[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 13]
[Senate]
[Pages 18182-18188]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                            NEW START TREATY

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we are in what we all understand are very 
difficult times--challenging in every respect and certainly with 
respect to the national security concerns of the country. As we speak, 
American soldiers are fighting a war in Afghanistan, winding down a war 
in Iraq, and our Nation has young men and women in harm's way in many 
parts of the world, engaged in a persistent challenge against global 
terrorism. Iran's nuclear program continues to advance, and North Korea 
is building a uranium enrichment facility and provoking the south on a 
regular basis with its military aggression.
  Every single one of these is a complex challenge without any easy 
solution. But in the middle of all these challenges, the Senate has 
been given an opportunity to actually reduce the dangers our country 
faces. We have been given an opportunity set an example for the world. 
We have been given an opportunity to make the decision that would help 
to put greater pressure on Iran, on North Korea or on any other country 
that might be contemplating the notion of moving toward nuclear 
weapons. The Senate has been given the opportunity in the next days to 
express the leadership of our country with respect to moving in the 
opposite direction--away from nuclear weapons to greater controls, 
greater accountability, greater security and safety for our people.
  With one simple vote before we leave here in the next days, we could 
approve the New START treaty and make America and the world more secure 
and take an important step forward in leadership as we express to the 
world our sense of responsibility with respect to the challenge of 
nuclear weapons. That is the opportunity we have. The question before 
every Senator is going to be whether we come here in these next days to 
do the business of the American people, to do our constitutional 
responsibility to advise and consent to a treaty negotiated by the 
executive department of the country.

[[Page 18183]]

