[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 13]
[Senate]
[Pages 18257-18260]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                            NEW START TREATY

  Mr. FRANKEN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak once again about 
the New START treaty. Today I will talk about the New START treaty and 
the maintenance of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. 
That means maintaining and sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile and 
delivery platforms; modernizing the buildings and equipment in the 
nuclear weapons complex; and supporting the experts and scientists who 
are involved in it.
  I would like to preface my remarks by underlining the urgency for the 
Senate to ratify the treaty. How can it be that we do not have a treaty 
with Russia in place, along with its verification

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regime 360 days after the expiration of the original START treaty? That 
is more than 6 months after the administration submitted the treaty to 
the Senate.
  The verification regime will provide crucial insight into Russian 
forces, insight that is degrading over time without the treaty in 
place. We need to ratify this treaty now.
  For decades, our relations with the Soviet Union, and now with 
Russia, have been stabilized and made more predictable and cooperative 
through arms control agreements. How can it be that now, when Russia is 
no longer our enemy and yet not our ally, my friends across the aisle 
are refusing to move forward on ratifying a modest treaty that is 
critical for our national security?
  If consideration of the treaty is delayed or blocked, it will make 
cooperation with Russia on national security interests much more 
difficult, if not impossible. Do you seriously believe that, if you 
block or reject the treaty, we will see Russia's continued cooperation 
with international sanctions on Iran? Are you not concerned that Russia 
will reconsider its prohibition on the sale of the S-300 anti-air 
defense missile systems to Iran, as it did in September?
  And why put the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program at 
risk? Senator Lugar himself has warned that failure to ratify the 
treaty could imperil that enormously successful program in securing 
loose nukes.
  If this modest treaty is blocked by the minority, I do not believe my 
friends on the other side will be pleased with the consequences.
  Many of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle want to see 
negotiations with Russia on reductions in tactical nuclear weapons. I 
agree. That is going to be a difficult task under any circumstances. 
But as our lead negotiator Rose Gottemoeller said recently, there is 
zero chance of getting to the negotiating table with the Russians on 
tactical nuclear weapons unless we get this treaty ratified and entered 
into force.
  It is also important to note that my colleagues on the other side of 
the aisle have been delaying consideration of the treaty for some time. 
Back in August, Senator McConnell said, ``The only way this treaty gets 
in trouble is if it's rushed.'' And Senator Kyl told reporters that 
since it could be hard to get everything done before the November 
election, the Senate might need a lameduck session to vote on New 
START.
  The administration and Chairman Kerry deferred to those Republicans, 
but now those same colleagues are saying we can not do it during the 
lameduck session. To them, I say, if not now, when? If we defer and 
delay further, we risk a collapse in relations with Russia, including 
the loss of their continued cooperation on the all-important Iran 
issue.
  Now, the remaining major objection to ratification that Republicans 
have raised is not a feature of the treaty itself, but maintenance and 
modernization of our nuclear arsenal and complex.
  There is bipartisan agreement that as our nuclear arsenal gets 
smaller through arms control agreements, ensuring that it remains safe, 
secure, and effective takes on added importance. From my perspective 
that is the fundamental justification for nuclear modernization. And I 
agree with Senator Kyl, who emphasized in a floor statement, and I 
quote, the ``direct link between nuclear force reductions and 
modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.'' Likewise, Senator 
McCain has noted that, ``as we move to reduce the size of our nuclear 
stockpile, this modernization effort becomes all the more important.''
  The Obama administration has made a serious commitment to nuclear 
modernization, and they have paired it with arms control. We have an 
extensive set of programs in place to retain confidence in the 
stockpile without testing. We are extending the life of our current 
nuclear delivery vehicles and studying, planning, and beginning the 
next generation. And we are continuing to develop plans for major 
improvements in the complex of facilities that support the nuclear 
enterprise.
  I support the administration's approach to modernization tethered to 
arms control. Now I have to admit, in these tough economic times, I do 
have concerns with spending $85 billion on an enormous nuclear complex, 
that is a staggering amount of money. Without a commitment to arms 
control and nonproliferation, it is impossible to justify spending that 
much money. This is the 21st century, not the cold war, and our needs 
are different.
  That is why I will not support this massive investment in 
modernization without an equal commitment to arms control and 
nonproliferation. That is why earlier this year I joined several 
colleagues in writing to the Budget Committee in support of the 
administration's massive Fiscal Year 2011 request for the National 
Nuclear Safety Administration, or NNSA.
  I will continue to fight for nuclear modernization paired with arms 
control. But they must be paired. Our national security requires it. 
And political reality requires it.
  That is what the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of 
the United States, better known as the Perry-Schlesinger Commission, 
made clear. The Commission's report has been the main touchstone on all 
sides of the debate over New START.
  The December 15, 2009 letter to the President from 41 of my 
colleagues, including all the members of the minority, relies heavily 
on the Commission's recommendations in spelling out its requirements 
for the treaty and modernization. Senator McCain's September 14 letter 
to the Foreign Relations Committee relies on the Commission's 
perspective on the modernization of the nuclear complex. Senator Kyl's 
May 24, 2010, floor speech on New START also makes prominent reference 
to and endorses the Commission's report.
  Here is the first page of the report's Executive Summary:

