[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 24]
[Senate]
[Pages 32006-32011]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Ms. CANTWELL (for herself, Mr. McCain, and Mr. Feingold):
  S. 2886. A bill to prohibit certain affiliations (between commercial 
banking and investment banking companies), and for other purposes; to 
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to be joining my friend and 
colleague from Washington, Senator Cantwell, to introduce the Banking 
Integrity Act of 2009. My reasons for joining this effort are simple--I 
want to ensure that we never stick the American taxpayer with another 
$700 billion tab to bail out the financial industry. If big Wall Street 
institutions want to take part in risky transactions--fine. But we 
should not allow them to do so with federally insured deposits.
  Paul Volcker, a top economist in the Obama administration and former 
Federal Reserve Chairman, wants the nation's banks to be prohibited 
from owning and trading risky securities, the very practice that got 
the biggest ones into deep trouble in 2008. The administration is 
saying no, it will not separate commercial banking from investment 
operations. Mr. Volcker argues that regulation by itself will not work. 
Sooner or later, the giants, in pursuit of profits, will get into 
trouble. The administration should accept this and shield commercial 
banking from Wall Street's wild ways. ``The banks are there to serve 
the public,'' Mr. Volcker said, ``and that is what they should 
concentrate on. These other activities create conflicts of interest. 
They create risks, and if you try to control the risks with 
supervision, that just creates friction and difficulties'' and 
ultimately fails.
  The bill we are introducing today precludes any member bank of the 
Federal Reserve System from being affiliated with any entity or 
organization that is engaged principally in the issue, flotation, 
underwriting, public sale or distribution of stocks, bonds, debentures 
or other securities. Essentially,

[[Page 32007]]

commercial banks may no longer intermingle their business activities 
with investment banks. It is that simple.
  Since the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act in 1999, this country has 
seen a new culture emerge in the financial industry: one of dangerous 
greed and excessive risk-taking. Commercial banks traditionally used 
people's deposits for the constructive purpose of main street loans. 
They did not engage in high risk ventures. Investment banks, however, 
managed rich people's money--those who can afford to take bigger risks 
in order to get a bigger return, and who bore their own losses. When 
these two worlds collided, the investment bank culture prevailed, 
cutting off the credit lifeblood of main street firms, demanding 
greater returns that were achievable only through high leverage and 
huge risk taking, and leaving taxpayers with the fallout.
  When the glass wall dividing banks and securities firms was 
shattered, common sense and caution went out the door. The new mantra 
of ``bigger is better'' took over--and the path forward focused on 
short-term gains rather than long-term planning. Banks became 
overleveraged in their haste to keep up in the race. The more they 
lent, the more they made. Aggressive mortgages were underwritten for 
unqualified individuals who became homeowners saddled with loans they 
couldn't afford. Banks turned right around and bought portfolios of 
these shaky loans.
  Sub-prime loans made up only five percent of all mortgage lending in 
1998, but by the time the financial crisis peaked in late 2008, they 
were approaching 30 percent. Since January 2008, we have seen 159 state 
and national banks fail. In my home State of Arizona, five banks have 
shut their doors, leaving small businesses scrambling to find credit 
from other banks that may have already been overleveraged.
  Banks sold sub-prime mortgages to their affiliates and other 
securities firms for securitization, while other financial institutions 
made risky bets on these and other assets for which they had no 
financial interest. As the market grew bigger, its foundation became 
shakier. It was like a house of cards waiting to fall, and fall it did.
  In October 2008, the financial system was on the brink of collapse 
when Congress was forced to risk $700 billion of taxpayer dollars to 
bail out the industry. These financial institutions had become ``too 
big to fail.'' In fact, the special inspector general of the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program, TARP, testified before Congress earlier this year 
that ``total potential Federal Government support could reach $23.7 
trillion'' to stabilize and support the financial system. Ironically, 
some of these ``too big to fail'' institutions have now become even 
bigger. An editorial from yesterday's New York Times stated:

