been 
doing on the Senate floor, which I will not bother to repeat. We are 
all well aware of it.
  But here we are on a Sunday afternoon. We should be debating a very 
serious proposal by Senator Risch to simply put wording in the preamble 
that tracks almost identically the wording that is already in there 
relative to missile defense, and this would relate to tactical nuclear 
weapons. Why would we not do that, unless we do not want to change the 
treaty in any way?
  I do not think we should be wasting our time here. The advice and 
consent clause of the Constitution meant something. The administration 
did not follow our advice that we gave them when we passed the defense 
bill last year on missile defense, on Prompt Global Strike. So we do 
not have to give them our consent, or at least we can say let's make a 
few changes--a change such as this, that I cannot see any principled 
argument against. There will be an argument, and the argument will be: 
Well, the Russians will not like it, we will have to renegotiate. I 
will be interested to see if there is any other argument.
  I hope my colleagues will gradually filter in here on a Sunday 
afternoon, turn off the football game, come in for a few hours of 
edification about some very important matters to American security, 
and, at the end of this afternoon when we vote, support the amendment 
of my colleague Senator Risch.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Indiana.

[[Page 23007]]


  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, let me state at the outset that the 
amendment offend by the distinguished Senator, Mr. Risch, would, in 
essence, terminate the treaty. We have been down this trail yesterday 
with a long debate about missile defense.
  But, in fact, the net result of amending the preamble, and thus the 
text of the treaty, is to kill it. That is the issue before the Senate. 
There may be Members in our body who do not like the treaty. There have 
been some, apparently, who from time to time have not been prepared to 
support any treaty with Russia.
  I have recited, at least from my recollection of previous debates, 
that many Senators simply said, you can never trust the Russians. You 
cannot deal with the Russians. Simply what we ought to be doing is to 
build up defenses of our own so that quite regardless of what the 
Russians have, what the Russians intend to do, we are prepared for 
that.
  Indeed, that was some of the argumentation at the time President 
Ronald Reagan first seriously got into these issues. There were persons 
at that point, and there may still be persons, who believe that somehow 
or other a complex system of missile defense can be set up that would 
protect our country against intercontinental ballistic missiles flying 
in from Russia, from North Korea, from Iran, from whomever might obtain 
them.
  That argument has gone on for decades. To this point, there has not 
been scientific backup that such a comprehensive missile system could 
be created, quite apart from what its expense might be, and quite apart 
from the lack of attention to the recognition of what else is going on 
in the world.
  Indeed it is a curious fact that in this debate some Senators have 
argued that the Russians are one thing, but a rather diminishing focus, 
as far as they are concerned; that the real problem is not how ever 
many intercontinental ballistic missiles the Russians may have, how 
many warheads that are aimed at our military installations and our 
cities but, rather, that development of a few nuclear weapons in North 
Korea, or the possibility of development of some in Iran ought to be 
the focus for those who are moderate as opposed to those who are still 
talking ancient history.
  Let me be very clear. We are talking this afternoon about an 
amendment that terminates the treaty and that means we have no New 
START. Some Senators would say, well, that is fine. Now let's go back 
to work. Let's send our negotiators into the fray, as if, for some 
reason or other, we anticipate the Russians, after this rejection, are 
eager to engage.
  In the meanwhile, let me say that for what I would call an indefinite 
period, while these negotiations might come about, although it is 
dubious given at least the rejection not only to the Russians, but the 
impression of the rest of the world, that we will have an inability, 
once again, to inspect what is proceeding in Russia.
  In other parts of the debate, we may talk about the verification 
procedures and their adequacy. Some Senators have already suggested 
that in their judgment those verification procedures may lack the 
adequacy that would give us confidence, even though the number of bases 
on which Russia has weapons has decreased by at least a half, and it is 
a very different situation with regard to inspection.
  But, at the same time, many of us have lamented since a year ago 
December 5 that we have not had so-called boots on the ground; that is, 
Americans inspecting what is proceeding. I think that is very 
important. If we reject the treaty today by passing this amendment, 
that problem will continue. I believe that has to be faced squarely, 
regardless of what Senators might feel ought to be in the treaty or 
left out of it. I would say each day that goes by, I do not predict 
that the Russians are going to construct something especially new and 
different, but we have come into a mode of feeling, that although that 
may be important, it has not been important enough for us to take up 
this treaty, even though it has been clearly signed by the two 
Presidents of the United States and Russia for some months.
  Thank goodness we finally have the treaty before us. I would say that 
the costs associated with requiring renegotiation of the treaty, I 
believe, far outweigh the benefits the Senate might gain by demanding a 
new treaty, new changes in due course. I would say, from my 
perspective, a rejection of the treaty today will make further 
limitations on Russian tactical nuclear arms far less likely, not more 
likely.
  The United States has made clear that any future nuclear arms 
reduction agreement with Russia should include tactical nuclear 
weapons, and I share that objective. Some critics have overvalued the 
utility, however, of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, and undervalued 
our deterrent to them.
  Only a fraction of those weapons; that is, the Russian tactical 
weapons, could be delivered significantly beyond Russia's borders. 
Pursuant to the INF treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union long 
ago destroyed intermediate range and shorter range nuclear-armed 
ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, which have a 
range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.
  In fact, most of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons have very short 
ranges. They are used for homeland air defense. Most, as has been 
suggested, are devoted to the Chinese border or are in storage now. A 
Russian nuclear attack on NATO countries is effectively deterred by 
NATO conventional superiority, our own tactical nuclear forces, French 
and British nuclear arsenals, and U.S. strategic forces. In short, 
Russian tactical nuclear weapons do not threaten our strategic 
deterrent. Our NATO allies that flank Russia in eastern and northern 
Europe understand this. I think we need to underline that because we 
have NATO allies. We have discussed this subject very frequently.
  Our NATO allies would seemingly be the most in harm's way of a short-
range tactical nuclear weapon. It could be a very short range into the 
Baltics, for example, or into Poland, but the NATO allies have all 
strongly endorsed the New START treaty for the reasons I have 
suggested. They understand the deterrents that are already present to 
the Russian use of these particular weapons.
  It is important to recognize that the science differential between 
Russian and American tactical nuclear arsenals did not come to pass 
because of American inattention to this point. During the first Bush 
administration, our national command authority, with full participation 
by the military, deliberately made a decision to reduce the number of 
tactical nuclear weapons we deployed. So it goes back to the first Bush 
administration, a deliberate decision to reduce the number. They did 
this irrespective of Russian actions because the threat of a massive 
ground invasion in Europe had largely evaporated due to the breakup of 
the former Soviet Union.
  In addition, our conventional capabilities had improved to the extent 
that battlefield nuclear weapons were no longer needed to defend 
western Europe. That was a military judgment. In this atmosphere, 
maintaining large arsenals of nuclear artillery shells, land mines, and 
short-range missile warheads was a bad bargain for us in terms of cost, 
safety, alliance cohesion, and proliferation risk. In my judgment, 
Russia should make a similar decision. The risks to Russia of 
maintaining their tactical nuclear arsenal in its current form are 
greater than the potential security benefits those weapons might 
provide. They have not done this in part because of their threat 
perceptions about their border, particularly their border with China--
which, apparently, they want to give an impression to the Chinese who 
are along a large border and territory largely unoccupied or sparsely 
occupied by Russians, that these weapons might be utilized against the 
Chinese.
  An agreement with Russia that reduced, accounted for, and improved 
security around tactical nuclear arsenals is in the interest of Russia 
and the United States. Rejection of New START, however, makes it 
unlikely that a subsequent agreement concerning tactical nuclear 
weapons will ever be reached. One of the basic points

[[Page 23008]]

of the exercise we are now proceeding on, the passage and ratification 
of a New START treaty, means we have another opportunity to move ahead 
with the Russians around the negotiating table.
  Logically, rejection of the treaty does not offer a promising benefit 
for at least the short run, and maybe the intermediate run to either 
country to proceed.
  The resolution of ratification encourages the President to engage the 
Russian Federation on establishing measures to improve mutual 
confidence regarding the accounting and security of Russian 
nonstrategic weapons. That has been deliberately put into the text we 
are discussing today. For this reason, I oppose the amendment because, 
in fact, it would require renegotiation of the treaty. I have suggested 
that is unlikely to come about very rapidly and very readily.
  One of the amazing things about the current situation was that with 
the expiration of the START treaty a year ago December, we were able to 
get together with the Russians, admittedly on a limited agenda. Those 
who are proponents of the treaty have said from the start that it is a 
limited agenda, small reductions in strategic arms, an ideal, once 
again, of verification and the possibilities that having at least 
reached limited agreements, we might in fact meet again around the 
negotiating table to think through the tactical weapons situation and 
other aspects and the very important objective we do have with the 
Russians of limiting the building of nuclear weapons or an industry 
that could field those in other countries.
  We believe it will be in the interest of the Russians, as well as our 
own, to have that cooperation on the basis of our knowledge of how the 
systems work and how that deterrence might be effected.
  I appreciate very much the importance of the issue. But for the 
reasons I have suggested, I believe it would be unwise to adopt the 
motion of the distinguished Senator. Furthermore, I would not like to 
see the treaty completely obliterated today by the adoption of this 
amendment because that, in fact, would be the effect.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted 
to speak for 15 minutes, to be followed by Senator Cornyn.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, we are grateful to be here on a weekend 
talking about a critically important treaty for the country. This 
treaty has been the subject for many months now of review by the 
Foreign Relations Committee, as well as other committees. There have 
been between 900 and 1,000 questions asked of the administration and 
answered. I think we should start with some basic fundamentals about 
the context within which this treaty is being debated and, I hope, 
ratified in the next couple of days.
  First, this treaty is entirely consistent with our concern in making 
sure our nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, effective, and reliable. 
There is no question about that in terms of our goal. That underpins 
our national security and is no way reduced or compromised because of 
this treaty.
  I wish to speak to the amendment offered by Senator Risch. Any 
amendment to the treaty would require renegotiation with the Russian 
Federation. That would lead to a prolonged delay for the U.S. nuclear 
weapons inspectors to return to Russia to get on the ground to inspect 
and to verify.
  As we sit here today on this Sunday, we can say, unfortunately, on 
this date, Sunday, December 19, we mark day 379 since we have had 
inspectors on the ground. That is a problem for our security. That is a 
problem, obviously, for verification. That is one of the reasons--only 
one, but one--we must ratify this treaty.
  Let me get to the amendment offered by Senator Risch. Senator Risch 
and I serve on the Foreign Relations Committee. I am the chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs. 
Senator Risch is our ranking member. We work well together. I think we 
have a basic disagreement about this amendment. This amendment involves 
what are known as tactical nuclear weapons. I recognize the importance 
of addressing the basic imbalance that exists with respect to the 
Russians and the scores of tactical nuclear weapons at their disposal. 
It is important that upon ratification of the New START accord, we 
proceed quickly to negotiations with the Russians on tactical nuclear 
weapons. But as we engage in this debate, it is also important to 
clearly define what we are talking about for the American people.
  The Congressional Research Service says the United States and the 
Soviet Union--what we used to call the Soviet Union--both deployed 
thousands of ``nonstrategic'' nuclear weapons during the Cold War that 
were intended to be used in support of troops in the field during a 
conflict. These included nuclear mines, artillery, short, medium, and 
long-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and gravity bombs.
  So we are talking about tactical weapons--in this case, tactical 
nuclear weapons--which were not included in the New START treaty 
because this is a strategic weapons treaty. We can all agree future 
negotiations must take place on tactical nuclear weapons. But the only 
way to get there, the only path forward, is by finalizing New START and 
ratifying this important treaty.
  Our allies in Europe are perhaps the most vulnerable to the threat 
posed by tactical nuclear weapons. Our allies in eastern Europe are 
especially so. Yet here is what Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw 
Sikorski wrote on November 20:

