[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 18726-18730]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010--Continued

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. S. 1390, the Defense Department authorization 
bill.


                             Cloture Motion

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I have a cloture motion at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under 
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     hereby move to bring to a close debate on Calendar No. 89, S. 
     1390, the National Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 
     2010.
         Carl Levin, Harry Reid, Barbara Boxer, Mark Udall, Jack 
           Reed, Jon Tester, Jeanne Shaheen, Al Franken, Evan 
           Bayh, Patrick J. Leahy, Richard J. Durbin, Byron L. 
           Dorgan, Daniel K. Inouye, Blanche L. Lincoln, Joseph I. 
           Lieberman, Ron Wyden, Mary L. Landrieu.

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the mandatory 
quorum call be waived.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, this week, we are considering important 
legislation to authorize spending for the Department of Defense. Among 
the many activities supported by this funding are our efforts to fight 
al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups around the world and 
prevent another terrorist attack on our country.
  The bill includes funding for a number of key priorities relating to 
our fight against terrorists. It provides $130 billion to fund our 
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Afghanistan remains the front line in 
the battle against terrorism, as it provides a haven for thousands of 
Taliban and al-Qaida fighters. And, as U.S. troops pull back from Iraqi 
cities, our mission in that country will increasingly focus on counter-
terrorism. It funds a number of key initiatives to enhance the safety 
of our troops and our citizens from terrorist threats, including 
funding for detecting and defeating improvised explosive devices, or 
IEDs. It funds some of our most important efforts to prevent unsecured 
nuclear material from falling into the hands of terrorists. It expands 
the size of our Special Operations Forces--the elite commando units 
like Navy SEALs and Army Green Berets--who lead this Nation's global 
ground fight against terrorism.
  While the Special Operations Forces provide us a unique and 
unsurpassed capability, they are hardly the only group of Americans on 
the front lines of this fight. The Special Operations Forces are part 
of one of three key groups of people in our government who play a 
critical role in this fight. Military service members, who are fighting 
house-to-house, street-to-street, and village to village in Iraq and 
Afghanistan to identify and eliminate terrorists and insurgents. 
Members of the Foreign Service and USAID who, in addition to carrying 
out our Nation's diplomacy, are working with local leaders to build 
governing capacity, improve essential services, and foster economic 
growth. And members of our Nation's intelligence agencies, who provide 
the vital information we need both to keep these other public servants 
out of harm's way and to take the fight to the terrorists.
  I want to pause for a moment to recognize and commend their 
tremendous service to our Nation. The courage, endurance, and sacrifice 
they exhibit on a daily basis exemplify the highest values of our great 
Nation. And while our country has made great strides in honoring the 
contribution of our military service members, many of our diplomats and 
intelligence personnel consistently demonstrate their patriotism and 
commitment with hardly any public recognition.
  I would like to especially honor the men and women of our Nation's 
intelligence services. The U.S. intelligence community has been under 
fire in recent weeks. The recent controversy is not over whether the 
CIA has done enough to go after bin Laden, or about whether it has done 
its job effectively. It is about whether senior leaders in the Bush 
administration mismanaged and misrepresented a particular program. That 
is an important question that our Intelligence Committee will seek to 
answer, but it should not call into question the distinguished service 
of the officers who continue to do a remarkable job for our country.
  I have seen first hand some of the military and intelligence officers 
who are hunting Osama bin Laden and other terrorists. CIA and Air Force 
personnel stationed at Creech Air Force Base outside of Las Vegas are 
working around the clock, 24 hours a day, supporting the missions of 
Predator and Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles. CIA officers and members 
of the Air Force's 432nd Air Expeditionary Wing control these UAVs from 
Creech, remotely identifying and striking terrorist targets. Their work 
is a clear example of military and intelligence personnel making a 
significant difference in protecting the safety of American citizens on 
a daily basis.
  According to press reports, since January 1, 2008, UAVs have carried 
out more than 50 separate strikes against terrorists and insurgents in 
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, killing more than 300 
terrorists and insurgents, including over 15 top leaders of the Taliban 
and al-Qaida. In addition, press reports indicate UAVs have also 
conducted surveillance and reconnaissance missions that have been 
critical in identifying and tracking targets for strikes by other 
military assets. In Nevada and around the world, members of our Armed 
Forces, intelligence services, and foreign services are on the front 
lines of our fight against terrorism. It is a fight we will win thanks 
to their dedication and sacrifice. As we continue debate on the Fiscal 
Year 2010 Defense Authorization Act, I urge my colleagues to join me in 
recognizing and commending their tremendous service to our Nation.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise in support of an amendment to be 
offered by my good friend, the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman.
  The purpose of this amendment is straightforward: it seeks to make 
sure that the missile defense system deployed in Europe is as cost-
effective and as capable of protecting the United States as the 
installation of ground-based midcourse defense missile defense 
interceptors and early warning radars proposed by the last 
administration; that proposal was endorsed by the NATO alliance and 
embraced by the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic.
  This system is important not just because it provides the U.S. with a 
much needed defense against the long-range ballistic missile threat of 
Iran, but also because of what it says about the alliance between the 
United States and these two countries. It is significant