  New START is, quite simply, a commonsense agreement to control the 
world's most dangerous weapons and enhance stability between the two 
countries that possess over 90 percent of them. Just think of the 
statement it makes to those countries contemplating where Iran may be 
going when the countries that possess 90 percent of these weapons begin 
to dismantle these weapons and provide intrusive verification steps 
between us for how we will both behave. What an important statement at 
this moment in time with respect to Iranian behavior, with respect to 
North Korean behavior, and what a completely opposite, irresponsible 
decision it would be if the Senate just got bogged down in politics and 
walked away from this moment, unwilling to make that kind of decision 
that offers the leadership that I think the world and certainly the 
American people expect us to make.
  This treaty will limit the number of nuclear weapons Russia can 
deploy to 1,550 warheads. What American who contemplates the nature of 
nuclear war and conflict and the potential damage of 1 weapon, 10 
weapons, 20 weapons--what American does not understand the common sense 
of limiting Russia to 1,550 weapons pointing at the United States of 
America, some of them directly pointing at us even as I stand here and 
speak today?
  This treaty will give us flexibility in deploying our own arsenal so 
we do not have to live by a strict restraint with respect to land or 
sea or air. We have flexibility in which weapons we want to put into 
which modality, and the verification provisions will significantly 
deepen our understanding of Russian forces. It has been almost a full 
year now since the original START treaty and its verification 
procedures expired. Every day since then, insight that treaty provided 
has been degrading.
  New START does more than just restrain the weapons. It does more than 
just provide verification. It actually strengthens the relationship 
between the United States and Russia, and it enhances the global 
nonproliferation regime we signed up to years and years ago during the 
Cold War. It will improve our efforts to constrain Iran and, most 
important, to contain the loose nuclear materials we all fear could one 
day fall into the hands of terrorists and, if not result in a nuclear 
explosion, result in what we call a dirty bomb explosion where nuclear 
material is, in fact, scattered for want of the ability to create a 
nuclear weapon itself but with grave consequences of radioactive 
material doing enormous injury to large populations as a result. 
Already in the 7 months since we signed the New START, Russia has shown 
greater dedication to this renewed relationship. They have supported 
harsher sanctions against Iran. They have suspended the sale of the S-
300 air defense system to Tehran.
  The original START agreement which was the bedrock of the Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, a program whereby we are 
currently reducing nuclear warheads with Russia and containing the 
nuclear material--one of the great contributions to nonproliferation of 
modern times--that is the most successful nonproliferation effort to 
date in which any country has engaged. That would be threatened if this 
START agreement does not pass. It is strengthened if the START 
agreement does pass.
  Without the START treaty, the New START treaty--I think nobody 
expresses concern greater than Senator Lugar. Senator Lugar, a 
Republican Senator, has shown enormous leadership on this issue for 
years and years now. He is respected all across the globe by those 
people who follow these issues. He has expressed the urgency of passing 
this treaty now, in this Senate, in this Congress, in this session.
  In summary, the New START helps the United States to lead other 
countries so we help each other to address the lingering dangers of the 
old nuclear age, and it gives us a very important set of tools in order 
to combat the threats of the new nuclear age. Indeed, the single most 
significant question being raised at this point in time is not about 
the substance of the treaty within the four corners of the treaty; it 
is about language external to the treaty with respect to whether it 
somehow might limit our missile defenses. All of us acknowledge that 
those missile defense investments we have made to date will go a long 
way toward helping us to be able to address the threat of rogue states.
  Let me just say as unequivocally as I know how that there is nothing 
in this treaty--there is no way this treaty--there is no way the 
policies of this administration--there is no way any language that is 
formal or binding between our nations or any other language, in fact, 
binds the United States or restrains us from pursuing missile defense. 
The answer with respect to any question on missile defense in this 
treaty is, no, it unequivocally does not restrain America's ability to 
develop and deploy missile defense. What is more, the evidence of that 
was very clear in Lisbon just the other day where the President of the 
United States, together with European countries, publicly announced the 
procedure by which we are going forward to deploy a missile defense in 
Europe in order to deal with the rogue threat problem.
  Let me be even more clear. With respect to the question of any 
limitation of missile defense, the Secretary of Defense, appointed by 
President George W. Bush, says no, there is no limitation on missile 
defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says no, there is no 
limitation on missile defense; the commander of our nuclear forces says 
no, no limitation on missile defense; the Director of the Missile 
Defense Agency says no, there is no limitation on missile defense. 
Again and again, senior military leaders have said unambiguously that 
this treaty does not limit our missile defense plans. So, in my 
judgment and the judgment of most people I know who reasonably approach 
this treaty, there is no issue of missile defense with respect to this 
treaty.
  Now we are beginning to hear people say that maybe we do not have 
time, in the context of the lameduck session, to deal with this 
question of American leadership, this constitutional responsibility 
that ought properly to be executed by the Senate that has done all of 
the work on this treaty. There is in that statement about lack of time, 
to some degree, a sort of question: Maybe there are a whole bunch of 
issues out there that just have not been resolved. Let me try to deal 
with that for a moment because I wish to make it very clear that the 
New START treaty's inspection and evaluation and analysis process by 
the Senate and appropriate committees has been extensive and 
exhaustive.
  I wish to make clear what the record says about the time we have to 
consider this treaty. The Senate has been working on this treaty for 
the past year and a half, ever since the negotiations first began.
  Starting in June of 2009, the Foreign Relations Committee was briefed 
at least five times during the talks with the Russians. Senators from 
the Armed Services Committee, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
Senate's National Security Working Group--all of them took part in 
those briefings. That was an obligation of this Congress. This Congress 
was present during the briefings with the negotiators, this Congress 
was privy to those negotiations as they went along--something a future 
Congress could not be because the negotiations are over. That 
underscores even more why this is the Congress that is the appropriate 
Congress to deal with this treaty. Roughly 60 U.S. Senators, through 
those committees I named, were able to follow the negotiations in 
detail, and individual Senators had additional opportunities to meet 
with our negotiating team, and a delegation of Senators even traveled 
to Geneva in the fall of 2009 to meet with the negotiators. I might add 
that included Senator Kyl, who has been one of the leading Senators on 
the other side involved in our discussions on this treaty. In other 
words, by the time the New START treaty was formally submitted to the 
Senate in May, the 111th Congress was already steeped in this, deeply 
steeped in this. No other Senate can now replicate the input we had 
into these negotiations.

