[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 13]
[Senate]
[Pages 18176-18177]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                       START TREATY RATIFICATION

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition principally to 
urge my colleagues to ratify the START treaty with Russia. I ask 
unanimous consent at the outset that the text of a memorandum from 
Senator Jon Kyl and Senator Bob Corker, two Republican Members, dated 
November 24, 2010, regarding progress in defining nuclear modernization 
requirements be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my 
statement.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SPECTER. I urge my colleagues to move ahead with the prompt 
ratification of this treaty.
  I have long been interested in the relationship between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, predecessor to Russia, on the issue of 
arms control, going back to my college days as a student of 
international relations.
  One of the first items which attracted my concern on election to the 
Senate was a Saturday speech made by then-President Reagan where he 
said essentially that the United States had sufficient weapons to 
destroy the Soviet Union and, similarly, the Soviet Union had 
sufficient weapons to destroy the United States. For decades, the two 
countries lived under the truce, so to speak, of mutual assured 
destruction. That has given way to arms control negotiations and the 
successful negotiation of treaties. For example, the START I treaty in 
1992 was approved by a margin of 93 to 6. The START II treaty of 1996 
was approved by a margin of 87 to 4. The Moscow Treaty of 2003 was 
approved by a vote of 98 to nothing.
  The memorandum I have referenced raises a number of concerns which I 
submit to my colleagues ought not to stop us from moving ahead with 
ratification. For example, the memorandum makes this point on page 5:

       Additional funding could be applied to accelerate the 
     construction of these facilities to ensure on schedule 
     completion. . . .

  Well, there is no showing of a problem on on-schedule completion. To 
talk about ``additional funding could be applied'' is far from saying 
it is necessary for our national security.
  The memorandum further says:

       Further Administration effort to advance funding is the 
     best path to successful completion of these facilities.

  Well, here again, there is no showing that advance funding is 
necessary for successful completion. It simply says it ``is the best 
path to successful completion of these facilities,'' but no showing 
that the current path is not an adequate path.
  The memorandum, in another spot, makes this statement:

       . . . the NNSA is reviewing an updated surveillance plan 
     that could lead to greater budget requirements.

  ``Could.'' It does not say it would lead to greater budget 
requirements, and what is speculative as to what could happen ought not 
to be taken as any reason for objecting to the ratification.
  Still later in the memorandum there is the statement:

       . . . there are still no costs or funding commitments 
     beyond FY 2015.

  Well, that is not surprising when we are in the year 2010. Adequate 
time to consider and make commitments beyond 2015 is hardly a reason 
not to move ahead with ratification.
  Then, on page 5, under the category of ``Conclusion,'' there is a 
statement about ``assurances from the appropriate authorizers and 
appropriators must be obtained to ensure that the enacted budget 
reflects the President's request.''
  Well, that is unrealistic. There is no way to get assurances from 
authorizers--that is referring to the Armed Services Committee--or the 
appropriators, specifically the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, a 
subcommittee on which I have served during my tenure.
  When you talk about getting assurances from legislators, from 
Senators, from Members of the House of Representatives, that, simply 
stated, is unrealistic, I submit.
  The concerns I had in the early days of my tenure in the Senate led 
me to propose a resolution for a summit meeting which was contested by 
Senator Tower, who was then-chairman of the Armed Services Committee. 
On this floor--I can still see Senator Tower on the end seat in the 
third row back and I in the junior league my first couple of years in 
the Senate. Senator Tower was a tough advocate. We had quite a 
protracted debate about the triad.
  I had done my homework. I had been to Grand Forks, ND, and seen the 
Minuteman II. It was my first experience seeing a nuclear weapon, and 
it was quite a sight. I recall looking down an open space--I think it 
went close to 100 feet, perhaps 90 feet; I would not affirm exactly 
what it was--and seeing the Minuteman II, and that was, in effect, 
small potatoes compared to what we have had since. I went to the Air 
Force base in California to look at the B bomber, the B-1 or the B-2 at 
that time, and to South Carolina to Charleston to see the nuclear 
submarines.
  I had quite a debate with Senator Tower as to whether the subs were 
detectable, which bore on the issue of whether we had sufficient 
strength, and the tabling motion was defeated on a vote of 60 to 38. I 
recall Senator Laxalt walking down the aisle and voting no and starting 
to head for the Republican cloakroom, and Senator Tower walked fast, 
chasing him up the aisle, and said: You don't understand, Paul, this is 
a tabling motion. I am looking for an ``aye.'' And Laxalt turned and 
said: I understand what you are after, John, but I agree with Arlen 
Specter. Senator Tower said: He is trying to tell the President what to 
do. Senator Laxalt said: Well, so is everybody else--really, in effect, 
saying that is what Senators do from time to time, just expressing 
their opinions.
  The tabling motion was defeated 60 to 38, and the resolution was 
adopted 90 to 8.
  There has been a lot of unease and consternation among foreign 
nations as to what is going on in the Senate. I do not question the 
motives of the writers of the memorandum. I do not question their 
motives or their good faith. But there is considerable concern both at 
home and abroad as to the gridlock which now confronts the Senate. That 
is inevitable when one Senator says: We are going to see to it that 
this is President Obama's Waterloo, and