       The truth is that the taxpayers are still very much on the 
     hook for a banking system that is shaping up to be much 
     riskier than the one that led to disaster.
       Big bank profits, for instance, still come mostly courtesy 
     of taxpayers. Their trading earnings are financed by more 
     than a trillion dollars' worth of cheap loans from the 
     Federal Reserve, for which some of their most noxious assets 
     are collateral. They benefit from immense federal loan 
     guarantees, but they are not lending much. Lending to 
     business, notably, is very tight.
       What profits the banks make come mostly from trading. Many 
     big banks are happy to depend on the lifeline from the Fed 
     and hang onto their toxic assets hoping for a rebound in 
     prices. And the whole system has grown more concentrated. 
     Bank of America was considered too big to fail before the 
     meltdown. Since then, it has acquired Merrill Lynch. Wells 
     Fargo took over Wachovia. JPMorgan Chase gobbled up Bear 
     Stearns.
       If the goal is to reduce the number of huge banks that 
     taxpayers must rescue at any cost, the nation is moving in 
     the wrong direction. The growth of the biggest banks ensures 
     that the next bailout will have to be even bigger. These 
     banks will be more likely to take on excessive risk because 
     they have the implicit assurance of rescue.

  Excess was a common theme for banks/financial institutions in the 
mid-2000s--excessive risk, excessive bonuses. Times were good at 
Merrill Lynch in 2006 when the firm's risky mortgage business was 
booming. The firm made record earnings of $7.5 billion that year and 
paid out bonuses of $5 billion to $6 billion. Fast forward to late 2008 
when Merrill's gambling left it in deep financial despair with losses 
exceeding $27 billion. Yet we witnessed the firm pay out another $3.6 
billion in bonuses just before it was acquired by Bank of America.
  Merrill Lynch wasn't alone in excess and greed. Citigroup posted a 
net loss of nearly $28 billion in 2008, yet paid out $5.3 billion in 
bonuses. Although Goldman Sachs earned only $2.3 billion, it paid out 
$4.8 billion in bonuses. Morgan Stanley earned $1.7 billion, and paid 
out nearly $4.5 billion in bonuses. JPMorgan Chase earned $5.6 billion 
and paid $8.7 billion in bonuses. If a company doesn't make money, how 
can it pay these bonuses? In this case, each of these firms was a 
recipient of billions in taxpayer-funded TARP money.
  The Federal Government has set a dangerous precedent here. We sent 
the wrong message to the financial industry: you engage in bad, risky 
business practices, and when you get into trouble, the government will 
be there to save your hide. Many would call it a moral hazard. I call 
it a taxpayer-funded subsidy for risky behavior.
  The consolidation of the banking world was also riddled with 
conflicts of interest, despite the purported firewalls that were put 
into place. If an investment bank had underwritten shares for a company 
that was now in financial trouble, the investment bank's commercial arm 
would feel pressure to lend the company money, despite the lack of 
merits to do so. The Banking Integrity Act of 2009 would eliminate some 
of these conflicts.
  Today, it is time to put a stop to the taxpayer-financed excesses of 
Wall Street. No single financial institution should be so big that its 
failure would bring ruin to our economy and destroy millions of 
American jobs. This country would be better served if we limit the 
activities of these financial institutions. Banks should accept 
consumer deposits and invest conservatively, while investment banks 
engage in underwriting and sales of securities.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. CARDIN:
  S. 2888. A bill to amend section 205 of title 18, United States Code, 
to exempt qualifying law school students participating in legal clinics 
from the application of the general conflict of interest rules under 
such section; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I have introduced the Law Student 
Participation Act of 2009.
  The bill creates exceptions to Federal conflicts of interest law 
which generally prohibits Federal employees from acting as an attorney 
or agent in a matter adverse to the U.S. government. The legislation 
directs the exceptions to Federal employees attending law school and 
participating in legal clinics and employees of the District of 
Columbia who staff legal clinics. Where the Federal employee has 
participated personally and substantially in the matter or the matter 
is before the employee's particular agency or department, specific 
conflicts of interest provisions still apply. The current law is over 
broad and denies learning and teaching opportunities where no real 
conflict may exist.
  Law schools, including schools in my home State, have voiced concern 
over the present law. Some of these schools include the University of 
Maryland, the University of the District of Columbia, and Georgetown 
University School of Law. The schools have related stories of students, 
who are Federal employees, regulated to clinics dealing only with state 
matters. In other instances a student might start working on a client's 
matter, but will be unable to continue once the matter goes to trial or 
before an administrative proceeding. Law schools complain that under 
such circumstances the client's right to effective counsel is 
diminished. Due to a requirement I championed, the University of 
Maryland School of Law faces unique challenges. Each student must 
provide legal services to the poor or persons who otherwise lack access 
to justice prior to graduation. Federal employees, unlike other 
students, must choose

