[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 19]
[House]
[Pages 25684-25685]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                   SAUDI ARABIA: MINORITY'S NEW ALLY

  (Mr. CONNOLLY of Virginia asked and was given permission to address 
the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. CONNOLLY of Virginia. Madam Speaker, the minority party has a new 
ally in its effort to obstruct clean energy legislation--the Saudi 
Arabian Government.
  Here in the House I was proud to join my colleagues in passing 
legislation that would invest in clean energy technology, create new 
green jobs, and cut global warming pollution. Those same countries on 
whose foreign oil we are currently dependent are not supportive of 
legislation that would do these things.
  As The New York Times reported on October 14--an article I will enter 
into the Record--Saudi Arabia will go to the international climate 
negotiations in Copenhagen with the goal of preventing ratification of 
an effective international treaty to reduce greenhouse gas pollution 
precisely because such a treaty would reduce American reliance on its 
oil.
  The Senate is considering a bill analogous to what we already passed 
here in the House to cut global warming pollution and reduce our 
dependence on foreign oil. I hope Saudi Arabia's opposition to American 
energy independence will remind all of us how important it is for the 
Senate to act, and act now.

                [From the New York Times, Oct. 14, 2009]

                  ``Striving for No'' in Climate Talks

                         (By Andrew C. Revkin)

       UNFCCC Amid the throngs at climate talks, as shown in Bali 
     here in 2007, officials from individual countries can make a 
     big difference. Saudi Arabia has been pinpointed as an 
     influential player.
       In doing my reporting for the story in The New York Times 
     today on Saudi Arabia's latest maneuvers in climate treaty 
     talks (they are reviving longstanding demands for 
     compensation for lost oil revenue), I found an interesting 
     paper on the oil kingdom's involvement in climate talks by 
     Joanna Depledge, a research fellow at Cambridge University 
     focusing on climate negotiations.
       The paper, ``Striving for No: Saudi Arabia in the Climate 
     Change Regime,'' was published last November in the journal 
     Global Environmental Politics. It is the most comprehensive 
     analysis I've seen of the role that Saudi Arabia and other 
     oil exporters have played through two decades of global 
     climate diplomacy. Dr. Depledge's conclusion is that this is 
     a classic case of parties--in this case Saudi Arabia and 
     other oil-rich states--getting involved in a process 
     primarily to obstruct it. She concludes by noting hints that

[[Page 25685]]

