[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 21]
[Senate]
[Pages 28783-28786]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              NSWG TRAVEL

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today in my capacity as the cochairman 
of the Senate's National Security Working Group. It is in that capacity 
I recently traveled on a CODEL with the senior Senator from California.
  Pursuant to the requirements of the current Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Administrative Procedures for the U.S. Senate 
National Security Working Group, specifically paragraph 6, Senator 
Feinstein and I have filed in the Office of Senate Security a 
classified memorandum available to the members of the working group and 
their designated staffer.
  As my colleagues are aware, the NSWG, which is the successor of the 
Senate's Arms Control Observer Group, was created by the Senate to aid 
administrations that choose to negotiate arms control treaties. In view 
of the 67-vote threshold to ratify a treaty, and given the complexity 
and importance of the subject matter at the heart of arms control 
treaties, as well as the Constitution's mandate that the U.S. Senate 
has a role of advice and consent in treaty making, the NSWG exists to 
provide a forum for an expert group of Senators to have up-to-date 
information on ongoing treaty negotiations, and to provide the 
Administration with consultation from the Senate.
  This consultative role is important, because the Constitution 
entrusts the Senate with the responsibility to provide its advice along 
with, perhaps, its consent to a treaty. This means administrations are 
supposed to listen to the advice of Senators if they expect to earn the 
Senate's consent.
  The U.S. negotiating team is lead by Assistant Secretary of State 
Rose Gottemoeller, a highly capable administration official and a 
gracious host. I thank her for her time and hospitality, as well as for 
her service.
  I urge my colleagues in the NSWG to take the time to study the 
classified memorandum Senator Feinstein and I have drafted. The issues 
covered in our memorandum are significant, and, in some cases 
worrisome. I won't go into detail here--the memorandum is classified 
and for good reason.
  That said, I will ask to have printed four recent articles on the 
START follow-on treaty negotiations to the Record. These articles 
highlight issues that every Senator should consider.
  As my colleagues know, the 1991 START Agreement expires 2 weeks from 
today. I urge my colleagues to consider what will happen on December 6, 
the day after the expiration of that agreement. For the first time in 
15 years, an extensive set of verification, notification, elimination 
and other confidence building measures will expire.
  The U.S. will lose a significant source of information that has 
allowed it to have confidence in its ability to understand Russian 
strategic nuclear forces; likewise, the Russian Federation will lose 
information about U.S. nuclear forces, almost all of which are 
strategic, unlike the Russian-forces, which place tremendous emphasis 
on tactical nuclear forces not covered by the 1991 Agreement or its 
successor.
  Yet, no one appears to know what will come next. According to the 
reports I will add to the Record, there is no plan for what provisions 
of the 1991 Agreement will be maintained after the 1991 Agreement 
expires on December 5.
  The question of what happens after the 1991 Agreement expires is 
important. The Russian Federation is already telling us they intend to 
deploy a new road mobile missile, one which, for the first time, will 
have multiple independent reentry vehicles. Open source reports 
indicate this missile will constitute 80 percent of Russian ICBM forces 
