[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 15]
[Senate]
[Pages 22051-22058]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                          PORTEOUS IMPEACHMENT

  Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a joint 
statement by myself and Senator Hatch regarding the Porteous 
impeachment be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Joint Statement of Senator Claire McCaskill, Chairman and Senator Orrin 
G. Hatch, Vice Chairman, U.S. Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on the 
Articles Against Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. of the Eastern District 
                              of Louisiana

       Because the Senate deliberated in closed session, this 
     statement is the only opportunity during the formal 
     impeachment trial process to formally explain our votes and 
     to offer some views on certain issues for future 
     consideration. We independently evaluated the articles of 
     impeachment brought by the House of Representatives and the 
     motions field by Judge Porteous. Because we came to the same 
     conclusions and share many of the same views regarding the 
     articles and motions, we thought it most useful to file a 
     joint statement for the record.
       The unique nature of impeachment, what it is and what it is 
     not, is an essential guiding principle for the impeachment 
     trial process. Impeachment is a legislative, not a judicial, 
     process for evaluating whether the conduct of certain federal 
     officials renders them unfit to continue in office. Our 
     impeachment precedents give some general definition to the 
     kind of conduct that may meet this standard. The Senate, for 
     example, convicted and removed U.S. District Judge Halsted 
     Ritter in 1933 for bringing his court into ``scandal and 
     disrepute.'' Similarly, during the impeachment trial of U.S. 
     District Judge Alcee Hastings, the President Pro Tempore 
     stated that the question is whether the defendant ``has 
     undermined confidence in the integrity and impartiality of 
     the judiciary and betrayed the trust of the people of the 
     United States.''
       A consistent focus on the essential nature of impeachment 
     helps answer many of the questions that arise in the 
     impeachment trial process. For example, it sets impeachment 
     apart from the civil or criminal justice processes. Federal 
     officials may be impeached for conduct covered by the 
     criminal law for which they have been convicted, acquitted, 
     or not prosecuted, as well as for conduct that is not 
     criminal at all. Standards of

