[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 17247-17249]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                         DEFENSE MODERNIZATION

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I read an article from the October 2010 
edition of the Defense Technology International this morning that 
discussed military and other technology advances. Entitled ``Big Guns: 
China muscles up artillery punch,'' this article details China's 
efforts in the development of artillery and rocket systems and the 
associated doctrine they have created. Specifically, it addresses 
Chinese efforts in research and development in areas such as computer-
based fire control, digital communication, and command capabilities, 
use of sophisticated radars and jammers, and the development of ramjet 
powered and stealth coated artillery shells, to name a few key areas. 
Though not necessarily new items of research and development for the 
United States, China's efforts in these areas tells me one thing: China 
is pursuing modernization and development initiatives that, based on 
our recent history of research and development specific to artillery 
and rockets, may be superior if they are not at least equal to our 
efforts
  Now let me shift same gears to another potential peer country: Russia 
and its fifth-generation fighter development. In the same context as 
China's efforts in artillery and rocket capability, Russia is pursuing 
the deployment of a fifth-generation fighter, known as the PAK FA 
advanced tactical frontline fighter. Russia has publicly stated that 
this aircraft is the peer to the F-22. This aircraft, together with 
upgraded fourth-generation fighters, will define Russian Air Force 
potential for the next several decades and will challenge our aviation 
efforts without question. And don't think that China isn't developing 
their own fifth-generation aircraft; they are. It is called the JA-12 
it is also going to go head to head with our F-22.

[[Page 17248]]

  The point to this is not a comparison of capabilities or numbers but 
a public reinforcement of an assessment I have maintained for a long 
time. We, the United States of America, are not taking our future 
national security seriously, because we are failing to focus on 
maintaining the edge that we have had for the last several decades.
  So where is the United States in terms of future military hardware 
necessary to maintain that edge? Did you know that the oldest combat 
vehicle in the Army inventory is the M109A6 Paladin howitzer and we are 
on the sixth version of this vehicle which is built around a 
refurbished chassis circa 1963? The Army's answer to artillery 
modernization has been the Crusader, which was supposed to replace the 
Paladin, the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon as part of FCS, the Non-Line-of-
Sight Launch System, another FCS related system, and now the Paladin 
Integrated Management, or PIM program, which is a modification of the 
Paladin to a Bradley chassis. All but the PIM program have been 
cancelled in the last 8 years or so, and the PIM program has been 
delayed in production.
  Current Army fleets of armored personnel carriers, tanks, wheeled 
vehicles, and helicopters were developed and procured 30 to 60 years 
ago. DOD and the President's answer to that: cancel FCS, with no viable 
replacement options, and continue to ``upgrade'' current fleets of 
Bradleys an Abrams tanks until the next-generation ground combat 
vehicle can be figured out.
  Our strategic bomber fleet of B-52s, B-1s and B-2s vary in age from 
10 to 30 years. The SECDEF has publicly stated in the press and in 
Congress that 2020 will be the first time we see a new bomber, which 
means that current airframes will have to remain in service until at 
least 2040.
  One of our two fifth-generation aircraft, the F-22, the peer to the 
Russian's PAK FA and Chinese JA-12, has had the production line 
cancelled with only 187 aircraft built out of a requested 750, pulling 
us in a ``high risk'' state for air dominance. The other fifth-
generation aircraft, the F-35, will not be ready until at least 2015, 
has suffered significant cost and timing problems, and will be 250 
aircraft less than the requested 1,240.
  Our Ohio class Trident submarines, the ones that deliver ballistic 
missiles from the sea, are an average of 20 years old. Replacement 
builds don't start till 2019 and won't be finished until 2028. As well, 
the administration remains opaque about plans for replacement of the 
30-year-old air-launched cruise missile which is a critical component 
of our nuclear and long-range conventional strike capability. This is 
the same for our Minuteman ICBM, which is decades old as well.
  I am convinced well beyond any reasonable doubt that we are heading 
down a slippery slope due to a shortsighted and dangerous strategy from 
our current administration. The litany of programs cancelled, modified, 
or mismanaged over the last two budget periods is minf-boggling--FCS, 
F-22, F-35, NLOS-C and LS, PIM, missile defense, nuclear stockpile, 
surface and submarine ships, strategic bombers--the list is 
overwhelming.
  I, for one, will not let this happen. I will continue to voice my 
concerns over this issue. I will continue to fight for a flat 
expenditure of at least 4 percent of GDP spent on defense to ensure 
that this country continues to have the best military in the world. I 
will continue to press the administration to do more for the future of 
our national security.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the article 
``Big Guns'' to which I referred.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         [From the Defense Technology International, Oct. 2010]

               Big Guns--China Muscles Up Artillary Punch

                      (By Richard D. Fisher, Jr.)

