[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 6]
[Senate]
[Pages 7169-7173]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                             GUANTANAMO BAY

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to express my apprehension 
regarding the closure of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Center in Cuba. I 
have several concerns regarding the transfer and disposition of the 
enemy combatants detained there in response to the attacks of September 
11, 2001.
  Here we are, almost 8 years removed from that fateful Tuesday morning 
when terrorists murdered 3,000 of our citizens at the Pentagon, the 
World Trade Center complex, and on hijacked flights. On that day, we 
were caught flatfooted and hit with a right cross. Many of us who were 
here in Congress in the days that followed 9/11 swore we would provide 
the President and the Nation with whatever tools were necessary to 
ensure that we would never be caught by surprise again.
  So on September 18, 2001, Congress sent to President Bush the 
Authorization to Use Military Force. This was signed into law. Twenty-
six days after the attacks on New York and Washington, we commenced 
military operations in Afghanistan. We had identified our enemy and 
determined the location of his base of operation and where this 
treacherous plot had been devised. We took the fight to the Taliban and 
al-Qaida and engaged them in Afghanistan. In the course of those 
engagements, U.S. and coalition forces captured enemy combatants.
  Early in 2002, enemy combatants who were seized on the battlefield 
began arriving at Guantanamo for detention. In 2004, the Supreme Court 
issued an opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that, as a necessary incident to 
the AUMF, the President is authorized to detain persons captured while 
fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan until the cessation of hostilities. 
At one time, nearly 800 detainees were housed at Guantanamo. 
Approximately 525 detainees have been transferred to other countries 
for detention or released outright and returned to their country of 
residence. Approximately 60 detainees who were released were later 
recaptured on the field of battle in Afghanistan or have again taken up 
arms against the United States on other fronts.
  Recently, as reported this year in the January 23 edition of the New 
York Times, a former Guantanamo detainee from Saudi Arabia has 
resurfaced as No. 2 in charge of al-Qaida in Yemen.
  There he is, as shown in this picture: Said Ali al-Shihiri, deputy 
leader for

[[Page 7170]]

al-Qaida in Yemen; also known as Abu Sayyaf al-Shihiri and also as Abu-
Sufyan al-Azidi; and also known as Guantanamo detainee No. 372. He was 
released from Guantanamo in November 2007. He planned the U.S. Embassy 
attack in Yemen in September 2008.
  Furthermore, it is believed this man was involved in the planning of 
an attack on the American Embassy in Yemen last September. This 
terrorist assisted in the murder of 10 Yemeni citizens and 1 American--
former Guantanamo detainee No. 372.
  The Washington Post recently ran a 2-day installment profiling a 
Guantanamo detainee from Kuwait: Abdullah Saleh al-Ajmi, also known as 
Guantanamo detainee No. 220, released from Guantanamo in November 2006, 
and detonated a truck bomb in Mosul, Iraq, in March 2008.
  He was released and subsequently traveled to Syria and snuck into 
Iraq. Ultimately, this terrorist drove a truck packed with explosives 
into a joint American and Iraqi military training camp and blew himself 
up, taking 13 Iraqi soldiers with him--former Guantanamo detainee No. 
220.
  In March of 2004, a released detainee returned to Pakistan to again 
take up the fight against coalition forces as an insurgent. His name is 
Abdullah Mehsud. This former detainee, in July 2007, killed himself in 
engagement. He was responsible for the kidnapping of Chinese nationals 
in Pakistan. After Pakistani forces began to close in on him, he blew 
himself up with a grenade.
  These are just a few of the examples that illustrate how precarious 
it can be to release these detainees to other nations. We are 
outsourcing the security of our Nation to other countries. Shouldn't we 
be cautious and examine who we are letting free? Who is taking custody 
of these detainees? What security precautions and monitoring measures 
are in place to ensure they stay incarcerated or remain accountable?
  If we shelve the only DOD strategic interrogation facility we have 
and cannot place these detainees with confidence in other countries, 
will we be forced to transfer these enemy combatants to the United 
States? Removing these detainees from a secure military facility with 
an airport, a highly trained security force, a secure infrastructure, 
and located on an island outside the continental United States is, in 
my opinion, reckless. Bringing these detainees to the continental 
United States is tantamount to injecting a virus into a healthy body.
  On January 22, 2009, President Obama signed three Executive orders 
pertaining to Guantanamo and the enemy combatants detained there. He 
has ordered the closure of the detention facility within 12 months. He 
has also required that any detainees presently in custody be treated 
humanely and in accordance with the Army Field Manual. In fact, this 
order references the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, an act passed by 
Congress that required that the treatment of the detainees comply with 
the Army Field Manual. The objective of this order was already 
fulfilled by the passing of that law.
  The third order commissioned a task force to conduct a comprehensive 
review of options available that will provide a solution and final 
disposition for the detainees at Guantanamo. The Executive order 
closing Guantanamo states:

