[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 19493-19495]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              AFGHANISTAN

  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, this month, the Obama administration will 
submit its review of the war in Afghanistan. I expect--and I think a 
number of Members of Congress expect--that this review will provide 
answers to the key questions before us, questions the American people 
deserve answers to. I believe these questions fall into three broad 
categories: first of all, Afghan governance; second, development and 
humanitarian efforts; and, finally, establishing a sustainable security 
environment in Afghanistan.
  Since the announcement of a new strategy in December of 2009 and the 
deployment of 30,000 additional troops, I have sought to carefully 
monitor U.S. progress toward its goals. As part of this effort, I have 
paid special attention to combating the top killer of U.S. troops, 
which, of course, is improvised explosive devices. I chaired a Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee hearing on this topic on November 18 and 
will continue to press our government and our leaders and governments 
in the region to do more to restrict the availability of components 
that make up these terrible weapons, especially, of course, ammonium 
nitrate, which flows into Afghanistan every day of the week to make 
IEDs that kill our troops.
  I am pleased significant progress has been made by the Department of 
State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of 
Defense to coordinate an all-of-government approach to this problem. I 
wish to applaud the recent efforts of the Afghan security forces that 
seized one metric ton of ammonium nitrate on Monday in Zabul Province. 
All the key players appear to be on the same page on this issue, but 
there still has not been a significant decrease of these deadly weapons 
in Afghanistan. I trust that the December review by the administration 
will address the flow of ammonium nitrate, and I look forward to 
continuing to work closely with the administration on this issue.
  At a strategic level, too many questions remain as we head into the 
December review. I would like to list some of those right now.
  First of all, on the issue of governance, I have two questions I hope 
the December review will address. First, do we have a political 
strategy--a political strategy--in place to ensure that the Afghan 
Government is prepared to enact reforms that concretely show the 
population it represents their key interests and concerns? I believe 
our efforts to pressure the Afghan Government have been at best uneven 
in this

[[Page 19494]]

