[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 24]
[Senate]
[Pages 33160-33163]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. GRASSLEY:
  S. 2928. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend 
certain disaster tax relief provisions, and for other purposes; to the 
Committee on Finance.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, today I have introduced a bill to extend 
deadlines for a number of provisions in the Heartland Disaster Tax 
Relief Act of 2008, as well as a number of national disaster tax relief 
provisions, through 2010.
  The Heartland Disaster Tax Relief Act has been critical in rebuilding 
the lives and communities of those affected by the terrible floods and 
tornadoes from last year.
  Because of delays in Federal funding and tighter credit conditions, 
many individuals, families, and businesses affected by the 2008 floods 
and storms will be unable to meet the deadline for the tax relief 
intended to help with recovery.
  Louisiana is still rebuilding from Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
Congress extended tax incentives for that disaster twice, and might 
even extend them a third time. I am just proposing a second year of the 
same kind of tax incentives that have been in effect for Hurricane 
Katrina victims for over 4 years.
  This is especially important when small businesses are struggling to 
recover, and small businesses create 70 percent of all net new jobs.
  It is only fair to extend the deadlines and give these individuals, 
families, and businesses the chance to recover and rebuild.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                S. 2928

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Heartland Disaster Tax 
     Relief Extension Act of 2009''.

                   TITLE I--HEARTLAND DISASTER AREAS

     SEC. 101. CREDIT TO HOLDERS OF TAX CREDIT BONDS.

       Section 702(d)(7)(C) of the Heartland Disaster Tax Relief 
     Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-343; 122 Stat. 3918) is amended 
     by striking ``January 1, 2010'' and inserting ``January 1, 
     2011''.

     SEC. 102. EDUCATION TAX BENEFITS.

       Section 702(d)(8) of the Heartland Disaster Tax Relief Act 
     of 2008 (Public Law 110-343; 122 Stat. 3918) is amended by 
     striking ``or 2009'' and inserting ``2009, or 2010''.

     SEC. 103. SPECIAL RULES FOR USE OF RETIREMENT FUNDS.

       Section 702(d)(10) of the Heartland Disaster Tax Relief Act 
     of 2008 (Public Law 110-343; 122 Stat. 3918) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``January 1, 2010'' both places it appears 
     and inserting ``January 1, 2011'', and
       (2) by striking ``December 31, 2009'' both places it 
     appears and inserting ``December 31, 2010''.

     SEC. 104. ADJUSTMENTS REGARDING TAXPAYER AND DEPENDENCY 
                   STATUS.

       Section 702(d)(15) of the Heartland Disaster Tax Relief Act 
     of 2008 (Public Law 110-343; 122 Stat. 3918) is amended by 
     striking ``or 2009'' and inserting ``2009, or 2010''.

     SEC. 105. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       The amendments made by this title shall take effect as if 
     included in the enactment of section 702 of the Heartland 
     Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2008.

                   TITLE II--NATIONAL DISASTER AREAS

     SEC. 201. LOSSES ATTRIBUTABLE TO FEDERALLY DECLARED 
                   DISASTERS.

       (a) No Limit for 2010.--Paragraph (1) of section 165(h) of 
     the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking 
     ``$500 ($100 for taxable years beginning after December 31, 
     2009)'' and inserting ``$100 ($0 for taxable years beginning 
     after December 31, 2009, and before January 1, 2011)''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section 
     shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 
     2009.

     SEC. 202. EXPENSING OF QUALIFIED DISASTER EXPENSES.

       (a) In General.--Subparagraph (A) of section 198A(b)(2) of 
     the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking 
     ``January 1, 2010'' and inserting ``January 1, 2011''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section 
     shall apply to disasters occurring after December 31, 2009.

     SEC. 203. NET OPERATING LOSSES ATTRIBUTABLE TO FEDERALLY 
                   DECLARED DISASTERS.