[[Page 18727]]

that Poland and the Czech Republic, which spent the better part of the 
20th century as oppressed satellites of the Soviet Union have so 
earnestly sought to align themselves with the United States to confront 
the threats of the 21st century.
  This deployment is clearly in U.S. interests. The Congressional 
Budget Office, CBO, recently concluded a study of the options--current 
and future--to protect the U.S. and its allies from the Iranian threat. 
The results of that study were clear: only the Polish and Czech 
deployments can protect the United States and Europe; any other option 
costs more and defends the U.S. less, if at all.''\1\
  Let me quote from this CBO study, ``Options for Deploying Missile 
Defenses in Europe'':

       Of the modeled options, MDA's proposed European system 
     would provide the most extensive defense of the United 
     States, covering the entire continental United States against 
     liquid-fuel ICBMs and covering all of the threatened portion 
     of the continental United States plus part of Alaska against 
     solid-fuel ICBMs.\2\

  The reason for this deployment is plain: the STRATCOM and EUCOM 
Commanders said to Congress in a July 24, 2008 letter:

       We are in complete agreement that Europe requires a layered 
     defense enabled by a robust network of sensors in and a 
     credible interceptor capability. Iran's actions last week 
     illustrate the imperative for credible global missile 
     defenses. We cannot wait to counter a long-range, WMD-
     capable, Iranian missile threat. Deploying missile defenses 
     in Europe would demonstrate our resolve to deter this threat 
     and protect our nation and allies by providing a critical 
     capability to the warfighter.
       As Combatant Commanders responsible for both United States 
     military operations in the European theater (EUCOM) and 
     global missile defense plans, operations, and capability 
     (STRATCOM), our best military advice leads us to strongly 
     endorse the President's funding request for European missile 
     defense sites. These capabilities remain critical to 
     defending America and our allies in Europe and for deterring 
     our adversaries today and in the future.\3\

  That is why I am a cosponsor and supporter of the Lieberman 
amendment.


                                endnotes

       \1\CBO study, ``Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in 
     Europe.'' Pg. xv. (February 2009). (Quoting CBO: ``Overall, 
     CBO estimates, Option 1 would cost between $9 billion and $13 
     billion; Option 2, between $18 billion and $22 billion; 
     Option 3, between $9 billion and $13 billion; and Option 4, 
     between $10 billion and $14 billion. (Those and other cost 
     estimates in this report are in 2009 dollars.)'')
       \2\CBO, pg. 37. (Quoting the CBO study: ``Option 4, with 
     its Kinetic Energy Interceptors, would also provide 
     substantial added coverage of the United States, particularly 
     against solid-fuel ICBMs. The systems using SM-3 Block IIA 
     interceptors (Options 2 and 3) offer the least additional 
     defense of the United States: almost none against solid-fuel 
     ICBMs and coverage of only parts of the northeastern (and, in 
     the case of Option 2, central) United States against liquid 
     fuel ICBMs.'')
       \3\General Kevin P. Chilton and General Bantz J. Craddock. 
     Letter to Senator Robert C. Byrd. 14 July 2008.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in 
the Record the following documents: (1) an open letter to the Obama 
administration from leading Europeans, including Lech Walesa and Vaclav 
Havel, who warn in strong terms that the so-called U.S.-Russia reset 
must not come at the expense of mutual interests between the U.S. and 
the nations of central and eastern Europe; (2) a recent New York Times 
article, ``Eastern Europe Is Uneasy Over U.S. Ties with Russia''; and 
(3) an op-ed from yesterday's Washington Post, ``A Letter From Europe: 
U.S. leadership in the post-Soviet age is needed to face new 
challenges.''
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                            [July 15, 2009]

