[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 18381-18400]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senate will resume consideration of S. 1390, which the clerk will 
report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1390) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2010 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other 
     purposes.

  Pending:

       Thune amendment No. 1618, to amend chapter 44 of title 18, 
     United States Code, to allow citizens who have concealed 
     carry permits from the State in which they reside to carry 
     concealed firearms in another State that grants concealed 
     carry permits, if the individual complies with the laws of 
     the State.


                           amendment no. 1469

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 1469.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for himself and Mr. 
     McCain, proposes amendment No. 1469.

  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To strike $1,750,000,000 in Procurement, Air Force funding 
     for F-22A aircraft procurement, and to restore operation and 
maintenance, military personnel, and other funding in divisions A and B 
       that was reduced in order to authorize such appropriation)

       At the end of subtitle A of title I, add the following:

     SEC. 106. ELIMINATION OF F-22A AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT FUNDING.

       (a) Elimination of Funding.--The amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 103(1) for procurement for the Air 
     Force for aircraft procurement is hereby decreased by 
     $1,750,000,000, with the amount of the decrease to be derived 
     from amounts available for F-22A aircraft procurement.
       (b) Restored Funding.--
       (1) Operation and maintenance, army.--The amount authorized 
     to be appropriated by section 301(1) for operation and 
     maintenance for the Army is hereby increased by $350,000,000.
       (2) Operation and maintenance, navy.--The amount authorized 
     to be appropriated by section 301(2) for operation and 
     maintenance for the Navy is hereby increased by $100,000,000.
       (3) Operation and maintenance, air force.--The amount 
     authorized to be appropriated by section 301(4) for operation 
     and maintenance for the Air Force is hereby increased by 
     $250,000,000.
       (4) Operation and maintenance, defense-wide.--The amount 
     authorized to be appropriated by section 301(5) for operation 
     and maintenance for Defense-wide activities is hereby 
     increased by $150,000,000.

[[Page 18382]]

       (5) Military personnel.--The amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 421(a)(1) for military personnel is 
     hereby increased by $400,000,000.
       (6) Division a and division b generally.--In addition to 
     the amounts specified in paragraphs (1) through (5), the 
     total amount authorized to be appropriated for the Department 
     of Defense by divisions A and B is hereby increased by 
     $500,000,000.

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, there is 
2 hours of debate on the amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this amendment will strike $1.75 billion in 
additional funding for F-22 aircraft that was in the committee-reported 
bill. It will also restore serious cuts that were made in readiness and 
military personnel accounts and across-the-board cuts. These cuts were 
made in order to shift funds to support F-22 production. It is 
appropriate that the F-22 issue receive the full consideration by the 
Senate that it has received. The F-22 debate is among the most 
important debates we will have on the DOD authorization bill this year.
  Stating what may be one of the worst kept secrets in Washington 
today, the Department of Defense budget request called for ending 
production of several programs, including the F-22 program. I suspect 
the Department of Defense will seldom shut down any major acquisition 
program without a fair amount of controversy, and I agree with the 
Senator from Georgia that Congress should never be a rubberstamp for 
the executive branch. But neither should we object to terminating 
production of a weapons system because of parochial reasons.
  Terminating production, such as closing a base, can involve some 
economic loss for communities involved. I know that very personally. 
But we must do so from time to time and make these difficult decisions 
based on what is best for the Nation and what is best for the men and 
women of the Armed Forces.
  As President Obama said the other day, in strong support of ending 
the F-22 production:

       To continue to procure additional F-22s would be to waste 
     valuable resources that should be more usefully employed to 
     provide our troops with the weapons that they actually do 
     need.