       (a) In General.--Subclause (I) of section 172(j)(1)(A)(i) 
     of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking 
     ``January 1, 2010'' and inserting ``January 1, 2011''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section 
     shall apply to disasters occurring after December 31, 2009.

     SEC. 204. WAIVER OF CERTAIN MORTGAGE REVENUE BOND 
                   REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) In General.--Paragraph (11) of section 143(k) of the 
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking 
     ``January 1, 2010'' and inserting ``January 1, 2011''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section 
     shall apply to bonds issued after December 31, 2009.

     SEC. 205. SPECIAL DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCE FOR QUALIFIED 
                   DISASTER PROPERTY.

       (a) In General.--Subclause (I) of section 168(n)(2)(A)(ii) 
     of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking 
     ``January 1, 2010'' and inserting ``January 1, 2011''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section 
     shall apply to disasters occurring after December 31, 2009.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself and Mr. Whitehouse):
  S. 2929. A bill to prohibit secret modifications and revocations of 
the law, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today Senator Whitehouse and I will 
introduce the Executive Order Integrity Act of 2009. The bill prevents 
secret changes to published Executive Orders by requiring the President 
to place a notice in the Federal Register when he has modified or 
revoked a published Order. Through this simple measure, the bill takes 
an important step toward reversing the growth of secret law in the 
executive branch.
  The principle behind this bill is straightforward. It is a basic 
tenet of democracy that the people have a right to know the law. 
Indeed, the notion of ``secret law'' has been described in court 
opinions and law treatises as ``repugnant'' and ``an abomination.'' 
That's why the laws passed by Congress have historically been matters 
of public record.
  But the law that applies in this country includes more than just 
statutes. It includes regulations, the controlling legal 
interpretations of courts and the executive branch, and certain 
Presidential directives. As we learned at a hearing of the Judiciary 
Committee's Constitution Subcommittee that I chaired last year, some of 
this body of executive and judicial law was increasingly kept secret 
from the public, and too often from Congress as well, under the Bush 
administration. The administration concealed Department of Justice 
legal opinions and interpretations of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court.
  The shroud of secrecy extended to Executive Orders and other 
Presidential directives that carry the force of law. The Federal 
Register Act requires the President to publish any Executive Orders 
that have general applicability and legal effect. But through

[[Page 33161]]