       Prompt and appropriate disposition of individuals currently 
     detained at Guantanamo and closure of the facilities in which 
     they are detained would further the national security and 
     foreign policy interests of the United States.

  Now, presently, approximately 245 detainees designated as ``enemy 
combatants'' are housed at Guantanamo. The possibility of returning a 
majority of these detainees to their home country or a third country so 
that we can rid ourselves of this issue troubles me, nor does it strike 
me as particularly sophisticated in the analysis of how other countries 
see us. There is no doubt that among some European elites, their 
opinions on the previous administration became more negative as the 
years went by. There is no doubt that this was also reflected amongst 
the broader populations who have tended toward liberalism for decades. 
Opinions from other parts of the world are harder to measure, of 
course, as it is difficult to measure the views of populations living 
under various types of autocratic government.
  Negative international opinion should not be exaggerated for a number 
of reasons. First and most obvious, leadership, particularly in 
difficult times, should not be directed by polls. This is true 
domestically, and it certainly is true of foreign polls. It is neither 
our job nor the administration's job to represent foreign populations. 
Decisions in Government should not be made by leaders sticking their 
fingers in the air to see which way the wind is blowing.
  Second, appealing to foreign popularity completely disregards the 
unique role this Nation has played in advancing global security. It 
also disregards the historic debates in which leftwing parties have 
advanced their ideology. But we should not ignore that there has been 
unprecedented--unprecedented--cooperation from the same Democratic 
governments whose liberal disdain so succors some in the opposition 
here on all matters of national security. Cooperation from these 
governments on diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement, and 
humanitarian assistance has been the norm, not the exception, 
regardless of disputes on Iraq policy and on those governments' views 
on Guantanamo.
  In terms of foreign policy, I would much rather have the cooperation 
of a government than its approval, although I recognize that in some 
cases the approval facilitates the cooperation. But realistically 
speaking--and this is a subject that ought to be steeped in realism--
popularity is not a prerequisite for hard-headed cooperation against a 
common threat.
  I wish to quote what columnist Tom Friedman--who is certainly not a 
cheerleader for the Republican Party--said about foreign policy thinker 
Michael Mandelbaum, who is usually associated with Democratic policies:

       When it comes to the way other countries view America's 
     preeminent role in the world--

  Writes Friedman, who then quotes Mandelbaum--

     whatever its lifespan, three things can be safely predicted: 
     The other countries will not pay for it; they will continue 
     to criticize it; and they will miss it when it is gone.

  I would urge the policymakers in this administration, as well as my 
colleagues in the majority party, to consider this wisdom expressed by 
Democratic thinkers the next time they engage in the canard that we 
need to change our policy to improve our standing with other nations. 
Let's hope this is not the main reason to shutter Guantanamo because, 
if it is, it is a slim and irresponsible reason.
  Prior to the issuance of the Executive order, I received a briefing 
on the President's intention to close Guantanamo. I would endorse an 
approach that would have commissioned a 1-year review process rather 
than coming out and declaring closure within a year. It strikes me that 
the study should come before the decision, not accompany it.
  On his second full day in office, the President, without his Attorney 
General in place, issued this order, and I fear he painted himself into 
a corner. Two weeks ago, Attorney General Holder visited Guantanamo 
Bay. His public comment on his visit was the following:

       I think it is going to take us a good portion of that time 
     to really get our hands around what Guantanamo is and what 
     Guantanamo was.