  An Open Letter to the Obama Administration From Central and Eastern 
                                 Europe

 (By Valdas Adamkus, Martin Butora, Emil Constantinescu, Pavol Demes, 
Lubos Dobrovsky, Matyas Eorsi, Istvan Gyarmati, Vaclav Havel, Rastislav 
    Kacer, Sandra Kalniete, Karel Schwarzenberg, Michal Kovac, Ivan 
Krastev, Alexander Kwasniewski, Mart Laar, Kadri Liik, Janos Martonyi. 
   Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Adam Rotfeld, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Alexandr 
                         Vondra, Lech Walesa.)

       We have written this letter because, as Central and Eastern 
     European (CEE) intellectuals and former policymakers, we care 
     deeply about the future of the transatlantic relationship as 
     well as the future quality of relations between the United 
     States and the countries of our region. We write in our 
     personal capacity as individuals who are friends and allies 
     of the United States as well as committed Europeans.
       Our nations are deeply indebted to the United States. Many 
     of us know firsthand how important your support for our 
     freedom and independence was during the dark Cold War years. 
     U.S. engagement and support was essential for the success of 
     our democratic transitions after the Iron Curtain fell twenty 
     years ago. Without Washington's vision and leadership, it is 
     doubtful that we would be in NATO and even the EU today.
       We have worked to reciprocate and make this relationship a 
     two-way street. We are Atlanticist voices within NATO and the 
     EU. Our nations have been engaged alongside the United States 
     in the Balkans, Iraq, and today in Afghanistan. While our 
     contribution may at times seem modest compared to your own, 
     it is significant when measured as a percentage of our 
     population and GDP. Having benefited from your support for 
     liberal democracy and liberal values in the past, we have 
     been among your strongest supporters when it comes to 
     promoting democracy and human rights around the world.
       Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, however, we see 
     that Central and Eastern European countries are no longer at 
     the heart of American foreign policy. As the new Obama 
     Administration sets its foreign-policy priorities, our region 
     is one part of the world that Americans have largely stopped 
     worrying about. Indeed, at times we have the impression that 
     U.S. policy was so successful that many American officials 
     have now concluded that our region is fixed once and for all 
     and that they could ``check the box'' and move on to other 
     more pressing strategic issues. Relations have been so close 
     that many on both sides assume that the region's 
     transatlantic orientation, as well as its stability and 
     prosperity, would last forever.
       That view is premature. All is not well either in our 
     region or in the transatlantic relationship. Central and 
     Eastern Europe is at a political crossroads and today there 
     is a growing sense of nervousness in the region. The global 
     economic crisis is impacting on our region and, as elsewhere, 
     runs the risk that our societies will look inward and be less 
     engaged with the outside world. At the same time, storm 
     clouds are starting to gather on the foreign policy horizon. 
     Like you, we await the results of the EU Commission's 
     investigation on the origins of the Russo-Georgian war. But 
     the political impact of that war on the region has already 
     been felt. Many countries were deeply disturbed to see the 
     Atlantic alliance stand by as Russia violated the core 
     principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, 
     and the territorial integrity of a country that was a member 
     of NATO's Partnership for Peace and the Euroatlantic 
     Partnership Council--all in the name of defending a sphere of 
     influence on its borders.
       Despite the efforts and significant contribution of the new 
     members, NATO today seems weaker than when we joined. In many 
     of our countries it is perceived as less and less relevant--
     and we feel it. Although we are full members, people question 
     whether NATO would be willing and able to come to our defense 
     in some future crises. Europe's dependence on Russian energy 
     also creates concern about the cohesion of the Alliance. 
     President Obama's remark at the recent NATO summit on the 
     need to provide credible defense plans for all Alliance 
     members was welcome, but not sufficient to allay fears about 
     the Alliance's defense readiness. Our ability to continue to 
     sustain public support at home for our contributions to 
     Alliance missions abroad also depends on us being able to 
     show that our own security concerns are being addressed in 
     NATO and close cooperation with the United States
       We must also recognize that America's popularity and 
     influence have fallen in many of our countries as well. 
     Public opinions polls, including the German Marshall Fund's 
     own Transatlantic Trends survey, show that our region has not 
     been immune to the wave of criticism and anti-Americanism 
     that has swept Europe in recent years and which led to a 
     collapse in sympathy and support for the United States during 
     the Bush years. Some leaders in the region have paid a 
     political price for their support of the unpopular war in 
     Iraq. In the future they may be more careful in taking 
     political risks to support the United States. We believe that 
     the onset of a new Administration has created a new opening 
     to reverse this trend but it will take time and work on both 
     sides to make up for what we have lost.
       In many ways the EU has become the major factor and 
     institution in our lives. To many people it seems more 
     relevant and important today than the link to the United 
     States. To some degree it is a logical outcome of the 
     integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU. Our 
     leaders and officials spend much more time in EU meetings 
     than in consultations with Washington, where they often 
     struggle to attract attention or make our voices heard. The 
     region's deeper integration in the EU is of course welcome 
     and should not necessarily lead to a