[[Page 18184]]

  Over the next 6 months after the Senate treaty was submitted, the 
Senate became even more immersed in the treaty's details through 
hearings, briefings, documents, and hundreds upon hundreds of questions 
that were submitted to the administration. Something like 900 questions 
were submitted to the administration, and all of them have been 
answered in full.
  This Senate has done its homework on the New START treaty, and it is 
this Senate that has an obligation to complete the advice and consent 
on that treaty.
  The fact is, there are also very important security reasons for us 
not to wait. Next Sunday, December 5, it will have been 1 year since 
the original START treaty expired--a whole year without on-the-ground 
inspections in Russia. Some people say it doesn't really make a 
difference whether it be a month or 2 months or whatever. I have to 
tell you something: When it comes to nuclear arsenals, every day 
matters. Without this treaty, we know too little about the only arsenal 
in the world that has the potential to destroy the United States.
  As James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, said--and he 
does not come to us with an opinion that is clouded by politics; he 
doesn't come to us as a Democrat or a Republican; he comes to us as a 
professional whose task it is to defend the security of our country and 
who has a lifetime career wearing the uniform of our Nation, defending 
our country--he says of ratifying New START, ``I think the earlier, the 
sooner, the better.''
  One of our most solemn responsibilities is this responsibility of 
advice and consent. We have been through a tough political year. The 
American people, we all understand--Senators keep coming to the floor 
and referring to the anger. It is real. It is there. We know the 
American people are angry. But they are angry because the business of 
the country does not seem to get done. They are angry because they see 
a partisan food fight, a political food fight taking place instead of 
the serious business of our Nation.
  I believe other countries are watching us to see whether we can 
fulfill our constitutional responsibilities. Just how well does this 
democracy we sell all over the world actually work? If we can't make it 
work here at home and we can't deliver now, what kind of a message does 
it send about the power of the United States to leverage its values and 
its interests in the challenging world we face today?
  Every Senator has an obligation to ask that question of themselves 
over the course of these next days: Are we a credible partner? Can 
other nations rely on us? What happens when the President of the United 
States negotiates a treaty, and he comes back here and the rest of the 
world sees that treaty bogged down, not in the substance of the treaty 
but in the politics of the day?
  With this vote we can demonstrate our resolve and our leadership, and 
we can demonstrate something about the quality of our democracy. I 
think the schedule of the Foreign Relations Committee shows good-faith 
efforts which we have applied to live up to the Senate's 
responsibility.
  After the treaty was signed in April, Senator Lugar and I worked 
together to set up a bipartisan review of the treaty. Never once did 
Senator Lugar or I approach this in a partisan way. I am grateful to 
Senator Lugar for his exceptional leadership and his willingness to 
stand up to some of the currents of the day and act on the interests of 
the country as he sees them.
  Our primary consideration in the scheduling of witnesses before our 
committee was not whether they would support or oppose the treaty, we 
looked for expertise and we looked for experience. On April 29, the 
committee heard from Bill Perry, former Secretary of Defense, and Jim 
Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and 
Director of Central Intelligence.
  These men recently led the congressionally mandated Strategic Posture 
Commission. They both said we should approve the New START treaty. Dr. 
Schlesinger said it is--this is the quote of Dr. Schlesinger, who 
served a Republican President--``obligatory''--that is his word--
``obligatory for the United States to ratify New START.''
  Dr. Perry told us this treaty advances American security objectives, 
particularly with respect to nuclear proliferation and nuclear 
terrorism. On May 18, the committee held a hearing with Secretary 
Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. Admiral Mullen told us 
the New START treaty ``has the full support of your uniformed 
military.''
  Secretary Gates made clear the treaty will not constrain U.S. missile 
defense efforts. He said:

       From the very beginning of this process more than 40 years 
     ago the Russians have hated missile defense. They do not want 
     to devote the resources to it and so they try and stop us 
     from doing it through political means. This treaty does not 
     accomplish that for them.

  That is what Secretary Gates said. The next day, former Secretary of 
State Jim Baker, who helped negotiate START I and helped negotiate 
START II, said that the New START ``appears to take our country in a 
direction that can enhance our national security while at the same time 
reducing the number of nuclear warheads on the planet.''
  A week later, on May 25, Henry Kissinger recommended ratification of 
the treaty. He also cautioned us that rejection of the treaty would, in 
his words, have an ``unsettling impact'' on the international 
environment.
  We also heard from two former National Security Advisers; Stephen 
Hadley, who served under George W. Bush, who told us the treaty is ``a 
modest but nonetheless useful contribution to the security of the 
United States and to international security''; and Brent Scowcroft, who 
served under George H.W. Bush, said he supports the treaty and he told 
us the New START does not restrict our missile defense plans. He said 
the Russian unilateral statement was simply an issue of ``domestic 
politics for the Russians.''
  So we heard from some of the most eminent statesmen this country has 
produced, Republicans and Democrats, with decades and decades of public 
service. They said we should approve this treaty. In all, six former 
Secretaries of State, five former Secretaries of Defense, the Chair and 
Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission, and numerous other distinguished 
Americans have said it is important we approve New START.
  On July 14, seven former heads of the U.S. Strategic Command and 
Strategic Air Command sent the committee a letter urging approval of 
the treaty. Indeed, some of the strongest support for this treaty has 
come from the military, which unanimously supports the treaty. On June 
16, I chaired a hearing on the U.S. nuclear posture, modernization of 
the nuclear weapons complex, and our missile defense plans.
  GEN Kevin Chilton, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, which is 
responsible for overseeing our nuclear deterrence, explained why the 
military supports the New START. He said:

