[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 1350-1351]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                         TERROR FIGHTING POLICY

  Mr. BOND. Madam President, I thank the Chair and all of my friends 
for giving me this opportunity to speak.
  For Americans, the world changed on September 11, 2001. We learned--
at the cost of thousands of innocent lives--that treating terrorism as 
a law enforcement matter won't keep Americans safe.
  My real concern is that this administration doesn't understand that 
every day now is like September 12. We cannot afford to revert back to 
a 9/11 mentality. Instead, we need to treat the terrorists as what they 
are--not common criminals but enemy combatants in a war.
  I rise today to speak about my concerns with current terror-fighting 
policies of this administration and the vital importance of 
congressional oversight. Protecting this Nation from terrorist attack 
is our highest duty in government. In our great democracy, 
congressional oversight plays a critical role in ensuring that our 
government protects our citizens from terror attacks. Unfortunately, 
some in the White House don't agree.
  Just this morning, a White House spokesperson on MSNBC charged that 
``politicians in Congress'' should keep their opinions to themselves 
when it comes to one of our most vital national security interests--
counterterrorism. I note in the previous administration, my colleagues 
on the other side of the aisle were quite free to speak about their 
views on the policies. Mr. Brennan, the Homeland Security adviser, 
wrote an editorial in USA TODAY critical of congressional criticism of 
the administration's counterterrorism policies and called them fear-
mongering that serve the goals of al-Qaida.
  I welcome comments of substance from the administration and from the 
other side on the criticism and the points I make, but you are not 
going to be able to silence the legislative branch. To do so is 
unworthy of the democracy we defend. One might believe that some were 
trying to shift attention away from the decisions that were made in 
recent years.
  The bottom line is that my real beef is not with the White House 
spokespeople--although it is disappointing when the National Security 
Adviser claims that I have not told the truth about what he said--but 
with the dangerous policies of the administration. Clearly, my 
complaints are not directed at the men and women of the intelligence 
community--which was an insinuation by the White House spokesperson--
because I believe the men and women of the intelligence community are 
doing their very best job under at best difficult circumstances. What I 
am concerned about is major broader policies over which they have no 
control have been changed in a way to make their job more difficult, 
and we should not be making their job more difficult.
  One of the dangerous cases of ``ready, fire, aim'' and national 
security policies was the President's pledge to close the terrorist 
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay without any backup plans for the 
deadly terrorists housed there or how to handle them or how to treat 
them. There has been a temporary suspension of transfers of Gitmo 
detainees to Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but we understand the larger 
effort to transfer and release other dangerous Gitmo detainees 
continues.
  Let me be clear. The previous administration released terrorists and 
sent them back to their homeland, some for rehabilitation, and 20 
percent of them--1 out of 5--have returned to the battlefield and a 
couple of them apparently were coaching and training the ``Underpants 
Bomber.'' That was a big mistake. Stop making the mistakes. We can 
learn from the mistakes we have made in the past. If we send more back, 
they will be attempting to kill more Americans. We shouldn't compromise 
our security here at home and the lives of our soldiers overseas to 
carry out a campaign promise. If a campaign promise doesn't square with 
national security, I humbly suggest that national security should 
prevail.
  There is another case, the administration's decision to end or to 
bypass military commissions for detainees who are ready to plead 
guilty, as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was, to move him to New York City for 
the show trial. I will address that later. But the administration 
continues to prepare to try senior al-Qaida detainees in U.S. article 
III criminal courts rather than the military commissions that Congress 
designed for these difficult and complicated cases, to be used in a 
courtroom that we constructed at Gitmo.
  History has shown that civil criminal trials of terrorists 
unnecessarily hemorrhage sensitive classified information. The East 
Africa Embassy bombing trials made Osama bin Laden aware of cell phone 
intercepts, and surprisingly al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden started using 
different methods of communications. The trial of the first World Trade 
Center bomber Ramzi Yousef tipped off terrorists to another 
communications link that provided enormously valuable information. 
Well, their use of that link that we were able to compromise was shut 
down because they learned about it. Similarly, the trial of the ``Blind 
Sheik'' Omar Abdel Rahman provided intelligence to Osama bin Laden. The 
trial of Zacarias Moussaoui resulted in the inadvertent disclosure of 
sensitive material. That is why former Attorney General Michael 
Mukasey, who tried some of these cases, said you cannot prevent a 
defense attorney from getting classified, highly confidential 
information in the course of an article III criminal trial. We know for 
a fact these civilian trials have aided the terrorists by giving them 
information on our Intelligence Committee.
  The military commission system--and we passed a measure to regulate 
the sign-in law in 2009--was designed to protect our sensitive 
intelligence sources and methods and to comply with the laws of war. 
Why abandon them? It will come as no surprise to my colleagues that I 
also disagree with the administration's ``ready, fire, aim'' strategy 
of handling the Christmas Day bomber.
  On December 25, when Abdulmutallab landed on our shores, rather than 
incorporate intelligence into his interrogation, he was, after 50 
minutes of brief questioning, Mirandized and offered a lawyer. Not 
surprisingly, he clammed up for 5 weeks. Intelligence is perishable and 
that 5 weeks was time that our intelligence system should have been 
operating on the questions he was only 5 weeks later answering. I don't 
know what purpose there was in Mirandizing him. That is an exclusionary 
rule. The only reason to offer Miranda rights is so you can use the 
words of the suspect against him.