       Without a [New START] treaty in place, holes will soon 
     appear in the nuclear umbrella that the US provides to Poland 
     and other allies under article 5 of the Washington Treaty, 
     the collective security guarantee for NATO members. Moreover, 
     New START is a necessary stepping-stone to future 
     negotiations with Russia about reductions in tactical nuclear 
     arsenals and a prerequisite for a successful survival of the 
     Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).
       In effect, New START is a sine qua non for effective US 
     leadership on arms-control and non-proliferation issues that 
     matter to Europe--from reviving the CFE treaty to preventing 
     Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

  The Polish Foreign Minister said this. He represents the very people 
under direct threat from the Russians and from their tactical nuclear 
weapons. He believes New START should be done first, followed by 
negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons.
  Secretary General of NATO Rasmussen has said:

       The New START treaty would also pave the way for arms 
     control and disarmament initiatives in other areas that are 
     vital to the Euro-Atlantic security. Most important would be 
     transparency and reductions of short-range, tactical nuclear 
     weapons in Europe which allies have called for in our new 
     ``Strategic Concept.'' This is a key concern for allies--not 
     only those closest to Russia's borders--in light of the great 
     disparity between levels of Russian tactical nuclear weapons 
     and those of NATO. But we cannot address this disparity until 
     the New START treaty is ratified. Which is another reason why 
     ratification would set the stage for further improvements in 
     European security.

  Franklin Miller, the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms 
Control under President George W. Bush said:

       If we don't ratify New START, we're back to the drawing 
     boards on some sort of approach to strategic arms and the 
     tactical that are still going to get left behind. I do not 
     see a treaty in the future that will lump the large Russian 
     tactical stockpile in with the smaller strategic stockpiles 
     on both sides.

  End of quotation from President George W. Bush's Senior Director for 
Defense Policy and Arms Control.
  Finally, I would note that in April 2009, both President Obama and 
President Medvedev indicated that arms control would be a step-by-step 
process, with a replacement for the 1991 START treaty coming first but 
a more comprehensive treaty that might include deeper cuts in all types 
of warheads, including nonstrategic weapons, following in the future.
  Russian tactical weapons must be decreased, there is no question 
about

[[Page 23009]]

that, and experts across the political and international spectrum agree 
that completing New START is the essential first step in reducing 
Russian tactical nuclear weapons.
  Even if this amendment to the treaty were to be passed, the treaty 
itself would still be about strategic arms. Nothing in the amendment 
would actually change that fact. But it would unnecessarily continue to 
delay U.S. inspectors returning to Russia to verify nuclear weapons. So 
if this amendment were to pass, we not only make no progress--no 
progress--on tactical nuclear arms, but efforts to decrease the weapons 
actually pointed at the American people--the Russian ICBMs would grind 
to an immediate halt. This is not acceptable to the American people, I 
would argue, but certainly not to many of us supporting the 
ratification of the treaty. As a result, I will be voting no on the 
Risch amendment.
  I would also like to reiterate that the resolution of ratification 
that came out of the Foreign Relations Committee covers this issue by 
calling on the President to ``pursue, following consultation with 
allies, an agreement with the Russian Federation that would address the 
disparity between the tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the 
Russian Federation and of the United States and would secure and reduce 
tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.'' So says the 
resolution of ratification. This bipartisan resolution passed out of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a vote of 14 to 4.
  So we have spent lots of time on this treaty. We have spent a good 
deal of time as well on this basic question. But I think we have to do 
more than talk tough when it comes to this treaty and when it comes to 
making sure our arsenal is safe, secure, effective, and reliable. Tough 
talk is not enough. We need tough actions. The ratification of this 
treaty is one of those tough actions to make sure the American people 
are more secure.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Risch amendment 
and would refer all of us to the constitutional provision under which 
we are discharging our responsibility. Of course, it is article II, 
section 2 of the Constitution that says:

       [The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice 
     and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties. . . .

  The problem here is that even though Congress has told the 
administration about our concerns about constraining our missile 
defense capability and has told the administration about our concerns 
with regard to the exclusion of tactical weapons that are covered by 
the Risch amendment, in reality, the administration really does not 
want our advice but merely seeks our consent.
  I believe this matter is being treated with the kind of gravity and 
seriousness on a bipartisan basis that it deserves. But there are some 
very real differences between those of us who think this treaty is as 
good as we can get and that Congress's role is really to consent to 
something negotiated without our advice having been taken, and those 
who believe the Senate should play more than a rubberstamp role when it 
comes to matters as serious as these. Indeed, in section 1251 of the 
national defense authorization bill for fiscal year 2010, the Senate 
did provide advice on these matters. But, as I indicated earlier, most 
of that advice was ignored in favor of a strategy of seeking our 
consent after this treaty was basically a fait accompli.
  It concerns me that--and I admire our distinguished floor leader, 
Senator Lugar, who has a wealth of experience in this area, and I think 
we all acknowledge that--it worries me that any attempts by the Senate 
to offer amendments are called treaty killers. I do not really 
understand what our role is here if it is not to offer amendments to 
conform the treaty to what we believe is the best national security 
interests of the American people.
  But one of the treaty's problems that I think the Risch amendment 
reveals is, that by excluding tactical nuclear weapons, we are giving 
the Russians a huge advantage and increasing rather than decreasing 
instability. The Congressional Research Service has written a document 
that illustrates this, a research document dated January 14, 2010, 
entitled ``Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons,'' otherwise called tactical 
nuclear weapons. On pages 4, 5, and 6, they go through a factual 
distinction between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that those pages be printed in 
the Record following my remarks.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. CORNYN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, the Congressional Research Service points out that the 
distinction between strategic nuclear weapons that are covered by this 
treaty and nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons that are not 
covered by this treaty is, frankly, a muddled topic. We do know that 
some types of weapons, by exclusion, are left out and not included 
under the treaty. In other words, intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
sea-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers are included as 
strategic weapons, and, by definition, everything that is not included 
would be a nonstrategic or tactical weapon. They also point out in 
those pages that are being made part of the Record that part of the 
definition has traditionally been determined by the range of delivery 
vehicles and the yield of the warheads. But I think it is important to 
try, as well as we can, to paint a clearer picture of what we are 
talking about when we say nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons.
  I have in my hand an unclassified report taken from Jane's 
Information Group publications called ``Strategic Weapon Systems, 
Fighting Ships, Naval Weapon Systems, and All the World's Aircraft'' 
that covers a so-called nonstrategic Russian weapon known as the SH-11 
Gorgon ABM, otherwise called the UR-96.
  The reason I raise this example of a type of weapon that the Russians 
reportedly have, which is not covered by this treaty, is that the yield 
of this weapon is 1 megaton--1 megaton. If you look at the size of the 
nuclear weapon that was used on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, that 
killed anywhere from 80,000 to 140,000 people--actually, no one knows 
the exact number because of radiation-induced injuries and the like, 
but suffice it to say it caused enormous devastation and brought 
Imperial Japan to its knees in World War II--that was, by contrast, a 
10-kiloton nuclear warhead. In other words, this so-called nonstrategic 
nuclear warhead not covered by this treaty is 100 times more powerful 
than the nuclear warhead that killed perhaps 100,000 people or more in 
Hiroshima in 1945.
  So I mention this example--and this is, by the way, an unclassified 
document. We cannot go into, here on the floor, more detail about the 
distinction or, frankly, really, what we should call a continuum 
between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. But we are not talking 
about firecrackers. We are not talking about bottle rockets. We are 
talking about weapons that can wreak death and destruction that really, 
I think, most of us hesitate to even contemplate.
  So this is not an inconsequential amendment. This is a very important 
amendment that the Senator has brought. I listened to him a little 
earlier. I was in my office in the Hart Office Building, but I listened 
to Senator Risch cite some very distinguished authorities on the other 
side of the aisle, and this comes from the Congressional Record in 
March of 2003, talking about the Moscow Treaty. Senator after Senator--
Senator Dorgan, the distinguished Senator from North Dakota; Senator 
Biden, now Vice President Biden but then a Senator from Delaware; 
Senator Reed from Rhode Island, a distinguished expert on the Armed 
Services Committee on national security matters; Senator Conrad, the 
other Senator from North Dakota--to a man, they noted and expressed 
concern about the failure to deal with tactical nuclear weapons in the 
Moscow Treaty of 2003. The Senator from California,

[[Page 23010]]