       ``While deterrence plays an essential role in reducing 
     nuclear dangers, it is not the only means for doing so, and 
     accordingly the United States must seek additional 
     cooperative measures of a political kind, including for 
     example arms control and nonproliferation. This is a time 
     when these approaches can be renewed and reenergized.''

  Not only deterrence, but also arms control and nonproliferation. We 
must be committed to both together. That is why the Commission goes on 
to say, ``These components of strategy must be integrated into a 
comprehensive approach.''
  It is just such a comprehensive approach that the administration has 
taken. In its very first recommendation, the Commission warns of the 
importance of maintaining both components of strategy:

       The United States should continue to pursue an approach to 
     reducing nuclear dangers that balances deterrence, arms 
     control, and nonproliferation. Singular emphasis on one or 
     another element would reduce the nuclear security of the 
     United States and its allies.''

  I submit that the administration and those of us who have pushed 
nuclear modernization in good faith, to support deterrence and 
nonproliferation and arms control, are following this recommendation. 
Those who have held the New START treaty hostage to ungrounded 
complaints about modernization and ever-changing demands are not.
  I believe many of my colleagues on the other side will vote for this 
treaty. They understand that it is modest but also important, and they 
will put national security ahead of partisan political pressures. But 
if a small number of Republicans continue to delay and block this 
treaty, they will be responsible for the disintegration of the 
consensus on nuclear modernization, and the complex and arsenal will 
once again become subject to controversy, dispute, and drift. That is 
just the reality.
  It is true that Republicans have broadly questioned the 
administration's commitment on nuclear modernization. But their 
criticisms do not stand up to scrutiny.
  Thus, Senator Kyl's criticisms of the Obama administration's pledge 
to spend $100 billion to maintain and modernize nuclear delivery 
systems, that is right, $100 billion, is that ``the plan

