[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 18]
[Senate]
[Pages 25070-25073]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              START TREATY

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wish to speak to an issue that is very 
timely because the United States and Russia are beginning today their 
seventh round of negotiations on the so-called START treaty. This is a 
treaty that could limit the number of nuclear warheads and delivery 
vehicles by both countries and provide an extension of various 
compliance and verification procedures that are currently followed by 
both countries.
  It is interesting to me that the Russians do not appear to be in much 
of a hurry to complete the negotiations before the treaty expires, and 
it expires on December 5 of this year. According to Assistant Secretary 
of State Richard Verma, in a letter to me and several fellow Senators, 
I quote:

       Russian views with respect to the meaning of these two 
     terms--

  And he is specifically talking about the definitions of ``strategic 
delivery vehicle'' and ``associated warheads,'' both of which are 
obviously key to the treaty, in any event--

       Russian views with respect to the meaning of these two 
     terms have not yet been fully explained by the Russian 
     Federation.

  We are in the seventh round of negotiations, as I said. When these 
two fundamental terms have not yet had an explanation by the Russian 
side as to what they mean and, in effect, what they are tabling in the 
way of proposals, it is pretty clear we are not far enough down the 
road to see much light at the end of the tunnel.
  With regard to the verification rules, which are the heart of the 
START treaty, he wrote:

       The Russian Federation has not, as yet, elaborated 
     sufficiently on its views concerning verification for the 
     United States to judge the nature of its approach.

  Again, it is interesting that this letter, which is dated October 5, 
suggests the Russians had not yet provided to us their position on key 
provisions of this treaty. Yet we are supposed to have the negotiations 
completed before the treaty expires on December 5.
  It is increasingly clear to me, as a result of all this, there will 
not be a treaty by December 5; certainly not one that is ratified by 
the Senate, which is a process the Senate will require several months, 
obviously, to complete. As I said, I think it is doubtful we will even 
see one signed by the United States and Russia by December 5.
  It is clear to me the Russians have sensed an opportunity that they 
can use time to their advantage. They saw an overly ambitious American 
agenda, which went far beyond extending the compliance and verification 
measures of the existing treaty to actual proposals to significantly 
cut the numbers of warheads and delivery vehicles. They saw this 
obviously ambitious agenda pushing up against a very short timeframe--
in this case December 5. I think they have cleverly manipulated the 
situation, among other things, by throwing additional subjects into the 
mix, such as missile defenses and advanced conventional modernization 
and our nonnuclear conventional strike capabilities. By throwing these 
things into the mix, they have created a situation where it is going to 
be impossible to conclude negotiations by December 5, at least if the 
United States wants to stand firm on its position that neither the 
conventional strike capability nor missile defenses should be a subject 
of these negotiations.
  I think the Russians think they can scoop up a bunch of concessions 
from the United States because of this short timeframe and the fact 
that the United States will obviously want to conclude

[[Page 25071]]