Mrs. Feinstein, also noted the absence of any dealing with tactical 
nuclear weapons. I mention this to say, again, no one is talking about 
divisions among us. We are talking about a unified concern with the 
threat tactical nuclear weapons poses.
  So I think it is simply a mistake--but it is a correctable mistake--
that the negotiators of this treaty and the administration have 
excluded tactical nuclear weapons. As others have stated, the United 
States has an advantage at this time on strategic nuclear weapons. So 
basically we are going to have to cut our stockpile, while the Russian 
Federation, which does not currently have as many weapons as this 
treaty would allow, would be allowed to build up to that cap. But in 
the area of tactical nuclear weapons, the Russian Federation has--one 
classified estimate was around 10 times what the United States has in 
terms of tactical nuclear weapons.
  I was talking in my office with Tom D'Agostino, the head of the 
National Nuclear Security Administration, someone who has long served 
in this area and who has confirmed that this tactical nuclear asymmetry 
is very real. According to him--he said--``the actual numbers are 
classified''--as I alluded to earlier--but he confirmed that ``there's 
a ten to one ratio, roughly, give or take. You know, it's a big 
difference between the two.''
  It seems to me that from a bargaining standpoint, it would have made 
all of the sense in the world for the Obama administration to have 
insisted on reductions in the Russian tactical nuclear weapons as part 
of the New START. If not now, I would say, when. If not in 2003--if all 
of our colleagues whose names I have mentioned earlier thought it was a 
good idea to deal with tactical nuclear weapons back in 2003, it 
strikes me as even more important to do it now rather than kick the can 
down the road and not take advantage of the leverage we would have due 
to the Russians' desire to maintain their current arsenal of tactical 
nuclear weapons.
  But Vice President Biden recognized, in 2003, that this omission was 
potentially dangerous. I will quote him. He said:

       Getting a handle on Russian tactical nuclear weapons must 
     be a top arms control and nonproliferation objective of the 
     United States Government.

  So one has to question why that top objective remains unmet under New 
START.
  James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the 
now-defunct U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, has testified that ``the 
significance of tactical nuclear weapons rises steadily as strategic 
nuclear arms are reduced.'' This is a sobering conclusion, and it helps 
illustrate the importance of this glaring omission in the New START 
treaty.
  Simply put, this treaty in its current form represents a lost 
opportunity to compel the Russian Federation to downsize their tactical 
nuclear arsenal. This amendment provides an opportunity to lay the 
groundwork for that goal to be accomplished in the future.
  Following Senate ratification of the START I treaty, President George 
Herbert Walker Bush committed the United States to unilaterally 
reducing our tactical nuclear weapons. Not surprisingly, while the 
Russians made a similar commitment, they failed to follow through and 
never completed their promised reductions.
  Today, Russia's widespread deployment of tactical nuclear weapons 
raises concerns with their safety and security. These weapons are often 
located at remote bases close to potential battlefields, sometimes far 
from central command authority. Questions have been raised regarding 
the stability and reliability of those Russian troops charged with 
monitoring and securing those weapons. In 2008, Secretary Gates said he 
was worried that the Russians themselves didn't even know the numbers 
and locations of old land mines, nuclear artillery shells, and so on, 
that would be of interest to rogue states and terrorists.
  In addition, unlike strategic nuclear weapons, tactical weapons have 
very little transparency and very little accounting. The treaty should 
at least take a step in the direction to provide more transparency and 
an accounting requirement.
  Achieving reductions in Russian tactical nuclear weapons would also 
reduce the supply of those weapons that could be acquired by groups 
such as al-Qaida. Tactical nuclear weapons are among those that are the 
most susceptible to theft or illicit transfer because they are 
relatively small and compact, including so-called suitcase nukes. They 
are the most susceptible to theft and illicit transfer to terrorists 
and also rogue states.
  During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was known to have produced and 
deployed smaller tactical weapons, sometimes called suitcase nukes, as 
I mentioned a moment ago. These nuclear weapons--unlike large strategic 
weapons that New START would limit--are the terrorist's dream. They are 
easily concealed and highly transportable. They could all too easily be 
moved across our border and positioned in almost any building in the 
United States.
  Additionally, the Strategic Posture Commission, in its 2009 report to 
Congress, found that Russia's tactical nuclear weapons advantage opens 
up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten the use of nuclear 
weapons to influence regional conflicts and threaten our allies. The 
Commission observed that there is an ``evidently rising value in 
Russian military doctrine and national security strategy'' of tactical 
nuclear weapons.
  These fears are coming to fruition, as U.S. officials say that Russia 
has moved tactical nuclear weapons to facilities near NATO allies 
several times in recent years, most recently this past spring. These 
actions, again, would run counter to pledges made by Moscow that they 
would pull back tactical nuclear weapons and reduce their numbers.
  By ratifying the New START treaty without addressing this asymmetry, 
the United States would squander valuable leverage to negotiate a 
future reduction in Russian tactical nuclear weapons. The 
administration says no matter, we must ratify the New START treaty and 
we can deal with the tactical nuclear weapons sometime in the future. 
Well, again, we didn't do it in 2003 when Vice President Biden and 
others pointed out the omission and the potential danger, and here we 
are in 2010 being asked in a lameduck session to ratify this treaty and 
leave tactical nuclear weapons excluded once again. It leads me to 
wonder whether instead of the doctrine of ``trust, but verify,'' we are 
embracing a doctrine of ``ignore it and it will simply go away.'' We 
all know it won't. Russia would have little reason to agree to reduce 
its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons in a future treaty without 
extracting major concessions from the United States. We can fix this 
issue now if we would simply adopt the Risch amendment.
  I join my colleagues in urging the adoption of the Risch amendment.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, would the Senator from Texas yield for a 
question?
  Mr. CORNYN. I am happy to yield for a question.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. The Senator from Texas has mentioned a statement I and 
some others have made with respect to the Moscow Treaty. I simply 
wanted to observe that then and now, I wish we had included tactical 
nuclear weapons, but I then voted for the Moscow Treaty and I will vote 
for this treaty. The reason for that is making progress on strategic 
nuclear weapons, reducing the stock of nuclear weapons, and reducing 
delivery vehicles, it seems to me, is major progress. This 
administration has indicated it intends to move forward on tactical 
weapons negotiations with the Russians. I didn't want it to stand that 
somehow my concern--back in the discussion about the Moscow Treaty, the 
concern about not including tactical weapons had me voting against the 
treaty. I did not. I voted for that, and I will vote for this treaty 
because I think it advances the ball in a very significant way with 
respect to arms control.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator from North Dakota

[[Page 23011]]

coming out and making that statement. I didn't mean to suggest that he 
voted against the Moscow Treaty, but I do believe I accurately quoted 
his concerns, which he has reconfirmed here, in the failure to deal 
with tactical nuclear weapons.
  I would say in response to my colleague that we are making a 
unilateral reduction in strategic nuclear weapons and the Russians are 
not going to have to reduce any in their current stockpile because we 
are presently over the cap set by the treaty and they are under the 
cap. So it seems to me there is even further evidence we got out-
negotiated on this, and particularly when it omits this important part 
of the nuclear arsenal and a threat to the stability of not only the 
region but also of the world.

                               Exhibit 1

   The Distinction Between Strategic and Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

       The distinction between strategic and nonstrategic (also 
     known as tactical) nuclear weapons reflects the military 
     definitions of, on the one hand, a strategic mission and, on 
     the other hand, the tactical use of nuclear weapons. 
     According to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
     Terms, a strategic mission is:
       ``Directed against one or more of a selected series of 
     enemy targets with the purpose of progressive destruction and 
     disintegration of the enemy's warmaking capacity and will to 
     make war. Targets include key manufacturing systems, sources 
     of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power 
     systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, 
     and other such target systems. As opposed to tactical 
     operations, strategic operations are designed have a long-
     range rather than immediate effect on the enemy and its 
     military forces.''
       In contrast, the tactical use of nuclear weapons is defined 
     as ``the use of nuclear weapons by land, sea, or air forces 
     against opposing forces, supporting installations or 
     facilities, in support of operations that contribute to the 
     accomplishment of a military mission of limited scope, or in 
     support of the military commander's scheme of maneuver, 
     usually limited to the area of military operations.''


                 Definition by Observable Capabilities

       During the Cold War, it was relatively easy to distinguish 
     between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons because 
     each type had different capabilities that were better suited 
     to the different missions.


                Definition by Range of Delivery Vehicles

       The long-range missiles and heavy bombers deployed on U.S. 
     territory and missiles deployed in ballistic missile 
     submarines had the range and destructive power to attack and 
     destroy military, industrial, and leadership targets central 
     to the Soviet Union's ability to prosecute the war. At the 
     same time, with their large warheads and relatively limited 
     accuracies (at least during the earlier years of the Cold 
     War), these weapons were not suited for attacks associated 
     with tactical or battlefield operations. Nonstrategic nuclear 
     weapons, in contrast, were not suited for strategic missions 
     because they lacked the range to reach targets inside the 
     Soviet Union (or, for Soviet weapons, targets inside the 
     United States). But, because they were often small enough to 
     be deployed with troops in the field or at forward bases, the 
     United States and Soviet Union could have used them to attack 
     targets in the theater of the conflict, or on the battlefield 
     itself, to support more limited military missions.
       Even during the Cold War, however, the United States and 
     Russia deployed nuclear weapons that defied the standard 
     understanding of the difference between strategic and 
     nonstrategic nuclear weapons. For example, both nations 
     considered weapons based on their own territories that could 
     deliver warheads to the territory of the other nation to be 
     ``strategic'' because they had the range needed to reach 
     targets inside the other nation's territory. But some early 
     Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles had relatively 
     short (i.e., 500 mile) ranges, and the submarines patrolled 
     close to U.S. shores to ensure that the weapons could reach 
     their strategic targets. Conversely, in the 1980s the United 
     States considered sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) 
     deployed on submarines or surface ships to be nonstrategic 
     nuclear weapons. But, if these vessels were deployed close to 
     Soviet borders, these weapons could have destroyed many of 
     the same targets as U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. 
     Similarly, U.S. intermediate-range missiles that were 
     deployed in Europe, which were considered nonstrategic by the 
     United States, could reach central, strategic targets in the 
     Soviet Union.
       Furthermore, some weapons that had the range to reach 
     ``strategic'' targets on the territory of the other nations 
     could also deliver tactical nuclear weapons in support of 
     battlefield or tactical operations. Soviet bombers could be 
     equipped with nuclear-armed anti-ship missiles; U.S. bombers 
     could also carry anti-ship weapons and nuclear mines. Hence, 
     the range of the delivery vehicle does not always correlate 
     with the types of targets or objectives associated with the 
     warhead carried on that system. This relationship between 
     range and mission has become even more clouded since the end 
     of the Cold War because the United States and Russia have 
     retired many of the shorter and medium-range delivery systems 
     considered to be nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Further, both 
     nations may develop the capability to use their longer-range 
     ``strategic'' systems to deliver warheads to a full range of 
     strategic and tactical targets, even if long-standing 
     traditions and arms control definitions weigh against this 
     change.