       The International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military 
     Balance 2010 report places China third in the number of 
     artillery systems it fields, after Russia and North Korea. 
     But China doubtless exceeds both in resource commitment and 
     breadth of artillery investments. Credited with an estimated 
     17,700-plus towed, self-propelled and rocket systems, the 
     People's Liberation Army (PLA) has at least 56 artillery 
     systems in use, development or available for export. The U.S. 
     Army and Marine Corps, by contrast, have 8,187-plus artillery 
     pieces of roughly 10 types.
       China has had a mixed record of using artillery for 
     military and political-military goals. Its successes as when 
     it routed Indian forces in 1962 with the high-altitude use of 
     artillery and mortars, have been offset by incidents 
     provoking third-party responses or leading to regional 
     standoffs. Examples include the shelling of islands 
     controlled by Taiwan in 1955-58, resulting in U.S. 
     intervention and a stalemate over the Taiwan Strait. In July, 
     a unit based in the Nanjing military region fired missiles 
     from 300-mm. PHL-03 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) into the 
     Yellow Sea to show China's anger at U.S. naval exercises with 
     South Korea. The exercises, a result of China-backed North 
     Korea's sinking of the South Korean frigate Cheonon in March, 
     went ahead anyway.
       China evolution as an artillery power stems from Soviet and 
     Russian influences dating to the Korean War Soviet artillery 
     and training improved PLA artillery operations during the war 
     and led to the formation of the first formal artillery 
     command. Soviet aid continued through the 1950s, and by the 
     time of the Sin-Soviet split of the 1960s, China was 
     producing copies or modified versions of Soviet pieces.
       The PLA makes extensive use of Soviet-origin 152-, 130- and 
     122-mm. calibers, though Western calibers such as the 155- 
     and 105-mm. are seeing greater use. China purchased the 
     Russian 9A52 Smerch 300-mm. MRL in the 1990s, and the PLA 
     produced a near facsimile in the A-100/PHL-03 MRL. The 155-
     mm. PLZ-05 self-propelled artillery system that emerged in 
     2005 bears an uncanny resemblance to the Russian 2519 MSTA.
       In the 1990s, PLA artillery was affected by reforms in 
     strategy (its closest concept to doctrine) and organization. 
     Toward the end of the decade, the PLA was immersed in 
     strategy goals of ``informatization'' and ``mechanization.'' 
     The former included the broad application of improving 
     information technologies, which for artillery included new 
     computer-based fire controls and ever-improving digital 
     communication and command linkages. PLA artillery units 
     increasingly include flrefinding counter-battery radar such 
     as the 50-km.-range (31-mi.) SLC-2 and Type 704, and use 
     sophisticated electronic warfare systems such as the Russian 
     SPR-2 radio fuse jammer, a possible Chinese facsimile and 
     possibly a recently revealed artillery radar jammer. 
     Artillery recon vehicles and recon troops feature advanced 
     optronic and digital communication capabilities. In addition, 
     PLA artillery units have sophisticated meteorological 
     capabilities and use muzzle velocity radar to improve 
     accuracy.
       Mechanization put renewed emphasis on developing tracked 
     and wheeled self-propelled tubed artillery, with rocket 
     artillery largely truck-mounted. This trend was emphasized in 
     late 2004 when Chinese Communist Party and PLA leader Hu 
     Jintao enunciated the PLAs new ``historic missions,'' a 
     euphemism for invasions, which call on the PLA to defend 
     state interests abroad. It is likely that new medium-weight 
     artillery systems based on airmobile armored personnel 
     carriers will follow for these strategic missions.
       Organic PLA artillery units have decreased in size, 
     following the pattern of general large-scale troop 
     reductions. When combined with ``informatization'' advances, 
     this will permit many infantry and armored divisions to be 
     reformed into mechanized brigades. However, in a counter-
     trend that emphasizes their continued importance, the PLA 
     maintains five independent artillery divisions and 20 
     independent brigades. Of these, two divisions and six 
     brigades are stationed in the Shenyang and Beijing military 
     regions, for potential Korean contingencies. Three divisions 
     and eight brigades are in the Nanjing Guangzhou and Jinan 
     military regions, for Taiwan contingencies.
       Among artillery systems, mortars include a 60-mm. hand-held 
     system used by infantry and special forces. The new Type 93 
     60-mm. fixed mortar weighs 22.4 kg. (49.2 lb.) and fires 20 
     rounds/min. to 5.5 km. There are also fixed W91 and W87 81-
     mm. mortars that fire to 8 km. and 5.6 km., respectively. The 
     PLA has largely copied Russia's Vasilyek 81-mm. automatic 
     mortar, called the W99 or SM-4, which comes in a towed 
     version or mounted in a Hummer-like vehicle. It fires four 
     rounds in 2 sec. out to 6.2 km. The W86 120-mm. towed mortar 
     weighs 206 kg. and fires 20 rounds/min. to 4.7 km.
       In 2001, the PLA revealed the PLL-05 mobile mortar based on 
     the Russian 120-mm. 2S23 NONA-SVK that it purchased in the 
     1990s, but mounted on a WZ-551 6 X 6 armored personnel 
     carrier (APC). It fires a rocket-assisted round 13.5 km. In 
     2007, the PLA revealed a laser-guided 120-mm. mortar round, 
     though it is not clear if it is in service.
       Towed and self-propelled tubed systems dominate artillery 
     units. The largest number of towed guns are likely the 122-
     mm. versions. These include the Type-96, based on the Russian 
     D-30, with a 360-deg. traversing base, and the simpler Type-
     83. Their rocket-assisted rounds have a 27-km. range. The