the diligent efforts of my colleague Senator Whitehouse, we learned in 
late 2007 that the Department of Justice took the position that a 
President can ``waive'' or ``modify'' any Executive Order without any 
notice to the public or Congress--simply by not following it. In other 
words, even in cases where the President is required to make the 
public, the President can change the law in secret.
  The Office of Legal Counsel memorandum that contains this position is 
still classified, but Senator Whitehouse convinced the Department of 
Justice to declassify certain propositions in the memorandum. Among 
them is the proposition that ``[w]henever [the President] wishes to 
depart from the terms of a previous executive order,'' he may do so, 
because ``an executive order cannot limit a President.'' And he doesn't 
have to change the executive order, or give notice that he is violating 
it, because by ``depart[ing] from the executive order,'' the President 
``has instead modified or waived it.''
  Now, no one disputes that a President can withdraw or revise an 
Executive Order at any time; that is every President's prerogative. But 
abrogating a published Executive Order without any public notice works 
a secret change in the law. Worse, because the published Order stays on 
the books, it actively misleads Congress and the public as to what the 
law is.
  This is not just a hypothetical problem dreamed up by the Office of 
Legal Counsel. It has happened, and it could happen again. To list just 
one example, the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping program 
not only violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; it was 
inconsistent with several provisions of Executive Order 12333, the 
longstanding executive order governing electronic surveillance and 
other intelligence activities. Apparently, the administration believed 
its actions constituted a tacit amendment of that Executive Order. Who 
knows how many other Executive Orders were secretly revoked or amended 
by the conduct of the administration over the past 8 years.
  The bill that Senator Whitehouse and I are introducing provides a 
simple solution to this problem. If the President revokes, modifies, 
waives, or suspends a published Executive Order or similar directive, 
notice of this change in the law must be placed in the Federal Register 
within 30 days. The notice must specify the Order or the provision that 
has been affected; whether the change is a revocation, a modification, 
a waiver, or a suspension; and the nature and circumstances of the 
change. If information about the nature and circumstances of the change 
is classified, it is exempt from the publication requirement, but the 
information still must be provided to Congress so that we, as 
legislators, know how the law has been changed.
  That is what our bill does; now let me talk briefly about what our 
bill does not do. First, it does not expand the existing legal 
requirements, under the Federal Register Act, that determine which 
Executive Orders must be published. To the extent the Federal Register 
Act permits a certain amount of ``secret law'' in the form of 
unpublished Executive Orders, our bill leaves that framework in place.
  Second, our bill does not require public notice when the President 
revokes or modifies an unpublished Executive Order--even if the 
substance of the unpublished order is well-known to Congress and even 
the American people. This bill is narrowly aimed at the situation in 
which the American people have been given official notice of one 
version of the law, but a different version is being implemented.
  Third, the bill does not require the President to adhere to the terms 
of an Executive Order. Many scholars have argued that a President must 
adhere to a formally promulgated Executive Order unless or until the 
Order is formally withdrawn or amended, just as the head of an agency 
must adhere to the agency's regulations. I happen to agree. But this 
bill does not take issue with the Bush administration's assertion that 
any deviation from the Executive Order by the President is a 
permissible amendment of that Order. It simply requires public notice 
that the amendment has occurred.
  Fourth, the bill does not require the publication of classified 
information about intelligence sources and methods or similar 
information. The basic fact that the published law is no longer in 
effect, however, cannot be classified. On rare occasions, national 
security can justify elected officials keeping some information secret, 
but it can never justify lying to the American people about what the 
law is. Maintaining two different sets of laws, one public and one 
secret, is just that--deceiving the American people about what law 
applies to the Government's conduct.
  It is my hope and my expectation that the Obama administration will 
not continue the previous administration's practice of purporting to 
amend the law in secret. But even if the administration agrees to end 
this practice, that will not end the need for this legislation. At last 
year's Secret Law hearing, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for 
OLC testified that during the Iran-Contra scandal in the 1980s, the 
Reagan Department of Justice took the same position: that the President 
could secretly modify executive orders simply by not complying with 
them. We can safely assume that the ability to modify the law in secret 
will hold as much appeal for a future administration as it did for at 
least two administrations in the past. We can't wait for this to happen 
in order to act, because we won't know that it has happened--the entire 
point of the practice, after all, is to keep Congress and the public in 
the dark. The time to prevent this eventuality is now.
  I commend Senator Whitehouse for his tireless work to bring this 
issue to light, and I urge all of my colleagues in the Senate to 
support this modest effort to ensure the integrity of our published 
laws.
   Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                S. 2929

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Executive Order Integrity 
     Act of 2009''.

     SEC. 2. REVOCATIONS, MODIFICATIONS, WAIVERS, AND SUSPENSIONS 
                   OF PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS AND EXECUTIVE 
                   ORDERS.

       Section 1505 of title 44, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(d) Revocations, Modifications, Waivers, and Suspensions 
     of Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders.--
       ``(1) Notice required.--If the President, whether formally 
     or informally, and whether through express order, conduct, or 
     other means--
       ``(A) revokes, modifies, waives, or suspends any portion of 
     a Presidential proclamation, Executive Order, or other 
     Presidential directive that was published in the Federal 
     Register; or
       ``(B) authorizes the revocation, modification, waiver, or 
     suspension of any portion of such Presidential proclamation, 
     Executive Order, or other Presidential directive;