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     proof that apply in those contexts do not necessarily apply 
     in an impeachment trial; in fact, there exists no single or 
     uniform standard of proof that the Senate as a body must 
     apply.
       There also exists no rigid standard for the form that 
     articles of impeachment must take. The Constitution gives the 
     ``sole power of impeachment'' to the House of 
     Representatives, which necessarily includes substantial 
     authority to frame articles of impeachment. As it did in the 
     Hastings impeachment, this may result in articles that each 
     alleges an individual act. But other cases, like the present 
     one, may involve distinct sets or categories of conduct. Just 
     as impeachments arise out of different sets of facts, 
     impeachment articles may take more than one form. In every 
     case, however, the House must prove that the conduct alleged 
     in the articles that it frames and exhibits to the Senate 
     justifies removing a federal official from office.
       In July, Judge Porteous filed with the Senate Impeachment 
     Trial Committee a motion to dismiss the articles of 
     impeachment as ``unconstitutionally aggregated.'' Before the 
     full Senate, he revised this motion to request that the 
     Senate take a preliminary vote on each allegation, a total by 
     his count of approximately 25, contained in the articles. The 
     Committee denied the original motion to dismiss and we joined 
     the Senate in unanimously defeating the revised motion. Even 
     though the articles of impeachment include multiple 
     allegations, we believe that each meets the standard 
     established by the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee during 
     the impeachment of U.S. District Judge Walter Nixon and 
     adopted in the present case. Each article presents a coherent 
     and intelligible accusation that properly serves as the basis 
     for the impeachment trial. The need for proving individual 
     elements of an offense is appropriate for the criminal law 
     but, as mentioned earlier, impeachable offenses need not be 
     prohibited by the criminal law at all. Requiring a separate 
     vote on every allegation contained within an impeachment 
     article effectively re-drafts that article, with the result 
     that the Senate would vote on an impeachment matter that the 
     House did not adopt. Finally, Rule 23 of the Senate's 
     impeachment rules explicitly prohibits dividing articles of 
     impeachment for the purpose of voting ``at any time during 
     the trial.''
       Unless absolutely necessary, impeachment trials should be 
     decided not on the basis of motions that make broad 
     statements or set broad precedents, but on the merits of 
     individual cases and articles of impeachment as the House 
     frames and exhibits them. In this case, each article of 
     impeachment alleged not a collection of unrelated acts but 
     coherent patterns or sets of conduct. The question for the 
     Senate was whether the conduct alleged in each article 
     justified removing Judge Porteous from the bench.
       One somewhat novel issue raised in this case was whether a 
     federal official may be impeached on articles that allege 
     conduct occurring before he took federal office. The proper 
     focus on the essential nature of impeachment is again 
     important here. Judge Porteous argued for an absolute, 
     categorical rule that would preclude impeachment and removal 
     for any pre-federal conduct. That should not be the rule any 
     more than allowing impeachment for any pre-federal conduct 
     that is entirely unrelated to the federal office or the 
     individual's conduct in that office.
       Pre-federal conduct should not itself ordinarily be the 
     primary basis for impeachment. Particularly egregious pre-
     federal conduct that, by itself, would justify impeachment 
     and removal would likely have prevented an individual's 
     appointment in the first place. In most cases, therefore, the 
     question is whether a federal official's conduct since taking 
     office warrants removal from that office. That is the 
     question in the present case because none of the articles of 
     impeachment against Judge Porteous is based entirely on pre-
     federal conduct.
       The conduct alleged in Article I contained substantial pre-
     federal and federal conduct. The House framed the article to 
     include a kickback scheme whereby the law firm of Jacob Amato 
     and Robert Creely would receive curatorship case appointments 
     from Judge Porteous in exchange for Creely and Amato paying 
     some of the fees back to Judge Porteous through the hands of 
     Creely. All parties agree that there was no explicit 
     agreement regarding these cases, but it is estimated that 
     approximately half of the fees went back to Judge Porteous. 
     The curatorship kickback scheme, by definition, could only 
     have occurred during Judge Porteous's time on the state 
     bench. When Judge Porteous, after his appointment to the 
     federal bench, could no longer assign curatorship cases to 
     Amato and Creely, the money stopped coming to Judge Porteous 
     from Amato and Creely.
       This pre-federal conduct flowed into Judge Porteous's 
     federal service in two documented instances. First, Amato was 
     brought on as counsel for Liljeberg in a multi-million dollar 
     lawsuit named Lifemark v. Liljeberg. Judge Porteous was 
     scheduled to try the case without a jury approximately six 
     weeks from Amato's entry into the case. Counsel for Lifemark 
     filed a motion to recuse Judge Porteous because of the close 
     relationship between Amato and Judge Porteous. While opposing 
     counsel did not know of the curatorship kickback scheme, 
     Judge Porteous did. Judge Porteous clearly should have 
     recused himself or disclosed the scheme. Instead, he chose to 
     misrepresent his relationship with Amato during the recusal 
     hearing. Second, after trial in the Lifemark case, Judge 
     Porteous took the case under advisement. During this period, 
     Judge Porteous solicited money from Amato and received $2,000 
     in cash, split equally by Amato and Creely from the firm's 
     account. There is no legitimate reason that a federal judge 
     would solicit and accept cash from a lawyer with a case in 
     front of him. We believe that soliciting and receiving a 
     $2,000 cash payment from a lawyer in a case currently before 
     him would alone have been enough to warrant Judge Porteous's 
     impeachment and removal. When viewed with the additional 
     factors, including the kickback scheme, the fact that the 
     lawyer stood to make hundreds of thousands of dollars through 
     a contingency fee if he won, that the judge misrepresented 
     his relationship during the recusal hearing, and that the 
     appeals court found that parts of the judge's decision in 
     favor of this lawyer's client were ``apparently constructed 
     out of whole cloth,'' Judge Porteous's conduct deserved the 
     unanimous rebuke of the United States Senate and removal from 
     the federal bench.
       The allegations in Article II were very serious and no 
     doubt tainted Judge Porteous's ability to serve on the bench. 
     They involve Judge Porteous's relationship with a bail bonds 
     company and its owners, Louis and Lori Marcotte. This article 
     is, primarily though not exclusively, based upon Judge 
     Porteous's actions prior to his service on the federal bench. 
     The fact that this conduct is pre-federal is not alone a bar 
     to removal, though it is a significant factor to consider 
     when evaluating this and future articles.
       We decided to vote against conviction on Article II not 
     only because most of the alleged conduct occurred before 
     Judge Porteous became a federal judge, but also because we 
     were not convinced that the conduct sufficiently proven by 
     the House rose to the level of a high crime or misdemeanor. 
     The Marcottes, who are felons convicted of manipulating the 
     Louisiana justice system for profit, are the only source of 
     evidence against Judge Porteous. Unlike the evidence 
     presented on Article I, there are limited receipts and other 
     documentary evidence supporting the claims made by the 
     Marcottes. We found that the timelines laid out by Louis 
     Marcotte, Lori Marcotte, Jeffrey Duhon, and Aubrey Wallace to 
     be inconsistent with one another and with the documentary 
     evidence that does exist regarding this article.
       The most prominent example of the inconsistent timelines 
     deals with the allegation that Judge Porteous improperly set 
     aside or expunged the convictions of Jeffrey Duhon and Aubrey 
     Wallace as a favor to Louis Marcotte. Louis Marcotte 
     testified that his corrupt relationship with Judge Porteous 
     did not really begin until after September 1993. The Duhon 
     conviction was expunged in 1992. In addition, Judge Porteous 
     only performed a ministerial step in expunging the 
     conviction. Another judge performed most of the 
     responsibilities in setting aside and expunging both of 
     Duhon's convictions. Louis Marcotte testified that he hounded 
     Judge Porteous for weeks about setting aside the conviction 
     of Aubrey Wallace. Marcotte stated that Judge Porteous said 
     he would set aside the conviction but not until after he had 
     secured his ``lifetime appointment.'' As we discuss below in 
     relation to Article IV, this statement may reflect Judge 
     Porteous's awareness that certain decisions or actions might 
     impede his confirmation to the federal bench. The documentary 
     evidence shows, however, that Judge Porteous actually took 
     some of the steps towards removing the Wallace conviction, 
     including a hearing on the set aside motion, before his 
     Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearing In addition 
     to the conflicting timelines, the House failed sufficiently 
     to establish that Judge Porteous's actions with respect to 
     the Duhon or Wallace convictions were illegal or even 
     improper under state law.
       The House alleges that Judge Porteous was the Marcottes' 
     ``go-to'' judge and would sign almost any bond that they 
     requested. However, the House conceded that they could not 
     point to any individual bond that was set either too high, 
     too low, or improperly in any other way for the benefit of 
     the Marcottes. Additionally, Judge Porteous's former criminal 
     minute clerk suggests the opposite. The clerk indicated that 
     Judge Porteous or a member of his staff was diligent about 
     calling the jail for information about a prisoner for whom 
     Marcotte requested a bond be set, instead of just taking 
     Marcotte's word for it.
       The remaining conduct alleged in Article II, that Judge 
     Porteous used his prestige as a federal judge to recruit new 
     state judges for the Marcottes to corrupt, was also not 
     sufficiently proven. The House was able to document six 
     lunches over a ten year period where Judge Porteous is 
     alleged to have helped the Marcottes recruit and train 
     judges. The only evidence that the House presented that Judge 
     Porteous was present at some of these lunches was the fact 
     that there was a reference to Absolut Vodka on

