[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 16528-16530]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              AFGHANISTAN

  Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about our policy in 
Afghanistan, which has evolved significantly since I arrived in the 
Senate in January 2009. After President Bush diverted our focus from 
Afghanistan to Iraq in 2003, President Obama redoubled our efforts to 
engage in an effective counterinsurgency strategy. In the past year, we 
have finally invested the resources necessary to make progress in 
Afghanistan with increased troop levels, equipment, and funding. But 
despite this commitment and the outstanding performance of our troops, 
progress in Afghanistan is riding on far more than the military. It 
also requires a civilian strategy, Afghan National Security Force 
training, cooperation with Pakistan, Afghan Governance, and tackling 
corruption at all levels, beginning with President Karzai.
  The Obama administration has made a concerted effort to get the 
policy right in Afghanistan, as demonstrated

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by the two policy reviews conducted in 2009. As it embarks on a third 
review this fall, I encourage a renewed focus on corruption, which will 
serve as the bellwether for progress as we transition toward a 
conditions-based drawdown in July. The majority of Afghans do not 
support the Taliban, but they will not support U.S. efforts if they 
perceive their government as corrupt. According to a recent poll, 59 
percent of Afghans cite corruption as the biggest problem, while 54 
percent cite security.
  At the same time, this is not a battle between the U.S. and the 
Taliban. It is a struggle between the Afghan Government and the Taliban 
for the support of the population. While less than 10 percent of 
Afghans actively support the Taliban, this does not necessarily 
translate into support for the Afghan Government in the absence of 
jobs, free and fair elections, an efficient judicial system, and other 
essential services. Counterinsurgency is about building trust between 
the local population, the security forces, and the government. And 
without credible governance at the national and subnational levels, we 
cannot expect sustainable progress.
  Since assuming office, I have traveled to Afghanistan three times in 
March and September 2009, and April of this year. My trips have been 
eye-opening experiences, and I have made the following observations. 
First, our military is performing at the highest level--a 10 out of 10. 
The bravery and commitment of our men and women in uniform is both 
admirable and inspiring. Moreover, from the top down, the military has 
embraced counterinsurgency strategy, which is the best way to meet 
current and future security challenges. This is why I strongly support 
Secretary Gates' efforts to rebalance the defense budget to better 
prepare for the non-conventional threats of the future, drawing on the 
lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan.
  My second observation is that counterinsurgency strategy in 
Afghanistan requires far more than the military. It requires a strong 
civilian capacity, indigenous security forces, and governance to meet 
the requirements necessary for progress. First, the military must shape 
the strategy. Second, security forces must clear the area of 
insurgents. Third, they must hold the area. And fourth, civilians, in 
partnership with the local and national government, must build through 
economic development. In Afghanistan, we are working toward a fifth 
stage of transferring responsibility to the Afghans by July 2011.
  Last year at this time, I gave a speech detailing the requirements 
necessary for waging an effective counterinsurgency strategy in 
Afghanistan, including sufficient numbers of Afghan National Security 
Forces, or ANSF; a ``civilian surge'' strategy; increased levels of 
cooperation with Pakistan; and building Afghan government capacity 
through the elimination of corruption. In the past year, there has been 
progress in some of these areas, but significant challenges still 
remain.
  When considering the sufficient number of ANSF, it is important to 
look to COIN doctrine, which stipulates one counterinsurgent for every 
50 civilians. This requires nearly 600,000 counterinsurgents given the 
size of the Afghan population. If we add the total number of 
international troops plus current levels of the Afghan army and police, 
it is less than half the required 600,000. At the same time, there has 
been recent progress in lowering the rates of attrition and increasing 
recruitment and retention, especially among the Afghan National Police.
  By comparison, the current level of Iraqi Security Forces is 600,000, 
which seemed like a lofty goal just a few years ago. Increasing the 
size of the ANSF is possible, but training an effective Afghan army and 
police will continue to require great patience, determination, and 
leadership.
  Remember, Iraq and Afghanistan are about the same size and need 
600,000 troops for our counterinsurgency. We have less than 300,000 
now, security forces, troops, police, and our troops.
  When I asked him about this issue last year, General McChrystal said 
that we did not need to reach the requisite level of 600,000 because 
the plan was to selectively focus on population centers in regional 
commands east and south. While it makes sense to hone in on areas with 
the biggest security problems, the Taliban has filled the void in areas 
where we diverted our attention. We have seen this most prominently in 
the north, where violence has increased in recent months as U.S. and 
international troops continue to concentrate, where they should, on 
southern Afghanistan.
  In addition to levels of trained ANSF, I also remain concerned about 
the U.S. civilian strategy. While it is positive that the number of 
civilians posted in Afghanistan more than tripled since President Obama 
took office--rising from 300 to nearly 1,000--there are not enough 
civilians posted outside of Kabul to partner with the local government. 
Today, there are approximately 400 civilians outside of Kabul, but more 
are required to reach the population of more than 28 million.
  This underscores the need for building greater U.S. civilian capacity 
for engaging in counterinsurgency. We are more likely to face 
nonconventional threats in the future, and must therefore prepare both 
the military and civilian agencies for such operations. This requires 
a-whole-of-government approach and greater civilian-military 
coordination. While I am pleased that joint training with the military 
is now required for all civilians deploying to the field in Afghanistan 
at Camp Atterbury in Indiana, other steps must be taken to better 
prepare our civilian workforce for engaging in counterinsurgency 
operations. We must also increase interagency staffing of the Civilian 
Response Corps, as overseen by the Office of the Coordinator for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction, or S/CRS, at the State Department.
  In addition, an increased number of Afghan civil servants are 
required for partnership with U.S. civilians, especially as we look 
toward the build and transfer stages of the process. The establishment 
of the Afghan Civil Service Institute, which trains Afghan bureaucrats, 
is a step in the right direction. But examples such as Marja 
demonstrate that ``government in a box'' cannot be installed without 
Afghan partners who can institute rule of law and provide credible 
government services. We must avoid situations like in Marja, where we 
opened the so-called government in a box and there was little 
government.
  Since last year, cooperation with Pakistan has improved perhaps more 
than any other area. In April 2009, the military began an extensive 
operation targeting the Pakistani Taliban beginning in the Swat Valley 
and extending into South Waziristan. These operations, coupled with 
high-profile arrests of Pakistani Taliban leadership, were positive 
developments. But there is no question that Pakistan--and especially 
the Pakistani intelligence service--could do more to target the Afghan 
Taliban and other extremists operating along the border in North 
Waziristan.
  More than any other factor, however, corruption at every level of the 
Afghan Government and distrust between the U.S. and President Karzai 
are undermining our chances for success. This is the elephant in the 
room, which cannot be ignored. We cannot afford to turn a blind eye to 
corruption, or deal with it only at the local level. Rule of law must 
be instituted from the top, and we will not succeed if corrupt 
officials escape justice.
  Since last year, this is the one area where there has been no 
progress. To the contrary, the Afghan Government has continued to 
derail corruption investigations led by Afghan institutions, such as 
the Major Crimes Task Force and the Special Investigative Unit. This 
situation has worsened in recent months, as demonstrated by the recent 
case of Mohammad Salehi, an aide to President Karzai who was arrested 
for soliciting bribes. President Karzai personally intervened to secure 
Salehi's release despite the fact that his arrest was ordered by the 
Afghan Attorney General and the investigation surrounding the charges 
against him was Afghan-led.
  As the administration prepares for a December review of its strategy, 
I am