[[Page 32008]]

from a smaller selection of clinics due to the current Federal 
conflicts of interest law. Finally, if Federal employee students seek 
careers in practice areas where Federal law predominates, they likely 
will obtain no practical clinic experience in law school.
  It should be noted that the Office of Government Ethics, OGE, and the 
Department of Justice are aware of the text of the bill. Both have 
conveyed informally that they do not have problems with this 
legislation. The OGE released a report in 2006 that was critical of 
current Federal conflict of interest law as being overbroad and 
specifically pointed out that volunteer work was frequently barred even 
when no potential for conflict of interest existed.
  The current law deprives law students who are Federal employees of 
valuable practical educational opportunities. Ultimately participation 
in these clinics would result in better attorneys many of whom later go 
on to work for the Federal government.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. FEINGOLD:
  S. 2890. A bill to amend the Buy American Act to increase the 
requirement for American-made content, to tighten the waiver 
provisions, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation to 
help American workers and companies.
  The bill that I am introducing, the Buy American Improvement Act, 
focuses on the Federal Government's responsibility to support domestic 
manufacturers and workers and on the role of Federal procurement policy 
in achieving this goal. The reintroduction of this bill, which I first 
introduced in 2003, is part of my ongoing efforts to support American 
workers and manufacturing.
  The Buy American Act of 1933 is the primary statute that governs 
Federal procurement. The name of this law accurately describes its 
purpose: to ensure that the Federal Government supports domestic 
companies and domestic workers by buying American-made goods. 
Regrettably, this law contains a number of loopholes that make it too 
easy for government agencies to buy foreign-made goods.
  My bill, the Buy American Improvement Act, would strengthen the 
existing law by tightening its waiver provisions. Currently, the heads 
of Federal departments and agencies are given broad discretion to waive 
the act and buy foreign goods with little or no accountability. We 
should ensure that the Federal Government makes every effort to give 
Federal contracts to companies that will perform the work domestically. 
We should also ensure that certain types of industries do not leave the 
U.S. completely, thus making the Federal Government dependent on 
foreign sources for goods, such as plane or ship parts, that our 
military may need to acquire on short notice.
  With unemployed workers in the U.S. facing a double-digit 
unemployment rate, the highest rate since 1983, it is critical Congress 
back efforts to support American workers. Many unemployed American 
workers are currently facing persistently long periods of unemployment; 
data from the Department of Labor showed that in October of this year, 
over 35 percent of unemployed workers had been without jobs for at 
least 27 weeks. Since December of 2007, the number of unemployed 
workers in the U.S. has grown by over 8 million, with manufacturing and 
construction workers being particularly hard-hit. We need to do all we 
can to promote fiscally responsible Federal policies that support the 
creation of American jobs to help get the unemployed and Funderemployed 
back to work. A strong Buy American Act should be part of the Federal 
effort to create and retain American jobs.
  During another period of economic upheaval in the 1930s, Congress 
passed a series of laws designed to promote job growth in the U.S., 
including the Buy American Act of 1933, 41 U.S.C. Sec. 10a-10d. The Buy 
American Act requires the Federal Government to support domestic 
manufacturers and workers by purchasing American-made goods. Over the 
years, other domestic sourcing legislation has been passed to help 
support American industry, including the Buy America Act, 23 U.S.C. 
Sec. 313, which applies to Federal transportation funding. In addition, 
Congress included domestic sourcing requirements in the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, P.L. 111-5, earlier this year because it 
recognized the importance of supporting American workers and American 
industry. My legislation would help American industry by making it more 
difficult to waive the Buy American Act and help ensure the Federal 
Government does all it can to support American workers.
  I have a long record of supporting efforts to help taxpayers get the 
most bang for their buck and opposing wasteful Federal spending. I 
don't think anyone can argue that supporting American jobs is 
``wasteful.'' We owe it to American manufacturers and their employees 
to make sure they get a fair shake. I would not support awarding a 
contract to an American company that is price-gouging, but we should 
make every effort to ensure that domestic sources for goods needed by 
the Federal Government do not dry up because American companies have 
been slightly underbid by foreign competitors.
  The gaping loopholes in the Buy American Act and the trade agreements 
and defense procurement agreements that contain additional waivers of 
domestic source restrictions have combined to weaken our domestic 
manufacturing base by allowing--and sometimes actually encouraging--the 
Federal Government to buy foreign-made goods. Congress can and should 
do more to support American companies and American workers. We must 
strengthen the Buy American Act and we must stop entering into bad 
trade agreements that send our jobs overseas and undermine our own 
domestic preference laws.
  By strengthening Federal procurement policy, we can help to bolster 
our domestic manufacturers during these difficult times. As I have 
repeatedly noted, Congress cannot simply stand on the sidelines while 
tens of thousands of American manufacturing jobs have been and continue 
to be shipped overseas. While there may be no single solution to this 
problem one way in which Congress should act is by strengthening the 
Buy American Act.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. REID (for himself, Mr. Ensign, Mrs. Feinstein, and Mrs. 
        Boxer):
  S. 2891. A bill to further allocate and expand the avaiability of 
hydroelectric power generated at Hoover Dam, and for other purposes; to 
the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the 
bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                S. 2891