[[Page 18728]]

     weakening of the transatlantic relationship. The hope was 
     that integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU 
     would actually strengthen the strategic cooperation between 
     Europe and America.
       However, there is a danger that instead of being a pro-
     Atlantic voice in the EU, support for a more global 
     partnership with Washington in the region might wane over 
     time. The region does not have the tradition of assuming a 
     more global role. Some items on the transatlantic agenda, 
     such as climate change, do not resonate in the Central and 
     Eastern European publics to the same extent as they do in 
     Western Europe.
       Leadership change is also coming in Central and Eastern 
     Europe. Next to those, there are fewer and fewer leaders who 
     emerged from the revolutions of 1989 who experienced 
     Washington's key role in securing our democratic transition 
     and anchoring our countries in NATO and EU. A new generation 
     of leaders is emerging who do not have these memories and 
     follow a more ``realistic'' policy. At the same time, the 
     former Communist elites, whose insistence on political and 
     economic power significantly contributed to the crises in 
     many CEE countries, gradually disappear from the political 
     scene. The current political and economic turmoil and the 
     fallout from the global economic crisis provide additional 
     opportunities for the forces of nationalism, extremism, 
     populism, and anti-Semitism across the continent but also in 
     some other countries.
       This means that the United States is likely to lose many of 
     its traditional interlocutors in the region. The new elites 
     replacing them may not share the idealism--or have the same 
     relationship to the United States--as the generation who led 
     the democratic transition. They may be more calculating in 
     their support of the United States as well as more parochial 
     in their world view. And in Washington a similar transition 
     is taking place as many of the leaders and personalities we 
     have worked with and relied on are also leaving politics.
       And then there is the issue of how to deal with Russia. Our 
     hopes that relations with Russia would improve and that 
     Moscow would finally fully accept our complete sovereignty 
     and independence after joining NATO and the EU have not been 
     fulfilled. Instead, Russia is back as a revisionist power 
     pursuing a 19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and 
     methods. At a global level, Russia has become, on most 
     issues, a status-quo power. But at a regional level and vis-
     a-vis our nations, it increasingly acts as a revisionist one. 
     It challenges our claims to our own historical experiences. 
     It asserts a privileged position in determining our security 
     choices. It uses overt and covert means of economic warfare, 
     ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated 
     investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to 
     advance its interests and to challenge the transatlantic 
     orientation of Central and Eastern Europe.
       We welcome the ``reset'' of the American-Russian relations. 
     As the countries living closest to Russia, obviously nobody 
     has a greater interest in the development of the democracy in 
     Russia and better relations between Moscow and the West than 
     we do. But there is also nervousness in our capitals. We want 
     to ensure that too narrow an understanding of Western 
     interests does not lead to the wrong concessions to Russia. 
     Today the concern is, for example, that the United States and 
     the major European powers might embrace the Medvedev plan for 
     a ``Concert of Powers'' to replace the continent's existing, 
     value-based security structure. The danger is that Russia's 
     creeping intimidation and influence-peddling in the region 
     could over time lead to a de facto neutralization of the 
     region. There are differing views within the region when it 
     comes to Moscow's new policies. But there is a shared view 
     that the full engagement of the United States is needed.
       Many in the region are looking with hope to the Obama 
     Administration to restore the Atlantic relationship as a 
     moral compass for their domestic as well as foreign policies. 
     A strong commitment to common liberal democratic values is 
     essential to our countries. We know from our own historical 
     experience the difference between when the United States 
     stood up for its liberal democratic values and when it did 
     not. Our region suffered when the United States succumbed to 
     ``realism'' at Yalta. And it benefited when the United States 
     used its power to fight for principle. That was critical 
     during the Cold War and in opening the doors of NATO. Had a 
     ``realist'' view prevailed in the early 1990s, we would not 
     be in NATO today and the idea of a Europe whole, free, and at 
     peace would be a distant dream.
       We understand the heavy demands on your Administration and 
     on U.S. foreign policy. It is not our intent to add to the 
     list of problems you face. Rather, we want to help by being 
     strong Atlanticist allies in a U.S.-European partnership that 
     is a powerful force for good around the world. But we are not 
     certain where our region will be in five or ten years time 
     given the domestic and foreign policy uncertainties we face. 
     We need to take the right steps now to ensure the strong 
     relationship between the United States and Central and 
     Eastern Europe over the past twenty years will endure.
       We believe this is a time both the United States and Europe 