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deeply concerned that the debate has changed from reducing corruption 
to determining how much corruption can be tolerated. Reports indicate 
that the administration has considered focusing on lower level 
corruption as opposed to that which stems from the top. Make no 
mistake, just as the ``fish rots from the head,'' the root of the 
problem stems from Kabul. This has been clearly demonstrated by the 
decisions to release corrupt officials, which have been personally made 
by President Karzai.
  Corruption in Afghanistan is a continuum, and we must address the 
problem at both ends of the spectrum. It is a fallacy to think we can 
delineate a clear line between corruption at the highest level and the 
local level, or that we can address this issue without dealing with 
President Karzai. National and subnational incidents are of equal 
importance and must be confronted at the same time if we are to be 
successful.
  In the midst of the debate about the best way to tackle corruption, 
concerns have been raised about Afghan sovereignty. Fighting corruption 
and protecting Afghan sovereignty are not mutually exclusive, and 
combating corruption does not necessarily impede on Afghan sovereignty.
  As someone once said, we cannot want to win this more than the 
Afghans want to win it themselves. To the contrary, the two most 
significant bodies for investigations--the Major Crimes Task Force and 
the Special Investigative Unit--are housed in the Afghan Interior 
Ministry, and they operate with only minimal U.S. involvement apart 
from advising.
  While it may be unrealistic to eliminate corruption completely, we 
must demonstrate that we are committed to doing so. And at the moment, 
we are moving in the wrong direction. We must measure and assess levels 
of corruption using a standardized metric to demonstrate that we are on 
an upward trajectory as we move toward the July 2011 drawdown date.
  The recent establishment of three U.S.-led task forces to deal with 
corruption in Kabul is a good idea, but it is a tacit acknowledgement 
that our current strategy is not working. Now that the task forces have 
been created by the State Department and DOD, coordination and 
implementation of a common strategy are key. At the same time, these 
task forces are worth nothing--they are worth nothing--if Karzai 
releases corrupt officials or stands in the way of prosecutions. As we 
approach July, the Karzai government must demonstrate it is willing to 
arrest, detain, prosecute, and punish those who are caught red-handed.
  The war in Afghanistan is critically important and worth fighting. If 
we leave, al-Qaida and other terrorist groups will reconstitute and 
once again find safe haven in Afghanistan, which will undoubtedly 
increase the threat to the homeland. American lives are at risk, and we 
must do everything in our power to defend our national security 
interests and ensure al-Qaida does not return to Afghanistan.
  That said, let me be clear on two critically important points. First, 
we must remain dedicated to a top-to-bottom review of the entire 
Afghanistan campaign this December. Anything less would be a 
disingenuous attempt to sidestep the hard questions that linger about 
this exceedingly difficult foreign policy issue. Second, and most 
important, the December review must assess whether the Karzai 
government is genuinely committed to detaining and prosecuting corrupt 
officials who are brought before the courts, regardless of their family 
and political connections. Additional findings to the contrary gravely 
threaten our prospects for long-term success.
  At the end of the day, we have to ask whether the Afghan people will 
choose the Afghan Government over the Taliban when we begin 
transferring security and governmental responsibilities to the Kabul 
government next year. Given that rampant graft and corruption is the 
top concern of Afghan citizens who were polled--ranked even above their 
own security--the answer to that question will be no unless the Karzai 
government gets serious about this debilitating and rampant problem.
  This is what defines, more than anything else, our long-term success. 
And we should not continue--I cannot emphasize this enough--we should 
not continue to put our brave young men and women in harm's way unless 
we are pursuing a strategy that we believe has a reasonable chance of 
success.
  This is the litmus test, and we must confront it head-on in December. 
As stewards of America's treasure, both in terms of resources and 
American servicemembers' lives, we owe the American people and our 
distinguished fighting force nothing less. And the American people 
deserve no less.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

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