  I am sure Attorney General Holder saw what I saw at Guantanamo when I 
visited there. I am sure he saw the impressive infrastructure, with 
medical, recreational, and legal facilities. Attorney General Holder is 
a good man, and I am glad the President has made him the point man on 
this issue, but his comments are indicative of the fact that the 
complexities surrounding Guantanamo cannot be solved by the stroke of a 
pen on an Executive order.
  On February 23, 2009, the Department of Defense submitted a report to 
the White House titled ``Compliance With the President's Executive 
Order on Detainee Conditions of Confinement at Guantanamo Bay.'' The 
Secretary of

[[Page 7171]]

Defense tasked a special team to review the treatment of detainees and 
the conditions at Guantanamo in response to the President's order of 
January 22, 2009. The review team focused on myriad issues, especially 
housing, medical treatment, food services, religious freedom, access to 
attorneys, mail, security, use of force, interrogation, discipline, and 
intellectual stimulation.
  During its 13-day investigation, the review team reviewed hours upon 
hours of videotapes, reports, and important records. Team members also 
conducted more than 100 interviews of base leadership, support staff, 
interrogators, and guards. Moreover, they conducted unannounced spot 
checks both day and night.
  In the end, the review team concluded that the detention facility and 
the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo are in compliance with common 
article III of the Geneva Convention. What I found especially pleasing 
is that the review team concluded that Guantanamo interrogation 
protocols exceed the Army Field Manual and that cells at Guantanamo 
from maximum and high security cell blocks--I am quoting from the 
report--``exceed those typical of medium and maximum security detention 
facilities throughout the United States.''
  I wish to quote other excerpts:

       Interrogations of Guantanamo detainees are all voluntary. 
     Approximately one-third of all interrogations take place at 
     the request of the detainee. Detainees are permitted to 
     decline participation in interrogations at any time with no 
     negative disciplinary consequences.

