[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 19]
[Senate]
[Pages 25745-25747]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                       AFGHANISTAN TROOP REQUEST

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I believe it is now time for President Obama 
to move forward with General McChrystal's plan for executing the war in 
Afghanistan and to fully support his troop request.
  The President has correctly called Afghanistan a ``war of 
necessity.'' The counterinsurgency strategy that he announced last 
March is a good one, and it has been widely accepted. Having read 
General McChrystal's August report, I believe it may represent our only 
chance to successfully implement the March strategy, and it will 
require the forces that General McChrystal has recommended.
  There is no reason to delay the decision regarding a troop increase 
until after the Afghan election, a point that I will talk about in a 
moment. Our national security is at stake regardless of the government 
in Kabul. The outcome of the Afghan runoff election on November 7 will 
not change our mission there. Whether Abdullah or Karzai wins, our 
mission will be the same, and time is not on our side. General 
McChrystal's August report said we have only 1 year. It is now down to 
10 months, and it will take time to get troops in-country.
  I want the President to know and the American people to know that 
Republicans will support the President if he follows through on his 
strategy and provides General McChrystal with the resources he needs. 
But this must be done in a timely fashion. The strategy can only 
succeed if it is implemented within the next 10 months and with the 
resources that have been recommended.
  The stakes are high in Afghanistan. When President Obama announced 
his strategy last March, he said:

       If the Afghan government falls to the Taliban or allows al-
     Qaida to go unchallenged, that country will again be a base 
     for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they 
     possibly can.

  Mr. President, he was right. The Afghan people are watching. When I 
was in Afghanistan this past April and visited with tribal elders in 
Kandahar, for example, it was very clear the Afghan people were looking 
to the United States for a commitment to their security. If we can't 
provide that security to them, they will be forced to make 
accommodations with the Taliban.
  Pakistan is also under threat, as Secretary Clinton recently pointed 
out. She said:

       The extremists in Pakistan, whatever their titles or 
     whatever their affiliation, are increasingly threatening the 
     authority of the state.

  We all know if nuclear-armed Pakistan were to fall into extremists' 
hands, the world would face a monumental crisis. Moreover, if Pakistan 
senses a lack of commitment on our part, how long will it be until it 
seeks accommodation with al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist groups?
  For these reasons, we must not shortchange the mission in 
Afghanistan. General McChrystal was very clear about the need for more 
troops. In his assessment he said the following:

       ISAF, [the International Security Assistance Force]--

  Of which the United States is a part--

     requires an increase in the total coalition force capability 
     and end strength.

  During an August speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, President 
Obama made this pledge to our Armed Forces:

       I will give you a clear mission, defined goals, and the 
     equipment and support you need to get the job done. That is 
     my commitment to you.


[[Page 25746]]


  Of course, the President can now demonstrate that commitment by 
following the advice of his general and providing the resources that 
have been requested.
  What exactly is General McChrystal's plan? Well, I think his 
assessment demonstrates both a thorough understanding of the Afghan 
people and the enemy we are fighting. He described the situation as:

       Three regional insurgencies [that] have intersected with a 
     dynamic blend of local power struggles in a country damaged 
     by 30 years of conflict.

  Not an easy situation, obviously, and he described the enemy as 
follows:

       The conflict in Afghanistan can be viewed as a set of 
     related insurgencies, each of which is a complex system with 
     multiple actors and a vast set of interconnecting 
     relationships among those actors. The most important 
     implication of this view is that no element of the conflict 
     can be viewed in isolation.

  In other words, we can't defeat al-Qaida without also addressing its 
support networks--the Taliban and the so-called Haqqani groups. These 
are the groups that work with al-Qaida, protect it, and give it a place 
to hide when we attempt to deal with al-Qaida.
  In order to effectively counter this enemy, General McChrystal 
proposed a comprehensive plan that would effectively implement the 
President's strategy--improve the performance of the Afghan security 
forces, prioritize responsible and accountable governance, gain the 
initiative to reverse the insurgency's momentum, and focus our 
resources on areas where vulnerable populations are the most 
threatened.
  One of the key principles of General McChrystal's plan is increasing 
Afghan ownership of its own security. He said in his assessment:

       ISAF, with the Afghan National Security Force, must shift 
     its approach to bring security and normalcy to the people and 
     shield them from insurgent violence, corruption, and 
     coercion, ultimately enabling the Afghan government to gain 
     the trust and confidence of the people while reducing the 
     influence of insurgents.