       If we don't get the treaty, A, the Russians are not 
     constrained in their development of force structure, and, B, 
     we have no insight into what they are doing. So it is the 
     worst of both possible worlds.

  Again, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command says not ratifying 
this treaty is the worst of both possible worlds. And LTG Patrick 
O'Reilly, who heads the Missile Defense Agency, told us the New START 
does not limit our missile defense plans.

       I have briefed the Russians, personally in Moscow, on every 
     aspect of our missile defense development. I believe they 
     understand what that is. And that these plans for development 
     are not limited by this Treaty.

  In other words, the Russians know what we intend to do and they 
signed the treaty, nonetheless.
  On July 14, the committee had a closed hearing on monitoring and 
verification of treaty compliance with senior officials from the 
intelligence community. Obviously, that was a highly classified 
briefing. But every Senator is welcome to go down to the Office of 
Senate Security and read the transcript of that hearing, which I 
suspect will stay there and not appear in WikiLeaks.

[[Page 18185]]

  If my colleagues want a public statement on verification, I would 
once again cite what James Clapper, the Director of National 
Intelligence, said last week about ratifying the New START treaty:

       I think the earlier, the sooner, the better. You know the 
     thing is, from an intelligence perspective only--

  This is General Clapper's perspective--

     are we better off with it or without it? We're better off 
     with it.