area, due, in large part, to a reluctance to pressure the Afghan 
leadership.
  Any security gains in Afghanistan can be easily squandered without 
serious progress on governance. The United States, ISAF, and Afghan 
security forces are sacrificing too much as the Afghan Government fails 
to enact reforms in the best interests of the Afghan people. It will be 
difficult to succeed in Afghanistan without a strategy to help build 
the institutions of governance, including the judiciary, political 
parties, and, of course, electoral institutions.
  As difficult as these interactions may be, the international 
community must be more willing to confront the Afghan Government on 
issues of political representation, corruption, and the rule of law. We 
should stand ready to help build and develop these democratic 
institutions.
  The 2009 Presidential election and the 2010 parliamentary elections 
were rife with problems that seriously undermined the confidence of the 
international community in Afghanistan's ability to conduct elections 
free of fraud and manipulation. If the electoral process remains deeply 
flawed, the Afghan people's support for the democratic process itself 
may well erode.
  While the government has said it wants to develop a ``strategy for 
long-term electoral reform that addresses in particular the 
sustainability of the electoral process,'' few steps have been taken in 
this direction. The election law is in need of serious reform. The 
executive branch has nearly exclusive power over the Independent 
Election Commission and Electoral Complaints Commission. The single 
nontransferable vote system impedes the development of political 
parties, an essential long-term way to organize and represent the 
interests of the Afghan people.
  Corruption continues to be a serious issue that affects citizens 
across Afghanistan, especially in the southern part of the country. A 
recent public opinion survey conducted by the Washington Post, ABC 
News, the BBC, and ARD television in Germany showed that 55 percent of 
respondents in Kandahar say they have been asked for bribes from the 
police--55 percent--well above the national figure of 21 percent. 
Moreover, most Kandahar residents say their situation would only get 
worse if they exercised due process and filed a complaint about a 
public official.
  U.S. efforts to improve governance at times compete with our security 
concerns. There is an inherent tension between the United States and 
ISAF forces in efforts to engage, to combat extremist elements at the 
local level and cooperation with warlords who rule over certain areas. 
While there is an imperative to collect intelligence and conduct 
operations that may require cooperation with local power brokers, I am 
concerned the long-term cost of such interaction is very high. Are we 
empowering another generation of local power brokers who have little 
regard for representing the interests of the local population? That is 
a question that needs to be asked over and over, and we need answers to 
that question.
  It is a simple fact, disaffection among Afghan citizens with the 
central government and local power brokers provides recruiting 
opportunities for the Taliban. This is a serious concern because it 
gets to the heart of our engagement in Afghanistan: Cooperation with 
local warlords can provide short-term security gains, but what is the 
long-term impact? I hope the administration's December review will 
address this issue.
  Question No. 2: What is the state of the reconciliation process with 
the Taliban? I have expressed serious concerns about the impact of 
negotiations with the Taliban on women and other vulnerable groups in 
Afghanistan. My concern grew--and I know others' concern as well--our 
concern grew in reading the poll numbers from Afghanistan recently. 
There was a 13-percent jump from last year among respondents who say 
women's rights are suffering.
  The December review should address the current state of play with 
respect to these negotiations. The recent Afghan poll showed that 
nearly three-quarters of Afghans now believe their government should 
pursue negotiations with the Taliban, with almost two-thirds willing to 
accept a deal allowing Taliban leaders to hold political office.
  Ultimately, there must be a political solution to end the war in 
Afghanistan. I am not suggesting we are close at this time to that 
result, but we need to know the degree to which the administration and 
the Karzai government are coordinated and headed down the same path. 
International engagement on any negotiation process will be essential 
to long-term success. Pakistan has a role to play and is a necessary 
element to any long-lasting peace agreement.
  The next area, security. U.S. operations in southern Afghanistan 
appear to be having a positive impact on Afghan public opinion. Sixty-
seven percent of the people in the Province of Helmand describe their 
security as good, a 14-percent jump from December 2009. Nearly two-
thirds of Helmand residents state that Afghanistan is on the right 
track.
  This is an indication that positive momentum has been built in 
Afghanistan's most sensitive region. But such gains can be short-lived, 
and in order to facilitate a sustainable security, we must take a long-
term approach to ensure that the Afghan Government can provide for its 
own security.
  The training of the Afghan National Security Forces is a key 
threshold question. We cannot allow Afghanistan to once again become a 
haven for al-Qaida or other extremist groups to launch attacks against 
the United States. ISAF forces have denied al-Qaida this haven since 
2001. However, we cannot provide this security in perpetuity. The 
Afghans have to assume more responsibility for their own security, and 
we must do all we can to prepare the Afghan National Security Forces 
for that day.
  So where do we stand at this point? I would have to say the view is 
decidedly mixed. For years, the international community exercised what 
can be characterized as gross neglect in building Afghan security 
forces, and only recently have we begun to take on this task.
  First, some positive news on this issue. We do not hear enough about 
this.
  Under the leadership of Lieutenant General Caldwell, the NATO 
Training Mission-Afghanistan, the so-called NTM-A, has been a source of 
real progress. The Afghan National Army and Police are exceeding--
exceeding--their recruitment goals. As of August of this year, the 
Afghan National Army's total strength had grown to 138,164, exceeding 
the goal for October 2010 by more than 8,000 troops. As of August, the 
Afghan National Police had an end strength of 119,639, exceeding the 
2010 goal of 109,000.  These recruitment numbers are an important sign 
of progress, but serious concerns remain related to the quality of the 
force, the retention rate, and the low rate of literacy.
  The Afghan National Army has significant shortages in officer and 
noncommissioned officer leadership. Effective junior leaders are 
essential to a professional force since they control immediate on-the-
ground situations.
  The Ministry of Defense and the training mission in Afghanistan are 
working to overcome a shortfall of more than 4,500 Afghan National Army 
officers. There are more Officer Candidate School units, twice as many 
seats in the Integration Mujahedeen Course, and larger classes at the 
National Military Academy.
  As for noncommissioned officers, the Afghan National Army faces a 
shortage of more than 10,500. Similar expansions in training capacity 
and direct entry programs are underway to address this deficiency. 
According to a recent Pentagon report, the gap will not be closed until 
the end of 2012.
  The Pentagon also reports we face a shortfall of more than 900 
international trainers in Afghanistan. I hope our allies in ISAF can 
help to address this very important training need. Many European 
countries have a proud history of developing elite paramilitary forces. 
This valued expertise is needed right now in Afghanistan.

