[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 16]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 22104-22105]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                      TURKEY-ARMENIA NORMALIZATION

                                 ______
                                 

                  HON. HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, JR.

                               of georgia

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, September 17, 2009

  Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia. Madam Speaker, I come to the floor today to 
hail the efforts underway to heal past wounds between the Republics of 
Turkey and Armenia.
  For several years, the two countries have quietly been meeting, with 
the assistance of Switzerland, to come to an agreement to normalize 
diplomatic relations and open the borders between Armenia and Turkey. I 
am quite pleased that these negotiations have been fruitful. I also 
encourage the two countries to continue to work together to finish the 
process quickly since it will not only benefit the citizens of these 
two countries, but the region and the world as well.
  I would like to put into the Record an article by Hugh Pope from the 
International Crisis Group who calls this recent action by Turkey and 
Armenia as taking, ``. . . a brave and statesmanlike step.
  Like the International Crisis Group, I too am optimistic that these 
efforts will lead to greater stabilization of the region and am proud 
to stand here today and congratulate the governments of Armenia and 
Turkey on their efforts to date and offer our friendship and help as 
they move on to the next steps in the process.

 The EU-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle: ``Turkey and Armenia Vow to Heal Past 
                         Wounds'', by Hugh Pope


                            1 September 2009

       It's been a long time coming, but Turkey and Armenia's vow 
     on 31 August to establish diplomatic relations, open their 
     long-closed border and begin to talk seriously about the past 
     is excellent news. As laid out in our 14 April report Turkey 
     and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders, normalization 
     between Turkey and Armenia will benefit not just the 
     bilateral relationship. If successful, it could win back for 
     Turkey and its AKP government much of their recently faded 
     prestige as domestic reformers, as regional peace-makers and 
     as a country seriously intending to push forward with its 
     accession process to the European Union.
       The brief joint announcement from Ankara, Yerevan and the 
     Swiss mediators in Bern said that two protocols had been 
     initialed on the establishment of diplomatic relations and 
     the development of bilateral relations. The two sides 
     committed to seeing the protocols through to parliamentary 
     ratifications within six weeks--that is, two days before a 14 
     October World Cup qualifier match between Armenia and Turkey 
     due to be played in the western Turkish provincial city of 
     Bursa. Turkey hopes that Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian 
     will accept its invitation to attend, just as Turkish 
     President Abdullah Gill initiated the current process by 
     attending the first round match in Yerevan in September 2008.
       Texts of the two protocols circulating in Turkey and 
     Armenia set out a fully rounded and reasonable plan. In a 
     ``Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations'' the 
     two sides promised to establish diplomatic relations on the 
     first day of the first month after ratification; to exchange 
     diplomatic missions; to reopen the border within two months 
     of ratification; and to mutually recognize the existing 
     border. In a ``Protocol on Development of Relations''--to go 
     into effect simultaneously with the diplomatic opening--the 
     two sides promised to promote cooperation in all areas from 
     energy infrastructure to tourism; to set up a mechanism of 
     regular foreign ministry consultations, including a main 
     intergovernmental commission and seven sub-commissions; to 
     act jointly to preserve the cultural heritage of both sides; 
     and to establish consular cooperation. The protocols are 
     accompanied by a detailed timetable, in which all steps and 
     commissions would be fully implemented and in motion within 
     four months.
       On the vexed question of how to describe the Ottoman-era 
     massacres of Armenians in the First World War--widely known 
     as the Armenian genocide, a label rejected by Turkey--the 
     ``Protocol on Development of Relations'' agreed to 
     ``implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the 
     aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, 
     including an impartial scientific examination of the 
     historical records and archives to define existing problems 
     and formulate recommendations.'' The timetable adds that this 
     dialogue will be conducted under the aegis of the main 
     intergovernmental commission in a ``sub-commission on the 
     historical dimension . . . in which Armenian, Turkish as well 
     as Swiss and other international experts shall take part.''
       In short, Turkey and Armenia have taken a brave and 
     statesmanlike step. Both will win if it succeeds. Armenia 
     will overcome the sense that it is surrounded and under 
     siege, will open a new commercial and psychological gateway 
     westward to Europe, will be able to look better after the 
     interests of the many tens of thousands of Armenians working 
     in Turkey, will be able to market its electricity surplus and 
     have easier access to the many Armenian cultural and 
     religious sites in eastern Turkey. For Turkey, the gains are 
     just as significant: the ability to show European and Western 
     partners that it is working toward closure with Armenians on 
     the contested matter of the First World War massacres; to add 
     a new plank in its efforts to bring stability, prosperity and 
     cooperation through relations with all three of

[[Page 22105]]

     its Caucasus neighbours; and, finally, to achieve the 
     satisfaction of full and public Armenian recognition of its 
     borders.
       The 31 August step towards normalisation was originally 
     expected in April, but Turkey backed away from the deal. All 
     that could be announced on 22 April 2009 was a vague road 
     map. This hesitation was apparently due to pressure from 
     Azerbaijan--a major supplier of cheap gas to Turkey, and with 
     which Turkey shares close linguistic ties--and continued 
     nationalist opposition to compromise with Armenia inside the 
     Turkish political system. This coincided with a period in 
     Turkey in which reforms towards EU accession had virtually 
     halted; in which Prime Minister Erdogan appeared disengaged 
     with EU ambitions and to be pursuing alternatives in Russia 
     and the Middle East; and in which Turkey appeared to be 
     taking sides in Middle Eastern issues, with notably harsh 
     criticism of Israel. Turkey also appeared to side fully with 
     Azerbaijan against Armenia, and it remains unclear what will 
     happen to Erdogan's 14 May promise to the Azerbaijani 
     National Assembly that there would be no opening of the 
     Armenia-Turkey border until there is an Armenian withdrawal 
     from occupied Azerbaijani territory.
       The news that normalisation with Armenia is back on track, 
     therefore, is a signal that Turkey may be changing direction 
     again. In the past few months, Turkey and the AKP leadership 
     have also begun to push hard for progress on two other 
     difficult dossiers, coming to terms with the Kurdistan 
     Regional Government in Iraq and firmly setting out a 
     framework of reconciliation with its own substantial Kurdish 
     community. Progress towards Turkey-Armenia normalisation has 
     also been helped by the unusual way that the US and Russia 
     appear to have been working separately toward a similar 
     compromise outcome, and pushing more actively for progress 
     toward a settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over 
     Nagorno Karabakh.
       The fact that Turkey is now leaning back towards a 
     reconciliation with Armenia will do much to clear doubts 
     about the country's posture and the priorities of Prime 
     Minister Erdogan. It will also do proper credit to the polls 
     that showed 70 per cent of the Turkish population supported 
     President Gu's gesture of visiting Armenia for last 
     September's first round football match, and the great strides 
     Turkey's intellectual and political elites have taken in the 
     past decade to dismiss the old-fashioned narrative of 
     nationalist denial towards the catastrophic Armenian 
     massacres of 1915. Normalisation with Armenia will also give 
     real substance to new Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's 
     stated goals of ``zero problems'' and ``peace in the 
     neighbourhood''.
       However, while reconciliation with Armenia will rightly 
     attract great positive attention in Europe, the next test 
     will not be long in coming. Turkey has to find a way to 
     expedite a solution to the long-running Cyprus solution in 
     the next several months, or see its EU accession process 
     effectively grind to a halt.

                          ____________________