  The Senate has heard from the senior leadership of the Defense 
Department, both civilian and military, that we should end F-22 
production. The recommendation is strong and clear, as strong and clear 
as I have ever heard when it comes to ending the production of a 
weapons system.
  The Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force sent me and Senator McCain a letter on this matter. This letter 
is already part of the Record. It reads, in part, as follows:

       This review concluded with . . . a balanced set of 
     recommendations for our fighter forces: 1) focus procurement 
     on modern 5th generation aircraft rather than less capable F-
     15s and F-16s; 2) given that the F-35 will constitute the 
     majority of the future fighter force, transition as quickly 
     as is prudent to F-35 production; 3) complete F-22 
     procurement at 187 aircraft, while continuing plans for 
     future F-22 upgrades; and 4) accelerate the retirements of 
     the old 4th generation aircraft and modify the remaining 
     aircraft with necessary upgrades in capability.
       In summary, we assessed the F-22 decision from all angles, 
     taking into account competing strategic priorities and 
     complementary programs and alternatives, all balanced within 
     the context of available resources. We did not and do not 
     recommend F-22s be included in the FY10 defense budget. This 
     is a difficult decision but one with which we are 
     comfortable. Most importantly, in this and other budget 
     decisions, we believe it is important for Air Force leaders 
     to make clear choices, balancing requirements across a range 
     of Air Force contributions to joint capabilities.

  The Senate has also heard from the Secretary of Defense and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In their letter to me and 
Senator McCain on July 13, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen wrote the 
following:

       There is no doubt that the F-22 is an important capability 
     for our Nation's defense. To meet future scenarios, however, 
     the Department of Defense has determined that 187 aircraft 
     are sufficient, especially considering the future roles of 
     Unmanned Aerial Systems and the significant number of 5th 
     generation stealth F-35s coming on-line in our combat air 
     portfolio.
       It is important to note that the F-35 is a half generation 
     newer aircraft than the F-22, and more capable in a number of 
     areas such as electronic warfare and combating enemy air 
     defenses. To sustain U.S. overall air dominance, the 
     Department's plan is to buy roughly 500 F-35s over the next 
     five years and more than 2,400 over the life of the program.
       Furthermore, under this plan, the U.S. by 2020 is projected 
     to have some 2,500 manned fighter aircraft, almost 1,000 of 
     them will be 5th generation F-35s and F-22s. China, by 
     contrast, is expected to have only slightly more than half as 
     many manned fighter aircraft by 2020, none of them 5th 
     generation.
       The F-22 program proposed in the President's budget 
     reflects the judgment of two different Presidents, two 
     different Secretaries of Defense, three chairmen of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff, and the current secretary and chief of staff 
     of the Air Force. If the Air Force is forced to buy 
     additional F-22s beyond what has been requested, it will come 
     at the expense of other Air Force and Department of Defense 
     priorities--and require deferring capabilities in areas we 
     believe are much more critical for our Nation's defense.
  For all these reasons, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs concluded:

       [W]e strongly believe that the time has come to close the 
     F-22 production line. If the Congress sends legislation to 
     the President that requires the acquisition of additional F-
     22 aircraft beyond Fiscal Year 2009, the Secretary of Defense 
     will strongly recommend he veto it.

  You do not get much stronger statements than that from a Secretary of 
Defense and a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
  The Secretary of Defense, just last Thursday, expanded on those 
thoughts at the Economic Club in Chicago, when he said the following:

       . . . supporters of the F-22 lately have promoted its use 
     for an ever expanding list of potential missions. These range 
     from protecting the homeland from seaborne cruise missiles 
     to, as one retired general recommended on TV, using F-22s to 
     go after Somali pirates who in many cases are teenagers with 
     AK-47s--a job we already know is better done at much less 
     cost by three Navy SEALS.

  The Secretary, in Chicago, said:

       These are examples of how far-fetched some of the arguments 
     have become for a program that has cost $65 billion--and 
     counting--to produce 187 aircraft, not to mention the 
     thousands of uniformed Air Force positions that were 
     sacrificed to help pay for it.

  The Senate has also heard, of course, from President Obama, as 
follows--this is what he wrote us:

       In December 2004, the Department of Defense determined that 
     183 F-22s would be sufficient to meet its military needs. 
     This determination was not made casually. The Department 
     conducted several analyses which support this position based 
     on the length and type of wars that the Department thinks it 
     might have to fight in the future, and an estimate of the 
     future capabilities of likely adversaries. To continue to 
     procure additional F-22s would be to waste valuable resources 
     that should be more usefully employed to provide our troops 
     with the weapons that they actually do need.