                    Definition by Yield of Warheads

       During the Cold War, the longer-range strategic delivery 
     vehicles also tended to carry warheads with greater yields, 
     or destructive power, than nonstrategic nuclear weapons. 
     Smaller warheads were better suited to nonstrategic weapons 
     because they sought to achieve more limited, discrete 
     objectives on the battlefield than did the larger, strategic 
     nuclear weapons. But this distinction has also dissolved in 
     more modern systems. Many U.S. and Russian heavy bombers can 
     carry weapons of lower yields, and, as accuracies improved 
     for bombs and missiles, warheads with lower yields could 
     achieve the same expected level of destruction that had 
     required larger warheads in early generations of strategic 
     weapons systems.


                        Definition by Exclusion

       The observable capabilities that allowed analysts to 
     distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear 
     weapons during the Cold War have not always been precise, and 
     may not prove to be relevant or appropriate in the future. On 
     the other hand, the ``strategic'' weapons identified by these 
     capabilities--ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers--are the only 
     systems covered by the limits in strategic offensive arms 
     control agreements--the SALT agreements signed in the 1970s, 
     the START agreements signed in the 1990s, and the Moscow 
     Treaty signed in 2002. Consequently, an ``easy'' dividing 
     line is one that would consider all weapons not covered by 
     strategic arms control treaties as nonstrategic nuclear 
     weapons. This report takes this approach when reviewing the 
     history of U.S. and Soviet/Russian nonstrategic nuclear 
     weapons, and in some cases when discussing remaining stocks 
     of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
       This definition will not, however, prove sufficient when 
     discussing current and future issues associated with these 
     weapons. Since the early 1990s, the United States and Russia 
     have withdrawn from deployment most of their nonstrategic 
     nuclear weapons and eliminated many of the shorter and 
     medium-range launchers for these weapons (these changes are 
     discussed in more detail below). Nevertheless, both nations 
     maintain roles for these weapons in their national security 
     strategies. Russia has enunciated a national security 
     strategy that allows for the possible use of nuclear weapons 
     in regional contingencies and conflicts near the periphery of 
     Russia. The Bush Administration also stated that the United 
     States would maintain those capabilities in its nuclear 
     arsenal because it might need to counter the capabilities of 
     potential adversaries. The Bush Administration did not, 
     however, identify whether these capabilities would be 
     resident on strategic or nonstrategic nuclear weapons. That 
     distinction will reflect the nature of the target, not the 
     yield or delivery vehicle of the attacking warhead.

  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Procedurally, so not to come out of either side's time, if 
I can ask: I understand the Senator from Oklahoma wants to propose an 
amendment, so I think we would both yield to him for that purpose.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Oklahoma.


                           Amendment No. 4833

  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts. Following the 
disposition of the Risch amendment, we will be scheduling my amendment 
No. 4833 having to do with verification and numbers of inspections. I 
will be wanting to speak on this. I don't want to take time from the 
Risch amendment.
  I ask unanimous consent to temporarily set aside the Risch amendment 
for consideration of amendment No. 4833.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Inhofe] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 4833.

  Mr. INHOFE. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment 
be dispensed with.

[[Page 23012]]

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To increase the number of Type One and Type Two inspections 
                       allowed under the Treaty)

       In paragraph 2 of section VI of Part V of the Protocol to 
     the New START Treaty, strike ``a total of no more than ten 
     Type One inspections'' and insert ``a total of no more than 
     thirty Type One inspections''.
       In paragraph 2 of section VII of Part V of the Protocol to 
     the New START Treaty, strike ``a total of no more than eight 
     Type Two inspections'' and insert ``a total of no more than 
     twenty-four Type Two inspections''.

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma.
  I will consume such time as I use for a moment. Let me say, first of 
all, again, I appreciate this amendment. There is not a lot of 
contention about the importance of addressing a lot of short-range 
tactical weapons, as we call them. The administration wants to do this 
as much as our friends on the other side of the aisle do, and I think 
the Senator from Idaho knows that.
  Let me correct one fact for a minute that both the Senator from Texas 
and the Senator from Idaho said. They said the Russians will not have 
to reduce their strategic warheads and that they are already below the 
number of 1,550. That is not accurate. I won't go into detail here. We 
can reinforce this tomorrow in a classified session. But the Russians 
do have to reduce warheads under this requirement--not as much as us. 
Our defense community has made the judgment that because of our triad, 
which will remain robust, and for other reasons, we have a very 
significant advantage. Again, I will discuss that tomorrow in the 
classified briefing.
  What I want to say to my colleague is that, again, I am 100 percent 
prepared to try to embrace this concept even further in the resolution 
of ratification. But we cannot do it in a way that requires this treaty 
to go back and be renegotiated. This is not a complicated amendment. 
There is a very simple reason why we should oppose this amendment as it 
is: because of the requirement that we go back. Because if we don't 
pass the START treaty, if we can't reach a bilateral agreement on the 
reduction of strategic weapons, there will be no discussion about 
tactical weapons. That is as plain as day. Every negotiator, everybody 
who has been part of this process, understands that. If we can't show 
our good faith to reduce and create a mutual verification system for 
strategic weapons, how are we going to sit in front of them and say, 
Oh, by the way, let's get you to reduce what is your advantage--it is 
an advantage, I acknowledge that--you go ahead and reduce it. They are 
going to laugh at us and we will have lost all of the verification we 
have today.
  It is not just me who says that. The fact is Secretary Gates has been 
very clear about this, and Secretary Clinton likewise. Secretary Gates 
said this. I know my colleagues all respect him enormously.

       We will never get to that step of reductions with the 
     Russians on tactical nukes if this treaty on strategic 
     nuclear weapons is not ratified.

  It is a pretty simple equation, folks. This isn't a one-way street 
where we can stand here and say, You have to do this and you have to do 
that and, by the way, we don't care what you think about what we are 
doing, we are going to do what we want. That is not the way it works. 
There has to be some reciprocity in the process of reduction and 
verification and inspection, and so forth. They have things they don't 
want us to see and we have stuff we don't want them to see. There is 
plenty in this agreement where we protect our facilities from them 
being able to intrude on them excessively, because our folks don't want 
them to. That is the nature of a contentious relationship which is the 
reason you have to argue out, negotiate out a treaty in the first 
place.
  If the Secretary of Defense is telling us--a Secretary of Defense, by 
the way, whom we all mutually respect enormously, but who was appointed 
to the job by President Bush--if he is telling us you have to pass this 
in order to get to the tactical nukes, I think we have to listen to 
that a little bit.
  Let me point out--I want the Record to reflect I agree with the 
Senator from Idaho. They have many more tactical nukes. They have had 
for a long time. The reason is they have different strategic needs. 
They are in a different part of the world. For a long time, the Warsaw 
Pact and NATO were head to head and squared off, and so they saw a 
world in which they saw the potential of a land invasion. So for a long 
time they had tanks and mines and other things that were nuclear 
capable. What happened is we unilaterally, I might add, decided under 
President Bush, I think it was, President George Herbert Walker Bush, 
we decided this is dangerous. It doesn't make sense. It doesn't make 
sense for us. So we unilaterally announced--after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, President Bush announced we were going to ratchet down 
our tactical nuclear forces, and everybody agreed with that. It made 
sense.
  So we did that and what happened is after that, President Boris 
Yeltsin in 1992 pledged that the production of warheads for ground-
launched tactical missiles, artillery shells, and mines had stopped. 
They stopped it because we stopped it. And all of those warheads would 
be eliminated. He pledged that Russia would dispose of one-half of its 
tactical airborne and surface-to-air warheads as well as one-third of 
its tactical naval warheads. The Russian Defense Ministry said in 2007, 
the ground force tactical nuclear warheads had been eliminated. Air 
defense tactical warheads were reduced by 60 percent. Air Force 
tactical warheads were reduced by 50 percent. Naval tactical warheads 
were reduced by 30 percent. Guess what. That didn't happen with the 
treaty. It happened because we had what we call Presidential nuclear 
initiatives. Our President made the decision, President Bush: We don't 
need them, dangerous, reduce them, and the Russians followed.
  I heard an estimate earlier of 2,000 or something--this is according 
to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. We estimate they have a large 
inventory of operational nonstrategic warheads--5,390 is the number of 
tactical warheads, air defense tactical, et cetera. So they do still 
have more, and it still is a very legitimate concern to us.
  That is why, I say to my colleagues, in the resolution of advice and 
consent we have the following declaration:

       (A) The Senate calls upon the President to pursue, 
     following consultation with allies, an agreement with the 
     Russian Federation that would address the disparity between 
     the tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian 
     Federation and of the United States and would secure and 
     reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.

  That is in the resolution. You can vote for that. In addition, we 
say:

       (B) Recognizing the difficulty the United States has faced 
     in ascertaining with confidence the number of tactical 
     nuclear weapons maintained by the Russian Federation and the 
     security of those weapons, the Senate urges the President to 
     engage the Russian Federation with the objectives of (1) 
     establishing cooperative measures to give each Party to the 
     New START Treaty improved confidence regarding the accurate 
     accounting and security of tactical nuclear weapons 
     maintained by the other Party; and (2) providing United 
     States or other international assistance to help the Russian 
     Federation ensure the accurate accounting and security of its 
     tactical nuclear weapons.