  Unfortunately, our own Washington Post chose only to run a small 
article on this report. It was buried on page 3. This is in sharp 
contrast to the multiday, multipage, above-the-fold story about the 
released detainee who blew himself up in Mosul in March of 2008. I 
suppose the media was hoping this review of operations at Guantanamo 
would reveal that the present conditions of the detainees would be in 
violation of the Geneva Convention. Therein lays the problem. Somewhere 
along the way politicians, nominees, and the media all started to label 
the present conditions at Guantanamo as intolerable and substandard.
  This report shows that conditions mirror or exceed any current prison 
in the Federal system. I encourage every Member to read the report and 
learn for themselves the facts about Guantanamo.
  Some of the administration's proposals--ones endorsed by my Senate 
colleagues in the majority--involve bringing the detainees to the 
United States. I have given this issue serious consideration and am 
unable to find one good reason why our Government would want to do 
this. We have legally detained enemy combatants on the field of battle. 
We have categorized them into three classifications: First, detainees 
who no longer pose a threat and need to be returned to their country or 
a third country; secondly, enemy detainees who are too dangerous to 
release and must be incarcerated until the cessation of hostilities; 
and, third, detainees against whom we will present admissible evidence 
and adjudicate within the parameters of a fair and constitutionally 
guaranteed process.
  There is no reason this court proceeding cannot be carried out at 
Guantanamo or satellite facilities outside the United States. The 
transfer of the detainees to the United States will undoubtedly present 
a wide array of complex legal issues that, in my estimation, will take 
longer than 1 year to solve. Mechanisms at Guantanamo that ensure a 
fair adversarial judicial proceeding, with all the applicable rights, 
is feasible and can be carried out and has been carried out previously 
at Guantanamo.
  If we close this facility and are unable to place some of these 
detainees into the custody of third countries, what then? The Bureau of 
Prisons has previously stated that they consider these prisoners a 
``high security risk.'' As such, these prisoners would need to be 
housed in a maximum security prison. According to the Bureau of 
Prisons, it does not have enough space in maximum security facilities 
to house these detainees. However, one idea offered by my colleagues in 
the majority party for holding the detainees would be to transfer them 
to the Federal Supermax Prison in Florence, CO.
  Now, this facility holds the worst criminal elements our country has. 
The maximum security institution, Supermax, ADX, Florence, CO. The 
rated capacity is 490 prisoners. The current level is 471. The Bureau 
tries to ensure that this facility is never at full capacity in case of 
emergency transfers. In reality, the Federal Bureau of Prisons doesn't 
have the room required to hold these very dangerous prisoners in high 
security facilities.
  As an alternative to the Supermax at Florence, CO, another idea 
offered by the majority would be to sprinkle the detainees throughout 
the Federal Prison System. Just look at this chart of the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons: We have 15 high-security prisons. The maximum beds 
in those 15 high-security prisons happen to be 13,448. The current 
population of those prisons is 20,291. It doesn't take too many brains 
to realize we can't solve it that way.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, would the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. HATCH. I would be happy to.
  Mr. INHOFE. It happens that I have been down there inspecting, maybe 
more than any other Member. The first time was right after 9/11; the 
last time was a couple of weeks ago.
  One of the interesting things is, if you talk to anyone who has been 
there and served there, you find this is above the standards of any of 
our Federal prisons. At the current time, the population down there is 
245, of which 170 cannot be repatriated; their countries would not take 
them back.
  Out of the 170, 110 are the real hardened ones. When the Senator from 
Utah talks about they would put them in 15 prisons, they identified my 
State of Oklahoma, Forest Hill. I went there to see the facility only 
to find it would not work. But the sergeant major in charge of that 
facility served a year at Guantanamo Bay and said that of all the 
prisons she has been in, or worked in, that is the one that has the 
most humane treatment and is best suited for this kind of detainee. I 
agree with the Senator and ask if he has given thought as to where 
these 15 prisons are as alternatives and would they not become magnets 
for terrorist activity in the United States?
  Mr. HATCH. That is a good question. I think I am making an 
overwhelming case that it is ridiculous to not use that facility, which 
is perfectly capable, offshore, on an island, where we have all the 
security we need and we don't have the capacity to take care of them in 
this country and we should not want to anyway. I have also made the 
point that sending them to other countries is not the answer either. 
They don't want them either.
  Mr. INHOFE. I ask the Senator from Utah, if you stop and think, can 
you think of a better deal that America has had? We have had that 
facility since 1903, and the rent is still the same, $4,000 a year. Can 
you find a better deal than that anywhere in Government?
  Mr. HATCH. You can't. To have to bring these prisoners here, we don't 
have room, and the cost would be astronomical. Thirdly, we are going to 
have real big problems that we will have a difficult time handling, 
assuming we can find places to put them. I have been down there, too, 
and I have been involved in this for a long time. The Federal Bureau of 
Prisons cannot receive these detainees. We are already overcrowded in 
high-security facilities by almost 7,000 prisoners.
  What is our next option? Military custody? These detainees are 
already held in military custody. Why are we bringing them from one 
military installation to another? Some ideas regarding military custody 
and presented by the majority include the transfer of the detainees to 
Fort Leavenworth, KS. My esteemed colleague from Kansas, Senator 
Brownback, already pointed out this idea would have dire consequences 
for the Army's Command and General Staff College. This is a course run 
by the Army and open to foreign students from our military partners. 
Some of these foreign officers are from Islamic nations that have 
supported us in our ongoing efforts against terrorism. The governments 
of these

[[Page 7172]]

nations have publicly declared that they will withdraw their personnel 
from the course if enemy combatants are transferred to the Military 
Discipline Barracks at Fort Leavenworth. What a loss that would be.
  I know mistakes were made in the early days of Guantanamo. There may 
have been some isolated cases where the treatment of some of these 
detainees there could be construed as not being in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention. In response to these deficiencies, the Supreme 
Court, Congress, the Department of Defense, and Justice have 
implemented protections and mechanisms to ensure that this will not 
happen again. The U.S. Supreme Court has issued decisions ensuring that 
constitutionally guaranteed rights apply to these men. Military 
prosecutors and FBI agents are conducting reviews of evidence held 
against detainees to ensure their admissibility. Military leaders in 
charge of Guantanamo have taken measures to ensure that humane 
standards and treatment of detainees and their religion exceeds not 
only the Geneva Convention but most prison standards found in the 
United States. Whatever problems there were at Guantanamo have been 
addressed and corrected.
  I also remind my distinguished colleagues that our war against 
terrorism will not end with the signing of a treaty. The cessation of 
hostilities in Afghanistan is far from over. We are now shifting our 
focus and additional troops back to that theater of operation. This 
will increase the likelihood of contact with the enemy, which may 
require additional detentions. In the days ahead, I hope Congress will 
play a part in the disposition of detainees and the future of 
Guantanamo Bay. A well-thought-out and properly executed plan offered 
by the President would easily garner bipartisan support. I ask the 
President to rethink his deadline of closing Guantanamo less than 12 
months from now. This is a useable facility that has merit and 
operational worthiness.
  In closing, I will quote the 34th President of the United States, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, who said the following: ``Peace and justice are 
two sides of the same coin.''
  I commend the President for wanting to conduct a thorough review of 
the operations at Guantanamo. My assessment is, this was completed 2 
weeks ago with the Defense Department's report and the Attorney 
General's visit. What else is there to do? Let's get back to the task 
at hand of resuming military commissions and the humane detention of 
enemy combatants.
  I am very concerned about this. So far, I have not seen a 
conscientious, let alone remarkably worthwhile or worthy, plan that 
would exceed what we are already doing in Guantanamo or that would be 
as good as what we are already doing there.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from the 
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, dated September 10, 
2007, be printed in the Record at this point.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                            Department of Justice,