[[Page 19495]]

  While expanding capacity is critical to growing the force, I hope the 
December review by the administration will address not just the efforts 
to grow more leaders but also describe how these leaders are laying the 
foundation for professionalizing the Afghan national security forces.
  Retention and attrition rates. For years, the Afghan national 
security force's attrition rate has been an issue. Facilitating rapid 
growth while increasing quality requires that retention rates remain 
high.
  In January 2010, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board approved 
the goal of developing a force of 305,600 personnel by October 2011. 
Recruiting efforts compared with increased retention have allowed the 
force to grow ahead of schedule so far. Moving forward, projections 
remain uncertain. The Defense Department reports the police have met 
attrition and retention goals. However, the Afghan National Army still 
has issues with attrition that may impact its ability to maintain its 
impressive growth in numbers. This month's review by the administration 
should clarify projections and detail efforts to boost retention.
  Literacy is a big problem. The literacy rates are very low in the 
Afghan Security Force and this must be addressed. Consider this story 
from Lieutenant General Caldwell. He visited a base in northern 
Afghanistan where 90 percent of the troops claimed they had been unpaid 
for months. To limit corruption, the government has been paying the 
troops by electronic funds transfer instead of cash. The troops had no 
idea, however, since they could not read their bank statements.
  Think about weapons security. How can a soldier be sure he has been 
assigned a weapon if he cannot read the serial number? Illiteracy is 
widespread in the force: Only 11 percent of enlisted personnel can 
read, write, or do simple math. This creates significant challenges in 
professionalizing the security force. In response, a huge literacy 
program has grown around the fielding of the Afghan security forces. So 
we have much to do on that.
  I will move to the last part of our concerns, and that is on 
development. A qualified Afghan soldier is much cheaper to train and 
equip on the field than an American, so the overall cost to U.S. 
taxpayers would certainly diminish as the U.S. forces draw down. But by 
investing in this large force, there are long-term implications. Do we 
expect to pay for the Afghan security forces 10 years from now, 20 
years from now? At what point will the Afghan Government be able to 
collect its own revenue to fund its security as well as other 
priorities?
  That is, again, why responsible Afghan governance is essential. While 
the international community will shoulder much of the humanitarian and 
security burden in the short term, the Afghan Government needs to take 
steps to increase its domestic revenue collection, as well as put into 
place a sound legislative framework to encourage investment. They need 
to develop a minerals framework law, and they also need to put in place 
changes to bring about a stronger infrastructure.
  Let me close with a reflection upon our troops. We have the 
obligation here in the Senate to ask and have answers to very critical 
questions, whether they relate to development or governance or 
security, and especially on the question of security. We also have an 
obligation to remember and keep in mind the human toll.


                           SSG SEAN FLANNERY

  In the State of Pennsylvania, as in a lot of States, we have lost a 
lot of soldiers. To date, we have lost 60 servicemembers since the 
beginning of the war in Afghanistan. In Iraq, we got to the number of 
about 196--just below 200. Let me share one story as I conclude. Two 
weeks ago, Pennsylvania lost Army SSG Sean Flannery who died a hero in 
Afghanistan. He is from the town of Wyomissing, PA, in Bucks County. He 
was an infantry squad leader who was killed after delivering first aid 
to a wounded Afghan soldier. Sean and his team carried the man to an 
evacuation helicopter. They stepped on an improvised explosive device 
which killed Sean and another soldier. Staff Sergeant Flannery was 29 
years old. After he graduated from Wyomissing High School in 1999 and 
Shippensburg University, he was determined to serve his country. He was 
on his fourth tour of duty after having served two tours in Iraq and a 
prior tour in Afghanistan. He earned a Bronze Star because of his 
heroism and then another commendation last week. One of his high school 
classmates paid tribute to his friend at a service earlier this week. 
He said:

       His fellow soldiers talked about how much they respected 
     him and what a great leader he was and how they had true love 
     for him, and not a word of it surprised us. He was the type 
     of guy everybody wants their son to be--loyal, humble, and 
     generous. I was honored to have him as a friend.

  That is what Matt Rader, a classmate of Sean Flannery's, said about 
Sean.
  All of us are honored to represent these young men and women who 
fight for us and some who die for this cause. Today we pray for those 
families. We pray for Sean and his family. But in the larger sense I 
guess we pray for ourselves as well. We pray that we are worthy and can 
prove ourselves worthy of their valor.
  One of the ways Members of the Congress can prove ourselves worthy of 
that valor is to ask and demand answers to these very difficult 
questions, no matter who the administration is and no matter what 
party, because we have to get this policy right. We have an obligation 
to get it right, for Sean Flannery and for those who have loved and 
lost, and for our country.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the 
conclusion of my remarks, the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, 
Senator Reed, be given time on the floor for his remarks.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

                          ____________________