  I am prepared--if that language doesn't satisfy folks, let's go look 
further. I am happy to do that. But we are not going to do it in a way 
that precludes us from going to the very negotiations you want to have. 
It doesn't make sense, not to mention the fact that it puts the entire 
treaty back into negotiating play. Who knows how long it would be.
  The estimates I have from the negotiating team is it could take 2, 3 
years. We have been a whole year now without inspections and knowing 
what they are doing. I will talk, tomorrow in the security briefing, 
about the impact that has on our intelligence, and the dissatisfaction 
in the intelligence community with a prolonged and continued delay in 
getting that.
  So I simply say to my colleagues, let's do what is smart. Secretary 
Clinton said:


[[Page 23013]]

       The New START Treaty was always intended to replace START. 
     That was the decision made by the Bush administration.

  I emphasize again that President Obama was not the person who made 
the decision not to extend START I. The Russians didn't do it 
unilaterally. Neither of us wanted to do it, because under this START 
agreement, we actually put in a better system, and one, let me say, 
that General Chilton emphasizes reduces the constraints on missile 
defense.
  So here is what Secretary Clinton said: ``I would underscore the 
importance of ratifying the New START Treaty to have any chance of us 
beginning to have a serious negotiation over tactical nuclear 
weapons.''
  Some Senators are saying: Why didn't they address them at the same 
time and say we have to get this and that done? Well, for a couple 
reasons. One, Russia's tactical weapons are primarily a threat to our 
allies in Europe. Knowing the differences of that equation, to have 
linked our own strategic interests to that negotiation at that time 
would have left us who knows how long without the capacity to get an 
agreement, No. 1. No. 2, last year when we began negotiations on New 
START, NATO was in the midst of working out its new strategic concept. 
Our allies were in the midst of assessing their security needs. It 
would have been impossible to have that discussion without them having 
made that assessment and resolved their own security needs and 
definitions.
  But now NATO has completed that strategic concept. We have heard from 
a lot of European governments about New START. What do they say and 
what do our allies say? We are not in this ball game alone. They are 
united in support for this treaty, in part because they see it as the 
necessary first step to be able to have the negotiations that bring the 
reductions in tactical nuclear weapons.
  Let me quote Radoslaw Sikorski, Poland's Foreign Minister:

       Without a New START Treaty in place, holes will soon appear 
     in the nuclear umbrella that the U.S. provides to Poland and 
     other allies under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the 
     collective security guarantee for NATO members. Moreover, New 
     START is a necessary stepping stone to future negotiations 
     with Russia about its tactical nuclear weapons.

  So they believe you have to pass START to get to this discussion.
  This is the Lithuanian Foreign Minister:

       We see this treaty as a prologue, as an entrance to start 
     talks about substrategic weaponry, which is much more 
     endangerous, and it is quite difficult to detect. And we who 
     are living in east Europe especially know this.

  The Secretary General of NATO said:

       We need transparency and reductions of short-range tactical 
     weapons in Europe. This is a key concern for allies. But we 
     cannot address this disparity until the New START Treaty is 
     ratified.

  I don't know how many times you have to make this connection. General 
Chilton, who is in charge of our nuclear forces, said this to the Armed 
Services Committee:

       The most proximate threat to the United States, us, are the 
     ICBM and SLBM weapons because they can and are able to target 
     the U.S. homeland and deliver a devastating effect on this 
     country. So we appropriately focused in those areas in this 
     particular treaty for strategic reasons. Tactical nuclear 
     weapons don't provide the proximate threat that the ICBMs and 
     SLBMs do.

  The disparity in U.S. and Russian tactical arsenals, I repeat, we 
want to address. I am prepared to put something in here--if the Senator 
from Idaho thinks we can find the language, as we did with Senator 
DeMint, who has strong language in here about missile defense, let's 
put it in here. But it doesn't put us at a strategic disadvantage.
  Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen stated, in response to our 
questions, for the record:

       Because of their limited range and the very different roles 
     played by strategic nuclear forces, the vast majority of 
     Russian tactical nuclear weapons cannot directly influence 
     the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and 
     Russia.

  Donald Rumsfeld said this to the Foreign Relations Committee a few 
years ago:

     . . . I don't know that we would ever want to have symmetry 
     between the United States and Russia [in tactical nuclear 
     weapons]. Their circumstance is different and their geography 
     is different.

  General Chilton said:

       Under the assumptions of limited range and different roles, 
     Russian tactical nuclear weapons do not directly influence 
     the strategic balance between the U.S. and Russia. Though 
     numerical asymmetry exists in the numbers of tactical nuclear 
     weapons we estimate Russia possesses, when considered within 
     the context of our total capability, and given force levels 
     as structured in New START, this asymmetry is not assessed to 
     substantially affect the strategic stability between the 
     United States and Russia.

  There is more here. I will reserve the balance of time because other 
colleagues want to say something. First, let me say this about the 
process as we go forward. There is some talk that we are now reaching a 
point--we are on day five--we had Wednesday afternoon, Thursday, 
Friday, Saturday, and now Sunday. That is 5 days. START I took 5 days. 
If we filed a cloture motion at some point in the evening, for 
instance, we would still have 2 days before we even vote on that. Then, 
presuming we were to achieve it, we have 30 hours after that, which can 
amount to almost 2 days in the Senate. That would mean 9 days, if we go 
that distance on this treaty, which is simpler than START I. We would 
have more days on this treaty--simpler than START I--than we had on all 
3--the Moscow Treaty, START II, and START I treaties put together.
  I hope my colleagues will recognize that the majority leader has 
given time to this effort. We are giving time to it. We want 
amendments. No amendment, I think, would be struck. We would have time 
to vote on each amendment and deliberate each amendment. But I think it 
is important for us to consider the road ahead.
  I reserve the remainder of our time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Risch 
amendment. The distinguished Senator from Massachusetts just helped 
make the case as to why this amendment is so important. In every 
hearing we have had in Armed Services and Intelligence, every 
conversation I have had in person, by telephone, with every 
administration official and everybody in support of this, I raised the 
issue of not what is in the treaty as being the most significant issue 
but what is not in there--the issue of tactical nuclear weapons.
  I hear what the Senator is saying. What he has reinforced to me is, 
we have been talking to the Russians about tactical weapons for over 
two decades, and we have not yet been able to get them to sit down at 
the table with us. If we don't get them now, when? I understand what 
the President said, which is that he will make a real effort to get 
them to the table. You should get them to the table when you have 
leverage. The Russians want this treaty bad. We had the opportunity, in 
my opinion, to discuss tactical weapons with them, to get them to the 
table for this treaty, but we didn't take the opportunity to do that.
  So I rise to talk about the issue of tactical nuclear weapons with 
respect to New START and the two amendments filed on this issue, the 
Risch amendment, as well as one filed by Senator LeMieux.
  We all know tactical nuclear weapons is one of the issues the treaty 
doesn't address and also an area where there is a huge disparity 
between the United States and the Russians relative to the numbers of 
weapons. Perhaps, most important, the intent of arms control treaties 
is to control and limit arms in order to create predictability and 
security.
  By not addressing tactical nuclear weapons in this treaty, we have 
left the least predictable and the least secure weapons in our nuclear 
inventories out of the discussion. Russia has somewhere in the 
neighborhood of 5,000 weapons. There have been numbers bantered around 
here. But the estimates of exactly how many vary widely. The point is, 
we don't know. That is part of the real problem with tactical weapons. 
Many of these nuclear weapons are near Eastern Europe and in

[[Page 23014]]

proximity to U.S. troops as well as to our allies.
  These weapons are different, not primarily in terms of how powerful 
they are, because the warheads are, in some cases, similar in size to 
strategic nuclear weapons. Instead, they are different primarily in 
terms of the range of the delivery systems. The Russian advantage in 
tactical nuclear weapons is at least 5 to 1, but could be as high as 10 
to 1. Again, we don't know because they will not tell us.
  It is also the case that the United States and Russia both agreed in 
the 1990s to reduce tactical nukes. The United States has, but we don't 
know that the Russians have. They said they have. But do we truly trust 
the Russians? We should not. In fact, they have cited the expansion of 
NATO as a change in the strategic landscape since the 1990's.
  Tactical weapons are the least secure nuclear weapons in our nuclear 
inventories. They are deliverable by a variety of means, and for these 
reasons are more of a threat of being stolen, misplaced or mishandled 
than strategic nukes. It is a mistake and unfortunate that this treaty 
doesn't address tactical nuclear weapons because an agreement to reduce 
and control these weapons is exactly where we need to be focusing and, 
relative to the overall security of the United States and the world, it 
is, frankly, more important than reducing and controlling strategic 
nuclear weapons.
  On Senator Risch's amendment, it would add a statement to the 
preamble of the treaty which addresses the interrelationship between 
nonstrategic and strategic offensive arms; that is, the relationship 
between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Senator Risch's 
amendment is correct in that ``as the number of strategic offensive 
arms is reduced, this relationship becomes more pronounced and requires 
an even greater need for transparency and accountability, and that the 
disparity between the Parties' arsenals could undermine predictability 
and stability.''
  We are reducing strategic nuclear weapons under this treaty. By doing 
so, we are making tactical nuclear weapons much more important and much 
more relevant and, therefore, we should seek to achieve greater 
transparency and accountability on both our side as well as on the 
Russian side.
  That brings me to the second amendment, which is not pending but is 
filed and of which I am a cosponsor; that is, Senator LeMieux's 
amendment. That amendment would require the United States and the 
Russians to enter into negotiations within 1 year of ratification to 
address the disparity in tactical nuclear weapons. Both these 
amendments address what I believe is one of the most crucial issues and 
one of the issues the treaty should have addressed but didn't. I urge 
my colleagues to support both these amendments but particularly today 
the Risch amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Udall of Colorado). Who yields time?
  Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, the proponents of the amendment have how 
much time remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 25 minutes remaining.
  Mr. RISCH. Does that include my 10 minutes of closing?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It does.
  Mr. RISCH. So we have 15 minutes left to yield time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, Senator Sessions was next, so I yield the 
floor to the Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I would ask to be advised after 4 
minutes have lapsed.
  Mr. President, I think Senator Risch is correct and Senator Chambliss 
is correct to make the point that tactical nuclear weapons are more 
available for theft and to transship than strategic nuclear weapons, 
and it is a high priority of the United States to reduce the risk of 
terrorists obtaining weapons of this kind, and this treaty does nothing 
about that. It does nothing about tactical nuclear weapons, which the 
Russians do care about.
  It is a big part, apparently, of their defense strategy, and they 
gave not one whit on it; whereas our President, who says he wants to 
move toward zero nuclear weapons in the world--a fantastical view, 
really, and one that endangers our country and would create instability 
around the world and create more national security risks--did not 
negotiate this in any effective way. I think that was a failure of the 
treaty, a failure of negotiations, and another example of the fact that 
we wanted the treaty too badly for what, I guess, are primarily public 
relations matters rather than substantive matters. That is just the way 
I see it.
  So the Russians have been steadily reducing their strategic weapons, 
we are reducing ours, and this strategic relationship has been moving 
along. There does not have to be a treaty. We would like to have a 
treaty. I think the Russians would probably like to have a treaty. But 
it is not essential that we have one if they will not agree to some of 
the things that are important, such as tactical nuclear weapons. I do 
think this is a weakness in the treaty, and I am disappointed our 
negotiators didn't insist on it.
  As Mr. Feith said, who negotiated with the Russians, and they made a 
number of demands on a previous negotiation over the SORT treaty in 
2002: You just have to say no, and then you can move forward once the 
Russians know we are not going to give. But they will push, push, push 
until they are satisfied you are not going to give on it, and then they 
will make a rational decision at that point whether to go forward with 
the treaty or not go forward with the treaty.
  He said no on curtailment of missile defense in 2002. The Russians 
insisted, insisted, insisted, and he said, finally, no treaty.
  We don't have a treaty with China, we don't have one with England, we 
don't have one with India, and they have nuclear weapons. We don't have 
to have one. We would like to, but we don't have to. At that point the 
Russians conceded and agreed. So I don't think we negotiated this well 
at all. We do not need to continue with this large disparity of 
tactical weapons between the United States and Russia, and I appreciate 
Senator Risch's raising it.
  I will perhaps talk a little later about the national missile defense 
question in President Obama's letter, but President Obama's letter----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has consumed 4 minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. Would the Senator be willing to yield for a question?
  Mr. SESSIONS. On my time or yours?
  Mr. KERRY. We can share the time. It depends on how long you answer.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I am not giving up any of mine. I want to finish this 1 
minute on the subject of the President's letter.
  What it fails to acknowledge is that we were on the cusp of 
implanting a GBI in Europe by 2016, and that was completely given up in 
the course of these negotiations. This is the same missile we have in 
the ground in Alaska and California. That was given up, and we are now 
proceeding with a phase four theory that might be completed by 2020, if 
Congress appropriates the money for the next five Congresses and some 
President who is then in office--not President Obama 10 years from 
now--is still supportive and pushes it through and Congress passes it.
  So this is a big mistake. We made a major concession on national 
missile defense and even put words in the treaty that compromise our 
ability to do the new treaty. The statement from Putin that we will be 
obliged to take action in response did not say just GBI; it also 
referred to the capabilities of an SM-3 Block IIB, which would be what 
the President said is going to be deployed in 2020.
  I thank the Chair, I thank Senator Risch, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, if you will let me know when I have used 
4 of the 5 minutes I am to have.
  Mr. President, I rise today to support the amendment by my friend and 
colleague and next-door neighbor on the Foreign Relations Committee, as 
well as my next-door neighbor of State, Senator Risch.