  The committee also heard testimony from the directors of the Nation's 
three nuclear laboratories. As we all know, much of the debate on the 
treaty has focused on the resources that are needed to sustain our 
nuclear deterrent and modernize our nuclear weapons infrastructure, and 
it was important for our committee to hear from the responsible 
officials directly. They praised the Obama administration's budget 
request for this fiscal year. I suspect my colleague from North Dakota, 
in a few minutes, will have something to say about that additional 
funding for the nuclear modernization program and the plan of action 
that has been outlined.
  I will simply say, again and again, the administration has bent over 
backward to work in good faith openly and accountably with Senator Kyl. 
I have been part of those discussions all along. I think we have acted 
in good faith to try to meet the needs--so much so that we put money 
into the continuing resolution a few months ago, in order to show our 
good faith for this effort to try to produce the modernization funding 
as we go forward.
  In all, the Foreign Relations Committee conducted 12 open and 
classified hearings, featuring more than 20 witnesses. The Armed 
Services and Intelligence Committees held more than eight hearings and 
classified briefings of their own. We did not stack the deck with 
Democrats. In fact, most of the former officials who testified were 
Republicans. Even the executive branch witnesses included several 
holdovers from the last administration--Secretary Gates, Admiral 
Mullen, General Chilton, Lieutenant General O'Reilly--all originally 
appointed to their posts by President Bush.
  Overwhelmingly, these witnesses supported timely ratification of the 
New START treaty. As I have said, some of the strongest endorsements 
came from America's military leaders. The combined wisdom of our 
current and former military and civilian leaders, accumulated over 
decades in service, not to political parties but in service to the 
Nation as a whole, was clear: All of them said this treaty should be 
ratified.
  Over the summer, the committee also reviewed a number of important 
documents, including a National Intelligence Estimate, assessing the 
U.S. capability to monitor compliance with the terms of the New START, 
a State Department report assessing international compliance with arms 
control agreements, including Russia's compliance with the original 
START, the State Department's analysis of the New START's 
verifiability, a classified summary of discussions during the treaty 
negotiations on the issue of missile defense.
  By the end of July, the Foreign Relations Committee had compiled an 
extensive record. We could have reported the treaty out of committee 
then. We had the votes. I was prepared to move forward, but because 
some Republican Senators knew we were prepared to move forward, they 
came and asked for more time to review the treaty and to look at the 
testimony and the documents we had gathered.
  So, in August, in direct response to this Republican request, I made 
a decision as chairman to postpone for 6 weeks, over the course of the 
August recess, until after that so Members would have more time to 
review the record, as the Republicans requested. Frankly, the treaty, I 
have said again and again, is too important to get caught up in 
partisan politics, so I thought it was very important not to allow 
anybody to say we were rushing it.
  We gave that additional time, even though we had the votes. We came 
back afterwards and we dealt with each and every one of the concerns 
that were raised in good faith. Frankly, it is important to have 
reciprocal good faith in the workings of the Senate. Over the next 6 
weeks, I encouraged Senators to contact Senator Lugar and me with their 
comments on a draft resolution of ratification. In discussions with 
Senator Lugar, Senator Corker, Senator Isakson, I made it clear we 
welcomed and needed their input and, indeed, we got their input.
  At the same time, the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees were 
wrapping up their work on the treaty. Senators Levin and McCain each 
wrote to the Foreign Relations Committee with their views on the 
treaty, as did Senators Feinstein and Bond from the Intelligence 
Committee.
  We received the answers to several outstanding questions Senators had 
posed to the administration. In all, over the past 7 months, Senators 
formally submitted some 900 questions to the Obama administration, and 
they have received thorough responses to every one of them.
  By mid-September, our bipartisan work produced a resolution of 
ratification we should all be able to support. Our review process was 
not designed to cheerlead for the treaty. It was designed to probe 
every aspect of the treaty and to come up with a resolution that 
provided the Senate's input and protected the prerogatives of the 
Senate and, indeed, of individual Senator's points of views. That is 
what we have done. At 28 pages, the resolution of ratification--
including 13 conditions, 3 understandings, 10 declarations--addresses 
every serious topic we have discussed over these months. If a Senator 
was worried about the treaty and missile defense, then condition (5), 
understanding (1), and declarations (1) and (2) addressed those issues.
  If they were worried about modernization of our nuclear weapons 
complex and strategic delivery vehicles, then condition (9) and 
declaration (13) addressed those concerns.
  If they were worried about conventional prompt global strike 
capabilities, then conditions (6) and (7), understanding (3) and 
declaration (3) addressed those.
  Worried about tactical nuclear weapons? Well, that is in there. 
Verifying Russian compliance? It is in there. Even the concern that was 
raised about rail-mobile missiles was fully addressed in the resolution 
of ratification.
  In short, the resolution is the product of careful, bipartisan 
deliberation and collaboration intended to address each of the concerns 
that was raised. That does not mean the resolution is perfect. It does 
not mean it could not possibly be further improved. But in the past 
weeks, I have been reaching out to colleagues to get additional ideas. 
I will be happy to consider any germane amendment that colleagues might 
propose. But the only way to do that is by having the floor debate on 
this treaty.
  With the Senate now back in session, there are 33 days before the end 
of the year. All of us would obviously not like to repeat what happened 
last year and not be here right up until Christmas Eve. But there is 
plenty of time in the next 3 weeks for debate.
  Look at the record. The original START agreement was a far more 
dramatic treaty than the New START because its cuts were sharper and 
because the Soviet Union had just collapsed, leaving tremendous 
uncertainty in its wake. Yet the full Senate needed only 5 days of 
floor time before it approved that treaty, by a vote of 93 to 6, a far 
more complicated and far more provocative, if you will, treaty at that 
time.
  The START II treaty took only 2 days on the floor in the Senate 
before it was approved by a vote of 87 to 4.
  So leave the precedent aside for a moment. When it comes to 
protecting our national security, the American people expect us to make 
time. That is exactly what we are prepared to do.
  We are prepared to work around the clock. If time is the only 
concern, then we have no concerns. Given the time that it took to 
consider past treaties, it is clear we can do this. We are not new to 
this business. We are not new to this treaty. We could get this done if