by 2016. This is a significant deployment. Moreover, it confirms that 
Russia, unlike the U.S., is modernizing its nuclear forces.
  How will we monitor this highly destabilizing weapon, the RS-24? 
According to the article I introduced from the Global Security Newswire 
by Elaine Grossman, we won't have the entry and exit portals at 
Votkinsk.
  That we don't have answers to these questions is alarming, more so 
because our negotiators must have known for months that a ``bridge'' 
would be necessary. Why do I say this? Simple: the Moscow Treaty took 
the Senate 9 months--287 days--to ratify from the date of its 
signature. And that was a very limited treaty--it was about two to 
three pages long.
  The START agreement of 1991 took 429 days to ratify on October 1, 
1992, after it was submitted to the Senate on July 31, 1991. And by 
everything we have seen in the press and been briefed on in the 
National Security Working Group, this new treaty will be almost as 
complicated, and will include highly significant nuclear force 
reductions, that will take time for Senators to consider. In fact, the 
Senate has not had even one hearing on the START process yet.
  The administration must have understood this. Yet it spent the first 
half of the year negotiating a joint understanding that would allow it 
to show progress towards the President's goal of world without nuclear 
weapons. According to press reports, only now have the negotiators 
begun looking at the question of verification.
  I was shocked that there had been virtually no talk--and I know this 
from my conversations with members of both the Russian and U.S. 
delegations in Geneva--of what happens after December 5 and prior to 
the possible entry into force of the follow-on agreement when and if it 
is signed by the two executives. Mr. President, I don't say this 
lightly, but, this borders on malpractice.
  I have said repeatedly that I hope to be able to support the treaty 
being negotiated now. I have kept an open mind throughout this process. 
Yet as I learn more about what has been negotiated thus far, and the 
general process this treaty negotiation has taken, I grow more 
concerned.
  The paramount object of this treaty should have been to extend the 
verification measure of the 1991 Agreement. But, it appears that the 
administration's object was to lock in significant nuclear weapons 
cuts; they achieved that with the July joint understanding. Only 
recently has verification gotten the attention it deserved all along.
  And, now, the Russians may think they have the advantage. That may be 
why they returned a counter offer a little over a week ago that the 
U.S. was ``very disappointed about'' in the words of Under Secretary of 
State Ellen Tauscher. We have entered an end-game where the Russians 
may feel that the U.S. wants the START follow-on agreement more than 
they do; even though Russia needs this treaty, needs to lock the U.S. 
into strategic delivery vehicle reductions as Dr. Keith Payne explained 
in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, only the 
House so far has held a hearing on START.
  I believe the U.S. would have been very well served with a simple 5 
year extension of the 1991 Agreement, as the treaty allowed. But, now 
the President is preparing to head to Oslo to collect his Nobel Peace 
Prize, one that was apparently based on the President's endorsement of 
the Global Zero vision. The Russians apparently perceive that the 
President would be quite embarrassed if he had to pick up his Prize 
having failed to get a START follow-on completed. In the interest of 
the United States, I implore the administration not to negotiate 
against an artificial deadline. There are means to lock in verification 
and associated activities from the 1991 Agreement after it expires in 2 
weeks.