[[Page 17249]]

     Type-59 130-mm. towed gun fires a rocket-assisted round 44 
     km. Of heavy towed artillery, the 152-mm. Type-66, a copy of 
     the Russian D-20, is most numerous and fires rocket-assisted 
     rounds 28 km. In 1999, the PLA revealed the 155-mm. PLL01/WA 
     021 towed artillery system, based on the Austrian Noricum GH 
     N-45, which fires a rocket-assisted round 50 km. The PLL01 
     and the Type-66 fire 155- and 152-mm. versions of the Russian 
     Krasnopol laser-guided shell.
       Self-propelled tubed artillery includes the PLL02, which 
     places the Type-86 100-mm. gun on a WZ-551 APC. In 2009, the 
     PLA revealed the new Type-07 122-mm. tracked artillery 
     system, which features hull and electronic improvements over 
     the previous Type-89 Tracked 122-mm. system. In 2009, 
     photographs appeared on the Internet of the SH-3, a truck-
     mounted 122-mm. artillery system with digital control systems 
     in a hatch over the cab.
       Heavy self-propelled systems include the 155-mm. PLZ-05, 
     which has a version of the PLL01 gun, and appeared in 2005. 
     It is replacing the 152-mm. Type-83, which entered service in 
     1983. The PLZ-05 also fires the Krasnopol laser-guided 
     projectile and a rocket-assisted round 50 km., and is capable 
     of flat-trajectory antitank fire. Unconfirmed reports state 
     the PLZ-05 has an automatic gun-loading system and weighs 35 
     tons.
       PLA investments in rocket artillery are impressive. A five-
     wheel all-terrain vehicle has been modified to carry a 107-
     mm. MRL for experimental mechanized special forces units. The 
     tracked Type-89 and more recent Type-90 truck-mounted 122-mm. 
     MRL feature self-contained 40-round rocket reloaders. In 
     addition, the Smerch-derived 12-round PHL-03, which 
     reportedly fires a 150-km.-range missile, is entering 
     increasing numbers of artillery units. The latest AR1A export 
     variant features a modular U.S. MLR system-style 5-round 
     rocket carrier, which speeds reloading. In 2009, Norinco 
     revealed an as yet unidentified truck carrier for this 5-
     round rocket box, similar to Lockheed Martin's High-Mobility 
     Artillery Rocket System.
       The PLA is also investing in larger MRL systems. The 400-
     mm. WS-2D reportedly has a range of 400 km., and one payload 
     features three ``killer unmanned aerial vehicles,'' according 
     to a Chinese report. An earlier 200-km.-range version, the 
     WS-3, uses navigation satellite guidance to achieve a 
     remarkable 50-meter (164-ft.) circular error probable. The WS 
     family complements the 150-km.-range P-12 and 250-km. B-611M 
     maneuverable navsat-guided short-range ballistic missiles 
     (SRBMs), which could supplement or replace the PLA's two 
     brigades of 300-600-km. DF-11A SRBMs.
       New artillery systems are entering amphibious and airborne 
     units for possible missions abroad. PLA marine and army 
     amphibious units are receiving the Type-07B tracked 122-mm. 
     amphibious artillery system, which places the gun from the 
     Type-07 on a larger hull. Airborne units are equipped with a 
     version of the Type-96 122-mm. gun, but a new tracked 
     airmobile APC may feature a mortar or gun system. The ZBD-09 
     122-mm. gun system could eventually feature in airmobile army 
     units. Future artillery systems may feature electromagnetic 
     launch, an area of extensive research. The PLA is also 
     interested in ramjet-powered and stealth-coated artillery 
     shells.

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