     need to reinvest in the transatlantic relationship. We also 
     believe this is a time when the United States and Central and 
     Eastern Europe must reconnect around a new and forward-
     looking agenda. While recognizing what has been achieved in 
     the twenty years since the fall of the Iron Curtain, it is 
     time to set a new agenda for close cooperation for the next 
     twenty years across the Atlantic.
       Therefore, we propose the following steps:
       First, we are convinced that America needs Europe and that 
     Europe needs the United States as much today as in the past. 
     The United States should reaffirm its vocation as a European 
     power and make clear that it plans to stay fully engaged on 
     the continent even while it faces the pressing challenges in 
     Afghanistan and Pakistan, the wider Middle East, and Asia. 
     For our part we must work at home in our own countries and in 
     Europe more generally to convince our leaders and societies 
     to adopt a more global perspective and be prepared to 
     shoulder more responsibility in partnership with the United 
     States.
       Second, we need a renaissance of NATO as the most important 
     security link between the United States and Europe. It is the 
     only credible hard power security guarantee we have. NATO 
     must reconfirm its core function of collective defense even 
     while we adapt to the new threats of the 21st century. A key 
     factor in our ability to participate in NATO's expeditionary 
     missions overseas is the belief that we are secure at home. 
     We must therefore correct some self-inflicted wounds from the 
     past. It was a mistake not to commence with proper Article 5 
     defense planning for new members after NATO was enlarged. 
     NATO needs to make the Alliance's commitments credible and 
     provide strategic reassurance to all members. This should 
     include contingency planning, prepositioning of forces, 
     equipment, and supplies for reinforcement in our region in 
     case of crisis as originally envisioned in the NATO-Russia 
     Founding Act.
       We should also re-think the working of the NATO-Russia 
     Council and return to the practice where NATO member 
     countries enter into dialogue with Moscow with a coordinated 
     position. When it comes to Russia, our experience has been 
     that a more determined and principled policy toward Moscow 
     will not only strengthen the West's security but will 
     ultimately lead Moscow to follow a more cooperative policy as 
     well. Furthermore, the more secure we feel inside NATO, the 
     easier it will also be for our countries to reach out to 
     engage Moscow on issues of common interest. That is the dual 
     track approach we need and which should be reflected in the 
     new NATO strategic concept.
       Third, the thorniest issue may well be America's planned 
     missile-defense installations. Here too, there are different 
     views in the region, including among our publics which are 
     divided. Regardless of the military merits of this scheme and 
     what Washington eventually decides to do, the issue has 
     nevertheless also become--at least in some countries--a 
     symbol of America's credibility and commitment to the region. 
     How it is handled could have a significant impact on their 
     future transatlantic orientation. The small number of 
     missiles involved cannot be a threat to Russia's strategic 
     capabilities, and the Kremlin knows this. We should decide 
     the future of the program as allies and based on the 
     strategic plusses and minuses of the different technical and 
     political configurations. The Alliance should not allow the 
     issue to be determined by unfounded Russian opposition. 
     Abandoning the program entirely or involving Russia too 
     deeply in it without consulting Poland or the Czech Republic 
     can undermine the credibility of the United States across the 
     whole region.
       Fourth, we know that NATO alone is not enough. We also want 
     and need more Europe and a better and more strategic U.S.-EU 
     relationship as well. Increasingly our foreign policies are 
     carried out through the European Union--and we support that. 
     We also want a common European foreign and defense policy 
     that is open to close cooperation with the United States. We 
     are the advocates of such a line in the EU. But we need the 
     United States to rethink its attitude toward the EU and 
     engage it much more seriously as a strategic partner. We need 
     to bring NATO and the EU closer together and make them work 
     in tandem. We need common NATO and EU strategies not only 
     toward Russia but on a range of other new strategic 
     challenges.
       Fifth is energy security. The threat to energy supplies can 
     exert an immediate influence on our nations' political 
     sovereignty also as allies contributing to common decisions 
     in NATO. That is why it must also become a transatlantic 
     priority. Although most of the responsibility for energy 
     security lies within the realm of the EU, the United States 
     also has a role to play. Absent American support, the Baku-
     Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline would never have been built. Energy 
     security must become an integral part of U.S.-European 
     strategic cooperation. Central and Eastern European countries 
     should lobby harder (and with more unity) inside Europe for 
     diversification of the energy mix, suppliers, and transit 
     routes, as well as for tough legal scrutiny of Russia's abuse 
     of its monopoly and cartel-like power inside the EU. But 
     American political support on this will play a crucial role. 
     Similarly, the