  So the President, based on his uniformed and civilian advisers' 
recommendations, has now said he will veto this bill if we keep the 
additional $1.75 billion in the bill to buy the additional seven F-22s 
those military leaders--uniformed and civilian--strongly say we do not 
need.
  I know my friend from Georgia has quoted some private sector 
individuals and one senior military official in particular, GEN John 
Corley, the Commander of the Air Force's Air Combat Command.
  I do not take lightly the recommendations and advice of someone with 
a distinguished career such as General Corley. However, General 
Corley's assessment of a high military risk if we end the buy of F-22s 
at 187 is not shared by the most senior leadership of the Department 
that is responsible for viewing the F-22 program, and all other 
Department of Defense programs, from a broader perspective. These same 
leaders from the previous administration--the previous Secretary of 
Defense, the previous Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--
recommended termination to President Bush, and President Bush also 
urged the termination of this program.
  General Cartwright said at his confirmation hearing--or 
reconfirmation hearing--2 weeks ago the following:

       . . . I was probably one of the more vocal and ardent 
     supporters for the termination of the F-22 production. The 
     reason's twofold. First . . . there is a study in the Joint 
     Staff

[[Page 18383]]

     that we just completed and partnered with the Air Force on 
     that, number one, said that proliferating within the United 
     States military fifth-generation fighters to all three 
     services was going to be more significant than having them 
     based solidly in just one service, because of the way we 
     deploy and because of the diversity of our deployments.

  General Cartwright went on to say the following:

       Point number two is, in the production of the F-35 Joint 
     Strike Fighter, the first aircraft variant will support the 
     Air Force replacement of their F-16s and F-15s. It is a very 
     capable aircraft. It is 10 years newer--

  ``It'' being the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter--

       It is 10 years newer in advancement in avionics and 
     capabilities in comparison to the F-22. It is a better, more 
     rounded, capable fighter.

  Well, that F-35 is in production now. In fact, there are 30 being 
paid for and bought and produced in the very budget for the Department 
of Defense which is before this body now.
  President Eisenhower noted, from time to time, the military 
industrial complex will push for more and more, more than is needed. In 
this case, however--in this case--the senior military leadership is not 
pushing for more.
  Finally, to quote again from Secretary Gates's speech last week--this 
was in Chicago at the Economic Club--

       The grim reality is that with regard to the budget we have 
     entered a zero-sum game. Every defense dollar diverted to 
     fund excess or unneeded capacity--whether for more F-22s or 
     anything else--is a dollar that will be unavailable to take 
     care of our people, to win the wars we are in, to deter 
     potential adversaries, and to improve capabilities in areas 
     where America is underinvested and potentially vulnerable.

  Secretary Gates said:

       That is a risk I cannot accept and I will not take.

  So, Mr. President, the time has come to end F-22 production at 187 F-
22As. That is all we need to buy, that is all we can afford to buy, and 
that is all we should buy.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of our 
time.


                   Recognition of the Minority Leader

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Republican leader is 
recognized.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I am going to proceed on my leader 
time.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.


                      Health Care Week VII, Day I

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, Americans are eager for health care 
reforms that lower costs and increase access. This is why many of us 
are proposing reforms that should be easy for everyone to agree on, 
such as reforming our medical liability laws, strengthening wellness 
and prevention programs that would encourage people to make healthy 
choices, such as quitting smoking and losing weight and addressing the 
needs of small businesses without imposing new taxes that kill jobs.
  The administration is taking a different approach to health care 
reform, and the more Americans learn about it, the more concerned they 
become. So it is good the President plans to spend a lot of his time in 
the days ahead discussing the administration's plan for reform because 
people need to know what the administration's plan is.
  Specifically, Americans have concerns about losing the care they have 
and spending trillions of dollars for a so-called reform that could 
leave them with worse care than they have now, especially if it is paid 
for by seniors and small business owners.
  One prospect Americans are extremely concerned about is that they 
will be forced off of their current plans as part of a government 
takeover of health care. Despite repeated assurances from the 
administration to the contrary, the independent Congressional Budget 
Office says that just one section of one of the Democratic proposals we 
have seen would force 10 million people off their current health plans.
  Americans do not want a government takeover, and they certainly do 
not want the government to spend trillions of their tax dollars to pay 
for it, especially if the care they end up with is worse than the care 
they already receive, and especially if the money that is spent on 
these so-called reforms only adds to the national debt.
  The President has repeatedly promised that his reform would not add 
to the debt. Yet both the House and Senate reform bills we have seen 
would do just that. This is why even Democrats have started to 
backpedal from the administration's plans.
  One reason Democrats are having second thoughts is because the 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office has sounded the alarm over 
the administration's claims that its reforms would cut long-term 
overall health care costs. On the contrary, he said the 
administration's reforms would actually lead to an increase in overall 
costs. Concerns like these about costs and debt have been building 
slowly for weeks.
  Another growing concern even among Democrats is the impact these 
higher costs would have on States in the form of higher Medicaid costs. 
At a time of tight budgets, this is something that Governors from both 
political parties are not very happy about.
  For example, New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson has said, and I am 
quoting him directly:
       I'm personally very concerned about the cost issue, 
     particularly the $1 trillion figures being batted around.