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makes a commitment only to a next-generation submarine, not to a next-
generation bomber, ballistic missile, or air-launched cruise missile.''
  This makes it sound like the administration lacks commitment to a 
credible deterrent, but that is just not true. Where decisions need to 
be made now, the administration has made them, with respect to the 
SSBN(X), the next-generation submarine. Where decisions would benefit 
from further consideration, and do not need to be made now, that is 
what is happening.
  The administration is undertaking a comprehensive set of assessments 
of 21st century threats and needs, and it will then make decisions on 
what follows the Minuteman III, the Air-Launched Cruise Missile, and 
the B-52 and B-2.
  The Minuteman III missile is, by congressional mandate, having its 
life extended through 2030. Studies to inform the decision about the 
follow-on are needed now, and they are happening.
  Similarly, the Department of Defense is studying the right mix of 
long-range strike capabilities, and part of that will be the 
appropriate role for successors to the Air-Launched Cruise Missile and 
the bomber. The decision with respect to our bombers can be made in the 
future because the bombers, though old, don't get that much stress and 
still have a lot of life left in them. The same is true for the Air-
Launched Cruise Missile, though a decision on what will follow next 
needs to be made sooner.
  The decision on our long-range strike capabilities should be deferred 
in part because, as the Under Secretary of Defense recently explained, 
the DoD will seek the same productivity growth and cost savings here as 
it is pursuing with the SSBN(X) submarine.
  On the nuclear stockpile, the administration, with congressional 
support, is moving forward with the ongoing Life Extension Program for 
the W76 and with studies for the B61 Life Extension Program. It will 
also conduct a similar study for the W78, including exploring the 
potential for a common system with the W88 warhead.
  Some of my Republican friends have complained that the 
administration's policy for the refurbishment, reuse, and replacement 
of nuclear components in the warheads unduly constrains the work of 
scientists in the nuclear complex. This is not so, as the lab directors 
have testified. These lab directors are on the frontlines of 
maintaining and modernizing the stockpile, and they will have the 
flexibility they need.
  Then there is the nuclear complex. In the 10-year plan the 
administration submitted under section 1251 of last year's defense 
authorization, the administration made an historic investment in the 
nuclear complex. It set a dramatically higher baseline for fiscal year 
2011. It included several years of funding increases consistent with 
what the NNSA can absorb and execute. And over 10 years, it initially 
committed to an $80 billion investment in the nuclear complex, a $10 
billion increase.
  Now, the Democratic Congress took the extraordinary step this past 
September of including funding at the full fiscal year 2011 level for 
weapons activities in the continuing resolution we passed. Almost 
everything else in the continuing resolution stuck to 2010 levels.
  The nuclear complex is one of the most controversial parts of the 
debate over nuclear modernization, particularly the prospect of 
replacing two major facilities. The first is the chemistry and 
metallurgy research facility replacement at Los Alamos, which is 
central to our plutonium capabilities. The second is the uranium 
processing facility at the Y-12 plant in Tennessee.
  Republicans have complained that there is uncertainty and not enough 
funding for these two replacement projects. But the administration's 
budget has shown a significant commitment. Where there is uncertainty, 
it is not due to a lack of commitment on the administration's part, but 
simply because the design and planning processes for these facilities 
are in an early phase.
  We simply do not know what construction of the facilities is going to 
cost, and that is something the fiscal year 2011 budget submission from 
NNSA makes abundantly clear. To budget as though we did know those 
costs would be irresponsible--especially for an agency that has 
historically been plagued by cost overruns. It is simply too soon to 
have a solid baseline planning number.
  To be sure, the administration has been updating and revising its 
plans and estimates. Two weeks ago, it released an update to its 
section 1251 report with a revised, substantially higher cost estimate 
for both replacement facilities.
  It also included yet more funding for the NNSA's overall budget. The 
administration has proposed an additional $600 million in funding for 
fiscal year 2012 and an additional $4.1 billion over the next 5 years. 
That brings the total for the next decade to $85 billion. This both 
serves as a reminder that it is too early to have a fixed budget for 
the new facilities, and also strongly reinforces the administration's 
good-faith effort and commitment.
  This brings me back to my fundamental point. I believe that support 
for the two new facilities can be sustained if we follow the path laid 
out by the Perry-Schlesinger Commission and pursued by the 
administration. This means balancing deterrence, arms control, and non-
proliferation. The reality is that there will be significant questions 
and doubts about proceeding with such a costly modernization effort if 
it is not accompanied by equal support for arms control and non-
proliferation.
  There is no doubt that the existing facilities are aging and run 
down. There are even safety problems. Something must be done.
  But if we are going to move forward effectively, modernization must 
be paired with arms control. And that starts with a modest first step--
ratification of the New START.
  Without that step, consensus will break down, the replacement 
facilities will once again lose a coherent mission, and we will be 
stuck with drift and controversy. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission 
recognizes that if it is not possible to sustain the budget requisite 
for both facilities concurrently, choices will have to be made.
  They give powerful reasons for moving forward with the chemistry and 
metallurgy research facility before the uranium processing facility. 
That is the kind of tough choice we will have to make if New START is 
not ratified. Similarly, real uncertainty will creep into the 
consideration of just what sort of project the chemistry and metallurgy 
research facility should be.
  Let me conclude by noting that the administration and the Democratic 
Congress have met every demand that many of my friends across the aisle 
have made on modernization. To my friends on the other side, I say, 
look at the demands in the December 2009 letter that you all signed. 
The administration has met each of those demands.
  Look at what Senator Kyl said in an op-ed in July: ``A key test is 
whether the Democratic-controlled Congress will approve the president's 
nuclear modernization requests for the coming fiscal year.'' We passed 
that test, and as I mentioned earlier under an otherwise flat-lined 
continuing resolution.
  In that same piece, and in his March letter with Senator McConnell to 
the President, Senator Kyl indicated he wanted assurances that the 
fiscal year 2012 budget would include adequate funding as well. 
Although next year's budget is not due out until February, as I 
mentioned before, the administration has already announced what it will 
be requesting, and it will be another enormous increase in the weapons 
activities budget. Can there really be any doubt that the 
administration will move aggressively forward with modernization--if 
Republicans take the first modest step of ratifying New START now?
  We have passed our key test. The administration has met the demands 
Senator Kyl had laid out. Now the key test for Senator Kyl and others 
is whether they will join us in ratifying the New START. If they don't 
do that now, the consensus that we have built will fall apart. Our 
national security will be put at risk. And we will return

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to the dark days when the nuclear enterprise was the subject of neglect 
and controversy.
  The New START is a modest but very important step. It is one we 
should all take together, without controversy.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

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