[[Page 18177]]

when leadership on the other side of the aisle says: Our principal 
objective is to defeat President Obama in 2012. There is a concern 
about what is happening, whether there are really bona fide objections 
to the START talks.
  In connection with the travels I have undertaken during the course of 
the past many months--in India, with a congressional delegation, a 
group of us met with the Prime Minister of India, a concern about 
agreements made with our executive branch, whether they will be upheld; 
a meeting with officials in China on certain trade issues; talking to 
leaders in other foreign countries, a real question about what is going 
on in the government of the United States.
  In this interdependent world, I suggest it is very important we 
project a national image, a national posture of rationality in what we 
are doing and not to throw up roadblocks to international agreements 
such as START without good reason in the context where at least in 
appearances there is obstructionism.
  When we talk about risks involved, my own view is that we are far at 
this point from a threat with the Russian Government. This is not the 
day of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 when the world may have 
teetered on the edge of a nuclear confrontation. The relations with the 
Soviet Union were disintegrated. The relations with Russia are vastly 
improved, and we need the cooperation of Russia in dealing with many 
very vexing international problems, paramount of which is our dealings 
with Iran and the need to have the Russians join us in sanctions 
against Iran and to promote the Russian offer to enrich the uranium 
from Iran so they do not enrich it themselves, posing a threat with 
what Iran would do with enriched uranium--a threat which is not present 
if it is not in Iran's hands when uranium is enriched, which could be 
used for peaceful purposes.
  We see today the importance of the cooperation of China in the 
concerns we have with North Korea. When that problem broke last week, 
my first comment publicly in a television interview on MSNBC was to 
state what was the obvious: that we had to engage China to deal with 
North Korea. China's initial comments were muted, were not very 
encouraging. I am pleased to see the most recent reports are that China 
is moving ahead to try to deal with a threat posed by North Korea, 
having shuttle talks between North Korea and South Korea.
  So it is in this overall context of having the assurances registered 
with foreign governments that there is rationality. When we talk about 
risks, my own assessment--and I have studied this situation closely. I 
was a member of the U.S. arms talks in Geneva going back into 1987, 
during that decade and beyond. But the risks are not what they once 
were. It is never possible to eliminate risks entirely, but when we are 
looking to evaluate the balance of risks and international cooperation 
with Russia and our conduct on START, as we project an image of 
strength with other countries, the risk is well worth taking to the 
extent that it exists. Again, I say my own evaluation is that there is 
not much of a risk involved.
  The Washington Post, last Friday, November 26, quoted one of the 
authors of the memorandum expressing satisfaction:

       I've come to the conclusion that the administration is 
     intellectually committed to modernization now. . . .Whether 
     they're committed in the heart is another matter. Suppose 
     Start is ratified, and they no longer have to worry about 
     that? Will they continue to press for the money?

  Well, if we concede there is a commitment, be it an intellectual 
commitment, there is not a whole lot more that we can ask for.

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