     the oil powers appear to be shifting these days to a more 
     constructive role.
       But many observers and participants in the interim climate 
     talks that concluded in Bangkok last week saw scant signs of 
     a cooperative approach. And the e-mail and statements from 
     Saudi officials that Jad Mouawad and I cited in our article 
     appear to display a willingness by Saudi Arabia to impede a 
     deal in Copenhagen if it does not include concrete 
     commitments of aid and investment to offset anticipated drop 
     in oil flows as countries try to cut emissions.
       In an e-mail message to me, Dr. Depledge warned that Saudi 
     Arabia and its lead official on climate, Mohammad al-Sabban, 
     should not be underestimated as they pushed for financial 
     commitments. ``I am absolutely sure that getting something on 
     this will be a deal-breaker/maker for them,'' she wrote. 
     ``They are quite blunt about it. It is the strategy they have 
     followed since 1991.''
       Dr. Depledge said she was hoping ``that getting something 
     on investment'' in carbon capture and storage would ``provide 
     a win-win way of getting them on board.''
       ``Al-Sabban is the most skillful and experienced negotiator 
     in the process,'' she continued. ``Others ignore him at their 
     peril.''
       Access to the paper requires a subscription, so I will 
     summarize its main points below. Here's part of the abstract:
       A key starting point for the conduct of global negotiations 
     under the U.N. system is that delegations are actively 
     seeking an agreement that will meaningfully address the 
     problem at hand. Sometimes, however, negotiations must 
     contend with cases of obstructionism, that is, negotiators 
     who are at the table with the aim of preventing an agreement. 
     Given that they face no imperative of striking a deal, 
     governments for whom ``no'' is the preferred outcome can have 
     a disproportionately high impact on the negotiations, not 
     only by formally blocking agreements, but on a day-to-day 
     basis by slowing down progress or souring the atmosphere. 
     This article examines Saudi Arabia's involvement in the 
     climate change regime, and argues that the delegation has 
     long played the role of obstructionist.
       Dr. Depledge notes that Saudi Arabia and many other oil-
     exporting states only joined the Kyoto Protocol once it 
     became clear it was going to take effect. ``Saudi Arabia 
     acceded in time to ensure that it would become a party--and 
     therefore able to fully influence proceedings,'' she wrote.
       She described a significant contrast between the stances of 
     Saudi Arabia and another developing country exporting fossil 
     fuels--in this case South Africa and its coal:
       Although the South African economy is more diversified than 
     that of Saudi Arabia, it is still highly dependent on the 
     coal sector. South Africa is the world's second-largest coal 
     exporter, with developed countries accounting for 80 percent 
     of its coal exports. South Africa is much poorer than Saudi 
     Arabia, and coal is more vulnerable to climate policy than 
     oil, given its higher carbon content and the greater 
     availability of alternatives. South Africa, however, has 
     adopted a more balanced view of the risks posed by climate 
     change and mitigation measures, translating into a far more 
     constructive role in the negotiations. Saudi Arabia has 
     simply sought to prevent or slow down progress, either on the 
     general thrust of the negotiations or on specific agenda 
     items.
       Dr. Depledge described signs of a shift in the oil 
     kingdom's stance, including its endorsement of science 
     pointing to big impacts from a building human influence on 
     climate and commitment of money to pursue technologies for 
     capturing carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels and 
     other new energy options.
       But her conclusion was still cautionary:
       The question is whether, and if so how, these developments 
     will eventually feed through to changes in the Saudi 
     delegation's approach to the negotiations themselves, 
     especially leading up to the landmark Copenhagen meeting in 
     December 2009. For now (up to the June 2008 sessions), any 
     signs of a softening in the Saudi negotiating position 
     remained well hidden.
                                  ____


        The Worst of Friends: OPEC and G77 in the Climate Regime

                            (By Jon Barnett)

       In the climate change negotiations the thirteen countries 
     that are members of OPEC obstruct progress towards reducing 
     emissions of greenhouse gases. Although these actions 
     undermine sustainable development in developing countries. 
     the larger Group of 77 (G-77) coalition nevertheless tacitly 
     supports its OPEC members in the climate regime. This article 
     explains the connection between OPEC's interests in oil 
     exports and its inaction on climate change, and the 
     divergence of these interests with those of the G-77. It 
     argues that OPEC's influence within the G-77, and therefore 
     the climate regime, stems from the desire to maintain unity 
     within the G-77. This unity has and is likely to continue to 
     cost the majority of developing countries in the form delayed 
     assistance for adaptation, the possibility of inadequate 
     reduction in emissions under the second commitment period 
     under the Kyoto Protocol, and continued dependence on 
     increasingly expensive oil imports.
                                  ____


       Striving for No: Saudi Arabia in the Climate Change Regime

                          (By Joanna Depledge)

       The international relations literature often assumes that 
     negotiators in global regimes are actively seeking a 
     collective agreement to the problem on the table. There are 
     cases, however, where a delegation may instead he ``striving 
     for no,'' that is, participating with the aim of obstructing 
     a deal. This article explores the challenges surrounding such 
     cases of ``obstructionism,'' using the example of Saudi 
     Arabia in the climate change regime. It examines the evidence 
     for diagnosing Saudi Arabia as an obstructionist in that 
     regime, the delegation's negotiating tactics, strategies for 
     addressing obstructionism, and finally the repercussions for 
     both the climate change regime, and Saudi Arabia itself. In 
     conclusion, the article considers whether Saudi Arabia may be 
     moving beyond obstruction.

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