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Hoover Power Allocation Act 
     of 2009''.

     SEC. 2. ALLOCATION OF CONTRACTS FOR POWER.

       (a) Schedule A Power.--Section 105(a)(1)(A) of the Hoover 
     Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(a)(1)(A)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``renewal'';
       (2) by striking ``June 1, 1987'' and inserting ``October 1, 
     2017''; and
       (3) by striking Schedule A and inserting the following:

[[Page 32009]]



                                                  ``SCHEDULE A
  Long term Schedule A contingent capacity and associated firm energy for offers of contracts to Boulder Canyon
                                               project contractors
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Contingent       Firm Energy (thousands of kWh)
                        Contractor                           capacity  -----------------------------------------
                                                               (kW)        Summer       Winter         Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California             249,948      859,163      368,212       1,227,375
City of Los Angeles                                            495,732      464,108      199,175         663,283
Southern California Edison Company                             280,245      166,712       71,448         238,160
City of Glendale                                                18,178       45,028       19,297          64,325
City of Pasadena                                                11,108       38,622       16,553          55,175
City of Burbank                                                  5,176       14,070        6,030          20,100
Arizona Power Authority                                        190,869      429,582      184,107         613,689
Colorado River Commission of Nevada                            190,869      429,582      184,107         613,689
United States, for Boulder City                                 20,198       53,200       22,800          76,000
                                                          ------------------------------------------------------
Totals                                                       1,462,323    2,500,067    1,071,729    3,571,796''.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

       (b) Schedule B Power.--Section 105(a)(1)(B) of the Hoover 
     Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(a)(1)(B)) is amended 
     to read as follows:
       ``(B) To each existing contractor for power generated at 
     Hoover Dam, a contract, for delivery commencing October 1, 
     2017, of the amount of contingent capacity and firm energy 
     specified for that contractor in the following table:

                                                  ``SCHEDULE B
  Long term Schedule B contingent capacity and associated firm energy for offers of contracts to Boulder Canyon
                                               project contractors
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Contingent       Firm Energy (thousands of kWh)
                        Contractor                           capacity  -----------------------------------------
                                                               (kW)        Summer       Winter         Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
City of Glendale                                                 2,020        2,749        1,194           3,943
City of Pasadena                                                 9,089        2,399        1,041           3,440
City of Burbank                                                 15,149        3,604        1,566           5,170
City of Anaheim                                                 40,396       34,442       14,958          49,400
City of Azusa                                                    4,039        3,312        1,438           4,750
City of Banning                                                  2,020        1,324          576           1,900
City of Colton                                                   3,030        2,650        1,150           3,800
City of Riverside                                               30,296       25,831       11,219          37,050
City of Vernon                                                  22,218       18,546        8,054          26,600
Arizona                                                        189,860      140,600       60,800         201,400
Nevada                                                         189,860      273,600      117,800         391,400
                                                          ------------------------------------------------------
Totals                                                         507,977      509,057      219,796      728,853''.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