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     the receipt and Judge Porteous was known to drink Absolut 
     Vodka. One of the judges who was allegedly recruited by Judge 
     Porteous, Ronald Bodenheimer, stated that Judge Porteous 
     never told him what to do in relation to the Marcottes, nor 
     did Bodenheimer feel that Judge Porteous ever used his 
     position as a federal judge to pressure Bodenheimer to work 
     with the Marcottes or to issue any bonds. Judge Porteous 
     simply told Bodenheimer that he could trust the Marcottes 
     when it came to providing information related to a particular 
     offender.
       While we do not take the position that any of these 
     witnesses was lying, we believe that the House must clear a 
     high bar in proving the guilt of a federal official in an 
     impeachment trial. The House did not meet its burden with 
     respect to the conduct alleged in Article II.
       Three features of Article III distinguish it from the 
     others. Article III is the only one alleging conduct that 
     occurred entirely after Judge Porteous was appointed to the 
     federal bench, that conduct was unrelated to either his 
     office or his official conduct in that office, and Article 
     III raises significant factual disputes. Unofficial conduct 
     may constitute the ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' that 
     justify impeachment and removal, but that conclusion must be 
     clearly established after giving Judge Porteous the benefit 
     of the doubt regarding remaining factual disputes.
       There is no dispute that Judge Porteous filed his initial 
     bankruptcy petition under a false name, signing the 
     declaration ``under penalty of perjury that the information 
     provided in this petition is true and correct.'' If there was 
     any evidence that he intended to defraud creditors, this 
     alone might be sufficient for impeachment and removal from 
     office. But the evidence is to the contrary. He used the 
     false name only to avoid the embarrassment of his real name 
     appearing in the newspaper's listing of bankruptcies.
       The false name existed for only 12 days, and he filed an 
     amended petition with correct information the day after the 
     false name appeared in the newspaper. The amended petition, 
     with the correct identifying information, was then sent to 
     creditors. The fact that so few creditors who were contacted 
     with the correct information actually filed claims suggests 
     that no one was prevented from filing a claim because a false 
     name was on file for less than two weeks. Ironically, if the 
     petition had been filed precisely the same way and the false 
     name had been entered inadvertently rather than deliberately, 
     it likely would not have been discovered and rectified until 
     later in the process.
       There is also no dispute that Judge Porteous's bankruptcy 
     petition and accompanying schedules omitted certain assets 
     and debts and inaccurately valued others. This fact might be 
     more serious if Chapter 13 bankruptcies typically are filed 
     without such omissions or inaccuracies. Judge Porteous 
     introduced evidence, however, that the opposite is true, that 
     nearly 100 percent of Chapter 13 bankruptcies contain 
     multiple inaccuracies. For these problems to constitute 
     ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' there must be clear and 
     convincing evidence that the inaccuracies and omissions were 
     intentional or fraudulent. The record does not contain such 
     evidence. The House forcefully presented a theory that Judge 
     Porteous hid assets so that he would have more money to 
     gamble away, but a theory unsupported by real evidence is not 
     enough to remove a federal judge from office.
       Several allegations in Article III raised the question 
     whether ``markers'' used to obtain chips in casinos are 
     checks or credit. This distinction is significant because 
     Judge Porteous was prohibited from obtaining more credit 
     while his bankruptcy plan was in effect. But there was far 
     from clear and convincing evidence settling that question.
       On the one hand, gamblers fill out a credit application 
     before they obtain markers. On the other hand, casinos redeem 
     markers by presenting them at the gambler's bank. On the one 
     hand, markers are checks under Louisiana commercial law. On 
     the other hand, Judge Porteous's bankruptcy attorney and the 
     bankruptcy trustee in his case considered them to be credit. 
     Experts testifying before the Committee at the evidentiary 
     hearing strongly and directly disagreed. This dispute, as 
     important as the issue may be, was simply not settled with 
     sufficient clarity to direct a conclusion either way. As 
     such, Judge Porteous deserves the benefit of the doubt.
       Finally, Judge Porteous not only successfully completed 
     what is considered a large Chapter 13 bankruptcy, even after 
     the bankruptcy judge nearly doubled his monthly payment, but 
     he actually paid more than the plan called for. That is not 
     the conduct of someone bent on bankruptcy fraud. The 
     question, then, is whether the allegations in Article III 
     that the evidence clearly showed to be intentional acts were 
     sufficient to remove Judge Porteous from the bench. We do not 
     believe so and, therefore, voted to acquit on that article.
       We looked at Article IV with particular interest because 
     the conduct by Judge Porteous that it alleged directly 
     implicated the Senate and the judicial confirmation process. 
     One of us not only serves on the Judiciary Committee, but was 
     its Ranking Member when Judge Porteous was confirmed in 1994.
       In FBI interviews, as well as in questionnaires before and 
     after his nomination, Judge Porteous was asked whether 
     anything in his personal life could be used by someone else 
     to intimidate or influence him, could be publicly 
     embarrassing to him or the President, or could affect his 
     nomination. He signed both questionnaires, which included the 
     statement that the information provided was ``true and 
     accurate.'' Those questions are still asked and still appear 
     in those questionnaires as part of the confirmation process 
     today. Judge Porteous argues that his negative answers to 
     these questions were true because he did not believe that 
     anything he had done, including in the relationships 
     described in Article I and II, to be improper or 
     embarrassing. But Judge Porteous was never asked whether he 
     personally thought anything in his personal life was improper 
     or embarrassing. There would be little value in asking such a 
     question. Judge Porteous was asked whether anything in his 
     personal life could be viewed by others, or by the public, as 
     embarrassing or, more importantly, affect his nomination. Not 
     only is that important information for the confirmation 
     process, but it is information that in most cases can come 
     only from the candidate or nominee.
       What Judge Porteous may have lacked in personal scruples, 
     he possessed in political instincts about matters that could 
     be confirmation obstacles. Louis Marcotte testified, for 
     example, that when he urged Judge Porteous to clear the 
     criminal record of a Marcotte employee, Judge Porteous said 
     he would do so only after the Senate confirmed his 
     nomination. He did not want it coming out in the newspaper 
     and said that he would not let anything stand in the way of 
     his lifetime appointment. Judge Porteous waited until after 
     his confirmation, but before he took the oath of office, to 
     set aside one of those criminal convictions.
       The propriety of setting aside that conviction is not the 
     issue. This example simply shows Judge Porteous' awareness 
     that perceptions of his actions might affect his appointment 
     to the federal bench. His instinct, it turns out, was 
     accurate because the New Orleans newspaper reported that 
     Judge Porteous had unlawfully set aside the conviction and 
     the Justice Department would later conclude that his decision 
     was contrary to law. Or consider another example. Judge 
     Porteous' financially interactive relationship with his 
     friends Jacob Amato and Bob Creely may not have bothered him, 
     but it certainly bothered them. While on the state court 
     bench, Judge Porteous began assigning unsolicited curatorship 
     cases to Creely after Creely refused to give him money. 
     Having provided a new source of revenue, Judge Porteous began 
     requesting, and Creely and Amato began providing, a portion 
     of the fees generated by those cases. Amato believed that 
     this arrangement was unethical, a kind of kickback, and 
     warned Creely that it was going to turn out badly. Amato did 
     not disclose it at the recusal hearing in the Lifemark case 
     because he believed he might be disbarred and that Judge 
     Porteous might be removed from the bench. At our evidentiary 
     hearing, the House's judicial ethics expert opined that this 
     conduct violated the ABA model code of judicial conduct, and 
     even Judge Porteous' own expert suggested that it was 
     ethically troubling.
       If his own best friend thought disclosing this financial 
     relationship might get Judge Porteous removed from the bench, 
     it is simply not credible that Judge Porteous believed 
     disclosure of that relationship could not affect his 
     appointment to the bench. Instead, he apparently answered 
     those questions in the negative for the same reason that he 
     put off setting aside that criminal conviction, to avoid any 
     obstacles to a lifetime appointment. This dishonest 
     participation in the confirmation process undermined the 
     integrity of that process and possibly deprived the Senate of 
     information that would have mattered in considering his 
     nomination. His negative answers to questions he was actually 
     asked were material and demonstrably false. For that reason, 
     we voted to convict on Article IV.
       The Senate was correct in removing Judge Porteous from the 
     bench. He argued that it was unclear that his actions 
     violated the public trust and warranted removal. The message 
     from the Senate is clear that the privilege of serving the 
     American people comes with a responsibility to be fair, 
     honest, and to behave in a manner that inspires confidence in 
     the courts and our system of justice.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, for just the eighth time in this country's 
history, the Senate has voted to impeach and remove a Federal judge 
from the bench. Impeachment is a serious, constitutional act intended 
not as a form of punishment, but rather as means of protecting the 
integrity of our system of government. This is particularly true when 
we consider the impeachment of members of the judiciary. Public 
confidence in our courts is fundamental to the functioning of our 
democracy. When a judge engages in conduct that grossly violates the 
public

