[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 19]
[Senate]
[Pages 25915-25916]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




              ENGAGEMENT WITH BURMA AND THE 2010 ELECTIONS

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise today on the floor of the Senate 
to discuss events involving the troubled country of Burma.
  Earlier this year, I encouraged Secretary of State Clinton to make 
Burma a priority and to see how the United States could better achieve 
its policy objectives toward the regime. Several weeks ago, the 
administration unveiled its review of existing Burma policy. The result 
is that the administration has undertaken a diplomatic effort with the 
State Peace and Development Council, SPDC, in pursuit of the 
fundamental U.S. goals of peace, democracy and reconciliation in Burma.
  Let me say that I wish the administration well with its diplomatic 
efforts.

[[Page 25916]]

I am hopeful this policy will meet with some success. In addition, I 
believe that this interaction should not be limited to talks merely 
with the SPDC but should also include discussions with the National 
League for Democracy, NLD, and representatives from Burma's ethnic 
minorities. That said, I am not sanguine about the prospects for 
engagement with the regime. The military junta has shown no inclination 
whatsoever to compromise on any issue that might jeopardize the 
regime's hold on power. According to news reports, in July of this 
year, just weeks before the unveiling of the new Burma policy, the 
State Department at the highest levels offered to drop the U.S. 
investment ban against Burma if the regime released Aung San Suu Kyi. 
This was a major test of how the regime would respond to diplomatic 
engagement, providing a golden opportunity for the SPDC to demonstrate 
that it had indeed changed its spots. Instead of accepting this offer 
and freeing Suu Kyi, the regime promptly sentenced her to an additional 
18 months of imprisonment. That does not augur well for diplomatic 
engagement.
  As part of its new strategy, the administration indicated that, while 
it will place a high priority on diplomatic engagement, it will 
maintain the economic sanctions in place against the regime. It seems 
to me that, as matters now stand, there are three significant tests of 
whether or not the junta's relationship with the United States has 
improved to the degree that we should even consider moving away from a 
policy of sanctions: No. 1, the release of all political prisoners, 
including Suu Kyi; No. 2, the free and fair conduct of the 2010 
elections; and No. 3, Burma's compliance with its international 
obligations to end any prohibited military or proliferation related 
cooperation with North Korea. Short of tangible and concrete progress 
in these areas, the removal of sanctions seems to make little sense. It 
is after all the most significant leverage our government has over the 
SPDC. Sanctions make clear that the military junta has not achieved 
legitimacy in the eyes of the West.
  It is that search for international legitimacy that has apparently 
driven the SPDC to hold elections next year. But the 2010 elections are 
fraught with problems. As a preliminary matter, for these elections to 
be meaningful, the new ``constitution'' should be amended to provide 
for truly open electoral competition and democratic governance. As it 
stands now under the junta's charter, if Suu Kyi's party the NLD won 
100 percent of the contestable parliamentary seats in next year's 
election it would still not control the key government ministries: 
Defence and Home Affairs. No matter what they will remain firmly under 
military control. Moreover, the NLD cannot amend the constitution to 
improve the charter because the military is guaranteed a quarter of the 
parliament's seats. That means the junta can block any constitutional 
change. Finally, Suu Kyi may not even hold a position in the 
government; she is excluded from office by the charter. I would say to 
my Senate colleagues, this is hardly a prescription for democratic 
governance.
  But putting the flaws in the constitution to one side, there would 
need to be a profound change in the political environment in Burma for 
next year's elections to be meaningful. For example, candidates would 
need to be permitted to freely speak, assemble, and organize. So far as 
I can tell, none of that has occurred. There would also need to be 
international election monitors allowed in the country well in advance 
of election day. This was not permitted during the 2008 ``referendum.'' 
Simply holding an election is not enough; the elections must pass 
muster.
  With respect to next year's balloting, the NLD, the clear winner of 
the 1990 elections which the regime abrogated, faces a Hobson's choice. 
It can either participate in the elections which are almost certain to 
be unfair and thereby legitimize the flawed constitution or boycott the 
elections and be treated as a member of an unlawful organization. 
Participation means casting aside its 1990 victory; nonparticipation 
means becoming outlaws. I am likely to support the NLD in whatever 
decision the party makes in this regard though I am not blind to the 
profound dilemma it faces.
  I would just close by paying special tribute to Aung San Suu Kyi. Her 
grace and courage are an inspiration not only to the people of Burma 
but to us all. Her imprisonment is a reminder of the paramount 
importance of the need for freedom and justice in her homeland. I want 
her to know that I stand with her in her efforts to bring freedom and 
reconciliation to the people of Burma.

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