  Further, General McChrystal describes this step as necessary to fix 
what he calls the ``crisis of confidence'' in the Afghan Government and 
coalition forces.
  General McChrystal has also said that more effective integration and 
partnership between Afghan and coalition forces will enable a more 
rapid expansion of the Afghan security force's capacity and 
responsibility for security. The same method was implemented in Iraq, 
resulting in a dramatic increase in the quality of Iraqi security 
forces.
  So those who say we should only train more Afghan troops and police 
present a false choice. General McChrystal proposes a total 
counterinsurgency strategy with both more Afghan police and military 
forces; but until they are trained sufficiently to do the job, an 
adequate and sufficient group of U.S. and NATO forces to both train the 
Afghan forces and provide the security that is necessary during that 
interim period of time.
  General McChrystal stated in his assessment:

       Ideally, the Afghan National Security Forces must lead this 
     fight, but they will not have enough capacity in the near 
     term given the insurgency's growth rate. In the interim, 
     coalition forces must provide a bridge capability to protect 
     critical segments of the population. The status quo will lead 
     to failure if we wait for the ANSF to grow.

  That is to say, the National Security Forces of Afghanistan.
  So, again, to simply argue we should train more NATO and U.S. 
security forces in the interim is a false choice. We need to do both. 
But in order to do the former, we must do the latter; that is to say, 
we have to increase our own troop strength in order to have the ability 
to both hold the line and train the Afghan forces who will ultimately 
be able to provide security for that country.
  Now to the matter of time. General McChrystal said in his assessment:

       Time matters; we must act now to reverse the negative 
     trends and demonstrate progress.

  One of the key points the general made in his assessment was this: He 
said:

       I believe the short-term fight will be decisive. Failure to 
     gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the 
     near term (next 12 months)--while Afghan security capacity 
     matures--risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is 
     no longer possible.

  As he said, time is of the essence. By the way, this 12-month clock 
started ticking in August when he submitted his report. So at this 
point, 10 months remain on the general's stopwatch to turn the tide of 
this war.
  Even if the President makes the right call without further delay and 
gives General McChrystal the resources he needs to prosecute the 
strategy the President ordered in March, it will take months before 
additional troops are available for the mission.
  Unlike Iraq where we did have at least a nominal infrastructure in 
place, in Afghanistan there are few roads and fewer other amenities and 
facilities with which to support the troops. All of that takes 
additional time to create.
  The troop surge in Iraq didn't turn the tide of that war until 6 
months after President Bush announced it. As I said, that was on 
terrain significantly easier to navigate than Afghanistan's mountainous 
border region where many of our soldiers are fighting today.
  Coalition forces are losing ground to the Taliban with current troop 
numbers. According to General McChrystal:

       Many indicators suggest the overall situation is 
     deteriorating, despite considerable effort by ISAF.

  So I submit that President Obama should delay no longer a decision to 
deploy troops that are necessary within this 12-month timeframe set out 
by General McChrystal in order to retake the momentum of this war.
  Finally, I mentioned earlier the Afghan election should not delay the 
President's decision. I disagree with the argument some have made that 
there should be some sort of test to determine whether the Afghan 
Government will be a reliable partner before we decide to commit 
additional troops.
  The very reason U.S. troops are fighting in Afghanistan is because 
there is no strong government to maintain security and fight corruption 
there. The point is to make it more reliable, to influence it to be 
less corrupt, and to protect the Afghan people so they will reject 
Taliban control and support their government.
  We need to help foster a situation in which the Afghan Government can 
grow into an institution that can provide for its people. That is what 
a successful exit strategy will look like. We should not curtail our 
effort in Afghanistan because of a less-than-ideal political situation 
today.
  President Karzai noted last week:

       The [Afghan] institutions are just young toddlers in this 
     democracy that resembles a toddler. It walks and falls. We 
     have to understand that, and we have to accept the Afghan 
     elections in the context of the Afghan situation and the 
     poverty and lack of means in this country.

