[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 15]
[Senate]
[Pages 22339-22349]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




TREATY WITH RUSSIA ON MEASURES FOR FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF 
                  STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS--Continued

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.


                              The Omnibus

  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President, I want to speak for a few minutes 
about the START treaty. Before I do, there is another issue that has 
been debated on this floor that we are going to continue debating over 
the next several days, and that is the issue of the funding of the 
Federal Government. There is an omnibus bill that has been laid out 
there now, which is something that happens from time to time that is 
simply not the way business ought to be done in this body.
  As we move into the debate on the omnibus bill, there are a lot of us 
who want to see, obviously, the government remaining open and running 
at full speed. All of us within this body want to make sure as we do 
that, we do it the right way.
  Frankly, to run in an omnibus bill at the last minute out here that 
has thousands of earmarks--some of which folks like me requested months 
and months ago, and until 2 or 3 days ago had no idea those requests 
would be honored and are now included in there, amounting to billions 
of dollars. With the issues we have now, including the election that 
took place on November 2 where the American people spoke loudly and 
clearly about the way Washington spends money, this is not the way to 
do business.
  I intend to vote against the omnibus bill. I will speak more about 
that at a later date.


                          The New START Treaty

  I want to speak for a minute on the START treaty, and I want to start 
off by commending both Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar who, as the 
chairman and ranking member on the Foreign Relations Committee, have 
worked long and hard on this particular measure.
  This treaty was signed by the President after negotiations were 
completed back in the spring. By the time we got the text, and then the 
additions to the text, I would say it was probably into April or May, 
whenever it was.
  Since that time, I know both Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar have 
worked very hard. They have been open for discussion. I have had 
several discussions with Senator Lugar about it and have explained my 
problems with it early on to him. He has been very receptive. I 
received another letter from him today further explaining some of the 
issues that are out there.
  But that is an indication of how complex this issue is. As a member 
of the Armed Services Committee and the Intelligence Committee, I have 
had the opportunity to have any number of briefings. I have been in 
hearing after hearing. I have been in meeting after meeting with 
members of the administration as well as outside experts who believe 
this is right, and those who believe it is wrong. I have been involved 
in phone calls. I have traveled abroad to visit with our friends in 
both France and Great Britain to learn about what they are doing with 
respect to their nuclear inventory.
  It is not like folks like me who have to make a decision whether to 
support this have not been working on it and trying to understand the 
complexities of this treaty. Gosh, those Members of the Senate who do 
not serve on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, or Intelligence do not 
have the benefit of the extensive briefings those who serve on those 
committees have had, and they have been trying to understand the 
operatives that are involved in this treaty also.
  My concerns were laid out to Senator Lugar early on in a letter. I 
have been very clear in conversations and hearings, including in an 
extensive conversation that I had with my longtime good friend, Senator 
Sam Nunn, who, along with Senator Lugar, in my mind are the two 
godfathers of the Russia-United States nuclear issue.
  The issues that are out there are in the process of being dealt with 
and resolved--but we are not there, in my mind. I cannot speak for the 
other 59 folks here, but I can tell you this: There are five major 
issues I have been concerned with from day one.
  First is missile defense and what impact this treaty is going to have 
on missile defense. I will be honest, I expressed concern about it, 
including in a hearing in the Armed Services Committee with Secretary 
Gates, who is an individual for whom I have such great admiration and 
respect--we can have a difference of opinion on policy from time to 
time, but I know where Secretary Gates stands when it comes to the 
national security interests of the United States.
  In response to a question I asked him in an Armed Services hearing, 
he satisfied me with respect to the missile defense issue. Then, like 
happens with so many other issues when there is a complex treaty like 
this, we have comments that were made in Portugal in recent weeks about 
phase 4 of our missile defense plan that all of a sudden raises another 
issue, or at least a potential issue, that has to be addressed and has 
to be resolved, in my mind, before I can vote for a treaty I want to 
support. I continue to work through that particular issue.
  The second issue is the issue of modernization of the weapons in the 
United States. We can look ourselves in the eye, Members of this body 
and Members of the House, and take part of the blame. We have not 
funded a modernization program for the updating of nuclear weapons of 
the United States. Now we have called on the administration to make a 
commitment, and that commitment is going to have to be a financial 
commitment as well as a policy commitment. To the credit of the 
administration, they have worked in a very diligent way--I know with 
the prodding of Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar--to address this issue 
both from a budgetary standpoint as well as a policy standpoint. Again, 
it is not just this administration that has to be

[[Page 22340]]

involved. It is future administrations as well as future Congresses 
that are going to have to address that issue.
  As we decide whether to vote for or against this treaty, we have to 
satisfy ourselves that future Congresses, future administrations are 
going to do that. How do we resolve that? I do not yet know. But it is 
another issue that we have to go through in our minds and satisfy 
ourselves on the issue of modernization before we can vote for it.
  Third is an issue of verification. This is probably the major issue, 
at least in my mind. The Senator from Illinois just spoke about the 
fact that we have gone for a year or so now without having the 
opportunity, under the treaty that expired in 2009, to look at what the 
Russians are doing and likewise to give the Russians the opportunity to 
look at what we are doing.
  It is important when there is a complex issue like this, and an issue 
where you have to trust the other side to do certain things, that you 
have the opportunity to verify after you enter into that trusting 
relationship with them.
  The verification process that is set forth in this New START treaty 
is frankly significantly different from the verification process that 
was in the treaty that just expired. There are reasons it needed to be 
different, and I understand that. But there still is an issue relative 
to: Do we have the right kind of verification measures in place in this 
treaty to be able to satisfy our community, both the defense community 
and the intelligence community, that this treaty gives us everything we 
need to have to be sure that the Russians are doing what they are 
supposed to do?
  In that vein, one way we are going about the issue of making sure the 
verification requirements that are set forth in here are adequate is to 
look at the National Intelligence Estimate that was put out 2 months 
ago, 6 weeks ago--whenever it was. When it did come out, I sat down and 
read through it. It is a rather detailed document that sets forth each 
of the issues in the minds of the intelligence community. And those 
concerns are dealt with in an appropriate way. There are still some 
questions in my mind with the classified portion of this treaty that I 
have to be satisfied with.
  I started going through the NIE again, and over the weekend, when it 
looks like we are going to have plenty of hours to sit down with not 
much going on, I am going to do that. Hopefully, I am going to satisfy 
myself on the classified portions.
  Last, what is not in this treaty is just as much of concern to me as 
what is in the treaty; that is, a total lack of addressing the issue of 
tactical weapons. I understand, because I have asked the question to 
the State Department, to the intelligence community, the Defense 
Department--about this issue of tactical weapons. Their rationale is, 
look, we cannot deal with tactical weapons until we get this treaty 
agreed to and signed and deal with the strategic side. Then we can deal 
with the tactical side.
  I don't buy that. I think there was an opportunity that was missed. 
We are dealing with a country that has fewer strategic weapons than we 
have. They are going to be huge beneficiaries under this bill from the 
standpoint of the sheer numbers. On the other hand, they have hundreds 
and hundreds, perhaps even thousands--we really don't know--more 
tactical weapons than what we have. It is the tactical weapons that 
bother me just as much as the strategic weapons because the tactical 
weapon can be put in a suitcase and delivered to a location that could 
destroy something domestically, or U.S. assets somewhere else around 
the world, or people.
  The lack of addressing the tactical weapons issue is a problem. Is it 
enough to say we should not do this? Maybe not. But there are those of 
us who are wrestling with the issue and trying to do it in the right 
way. I will have to say that in concluding my eighth year here, I have 
never had to vote in favor of a treaty that was this complex, this 
important, and had this much influence on what is going to happen with 
respect to the safety and security of our country for my children and 
grandchildren.
  I commend Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar and their staffs for a 
tremendous amount of work and their openness. We have never asked a 
question they have not attempted to respond to. I am hopeful, over the 
next couple days, a week, however long we are going to be here, if we 
conclude it or if we conclude it next year, that we will be able to 
ultimately come together as a body and address this issue in a right 
and positive way.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Durbin). The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mrs. SHAHEEN. Mr. President, I am here to join my colleagues who 
believe that now is the time to ratify the New START treaty. The New 
START treaty is a continuation of a long history of bipartisan arms 
control cooperation and it is the culmination of President Ronald 
Reagan's consistent appeal, as mentioned in previous remarks, to trust, 
but verify when we are dealing with Russia. At a time when much of 
America is fed up with this body's inability to work in a bipartisan 
fashion, I hope we can still work across the aisle to strengthen 
America's national security and deal with the threat that is posed by 
nuclear weapons. I certainly applaud the leadership of Senator Kerry 
and Senator Lugar and the work they have done on this issue heading the 
Foreign Relations Committee.
  Much like previous arms control treaties, including the old START 
treaty signed by President George H.W. Bush and the SORT treaty signed 
by President George W. Bush, the New START treaty is squarely in the 
national security interests of the United States. The New START treaty 
will reduce the limit of strategic nuclear arms aimed at the United 
States. The United States and Russia will be bound to a lower number of 
nuclear weapons, which will be 30 percent fewer than the current limits 
under the SORT treaty. The treaty's new rules allow us to count 
Russia's nuclear weapons more accurately. That is a critical piece as 
we listened to the concerns of Senator Chambliss about whether we can 
verify what is going on. These new counting rules give us the ability 
to more accurately figure out what is happening with Russia's nuclear 
arsenal.
  In addition, New START leaves us the flexibility to determine our own 
force structure and maintain a robust deterrent capable of protecting 
us and our allies.
  Despite all the concerns raised, this treaty does nothing--let me 
repeat that, this treaty does nothing--to constrain our missile defense 
plans. Further, it allows for the modernization of our nuclear weapons 
complex. We have already heard from the three directors of our nuclear 
labs that they are happy with the commitment this administration has 
provided to modernization of our nuclear arsenal. The treaty restores a 
critical verification regime that was lost when the old START treaty 
expired. We have gone over a year without important intelligence from 
these on-the-ground inspections. This gap hinders our insight into 
Russia's program.
  Much like previous agreements, this treaty deserves broad bipartisan 
backing in the Senate. Past treaties have benefited from overwhelming 
support in this body. The original START treaty was ratified by a vote 
of 93 to 6. We can see that on this chart. START II was ratified 87 to 
4. The SORT treaty, negotiated by George W. Bush, was ratified by a 
vote of 95 to 0. That is incredible--no opposition to that treaty. New 
START has earned the backing of an overwhelming number of foreign 
policy experts and national security officials across a broad political 
spectrum, both Republican and Democratic. New START has the unanimous 
backing of our Nation's military and its leadership, including 
Secretary Gates, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the commander of 
America's Strategic Command, and the Director of the Missile Defense 
Agency. America's military establishment is joined by the support of 
every living Secretary of State from Secretary Jim Baker to Secretary 
Condoleezza Rice, as well as five former Secretaries of Defense, nine 
former National Security