[[Page 18186]]

there is a will to do so. I know some Senators still worry about the 
administration's plans with respect to modernization of the nuclear 
weapons complex. That is not directly within the four corners of the 
treaty, but I understand their concern. So let's review the work very 
quickly that has been done there.
  The Obama administration proposed spending $80 billion over the next 
10 years. That is a 15-percent increase over the baseline budget, even 
after accounting for inflation. It is much more than was spent during 
the Bush administration's 8 years. Still some Senators have concerns.
  On September 15, the Vice President assured our committee that the 
10-year plan would be updated and a revised 2012 budget figure would be 
provided this fall. In the meantime, because I believed that the 
nuclear weapons program ought to be adequately funded, I worked with 
other colleagues--with the leader and Senators Dorgan and Inouye--to 
guarantee that an anomaly in the continuing resolution that we passed 
in October provided an additional $100 million for the past 2 months. 
It ensured that we would get the updated figures from the 
administration. The administration has now provided those figures. It 
is asking for an additional $5 billion over the next 10 years.
  I remind colleagues that according to the resolution of ratification, 
if any of this funding does not materialize in future years, the 
President will be required to report to Congress as to how he is going 
to address the shortfall. But if the Senate does not now approve the 
ratification of the New START, it will become increasingly difficult 
without any requirement for a report, and it will become increasingly 
difficult to provide that funding. That is a solid reason why we ought 
to get this done now.
  Ultimately, bottom line, we need to approve this treaty because it is 
critical to the security of our country. It is better to have fewer 
nuclear weapons aimed at the United States. It is better to have the 
right to inspect Russian facilities. It is better to have Russia as an 
ally in our efforts to contain Iran and North Korea and in order to 
deal with the global proliferation challenge. Our military thinks it is 
better to have these things. If any of my colleagues disagree, let them 
make their case to the full Senate. That is the way it is supposed to 
work around here. Let them make their case to the American people. If 
the American people said anything in this election year, it is that 
Congress needs to get down to the real business of our Nation. If the 
national security of our Nation is not the real business, I don't know 
what is. They have asked us to protect American interests. By ratifying 
this treaty, we will do so.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Massachusetts. 
Senator Kerry, as chairman of the committee, has done an extraordinary 
job. I also mention Senator Lugar and others who have worked very hard 
on the issue of the ratification of the START treaty. I was a member of 
the Senate National Security Working Group, and the Administration kept 
us informed all along the way during the negotiations with the 
Russians. We had meetings in various locations and were briefed by the 
negotiators who described to us what the negotiations were about, what 
the progress was, and so on. Some of my colleagues from this Chamber 
who were a part of that National Security Working Group came to the 
meetings. We all had an opportunity to ask a lot of questions. It is 
not as if someone just dropped on the Senate some package called the 
START treaty. We have been a part of that all along and have been a 
part of having discussions and descriptions of the work of this treaty 
for some long while.
  I wish to go through a couple of things today. First, some colleagues 
have decided we should not proceed with the ratification of this new 
arms reduction treaty that we have negotiated with the Russians. Some 
have alleged that there are all kinds of difficulties with it. They say 
it would limit our ability to produce and deploy an antiballistic 
missile. That is not the case. It is not accurate. They are suggesting 
that our modernization program of existing nuclear weapons or the 
lifetime extension programs for existing nuclear weapons is not funded 
sufficiently, and that is not the case. They indicate it would not meet 
our national security requirements to go ahead with this treaty.
  Let me describe what some very distinguished Americans who would know 
about this have said. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike 
Mullen, said: I, as well as our combatant commanders around the world, 
stand solidly behind this new treaty.
  That is from the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  This is General Chilton, commander of the Strategic Command that is 
in charge of our nuclear weapons. He says:

       The United States strategic command was closely consulted 
     throughout the development of the nuclear posture review and 
     during negotiations on the new strategic arms reduction 
     treaty. . . .
       What we negotiated is absolutely acceptable to the United 
     States strategic command for what we need to do to provide a 
     deterrent for the country.

  This chart pictures former nuclear commanders who support this 
treaty: Generals Davis, Welch, Chain, and Butler, Admiral Chiles, 
General Habiger, Admiral Ellis. I have worked with many of these folks, 
and they are very respected. All of them believe this treaty is the 
right thing for this country and its security.
  Dr. Henry Kissinger says:

       It should be noted I come from the hawkish side of this 
     debate so I'm not here advocating these measures in the 
     abstract. I try to build them into my perception of the 
     national interest. I recommend ratification of this treaty.