[[Page 28784]]

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the four articles to 
which I referred be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

     New Russian-U.S. Arms Reduction Treaty Hampered by Differences

                           (By Ilya Kramnik)

       Moscow.--Russia and the United States cannot agree on a new 
     strategic arms reduction treaty to replace the START-1, which 
     will expire on December 5, 2009.
       The problems concern control of mobile missile systems, 
     cuts in delivery vehicles, and a connection between the new 
     treaty and limits on the deployment of ballistic missile 
     defense systems.
       The START-1 treaty signed in 1991 stipulated the size of 
     mobile missile systems' deployment areas and the number of 
     basing stations for rail missile systems. It also limited the 
     number of missile systems that can be simultaneously deployed 
     outside their deployment sites, and the duration of such 
     deployment.
       The liquidation procedures stipulated for mobile missiles 
     are stricter than for silo-based missiles. In particular, 
     mobile missiles must be liquidated together with their 
     delivery vehicles, whereas the cuts for silo- and submarine-
     launched missiles stipulate only the liquidation of silos and 
     submarines.
       Topol is the only mobile intercontinental ballistic missile 
     on combat duty in Russia. The United States decided in the 
     early 1990s that submarine-launched Trident II missiles could 
     replace its land-based mobile systems.
       When the silo-based group of missiles was cut in Russia, 
     the focus was shifted to the Topol missiles. The role of 
     mobile systems increased when the Topol-M system was 
     introduced and the RS-24 Yars MIRVed missile, which is 
     heavier than Topol-M and can carry up to ten independently 
     targetable warheads, was created.
       Given the current trends, land-based mobile missiles will 
     constitute the bulk of Russia's Strategic Missile Force in 
     the next 20 years. Russia might also deploy new rail missile 
     systems.
       In this situation, limits put on the deployment areas and 
     movement of mobile systems will deprive Russia's Strategic 
     Missile Force of its main advantage--mobility, which ensures 
     a degree of safety in case of a first strike. However, the 
     survival of silo-based missiles in a first strike is not 
     assured either, given the growing precision of reentry 
     vehicles.
       The U.S. strategic nuclear might is based on the naval 
     element of the nuclear triad, in particular its 14 Ohio-class 
     nuclear submarines armed with 336 Trident II missiles, each 
     with eight individually targeted warheads. It would be 
     useless to try to limit the deployment areas and movement of 
     submarines, because such a limitation cannot be effectively 
     verified.
       Another bone of contention is the number of delivery 
     vehicles. Russia has proposed cutting them to 500, whereas 
     the United States sets the limit at 1,000. This explains the 
     big difference in the proposed limitations, between 500 and 
     1,100 delivery vehicles and 1,500-1,675 nuclear warheads.
       The issue of delivery vehicles is closely connected to the 
     ``upload potential,'' which is the number of warheads for 
     cruise missiles carried by heavy bombers that can be stored 
     for potential deployment in a dangerous period. The more 
     delivery vehicles a side's strategic nuclear forces have, the 
     larger the upload potential, which makes strategic arms 
     reductions senseless.
       And lastly, the main problem of the new reduction treaty is 
     a connection between strategic nuclear weapons and ballistic 
     missile defense (ABM) systems. Russia insists that the ABM 
     systems should be curtailed, whereas the United States is 
     only prepared to recognize a connection between strategic 
     offensive arms and ballistic defense systems in the preamble 
     to the new treaty.
       Unless the sides agree on this issue, the new treaty will 
     be a useless document suiting neither side. This will not 
     please the United States, the economically stronger partner. 
     At present Russia plans to supply 30 new missiles to its 
     strategic nuclear forces annually and may step up the 
     process. If necessary, Russia will be able to maintain its 
     nuclear forces at standards guaranteeing unacceptable damage 
     to the aggressor, irrespective of the ABM systems.
       If the sides do not sign the new treaty, or if the treaty 
     does not limit the deployment of ABM systems, this will 
     actually restart a nuclear missile race, even if at a lower 
     level than in the 1950s through 1980s.
       The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and 
     do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
                                  ____


 U.S. Treaty-Monitoring Presence at Russian Missile Plant Winding Down

                        (By Elaine M. Grossman)