  I add to that that President Karzai and his administration need to be 
more forceful in helping to bring those institutions about, to ensure 
that the election is not fraudulent and to ensure that his government 
is not corrupt and to do what is necessary to gain the trust of the 
Afghan people.
  But are we likely to have more influence in achieving that result by 
deciding that we can't commit the troops necessary to carry out the 
recommendations of General McChrystal, all of which will probably push 
the Afghans further toward the Taliban or by making the point that we 
are going to help establish the kind of government that is reliable and 
we are going to do that by engaging in this counterinsurgency strategy 
with everything that it takes, including the additional troops that are 
required, and thereby have the kind of influence over the Afghan 
Government that will bring it into a more reliable situation and enable 
them to rely on the security we provide rather than making 
accommodation with the Taliban?
  General McChrystal stated in his assessment that one of the key 
sources of the Taliban's strength is the perception by Afghans that a 
victory by the Taliban is inevitable. We need to make sure it is not. 
How can the United States expect to influence matters in Afghanistan if 
we are viewed as looking for a way out and not putting in

[[Page 25747]]

the troops General McChrystal has requested?
  Very importantly, this same question applies to Pakistan. We ask 
Pakistan to help us fight the Taliban and al-Qaida and other terrorist 
groups who are active in Afghanistan. But if we are viewed as an 
unreliable partner because we are not willing to commit sufficient 
troops, the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan will hedge their bet 
with the terrorists and their supporters. That is what has happened 
there in the past.
  When I went there last April and talked to Ambassador Holbrooke 
before I went, I said: Mr. Ambassador, what message would you like us 
to try to convey?
  He said: Help them understand we are there for the long run. We are 
not going to cut and run; we are going to stay with them and help them 
and do whatever is necessary for them to gain control of their country.
  I conveyed that message, and I believed it, and I want to believe it. 
But if we do not make the decisions to carry out this strategy the 
President announced in March, then the Pakistanis are going to be 
asking the same questions we did a few months ago: Will you be with us? 
Will you stand with us or are we going to have to make accommodations 
with people neither you nor we like very much? One individual said: Why 
would they make enemies with the people they are stuck with long after 
we have left? In other words, they don't live in a very good 
neighborhood. I think that is what General McChrystal's request is 
about--proof that we are committed to seeing this fight through against 
the common enemy.
  Interestingly, we faced a similar situation in Iraq. If we had opted 
against the surge in 2007, at a time when Iraq's central government was 
extremely weak and unable to protect its citizens from the insurgency 
there, the Iraqi people most likely would not have been able to 
eventually take ownership of their own security. But they did.
  Similarly, if President Obama were not to provide the additional 
troops General McChrystal needs, I believe we risk allowing Afghanistan 
to become the country it was on September 10, 2001--a result that none 
of us want.
  In Iraq, the surge created the space for Prime Minister Maliki to 
take greater control and reduce corruption in the Iraqi Government, and 
a troop surge in Afghanistan would allow President Karzai--or a new 
President Abdullah if he were to win--to do the same.
  A stable and legitimate government in Kabul is critical to the 
security of Afghanistan. But the United States cannot hinge its 
strategy on the current reliability of the Afghan Government, and the 
President should not wait until after the election to announce his 
troop decision. To do so would suggest that the United States doesn't 
have a core national interest of its own in Afghanistan, one based on 
our security. Yes, we aim to help establish the rule of law in 
Afghanistan, but our core national interest in that nation does not 
change based on who is elected in their November 7 runoff.
  Mr. President, in conclusion, I believe General McChrystal's 
assessment really rises above the political fray. It offers an 
objective description of what is happening on the ground and what 
resources are needed to turn the tide of this war. This report may 
represent our only chance to successfully implement the President's 
March strategy--as I said, a strategy with which I think we all agree--
and it will require the forces General McChrystal has recommended.
  Regardless of the current status of the Afghan Government, we must 
foster a situation in which it can grow into a government that can 
provide basic services, and that will require, first of all, providing 
security for its people. Our influence over this process will be far 
greater if we make it clear that we are there to stay until our goals 
are achieved.
  It has been 2 months since General McChrystal sent his assessment to 
Washington. I respectfully submit my recommendation to the President 
that he approve this full troop request and that he do so as soon as 
possible. If he does, as I said, I believe Republicans will be very 
supportive of his policy.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kaufman). The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, what is before the Senate at this time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is in morning business.

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