[[Page 22341]]

Advisers, and former Presidents Clinton and George H.W. Bush. I know 
people cannot read this because the writing is so small, but this is 
the column of former Presidents and Cabinet-rank officials who support 
New START. Look how long the list is. This is the list of those 
Cabinet-rank officials who oppose it.
  America's intelligence community also strongly supports the New START 
treaty. It has now been 376 days since we last had inspection teams on 
the ground in Russia monitoring its nuclear program. Every day we go 
without this critical intelligence is another day that erodes our 
understanding of Russia's intentions, plans, and capabilities. New 
START gives us on-the-ground intelligence we currently do not have and 
also, for the first time, includes a new unique identifier system which 
allows us to better track Russia's missiles and delivery systems.
  I heard the Senator from Georgia expressing a question about whether 
this gives us the ability we need to verify what Russia is doing. New 
START gives us more inspections per facility per year than the old 
START treaty did. Without this critical information, our intelligence 
community is hindered from an accurate assessment and our military is 
forced to engage in costly worst-case-scenario planning.
  Our NATO allies also support New START. As chair of the subcommittee 
responsible for NATO, I am mindful of the defense and security of our 
NATO alliance members living in Eastern Europe. I was pleased that at 
the recent NATO Lisbon summit, all 28 NATO allies gave their strong 
unanimous support for ratification of the New START treaty. In fact, 
some of the treaty's strongest backers are those countries that are our 
allies along Russia's borders. The NATO Secretary General said: ``A 
delay in the ratification of the START treaty would be damaging to 
security in Europe.''
  Finally, ratification of this treaty should be important to those who 
are concerned with the nuclear threats posed by Iran and North Korea or 
who are worried about the threat that is posed by terrorists around the 
world who are seeking a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials.
  I know some critics look at the New START treaty in isolation and say 
this arms agreement has nothing to do with these proliferation threats. 
I couldn't disagree more. What does it say to our allies and partners 
around the globe if we turn our back on a long history of bipartisan 
support for working with Russia to reduce the nuclear threat? Delaying 
ratification of a treaty with so much bipartisan support from our 
military and the national security and foreign policy establishments, a 
treaty that is so obviously in our national interest, tells the world 
we are not serious about the nuclear threat. It says we are not serious 
about our responsibilities under the nonproliferation treaty. I know my 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle agree we should do everything in 
our power to make sure Iran and North Korea and al-Qaida do not have 
nuclear weapons. If we abdicate our position as a leader on nuclear 
arms control, we risk losing the authority to build international 
consensus and stopping rogue nations and ending nuclear proliferation 
around the globe.
  Earlier this year, Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser 
under President George H.W. Bush, testified to the Foreign Relations 
Committee that ``the principal result of non-ratification would be to 
throw the whole nuclear negotiating situation into a state of chaos.'' 
It is much too dangerous to gamble with nuclear weapons or our national 
security at a time when we are working with our international partners 
to press Iran and North Korea on their nuclear weapons programs.
  In testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, former Defense 
Secretary James Schlesinger said that a failure to ratify this treaty 
would ``have a detrimental effect on our ability to influence others 
with regard to, particularly, the nonproliferation issue.''
  That sentiment was echoed by five former Republican Secretaries of 
State in an op-ed written for the Washington Post a couple weeks ago.
  One of the arguments we have heard this afternoon is that we are 
rushing consideration of this treaty. This is not true.
  This chart is an outline that shows how much time has been spent in 
the past as treaties have come to the floor. The fact is, the Senate 
has thoroughly considered the New START agreement. We have had plenty 
of time to review the treaty. Since it was signed in April, the treaty 
text has been available for everyone to read. It has not changed. We 
have had over 250 days to examine the treaty and ask questions of the 
administration. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 12 hearings 
on the treaty.
  There were another nine held by other committees. In contrast, there 
were only four committee hearings held on the SORT treaty and only 
eight held on START II. The Foreign Relations Committee also 
accommodated some Members' concerns earlier this year by delaying a 
vote on the treaty during the August recess. The Obama administration 
has answered over 900 questions for the record on New START. Nearly 
every major foreign policy or national security expert has weighed in 
on the treaty, either in testimony, briefings or in the press.
  The history of treaties such as New START shows that the concern that 
there isn't enough time on the floor to consider this treaty is not 
accurate. In general, arms control agreements take an average of 2 to 5 
days of floor time. The original START treaty, which was much more 
complicated and complex and the first of its kind, took only 5 days of 
floor debate. START II took 2 days of floor consideration. The most 
recent SORT treaty took 2 days of floor debate. We have already had 
almost 2 days of floor debate. Other arms control agreements, such as 
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, took 2 days of floor time. We have had more than 
enough time to consider this treaty on the floor.
  Finally, some have expressed concerns that the Senate should not be 
forced to work so close to their holiday vacations. I think it is 
important to repeat what retired BG John Adams said in response to that 
concern. He said:

       We have 150,000 U.S. warriors doing their job over 
     Christmas and the New Year. The U.S. Senate should do its 
     job--and ratify this treaty.

  I could not agree more with Brigadier General Adams. The Senate 
should get its work done. We should ratify New START. We should do it 
before the holidays, before we go home, in this session of Congress. It 
is time to vote on this critical national security concern.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order to 
return to legislative session be delayed and occur at 7 p.m., with the 
order then for recognition of the majority leader still in effect.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Thank you, Mr. President. It is a delight to see you in the 
chair.
  Mr. President, let me make a brief comment on the last comment from 
my colleague about the work schedule of the Senate because I have been 
one of those folks who have decried the fact that we are dual-tracking 
the START treaty and the Omnibus appropriations bill here with just a 
week left before Christmas.
  I do think it is an imposition on our families and our staff that we 
need to be working during this period of time. I do not think there is 
anybody in this body who works any harder than I do. I do not claim to 
be the hardest working, but I am no stranger to hard work, and I am 
happy to be here right up to Christmas Eve if that is what it takes.
  But my complaint is that this is a problem that has been brought on 
by the Democratic leadership. All year long, we had the opportunity to 
do a budget. Did we ever do a budget? No. All year long, we had the 
opportunity to pass appropriations bills. This is the first time in my 
memory that the Senate never passed a single appropriations bill--not 
one.