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trust, he or she not only becomes incapable of fulfilling the 
responsibilities of the office, but also brings disrepute to the entire 
judicial system.
  Prior to the Senate's vote on December 8, I voted three times to 
convict a Federal judge. In each instance, I carefully considered the 
facts in the case, as well as my constitutional obligations and the 
precedent being set for future generations. I have no doubt that just 
as we looked back to past impeachments to guide our actions in this 
proceeding, we now leave new precedent that others will look to for 
guidance and wisdom. For this reason, I wanted to elaborate on the 
constitutional issues presented during this impeachment trial and 
explain my decision to vote to convict Judge Porteous on all four 
Articles of Impeachment.
  First, I should note that the impeachment trial against Mr. Porteous 
was bipartisan, and, I believe, unquestionably fair. The Senate 
Impeachment Trial Committee held 5 days of evidentiary hearings, with 
testimony received from 26 fact and expert witnesses. The record before 
the Senate is well developed, and most of the facts underlying the 
allegations against Mr. Porteous are uncontested. These facts 
demonstrate that Mr. Porteous engaged in conduct that compromised the 
administration of justice, brought disrepute to his office, and 
required his removal from the bench.
  The first article of impeachment alleges that as a Federal judge, Mr. 
Porteous failed to recuse himself in the bench trial of Lifemark 
Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, despite having 
previously engaged in a corrupt scheme with one of the attorneys before 
the court. The House managers established that as a State judge, Mr. 
Porteous assigned curatorship cases to two attorneys, one of whom was 
before him in the Liljeberg case, and had a portion of the fees, 
totaling approximately $20,000, funneled back to him. Not only did Mr. 
Porteous fail to disclose these facts or recuse himself from the case, 
he proceeded to solicit and accept $2,000 cash from those attorneys 
while the Liljeberg case was still under his advisement.
  Out of concern for the public's confidence in our court system, I 
have frequently expressed disappointment about the lack of recusals by 
judges with conflicts of interest. There should be no doubt that 
recusals go to the heart of a judge's impartiality. In gross violation 
of his judicial ethics, Mr. Porteous engaged in a corrupt scheme with 
attorneys, solicited and accepted money from attorneys with pending 
matters before his court, and deprived the public and litigants of his 
honest services by failing to recuse himself.
  The defense argued that article I should be dismissed because of the 
Supreme Court's recent ruling in Skilling. I am familiar with the 
Court's ruling, and have authored legislation in response to it. The 
Supreme Court's holding was about a specific criminal statute, not 
judicial conduct or impeachment standards. No reasonable judge would 
believe that soliciting and accepting cash payments from an attorney 
with a pending case would be allowable or would not be an obvious 
ground for recusal.
  The notion that was raised by the defense that corrupt judges could 
not be impeached ignores the purpose of impeachment as it relates to 
public confidence in our justice system. The Constitution did not list 
a specific set of conduct that would result in impeachment. Instead, 
Senators should determine for themselves what conduct renders one unfit 
to hold public office. We must consider the type of duties that the 
impeached official is called upon to perform and whether the conduct 
engaged in impairs the official's ability to perform those duties. This 
analysis differs depending on the office and responsibilities of the 
official before us.
  Article II alleges that as a State court judge, Mr. Porteous took 
numerous things of value and accepted personal services from a bail 
bondsman, while setting favorable bonds for his company. As a Federal 
judge, Mr. Porteous continued to receive things of value in exchange 
for using ``the power and prestige of his office'' to help these 
bondsmen form corrupt relationships with State court judges. The 
evidence showed a pattern before and after his Federal confirmation of 
capitalizing on his position of power to receive improper gifts. 
Moreover, as Professor Michael Gerhardt, who served as Special Counsel 
to the Senate Judiciary Committee during the last two Supreme Court 
confirmations, testified before the House Task Force on Judicial 
Impeachment, the Constitution does not state that improper conduct must 
be committed during the tenure of the Federal office; rather, ``[t]he 
critical questions are whether Judge Porteous committed such misconduct 
and whether such misconduct demonstrates the lack of integrity and 
judgment that are required in order for him to continue to function [as 
a Federal judge].'' I agree with Professor Gerhardt on this fundamental 
question.
  Certainly if the Senate learned after confirmation that a judge 
killed someone before he or she was confirmed, the Senate should not be 
prevented from later removing that judge. Similarly, the Senate should 
not be foreclosed from removing a judge for serious misconduct not 
revealed during the confirmation process that goes to the role of the 
judge. A lifetime appointment to the Federal judiciary does not entitle 
those unfit to serve to a lifetime of Federal salary and benefits. As 
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I reject any notion of impeachment 
immunity if misconduct was hidden, or otherwise went undiscovered 
during the confirmation process, and it is relevant to a judge's 
ability to serve as an impartial arbiter.
  With regard to the third article of impeachment, it is clear that Mr. 
Porteous knowingly and intentionally made material false statements and 
representations--including signing and filing under the name ``G.T. 
Orteous''--under penalty of perjury on his personal bankruptcy court 
filing. It is hard to imagine stronger evidence that this judge 
believed the law did not apply to him. A judge who lies under oath in 
court filings is unable to continue in an office that requires him to 
administer oaths and sit in judgment. Mr. Porteous's actions in his 
bankruptcy proceedings demonstrate a flagrant disregard for the courts 
as an institution, making him unfit to serve as a respected member of 
the judiciary.
  The last article of impeachment against Mr. Porteous relates to his 
actions before the Senate Judiciary Committee. As chairman of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, I take the word of judicial nominees that 
come before our committee very seriously. The process for aiding the 
Senate in considering these lifetime appointments relies on being able 
to trust and evaluate the information provided to us by nominees, so it 
requires their utmost candor.
  Mr. Porteous knowingly made material false statements about his past 
to the Senate by responding ``no'' to questions on his Senate Judiciary 
Committee questionnaire, and to the FBI in connection with his 
background review, in order to obtain office. His defense to article IV 
is that his conduct was ``business as usual'' in New Orleans and, 
therefore, he believed his responses to be true. Whether he made false 
statements is not purely a subjective inquiry; and most certainly not 
where his ``belief'' in the truth of his statements is in direct 
conflict with the factual knowledge on which it is based. I am 
convinced that Mr. Porteous's responses on the Senate questionnaire 
were material because had his solicitation and acceptance of cash and 
gifts from parties with matters before him been known to the Senate, he 
would not have been confirmed.
  During the impeachment trial proceedings, I asked both the House 
managers and Mr. Porteous's defense attorneys the following question: 
``The Senate Judiciary Committee requires a sworn statement as part of 
a detailed questionnaire by a nominee. Until this questionnaire is 
filed, neither the Judiciary Committee nor the Senate votes to advise 
and consent to the nomination. Would not perjury on that questionnaire 
during the confirmation process be an impeachable offense?'' Both sides 
unequivocally answered that perjury on the Senate questionnaire and 
during the confirmation

