[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 2]
[Senate]
[Pages 1580-1581]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                 AFRICA

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, in recent years more and more observers 
have noted Africa's failing states, ungoverned spaces and pirate-
infested waters, and the threat they pose to our own national security. 
I have long raised these concerns on this Senate floor and I am pleased 
that they are receiving increasing attention. However, it is not enough 
to simply acknowledge Africa's security challenges; nor is it 
sufficient to shift resources toward them, although that is a good 
start. We must institute long-term strategies to further our national 
security goals while developing sustainable partnerships with Africans 
that advance our mutual interests and support nascent democratic 
institutions.
  As a 16-year member and the current chairman of the Subcommittee on 
African Affairs, I have closely followed U.S. policy toward the 
continent for many years. Too often, I have found that our approach has 
been driven by short-sighted tactics designed to buy influence or react 
to crises. In the absence of comprehensive interagency strategies, 
these tactics often undermine long-term efforts to build civilian 
institutions and strengthen the rule of law. This must change if we are 
to successfully pursue our strategic objectives on the African 
continent. It remains critical--and long overdue--that the United 
States develop a carefully planned and long-term approach to both 
promoting stability and combating terrorism in Africa. I would like to 
offer some thoughts today on key components of such an approach.
  During our December recess, I traveled to the headquarters of the new 
Africa Command in Stuttgart, Germany and discussed a range of issues 
with senior officials there. Although I have been focused on AFRICOM 
since its inception--and on the idea of such a command prior to that--I 
was reminded during my trip of the very important and strategic roles 
that AFRICOM, if