       (c) Schedule C Power.--Section 105(a)(1)(C) of the Hoover 
     Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(a)(1)(C)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``June 1, 1987'' and inserting ``October 1, 
     2017''; and
       (2) by striking Schedule C and inserting the following:

                                                  ``SCHEDULE C
                                                  Excess Energy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Priority of entitlement to excess energy                                   State
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
First: Meeting Arizona's first priority right to delivery of excess       Arizona
 energy which is equal in each year of operation to 200 million
 kilowatthours: Provided, That in the event excess energy in the amount
 of 200 million kilowatthours is not generated during any year of
 operation, Arizona shall accumulate a first right to delivery of excess
 energy subsequently generated in an amount not to exceed 600 million
 kilowatthours, inclusive of the current year's 200 million
 kilowatthours. Said first right of delivery shall accrue at a rate of
 200 million kilowatthours per year for each year excess energy in an
 amount of 200 million kilowatthours is not generated, less amounts of
 excess energy delivered.
Second: Meeting Hoover Dam contractual obligations under Schedule A of    Arizona, Nevada, and California
 subsection (a)(1)(A), under Schedule B of subsection (a)(1)(B), and
 under Schedule D of subsection (a)(2), not exceeding 26 million
 kilowatthours in each year of operation.
Third: Meeting the energy requirements of the three States, such          Arizona, Nevada, and California''.
 available excess energy to be divided equally among the States.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

       (d) Schedule D Power.--Section 105(a) of the Hoover Power 
     Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(a)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) as 
     paragraphs (3), (4), and (5), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
       ``(2)(A) The Secretary of Energy is authorized to and shall 
     create from the apportioned allocation of contingent capacity 
     and firm energy adjusted from the amounts authorized in this 
     Act in 1984 to the amounts shown in Schedule A and Schedule 
     B, as modified by the Hoover Power Allocation Act of 2009, a 
     resource pool equal to 5 percent of the full rated capacity 
     of 2,074,000 kilowatts, and associated firm energy, as shown 
     in Schedule D (referred to in this section as `Schedule D 
     contingent capacity and firm energy'):

[[Page 32010]]



                                                  ``SCHEDULE D
     Long term Schedule D resource pool of contingent capacity and associated firm energy for new allottees
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Contingent       Firm Energy (thousands of kWh)
                          State                              capacity  -----------------------------------------
                                                               (kW)        Summer       Winter         Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Entities Allocated by the Secretary of Energy               69,170      105,637       45,376         151,013
New Entities Allocated by State
Arizona                                                         11,510       17,580        7,533          25,113
 California                                                     11,510       17,580        7,533          25,113
Nevada                                                          11,510       17,580        7,533          25,113
                                                          ------------------------------------------------------
Totals                                                         103,700      158,377       67,975         226,352
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