[[Page 18729]]

     United States can play an important role in solidifying 
     further its support for the Nabucco pipeline, particularly in 
     using its security relationship with the main transit 
     country, Turkey, as well as the North-South interconnector of 
     Central Europe and LNG terminals in our region.
       Sixth, we must not neglect the human factor. Our next 
     generations need to get to know each other, too. We have to 
     cherish and protect the multitude of educational, 
     professional, and other networks and friendships that 
     underpin our friendship and alliance. The U.S. visa regime 
     remains an obstacle in this regard. It is absurd that Poland 
     and Romania--arguably the two biggest and most pro-American 
     states in the CEE region, which are making substantial 
     contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan--have not yet been 
     brought into the visa waiver program. It is incomprehensible 
     that a critic like the French anti-globalization activist 
     Jose Bove does not require a visa for the United States but 
     former Solidarity activist and Nobel Peace prizewinner Lech 
     Walesa does. This issue will be resolved only if it is made a 
     political priority by the President of the United States.
       The steps we made together since 1989 are not minor in 
     history. The common successes are the proper foundation for 
     the transatlantic renaissance we need today. This is why we 
     believe that we should also consider the creation of a Legacy 
     Fellowship for young leaders. Twenty years have passed since 
     the revolutions of 1989. That is a whole generation. We need 
     a new generation to renew the transatlantic partnership. A 
     new program should be launched to identify those young 
     leaders on both sides of the Atlantic who can carry forward 
     the transatlantic project we have spent the last two decades 
     building in Central and Eastern Europe.
       In conclusion, the onset of a new Administration in the 
     United States has raised great hopes in our countries for a 
     transatlantic renewal. It is an opportunity we dare not miss. 
     We, the authors of this letter, know firsthand how important 
     the relationship with the United States has been. In the 
     1990s, a large part of getting Europe right was about getting 
     Central and Eastern Europe right. The engagement of the 
     United States was critical to locking in peace and stability 
     from the Baltics to the Black Sea. Today the goal must be to 
     keep Central and Eastern Europe right as a stable, activist, 
     and Atlanticist part of our broader community.
       That is the key to our success in bringing about the 
     renaissance in the Alliance the Obama Administration has 
     committed itself to work for and which we support. That will 
     require both sides recommitting to and investing in this 
     relationship. But if we do it right, the pay off down the 
     road can be very real. By taking the right steps now, we can 
     put it on new and solid footing for the future.