  This chart shows America's most prominent national security experts 
who support this New START treaty, Republicans and Democrats, the most 
significant thinkers about foreign policy in this country today. They 
say they support this treaty and what it means to the country.
  Some have said there is not enough funding for our modernization 
program for existing nuclear weapons or for the lifetime extension 
program for existing nuclear weapons, and that would be a problem. They 
are wrong about that. Let me describe what Linton Brooks, the former 
NNSA administrator in charge of these areas, nuclear weapons and the 
modernization and the lifetime extension programs, says, someone who 
served under the Bush administration in that role:

       As I understand it, it is a good idea on its own merits, 
     but I think for those who think it is only a good idea if you 
     only have a strong weapons program, this budget ought to take 
     care of that. Coupled with the outyear projections, it takes 
     care of the concerns about the complex and it does very good 
     things about the stockpile. And it should keep the labs 
     healthy.

  Then he said:

       I would have killed for this budget.

  This is from the man who headed NNSA during the Bush administration.
  Let me go through the issue of spending because one of the principal 
concerns has been we are not spending enough money on the existing 
nuclear weapons stockpile. There are roughly 25,000 nuclear weapons in 
this world. With respect to our portion of those nuclear weapons, we 
modernize them. We have life extension programs to make certain they 
can be certified as workable nuclear weapons, notwithstanding the fact 
that we don't ever want to have to see that one works because it seems 
to me the explosion of a nuclear weapon in a major city will change 
everything in the future. But, nonetheless, we have a certification 
program. We spend a great deal of money modernizing and keeping up to 
date with lifetime extension programs, the existing stock of nuclear 
weapons.
  I chair the appropriations subcommittee that funds the nuclear 
weapons stockpile among other things. The Appropriations Committee 
considered a request from the President this year for $7 billion for 
these weapons programs. In my subcommittee, which does a lot of 
things--energy and water programs and nuclear weapons--almost