       ``(B) The Secretary of Energy shall offer Schedule D 
     contingency capacity and firm energy to entities not 
     receiving contingent capacity and firm energy under 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) (referred to in 
     this section as `new allottees') for delivery commencing 
     October 1, 2017 pursuant to this subsection. In this 
     subsection, the term `the marketing area for the Boulder City 
     Area Projects' shall have the same meaning as in Appendix A 
     of the General Consolidated Power Marketing Criteria or 
     Regulations for Boulder City Area Projects published in the 
     Federal Register on December 28, 1984 (49 Fed. Reg. 50582 et 
     seq.) (referred to in this section as the `Criteria').
       ``(C)(i) Within 18 months of the date of enactment of the 
     Hoover Power Allocation Act of 2009, the Secretary of Energy 
     shall allocate through the Western Area Power Administration 
     (referred to in this section as `Western'), for delivery 
     commencing October 1, 2017, for use in the marketing area for 
     the Boulder City Area Projects 66.7 percent of the Schedule D 
     contingent capacity and firm energy to new allottees that are 
     located within the marketing area for the Boulder City Area 
     Projects and that are--
       ``(I) eligible to enter into contracts under section 5 of 
     the Boulder Canyon Project Act (43 U.S.C. 617d); or
       ``(II) federally recognized Indian tribes.
       ``(ii) In the case of Arizona and Nevada, Schedule D 
     contingent capacity and firm energy for new allottees shall 
     be offered through the Arizona Power Authority and the 
     Colorado River Commission of Nevada, respectively.
       ``(iii) In performing its allocation of Schedule D power 
     provided for in this subparagraph, Western shall apply 
     criteria developed in consultation with the States of 
     Arizona, Nevada, and California.
       ``(D) Within 1 year of the date of enactment of the Hoover 
     Power Allocation Act of 2009, the Secretary of Energy also 
     shall allocate, for delivery commencing October 1, 2017, for 
     use in the marketing area for the Boulder City Area Projects 
     11.1 percent of the Schedule D contingent capacity and firm 
     energy to each of--
       ``(i) the Arizona Power Authority for allocation to new 
     allottees in the State of Arizona;
       ``(ii) the Colorado River Commission of Nevada for 
     allocation to new allottees in the State of Nevada; and
       ``(iii) Western for allocation to new allottees within the 
     State of California.
       ``(E) Each contract offered pursuant to this subsection 
     shall include a provision requiring the new allottee to pay a 
     proportionate share of its State's respective contribution 
     (determined in accordance with each State's applicable 
     funding agreement) to the cost of the Lower Colorado River 
     Multi-Species Conservation Program (as defined in section 
     9401 of the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 
     (Public Law 111-11; 123 Stat. 1327)), and to execute the 
     Boulder Canyon Project Implementation Agreement Contract No. 
     95-PAO-10616 (referred to in this section as the 
     `Implementation Agreement').
       ``(F) Any of the 66.7 percent of Schedule D contingent 
     capacity and firm energy that is to be allocated by Western 
     that is not allocated and placed under contract by October 1, 
     2017, shall be returned to those contractors shown in 
     Schedule A and Schedule B in the same proportion as those 
     contractors' allocations of Schedule A and Schedule B 
     contingent capacity and firm energy. Any of the 33.3 percent 
     of Schedule D contingent capacity and firm energy that is to 
     be distributed within the States of Arizona, Nevada, and 
     California that is not allocated and placed under contract by 
     October 1, 2017, shall be returned to the Schedule A and 
     Schedule B contractors within the State in which the Schedule 
     D contingent capacity and firm energy were to be distributed, 
     in the same proportion as those contractors' allocations of 
     Schedule A and Schedule B contingent capacity and firm 
     energy.''.
       (e) Total Obligations.--Paragraph (3) of section 105(a) of 
     the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(a)) (as 
     redesignated as subsection (d)(1)) is amended--
       (1) in the first sentence, by striking ``schedule A of 
     subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section and schedule B of 
     subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section'' and inserting 
     ``pursuant to paragraphs (1)(A), (1)(B), and (2)''; and
       (2) in the second sentence--
       (A) by striking ``any'' and inserting ``each'';
       (B) by striking ``schedule C'' and inserting ``Schedule 
     C''; and
       (C) by striking ``schedules A and B'' and inserting 
     ``Schedules A, B, and D''.
       (f) Power Marketing Criteria.--Paragraph (4) of section 
     105(a) of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 
     619a(a)) (as redesignated as subsection (d)(1)) is amended to 
     read as follows:
       ``(4) Subdivision E of the Criteria shall be deemed to have 
     been modified to conform to this section, as modified by the 
     Hoover Power Allocation Act of 2009. The Secretary of Energy 
     shall cause to be included in the Federal Register a notice 
     conforming the text of the regulations to such 
     modifications.''.
       (g) Contract Terms.--Paragraph (5) of section 105(a) of the 
     Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(a)) (as 
     redesignated as subsection (d)(1)) is amended--
       (1) by striking subparagraph (A) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(A) in accordance with section 5(a) of the Boulder Canyon 
     Project Act (43 U.S.C. 617d(a)), expire September 30, 
     2067;'';
       (2) in the proviso of subparagraph (B)--
       (A) by striking ``shall use'' and inserting ``shall 
     allocate''; and
       (B) by striking ``and'' after the semicolon at the end;
       (3) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting a semicolon; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(D) authorize and require Western to collect from new 
     allottees a pro rata share of Hoover Dam repayable advances 
     paid for by contractors prior to October 1, 2017, and remit 
     such amounts to the contractors that paid such advances in 
     proportion to the amounts paid by such contractors as 
     specified in section 6.4 of the Implementation Agreement;
       ``(E) permit transactions with an independent system 
     operator; and
       ``(F) contain the same material terms included in section 
     5.6 of those long term contracts for purchases from the 
     Hoover Power Plant that were made in accordance with this Act 
     and are in existence on the date of enactment of the Hoover 
     Power Allocation Act of 2009.''.
       (h) Existing Rights.--Section 105(b) of the Hoover Power 
     Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(b)) is amended by striking 
     ``2017'' and inserting ``2067''.
       (i) Offers.--Section 105(c) of the Hoover Power Plant Act 
     of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(c)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(c) Offer of Contract to Other Entities.--If any existing 
     contractor fails to accept an offered contract, the Secretary 
     of Energy shall offer the contingent capacity and firm energy 
     thus available first to other entities in the same State 
     listed in Schedule A and Schedule B, second to other entities 
     listed in Schedule A and Schedule B, third to other entities 
     in the same State which receive contingent capacity and firm 
     energy under subsection (a)(2) of this section, and last to 
     other entities which receive contingent capacity and firm 
     energy under subsection (a)(2) of this section.''.
       (j) Availability of Water.--Section 105(d) of the Hoover 
     Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(d) is amended to read 
     as follows:
       ``(d) Water Availability.--Except with respect to energy 
     purchased at the request of an allottee pursuant to 
     subsection (a)(3), the obligation of the Secretary of Energy 
     to deliver contingent capacity and firm energy pursuant to 
     contracts entered into pursuant to this section shall be 
     subject to availability of the water needed to produce such 
     contingent capacity and firm energy. In the event that water 
     is not available to produce the contingent capacity and firm 
     energy set forth in Schedule A, Schedule B, and Schedule D, 
     the Secretary of Energy shall adjust the contingent capacity 
     and firm energy offered under those Schedules in the same 
     proportion as those contractors' allocations of Schedule A, 
     Schedule B, and Schedule D contingent capacity and firm 
     energy bears to the full rated contingent capacity and firm 
     energy obligations.''.