[[Page 23015]]

  I want to discuss the issue of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, also 
known as tactical nuclear weapons. While the United States and Russia 
have a rough equivalence in their strategic nuclear weapons, there is a 
significant imbalance in tactical nuclear weapons, and it favors 
Russia.
  Russia currently has a 10-to-1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons, 
and it is expected that the number of tactical nuclear weapons in 
Russia will continue to grow. This imbalance directly impacts our 
security commitments to NATO and to our other European allies.
  Mr. President, I have been to the hearings in the Foreign Relations 
Committee. As a member of that committee, I have heard statements given 
by former Secretaries of State of both parties. Henry Kissinger 
testified before the committee and said:

       The large Russian stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, 
     unmatched by a comparable American deployment, could threaten 
     the ability to undertake extended deterrence.

  Former Secretary James Schlesinger called this imbalance of Russia's 
tactical nuclear weapons ``the dog that did not bark.'' He called it a 
``frustrating, vexatious, and increasingly worrisome issue.''
  In the past, many current Members of the Senate have expressed their 
concerns with Russia's tactical nuclear weapons. Even Vice President 
Biden, when he was a Member of this body and serving on the Foreign 
Relations Committee, spoke about it, and he said:

       We were hoping in START III to control tactical nuclear 
     weapons. They are the weapons that are shorter range and are 
     used at shorter distances, referred to as tactical nuclear 
     weapons.

  Well, Mr. President, as I look at this and work through it, it seems 
that, clearly, this administration did not make tactical weapons a top 
arms control and nonproliferation objective in the New START treaty. 
The negotiators of this treaty did not make this issue a priority, and 
they gave in to pressure from Russia to exclude the mention of tactical 
nuclear weapons.
  I want to point out that while the administration failed to negotiate 
the reduction of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in the New START 
treaty, it did allow a legally binding limitation of U.S. missile 
defense, and that is, I believe, a mistake.
  So I disagree with those who argue that ratifying the New START 
treaty is needed in order to deal with tactical nuclear weapons in the 
future. I believe the issue of tactical nuclear weapons should have 
been addressed--together with the reduction of strategic nuclear 
weapons--in the New START treaty. The administration lost a real 
opportunity by not negotiating a deal in this treaty. It is unclear 
what leverage will remain for us to negotiate a reduction in Russian 
tactical nuclear weapons.
  Mr. President, the Risch amendment tries to resolve the complete 
failure of the administration to address Russia's advantage in tactical 
nuclear weapons in the New START treaty. The Risch amendment 
acknowledges the interrelationship between tactical nuclear weapons and 
strategic-range weapons, which grows as strategic warheads are reduced. 
The Risch amendment seeks greater transparency.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has consumed 4 minutes.
  Mr. BARRASSO. I thank the Chair.
  The Risch amendment seeks greater transparency, greater 
accountability of tactical nuclear weapons, and the Risch amendment 
recognizes that tactical nuclear weapons can undermine stability.
  So with that, Mr. President, I support this amendment, and I urge my 
colleagues to adopt the amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, I understand we have 4\1/2\ minutes 
remaining, plus my 10 minutes at the very end.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, Senator Corker has indicated he would like 
to take those 4\1/2\ minutes, so I yield the floor to Senator Corker.
  Mr. CORKER. I thank the Senator, and I appreciate the Chair's 
courtesy.
  I think Senator Kerry was down here earlier today talking a little 
about procedures, and I want to follow up on that. I know we have a 
number of people back in the cloakroom wondering about how we go 
forward with the amendment process. So I just thought I could enter 
into a conversation with him through the Chair.
  Unlike most procedures, this is a situation where you have a 60-vote 
cloture and your ability or your strength on the issue itself rises 
because it actually takes 67 votes, or two-thirds, of those voting to 
actually ratify a treaty. So it is not like on a cloture vote on the 
floor where you go from a 60-vote threshold to 51, where you are 
weakened. In this case, you are actually strengthened because it takes 
more votes after cloture to actually pass this piece of legislation.
  So I just wanted to, if I could, verify with Senator Kerry the 
process of actually offering amendments, not just on the treaty--
because I know we are still on the treaty--but also on the resolution 
of ratification, where I think numbers of amendments might actually be 
approved and accepted.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the Senator is absolutely correct. The key 
question is, Is there sufficient support to ratify the treaty? Once we 
get to that sort of question postcloture, when and if that is invoked, 
that is what the threshold would be for the passage of this treaty. It 
is not as if you have cloture and all of a sudden, boom, only 51 votes 
are necessary to pass it.
  Secondly, I would say to my colleague--and I want to emphasize this--
if the majority leader were to put the cloture motion in this evening, 
it doesn't ripen until Tuesday. So we would have the rest of today, all 
of tomorrow, and Tuesday to have amendments; to continue as we are now. 
Then, if it did pass, we would have another 30 hours, which, as we all 
know, takes the better part of 2 days. So we are looking at Thursday 
under that kind of schedule, and I know a lot of Senators are hoping 
not to be here on Thursday.
  So I think that is quite a lot of time within the context of this. 
But the Senator is correct. The answer to his question is yes.
  Mr. CORKER. If I could ask one other question. If a Senator comes to 
the floor and wants to offer an amendment, not on the treaty itself--
which we realize is more difficult to pass because of what that means 
as relates to negotiations with Russia--but to offer an amendment on 
the resolution of ratification, which is something that might likely be 
successful and accepted, it is my understanding all they have to do is 
come down and offer that amendment, to ask unanimous consent to call it 
up; is that correct?
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, without the help of the Parliamentarian, 
obviously we are entitled to do a lot by unanimous consent, and that is 
one of those things. We will not object, obviously. We want to try to 
help our colleagues be able to put those amendments in, so it would be 
without objection on our side.
  Mr. CORKER. So it is my understanding--to be able to talk with other 
Senators who have an interest on the treaty itself and would like to do 
some things to strengthen it, it is my understanding that what I just 
heard was that the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee would be 
more than willing to accommodate a unanimous consent request to 
actually offer amendments to the resolution itself, and he knows of no 
one on their side, at present, who would object to that. So if people 
wanted to go back and forth between the actual treaty and the 
resolution itself, they now can do that on the floor?
  Mr. KERRY. That is correct.
  Mr. CORKER. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Tennessee.
  I will yield 5 minutes to the distinguished chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, Senator Levin, to be followed by 7 minutes to the 
Senator from Oregon.