the negotiations, if they can, by December 5. I think an example of 
concessions would be the recent decision of the United States to leave 
ourselves more exposed to a long-range missile threat from Iran as a 
result of taking out the so-called missile shield we had previously 
committed to the countries of Poland and the Czech Republic. I think 
the Russians may have correctly assessed that the Obama administration 
would be willing to make trades such as the one on European missile 
defense in order to get nuclear force levels lower because this would 
show progress on President Obama's agenda for a nuclear weapons-free 
world. At the same time, the Russians are attempting to constrain the 
United States.
  It is interesting they are actually developing programs, systems that 
would be prohibited by the START treaty. One is the RS-24 multiple 
warhead ballistic missile, which the Russians tested as recently as May 
29, 2007. That would be illegal for the Russians to deploy under START. 
So why are they testing it? They seem very happy to negotiate for fewer 
missiles because they would be able to add multiple warheads on the 
missiles they have.
  That is known as MIRVing or the multiple reentry vehicles. You just 
add more warheads on the same missile and you can accomplish the same 
thing, as if you had more missiles with an individual warhead on each 
one. It is clearly not progress, especially since the purpose of START, 
among other things, is to promote greater stability, which comes from 
reducing the number of multiple-warhead weapons.
  If the administration had simply limited the agenda to preserving and 
continuing the START treaty verification measures, we probably could 
have met the December 5 deadline and we could have preserved the treaty 
and avoided issues such as missile defense that have now been raised by 
the Russians.
  Although the Senate will have to participate in this ratification 
process--and very soon, quite possibly--we really have no idea yet how 
the administration will deal with the expiration of START on December 
5. What options does it have in mind to deal with that expiration date? 
How will it seek to extend the treaty? What are the legal consequences 
for information sharing and inspections both here and in Russia? What 
are the separation-of-power issues of the various approaches having to 
do with a treaty ratified by the Senate which expires, with the 
administration making treaty-like commitments to continue abiding by 
the treaty during the course of time prior to the Senate's ratification 
of the treaty? All of these are questions to which we have not gotten 
answers. Yet time is wasting.
  Several of my colleagues and I have asked for the answers to these 
questions in our August 14 letter to Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller. 
The October 5 response from Mr. Verma ignored the questions about the 
expiration date, and we need the answers.
  Beyond December 5, getting a new treaty ratified is not going to be 
an easy proposition. Many Members of the Senate have been clear that 
because the administration is seeking nuclear force reductions, it must 
concomitantly take responsibility for the nuclear forces that will 
remain. We will have fewer of them. We need to know that they will work 
and that they are safe.
  Of course, both of these issues are related to the nuclear posture 
review, which isn't really due until January. But since the 
administration rushed to its analysis to justify warhead and delivery 
vehicle reductions, it must now act quickly to assemble a comprehensive 
modernization plan that includes warheads, the nuclear weapons complex, 
and delivery systems. That plan has to be presented to the Senate no 
later than when they send the treaty up to the Senate, and the fiscal 
year 2011 budget will need to be sent at roughly the same time because 
it is the first year of the effectuation of the plan they would be 
presenting. Presumably, the plan will encompass maybe, let's say, a 
decade of nuclear weapons complex modernization, but next year's budget 
will really be the first time we will be able to verify the 
administration's seriousness about this modernization effort.
  So as to ensure there is no doubt on what ``comprehensive 
modernization plan'' means, let me refer to the definition provided by 
the Perry-Schlesinger Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture 
of the United States. The essential elements of such a program 
identified by the Perry-Schlesinger Commission are, first, full and 
timely Lifetime Extension Programs for the B61 and W76 warheads 
consistent with our military needs; second, funding for a modern 
warhead that includes new approaches to life extension involving 
replacement or, possibly, component reuse; third, full funding for 
stockpile surveillance work through the nuclear weapons complex as well 
as the science and engineering campaign at our National Laboratories; 
fourth, full funding for the timely replacement of the Los Alamos 
plutonium research and development and analytical chemistry facility, 
the uranium facilities at the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant, and a modern pit 
facility. These are the essential components the President needs to 
present. It is the minimum that should be included.
  I might add that this is already required as part of the fiscal 2010 
Defense Authorization Act I presume this body will soon pass and send 
to the President's desk. If anything short of this is submitted, the 
resulting delay in consideration of the treaty will be through no fault 
of the Senate; instead, blame will be with the administration and its 
failure to heed numerous admonitions from Senators. We needed this plan 
submitted at the same time as the treaty.
  It goes without saying that the administration must also understand 
that any limitations on U.S. missile defense or nonnuclear global 
strike capability will also be a deal breaker in the Senate.
  Finally, I will refer again to the issue of Russia's multiple-warhead 
RS-24. In this case, it appears the Russians have cheated--if not in 
the letter of the START agreement, at least in its spirit--by 
converting one of their existing missiles, the TOPOL-M, to this new 
multiple-warhead variant.
  However, if you look at the 2005 Section 403 Report, which is also 
known as the Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, 
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments report, 
prepared by the State Department's VCI Bureau, there are a litany of 
other outstanding issues regarding Russia's failure to comply with 
START.
  In fact, to quote from the 2005 report:

       A significant number of longstanding compliance issues that 
     have been raised in the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and 
     Inspection Commission remain unresolved.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
at the conclusion of my remarks the portion of the 2005 report dealing 
with Russia's noncompliance with its obligations under the 1991 
agreement.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, it is clear that the administration needs to 
tell the Senate whether this 2005 finding is still valid. In fact, I 
think the administration owes the Senate answers to the following 
questions:
  When will the State Department submit the next section 403 compliance 
report?
  Will the Senate see it before being asked to provide advice and 
consent on the START follow-on agreement? If not, why not?
  Does the State Department expect the compliance issues with the 1991 
agreement to be resolved prior to the expiration of that agreement?
  Does the State Department expect the follow-on agreement to include a 
mechanism for swift resolution of compliance issues? Have our START 
negotiators proposed such a mechanism? If so, can the negotiators brief 
the Senate, either in open Senate or a closed venue, on how it would 
work?
  I encourage the administration to provide answers to these questions 
soon. The longer it takes to receive answers, the more it appears there 
is

[[Page 25072]]

something to hide. Senators will want to know why we should ratify a 
new treaty when the administration is not enforcing provisions of the 
existing treaty.
  Mr. President, keeping START from expiring without replacement should 
not have been such a difficult matter. I regret that choices made by 
the administration have made it so. I encourage the administration to 
respond to the inquiries I have raised today, respond to the letters, 
the correspondence we have sent, and be able to provide to the Senate 
the answer to the key question: Why would we be asked to ratify a new 
treaty when we have not enforced compliance with the treaty it would 
seek to replace? All of these questions, as well as the requirement 
that a new modernization program be submitted, at the latest, at the 
same time the treaty is submitted, are important requirements for the 
Senate to provide its advice and consent with respect to a new START 
treaty.
  I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

 Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and 
                 Disarmament Agreements and Commitments

                             III. Overview


                 expansion of start compliance section

       Section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act--the 
     legislative basis for the submission to Congress of this 
     series of Noncompliance Reports--requires that the Report 
     provide greater specificity about compliance concerns. To 
     wit, the law requires the Report to include ``a specific 
     identification, to the maximum extent practicable in an 
     unclassified form, of each and every question that exists 
     with respect to compliance by other countries with arms 
     control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements with 
     the United States.'' To comply with this requirement, this 
     edition of the Report has included more information than ever 
     before on, among other things, Russia's implementation of the 
     Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
       To facilitate this effort, in 2003 the United States 
     conducted consultations with the Russian Government regarding 
     a number of longstanding, unresolved U.S. concerns about 
     Russian compliance with the START Treaty--some of which 
     actually date back to the first year of START implementation. 
     These included Russia preventing U.S. inspectors from 
     measuring the launch canisters of certain Intercontinental 
     Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) or verifying that certain ICBMs do 
     not contain more warheads than attributed under the Treaty. 
     The U.S. concerns also included Russia failing to provide all 
     required telemetry materials for some START-accountable 
     flight tests, failing properly to declare certain ICBM road-
     mobile launchers accountable under the Treaty, and locating 
     some deployed SS-25 ICBM launchers outside their declared 
     restricted areas. With respect to this last issue, however, 
     it should be noted that Russia has taken steps that have 
     resolved U.S. compliance concerns.

   V. Compliance by Successors to Treaties and Agreements Concluded 
                   Bilaterally With the Soviet Union


              the strategic arms reduction treaty (start)

       Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine are in compliance 
     with the START strategic offensive arms (SOA) central limits. 
     Both the United States and Russia met the START seven-year 
     reduction final ceilings of 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 
     attributed warheads by the December 4, 2001, deadline. By 
     December 2001, these four Former Soviet Union (FSU) successor 
     states had reduced their aggregate forces to 1,136 deployed 
     launchers, 5,518 deployed warheads, and 4,894 deployed 
     ballistic missile warheads, as defined by Article ll of the 
     Treaty, and all strategic weapons had been removed or 
     eliminated from the territories of Ukraine, Belarus, and 
     Kazakhstan. Additionally, START required the four FSU 
     successor states to eliminate at least 154 heavy ICBM (SS-18) 
     silo launchers by December 2001. In the original MOU, dated 
     September 1, 1990, the Soviet Union declared 308 SS-18 heavy 
     ICBM silo launchers. As of November 30, 2001, a total of 158 
     SS-18 silo launchers had been eliminated--104 in Kazakhstan 
     and 54 in Russia--leaving a total of 150 deployed heavy 
     ICBMs.
       Notwithstanding the overall success of START 
     implementation, a significant number of longstanding 
     compliance issues that have been raised in the START Treaty's 
     Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) remain 
     unresolved. The Parties continue to work through diplomatic 
     channels and in the JCIC to ensure smooth implementation of 
     the Treaty and effective resolution of compliance issues and 
     questions.
       The United States raised six new compliance issues during 
     the period of this report. The United States considers four 
     of these to have been closed. However, several previous--
     often long-standing--compliance issues remain unresolved. A 
     number of these issues, some of which originated as early as 
     the first year of Treaty implementation, highlight the 
     different interpretations of the Parties about how to 
     implement the complex inspection and verification provisions 
     of the START Treaty.


                              ICBM ISSUES

       Inability to Confirm during Reentry Vehicle Inspections 
     (RVOSIs) that the Number of Attributed ICBM Warheads Has Not 
     Been Exceeded. During RVOSIs of deployed Russian ICBMs, U.S. 
     inspectors have been hampered, in some cases, from 
     ascertaining whether the missile had a front section, or that 
     the front section contained no more reentry vehicles (RVs) 
     than the number of warheads attributed to a missile of the 
     declared type under the Treaty.
       The purpose of an RVOSI, as set forth in paragraph 6 of 
     Article XI of the Treaty, is to confirm that a ballistic 
     missile contains no more RVs than the number of warheads 
     attributed to a missile of that type. The RVOSI procedures 
     are referenced in paragraph 16 of Section IX of the 
     Inspection Protocol and contained in Annex 3 to the 
     Inspection Protocol. Paragraph 11 of Annex 3 allows the 
     inspected Party to cover RVs. Inspectors have a right to view 
     these covers and to measure hard covers prior to their 
     placement on the RVs. The covers are then installed on the 
     RVs before the inspectors view the front section. Under the 
     Treaty, such covers must not hamper inspectors in 
     ascertaining that the front section contains no more RVs than 
     the number of warheads attributed to a missile of that type. 
     Russian RV covers, in some instances, are too large; 
     consequently, they fail to meet this requirement.
       During certain RVOSIs, Russia did not demonstrate to the 
     satisfaction of the U.S. inspection team that additional 
     covered objects located on the front section, and declared by 
     Russia not to be RVs, were not RVs. Although START does not 
     differentiate between nuclear and non-nuclear RVs, Russia's 
     willingness to use radiation detection equipment (RDE) during 
     such RVOSIs to establish that the extra objects were not 
     nuclear has been useful for resolving some, but not all, U.S. 
     concerns.
       Finding Russian RV covers, and their method of emplacement, 
     have in some cases hampered U.S. inspectors from ascertaining 
     that the front section of the missiles contains no more RVs 
     than the number of warheads attributed to a missile of that 
     type under the Treaty. Russian cooperation in the use of RDE 
     and other measures has been helpful in addressing some, but 
     not all, of the difficulties encountered by U.S. inspectors.
       Russian Road-Mobile Launchers--``Break-in.'' Russia has 
     failed to declare certain road-mobile launchers of ICBMs when 
     they first leave their production facility, as required by 
     the Treaty. Russia has moved some of these launchers to an 
     undeclared ``break-in'' area located over 60 miles from the 
     production facility without declaring that they have left the 
     production facility and are accountable under the Treaty.
       Pursuant to paragraph 6(b) of Article III of the Treaty, a 
     mobile launcher of ICBMs becomes subject to the Treaty 
     limitations when it first leaves a production facility. Not 
     later than five days following the first exit of such a newly 
     produced non-deployed road-mobile launcher, and its entry 
     into Treaty accountability, Section I of the Notification 
     Protocol requires the Party producing the new Treaty-
     accountable item to provide a notification of this change in 
     data. Except for transits, Parties are proscribed from 
     locating non-deployed mobile launchers outside the boundaries 
     of the START-declared facilities identified in subparagraph 
     9(b) of Article IV of the Treaty.
       Finding. Russia continues to violate START provisions 
     relevant to these obligations.
       Deployed SS-25 Road-Mobile Launchers Based Outside Their 
     Designated Restricted Areas. Russia based some deployed SS-25 
     road-mobile launchers outside their declared restricted areas 
     (RAs) at two road-mobile ICBM bases while these RAs were 
     under construction. The United States and Russia concluded a 
     temporary, interim policy arrangement regarding the conduct 
     of inspections and cooperative measures at the facilities 
     where the launchers were housed during the period of 
     construction. This arrangement permitted U.S. inspectors to 
     conduct data update inspections and RVOSIs that they had not 
     previously been able to perform, and allowed Russia to 
     cooperate fully with providing cooperative measures access 
     for the launchers that were previously unavailable. All of 
     these road-mobile ICBMs and their launchers have since been 
     transferred from their bases, and their declared RAs have 
     been eliminated as START facilities.
       Finding. Notwithstanding the interim policy arrangement, 
     Russia's practice of locating deployed SS-25 road-mobile 
     launchers outside their declared RAs for long periods of time 
     constituted basing in a manner that violated the provisions 
     of paragraphs 1 and 9