[[Page 32011]]

       (k) Conforming Amendments.--Section 105 of the Hoover Power 
     Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a) is amended--
       (1) by striking subsections (e) and (f); and
       (2) by redesignating subsections (g), (h), and (i) as 
     subsections (e), (f), and (g), respectively.
       (l) Continued Congressional Oversight.--Subsection (e) of 
     section 105 of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 
     619a)) (as redesignated by subsection (k)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in the first sentence, by striking ``the renewal of''; 
     and
       (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``June 1, 1987, and 
     ending September 30, 2017'' and inserting ``October 1, 2017, 
     and ending September 30, 2067''.
       (m) Court Challenges.--Subsection (f)(1) of section 105 of 
     the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a) (as 
     redesignated by subsection (k)(2)) is amended in the first 
     sentence by striking ``this Act'' and inserting ``the Hoover 
     Power Allocation Act of 2009''.
       (n) Reaffirmation of Congressional Declaration of 
     Purpose.--Subsection (g) of section 105 of the Hoover Power 
     Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a) (as redesignated by 
     subsection (k)(2)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``subsections (c), (g), and (h) of this 
     section'' and inserting ``this Act''; and
       (2) by striking ``June 1, 1987, and ending September 30, 
     2017'' and inserting ``October 1, 2017, and ending September 
     30, 2067''.

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