                [From the New York Times, July 17, 2009]

          Eastern Europe Is Uneasy Over U.S. Ties With Russia

                          (By Nicholas Kulish)

       Berlin.--The deep concern among America's Eastern European 
     allies over improved relations between Russia and the United 
     States spilled into the open on Thursday when 22 prominent 
     figures, including Poland's Lech Walesa and the Czech 
     Republic's Vaclav Havel, published an open letter to the 
     Obama administration begging not to be forgotten.
       In the letter, the leaders urged President Obama and his 
     top policy makers to remember their interests as they 
     negotiate with Russia and review plans for missile defense 
     bases in Poland and the Czech Republic. Abandoning the 
     missile defense plan or giving Russia too big a role in it 
     could ``undermine the credibility of the United States across 
     the whole region,'' the letter said.
       The letter was published on the Web site of the Polish 
     newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza and was signed by former 
     presidents, like Mr. Walesa and Mr. Havel, as well as other 
     former heads of state, top diplomats and intellectuals from a 
     broad range of countries, including Hungary, Bulgaria and 
     Estonia.
       ``Our region is one part of the world that Americans have 
     largely stopped worrying about,'' the letter said, even 
     though ``all is not well either in our region or in the 
     trans-Atlantic relationship.''
       While the letter covered a range of issues, including the 
     dangers presented to the young democracies in the region by 
     the economic crisis, Russia was clearly central to the 
     worries expressed by the drafters.
       ``There is the fear among Central and Eastern Europeans 
     that our interest in keeping the trans-Atlantic bond could be 
     somehow sold out to the relationship with Russia,'' Alexandr 
     Vondra, a former minister of foreign affairs for the Czech 
     Republic, said in a telephone interview from Washington.
       Expressing concerns about the growing weakness of NATO, the 
     leaders said that Mr. Obama's call at the recent NATO summit 
     for ``credible defense plans for all Alliance members was 
     welcome, but not sufficient to allay fears about the 
     Alliance's defense readiness.''
       As geostrategic interests from Afghanistan to Iran to North 
     Korea have demanded Russian logistical or diplomatic 
     assistance, anxiety has risen among the states known 
     collectively as New Europe. Russia's invasion of Georgia last 
     August only intensified those fears, as much through the 
     American response as through Russia's own actions.
       ``The Georgia war exposed that there is a limit to what the 
     United States will or can do to respond to military conflict 
     in the neighborhood,'' said Angela E. Stent, who served as 
     the top Russia officer at the United States government's 
     National Intelligence Council until 2oo6 and now directs 
     Russian studies at Georgetown University.
       She added that the intentions of the administration toward 
     its allies were not yet completely clear. ``Until now, we've 
     heard a Russian policy but not a policy for Russia's 
     neighborhood,'' Ms. Stent said.
       The economic crisis masked these tensions for a while, but 
     the problems never really went away in these countries, where 
     Russia is seen as ``a revisionist power pursuing a 19th-
     century agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods,'' 
     according to the letter, and where any warming of relations 
     between Washington and Moscow raises hackles. Mr. Obama's 
     trip to Moscow last week did nothing to reassure nervous 
     allies in Eastern Europe.
       ``We all understand that a deal must come with Russia, but 
     we do not believe that a deal can be made at the expense of 
     the security interests of the countries of our region or of 
     Georgia and Ukraine,'' said Eugeniusz Smolar, senior fellow 
     at the Center for International Relations, a nonprofit, 
     nonpartisan research group in Warsaw.
       There is also a sense among many analysts and politicians 
     in the region that the new administration does not understand 
     Russia's true nature that friendly words from the Russian 
     leadership when Mr. Obama is in Moscow are just words, while 
     events like the murder of a Russian human rights campaigner 
     on Wednesday showed the true state of Russia's civil society.
       The former leaders also warned about threats within their 
     own countries and across Europe, driven by the economic 
     crisis, which had provided ``opportunities for the forces of 
     nationalism, extremism, populism and anti-Semitism,'' 
     according to the letter.
       ``Domestically these countries used to be led by idealistic 
     leaders. That's still the case in some of these countries, 
     but not all,'' said Kadri Liik, director of the International 
     Center for Defense Studies in Tallinn, Estonia, who was among 
     the drafters of the letter.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, July 19, 2009]