[[Page 22342]]

  So now here we are, with a week to go before Christmas, trying to 
cram everything into the same short period of time. We have to pass a 
bill to fund the operations of government which will cease on Saturday 
at midnight. We could have done that in the last 300 days of this year, 
but, no, we wait until the very last minute. We wait until the last 
minute to do the tax legislation that just passed out of the Senate and 
the House is considering this afternoon. In addition to that, we are 
trying to consider the START treaty. That is the concern a lot of us 
have.
  But let me return to where I was earlier today when I was talking 
about some of my concerns about the treaty, laying the predicate for 
some of the amendments we will have as soon as we are done with our 
comments, our opening statements about the treaty itself.
  I had last talked about the modernization program, and Senator Kerry 
and I had a brief conversation about that, agreeing that this was a 
very important part of the ability of the United States to have a 
credible nuclear deterrent. We were talking about the nuclear weapons 
part of that.
  There is a second part of our nuclear deterrent, and that is the 
delivery vehicles--the missiles, the submarines, the long-range 
bombers, the cruise missiles--those components of our so-called nuclear 
triad that enable us to effectively deliver the warheads in the event 
that should ever be required.
  The problem with this part of the modernization package is that we do 
not have the degree of certainty that I think we need to have the 
assurance that moving forward with an even lower number of warheads is 
a safe thing to do. Specifically, we have asked the administration for 
but have not received assurances with respect to the long-range bomber, 
the ICBM, and the Minuteman III. Let me just mention those two things.
  With regard to the long-range bomber, we have repeatedly asked: Will 
we have a nuclear capable long-range bomber? That is what the bomber 
leg of the triad is--a nuclear-capable bomber. Now, it could be a 
penetrating bomber, it could be a manned bomber, it could be a bomber 
that carries cruise missiles to get to the target, but it needs to be 
nuclear capable. We have no assurance. So while everybody in the 
administration continues to say: ``We believe in our nuclear triad, we 
must have a nuclear triad,'' we are not getting any satisfaction on the 
question, What about the bomber leg of the triad?
  Our current long-range bomber cruise missiles are due to be retired 
in 2025. Will there be a follow-on? Again, no reassurance. No funding 
has been provided in the 1251 plan that I spoke of earlier for 
replacement of an ICBM Minuteman III.
  There is some very troubling language in the 1251 update on a follow-
on assessment study. I am going to quote what this assessment study 
will be predicated on. This is for the ICBM. It is a study that--and I 
am quoting--``will consider a range of deployment options, with the 
objective of defining a cost-effective approach for an ICBM follow-on 
that supports continued reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons while 
promoting stable deterrence.''
  That supports continued reductions in the U.S. nuclear weapons. So 
the key criteria here is not to carry whatever weapons we think are 
necessary but, rather, an ICBM force that will be determined and sized 
in order to achieve those reductions. What I am wondering is whether 
that suggests that the administration might not maintain an ICBM 
capability so that it can pursue further reductions or that the ICBM 
follow-on system will be based on plans for reductions.
  Mr. KERRY. Will the Senator--
  Mr. KYL. Let me just complete this thought, if I could.
  The administration's arms control agenda--my belief--should not be 
the key factor in determining the level of our ICBM capability.
  I will make a note here and allow my colleague to interrupt.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Manchin). The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator very much. I just 
thought it would be helpful if we can talk about a few of these things 
as we go along.
  What I want to ask the Senator is what he thinks is inadequate in the 
resolution of ratification. Declaration 13 makes it clear that the 
United States is committed to accomplishing the modernization and 
replacement of the strategic delivery vehicles.
  The service lives of the existing strategic delivery vehicles run 
well past the 10-year life of this treaty. So my question would be, 
since the DOD has already scheduled study and decision deadlines, 
timelines, for the replacement of all of these systems--so since that 
is outside of the four corners of the treaty, so to speak, why would 
declaration 13 not state that we are committed to proceeding to the 
full modernization and replacement of the adequate delivery vehicles?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will be happy to respond to that.
  Let me respond first by quoting two key officials from the Obama 
administration: Secretary Gates and Under Secretary of Defense Jim 
Miller. This is what I gather their decision is going to be based on.
  First, Secretary Gates:

       There are placeholders for each of the modernization 
     programs because no decision has been made. They are 
     basically to be decided, and along the lines that Admiral 
     Mullen is just describing, those are decisions we are going 
     to have to make over the next few years in terms of we are 
     going to have to modernize these systems and we are going to 
     have to figure out what we can afford.

  Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Jim Miller:

       We think the current ICBMs are extremely stable and 
     stabilizing, particularly as we de-MIRV to one warhead each.

  I would interject, remember, we are doing that while the Russians are 
MIRVing, which, of course, creates more instability under this treaty.
  But to go on with the quotation:

       But we will look at concepts that would make them even more 
     survivable over time, which would allow them to be part of a 
     reserve force.

  My point in reading these two quotations is to suggest to my 
colleague that it is troubling that the administration is not willing 
to commit to making a decision, is not willing to commit to having a 
nuclear-capable bomber force, is not willing to say that the ICBM force 
will support the delivery of the warheads required for that leg of the 
triad but, rather, will be based on what we can afford and be based on 
our desire to continue to reduce U.S. nuclear weapons, and that perhaps 
we are developing them in order to be part of a reserve force.
  All of this suggests that the one quotation that was read by my 
colleague is a nice statement but does not reflect the reality of what 
the administration is actually planning on.
  Mr. KERRY. Will the Senator yield further?
  Mr. KYL. Yes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. As the Senator knows, a legitimate certain amount of 
analysis has to be made by DOD in order to be able to submit to the 
Congress a plan that is realistic both in cost and judgment about what 
the size will be. Every single testimony, from the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff through Secretary Gates, has committed to the maintenance of a 
viable triad. That could not be more clear in this record.
  Mr. KYL. If I could just interrupt my colleague, who interrupted me.
  Mr. KERRY. Absolutely.
  Mr. KYL. A viable triad at a minimum, per se, has to include nuclear 
capability or it is not part of our nuclear triad, right? And what I am 
saying here is that the administration is not assuring us that the 
long-range bomber will be nuclear capable. So maybe we have a dyad now, 
not a triad.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, again--
  Mr. KYL. Go ahead. I will yield to my colleague.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. This is very important to the sort of understanding of 
where we are here and what the real differences are.
  All of these systems, all three--DOD has scheduled and put out a 
timeline. Now, they have to go through that process. The fact is, they 
have stated in the 1251 report that they are going

[[Page 22343]]

