[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 901-902]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                      DENYING AL-QAIDA SAFE HAVENS

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the attempt to blow up a U.S. airliner 
on Christmas Day has shined a spotlight squarely, if belatedly, on 
Yemen. I cannot overstate the importance of denying al-Qaida safe 
havens in Yemen and countries like it, an issue on which I have been 
working for years. The threat from al-Qaida in Yemen, as well as the 
broader region, is increasing, and our attention to this part of the 
world is long overdue.
  That is why I welcome the President's increased focus on Yemen. But 
we need to remember, as we focus needed resources and attention on 
Yemen, that it shouldn't be seen as the new Afghanistan, or the new 
Iraq. Instead, Yemen highlights the importance of a comprehensive, 
global counterterrorism strategy that takes into account security 
sector reform, human rights, economic development, transparency, good 
governance, accountability, and the rule of law.
  We must seize the opportunity to focus attention on the strategy and 
policies we need to deny al-Qaida safe havens around the world, 
including in Yemen. Concurrently, we need to examine our policy in 
Yemen and better understand how we can develop a partnership that is 
both in our national security interest and helps Yemen to move towards 
becoming a more stable, secure nation for its people. The recognition 
at the recent high-level international meeting on Yemen in London of 
the importance of addressing broader economic, social and political 
factors in Yemen is thus very welcome.
  Any serious effort against al-Qaida in Yemen will require 
strengthening the weak capacity of the government as well as its 
legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. We need to be careful about 
providing assistance to a government that isn't always aligned with the 
needs of the Yemeni people, as last year's State Department report on 
human rights notes. I am pleased to be an original cosponsor with 
Senators Kerry and Feinstein of a resolution that urges the 
implementation of a comprehensive strategy to address instability in 
Yemen that also calls on the Yemeni government to strengthen efforts to 
address corruption, to respect human rights and to work with its 
citizens and the international community to address the factors driving 
instability in the country.
  Yemen is a fragile state whose government has limited control in many

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parts of the country. It faces a multitude of challenges including 
poverty, a young and growing population, resource scarcities, and 
corruption. It is also distracted from the counterterrorism effort by 
two other sources of domestic instability--the al-Houthi rebellion in 
the North and tensions with a southern region with which Sana'a was 
united less than 20 years ago. In other words, counterterrorism is 
hampered by weak governance and by internal conflicts that would not 
appear on the surface to threaten our interests. With this in mind, we 
must also work to ensure that, in the provision and use of our 
counterterrorism assistance to Yemen, care is taken to protect 
civilians and prevent the alienation of the local population and 
attention is given to the local conditions that enable militants to 
recruit followers.
  Instability in Yemen is, of course, also closely linked to conflict 
in the Horn of Africa. Last year, Somali pirates attacked a U.S. 
vessel, which briefly raised awareness of maritime insecurity fostered 
by a lack of effective governance and insufficient naval capacity on 
both sides of the Gulf of Aden. This problem continues, even when it is 
not on the front pages, and is both a symptom and a driver of overall 
instability in the region. Meanwhile, refugees from the conflict in 
Somalia, as well as from the broader region, are fleeing to Yemen. 
According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, more than 70,000 Somalis and Ethiopians arrived on 
Yemen's shores in 2009--a dramatic increase from previous years. The 
human cost to this exodus, as well as the potentially destabilizing 
effects, demand our attention.
  Congress and the executive branch need to work together to ensure 
that the weak states, chronic instability, vast ungoverned areas, and 
unresolved local tensions that have created safe havens in which 
terrorists can recruit and operate do not get short shrift in our 
counterterrorism efforts. We cannot continue to jump from one perceived 
``central front in the war on terror'' to the next. Local conditions in 
places like Yemen--as well as Somalia, north Africa and elsewhere--will 
continue to enable al-Qaida affiliates and sympathizers to recruit new 
followers. As a result, although we should aggressively pursue al-Qaida 
leaders, and our efforts to track individual operatives are critical, 
we will not ultimately be successful if we treat counterterrorism 
merely as a manhunt with a finite number of al-Qaida members. I am 
pleased to see that Ambassador Daniel Benjamin has underscored the 
importance of our counterterrorism efforts addressing conditions that 
facilitate recruitment to terrorism and extremism. I hope this 
understanding is shared throughout our government agencies and in the 
implementation process.
  To effectively fight the threat from al-Qaida and its affiliates in 
Yemen and elsewhere, we also need to change the way our government is 
structured and how it operates.
  In this regard, we need better intelligence. For example, we need to 
improve the intelligence that relates directly to al-Qaida affiliates--
where they find safe haven and why and the local conflicts and other 
conditions that create a fertile ground for terrorist recruitment. And 
we need to pay attention to all relevant information--including the 
information that the State Department and others in the Federal 
Government openly collect. Conditions around the world that allow al-
Qaida to operate are often apparent to our diplomats, and do not 
necessarily require clandestine collection. The information diplomats 
and others collect therefore should be fully integrated with the 
intelligence community.
  That is why I have proposed and the Senate has approved a bipartisan 
commission to provide recommendations to the President and to the 
Congress on how to integrate and otherwise reform our existing national 
security institutions. Unless we reform how our government collects, 
reports and analyzes information from around the world, we will remain 
a step behind al-Qaida's global network.
  We also need better access to important countries and regions. When 
our diplomats aren't present, not only will we never truly understand 
what is going on, but we also won't be able to build relationships with 
the local population. In some cases, we can and should establish new 
embassy posts, such as in northern Nigeria. In other cases, such as 
Yemen, where security concerns present obstacles, we should develop 
policies that focus on helping to reestablish security, for the sake of 
the local populations as well as for our own interests.
  In addition, as Yemen makes clear, we need strong, sustained policies 
aimed directly at resolving conflicts that allow al-Qaida affiliates to 
operate and recruit. These policies must be sophisticated and informed. 
We have suffered from a tendency to view the world in terms of 
extremists versus moderates, good guys versus bad guys. These are 
blinders that prevent us from understanding, on their own terms, 
complex conflicts such as the ones in Yemen that undermine broader 
counterterrorism goals. This approach has led us to prioritize tactical 
counterterrorism over long-term strategies. And it has contributed to 
the misperception that regional conflicts, which are often the breeding 
grounds for al-Qaida affiliates, are obscure and unimportant and can be 
relegated to small State Department teams with few resources and 
limited influence outside the Department. We must change this dangerous 
pattern, which is why my resolution with Senators Kerry and Feinstein 
urges a comprehensive policy toward Yemen, approved at the highest 
levels and agreed upon by the entirety of the U.S. Government.
  We have an opportunity to take a smarter approach. By recognizing al-
Qaida as a global network that takes advantage of local conditions, 
instead of a monolithic threat, we can get ahead of the curve and 
identify threats before the next attack.

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