[[Page 23016]]

  I ask the Senator from Oregon, is that enough time? Is 7 minutes 
enough time?
  Thank you.
  I reserve the remainder of our time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the Risch amendment states a concern which 
is a legitimate concern. I think probably everybody would agree to 
that. This concern was there in the START I treaty and it was there in 
the Moscow Treaty just a few years ago, that we need to address the 
imbalance or the--the imbalance, I guess, is a good word--between the 
number of strategic nuclear weapons that exist on both sides and the 
nonstrategic weapons. But that was true during START I in 1991 when 
President Bush negotiated it. There was no effort to, in effect, kill 
the treaty with an amendment stating that concern, although it was a 
concern then. During the Moscow Treaty debate here in 2002, I believe 
Senator Biden again raised the same concern about this imbalance. It is 
a legitimate concern. But you don't kill a treaty because there are 
some legitimate concerns about issues.
  The Russians have a concern about our large number of warehoused 
warheads. We have a big inventory of warheads compared to them. They 
have a concern. We could state that as a fact, that the Russians have a 
concern about the number of warheads we have. But putting that into the 
treaty kills the treaty.
  We could make any statement of legitimate concern. If it is in the 
treaty text, it will kill the treaty.
  Senator Biden, in 2002, I believe, or it may have even been in the 
first START treaty, raised this issue about the imbalance. It was a 
legitimate issue. But there was no effort to kill that treaty which had 
been negotiated by President Bush by inserting a legitimate concern 
into the treaty.
  There are a number of legitimate concerns. The Russians have 
legitimate concerns about our conventional capabilities, about 
accuracy, about our encryption capabilities. They were not addressed 
adequately for the Russians in this treaty. But they have a concern. 
Should we state in the treaty the fact of legitimate concern? Should we 
by amendment attempt to insert in the treaty that the factual statement 
of a legitimate concern just kills the treaty?
  That is what concerns me as to why it is that there is such a 
determination to try to kill this treaty by means of an amendment which 
states a legitimate concern, which was true during the last two 
treaties negotiated by two President Bushes. That is what troubles me. 
That was the difference Senator Corker pointed out between seeking to 
amend a resolution and seeking to amend the treaty.
  To Senator Risch, through the Chair, I happen to share the same 
concern the Senator has about this imbalance. As chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, this imbalance existed in 2002, it existed in 1991, 
and we ought to address it, but we don't address it by killing this 
treaty, and that is what this amendment does.
  Despite the absence of this language expressing a legitimate concern, 
we have support for this treaty by former President George H.W. Bush 
and Secretaries Brown, Carlucci, Cohen, Perry, and Schlesinger. They 
support this treaty without this language. It was true that former 
Secretary Schlesinger said, for instance, that he has a concern about 
this imbalance. I think we all do. He stated that concern. He still 
supports the treaty without this language, without this expression of 
concern.
  Former Secretaries of the State Albright, Baker, Christopher, 
Eagleburger, Kissinger, Powell, Rice, and Shulz support the treaty 
without this language. They have the same concerns. As a matter of 
fact, I believe it was Senator Sessions--it may have been someone 
else--who said that former Secretary Kissinger has expressed this 
concern, in fact quoted, I believe, from former Secretary Kissinger's 
writing on this issue. He has that same concern which Senator Risch and 
all of us have about this imbalance. But without the language, former 
Secretary Kissinger still supports this treaty.
  All I can say is that I think there is a legitimate concern which is 
expressed in this amendment. It is a concern which has existed and 
needs to be addressed, as former Senator Biden said when he was 
debating a treaty--but not to kill a treaty by an expression of a 
legitimate concern.
  That is what I think is the issue here--not whether the language in 
the Risch amendment expresses something which is legitimate but whether 
the absence of that concern being expressed in the treaty should be 
enough to vote for this amendment and to kill this treaty as a result 
and to force it back to an open-ended negotiation, which we have no 
idea where that would lead.
  I hope we defeat the Risch amendment not because we disagree with 
what the concern is but because, understanding that concern, we do not 
want to do damage to the treaty and kill a treaty which does so much 
for the security of this Nation.
  I yield the floor, and if I have any time, I yield the remainder of 
my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. MERKLEY. Mr. President, I would like to add a few comments to 
those of the Senator from Michigan.
  First, I would like to observe that this treaty encompasses fairly 
modest reductions in our strategic force. We are looking at ICBMs 
reduced from 450 to 420 and in some cases those ICBMs being reduced in 
terms of the number of warheads they are carrying--modest reductions.
  When we look at some relaunch ballistic missiles, we are looking at a 
fleet of 14 Trident submarines, and we are looking at keeping all 14 of 
those, reducing the number of silos on each submarine from about 24 to 
20--again, a modest reduction. Indeed, two of those subs will be in 
drydock at any one point in time, and they do not count against the 
numbers in this treaty.
  In bombers, we are looking at 18 Stealth missiles currently--Stealth 
bombers, and keeping all 18--or B-2s, as they are known. We look at 
modest reductions in our aging, ancient, antique fleet of B-52s, modest 
reductions there.
  In its entirety, what this represents is modest changes to the 
existing structure negotiated by a Republican administration and 
maintenance of verification regimes incredibly important to our 
national security. In that context, we have to look at various 
amendments being raised that, if they were sincere about their purpose, 
would be added to the resolution we are passing. But if their real 
purpose is to kill the treaty, then of course it comes in the form of 
an amendment to the treaty, which would effectively, in fact, do that.
  So let's look at the structure of the issues that were put forward 
here.
  First, the goal of this START treaty is to address strategic, not 
short-range tactical nuclear weapons which have never been covered by a 
treaty, including those negotiated by a Republican administration.
  Second, tactical weapons are categorically different from strategic 
arms because they do not pose an immediate catastrophic threat to the 
U.S. homeland that strategic weapons do. With shorter range and smaller 
yield, they are intended for battlefield use.
  I would note the quotation of General Chilton, commander of the U.S. 
Strategic Command, who said:

       The most proximate threat to the U.S. are the ICBM and SLBM 
     weapons because they can and are able to target the U.S. 
     homeland and deliver a devastating effect to this country.

  So we are appropriately focused in those areas in the particular 
treaty for strategic reasons. Tactical weapons do not have the 
proximate threat that ICBMs and SLBMs do.
  I also note that if you look at this from the Russian perspective, we 
have tactical weapons deployed in Europe. Numerous European nations 
have tactical weapons which can reach the Soviet--reach the Russian 
Federation, formerly the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, because of our 
superiority at sea, the Russian tactical weapons do not represent the 
same kind of threat to the United States.

[[Page 23017]]

  I then note that we have already addressed this issue in the Senate 
ratification resolution, which states that ``the President should 
pursue, following consultation with allies, an agreement with the 
Russian Federation that would address the disparity between the 
tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the 
United States and would secure and reduce the tactical nuclear weapons 
in a verifiable manner.'' So it is already in the resolution of 
ratification.
  Then I would note that Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton said in 
a letter:

       We agree with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's call 
     in the resolution of Advice and Consent to ratification of 
     the New START treaty to pursue an agreement with the Russians 
     to address them.

  Tactical weapons represents a thorny issue because it involves the 
European powers and it involves disparities of geography. That it is 
why it has been so hard to link them in the past to a strategic nuclear 
treaty and why they have not done so in this case. But it is the 
commitment by the Secretary of Defense, by the Secretary of State, by 
the President, and by this Senate through this resolution of 
ratification to pursue this issue that is important, and that is what 
is before us now.
  In terms of addressing this issue, there are changes that need to be 
made to the language, to the ratification resolution. That would be 
appropriate. But this treaty, which greatly enhances the security of 
the United States of America while providing the appropriate 
verification protocols, is absolutely essential.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, how much time do we still have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 16 minutes remaining.
  Mr. KERRY. Sixteen? And the Senator from Idaho has--
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ten minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. Ten. So somehow we are going past the hour of 3.
  MR. RISCH. Unless, of course, you want to yield.
  Mr. KERRY. Do you want to yield some time back?
  Mr. RISCH. No.
  Mr. KERRY. Let me use a portion of it, and I will reserve a little 
bit at the end.
  First of all, both Bill Perry, former Defense Secretary Bill Perry, 
and Jim Schlesinger have been mentioned, as well as the Commission on 
which they served. Let me make certain that the record is clear about 
their position with respect to this treaty.
  Secretary Perry said the following:

       The focus of this treaty is on deployed warheads and it 
     does not attempt to counter or control nondeployed warheads. 
     This continues in the tradition of prior arms control 
     treaties. I would hope to see nondeployed and tactical 
     systems included in future negotiations, but the absence of 
     these systems should not detract from the merits of this 
     treaty and the further advance in arms control which it 
     represents.

  Jim Schlesinger, from the same Commission, said:

       The ratification of this treaty is obligatory. I wish more 
     of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle were here to 
     hear Jim Schlesinger's comments, but he said ratification is 
     obligatory and the reason it is obligatory is that you really 
     can't get to the discussion you want to have with the 
     Russians about tactical unless you show the good faith to 
     have the strategic and verification reduction structure in 
     place.

  Let me just say, supposing the language of the Senator from Idaho was 
adopted here, would it mean we are reducing tactical nuclear weapons? 
No. Would it get you any further down the road to be able to reduce 
them? The answer is, not only would it not do that, it would set back 
the effort to try to get those reductions because the Russians will not 
engage in that discussion if you can't ratify the treaty, and if they 
pass this amendment, this treaty, as Senator Levin said, is dead.
  It goes back to the Russian Government with a provision that is now 
linking those weapons in a way that they have not been willing to talk 
about, even engage in the discussion at this point in time.
  In fact, we would be setting ourselves backwards if that amendment 
were to be put into effect. What is ironic about it is, he is amending 
a component of the treaty that has no legal, binding impact whatsoever. 
So not only would they refuse to negotiate, but there is nothing 
legally binding in the language he would pass that would force them to 
negotiate. So it is a double setback, if you will. I would simply say 
to my friend on the other side--I talked to him privately about this, 
and I think he is openminded on it--we have language in the resolution 
right now with respect to nuclear weapons. We are not ignoring the 
issue. The language says: The Senate calls on the President following 
consultation with allies to get an agreement with the Russian 
Federation on tactical nuclear weapons.
  I am prepared in the resolution of ratification to entertain language 
as a declaration that would also make the Senate's statement clear 
about how we see those nuclear weapons in terms of their threat. I hope 
that would address the concerns of many of our colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle.
  But the bottom line here is that Senator Risch's language not only 
does not make any progress on the topic he is concerned about, it 
actually sets back the capacity to be able to make the progress he 
wants to make.
  If you want to limit Russia's tactical nuclear weapons, and I do, and 
he does, and I think all 100 Senators do, then you have to pass the New 
START. You have got to approve the New START. If you reject it, you are 
forcing a renegotiation, which never gets you not only to the tactical 
nuclear weapons but which leaves you completely questionable as to 
where you are going to go on the strategic nuclear weapons, which means 
the world is less safe; we have lost our leverage significantly with 
respect to Iran, North Korea; we have certainly muddied the 
relationship significantly with respect to Russia; we have ``unpushed'' 
the restart button; and we have opened who knows what kind of can of 
worms with respect to a whole lot of cooperative efforts that are 
important to us now, not the least of which, I might add, is the war in 
Afghanistan, where Russia is currently cooperating with us in providing 
a secondary supply route and assisting us in other ways with respect to 
Iran.
  So I say, let's not do something that we know unravels all of these 
particular components. Anytime you change that resolution of 
ratification, it is like pulling, you know, a piece of string on a 
sweater or on a yarn roll and everything starts to unravel as a 
consequence. One piece undoes another piece undoes another piece. That 
is not where we want to go.
  I hope, obviously, we will say no to this amendment and proceed. I 
reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, under the UC, I believe I have the last 10 
minutes. Am I correct on that? I think that was the UC.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair believes that is correct.
  Mr. RISCH. So when I finish, at the conclusion of the 10 minutes, we 
will vote? Is that my understanding?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair believes that is correct. 
Correction. The Senator from Massachusetts still has 10 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. RISCH. My understanding is he can use that at any time and I get 
the last 10.
  Mr. KERRY. Unless the Senator says something completely outrageous, 
which he has managed not to do in the course of the last 3 hours, I 
have no intention of using the time. But I reserve it to preserve my 
rights. I would be happy to yield it back after the Senator speaks, 
depending on him.
  Mr. RISCH. I thank the Senator. I will try not to disappoint in that 
regard.
  Mr. President, fellow Senators, distinguished chairman and ranking 
member, I think certainly we have had a civil and a good airing of an 
issue that is of considerable concern to, I think, every Member of this 
body. I am a little disappointed in that we started out acknowledging 
it was a very deep and serious concern to every Member of this body, as 
it was to the commission, in their Report on America's Strategic 
Posture.