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everything else was either flatlined or reduced. But nuclear weapons 
was increased substantially. The $7 billion the President requested was 
a 10-percent increase over the previous year. Some of my colleagues 
have said that leaves us way short of what we need.
  That $7 billion was put into the continuing resolution in November. 
There wasn't much discussion of that. So while virtually all other 
functions of government will continue to function at last year's 
appropriations level, the nuclear NNSA, nuclear weapons function, will 
be able to spend at the new funding level of $7 billion, up 10 percent 
from the previous year.
  Let me also describe what has happened with respect to fiscal years 
2011 to 2015. The President's budget plan for those years provided $5.4 
billion above the previous plan. So this President has proposed 
generous appropriations to make certain that modernization and the life 
extension programs of existing nuclear weapons is funded well. I 
mentioned it went to $7 billion.
  Now, in November, the President sent a report to Congress which 
reported that he plans to request $7.6 billion for the year 2012. That 
is a $600 million increase over 2011 which was a $600 million increase 
over 2010. Overall, the request in this new report is a $4.1 billion 
increase over the baseline during 2012 to 2016. So then we will be 
spending $85 billion in the 10-year period, $85 billion on 
modernization of our current nuclear stockpile and the life extension 
program in our current nuclear stockpile, and even that is not enough. 
We are told that is not nearly enough money.
  How much is enough? If we can certify the stockpile works and the 
stockpile provides a deterrent, how much is enough? This President has 
robustly funded the requests that were needed. Now we are told not 
nearly enough money has been appropriated.
  By the way, those who are saying this are saying we need to 
substantially cut Federal spending and reduce the Federal budget 
deficit. Very interesting.
  Let me relate, as I have in the past, something that happened over 9 
years ago to describe the importance of this subject. On 9/11/2001, 
this country was attacked. One month later, October 11, 2001, there was 
a report by a CIA agent code named Dragonfire. One of our agents had a 
report that said there was a nuclear weapon smuggled into New York, a 
10-kiloton Russian nuclear weapon stolen and smuggled into New York by 
terrorists to be detonated. That was 1 month to the day after 9/11. 
That report from the CIA agent caused apoplexy among the entire 
national security community. It was not public at that point. It was 
not made public.
  After about a month, they decided that it was perhaps not a credible 
piece of intelligence. But when they did the post mortem, they 
discovered that clearly someone could have stolen a Russian nuclear 
weapon, perhaps a 10-kiloton weapon, and could have smuggled it into 
New York City. A terrorist group could have detonated it, and a couple 
hundred thousand people could have perished--one stolen nuclear weapon. 
There are 25,000 of them on the planet--25,000.
  The question is, Do these agreements matter? Do they make a 
difference? Of course, they do. The fact is, nuclear arms agreements 
have made a very big difference.
  I have had in the drawer of my desk for a long period a couple of 
things I would like unanimous consent to show.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. This is a piece of metal from a Soviet Backfire bomber. 
We didn't shoot this bomber down. It was sawed off. They sawed the 
wings off this bomber. They did it because we paid for it under the 
Nunn-Lugar agreement in which we have actually reduced nuclear weapons, 
both delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons.
  So I have in my desk a piece of a Soviet bomber that had its wings 
sheared off because of a US-Russian agreement, and that delivery system 
is gone. I have a hinge that was on a silo in Ukraine for a missile 
that had on it a nuclear weapon aimed at this country. Well, that 
missile is now gone. I have the hinge in my hand. That missile that 
held a nuclear warhead aimed at America is gone. In its place on that 
field are sunflowers--sunflowers--not missiles.
  I have in this desk as well some copper wire that was ground up from 
a Soviet submarine that was dismantled as a result of a US-Russian arms 
control agreement. These agreements work. We know they work. We have 
reduced the number of delivery vehicles; yes, submarines, bombers, 
missiles. We have reduced the number of nuclear weapons. This agreement 
will further reduce the number of nuclear weapons.
  Now, if it is not the responsibility of our country to begin 
addressing the ability to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to 
reduce the number of nuclear weapons on the face of this Earth, then 
whose responsibility is it? It is clearly our responsibility to 
shoulder that leadership. One important element of that is when we 
negotiate these kinds of treaties, arms reduction treaties, that 
virtually everyone--Republicans and Democrats who know anything at all 
about national security and about arms reduction agreements--has said 
makes sense for our country, when we do that, it seems to me we ought 
not have the same old thing on the floor of the Senate, and this ought 
not be a part of gridlock.
  This is a negotiation between our country and Russia with respect to 
reducing delivery vehicles and reducing nuclear weapons. The National 
Security Working Group, of which I was a member--and a number of my 
colleagues were members--met in this Capitol Building, and we were 
briefed and briefed and briefed again by those who were negotiating 
this treaty. This is not a surprise. There is nothing surprising here. 
In my judgment, this Senate should, in this month, do what is necessary 
to have the debate and ratify this treaty.
  Again, let my say, this President sent to the Congress a budget 
request that had ample and robust funding, with a 10-percent increase 
for modernization and life extension programs for our nuclear weapons. 
I know that because I chaired the committee that put in the money at 
the President's request.
  Then, because of those who believed you had to have the extra money 
for the nuclear weapons program, that money was put in a continuing 
resolution so that program goes ahead with a 10-percent increase, while 
the rest of the Federal Government goes on at last year's level. I did 
not object to that. But I do object when they say there is not ample 
funding here--a 10-percent increase this year, a 10-percent increase 
next year. Testimony by everyone who knows about these weapons 
programs, the cost of them and the effectiveness of these treaties, 
ought to be demonstration enough for us to do our job and to do our job 
right.
  We have a lot of important issues in front of us. I understand that. 
But all of these issues will pale by comparison if we do not find a way 
to get our arms around this question of stopping the spread of nuclear 
weapons and reducing the number of nuclear weapons. If one, God 
forbid--one--nuclear weapon is exploded in a city on this planet, life 
on this planet will change.
  So the question of whether we assume the responsibility of 
leadership--whether we are willing to assume that responsibility--will 
determine in large part, it seems to me, about our future and about 
whether we will have a world in which we systematically and 
consistently reduce the number of nuclear weapons and therefore reduce 
the threat of nuclear weapons in the future.
  I do hope my colleagues--and, by the way, I do not suggest they are 
operating in bad faith at all. But some of my colleagues have 
insisted--insisted--there is not enough funding. It is just not the 
case. The demonstration is clear. It is the one area that has had 
consistent, robust increases in funding, requested by this President, 
and complied with by this Congress, and now even advance funding 
through the continuing resolution. It seems to me it is time to take 
yes for an answer on the question of funding, and let's move ahead and 
debate this treaty and do

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what this country has a responsibility to do: ratify this treaty, and 
do it soon.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.

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