                                    Federal Bureau of Prisons,

                               Washington, DC, September 10, 2007.
     Hon. Trent Franks,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman Franks: This is in response to the letter 
     signed by you and several other Members of Congress 
     requesting a description of the impact of transporting and 
     incarcerating in the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) the 
     approximately 500 enemy combatants currently being held in 
     the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
       We have provided estimates of the costs you identify, and 
     we also mention some of the challenges we would encounter if 
     we were responsible for taking these enemy combatants into 
     BOP custody. We must emphasize, however, that we would hope 
     to learn more about this unique population and what would be 
     required of our agency if we were required to assume custody 
     of them. This would allow us to undertake a more complete and 
     comprehensive impact assessment.
       We would consider the individuals confined in Guantanamo 
     Bay, Cuba, to be high security; therefore, they would require 
     the highest level of escort staff, type of restraints, and 
     other security measures if they were to be transferred into 
     BOP custody. The transportation of Federal inmates and 
     detainees is coordinated through the Justice Prisoner and 
     Alien Transportation System (JPATS) within the United States 
     Marshals Service. JPATS is a nationwide network of aircraft 
     and ground transportation vehicles. The BOP assists JPATS by 
     transporting Federal inmates from the airfields used by the 
     U.S. Marshals Service aircraft to our institutions.
       We estimate that it would cost approximately $455,000 for 
     the JPATS air travel of 500 detainees from Cuba to any of our 
     United States penitentiaries. This air travel includes 
     flights from Cuba to the Federal Detention Center (FDC) in 
     Miami, Florida, from FDC Miami to the Federal Transportation 
     Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and a third flight to a 
     high-security United States penitentiary. Costs of 
     transportation would also include BOP buses to move the 
     detainees from the airfields to our facilities (a cost of 
     approximately $1,300 per bus trip). Thus, the total cost 
     could reach approximately $500,000.
       Currently, there is not sufficient bedspace at any high-
     security Federal prison to confine these individuals. Our 
     high-security institutions are operating at 55 percent above 
     capacity. There are approximately 199,700 Federal inmates at 
     present, and we are expecting the inmate population to 
     increase to over 221,000 by the end of fiscal year 2011. The 
     average yearly cost of confining a high-security inmate in 
     the BOP is approximately $25,400.
       We would most likely confine these detainees in one or two 
     penitentiaries. This would require us to transfer a 
     sufficient number of inmates to other penitentiaries in order 
     to create the necessary bedspace. Such transfers would add to 
     the cost of confining the enemy combatants and would impose 
     significant additional challenges on our agency (based the 
     level of crowding in all high-security BOP institutions).
       Due to the unique status of enemy combatants and the 
     probable lack of information about these individuals' 
     histories of violent behavior or disruptive activities, it is 
     unlikely that we would house these detainees with inmates in 
     the general population of high-security institutions (with 
     inmates serving sentences for Federal crimes and District of 
     Columbia code offenses). Therefore, if transferred to BOP 
     custody, these enemy combatants would most likely be confined 
     in special units, segregated from the general inmate 
     population. It is also likely that many of these individuals 
     require separation from other enemy combatants. This kind of 
     confinement is comparable to special housing units in BOP 
     institutions (which are used for administrative detention and 
     disciplinary segregation). These units are more costly to 
     operate than general population units due to the increased 
     staffing and enhanced security procedures needed for inmates 
     who have separation requirements and/or who are potentially 
     violent or dangerous.
       The management of inmates in special housing units presents 
     additional challenges due to the increased security required 
     for these individuals. It would be even more challenging to 
     confine enemy combatants who would likely have additional 
     restrictions or requirements dictated by the Department of 
     Defense. We are unsure how our inmate management principles, 
     which focus on constructive staff-inmate interaction, maximum 
     program involvement, and due process discipline would fit 
     into the Department of Defense's requirements for the enemy 
     combatants.
       While it is not entirely clear where the BOP's obligations 
     would begin and end with regard to the provision of basic 
     inmate programs and services, we foresee the need for some 
     special or enhanced services in order to provide the basic 
     necessities to these enemy combatants. We would need to 
     acquire translation services or transfer appropriate 
     bilingual staff for us to communicate our expectations to 
     these individuals and to allow these detainees to communicate 
     their needs and concerns to us. We would need these 
     translation services in order to provide appropriate 
     visiting, telephone, and correspondence privileges to the 
     detainees and, if required, to monitor these communications. 
     We also would likely need to make accommodations with regard 
     to our food service and religious programs to meet the 
     cultural and religious requirements of these detainees.
       I hope this helps you understand our concerns regarding the 
     confinement of enemy combatants. Please contact me if I can 
     be of any further assistance.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Harley G. Lappin,
                                                         Director.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I point out also that in a recent report, 
U.S. officials said the Taliban's new top operations officer in 
southern Afghanistan is a former prisoner at the Guantanamo detention 
center.
  Pentagon and CIA officials said Abdullah Ghulam Rasoul was among 13 
prisoners released to the Afghan Government in December 2007. He is now 
known as Mullah Abdullah Zakir, a name officials say is used by the 
Taliban leader in charge of operations against United States and Afghan 
forces in southern Afghanistan.