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process would be an impeachable offense.
  As chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I am particularly 
offended by Mr. Porteous's intentional dishonesty and disrespect for 
the office to which he was confirmed, and for the entire confirmation 
process. When a judicial nominee testifies before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, they must be completely forthright and honor the promises or 
statements they make to us. Once confirmed, Federal judges have 
lifetime appointments. Impeachment is a drastic measure, but one we 
must take when a nominee conceals serious wrongdoing.
  The House managers presented uncontested facts that Mr. Porteous 
engaged in conduct that violated the public trust and is now unfit to 
be a district court judge, or hold any other public office. Both sides 
were well represented in this proceeding, and I thank them for their 
advocacy and professionalism.
  Mr. UDALL of New Mexico. Mr. President, as a member of the 
Impeachment Trial Committee, I had the privilege of carrying out a 
constitutional duty that fortunately is a rare occurrence. I commend 
the work of Chair McCaskill and Vice-Chair Hatch, as well as the staff 
of the committee, Senate legal counsel, and CRS. They have done an 
excellent job of making a complex and time-consuming process as clear 
and straightforward as possible.
  I began the impeachment process with the belief that my legal 
background would help guide my judgment as to whether or not Judge 
Porteous is guilty. As the attorney general of New Mexico for 8 years 
and a former assistant U.S. attorney, I saw the impeachment process as 
closely analogous to a criminal trial. It turns out, however, that the 
two are very different in many key aspects.
  Unlike a criminal trial, our role is not to punish the guilty, but is 
instead to protect the integrity of the judiciary. The U.S. Judicial 
system is the greatest in the world, but it can only remain so as long 
as the integrity and impartiality of our judges is never in doubt. 
Judge Porteous's actions were so contrary to everything we demand of 
our judges that I have no hesitation in voting to convict him on each 
article.
  One of the primary aspects that make an impeachment trial unique from 
a criminal trial is the standard of proof. I began the impeachment 
process believing that the House must prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt in order for a conviction. This is not the case.
  Obviously Judge Porteous would like all of us to use the standard of 
``beyond a reasonable doubt,'' while the House managers would prefer a 
``preponderance of the evidence standard.'' Some scholars have urged a 
middle ground, suggesting that the appropriate standard of proof should 
be ``clear and convincing evidence.'' But the fact is that we each have 
to make our own decision.
  I believe that the ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' standard is too 
high. The Senate does not have the authority to take away Judge 
Porteous's liberty but only the authority to remove him from a position 
of public trust. I also believe that whether you use a clear and 
convincing evidence standard or a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, the House managers have met their burden.
  Another important question each of us must decide is what constitutes 
an impeachable offense. Judge Porteous's attorneys argue that much of 
his conduct is not impeachable because it does not meet the 
constitutional standard of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' They also 
argue that most of his conduct occurred prior to his confirmation to 
the Federal bench or was not related to his duties as a Federal judge, 
and therefore not grounds for impeachment. I do not believe any of 
these arguments are persuasive.
  I initially thought of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' in the 
context of a criminal trial. My prosecutor experience made me ask what 
elements had to be proven in order to convict on each article. But now 
I understand that an impeachment is so fundamentally different than a 
criminal trial that such comparisons do not work.
  Alexander Hamilton wrote that impeachable offenses ``proceed from . . 
. the abuse or violation of some public trust'' and ``relate chiefly to 
injuries done immediately to the society itself.'' The Framers also did 
not use the term ``misdemeanor'' to mean a minor crime, as it is used 
today. At the time of the Constitution's drafting, a misdemeanor 
referred to the demeanor or behavior of a public official.
  Judge Porteous's counsel made several references to the fact that the 
judge was not criminally charged for his actions. But this is not a 
relevant consideration. The 1989 report on the impeachment of U.S. 
District Judge Walter Nixon provides us with guidance as to what 
constitutes an impeachable offense. It states:

       The House and Senate have both interpreted the phrase other 
     high Crimes and Misdemeanors' broadly, finding that 
     impeachable offenses need not be limited to criminal conduct. 
     Congress has repeatedly defined [the phrase] to be serious 
     violations of the public trust, not necessarily indictable 
     offenses under the criminal law.
       Thus, the question of what conduct by a Federal judge 
     constitutes an impeachable offense has evolved to the 
     position where the focus is now on public confidence in the 
     integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When a judge's 
     conduct calls into question his or her integrity or 
     impartiality, Congress must consider whether impeachment and 
     removal of the judge from office is necessary to protect the 
     integrity of the judicial branch and uphold the public trust.