to replace the Ohio class submarine when it commences scheduled 
retirement in 2027. I do not think President Obama is going to be there 
in 2027, unless there is some extraordinary transition in America. So 
this goes way beyond this administration in terms of a decision and in 
terms of a Congress. The Navy is going to sustain the existing Trident 
II through at least 2042. That is on the books right now with the 
robust life extension program. The current Minuteman life extension 
program will keep the fleet in service through 2030. And DOD has 
already begun the preparatory studies on replacement options, which 
will begin in 2012. And the soon-to-be-completed long-range bomber 
issue the Senator just raised is only on what type of new bomber is 
needed, not whether there will be a new bomber.
  So the future Congresses and future administrations are really going 
to make this decision. So to suggest that somehow the Obama 
administration can right now have this treaty held accountable to 
decisions where every one of those delivery platforms is going to be in 
existence well beyond the life and public service of any of us here I 
think is a completely inappropriate standard.
  I would ask my colleague, why a 2027 date and a 2042 date and a 2030 
date and a commitment to a bomber, even though they do not know what 
kind of bomber, why that is not satisfactory?
  Mr. KYL. Let me answer a question with a question.
  First of all, given the fact that I think we are taking 30-minute 
segments each and we are having a debate here, can we agree that we 
will debate until 7 o'clock, and you can have half the time and I will 
have half the time? Either that or I am going to have to quit yielding 
to make my points.
  Mr. KERRY. No, no, no. I appreciate that. And the Senator is always 
good about engaging in this.
  Mr. KYL. And I am happy to do it either way.
  Mr. KERRY. I just think it is important to get it out. I do not need 
that time. I think it is important. I want Senator Kyl to have his 
time--
  Mr. KYL. Let me respond to this question.
  Mr. KERRY. And I will not interrupt him, but I wanted to try to see 
if we could not engage a little in what the Senate does, which is 
debate.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, first of all, this is the kind of engagement 
we need on this treaty and on so many other issues in this body. Too 
many times it is a Senator coming down and giving a speech, and half of 
us or more are not listening. And this kind of colloquy can develop 
more useful material for our colleagues and for the record than 
anything else. So I am very happy to engage in it. I just want to make 
sure I do not run out of my time with my colleague's questions.
  But here is how it relates, and here is the importance.
  We are being told that even though the delivery systems--and 
remember, this treaty deals with warheads and delivery systems. Let's 
leave the warheads off to the side for a moment. The delivery systems--
which are the submarines with their missiles, the long-range bombers, 
with cruise missiles in some cases, and our ICBM force and the Russian 
counterparts--those delivery systems are constrained in this treaty. 
The numbers are brought down to 700 deployable systems. So the question 
we have asked, naturally enough is, Is that enough? Will that work to 
cover all of the targets we need to cover?
  I talked this morning about--and the answer to that question depends 
in part on what our future plans are because--take the B-52. Most of 
the pilots who are flying B-52s--I think we are two generations beyond 
the time these B-52s were built. These are old, aging aircraft. And 
everybody realizes even the B-1s and to some extent the B-2s need to be 
replaced. So the decisions to do that need to be made very soon.
  Whether 700 is a good number will depend on whether we have an 
adequate triad to deliver these weapons when the time comes. So 
naturally we ask the question, What is our triad going to look like? It 
is true that some of these systems--the new systems that replace what 
we currently have--will not be available until outside the 10-year 
limit of the treaty.
  But it is also true that every one takes an inordinate amount of 
time. How do they take so much time? I don't know. It seems as though 
in World War II we had all kinds of weapons systems come together to be 
built and fight the war and it is over in 5 or 6 years, but nowadays it 
takes 5 or 6 years just to get something ready to go, and then it takes 
them that long to deploy. So these are long timeframes for development 
and deployment.
  It is true the Navy has already made the basic decision for the 
submarine, but I haven't mentioned the Navy. That is not my concern. 
But my concern is the IBM force and the bomber force.
  I will leave the point with this: What is troubling to me is that on 
the bomber force, our administration is unwilling to commit we will 
have a bomber triad nuclear capable. That is an important decision, 
because if we are talking about 700 delivery vehicles that will not 
include nuclear-capable bombers, I have a problem. The reason is, 
because when you get briefed on how we are going to deliver these 
weapons if, God forbid, they ever have to be delivered or how we are 
going to deal with a potential Russian breakout, for example, or how we 
are going to deal with a problem if, let's say, we have an issue with 
one of our submarine or ICBM components to the triad, if we don't have 
a bomb-carrying or cruise missile-carrying nuclear capability with our 
bombers, then it is quite obvious the viability of our triad is 
implicated.
  So we have to know these things. It is not some esoteric question. We 
are talking about delivery systems being brought down to 700 and is 
that too low. It is not too low if we have a very viable triad, but it 
becomes too low if our triad is not viable.
  In the time remaining, let me talk about missile defense. This is 
something a lot of my colleagues have talked about. It is kind of core 
to the concerns a lot of us have with the treaty and, frankly, my 
ultimate support or not will depend, to some extent, on how we resolve 
this issue, whether it is by amendment to the preamble or the treaty or 
the resolution of the ratification or a combination of things. But, 
clearly, this treaty implicates U.S. missile defense, and that is 
wrong.
  One of the chief achievements of the Bush administration was to 
finally decouple missile defense and strategic offensive weapons and 
the treaties that deal with strategic offensive weapons. It was 
somewhat limited in the START treaty, but in the Moscow Treaty of 2002 
we said: We are going to reduce our weapons. If the Russians want to do 
the same, that is fine with us. We don't need a treaty to deal with 
that. The Russians essentially said: We want a treaty, and we want you 
to limit your missile defenses. We said no, and they eventually 
relented and said OK.
  I have spoken with Secretary Rice and Under Secretary Feith and other 
people in the administration who count it as one of their achievements, 
the fact that we finally decoupled those two issues. In this treaty, 
they are right back together again and in a way that is inimicable to 
other defenses by the United States. That is what I want to focus on. 
We don't think there should be any limitations on U.S. missile defense. 
Yet the New START treaty not only contains specific limitations, though 
we were told there wouldn't be any, but it also reestablishes this 
unwise linkage I talked about in the preamble.
  Let me quote three things that Under Secretary Tauscher said as of 
March 29 of this year:

       The treaty does nothing to constrain missile defense . . . 
     this treaty is about strategic weapons. There is no limit on 
     what the United States can do with its missile defense 
     systems.

  The third quote:

       There are no constraints to missile defense.

  Those three statements are not true because it turns out there are 
limitations and constraints specifically in the treaty. Article V, 
section 3 specifically constrains a particular kind of missile defense, 
the United States

[[Page 22344]]

using a strategic offensive silo, for example, to use for defense. We 
have done that before. Our current plans are not to do it again because 
it is expensive. We might not do it in the future. This administration 
says it doesn't want to, but it is certainly constraining. How can you 
say those three statements by Under Secretary Tauscher are true? They 
are false. The administration simply says: Well, yes, there are limits, 
but we don't intend to do that anyway, so it is kind of a theoretical 
limit.
  Well, in the first place, why is there a limitation on any missile 
defense capability in this treaty? We thought this was about, as 
Secretary Tauscher said, strategic weapons. Well, it turns out the 
Russians, of course, want to make it also about missile defense. One 
way they make it about missile defense is by article V, section 3 or 
paragraph 3, specifically constraining a particular way we would 
develop missile defense.
  That is what we object to, that linkage. Why is that important? 
Because the Russians have always wanted to limit U.S. missile defenses, 
and this now gets the foot in the door for them to argue that under the 
treaty, they would have a right to withdraw if we improve our missile 
defenses. That gets to the real issue, and that is the preamble to the 
treaty.
  I wish to quote from Richard Perle and Ed Meese, both of whom served 
in the Reagan administration. Richard Perle was with President Reagan 
at Reykjavik, a seminal moment in arms control history and for the 
Reagan administration. It was a time when President Reagan decided 
missile defenses for the United States were so important that he would 
walk away from a major strategic offensive weapon proposal that had 
been made to him by President Gorbachev. Here is what they write:

       With this unfortunate paragraph, New START returns to the 
     old Cold War `balance of terror' and assumes that attempts to 
     defend the U.S. and its allies with missile defenses against 
     strategic attack are threatening to Russia and thus 
     destabilizing. Limiting missile defenses to preserve U.S. 
     vulnerability to Russian strategic nuclear strikes (as 
     defined by the Russians) will result in less effective 
     defenses against any and all countries, including Iran and 
     North Korea.

  That is the problem.
  How does that problem arise? Because of the language in the preamble. 
This is the language followed by two signing statements from Russia and 
the United States that define the intentions of the two countries with 
respect to this issue of missile defense. Here is what the preamble 
states:

       The current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the 
     viability and effectiveness of the strategic arms of the 
     parties.

  That is what it says, in part.
  Quote:

       Current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the 
     viability and effectiveness of the strategic arms of the 
     parties.

  ``Current,'' that is new language. That was not in the START I 
treaty. So what they are doing is defining the current systems. Why is 
that important? Because later they talk about any additions that would 
qualitatively or quantitatively improve our system would allow the 
Russians to withdraw.
  Here is what--well, let me just make one point before I quote that. 
The administration says the preamble is not important because you can 
always walk away from a treaty, and even though the Russians say this 
preamble language gives them the right to walk away from the treaty, 
they can do it anyway, so what is the big deal?
  Well, you can't just do it on a whim. We agree that if there is a 
matter that is so important to either country that it constitutes an 
exceptional circumstance referred to in article XIV which is the 
withdraw clause, then a party could withdraw. So, yes, it is true, that 
either party can define anything as an exceptional circumstance and 
therefore withdraw, but that is bad faith and it clearly is something 
that would be very difficult for a country to do, unless a country had 
built into the treaty the very excuse that they are talking about as 
grounds for leaving the treaty. What would that extraordinary event be? 
Well, it would be the improvement of U.S. missile defense systems.
  Here is what Foreign Minister Lavrov said on March 28:

       [T]he treaty and all obligations it contains are valid only 
     within the context of the levels which are now present in the 
     sphere of strategic defensive systems.

