[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 6]
[Senate]
[Pages 7183-7184]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                         LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I wish to express my grave concern at 
the continuing massacres, kidnappings, and terror orchestrated by the 
Lord's Resistance Army, the LRA, in northeastern Congo and southern 
Sudan. As many of my colleagues know, I have long been engaged in 
efforts to bring an end to this--one of Africa's longest running and 
most gruesome rebel wars. In 2004, I authored and Congress passed the 
Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act, which committed the United States 
to work vigorously for a lasting resolution to this conflict. In 2007, 
I visited displacement camps in northern Uganda and saw first-hand the 
impact the violence orchestrated by the LRA has had throughout the 
region. I have been frustrated as the LRA has been able to move in 
recent years across porous regional borders to gain new footholds in 
northeastern Congo, southern Sudan, and even the Central African 
Republic, with little consequence.
  Just over 2 months ago, the Ugandan, Congolese, and South Sudanese 
militaries launched a joint offensive against the LRA's primary bases 
in northeastern Congo. Serious concerns have been raised about the 
planning and implementation of this operation. Since the military 
strike began, the LRA has been able to carry out a series of new 
massacres in Congo and Sudan, leaving over 900 people dead. That is a 
killing rate that, according to the Genocide Intervention Network, 
exceeds that in Darfur or even in Somalia. Hundreds of new children 
have been abducted and new communities have been devastated and 
displaced. It is tragically clear that insufficient attention and 
resources were devoted to ensuring the protection of civilians during 
the operation. Meanwhile, the LRA's leader, Joseph Kony, and his 
commanders escaped the initial aerial assault and have continued to 
evade the militaries. Thus far, this operation has resulted in the 
worst-case scenario: it has failed to stop the LRA, while spurring the 
rebels to intensify their attacks against civilians.
  I am not ruling out that this offensive--still ongoing--may yet 
succeed. Indeed, I strongly hope it does. On several occasions last 
year, Kony refused to sign a comprehensive peace agreement with the 
Government of Uganda, an agreement that even included provisions to 
shield him from an International Criminal Court indictment. At the same 
time, as negotiations were still underway, his forces launched new 
attacks in Congo, Sudan, and, for the first time, Central African 
Republic. They abducted hundreds of youths to rebuild their ranks. It 
was apparent that Kony was not interested in a negotiated settlement, 
despite the good efforts of mediators and northern Ugandan civil 
society leaders. I supported those peace negotiations, but it became 
increasingly clear that the LRA's leaders would only be stopped when 
forced to do so.
  For many years I have pressed for a political solution to the crisis 
in northern Uganda. I pressed for the international community to work 
collectively to support efforts to bring peace and stability to this 
war-torn area. And against all odds, the most recent peace talks in 
Juba, South Sudan, did see a collective effort but to no avail. These 
negotiations were not perfect but for some time offered a path forward 
and provided a framework to address the underlying grievances of 
communities in northern Uganda. But then, it became increasing clear 
that Joseph Kony had no intention of ever signing the final agreement 
and had instead been conducting new abductions to replenish his rebel 
group. It became increasingly clear that Kony and his top commanders 
would stand in the way of any comprehensive political solution.
  These failed talks justify military action against the LRA's top 
command, but that action must be carefully considered. As we have seen 
too many times, offensive operations that are poorly designed and 
poorly carried out risk doing more harm than good, inflaming a 
situation rather than resolving it. Before launching any operation 
against the rebels, the regional militaries should have ensured that 
their plan had a high probability of success, anticipated 
contingencies, and made precautions to minimize dangers to civilians. 
It is widely known that when facing military offensive in the past, the 
LRA have quickly dispersed and committed retaliatory attacks against 
civilians. Furthermore, to be sustainable, military action needs to be 
placed within a larger counterinsurgency strategy that integrates 
outreach to local populations, active programs for basic service 
provision and reconstruction in affected areas, and mechanisms for ex-
combatant disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Those 
mechanisms are especially

[[Page 7184]]

important in the case of the LRA because of the large number of child 
abductees who make up the rebel ranks.
  As this operation continues, I hope the regional militaries are 
identifying their earlier mistakes and adjusting their strategy in 
response. Meanwhile, the international community cannot continue to 
stay on the sidelines as these massacres continue. The United Nations 
Security Council should take up this matter immediately and, in 
coordination with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative 
for LRA-affected areas, develop a plan and new resources to enhance 
civilian protection. I urge the Obama administration to use its voice 
and vote at the Security Council to see that this happens. At the same 
time, I urge the administration to develop an interagency strategy for 
how the United States can contribute to longer term efforts to disarm 
and demobilize the LRA, restore the rule of law in affected areas of 
Congo and Sudan, and address political and economic marginalization in 
northern Uganda that initially gave rise to this rebel group.
  This is not to suggest the United States has not already been 
involved with the ongoing operation. AFRICOM officials have 
acknowledged that they provided assistance and support for this 
operation at the request of the regional governments.
  As a 17-year member of the Subcommittee on African Affairs and 
someone who has been involved with AFRICOM since its conception, I 
would like to offer some thoughts on this matter. While I supported 
AFRICOM's creation, I have been concerned about its potential to 
eclipse our civilian agencies and thereby perpetuate perceptions on the 
continent of a militarized U.S. policy. It is essential that we get 
this balance right and protect chief of mission authority. By doing so, 
we can help ensure AFRICOM contributes to broader efforts to bring 
lasting peace and stability across Africa. When I visited AFRICOM's 
headquarters last December and talked with senior officials, we 
discussed the important roles that it can play. They include helping to 
develop effective, well-disciplined militaries that adhere to civilian 
rule, strengthening regional peacekeeping missions, and supporting 
postconflict demobilization and disarmament processes. In my view, 
assisting a multilateral operation to disarm an armed group that preys 
on civilians and wreaks regional havoc fits this job description, 
theoretically, at least.
  To put it bluntly, I believe supporting viable and legitimate efforts 
to disarm and demobilize the LRA is exactly the kind of thing in which 
AFRICOM should be engaged. Of course, the key words there are viable 
and legitimate. We should not be supporting operations that we believe 
are substantially flawed and do not have a high probability of success. 
Furthermore, we should ensure that operations we assist do not 
exacerbate inter-state tensions or violate international humanitarian 
law. If we get involved, even in an advisory capacity, we have to be 
willing to take responsibility for outcomes, whether anticipated or 
not. To that end, it is critical that the State Department is not only 
involved but plays a leading role in ensuring that any military 
activities are coordinated with long-term political strategies and our 
overarching foreign policy objectives.
  In the case of this current operation against the LRA, as I have 
already outlined, I do not believe these conditions were met or the 
necessary due diligence undertaken before its launch. But we cannot 
just give up on the goal of ending the massacres and threat to regional 
stability posed by this small rebel group. That is precisely why I am 
urging the development of an interagency strategy to drive U.S. policy 
going forward. By putting in place such a proactive strategy, we can 
better help the region's leaders to get this mission right and protect 
their people from the LRA's continuing atrocities. This could finally 
pave the way for a new future for this region and its people and help 
shape an AFRICOM that works effectively for both Africa and America's 
security interests.

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