  Expanding Medicaid might look like an easy way to expand access, but 
it will actually mean massive spending increases for both Federal and 
State taxpayers. This could be a devastating blow to States such as 
Kentucky and many others which are already struggling to pay the 
Medicaid costs they currently owe.
  The administration's efforts to pay for its plans are not the least 
bit reassuring. The two main groups they are targeting are the last two 
that should be expected to pay for it: seniors, through Medicare cuts, 
and small business owners, through higher taxes.
  To me, it is just common sense that in the middle of a recession the 
last thing--the last thing--we should be doing is raising taxes on 
small businesses. Yet both bills we have seen would do just that. 
Indeed, under the House bill, taxes on some small businesses would rise 
as high as roughly 45 percent. This means in order to pay for health 
care reform, Democrats would increase the tax rate on some small 
businesses to about 30 percent higher than the rate for big 
corporations. Taxes would go up so much, in fact, under the House 
proposal that the average combined Federal and State top tax rate for 
individuals would be about 52 percent--52 percent, Mr. President.
  Let's consider that figure for a moment. To repeat: In order to pay 
for a health care proposal that would not even address all the concerns 
Americans have about access and cost--and which might even increase 
overall health care costs--Democrats in the House would raise the 
average top tax rate in the United States to about 52 percent.
  The chart behind me was created by the Heritage Foundation and 
appeared last week in the Wall Street Journal. It shows that the House 
bill would raise the top U.S. rate above even France. Of the 30 
countries the OECD measures, only Belgium, Sweden, and Denmark have 
higher rates, and five U.S. States would have tax rates even higher 
than both Belgium and Sweden.
  The United States is in the middle of a recession. We have lost more 
than 2.5 million jobs since this January. Families are losing homes. 
The last thing they need is a government takeover that kills even more 
jobs, adds to the ballooning national debt, increases Americans' long-
term health care costs, and leaves Americans paying more for worse care 
than they now receive. The proposals we have seen are not just 
incomplete, they are indefensible, particularly at a time of spiraling 
debt and ever-increasing job losses.
  Maybe this is why the administration has started to insist on an 
artificial deadline for getting its reform proposals through. We 
certainly do not need to rush and spend $1 trillion to enact this 
flawed proposal by the August recess. The American people and members 
of both parties in Congress are calling on us to slow down and take the 
time to get it right.

[[Page 18384]]