  That is their position. That is their legal position. That is what 
they mean by ``current'' in the preamble. The reason that legal opinion 
is important is because the United States does intend--if you believe 
Secretary Gates and I certainly do--does intend to develop missile 
defense capabilities that could qualitatively advance our protection 
against a missile coming from Russia. It is not necessarily designed 
for that purpose. It may be designed to thwart an ICBM from Iran or 
from North Korea, but it has that capability and the Russians can 
easily define it as such.
  Here is the Russian legal opinion:

       The treaty between the Russian Federation and the United 
     States of America on the reduction and limitation of 
     strategic offensive arms signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, 
     can operate and be viable only if the United States of 
     America refrains from developing its missile defense 
     capabilities, quantitatively or qualitatively.

  Well, we will develop our missile defense capabilities quantitatively 
and certainly qualitatively. That is what the phased adaptive approach 
Secretary Gates has announced is all about: a qualitative improvement 
of our missile defense capabilities. So how would the Russians treat 
that? Their statement, their signing statement, signed at the time that 
the treaty was signed, says the exceptional circumstances referred to 
in article XIV, the withdrawal clause of the treaty, include increasing 
the capabilities of the U.S. missile defense system in such a way that 
threatens the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian 
Federation.
  That is why this preamble is so important. They treat it as the legal 
basis for their withdrawal if we improve our missile defenses 
qualitatively, which we most certainly will, and potentially 
quantitatively.
  They have already built this into the record. From my point of view 
and a lot of my colleagues, this can only be read as an attempt to 
exert political pressure on the United States to forestall continued 
development and deployment of our missile defenses, and there is 
evidence it has already worked. First of all, we have pulled back from 
the deployment of the ground-based interceptor system that the Bush 
administration had developed and was prepared to deploy in Poland with 
the radars associated in Czechoslovakia, and we have also said now that 
with respect to our NATO deployment of the so-called phased adaptive 
approach, the first three phases will be deployed, but the fourth 
phase, the one that is most effective against an ICBM coming from long 
range, which could include a country such as Russia, is available--not 
deployed but available--by 2020.
  Instead of having a firm rebuttal in response to what the Russians 
said in the preamble and in their signing statement accompanying the 
signing of the treaty, what was our response? It was not a firm 
rebuttal. We didn't say: No, that is not correct. That is not our 
understanding. That is not what we did, even though we had done that, 
by the way, with the START treaty. We pushed back very firmly on the 
Russians' signing statement. But instead, the State Department response 
to the Russian unilateral statement is as follows:

       The United States of America takes note of the statement on 
     missile defense by the Russian Federation. Defense. The 
     United States missile defense systems are not intended to 
     affect the strategic balance with Russia. The United States 
     missile defense systems would be employed to defend the 
     United States against limited missile launches, and to defend 
     its deployed forces, allies and partners against regional 
     threats. The United States intends to continue improving and 
     deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend 
     itself against limited attack and as part of our 
     collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key 
     regions.

  In other words, don't worry, Russia. We are not going to develop 
missile defenses that could thwart your strategic offensive 
capabilities. We are only developing missile defenses that would be 
effective against regional threats,

[[Page 22345]]

against limited missile launches, against limited attack.
  So it appears to me that while the Russians have built into this 
treaty and into the preamble the perfect argument for withdrawal and 
they have directly said it constitutes exceptional circumstances under 
their interpretation of article XIV, the United States has not 
responded with a negative but rather with a statement that says: Don't 
worry.
  Might I inquire, is the original 30 minutes which this side was 
allotted consumed?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has no time 
limitation right now because there is no one following.
  Mr. KYL. Let me do this, since I do see Senator Casey on the floor, 
and Senator Kerry may have something more to say. Let me try to sum up 
what I am saying about missile defense, although there is much more to 
talk about, and this will very definitely be the subject of maybe even 
the first amendment that is offered on our side because there has been 
such a cavalier attitude about this on the other side: We don't need 
any amendments. We don't need any missile defenses. This is serious 
business. You would never enter into a contract to buy a car or a 
house, for example, with a degree of uncertainty or disagreement 
between the parties as to what the terms mean. Think about this treaty. 
This is a very serious proposition that starts with a fundamental 
disagreement between the parties and clearly could create enormous 
complications in our relationships in the future.
  If I could just finish this point. Instead of creating a more stable 
relationship, a relationship built on the reset, a relationship which 
is built on very clear, transparent views of things on how we are 
moving forward together, built into this treaty is an inherent conflict 
that can cause nothing but trouble in the future unless the United 
States says: Fine. We will not develop any missile defenses that could 
conceivably be effective against Russia, which then means that they 
couldn't be effective against an ICBM from Iran or an ICBM from Korea.
  This is the dilemma presented by this treaty and its preamble terms. 
This is what causes us such great concern. I am happy at this point to 
yield to my colleague, and if he would like to engage in a colloquy, 
that would be fine.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona. I want to 
take a moment, though, to address this point he made--I think it is 
central--and then we can talk about it. Then I want to give Senator 
Casey an opportunity to speak.
  I say to my colleague from Arizona that a lot of us are scratching 
our heads trying to figure out what we have to do to get the Senator 
from Arizona to accept yes for an answer--yes on modernization, yes on 
our willingness to go forward and build a missile defense.
  It has been said again and again and again by the highest officials 
of our government--and I think the President will make some further 
statement about this, hopefully, within the next hours or the next 
day--that can indicate the absolute total commitment to proceed forward 
and the irrelevance of what the Senator is referring to in the context 
of a statement that is not within the four corners of the agreement, 
that has no legal binding authority at all--none.
  Don't accept my word for it. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, whom 
I know the Senator respects enormously, said the following on May 25:

       So you know the Russians can say what they want. But as 
     Secretary Clinton said, these unilateral statements are 
     totally outside the treaty, and they have no standing. They 
     are not binding. They never have been.

  That is one statement.
  LTG Patrick O'Reilly is the Director of the Missile Defense Agency. 
He testified on June 16, and this is a yes:

       I have briefed the Russian officials in Moscow, a rather 
     large group of them, in October of 2009. I went through all 4 
     phases of the phased adaptive approach, especially phase 4. 
     And while the missiles that we have selected, as far as the 
     interceptors in phase 4, as Dr. Miller says, provide a very 
     effective defense for a regional-type threat, they are not of 
     the size that have a long-range to be able to reach strategic 
     missile fields.

  He says:

       It's a very verifiable property of these missiles, given 
     their size, and so forth. It was not a very controversial 
     topic of the fact that a missile given the size of the 
     payload, could not reach their strategic fields. I have 
     briefed the Russians personally in Moscow on every aspect of 
     our missile defense development. I believe they understand 
     what it is and that those plans for development are not 
     limited by this treaty.

  So in the treaty ratification resolution--here I will make the 
Senator from Arizona happy, but I will also not please him. The happy 
part: If we want to be purely technical and sort of be kind of literal 
as to technical writing of some particular thing, can we say that 
article V has a limitation on strategic defense? Yes, in the most 
limited technical way we can say there is a limitation. The limitation 
is that we can't take intercontinental ballistic missile silos, other 
than the four already grandfathered--the new ones--and convert them 
into an interceptor missile silo.
  In that sense, we have limited something, but have we limited missile 
defense? As we think about it in its larger strategic context, the 
answer is, no, not one iota. Why? Because those particular silos cost 
more money, and in a deficit-conscious age, where we are trying to cut 
spending, it is a heck-of-a-lot smarter to dig a new hole, build a new 
silo that is more effective, more efficient, less costly, and does the 
same thing. That is our plan.
  So there is no limitation on the ability to actually deploy missile 
defense. So if we want to play a technical game on the floor and run 
away and say: Oh, there is a limitation here; that is terrible, well, 
you can do that, but it doesn't make sense. It doesn't actually limit 
the plans of this administration to go forward with real missile 
defense and with a system that allows us to intercept missiles fired 
from a silo in a missile field in the United States.
  What is more, if we do convert those other silos, we don't have a 
mechanism for determining what kind of missile is coming out of there. 
Is it an ICBM or an interceptor? What happens if we are firing one of 
those missiles to intercept a rogue missile from North Korea or 
wherever, and the Russians happen to misinterpret it and they don't 
know what it is--there is no plan or anything that says we can do that.
  In fact, we are safer, given the way the administration has decided 
to deploy this. Here is what the resolution of ratification says: It 
says in understanding No. 1, missile defense--and this is what we will 
vote on. It says it is the understanding of the United States that the 
New START treaty does not impose any limitations on the deployment of 
missile defenses other than the requirements of paragraph 3 of article 
V that I just referred to about the silos that we don't want to do 
anyway, which costs the American people more and will make us less 
safe. We don't want to do that. So that is in there. That is all that 
is in there.
  It then goes on to say that this provision shall not apply to ICBM 
launchers that were converted prior to the signature of the treaty. 
Then paragraph (b) says any additional New START treaty limitation on 
the deployment of missile defense, beyond that one I just referred to 
that we are talking about, including any limitations that come out of 
the Bilateral Consultative Commission, those would require an amendment 
to the New START treaty which could only enter into force with the 
advice and consent of the United States Senate. That is it. We have 
control over whatever might happen beyond that one simple silo issue.
  I respectfully suggest we ought to listen to the folks who are 
telling us what they have accomplished. The Secretary of Defense said, 
from the very beginning of this process more than 40 years ago, the 
Russians have hated missile defense. It is because we can afford it and 
they can't; and we are going to be able to build a good one and are 
building a good one, and they probably aren't. They don't want to 
devote the resources to it, so they try to stop us from doing it 
through political means.
  This treaty doesn't accomplish that for them. That is what Secretary 
Gates has said. This treaty doesn't accomplish it. I believe Secretary 
of Defense