[[Page 7173]]

  One intelligence official told the Associated Press that Rasoul's 
stated mission is to counter the growing U.S. troop surge. I wished to 
put that in the Record.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I inquire of the Chair, I was scheduled to 
speak after the Senator from Ohio. I understand he is not ready to 
speak yet and that it is permissible if I take some time now.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
  Mr. INHOFE. First of all, before I get into what I want to talk 
about, I have been listening to the Senator from Utah. I find it to be 
very interesting because his subject matter is also a mission of mine. 
I think a lot of people have not realized the problem we have with the 
bum raps given to Guantanamo Bay, and almost all of them are by people 
who have not been there. To my knowledge, almost without exception, 
those people who have gone down there--newspapers and publications 
making accusations of torture and human rights violations--once they go 
there and see it, you never hear from them again, and that includes Al-
Jazeera and some of the Middle Eastern publications. I believe we have 
a problem with people who have somehow brought forth this idea that 
there have been abuses that haven't taken place. I think probably the 
most important part of the argument is that there is not another 
Guantanamo Bay; there is no place you can put these detainees.
  As I said in my question to the Senator from Utah, what are we going 
to do with these some 245 detainees if they are not there? Also, with 
the escalation of activity in Afghanistan, what will we do with those 
detainees whom we will capture? The problem is, some people say they 
will be put in prisons in Afghanistan. There are two prisons there; 
however, they have said they will only take Afghans. If the terrorist 
who is caught is from Djibouti or Yemen or Saudi Arabia, there is no 
place else to put them other than Guantanamo Bay. It is a resource we 
need to have. We don't have a choice.
  I believe our President was responding to a lot of activists who were 
upset because during his inaugural address he didn't say anything about 
this, so they are making demands that he stop any kind of legal 
activity that is going on in the way of trials or tribunals and then 
close it in 12 months. You cannot do that until you determine how you 
are going to take care of the detainees who are currently there and 
those who will be there.
  I feel strongly we are going to have to look out after the interests 
of the United States. Nothing could be worse than to take 15 to 17 
installations within the continental United States and put terrorists 
there, only to serve as magnets for terrorist activity.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning 
business for as much time as I may consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.

                          ____________________