[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 17]
[Senate]
[Pages 22580-22581]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                             EASTERN EUROPE

  Mr. VOINOVICH. Madam President, I rise to discuss America's 
relationship with our Eastern European friends as well as the 
challenges America faces in our relationship with Russia.
  Over the last decade in the Senate, I have been a champion of NATO 
and worked diligently to increase membership in the alliance. I have 
also been active in improving our image in Eastern Europe through the 
expansion of the Visa Waiver Program at the request of our friends and 
allies in Eastern Europe. My passion for foreign relations stems in 
large part as a supporter of Ohio's diverse ethnic communities. As 
mayor of Cleveland and Governor of Ohio, I gained a keen understanding 
of Europe from my close work with constituents who had ties to 
countries that were once subject to life behind the Iron Curtain. This 
goes back to my first paper in undergraduate school and how the United 
States sold out Yugoslavia at Teheran and Yalta.
  We did see the Berlin Wall fall and the Iron Curtain torn thanks in 
part to the efforts of Pope John Paul II, President Reagan, and 
President George H.W. Bush. But even with the end of the Cold War, I 
was deeply concerned that darker forces in Russia could once again 
reemerge as a threat to democracy, human rights, and religious freedom 
not just for the Russian people but for the newly freed ``captive 
nations'' of Eastern Europe.
  I understood getting those nations into NATO could make the alliance 
more vibrant and healthy and give them safe harbor from the possible 
threat of Russian expansionism. One of my proudest moments in the 
Senate was being present at Prague in March of 2002 in the room when 
Lord Robertson announced that seven countries--

[[Page 22581]]

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia--
were invited to join NATO.
  When I was Governor of Ohio and chairman of the National Governors 
Association, I led an effort in 1998 to secure passage of an all-50-
State resolution in support of NATO expansion for the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland. These new members have brought great vigor to the 
NATO Alliance and are now some of our strongest allies working 
alongside our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan--especially Afghanistan.
  As such, I was astounded last week to see the Obama administration 
appear to turn its back on some of our staunchest NATO allies. Last 
week's missile defense announcement was made with little advance notice 
or consultation and disregarded the great political capital expended by 
the leaders of Poland and the Czech Republic. This decision leaves the 
impression that the United States is dealing unilaterally with Russia 
without regard to our NATO allies. Regardless of the merits of the 
decision itself--and I had a chance to talk to Secretary Gates about 
it, and it makes sense that this was a good decision--the manner in 
which it was revealed to Warsaw and Prague was a major public relations 
and public diplomacy blunder.
  The Polish people are up in arms about the decision--and not so much 
with the decision, but the way it was handled and the disregard for 
handling it in a proper fashion. The fact also that the decision was 
announced on September 17, 2009, the 70th anniversary of the Soviet 
invasion of Poland, makes it even worse. The way this decision was 
communicated shabbily to Poland and the Czech Republic should also send 
a shiver down the spines of our brothers and sisters in Eastern Europe 
and their Baltic neighbors, who are concerned with Russia's aggressive 
efforts to reassert its influence in what was once the Soviet Union.
  In an opinion piece in last Friday's edition of the Washington Post, 
David J. Kramer, of the German Marshall Fund, notes that:

       Whatever the official explanation now for not moving 
     forward, many--including the Kremlin--will read this shift as 
     an effort to placate Moscow. Announcing the decision ahead of 
     [President] Obama's meeting with Russian President Dmitry 
     Medvedev this week in Pittsburgh reinforces such thinking.

  I had the opportunity this past July to travel to the Baltic States 
with my friends Senators Durbin, Cardin, and Wicker as part of the U.S. 
delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
to the parliamentary assembly that was held in Vilnius, Lithuania. As 
part of that trip, I also visited Riga, Latvia--a stop that marked the 
highest ranking official visit of the United States in Latvia in over 3 
years. In all of our bilateral meetings with Presidents, Prime 
Ministers, and Foreign Ministers from former Soviet countries or 
countries the Soviet Union exercised influence over, we were told it 
was comforting for them to know their membership in NATO serves as a 
hedge against a potential expansionist Russia.
  We should be worried about the uncertainty surrounding a Russia that 
is reverting back to a KGB-ruled country seeking to weaponize its oil 
and natural gas resources as a means to expand its influence on Europe 
and the West.
  I think one of the concerns we all ought to have is that many members 
of the European Union, instead of coming together and negotiating with 
Russia over the issue of natural gas, are cutting their own deals. I 
think we should be very concerned that in the long run many of those 
countries are not going to be able to make good decisions because of 
the influence Russia will have over their natural gas resources.
  Russia has the world's largest reserves of natural gas and has the 
eighth-largest oil reserves. Moscow turned off the tap to Ukraine this 
past winter. They could do it again. We should also be concerned about 
Moscow using its control of oil and natural gas to pit members of NATO 
against each other.
  There is much talk about resetting the U.S. bilateral relationship 
with Russia. Moscow seeks to regain its global stature and be respected 
as a peer in the international community. There is nothing inherently 
wrong with this.
  I believe there are key areas where the United States and Russia 
share common cause and concern: Russia is a permanent member of the 
U.N. Security Council and will be essential to effective multilateral 
pressure on Iran to give up its nuclear program; Russia continues to 
have leverage on the North Korean regime and has stated that a nuclear-
free Korean peninsula is in the interest of both our countries; we are 
partners on the International Space Station--in fact, we are going to 
rely on them to send our NASA people to the space station; and, until 
the Georgia situation flared in August of last year, our government and 
U.S. industry were working hard on a nuclear cooperation agreement with 
Russia, very much like the one we entered into with India.
  With the world economy as it is today, the worst thing we could do is 
break off communication and revert back to our Cold War positions. This 
week's G-20 conference in Pittsburgh is an opportunity to further 
engage Russia and determine where we have a symbiotic relationship and 
what we can accomplish together for the good of the international 
community. Nevertheless, such a reset should not come at the expense of 
our Eastern European friends.
  Time will tell whether last week's decision will have any influence 
on Russian cooperation on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty--START--
or our efforts to prevent a nuclear-armed Iranian regime.
  In the meantime, we have our work cut out as we seek to rebuild 
confidence and trust with our friends in Eastern Europe. After last 
week's events, I suspect that their confidence in the reliability of 
the United States as a partner and ally has been shaken.
  I yield the floor and note the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BURRIS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BURRIS. Madam President, I would like to speak in morning 
business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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