[[Page 22346]]

 Gates. I believe GEN Patrick O'Reilly, who serves our country with one 
purpose. He is not a member of a party or here for politics. He 
believes he is defending the Nation. He says he told the Russians in 
full that we are doing phase 4. We are going forward.
  Finally, Secretary Clinton said to the Foreign Relations Committee 
that the Obama administration has consistently informed Russia that, 
while we seek to establish a framework for U.S.-Russian BMD 
cooperation, the United States cannot agree to constrain or limit U.S. 
BMD abilities operationally, numerically, qualitatively, 
geographically, or in other ways. I don't know how much more ``yes'' 
you can have in statements.
  One last thing with respect to the comment about how they can 
withdraw: Mr. President, they can withdraw for any reason they want, at 
any point in time, just by noticing us that they are going to do that. 
Guess what. So can we. Both parties have the right to withdraw. So this 
isn't some new component they can withdraw from. The point I make to my 
colleague--and he is very intelligent and knows these issues very 
well--the Senator from Arizona knows we can't unilaterally get another 
country to change its perception of how they may feel threatened. That 
is what drove the arms race for 50 years.
  If the United States of America has an ability to knock down their 
missiles that they think defend them, and all of a sudden they no 
longer believe those missiles can defend them because we can knock them 
down, what do you think they are going to do? They are going to scratch 
their heads and say: Wow, we ought to develop some method to guarantee 
that they can't knock them down, or that we have enough of them so that 
we can overwhelm whatever system they have that knocks them down.
  We went through this with President Reagan, and we have spent 
billions trying to pursue this. We understand that.
  The fact is, they are just stating a truism. Those are not my words; 
those are Dr. Henry Kissinger's words, who said all the preamble does 
is acknowledge that they believe there is a connection. We have stated 
simultaneously that we don't care if they believe there is a 
connection. We stated that. Secretary Clinton stated it, Secretary 
Gates stated it, and the President has said we are going forward with 
our phase 4.
  Now, it is not connected. There is no legal, binding connection 
whatsoever in this treaty. This treaty does not constrain America's 
capacity to develop a robust, qualitatively superior, improved system. 
If we do, we are going to make a decision, when we deploy it, to accept 
whatever consequences come with whatever shape and form we do deploy. 
But there is no restraint on our ability to do it.
  In fact, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle ought to be 
leaping at this opportunity because it, in effect, codifies America's 
intent and codifies our independence and capacity to go off and do what 
we are going to do. I wish I could get the Senator from Arizona to 
accept yes.
  Mr. KYL. I have a brief response. There are concerns by a lot of 
colleagues on my side of the aisle, so it is not just a matter of 
satisfying John Kyl. Let's understand that. I would be happy to take 
yes for an answer--if that were the answer.
  My colleague confuses two things. First, the preamble has been agreed 
to by both parties. This is not just a Russian statement of intent. The 
preamble is part of the treaty that we have agreed to. For the first 
time, it connects missile defense with strategic offensive limitations 
by saying the current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the 
viability and effectiveness of the strategic arms of the parties.
  Secondly, my colleague says it is a technical argument that the 
treaty otherwise constrains missile defenses. It is more than a 
technical argument. It specifically does--and there was no place in 
this treaty for any limitation on missile defenses or how important or 
unimportant they are. Why would the Russians insist on putting that in 
there except to establish the beachhead? The point is that, yes, a 
strategic arms control treaty will deal with missile defense. It does, 
and the preamble does too by linking the two.
  Why is this important? There is not a technical statement in the 
treaty that says the United States will limit its missile defenses. 
That is true. But because the Russians interpret the extraordinary 
events--the technical term under article IV that would permit a country 
to withdraw--as specifically including the U.S. development of missile 
defenses that are qualitatively better than we have now, better than 
current policy, because that is their interpretation, whether or not we 
agree with that interpretation, we have created a dichotomy between the 
two parties to a very important contract. They interpret it one way and 
we interpret it another. What will the inevitable result be? 
Disagreement between our countries about a fundamental point, one 
which, according to the Russians, will require them to engage in a new 
round of the arms race that will begin, according to President 
Medvedev.
  They are saying: If you don't agree with this, under the 
circumstances we are going to engage in another round of strategic 
offense weapon building.
  What we on our side are concerned about is that President Obama, who 
has already backed off the deployment of the GBI system, which was the 
most robust American missile defense system, and has qualified, it 
appears, the deployment of the fourth phase of the phased adaptive 
approach, and who other people in the administration speak in terms of 
that--I am talking about the State Department and our signing 
statement--they suggest we would only develop a missile defense against 
a limited or regional threat.
  Those are reasons to believe this position of Russia is already 
working to cause the United States to back away from what would have 
otherwise been a much more robust development of missile defenses to 
protect the people of the United States.
  So that is the argument we are making. We can say that, technically, 
anybody can withdraw from the treaty all they want to and the preamble 
doesn't mean anything or so on. Well, it appears to have already had a 
significant meaning within this administration is the point we are 
trying to make.
  Mr. KERRY. Well, Mr. President, I want the Senator from Pennsylvania 
to be able to have his chance, and we are running out of time, but I 
disagree with the Senator with respect to the judgment he has made with 
regard to what it does or does not do, and we will have an opportunity 
to be able to further discuss that component of it.
  But let me remind the Senator of what Secretary Gates said this May. 
He said, under the last administration as well as under this one, it 
has been the U.S. policy not to build a missile defense that would 
render useless Russia's nuclear capabilities. It has been a missile 
defense intended to protect against rogue nations, such as North Korea 
and Iran or countries that have very limited capabilities. He went on 
to talk about the expense and capacity we have today.
  We are going to continue to develop whatever the best system is we 
are able to develop that could protect the United States of America. We 
support that. The administration could not be more clear in its 
determination to continue to do that, including phase IV. I will 
submit, when we get time and come back, further statements and further 
clarification to the Senator that hopefully can give him a comfort 
level that there is no dichotomy, that we are proceeding forward, and 
the Russians understand what we are doing.
  We should not misinterpret. Preambles have historically incorporated 
statements that one side or the other need for domestic consumption for 
their politics. There is no misinterpretation here about where we are 
headed, what we are committed to do, and I would think the recent 
announcement by the administration in Lisbon and the embrace of this 
effort through the European countries, our allies, would be strong 
testimony to the direction we are moving with respect to this missile 
defense.
  We will continue this. I look forward to doing that with my 
colleague. I

[[Page 22347]]

thank him for his courtesy, and I look forward to further discussion.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I am grateful for the work our chairman, 
Chairman Kerry, has put into this treaty over many months now--in fact, 
many years when you consider his work as a member and now chair of the 
Foreign Relations Committee.
  We are grateful for the debate we have just heard. These are 
critically important issues we are talking about, and that is one of 
the reasons why it is critically important we make sure the American 
people know what the stakes are. Without ratification of this treaty, 
we are, in fact, less safe than we should be. I think the American 
people understand that. I also believe the American people want to make 
sure that even upon ratification of this treaty, the New START treaty, 
that in no way will our security be undermined as relates to our 
nuclear arsenal. We can say, without qualification and without 
hesitation, that ratification of the New START treaty doesn't in any 
way undermine the safety, security and effectiveness and even the 
reliability of our nuclear arsenal.
  So these are critically important issues. We know there has been kind 
of a side debate about time and timing. We know that in addition to all 
the living Secretaries of State who have supported ratification, former 
President George Herbert Walker Bush, Secretary Gates, and Admiral 
Mullen, our leading national security team--but also I think the 
American people--want to tell us in a very direct way that we are going 
to continue to work up to and through the holidays, if that is 
necessary, because I think a lot of Americans agree with what BG John 
Adams recently said:

       We have 150,000 United States warriors doing their job over 
     Christmas and the new year. The U.S. Senate should do its job 
     and ratify this treaty.