[[Page 23018]]

  I felt that along the line a little bit the concern was denigrated. I 
want to back up on that one more time and say that, in my judgment, and 
in the judgment of members of this commission, the issue of tactical 
weapons exceeds, in severity, in concern, the issue of strategic 
weapons.
  I understand one might argue that you are arguing about how many 
angels can dance on the head of a pin as opposed to which is of the 
most concern. But I come back to the reasons I gave as to why I think 
the tactical issue is important more than the strategic issue. That is, 
on the strategic issue, we are in about the same position we were 40 
years ago, with the exception, and admittedly an important exception, 
that the raw numbers are down. When we started this 40 years ago, each 
party had about 6,000 warheads. As I said, if either party pulled the 
trigger and launched 6,000 or some significant part of that, obviously 
that is the deterrence that each party was counting on that neither 
would do that.
  Today we are down to--and with all due respect to my good friend from 
Massachusetts, the numbers reported in the press are 1,100 and 2,100. I 
understand there is intelligence information that we cannot go into 
here. But, in any event, I think most people would agree that we have 
the advantage in numbers from a strategic standpoint.
  Indeed, if the numbers are even close to that, the--whether it is 
6,000 warheads or 1,000 warheads, when someone pulls the trigger, the 
party is over for this world. So focusing on the raw numbers, when we 
have got a 40-year history that we are not going to do that and they 
are not going to do that, and most people agree that neither side is 
inclined to pull the trigger, what are the real concerns?
  The real concerns are an accidental launch from them, although 
remote, possible, but, more importantly, an intentional launch by a 
rogue nation. Obviously one would look at North Korea or one would look 
at Iran in that regard.
  In my judgment, the two issues that need to be focused on are the 
defensive missile issue and the tactical nuclear weapons issue.
  Let me say I agree with my good friend from Massachusetts and Senator 
Levin, that geography is such that the issue of tactical weapons is 
substantially more important on a direct basis to the Russians than it 
is to us. After all, we are insulated by oceans on each side of us to 
the east and the west, which the Russians do not enjoy, and they have a 
several hundred-year history of seeing invasions come by land and 
intermediately, which we do not have.
  So in that regard I will concede certainly that the tactical issue is 
important for them. And the good Senator from Massachusetts makes a 
good point in that I think they would like to relocate, if they could, 
their tactical weapons to be focused more on the Chinese threat and 
perhaps more on the threat from the south, from other countries. We 
ought to help them out in that regard by entering into negotiations in 
that regard on the tactical weapons.
  But I come back to the tactical weapons are an important issue. 
Senator Levin says they are a concern. Senator Levin says, we should 
not kill this treaty simply because of a concern, and I agree with 
Senator Levin. I have not, from day one, said we ought to kill this 
treaty. I have said from day one, everyone has convinced me, and I 
think virtually everyone else, that we are much better off with a 
treaty than we are without a treaty.
  I think everyone has worked in good faith in that regard. But, on the 
other hand, having said that, I do not think we should then throw in 
the towel and say: Well, okay, we will agree to any treaty. That brings 
me to the point of where we are. We are exercising our constitutional 
right that every one of us--not only our right but our duty as a 
Senator, to advise and consent on this treaty and any other treaty that 
is put in front of us, and that is where I have problems.
  The position we have been put in is these negotiations have gone on, 
the treaty has been negotiated, it has been signed by the President, 
and it has been put in front of us, and what we are told is, it is a 
take it or leave it. If you do not vote for this, you are voting to 
kill the treaty.
  I disagree with that. I think simply because we amend the preamble to 
this treaty is not a killer. Indeed, my good friend from Massachusetts 
keeps telling us, the preamble does not mean anything, it is a throw-
away, the language is a throw-away, it does not mean anything.
  Well, it does mean something, particularly when it comes to the 
context in which you interpret and you react to the treaty. So to 
everyone here, I say, you have the opportunity to set the restart 
button with Russia, and we can do it by focusing on what is an 
extremely important issue, which most everyone here agrees is an 
extremely important issue, but nobody ever does anything about it.
  So let's tell the negotiators: Go back to the table and at least 
agree that the interrelationship between the strategic and tactical 
weapons is an important issue, and we are not going to go on as we have 
over the last 40 years. The times have changed. We trust you are not 
going to pull the trigger on us, and you trust that we are not going to 
pull the trigger on you. But this issue of tactical weapons where we 
enjoy, if you would, a 10-to-1 disadvantage to the Russians, we have 
tactical weapons that are out there that can be much more easily gotten 
ahold of by terrorists than strategic weapons. We have tactical weapons 
that continue to be designed, continue to be manufactured, and continue 
to be deployed by the other side, in violation of their admittedly 
individual Presidential initiatives, which needs to be addressed.
  It is so important that people on this commission said that it should 
be addressed before strategic weapons. You have the opportunity to put 
that in here. There is no intent to kill this. It is an intent to make 
it better. We have the right. We have the duty. We must advise and 
consent. I urge that my colleagues vote in favor of this very good 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Has the time expired?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho has slightly less than 
a minute left.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me say, as I yield back----
  Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, is the next vote going to be on this 
amendment or are the judges going to be voted on first?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. The next vote is on the Risch 
amendment.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I will yield back the time momentarily. I 
want to say one thing. The commission report that the Senator refers to 
and has held up, the two principal authors are former Secretary of 
Defense, Bill Perry, who says: The absence of the tactical nuclear 
should not detract from the merits of this treaty, and he is in favor 
of our ratifying this treaty, and Jim Schlesinger, who was his 
coauthor, who worked with Republican Presidents as a Secretary of 
Defense, Secretary of Energy, said, ``The ratification of this treaty 
is obligatory.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, I say to Senator Kerry, I respect that. I 
would remind everyone that I filed a letter dated December 17 to 
Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar from six members of the commission, 
including James Schlesinger, which says that:

       Dealing with this imbalance is urgent--

  Referring to the tactical weapons--

       Dealing with this imbalance is urgent, and, indeed, some 
     Commissioners would give priority to this over taking further 
     steps to reduce the number of operationally deployed 
     strategic nuclear weapons.

  I agree. I thank the good chairman and ranking member for a very good 
dialogue on this particular issue.
  I yield back my time.
  I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 4839.

[[Page 23019]]

  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from New Hampshire (Mrs. 
Shaheen), the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Specter), and the Senator 
from Oregon (Mr. Wyden) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Kentucky (Mr. Bunning), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. 
DeMint), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Isakson), the Senator from 
Illinois (Mr. Kirk), and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Voinovich).
  Further, if present and voting, the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. 
DeMint) would have voted ``yea'' and the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. 
Bunning) would have voted ``yea.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 32, nays 60, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 283 Ex.]

                                YEAS--32

     Barrasso
     Bond
     Brown (MA)
     Brownback
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Crapo
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Johanns
     Kyl
     LeMieux
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Risch
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Snowe
     Thune
     Vitter
     Wicker

                                NAYS--60

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Begich
     Bennet
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown (OH)
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Conrad
     Coons
     Corker
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gillibrand
     Gregg
     Hagan
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     Manchin
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Nelson (FL)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse

                             NOT VOTING--8

     Bunning
     DeMint
     Isakson
     Kirk
     Shaheen
     Specter
     Voinovich
     Wyden
  The amendment was rejected.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.


                           Order Of Business

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, we are going to have one more vote today on 
a circuit judge. It is my understanding the district judge will go by 
voice.
  Mr. President, tomorrow, we are going--first of all, tonight, anyone 
who wants to work on the START treaty, the managers of the bill, 
Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar, have said they are here as long as 
people want to work on it. We are going to come in at 10 in the 
morning. We will work from 10 until 2 on the START treaty, and then a 
number of Senators want to have a closed session. We will do that in 
the Old Senate Chamber. The Chamber has already been cleared by the 
security folks, so we will start that at 2 o'clock and go as long as 
necessary. Then we will come back tomorrow evening and continue working 
on the START treaty.
  We have very few things left to do. The Republican leader and I and 
our staffs have worked throughout the morning trying to come up with 
something on the CR. We are very close to being able to get that done, 
but it is not done. So we have the CR to do. The short-term runs out on 
Tuesday, so we have to have things done by then. We have this START 
treaty, and then, of course, we have the 9/11 health bill and the 
motion to reconsider. Senator Levin has been working on some other 
things, namely defense, on an agreement to get it done.

                          ____________________