  We are also faced with deciding whether impeachable offenses are 
limited to acts occurring after an individual became a Federal 
official. According to the Congressional Research Service, ``it does 
not appear that any President, Vice President, or other civil officer 
of the United States has been impeached by the House solely on the 
basis of conduct occurring before he began his tenure in the office 
held at the time of the impeachment investigation, although the House 
has, on occasion, investigated such allegations.''
  I do not see how we can restrict our authority to impeach and convict 
a Federal official to conduct that only occurred after he or she took 
office. To do so would lead to a perverse result, one in which, as the 
House managers argue, ``makes the position of federal judge a lifetime 
safe harbor for someone who is able to hide his misdeeds and defraud 
the Senate into confirming him.''
  In considering whether pre-Federal conduct should be considered as a 
basis for impeachment, Professor Michael Gerhardt testified before the 
House that, ``[t]he critical questions are whether Judge Porteous 
committed such misconduct and whether such misconduct demonstrates the 
lack of integrity and judgment that are required in order for him to 
continue to function'' as a Federal judge.
  I believe this is an appropriate standard, and I believe Judge 
Porteous's conduct as a State court judge was incompatible with the 
trust we place in our Federal judges. Had his pre-Federal conduct been 
serious, but outside of the scope of his role as a State judge, I might 
have been more hesitant to consider it as a basis for impeachment. In 
this case, however, his corrupt conduct was directly connected to his 
duties as a judge. In arguing against considering pre-Federal conduct, 
Judge Porteous is essentially telling the Senate that although he was a 
corrupt State court judge, that conduct should not be considered in 
determining his fitness to continue as a Federal judge. I do not find 
this argument the least bit persuasive.
  A final question is whether impeachable offenses should be limited to 
official acts that are directly related to his duties as a judge. Just 
as I don't believe pre-Federal conduct must be excluded as a basis for 
impeachment, I do not feel that nonofficial conduct must be excluded.
  In fact, Judge Porteous's own attorney, Jonathan Turley, wrote in a 
law review article that ``Congress repeatedly rejected the view that 
impeachable conduct was limited to official acts or abuses of 
authority. Impeachable conduct often included acts that were 
incompatible with continuing to

[[Page 22056]]

hold an office of authority, including crimes or misconduct outside the 
official realm.''
  I believe the question to ask when considering nonofficial acts is 
the same as that for pre-Federal acts does the misconduct demonstrate a 
lack of integrity and judgment that are required in order for him to 
continue to function as a Federal judge? Once again, I found Judge 
Porteous's nonofficial conduct to reach the level of an impeachable 
offense. We expect a Federal judge to have the utmost respect for the 
rule of law, but Judge Porteous knowingly filed for bankruptcy under a 
false name, an act that he knew was illegal. His attorneys argue that 
this act was insignificant he filed amended forms a few weeks later and 
none of his creditors were harmed. But this argument misses the point 
that a Federal judge had so little respect for the legal process that 
he would commit perjury in order to avoid embarrassment. Such actions 
make him unfit for a lifetime appointment to the Federal bench.
  For the reasons discussed above, I voted guilty on each of the four 
Articles of Impeachment.
  Mrs. SHAHEEN. Mr. President, it has been a privilege to serve as a 
member of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee over the past year. We 
have been part of a rare event in the history of this Congress and our 
country and it has been fascinating to watch this process unfold. I 
want to join my fellow committee members in thanking Chairman McCaskill 
and Vice-Chairman Hatch for leading a fair, effective, and efficient 
operation. They provided remarkably decisive leadership on complex 
legal issues while also respecting the rights and the interests of both 
parties to this matter.
  I am proud of the report our bipartisan committee produced, and I 
would like to once again thank and recognize the trial committee's 
staff for their hard work. Their efforts were an indispensable part of 
this unique and historic undertaking.
  Judging Articles of Impeachment drawn up by the House of 
Representatives is one of the more solemn duties given to Senators by 
our Constitution. After spending more than a week with my fellow 
committee members hearing the evidence against Judge Thomas Porteous, 
and after reviewing the parties' final submissions, I concluded that he 
should be convicted on all four articles and removed from office. I 
would like to explain the principles I used to reach this conclusion 
and touch on some of the evidence that supported conviction.
  There has been much discussion by the parties about the standard of 
proof to be employed in an impeachment proceeding, and what constitutes 
an impeachable offense. The Constitution provides us with limited 
guidance on these issues. Ultimately, in keeping with precedent 
established by this body in the past, each Senator must individually 
decide what conduct is impeachment-worthy and how much proof is 
necessary to reach that conclusion.
  In my opinion, the question before us is whether Judge Porteous's 
conduct calls his integrity and impartiality into question and whether 
we must remove him from office to protect the reputation of the 
judiciary and preserve the public's trust in it. Our courts are the 
places where citizens expect to receive a fair and legitimate 
resolution of their disputes. This is a cornerstone of civil society. 
Any conduct by a judge--whether on the job or off that causes people to 
seriously question his honesty and basic willingness to dispense 
justice fairly is a violation of the public trust.
  Unfortunately, I think any reasonable citizen walking into Judge 
Porteous's courtroom would have ample reason to question his commitment 
to doing justice. This is a judge who used his judicial offices at both 
the State and Federal levels to routinely obtain personal perks, 
including meals, alcohol, a bachelor party for his son, trips, and 
eventually cash kickbacks totaling some $20,000.
  Any reasonable citizen would also doubt this judge's ability to be 
impartial. The House presented substantial evidence related to a 
multimillion dollar piece of litigation in which Judge Porteous had an 
obvious conflict of interest but failed to recuse himself. He took 
thousands of dollars in cash gifts from a lawyer friend representing a 
party to the case during the course of his deliberations. He then 
turned around and issued a decision favoring his friend's client. Judge 
Porteous's ruling was overturned in an absolutely scathing opinion by 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which called his decision 
``inexplicable'' and ``close to being nonsensical,'' among other 
rebukes.
  While on the State bench, the Judge maintained close relationships 
with bail bondsmen working for defendants in his courtroom. The 
evidence showed that he continuously set favorable bail levels that 
while perhaps within the bounds of his legal discretion had been 
suggested by the bondsmen to maximize their profits. For this, the 
judge enjoyed complimentary steak lunches, midday martinis, at least 
one trip to Las Vegas, as well as home and car repairs.
  I was totally unpersuaded by the defense team's argument that Judge 
Porteous's ``pre-Federal'' conduct should be outside the scope of our 
deliberation. I do not believe the act of being confirmed to a Federal 
judgeship by the Senate erases or excuses an individual's conduct up to 
the point of confirmation.
  Had the Senate known in 1994 what we know now about Porteous's 
conduct as a State judge, it would have undoubtedly disqualified him 
from becoming a Federal judge. No judge at any level should accept 
gifts that would even appear to be designed to affect his judgment or 
influence his decisions. Yet there is no doubt Judge Porteous did just 
that.
  It is unfortunate that those charged with investigating Judge 
Porteous's fitness for office in 1994 did not raise more flags about 
his history. This does not eliminate our duty to act. I see no reason 
not to remove him from office today when these events still bear on his 
integrity and impartiality. Plain and simple, the judge perjured 
himself before this body during his confirmation by representing that 
nothing in his history would cast doubt on his fitness to hold office.
  Finally, Judge Porteous also perjured himself during his own personal 
bankruptcy proceedings. The House presented evidence that he failed to 
disclose gambling debts during his bankruptcy, failed to disclose a 
number of assets, and made other willful misrepresentations in his 
filings like using a false name in his initial petition. I understand 
that this conduct may not have been a direct abuse of the judge's 
office, but his deception during this period reflected a lack of 
respect for the law and an unwillingness to follow it. A sitting 
Federal judge should have erred on the side of overdisclosure. Instead, 
I believe the House has shown that Judge Porteous repeatedly committed 
perjury.
  Serving as a judge is a privilege, and it demands strict adherence to 
the highest ethical standards. The evidence in this case, taken as a 
whole, showed that Judge Porteous failed this test routinely over the 
course of some 15 years. The House presented ample credible evidence to 
support the charges in each of the articles, and I felt compelled to 
vote to convict on all four to protect the integrity of the judiciary 
and its credibility in the eyes of the public.
  Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I want to first commend my colleagues on the 
Senate Impeachment Trial Committee for the outstanding work they have 
done to receive and report the evidence in this case to the full 
Senate. Led by Senators McCaskill and Hatch, the committee's dedication 
to impartiality and integrity is something of which we can all be 
proud.
  The Constitution gives the Senate ``the sole power to try all 
impeachments.'' The Senate acts as the factfinder in impeachment 
proceedings and determines, as individuals and as a body, whether the 
respondent is guilty of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' so as to 
require removal from office.
  After carefully reviewing the evidence, I voted to convict Judge 
Porteous on each Article of Impeachment. On articles I and II, the 
evidence showed that Judge Porteous used his