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advanced properly, can play. These roles include helping to develop 
effective, well-disciplined militaries that adhere to civilian rule, 
strengthening regional peacekeeping missions, and supporting 
postconflict demobilization and disarmament processes. If carried out 
properly, AFRICOM's work can complement that of the State Department, 
USAID, and other U.S. Government agencies working on the continent and 
help contribute to lasting peace and stability across Africa.
  It is because of the significant need for this important work that we 
must support AFRICOM, while also working to ensure that it adheres to 
its defined military mandate and defers to the State Department as the 
lead on policy matters. The challenge for AFRICOM is to strike the 
right balance with our civilian agencies and not become our primary 
representation throughout Africa. Serious work remains to be done in 
ensuring that the Command is operating within comprehensive interagency 
national security strategies and squarely under the authority of our 
Chiefs of Mission. I also remain concerned that AFRICOM has been unable 
to adequately convey its role within a larger policy framework to 
Congress, to the American people or to African governments and regional 
organizations--perhaps its most important partners.
  It is true that the Command's initial rollout was fraught with 
mistakes and the Command understandably received a cool reception on 
the continent, among civilian agencies and here in Congress. But I am 
confident from my recent meetings that the staff in Stuttgart has 
recognized and is learning from these setbacks. Rather than merely 
criticizing, we in Congress should work across the spectrum of agencies 
here in Washington as well as with AFRICOM's leadership to help craft a 
combatant command that is doing the right job, for the right reasons 
and can thus be adequately resourced. In the months ahead, I intend to 
use my role as chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs to do 
just that.
  I hope, however, that no one thinks for a minute that military tools 
alone are sufficient to transform the underlying causes of violence and 
instability in Africa. To promote long-term stability, it is crucial 
that we strike a better balance between our military relationships and 
our support for civilian institutions and the rule of law.
  Achieving that balance is no small task and it will only be possible 
if we invest seriously in new institutional capacities for our civilian 
agencies on the continent. This begins with ensuring our embassies have 
the Foreign Service officers and resources they need to do the job 
properly. We cannot continue to shortchange our embassies across Africa 
while we focus on one or two other locations around the world. We need 
to make sure our embassies have sufficient resources to meet the 
challenges of today, and to identify the challenges of tomorrow. And we 
need to make sure our presence includes the right kind of people--
trained political and economic officers who can get out and about to do 
their job.
  By expanding our diplomatic presence in Africa, including outside the 
capitals, we increase our ability to learn about the continent--its 
governments, its people and its cultures. Right now, we do not have the 
necessary human resources or expertise on the African continent to 
gather this information and anticipate emerging crises or fully 
understand existing ones. Diplomatic reporting and open source 
collection in Africa are a critical complement to the clandestine work 
of the intelligence community, and I have long called for more 
resources for both. I have also called for an integrated, interagency 
collection and analysis strategy, which is why Senator Hagel and I last 
year introduced legislation to establish an independent commission to 
address this long-term, systematic problem. This legislation was passed 
by the Intelligence Committee last year and, although Senator Hagel has 
retired, I intend to reintroduce this legislation this year.
  Developing these capacities and a balanced approach is in our 
national security interest and is necessary if we are to better address 
areas of concern in Africa. At present, there are several devastating 
crises that we cannot ignore, including in Congo, Nigeria, the Sahel, 
Sudan and Zimbabwe. But I believe one region stands out for its 
particular significance to our national security, and that is the Horn 
of Africa and specifically the deepening crisis in Somalia. I would 
like to spend the rest of my remarks discussing the situation in this 
region, where the need for a carefully planned and long-term approach 
is particularly urgent.
  During my December trip, I also visited Djibouti. There, I met with 
many leading figures in Somalia, including the Prime Minister of the 
Somali Transitional Federal Government, the leadership of the 
opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, the UN Special 
Representative for Somalia, the President of Somaliland and members of 
Somalia's civil society. I also met with Djiboutian government 
officials and members of civil society, as well as with our diplomats 
working on Somalia out of both Djibouti and Nairobi, who are 
extraordinary and deeply committed individuals.
  Tragically, the situation in Somalia continues to get worse. Six 
months ago I stood on the Senate floor to discuss Somalia's 
humanitarian crisis--the worst in the world. According to a local human 
rights group, an estimated 16,000 people have been killed since the 
start of 2007, with over 28,000 people wounded and more than one 
million displaced. USAID now estimates that 3.2 million people--soon to 
be half of the population--are in need of emergency assistance, 
including hundreds of thousands of refugees in neighboring countries. 
The stories and images of human suffering coming out of Somalia are 
horrifying.
  In addition to the humanitarian impact, I am deeply concerned by the 
potential impact of this crisis on our national security. With the 
Ethiopian army withdrawing, the transitional government remains 
deadlocked, new militias are forming, and existing ones continue to 
gain new territory. And while the Somalis are a moderate people, the 
terrorist group al Shabab has grown in ranks and expanded its reach. 
Moreover, just last month, several senior officials, including CIA 
Director Hayden and Joint Chiefs Chairman Mullen, said that al-Qaida is 
extending its reach in Somalia to revitalize its operations.
  The Bush administration's approach to Somalia--endorsing the 
Ethiopian invasion, backing an unpopular transitional government and 
launching periodic military strikes in the absence of a broader 
coherent strategy--was an abject failure. Without a carefully crafted 
strategy for Somalia, we have long relied on short-sighted tactics and 
a ``manhunt'' approach, rather than investing fully in efforts to 
promote a sustainable peace and help build legitimate and inclusive 
institutions. The result has been increased anti-Americanism, which 
helps enable extremist groups to effectively recruit and operate.
  With the Obama administration now in office, there is a critical 
opportunity, as well as an urgent need, to identify the lessons of this 
failed policy and signal a break from the past. One of my top 
priorities is to work with the Obama administration to develop a new 
comprehensive interagency strategy to bring stability to Somalia and 
the wider Horn of Africa. Support for the Djibouti process should 
continue, but we need to be far sighted about what it will take to 
translate diplomatic initiatives into security for the people of 
Somalia. That effort must include efforts from the ground up to build 
legitimate and inclusive governance institutions that respond to the 
needs of ordinary Somalis. For only when those institutions take hold 
will we finally be able to limit the appeal of violent extremism and 
achieve sustainable peace and security--and bolster our own national 
security.

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