  Health care reform is too important to rush through and get it wrong. 
We saw what happened when some rushed and spent $1 trillion on an 
artificial deadline with the stimulus. The American people do not want 
the same mistake to be made. Instead of setting a 3-week deadline on 
legislation that would end up affecting one-sixth of our economy, the 
administration should focus on meeting existing deadlines.
  The Mid-Session Review of the administration's earlier predictions 
about unemployment, economic growth, government spending, and the 
outlook for the Federal deficit has traditionally been released in mid-
July. Yet now we are hearing the administration may not release its 
midsession review until August, after Congress has adjourned and after 
the administration's artificial deadline for a Senate bill on health 
care.
  The administration is also struggling to meet its decision to close 
Guantanamo by January 2010. The administration's task force on detainee 
policy has said it will miss its deadline for making recommendations. 
It seems premature to announce a closing date for Guantanamo without 
knowing where these detainees may be sent. The most recent delay is 
even more reason for the administration to show flexibility and 
reconsider its artificial deadline for closing Guantanamo.
  Americans want Republicans and Democrats to enact real health care 
reform that reduces costs and makes health care more accessible. They 
don't want a government takeover of the health care system that costs 
trillions of dollars, is paid for by seniors and job-killing taxes on 
small businesses and that leaves them paying more for worse care than 
they currently have. Before the administration rushes to spend another 
trillion dollars, it needs to slow down and focus on fixing our economy 
and addressing the issues it is already falling behind on.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Levin-
McCain amendment on the F-22. I was listening with interest to the 
chairman speak a little bit earlier when he raised several points that 
I am going to address specifically as I get into the guts of the 
argument. I think it is kind of interesting when he gives a list of 
those individuals in the Pentagon and in the White House who are now in 
opposition to continued production of the F-22. Interestingly enough, 
everybody he talked about--from the President to the Secretary of 
Defense, to the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff of the 
Air Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs--every single one of those 
individuals is political. They are appointed. They are appointed by the 
President.
  I am going to talk about some individuals who are in support of the 
F-22 who are not appointed. No. 1, they are the men and women who fly 
the F-22. Secondly, it is men who have had the courage to wear the 
uniform of the United States of America in an unparalleled way that I 
have seen since I have been here, who have been willing to stand up to 
that political leadership and say: You guys are wrong. They have been 
willing to stand and say that if you cut off production of the F-22 at 
187, you are going to put this country at a high risk from a national 
security standpoint.
  As we go through the debate, it is going to be interesting to 
contrast the statements and the letters that every Member has received 
a flurry of over the last several days. I have never seen the White 
House lobby such as they have lobbied on this issue. For a White House 
that was not supposed to be a lobbying White House or in support of 
lobbyists, it has been unparalleled in my now going on 15 years as a 
Member of the Congress.
  Senator Levin spoke earlier about the F-35: We are going to ramp up 
production. We are going to buy 30 airplanes, 30, in this budget. Well, 
guess what we are paying for those airplanes. We are paying $200 
million a copy. Guess what we are buying an F-22 for today--an airplane 
that has been through the test phase; an airplane that has proved 
itself. We are under a multiyear contract that calls for payment by the 
Air Force to the contractor of $140 million a copy. There is going to 
be a lot of conversation on this floor about the cost of the F-22, and 
it is expensive: $140 million a copy is very expensive. But to come in 
here with a straight face and say we are going to save taxpayers' money 
by moving to the F-35 and then turn around and say we are going to pay 
$200 million a copy in this bill for F-35s, something about that 
doesn't add up.
  Well, let me just say we are in a debate with the Pentagon with 
respect to budgetary issues submitted by the Pentagon to Congress. 
There are a lot of people who think we ought to step in line, salute 
the Pentagon and move ahead and do exactly what the Pentagon says with 
respect to the purchase of weapons systems. Well, that is not the way 
the Framers of the Constitution intended the Senate and the House to 
work. Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides Congress with 
the power to levy and collect taxes, provide for the common defense of 
the United States, to raise and support armies and to make rules for 
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.
  Clearly, we in Congress have a role in overseeing the Department of 
Defense, reviewing budgets, and questioning budget and policy 
recommendations. Our interest and involvement in these issues are 
appropriate and not just based on parochial issues. We are charged with 
the responsibility of reviewing DOD policies, whether fiscal policies 
or otherwise. That is simply a part of our job.
  I think it is important to note that on several occasions in recent 
years, Congress has authorized policy or funding initiatives that DOD 
has strongly opposed and, in retrospect, Congress was right and DOD was 
wrong. Perhaps the most similar example to the F-22 is the battle over 
the F-117 that occurred many years ago when the Air Force wanted to 
stop buying F-117s. Thank goodness my predecessor, Senator Sam Nunn, 
who was then chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, forced 
the Air Force to buy more F-117s. Ironically, part of the Air Force's 
argument was that they wanted to shift funding and focus to buying more 
F-22s. The F-117 was critical to establishing air dominance over Iraq 
in Desert Storm, and we can thank Congress for recognizing the need for 
more F-117s years ago.
  There are several other examples, such as the Goldwater-Nichols 
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the establishment of Special Operations 
Command in 1987, both of which were strongly opposed by the Pentagon. 
Other examples are continuation of the V-22 program and prohibition 
against retiring U-2s and B-52s, all of which are paying dividends 
beyond what the military expected, including in Iraq and Afghanistan 
today.
  I wish to address a comment Senator Levin and others have made 
regarding previous Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint 
Chiefs supporting only 183--or 187 now, with the addition of four F-22s 
we are buying in the supplemental. First, that number of 183 originally 
was established not on the basis of any study or analysis--never a 
study that came out and said we need 183 and we are going to be basing 
our decision on that--but it was based on PBD 753, which is inside 
Washington baseball, which was an OSD budget drill 2 days before 
Christmas in 2004, in which the Air Force had absolutely no input. 
Neither the Chief of Staff nor the Secretary was involved. A number of 
``183'' or ``187'' has always been budget driven and not strategically 
driven.
  There have been at least 10 studies done on F-22 numbers over the 
past 10 years. Of those, only one, the Joint Air Dominance Study done 
by DOD in 2005, recommended 183 F-22s. However, that study was based on 
only needing F-22s in a single-threat scenario and which also used a 
fixed budget.
  Senator Levin mentioned the comments General Cartwright made in the 
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing 2 weeks ago. And he relies 
heavily on the statement General Cartwright made. General Cartwright 
responded to a question I asked, and my