[[Page 22057]]

judicial office for financial gain by failing to recuse himself in a 
nonjury civil case and engaging in corrupt relationships with Jacob 
Amato, Robert Creely, and Louis Marcotte. The House managers proved by 
clear and convincing evidence that Judge Porteous deprived litigants of 
a fair trial and undermined his sworn judicial duties.
  On articles III and IV, I found Judge Porteous guilty because of his 
dishonesty and gross misconduct. The facts were clear. He filed his 
bankruptcy petition under a false name, concealed assets and debt to 
finance his gambling habit and lied to the FBI to obtain Senate 
confirmation of his judicial appointment.
  Finally, I voted against Judge Porteous's motion to disaggregate the 
articles. I did so because each article contained a series of events 
that sufficiently related to the charged allegation. The case against 
Judge Porteous can be distinguished from those of Judge Nixon and 
President Clinton. Here, the House presented specific, indivisible 
articles of misconduct which provided a clear record for us to 
evaluate.
  As with each judicial impeachment, the Senate is faced with difficult 
and novel issues. However, the Constitution makes clear that 
impeachment is a remedial provision that cures our institutions when 
officials violate the public's trust and confidence. I do not come to 
my decision lightly, but removal and disqualification of Judge Porteous 
is necessary. As required by the Constitution, Judge Porteous no longer 
enjoys the privilege of sitting on the Federal bench or holding any 
Federal position ``of honor, trust or profit.'' I thank and appreciate 
my colleagues for their commitment and collegiality during this 
process.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the 
impeachment of Judge Thomas Porteous and specifically to offer my 
thoughts on the Articles of Impeachment.
  First, let me say as a general matter that when we as a body consider 
the nomination of a Federal judge, we do so with the hope and 
expectation that the individual being considered will uphold the law 
and treat people appearing in his or her courtrooms with fairness and 
impartiality. The lengthy record presented by the House managers 
demonstrated that Judge Porteous has had an ongoing pattern of conduct 
that does not comport with the trust that the Senate placed in him when 
it confirmed Judge Porteous as a U.S. district court judge in 1999.
  The managers also presented sufficient evidence for me to vote in 
favor of each of the Articles of Impeachment. Because of the lengthy, 
ongoing, and egregious nature of the judge's conduct, I also voted to 
disqualify Judge Porteous from any future Federal office.
  The most compelling evidence presented for each article was as 
follows:
  Article I--The record demonstrated that Judge Porteous, while 
presiding as a U.S. District Judge, denied a motion to recuse himself 
in the case of Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc. v. Liljeberg 
Enterprises, despite the fact that he had a corrupt financial 
relationship with the law firm representing Liljeberg Enterprises. The 
record also demonstrated that Judge Porteous engaged in corrupt conduct 
after the Lifemark v. Liljeberg bench trial, and while he had the case 
under advisement. Judge Porteous solicited and accepted things of value 
from both Mr. Amato and his law partner, Mr. Creely, including a 
payment of thousands of dollars in cash, then ruled in favor of the law 
firm's client, Liljeberg Enterprises.
  Article II--The record demonstrated that while Judge Porteous was a 
U.S. district judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana, he engaged 
in a corrupt relationship with bail bondsman Louis M. Marcotte, II and 
his sister, Lori Marcotte. The record also demonstrated that, as part 
of this corrupt relationship, Judge Porteous solicited and accepted 
numerous things of value for his personal use and benefit, including 
meals, trips, home repairs, and car repairs, while at the same time 
taking official actions that benefitted the Marcottes.
  Article III--The record demonstrated that Judge Porteous knowingly 
and intentionally made material false statements and representations 
under penalty of perjury related to his personal bankruptcy filing, and 
that he repeatedly violated a court order in his bankruptcy case.
  Article IV--The record demonstrated that Judge Porteous knowingly 
made numerous material false statements about his past to both the U.S. 
Senate and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to obtain the 
office of U.S. district court judge. The record demonstrated that these 
statements included the following:
  1. On his Supplemental SF-86, Judge Porteous was asked if there was 
anything in his personal life that could be used by someone to coerce 
or blackmail him, or if there was anything in his life that could cause 
an embarrassment to Judge Porteous or the President if publicly known. 
Judge Porteous answered no to this question and signed the form under a 
warning that a false statement was punishable by law.
  2. During his background check, Judge Porteous falsely told the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation on two separate occasions that he was 
not concealing any activity or conduct that could be used to influence, 
pressure, coerce, or compromise him in any way that would impact 
negatively on his character, reputation, judgment or discretion.
  3. On the Senate Judiciary Committee's Questionnaire for Judicial 
Nominees, Judge Porteous was asked whether any unfavorable information 
existed that could affect his nomination. Judge Porteous answered that 
to the best of his knowledge, he did ``not know of any unfavorable 
information that may affect [his] nomination.'' Judge Porteous signed 
that questionnaire by swearing that the information provided in the 
statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.''
  Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Mr. President, I rise to explain my votes in 
relation to the impeachment of Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. I take my 
role in the rare process of impeachment seriously, and welcome the 
opportunity to explain my reasoning for voting guilty on all four 
Articles of Impeachment and to clarify for the record the limited 
precedential value that I believe the conviction on Article IV should 
provide.
  When considering the evidence presented by the House and Judge 
Porteous, I first had to establish what standard of proof I would use 
to determine his guilt or innocence on each Article of Impeachment 
passed by the House of Representatives. The Senate has never adopted a 
standard of proof like `beyond a reasonable doubt' from the criminal 
context or `a preponderance of the evidence' from a civil dispute 
context; rather, the Senate has allowed individual Senators to decide 
for themselves what standard is most appropriate. I ultimately settled 
on the standard suggested by the House Manager, that I be convinced of 
the truthfulness of the allegations and that they rise to a level of 
high crimes and misdemeanors.
  Mr. President, our founders granted Congress the power of impeachment 
to protect the institutions of government from those judged to be unfit 
to hold positions of trust. In Federalist 65, Alexander Hamilton wrote 
of the jurisdiction to impeach an official: ``There are those offenses 
which proceed from the misconduct of public men or, in other words, 
from the abuse or violation of some public trust.'' This captures the 
standard I applied to reach a determination of guilt on each Article of 
Impeachment. I was convinced that Judge Porteous, through each action 
and through his pattern of behavior, undermined the public's faith in 
him as a government official and in the institution that he 
represented--the United States Federal Court.
  With respect to Articles I, II and III, I am confident that the 
evidence of specific acts and the pattern of behavior displayed by 
Judge Porteous justifies my determination that he was guilty of high 
crimes and misdemeanors. Article IV, however, gives me pause. While I 
believe that the guilty vote on Article IV was correct, I have 
reservations about the precedent that scholars and