A Letter From Europe--U.S. Leadership in the Post-Soviet Age Is Needed 
                         To Face New Challenges

       Twenty years have passed since the revolutions that 
     restored freedom to what had been the captive nations of 
     Central and Eastern Europe. That many Americans no longer 
     give much thought to that part of the world testifies, in 
     part, to the region's success. The eastward expansion of NATO 
     and the European Union helped bring security, stability and 
     growing prosperity; more important, the countries themselves 
     have nurtured democratic and free-market institutions that in 
     1989 would have seemed unreachable.
       Yet an impressive collection of former presidents and 
     ministers from the first two decades of post-communism warn, 
     in a letter released last week, that long-lasting success 
     should not be assumed. ``All is not well either in our region 
     or in the transatlantic relationship,'' they caution. Since 
     the signatories are staunch allies of the United States and 
     of democracy--ranging from Vaclav Havel and Alexandr Vondra 
     of the Czech Republic to Lech Walesa and Alexander 
     Kwasniewski of Poland to Vaira Vike-Freiberga of Latvia and 
     Valdas Adamkus of Lithuania--they merit a hearing.
       The global recession has given room to ``nationalism, 
     extremism, populism, and anti-Semitism'' in some of their 
     countries, the former leaders acknowledge. At the same time, 
     they say, ``NATO today seems weaker than when we joined'' 
     while ``Russia is back as a revisionist power pursuing a 
     19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods. . 
     . . The danger is that Russia's creeping intimidation and 
     influence-peddling in the region could over time lead to a de 
     facto neutralization of the region.''
       In response, they say, the Obama administration should 
     recommit to NATO as a defense alliance, not just an 
     expeditionary force with duties in Afghanistan and beyond. It 
     should support pipelines that will diminish the region's 
     dependence on Russian oil and gas. It should take care, as it 
     evaluates planned missile-defense installations in Poland and 
     the Czech Republic that Russia opposes, to consult closely 
     with the governments that have the most at stake. It should 
     invest in relationships with younger generations that do not 
     remember communism or the struggle against it.
       None of this will come as news to President Obama, who has 
     made clear, in Moscow and elsewhere, that the United States 
     will not recognize a privileged Russian sphere of influence 
     in the former Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact. Vice President 
     Biden, who first delivered that message for the 
     administration in a speech in Munich in February, presumably 
     will reiterate it during his upcoming visit to Ukraine and 
     Georgia. The administration nonetheless should take the 
     letter to heart, not as a rebuke but as encouragement.

[[Page 18730]]

     Nations clamoring for a stronger U.S relationship, built on 
     the ideals of freedom and alliance, are not so numerous that 
     Washington can afford to take them for granted.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I voted against Senator Lieberman's 
amendment to immediately authorize a significant increase in the size 
of the Army because I did not believe it was in the best interest of 
our troops or our national security. There is an incredible strain on 
the force right now, including multiple deployments and insufficient 
dwell time, due to our failure to promptly and fully redeploy from 
Iraq. Rather than spending billions of dollars to increase the size of 
the Army, we should promptly redeploy from Iraq so that we can focus on 
the global threat posed by al-Qaida and so that we can reduce the 
strain on our troops. Indeed, the Iraqi Government has asked us to 
remove our troops from Iraqi cities, and as a result many U.S. 
servicemembers, including Wisconsin soldiers, are sitting on their 
bases with no mission.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________