       Washington.--With the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
     expiring in early December, U.S. inspectors are winding down 
     their nearly 15-year presence in the remote Russian village 
     of Votkinsk.
       Roughly 630 miles northeast of Moscow, the town is home to 
     the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, a weapon factory where 
     the accord allows as many as 30 U.S. personnel to ensure 
     Russian compliance with treaty provisions on nuclear-capable 
     missiles. Moscow uses the facility to manufacture SS-27 
     Topol-M and SS-26 Bulava ICBMs.
       Operating 24 hours a day, the monitoring staff can observe 
     and inspect vehicles leaving the facility by rail or road, 
     according to the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The 
     monitors also conduct twice-daily perimeter inspections to 
     verify that missiles cannot leave the facility by any other 
     means.
       Washington and Moscow are engaged in intense negotiations 
     to replace the treaty with a new accord that sets lower caps 
     on deployed nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles. However, 
     the envoys have not yet reached agreement. Despite earlier 
     hopes to the contrary, the two nations will be unable to 
     achieve ratification of a new treaty before the old one comes 
     to an end.
       Lacking a new agreement that allows for a continued U.S. 
     presence at the Votkinsk facility, the monitors would be 
     forced to move out by Dec. 5, when the 1991 treaty expires.
       There is no public indication yet that a new pact would 
     maintain a provision allowing for U.S. inspectors on the 
     ground at Votkinsk.
       With the United States not currently producing any new-
     design strategic missiles, there is nothing for Moscow to 
     monitor at shuttered U.S. production lines. In that the 
     production-monitoring verification measure is now not 
     reciprocal, Moscow no longer finds it useful, even if 
     Washington does, according to nuclear weapons expert Jeffrey 
     Lewis of the New America Foundation.
       Lewis has pointed to indications that Moscow wants to 
     jettison any such missile-production monitoring in the so-
     called ``New START'' agreement.
       ``The Russians have been saying that for a long time,'' one 
     U.S. Defense Department official told Global Security 
     Newswire last week.
       Given clear signals that a Russian change of heart was 
     unlikely, ``we had to [start packing up],'' the official 
     said. ``We had to. You can't just walk away.''
       U.S. facilities at the Votkinsk site include a large 
     administrative building and three residential buildings, 
     called Lincoln, Roosevelt and Washington.
       Although preparing to depart Votkinsk has been a major 
     undertaking, responsibility for winding down operations has 
     fallen largely to the support staff, freeing inspectors to 
     continue their treaty-controlled mission, officials said.
       ``We've got monitors there right now . . . and we will 
     continue to monitor until the treaty expires on Dec. 5,'' the 
     defense official said. ``Nobody has suspended it. Nobody 
     would. We've maintained that [monitoring since 1995 when] we 
     sent our first monitors there, and they've been there 
     continuously, 365 days a year, since that point.''
       This official and several others interviewed for this 
     article spoke on condition of anonymity. They cited 
     diplomatic and political sensitivities involved in discussing 
     a verification regime under negotiation in the ongoing U.S.-
     Russian arms control talks.
       Asked to describe treaty-verification activities at 
     Votkinsk, a U.S. official would say only that ``the United 
     States has fully implemented its rights under START at 
     Votkinsk and will continue to do so until Dec. 5.''
       However, the monitoring process at Votkinsk is based on 
     clearly established rules and is fairly straightforward, 
     other officials said.
       From inside a Navy-issued trailer called a ``Data 
     Collection Center,'' the inspectors observe traffic exiting 
     the production facilities through a huge portal, according to 
     those familiar with the setup.
       They use red traffic lights to control vehicles, and can 
     exercise treaty rights to inspect cargo if a truck or railcar 
     exceeds a specified length and is potentially capable of 
     transporting a missile, these sources said. U.S. personnel 
     also can record the serial numbers of START-limited missiles, 
     aiding in any subsequent efforts to track deployed missiles 
     under treaty provisions.
       The inspections have helped Washington assess Moscow's 
     nuclear-capable missile fleet and remain aware of new 
     missiles under development, officials say.
       Under a New START accord, Washington and Moscow each 
     anticipate reducing deployed strategic nuclear warheads to no 
     more than 1,675, U.S. and Russian Presidents Barack Obama and 
     Dmitry Medvedev announced in July. The pact would also cut 
     nuclear-capable delivery vehicles to a level between 500 and 
     1,100, the leaders said.
       Perhaps the greatest challenge in the ongoing negotiations 
     has been finding common ground on how to verify the new 
     numerical limits, experts say. Moscow has resisted a number 
     of measures that it interprets as nonreciprocal, including 
     Washington's interest in tracking Russia's mobile ICBMs, 
     according to reports. The United States fields no such mobile 
     systems for possible monitoring.
       Russian negotiators also have opposed renewing START 
     provisions for exchanging missile-test data, called 
     ``telemetry,'' Lewis said early this month on his blog, 
     ArmsControlWonk.com. However, it remains unclear what the 
     U.S. negotiating position has been on this issue, he said.

[[Page 28785]]