     notice of such revocation, modification, waiver, or 
     suspension shall be published in the Federal Register within 
     30 days after the revocation, modification, waiver, or 
     suspension, in accordance with the terms under paragraph (2).
       ``(2) Content of notice.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided under subparagraph 
     (B), the notice required under paragraph (1) shall specify--
       ``(i) the Presidential proclamation, Executive Order, or 
     other Presidential directive, and any particular portion 
     thereof that is affected;
       ``(ii) for each affected directive or portion thereof, 
     whether that directive or portion thereof was revoked, 
     modified, waived, or suspended; and
       ``(iii) except where such information is classified, the 
     specific nature and circumstances of the revocation, 
     modification, waiver, or suspension.
       ``(B) Revised executive order.--Where the revocation, 
     modification, waiver, or suspension of a Presidential 
     proclamation, Executive Order, or other Presidential 
     directive is accomplished through the publication in the 
     Federal Register of a revised Presidential proclamation, 
     Executive Order, or other Presidential directive that 
     replaces or amends the one that was revoked, modified, 
     waived, or suspended, that revised Presidential proclamation, 
     Executive Order, or

[[Page 33162]]

     other Presidential directive shall constitute notice for 
     purposes of paragraph (1).
       ``(3) Classified information.--If the information specified 
     under paragraph (2)(A)(iii) is classified, such information 
     shall be provided to Congress, using the security procedures 
     established under section 501(d) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(d)), in the form of a classified annex 
     delivered to--
       ``(A) the majority and minority leader of the Senate;
       ``(B) the Speaker, majority leader, and minority leader of 
     the House of Representatives;
       ``(C) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; 
     and
       ``(D) if the information pertains to national security 
     matters, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
     and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       ``(4) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection 
     shall be construed as either authorizing or prohibiting the 
     revocation, modification, waiver, or suspension of any 
     Presidential proclamation, Executive Order, or other 
     Presidential directive that was published in the Federal 
     Register through means other than a formal directive issued 
     by the President and published in the Federal Register.''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. SPECTER (for himself, Mr. Schumer, and Mr. Graham):
  S. 2930. A bill to deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, and 
for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, l have sought recognition to urge support 
for the legislation I have just introduced, the Justice Against 
Sponsors of Terrorism Act. The legislation would amend the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, FSIA, and the Anti-Terrorism Act, ATA, to 
ensure that foreign sponsors of terrorism are held accountable to their 
American victims in our courts. These amendments are necessary because 
some lower-court decisions have deprived victims of terrorism, 
including most recently 9/11's victims, of the legal remedies Congress 
intended to confer on them when it enacted the FSIA and ATA, and 
thereby removed a critical deterrent to the financing and sponsorship 
of terrorism. Congressional inaction would leave the victims of 9/11 
without recourse against the sponsors of al-Qaeda and, more importantly 
perhaps, render the FSIA and the ATA ineffective deterrents to future 
terrorist attacks.
  Recent news reports serve as a reminder that al-Qaeda and other 
foreign terrorist organizations remain dedicated to their declared goal 
of carrying out large-scale terrorist attacks within the U.S. In our 
continuous efforts to prevent such attacks, we have appropriately 
focused our attention on stemming the flow of money to terrorists 
through deterrence. As the Treasury Department's Undersecretary for 
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence has observed, ``the terrorist 
operative who is willing to strap on a suicide belt is not susceptible 
to deterrence, but the individual donor who wants to support violent 
jihad may well be,'' Testimony of Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for 
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, before the Senate Committee on 
Finance, April 1, 2008. Holding them liable for civil damages in courts 
may be the most effective--and, given the absence of effective criminal 
sanctions, often only--way to deter them from sponsoring terrorist 
attacks. ``Suits against financiers of terrorism can,'' as renowned 
federal judge Richard Posner recently emphasized, ``cut the terrorist's 