[[Page 22058]]

future Senators might find in this impeachment. The questionnaire the 
judicial nominees fill out for the Senate Judiciary Committee provides 
an opportunity for those nominated to answer questions about their past 
activities and involvement in and with the law. From these 
questionnaires, we are able to learn of a nominee's legal experience, 
find information about past statements and generally assess the fitness 
of the nominee for the federal bench.
  On his questionnaire, Judge Porteous was asked whether any 
unfavorable information existed that could affect his nomination, and 
he answered that he did not know of any. I believe that Judge Porteous 
engaged in a pattern of behavior prior to, during and after his 
nomination to the federal district court that undermined the public's 
faith in him as a government official, and that this pattern of 
behavior rose to the level of an impeachable offense that met the 
standard of high crimes and misdemeanors. Having said that, I do not 
believe that future nominees should be subject to impeachment simply 
for a failure to answer a subjective, open-ended question on the Senate 
Judiciary Committee's questionnaire.
  Judge Porteous abused the questionnaire process, misrepresented his 
background and misled the Senate in an egregious manner that was unique 
to this specific situation. However, I can imagine a scenario whereby a 
nominee could falsely affirm that no negative information affecting his 
nomination existed, yet I might not find that false answer to be an 
impeachable offense. I do not wish to see the nomination process become 
even more difficult for qualified men and women of good character, 
solely because of an onerous application process. Many of us have 
things in our backgrounds that we might miss when asked open ended 
questions, and the Senate should not hang the cloud of impeachment over 
every nominee's head because of such oversights alone--otherwise, we 
will find ourselves without any nominees.
  As a Senator who is not a lawyer, I would like to thank my colleagues 
who took on the historic task of preparing and presenting this 
impeachment trial. Specifically, Senator Claire McCaskill and Senator 
Orrin Hatch who shared the role of chair of the Special Impeachment 
Trial Committee. I came away from this experience with a renewed 
respect for the Senate as an institution. When given the opportunity, 
Senators can work in a productive and civil manner, and I am sure that 
if he were able to see the dignity and respect with which the Senate 
treated this impeachment, Alexander Hamilton would be very proud.
  Mr. COONS. Mr. President, as a result of today's vote on the four 
Articles of Impeachment against Judge G. Thomas Porteous, the Senate 
has fulfilled its constitutional duty to remove a threat to the 
public's trust and confidence in the Federal judiciary.
  The conduct set forth in the first Article of Impeachment alone 
justifies the Senate's conviction of Judge Porteous. By coercing his 
former law partners to participate in a kickback scheme while a state 
judge, by failing to properly disclose this corrupt relationship when 
warranted as a federal judge in a recusal hearing and by obtaining 
further improper cash payments from them while taking their case under 
advisement, Judge Porteous misdemeaned himself in a manner that is 
directly contrary to the essential public trust of his office. Federal 
judges cannot solicit improper gifts, and they certainly cannot lie to 
litigants who appear before them.
  The conduct described in the remaining three Articles of Impeachment 
is, likewise, wholly repugnant to the office of a U.S. judge. Counsel 
for Judge Porteous argued that the Senate's unprecedented conviction on 
these counts would weaken the judiciary to political attacks. I do not 
dismiss these arguments lightly. With only 12 impeachment trials having 
been completed in our Nation's history, however, novelty of the 
particular offenses charged is no absolute defense. My votes to 
convict--whether for conduct on the State bench, as a private citizen, 
or before the Judiciary Committee--were compelled because they revealed 
corruption and duplicity that, if countenanced, would destroy the 
integrity of the federal judiciary. While counsel argued that the 
behavior charged in the final three articles did not concern Judge 
Porteous' conduct as a Federal judge, each article charged conduct that 
bore an essential nexus to his Federal service.
  Judge Porteous set bail bonds for the purpose of maximizing the 
profits of the bail bonds company, rather than protecting the public 
safety and guaranteeing the defendant's presence at trial. He carried 
out this scheme to cultivate improper benefits from the bail bonds 
company, trading official judicial action for personal gain. This 
behavior was not an isolated lapse in judgment. It lasted for more than 
a year, stopping only when Judge Porteous was confirmed to be a Federal 
judge.
  Judge Porteous also lied during his bankruptcy while serving as a 
Federal judge. His only defense was that such conduct was not related 
to his service as a judge and included only acts taken as a private 
citizen. A judge cannot repeatedly demean a Federal court by lying to 
it, as here, in an attempt to avoid embarrassment and to continue to 
amass more gambling debts.
  Likewise, Judge Porteous' lies and deceptions during his confirmation 
process reflect a willingness to subvert the truth, under penalty of 
perjury, for personal gain. His claim that any mistakes were 
inadvertent is simply not credible. The evidence demonstrates that 
Judge Porteous actively concealed the corrupt bail bonds scheme from 
FBI investigators, and failed to disclose much more corrupt behavior.
  Our Federal courts are an enduring symbol of our national commitment 
to equal justice under the law. Judge Porteous' long history of 
corruption, deceit, and abuse of power renders him incompatible with 
that commitment. His removal strengthens our judiciary and confirms the 
integrity of those who remain a part of it.

                          ____________________