       Interviewed last week, Lewis rued the potential loss of 
     these verification measures under the anticipated New START 
     pact, saying, ``I suspect we're going to lose Votkinsk, but I 
     hope we can hang onto the telemetry.''
       Not everyone views Votkinsk monitoring as a valuable 
     verification provision to be sought in a forthcoming treaty.
       The basis for exchanging inspectors at U.S. and Russian 
     weapon-production facilities essentially is that ``we think 
     you're cheating and we're here to prove it,'' said one 
     retired nuclear-weapons officer. ``[But] if they're going to 
     do something they don't want us to know about, they'll go and 
     do it someplace else.''
       Over the years, it has become increasingly possible to 
     verify missile-test performance and weapon deployments via 
     direct observation or satellite imagery, according to this 
     defense expert and others.
       Under the 1991 treaty, ``we put some rather onerous 
     requirements on the Russians because we could,'' said the 
     retired officer. ``If the Cold War is either over or thawing, 
     there are certain things you would not require a counterpart 
     to do.''
       Moscow actually never exercised its reciprocal right to 
     continuously monitor a U.S. missile production facility by 
     deploying inspectors, according to a DTRA fact sheet. In 
     April 2001--a year after Thiokol Corp. stopped making 
     Peacekeeper missiles at a plant in Promontory, Utah--the 
     Russian right to maintain such inspectors in the United 
     States came to an end.
       That left Votkinsk as the only operating strategic-missile 
     production facility in either nation, and the only site to 
     host continuous monitoring. The START accord also allows for 
     12 types of intrusive verification measures that include 
     suspect-site inspections to confirm that clandestine weapons 
     production is not occurring, according to the U.S. defense 
     agency.
       Even as hosting the only remaining monitoring mission at a 
     production facility has evolved into an irritant for Moscow, 
     it is unclear how useful the U.S. presence at Votkinsk has 
     been for Washington. Intelligence officials have prized the 
     U.S. opportunity to observe Russian manufacturing operations 
     at Votkinsk, but how much militarily useful information has 
     been gleaned is uncertain, some experts said.
       For many of the U.S. civilian and military inspectors who 
     served at the remote Russian location, there were apparently 
     few surprises.
       ``It was very monotonous. We could have months go by 
     without inspecting a missile,'' a former U.S. inspector at 
     Votkinsk told GSN in an interview. ``It all seemed like the 
     whole process was very ridiculous, in a way.''
       A photograph posted on a Facebook page for the ``Votkinsk 
     Portal Monitoring Facility'' shows a group of U.S. personnel 
     wearing swimsuits and big smiles, posing on beach chairs in 
     several inches of snow. A Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
     building appears in the background.
       ``It always felt like an episode from `M*A*S*H,''' said the 
     former inspector, referring to the television comedy series 
     about an Army medical unit during the Korean War. ``There's 
     people from all over the country just thrown in there to do 
     this job. It was very surreal at times.''
       Military duty officers would cycle through the facility on 
     three- or six-week rotations, this source said. Civilians 
     typically served much longer tours--many on DTRA contract 
     with Raytheon Technical Services, or Hughes before that--on 
     duty for nine-week stretches, with three weeks of leave in 
     between.
       Under the START accord, the U.S. government could deliver 
     food and other goods to the inspection and support teams at 
     Votkinsk in two cargo aircraft flights a year.
       The defense agency describes a typical inspection team as 
     including a team chief and deputy, two linguists, a weapons 
     specialist and other experts. Government and contracted 
     support personnel include translators, technicians, cooks and 
     medical staff, according to defense officials.
       The former inspector said the U.S. team at Votkinsk used 
     relatively little advanced technology for its monitoring 
     operations, and the staff's computers or other electronics 
     could likely be moved using a single cargo aircraft. Most 
     furniture and office supplies would likely be disposed of or 
     left behind, officials speculated.
                                  ____


             Russia Hints at Delay in START II Negotiations

       Washington--A report from Interfax news agency has quoted 
     the Russian Foreign Ministry as saying that the provisions of 
     the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) can remain in 
     force even after it expires on December 5.
       To some, the pronouncement looks problematic for the 
     administration of U.S. President Barack Obama, which was 
     hoping to sign a new treaty with Russian President Dmitry 
     Medvedev when Obama goes to Europe to accept his Nobel Peace 
     Prize on December 10.
       At a November 15 meeting with Medvedev in Singapore after 
     the close of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, 
     Obama said that the two men's ``goal continues to be to 
     complete the negotiations and to be able to sign a deal 
     before the end of the year.''
       He added that he was ``confident'' that with ``hard work 
     and a sense of urgency,'' it could happen.
       But as Russian and U.S. weapons negotiators continue to 
     meet in Singapore, it has emerged that a key sticking point 
     is how each country inspects the other's nuclear weapons 
     facilities.
       ``If you believe the leaks that have been coming out over 
     the past couple of days, the issue is now about disagreements 
     over the systems and processes of how things are checked,'' 
     Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor of the journal ``Russia in Global 
     Affairs,'' told RFE/RL's Russian Service. ``For its part, the 
     Russian side is opposed to the proposals that the Americans 
     have put forward.''
       Lukyanov said that one point of disagreement could bring 
     the talks to a crashing halt.
       ``Nothing is agreed on until everything is agreed on,'' he 
     said.