lifeline.'' Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, 
549 F. 3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008).
  As carefully written by Congress, the FSIA abrogates the sovereign 
immunity of foreign countries and permits suit against them in Federal 
court when, among other things, a foreign country commits terrorists 
acts or other tortious conduct that results in injury on our soil. The 
ATA authorizes suit in Federal court by any U.S. national injured ``by 
reason of an act of international terrorism'' and permits the recovery 
of ``threefold the damages he or she sustains'', that is, treble 
damages, as well the costs of suit and attorneys' fees. ``18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 2333(a).
  But a number of lower Federal courts have frustrated Congress's 
intent by erecting unfounded jurisdictional barriers to suit. No such 
decision is more significant in its effect than the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit's In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 
538 F. 3d 71 (2d Cir. 2009). That decision arose from litigation 
brought by the victims of the 9/11 attacks, including family members of 
the nearly 3,000 innocent people killed and commercial entities that 
suffered in excess of $10 billion in damage to their property. The 
plaintiffs sought damages against, among other defendants, the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, several Saudi officials, and a purported charity under 
the control of the Kingdom known as the Saudi High Commission for 
Relief of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Substantial evidence establishes that 
these defendants had provided funding and sponsorship to al-Qaeda 
without which it could not have carried out the 9/11 attacks. Even the 
Second Circuit acknowledged that plaintiffs had offered a ``wealth of 
detail, conscientiously cited to published and unpublished sources,'' 
as to the defendants' sponsorship of al-Qaeda.
  None of the plaintiffs had their day in court, however, for the 
Second Circuit ruled that the Federal courts have no jurisdiction over 
the principal defendants. As for Saudi Arabia and its official state 
agencies, the Second Circuit held that they were not subject to suit 
under the FSIA's tort exception because, having not been designated by 
the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism, Saudi Arabia was not 
covered by a separate FSIA exception for suits against designated state 
sponsors of terrorism. Suits arising from terrorist activities, the 
court concluded, can only be brought under the FSIA's exception 
governing designated state sponsors of terrorism. As for the Saudi 
princes, the Second Circuit held that the courts lacked personal 
jurisdiction over them because, though they ``could and did foresee 
[that] the recipients of their donations would attack targets in the 
United States,'' they did not themselves ``direct'' any terrorist 
attacks or ``command'' any ``agent'' to ``commit them.''
  Both conclusions are wrong. The former is especially troubling 
because it establishes an immunity from suit under the FSIA that 
Congress did not intend. A foreign state is subject to suit for its 
terrorist activities under the FSIA's tort exception without regard to 
whether it is subject to suit under the separate exception for 
designated state sponsors of terrorism--that is, without regard to 
whether the United States has designated it as a state sponsor of 
terrorism. The Second Circuit effectively read into the tort exception 
an exception for terrorist-related torts. Even the Solicitor General, 
who has adopted an unduly restrictive interpretation of the FSIA's 
exceptions, concluded that the Second Circuit misread the statute on 
this critical point.
  The Second Circuit's and other lower courts' decisions on these 
seemingly technical jurisdictional points not only deprive the victims 
of terrorism the compensation to which they are entitled but also 
remove a powerful weapon in our arsenal against foreign terrorism. We 
can no longer wait for the Supreme Court to correct these errant 
decisions. The Court's refusal earlier this year to hear the 
plaintiffs' appeal of the Second Circuit's decision in In re Terrorist 
Attacks, despite the importance of the case and the conflicts among the 
lower courts on the key issues it presents, suggests that the Court may 
well never do so.
  That is why I have introduced the Justice Against Sponsors of 
Terrorism Act. The act is main provisions would amend FSIA to make 
clear that, as Congress originally intended, a foreign state may be 
sued under the torts exception if it sponsors terrorists who commit 
terrorist attacks on our soil, without regard to whether it is a state-
designated sponsor of terrorism, and amend the ATA to ensure that its 
anti-terrorism provisions, like FSIA's, are given the meaning Congress 
intended. I urge my colleagues to support these modest, but critical, 
amendments.

[[Page 33163]]



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