  That is not a comment by a public official, that is from BG John 
Adams.
  We know similar treaties in the past have been overwhelmingly 
bipartisan. I think when we finally get to the vote, this will be as 
well, and there is evidence of that both in the Foreign Relations 
Committee--a committee I am proud to be a member of, working with 
Chairman Kerry on this treaty ratification and the work done in the 
committee--but also we are seeing a lot of bipartisanship as well in 
the Senate as we are discussing the eventual ratification.
  I wished to talk about two or three issues but, first of all, 
ratification as it relates to verification.
  I think in our own lives, no matter who we are, when we are making an 
important decision and we are reaching conclusions, we want proof. We 
want information that is conclusive so we can make important decisions 
in our own lives. The same is true, and certainly even more urgent, 
when we are talking about nuclear weapons. When we talk about a treaty 
that we are working to ratify, we are talking about a couple of basic 
issues. One of them is verification.
  What does verification mean? Well, it means that, for example, the 
American people hope we have in place--and they know we will upon 
ratification--a verification and tracking system that will give us the 
assurance that will allow us to be secure in the knowledge we are going 
to be able to do everything humanly possible to verify. The treaty 
contemplates ways to do that, and there are four or five I will 
mention.
  First of all, invasive onsite inspections, as you would want in any 
situation in your own life. You would want to make sure you can be 
onsite. The problem right now is, we have gone all these months without 
verification in place. So we want to have boots on the ground and 
experts trained to verify what the situation is when they are reviewing 
the Russian nuclear weapons.
  Second, it allows us to use the wonders of American technology to 
help us on this--the so-called national technical means.
  Third, what is referred to as ``unique identifiers'' placed on each 
weapon so you can track each weapon because of that identifier. That is 
a critically important part of this.
  The data exchanges between our two countries and certainly the prompt 
notification of the movement of weapons.
  This treaty permits up to 18 short-notice, onsite inspections each 
year to determine the accuracy of Russia's data and to verify 
compliance. We will talk more about that later.
  But of course when the American people talk to us, they tell us they 
expect us to get this right. They want to make sure there is a very 
strong verification structure in place as we go forward. Without 
ratification, we would not have that verification in place, and I think 
a lot of people in the country expect us to ratify for that reason 
alone, in addition to the other reasons.
  We had a good debate today about missile defense--a second issue I 
will address--and I know we are short on time, but the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee made it absolutely clear in the resolution of 
ratification of the treaty that the treaty itself would not constrain 
missile defense. Two understandings within that--understandings No. 1 
and No. 2--as well as declarations No. 1 and No. 2 specifically address 
and reiterate the U.S. commitment to developing and deploying missile 
defenses.
  Nothing in this treaty will prevent us from having a safe, secure, 
and reliable nuclear arsenal and nothing will constrain our ability to 
have missile defense. In fact, as Chairman Kerry noted--and it is 
important to repeat this--the committee's resolution that brought the 
treaty to the floor goes to great lengths to reaffirm and further 
clarify the treaty's preamble, and Russia's unilateral statement 
imposes no limits on our ability to develop and deploy these missile 
defense systems.
  I would note also, in connection with missile defense, that our 
military and civilian leaders--the ones who have studied the treaty, 
who have vast experience with national security and, in fact, 
experience with nuclear weapons treaties of the past--have stated that 
neither the language in the preamble referencing any interrelationship 
between strategic offensive and defensive forces nor this unilateral 
statement by the Russians places legally binding obligations on the 
United States.
  In fact, that summary of their position appeared in the Wall Street 
Journal on April 20, 2010. So that is not just a statement by people on 
this floor, it is cited in the Wall Street Journal.
  I think when you step back from this, especially on missile defense, 
in order to reach the conclusion that some have reached and the 
determination they have made against the treaty--I guess on missile 
defense grounds alone--you would have to believe it is a logical 
conclusion that Secretary Gates doesn't seem to be too concerned about 
missile defense. But apparently he is, and he has spoken to this. You 
would have to conclude Admiral Mullen, who has said we should ratify 
this, hasn't made a determination about missile defense. I think he has 
and I think that is why we can rely upon that support and certainly the 
support of the Missile Defense Agency Director, LTG Patrick O'Reilly, 
someone whose job it is to be concerned about this and someone who has 
experience with and involvement in what missile defense means and what 
it means to our security.
  So I think there is ample evidence and ample testimony on the record 
before our committee and otherwise that indicates in no way does this 
treaty constrain our ability to develop and deploy missile defense.
  I know we are short on time, and I will wrap up, and I will have more 
to say as we go forward. But when you consider the implications for our 
security that this treaty involves and also think in a larger sense in 
terms of how people view this debate in Washington, there are a lot of 
people who are concerned about our economy. They are concerned about 
their own jobs and concerned about their own family's economic or 
financial security. That is a chief source of their anxiety. But I 
think they also worry about our national defense. They are worried 
about terrorism and they are worried about attacks and they are worried 
about national security and their own security.

[[Page 22348]]