[[Page 25073]]

     of Article VI of the Treaty. This practice has ceased and the 
     United States considers this issue closed.
       Denial of the Right to Measure Certain Deployed ICBM Launch 
     Canisters on Mobile Launchers. U.S. inspectors have been 
     prevented from exercising the Treaty right to measure certain 
     ICBM launch canisters on mobile launchers, both deployed and 
     non-deployed, that are encountered during data update 
     inspections to confirm data regarding the type of item of 
     inspection. Russia, for instance, has prevented U.S. 
     inspectors from measuring launch canisters for SS-24 ICBMs 
     contained in rail-mobile launchers that are located within 
     the boundaries of an inspection site. Similar concerns have 
     arisen with regard to launch canisters for SS-25 and SS-27 
     mobile ICBMs located on road-mobile launchers. With regard to 
     launch canisters for these latter types, Russia and the 
     United States have agreed upon a policy arrangement to 
     address this issue, though it has not yet been implemented 
     for the SS-27 ICBM.
       Subparagraph 20(a) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol 
     identifies ICBM launch canisters as one of the items of 
     inspection for data update inspections. In accordance with 
     the procedures in Annex 1 to the Inspection Protocol, 
     inspectors have the right to confirm the number and, if 
     applicable, the types of items of inspection that are 
     specified for the facility to be inspected and declared for 
     the inspection site, and the right to confirm the absence of 
     any other item of inspection at the inspection site. Pursuant 
     to paragraph 6 of Annex 1, inspectors may view and measure 
     the dimensions of a launch canister declared to contain an 
     item of inspection to confirm it is of the declared type.
       Finding. Russia prevented U.S. inspectors from exercising 
     their Treaty right to measure launch canisters for SS-24 
     ICBMs contained in rail-mobile launchers that are located 
     within the boundaries of an inspection site, in contravention 
     of paragraphs 1 and 6 of Annex 1 to the Inspection Protocol. 
     With regard to launch canisters for SS-25 and SS-27 ICBMs 
     located on road-mobile launchers, the Parties have agreed 
     upon a policy arrangement to address this issue, but it has 
     not yet been implemented for the SS-27 ICBM.


                            TELEMETRY ISSUES

       As part of the START verification regime, the Parties are 
     obligated to notify each other of missile flight tests and to 
     exchange telemetry tapes, tape summaries, interpretive data, 
     and acceleration profiles for each flight test of a START-
     accountable ICBM or SLBM. The United States has raised 
     several concerns regarding Russia's failure to provide all 
     Treaty-required telemetry materials for some START-
     accountable flight tests in violation of paragraphs 4 and 5 
     of Article X of the Treaty, and paragraph 1 of Section I and 
     paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol.
       Finding. Russia has in some instances failed to comply with 
     Treaty requirements regarding the provision of telemetry 
     information on missile flight testing pursuant to Article X 
     of the START Treaty and Sections I and II of the Telemetry 
     Protocol.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

                          ____________________