                       ``Working Through Issues''

       Obama may have been referring to that issue in Singapore 
     when he said he felt ``as if both sides are trying to work 
     through some difficult technical issues but are doing so in 
     good faith.''
       Obama and Medvedev met in Moscow in July and agreed to 
     reduce the number of nuclear warheads that each country could 
     possess to between 1,500 and 1,675 within seven years.
       Kennette Benedict, executive director of the Bulletin of 
     Atomic Scientists, which focuses on the consequences of 
     nuclear weapons, thinks the statement by the Russian Foreign 
     Ministry about allowing the original START treaty to remain 
     in force is a positive sign from Moscow.
       ``I take this as a very positive sign because the START 
     Treaty does expire on December 5--and there are provisions 
     for extending it, and the reason it's so important to extend 
     is because it has such robust verification measures in it. We 
     have inspectors now in Russia and they have inspectors here 
     in the United States,'' Benedict said. ``If START I is not 
     extended, then our inspectors would need to leave, Russia and 
     their inspectors would need to leave the U.S., and the trust 
     that we've built may make it more difficult to come to a 
     final agreement.''
       Benedict said she expects that Obama and Medvedev will sign 
     a START II Treaty soon, perhaps by the end of the year. The 
     hard part, she said, will be persuading getting the U.S. 
     Senate to ratify it.


                           Domestic Politics

       For the past decade, Benedict said, the Senate has been 
     reluctant to ratify any international treaties, regardless of 
     subject matter.
       ``As I understand it, they think that the United States can 
     go it alone on any number of things, and that we have a right 
     to have as many weapons as we want, and they believe, I 
     guess, that all weapons are useful,'' Benedict said. ``So 
     they think that military might is the best way for the United 
     States to proceed.''
       Gary Schmitt, director of advanced strategic studies at the 
     American Enterprise Institute, a private policy-research 
     center in Washington, agreed that Senate ratification will be 
     difficult, but for a more nuanced reason.
       ``It's not going to be a slam-dunk [in the Senate] because 
     the actual agreement's going to reduce the number of warheads 
     and platforms,'' Schmitt said. ``And if it's really a 
     substantial cut, there'll be a serious debate about what the 
     nature of our deterrent looks like.''
       In fact, Schmitt said he's surprised that Obama is acting 
     as if the United States needs a START II Treaty. One of the 
     snags in the negotiations so far, he noted, is that Moscow 
     wants to cut weapons further than Washington does.
       ``I think one of the problems with the Obama 
     administration's approach was that they actually acted like 
     we needed this arms-control agreement, when, in fact, it was 
     the Russians who were looking for it because, first of all, 
     it costs a lot of money to develop new weapons, and the 
     second thing is that a lot of what they have is extremely old 
     and should be taken out of commission,'' Schmitt said. 
     ``Somebody was telling me that at the most recent military 
     parade in Moscow they were driving some of the missiles by 
     and they were noticeably rusty, which is not what you want 
     when you have ICBMS.''
       Ultimately, Schmitt said, it is good news that both Russia 
     and the United States aren't arbitrarily standing by the 
     December 5 deadline.
       Give the two sides plenty of time to talks, he said, 
     because both sides can easily live with an extension of START 
     I.
                                  ____


         Russia Not Preparing Interim Agreement at START Talks

       Moscow, Nov. 17.--The United States and Russia are not 
     preparing some interim agreement on strategic offensives 
     weapons, the Russian Foreign Ministry said.
       ``According to the instructions that were given our 
     delegation is working on a new agreement on the reduction and 
     limitation of strategic offensive weapons and not some 
     interim documents,'' Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman 
     Andrei Nesterenko said at a briefing in Moscow on Tuesday.

[[Page 28786]]

       Nesterenko was commenting on the statement by U.S. 
     presidential aide Michael McFaul that Moscow and Washington 
     need to prepare an interim agreement on strategic offensive 
     weapons, as the main agreement will not be ratified by 
     December 5 when the current one expires.

                          ____________________