We need to give them assurances that at least as it relates to nuclear 
weapons pointed at the American people, that we are taking a 
significant step here--a historic step--that will ensure we have both a 
safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to go at any nation that 
would cause us harm, but at the same time we are taking steps to reduce 
nuclear weapons across the world to make us, in fact, safer.
  We all believe this. Both sides of the aisle believe this. We want a 
strong national defense and we want to be safe. What we have to do in 
the next couple days--after thousands and thousands of questions being 
asked of and answered by the administration, after 15 or so hearings 
just in the Foreign Relations Committee, after months and months of 
debate, months and months of testimony, after all that--is complete our 
work. We have to ratify this treaty, give the American people some 
peace of mind in this holiday season that our defense is strong, that 
our nuclear arsenal is strong, and that we can come together and ratify 
a treaty that has been endorsed across the board by experts in national 
defense, people who care deeply about our security.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I support the New Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty, also called the New START Treaty. New START, if ratified, will 
have several major and positive impacts on our national security and on 
global nonproliferation. I must express my deep disappointment that the 
Senate has not yet ratified this treaty, and I join my friends Chairman 
Kerry and Senator Lugar in appealing to all Senators for their 
cooperation and support in ratifying this treaty. The New START treaty 
is the right move for our country and for our world.
  New START builds on a long history of strategic nuclear arms treaties 
between the United States and Russia and Russia's predecessor, the 
Soviet Union. Beginning with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
ratified in 1972, we have entered into three strategic arms control 
treaties with the Soviet Union and Russia. This number does not include 
START II, which was ratified by the Senate in 1996 but never entered 
into force due to subsequent treaty mandates from the Russian Duma. The 
most recent arms control treaty, the Strategic Offensive Reductions 
Treaty, or SORT, was ratified unanimously in March 2003.
  Unfortunately, both the SALT and original START treaties have 
expired, with START concluding last December. The expiration of these 
treaties means that the United States presently has no fully 
implemented arms control treaty governing the nuclear weapons 
stockpiles of the United States and Russia. This circumstance is 
dangerous to our national security and needs to be rectified as soon as 
possible.
  I am not alone in holding that position. A bevy of experts have 
strongly urged support for the New START treaty, from all points on the 
political spectrum. Every senior leader and expert in the current 
administration supports the quick ratification of New START, from 
Secretaries Gates and Clinton to a whole range of uniformed leaders 
such as Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; General 
O'Reilly, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency; and General 
Klotz, the Commander of the Air Force Global Strike Command. General 
Klotz is joined by many of his predecessors who commanded the Strategic 
Command and Strategic Air Command, including General Welch, General 
Chain, General Butler, Admiral Ellis, General Davis, and more. Former 
Secretaries of Defense have come out in support of New START, including 
James Schlesinger, William Perry, Frank Carlucci, and Harold Brown. 
Former Secretaries of State of both parties are also advocating Senate 
ratification: Colin Powell, Madeleine Albright, George Shultz, James 
Baker, and Henry Kissinger. The list of distinguished, trusted and 
experienced advocates goes on and on, reading like a ``Who's Who'' of 
the U.S. diplomatic and military communities.
  One of the biggest reasons why so many experts are arguing for 
ratification of this treaty is because it will do a great deal to 
control Russian nuclear arms and resume verifiable inspections. New 
START would reduce Russia's deployment of strategic nuclear warheads by 
about 25 percent. U.S. inspectors have not held an inspection of 
Russia's nuclear arsenal for a year; New START would resume 
inspections. Specifically, U.S. inspectors will have 18 annual 
inspections of Russian delivery vehicles and warheads. No previous 
treaty has allowed direct U.S. monitoring of Russian warheads for 
verification purposes. In fact, the close perspective that U.S. 
inspections would allow under this treaty will eliminate the need to 
share information about missile flight testing since that information, 
also called telemetry, was used to determine the number of warheads 
that a missile carried. New START will let us determine that by 
counting the warheads themselves, not by evaluating missile flight 
data. Secretary Gates has confirmed that New START is sufficiently 
verifiable that the United States could determine if Russia made any 
attempts to cheat on our break out of the treaty.
  Perhaps one of the greatest benefits of New START is its contribution 
to global nonproliferation, which all of us can agree would be strongly 
beneficial to our national security interests. The United States will 
never convince other states to forgo a nuclear program if we do not 
show our own commitment to ending the nuclear scourge. More 
importantly, we will not be able to reach agreement with our partners 
about punitive nonproliferation measures without ratifying New START.
  It is difficult to discuss this subject without raising the issue of 
Iran's nuclear program. Today the international community has put in 
place deservedly harsh sanctions against Iran's governing regime. These 
sanctions are so tough that Kenneth Pollack quotes former Iranian 
President Ayatollah Rafsanjani as calling them ``no joke'' and warning 
``that [Iran's] situation is dire.'' These sanctions required patient 
international cooperation that cannot survive American preventive 
attacks. And without sanctions we should give up any hope of ending 
Iran's nuclear program.
  Instead, we must continue to isolate Iran by garnering international 
support for further escalating sanctions. The United States, not Iran, 
is the indispensable nation, and to gather support for punitive non-
proliferation we must lead by example. New START demonstrates our 
commitment to limiting the threat of nuclear weapons--even those in our 
own arsenal. And it bolsters our further requests to other countries to 
squeeze Iran in ways that the ayatollahs cannot tolerate.
  Even while New START will renew our leadership in nuclear 
nonproliferation, the treaty reserves our right to pursue missile 
defense options and maintain an effective nuclear deterrent. A nuclear 
weapon in the hands of a terrorist is extremely unlikely to arrive on 
the tip of a missile. Even so, the most ardent supporters of spending 
billions more on strategic missile defense must acknowledge that New 
START's provisions were so well negotiated as to bar limitations on 
American defensive technologies. Similarly, the treaty will not prevent 
us from deterring other nuclear powers. New START allows the United 
States to maintain a highly credible deterrent.
  Expansive and unchecked Russian and American nuclear arsenals are 
dangerous, expensive, and unnecessary. Eliminating the threat of stolen 
or illegally purchased nuclear weapons must be among the very gravest 
threats that the United States faces today. New START will help us 
diminish and contain that threat. At a time when leaders of both 
parties are seeking ways to cut the budget deficit, our nuclear program 
seems like an unnecessary and burdensome vestige of the Cold War. It is 
difficult if not impossible to credibly argue today that the massive 
nuclear arsenal we built to deter the Soviet Union serves our needs in 
today's changed world, where terrorism and the support of terrorism 
loom so large as threats to our security.
  The time has come to do the right thing for the right reasons. Both 
parties should cooperate, as we have in the past, on issues that will 
make our country safer. No one should doubt that the New START treaty 
will do exactly that. Especially on an issue so vitally important to 
our security, and to

[[Page 22349]]

the security of our children and grandchildren, the American people 
want and deserve a fair and straightforward debate. Partisan point-
scoring should be checked at the door. Let us vote to ratify New START.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, we have done a lot of important work this 
year. We have reformed our health care system to give families more 
options and more control. We have brought accountability to Wall 
Street; and reigned in the reckless behavior that led to the economic 
crisis. We have given relief to millions of Americans hurting because 
of the economy. Now, it is time for us to protect the national security 
of the United States.
  First of all I want to say that I was pleased that we were able to 
move forward and start debate on the treaty today. I hope we can 
continue to have a process that allows for real discussion and debate.
  This treaty is critical to the national security of the United 
States. We know that one of the greatest security threats America faces 
is a nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist. A nuclear-armed 
terrorist would not be constrained by doctrines of deterrence or 
mutually assured destruction but could attack and destroy one of our 
cities without warning. By ratifying this treaty, we can help stop that 
tragedy from happening.
  This treaty would secure nuclear stockpiles by taking nearly 1,500 
U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons--weapons that now sit pointed at 
cities like Washington and Moscow, Chicago and St. Petersburg--and put 
them on ice. It has been more than a year since American inspectors 
were on the ground monitoring the Russian nuclear weapons arsenal. It 
is critical that we ratify this treaty so we can get that window into 
exactly what the Russians are, or are not, doing.
  This treaty preserves a strong U.S. nuclear arsenal. As treaty 
negotiations were underway, U.S. Military leaders provided analysis and 
determined the number of nuclear weapons we needed to retain to keep us 
safe here at home.
  With the United States and Russia controlling over 90 percent of the 
world's nuclear weapons, we need the stability and transparency this 
treaty would provide.
  We aren't ratifying this treaty because we want to be Russia's best 
friend. But we do need to work together with Russia to stop the most 
dangerous nuclear threats from around the world, including Iran and 
North Korea.
  By ratifying the START treaty, we will increase our ability to work 
with other countries to reduce nuclear weapons around the world and to 
make sure that those weapons are kept safe and secure.
  Given the obvious advantages of this treaty to our national security, 
I hope we will be able to continue this institution's tradition of 
bipartisan support for arms control. The START treaty builds on a long 
history of bipartisan support for treaties which limit the strategic 
offensive weapons of the United States and Russia.
  The Senate, as well, has a long history of broad bipartisan support 
for these types of treaties.
  Continuing that tradition, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
overwhelmingly approved the resolution of ratification of the START 
treaty with a bipartisan vote of 14 to 4.
  The U.S. military leadership unanimously supports the treaty, and 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Admiral Mullen have spoken in favor of the treaty in their 
testimony before the Senate.
  Secretaries of State from the last five Republican Presidents support 
the treaty because they know, in their words, the world is safer today 
because of the decades-long effort to reduce its supply of nuclear 
weapons.
  A wide range of Republican and Democratic national security leaders 
have come out in support of the treaty, including former President 
George H.W. Bush, Colin L. Powell, Madeleine K. Albright, LTG Brent 
Scowcroft, James Schlesinger, Stephen Hadley, Sam Senator Nunn, and 
Senator John Warner.
  As we enter this historic debate, we want to ensure that all voices 
are heard. We plan to allow our Republican colleagues the opportunity 
to express their views and concerns about the treaty and to have a 
reasonable number of germane and relevant amendments.
  Republicans have been included in the process from the beginning--the 
resolution recommended by the Foreign Relations Committee that we will 
debate was, at the urging of Senator Kerry, crafted by Senator Lugar to 
reflect the views of Republican colleagues, and the Foreign Relations 
Committee then adopted in its markup two additional Republican 
amendments.
  Senator Kyl raised legitimate concerns about the state of the U.S. 
nuclear weapons complex, and the administration responded with a 
commitment of $85 billion to upgrade that complex over the next 10 
years.
  But there is a difference between legitimate policy concerns and 
those who simply wish to use procedural tricks to keep the treaty 
moving forward.
  We can easily complete this treaty with a reasonable amount of time, 
as the Senate has in the past. We can continue our institution's long 
history of bipartisan support for arms control. And we can take 1,500 
nuclear weapons off their launchpads and make the future far safer for 
the children of America and the world.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I think we have had a good opportunity 
throughout today and yesterday to open some of the issues and give 
colleagues a sense of what is in the treaty, the resolution of 
ratification, and how it addresses many of the concerns. My hope is, 
perhaps, as we go out of executive session and into legislative session 
for a period of time, it will give some of us an opportunity to sit 
down and work together to see if we can find some of the clarifications 
that might resolve some of those issues for people.
  Senator Lugar and I are both prepared to sit with our colleagues and 
try to do that, and obviously we look forward to being able to get back 
to begin the process of legislating on whatever understandings, 
declarations, and clarifications Senators may have. I would ask my 
colleagues to carefully read the resolution and look at the many places 
in which rail-mobile missile defense and all these other issues have 
been addressed by that resolution.
  I see the hour of 7 has arrived, and I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call 
be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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