[[Page 1351]]

There is plenty of evidence of this guy who had strapped chemical 
explosives to his legs, set them off, and burned himself in front of 
200 witnesses. It doesn't matter what he says, you can convict him. Why 
weren't our intelligence agencies consulted on the important decision 
of whether to Mirandize him? At least the FBI agents questioning him 
should have had the benefit of the intelligence that other agencies 
knew. Who is running the war on terrorism? I am afraid it is the 
Justice Department or the White House. Why did the White House announce 
what the few of us who were notified of his cooperation warned not to 
disclose? Not only did they disclose that information the day after we 
were advised, they disclosed the fact that Abdulmutallab's family came 
here to pressure him. Why on Earth would you do that? What message does 
that send? Unfortunately, to the family, they now have targets on their 
backs, because the terrorists know that they have convinced a member of 
their family to talk. What does it say to future sources? We are going 
to be concerned if they provide information that our intelligence 
agencies asked for that they will be identified by the White House and 
put at great risk.
  The handling of the Christmas Day bomber also showed something else. 
When the President took away the powers of the CIA to question terror 
suspects, he said: We will handle it in the White House. We found out 
on December 25, 11 months after he announced it, that there was no high 
value detainee interrogation operation set up. They had no plans on how 
to do it. These people are supposed to be interrogating high value 
detainees and for a year they didn't set it up until after the attack.
  Our intelligence chiefs testified early this month in an open hearing 
that there will be attempts by terrorists to attack again. Yet the 
administration waited until after the attack to begin the process of 
setting it up. These are all important policy questions to raise. If 
the White House had its way, I wouldn't be asking them, but I am asking 
them because I am very fearful that our security has been lessened, and 
that this is a subject this body must address.
  Article I of the Constitution created a legislative branch to help 
ensure that nobody in government is above oversight and being held 
accountable. I as a Senator have a right and responsibility as a Member 
of this body and as a representative of the people of my State to shine 
a light on policies that I think need to be changed, and I will 
continue to do so regardless of what is said about me. I am concerned 
that these policies of the administration have moved us back to a pre-
9/11 mentality. That failed in the past and it will again.
  In terms of the debate, my colleagues from California and Vermont 
have raised questions in a letter. They said we ought to try these 
terrorists in an article III court because the rule of law must 
prevail. Well, I agree, but we have a law. It is called the military 
commissions law that was passed and signed into law last year by the 
President that carries out the laws of war. Those are places which are 
much safer in terms of handling the terrorists, in terms of handling 
classified information.
  Finally, they say that we should not--they strongly believe we ought 
to bring all of these people to article III courts and the prosecutors 
and everybody can handle those. It is not the prosecutors or the 
intelligence community we are worried about, No. 1. It is the cost, 
because the terrorist trial is going to bring undesirables here, and 
the city of New York figures it is going to have to spend over $2 
million a year. They do not want it. Nobody else wants it.
  I tell you, even more important, when Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was 
apprehended, he said: My lawyer and I will see you in New York. He 
wants to come to New York or Washington or someplace where he can get a 
lot of media attention--and believe me, were he to be tried here, he 
would get a lot of media attention--because he wants to be able to 
spread his message to others who might be vulnerable that they need to 
join him in the jihad.
  I also pointed out that disclosure of sensitive information has and 
will be released if you try him in an article III court because any 
defense attorney bound to provide the best defense for their clients 
will have to get into what the intelligence community knew, how they 
knew it about him, and that is a disaster. That is why I welcome the 
discussion and I urge a change in policy.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.

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