[[Page 18385]]

question to General Cartwright was: General, you say you support 
terminating the F-22 program at 187. Has there been any one single 
study, in the Air Force or outside the Air Force, any analysis done 
that recommends we terminate the program at 187? General Cartwright's 
statement to me was: Yes; there is a study going on in the Air Force 
right now that says we should terminate the program at 187.
  Well, unfortunately for General Cartwright, we now know no study was 
done. It is our understanding that the comment of General Cartwright is 
being corrected for the record and that we are receiving a corrected 
statement coming to the committee shortly.
  I wish to quote from a statement by Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell 
that was made last Tuesday with respect to the comments of General 
Cartwright. This comment is quoted in the Daily Report. It now turns 
out that a recent study touted by Pentagon leadership as the 
justification for terminating the F-22 fighter isn't a study at all but 
a series of briefings by DOD's program analysis and evaluation shop in 
the Air Force. That word comes from the Pentagon's top spokesman, Geoff 
Morrell, who told the Daily Report late Tuesday that the study, or 
whatever it is, is: Not so much a study as work products.
  Asked to describe the nature and timing of this study, Morrell told 
the Daily Report:

       What I think General Cartwright was referring to . . . is 
     two different work products--

  One by the PA&E shop and one by the Air Force--

     and not so much a study.

  Since PDB 753, only 183 F-22s have been programmed in the budget, 
with fiscal year 2009 being the last year of funding. To say previous 
Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs supported this 
is misleading since, until the fiscal year 2010 budget bill process, a 
decision on whether to buy more F-22s would be deferred to future 
decisionmakers. It is perhaps with this in mind that Secretary Gates 
himself decided last year to request additional F-22s in the fiscal 
year 2009 supplemental, and he did, in order to keep the line open and 
preserve the next administration's option for procurement of the F-22.
  I know the former President, President Bush, did not want to see the 
program terminated. They can say what they want to on the other side, 
but having had personal conversations, I know what his feeling was 
about this great aircraft. He could have terminated the program, but he 
did not terminate the program. It is this administration that is 
seeking to terminate this program.
  There have been five previous Secretaries of the Air Force, six 
previous Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force, seven previous Secretaries 
of Defense before this one, and eight previous commanders of Air Combat 
Command who have said we need more F-22s. We have supported this 
program from day one. We have continued to reduce the number from the 
original 781, now down to 187. The current Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force, whose letters have been quoted and inserted in the Record where 
he says we should cap it at 187, has testified time and time and time 
again in recent days and in recent weeks and who has written me letters 
stating that the military requirement for F-22s is not 187, it is 243, 
but he says we can't afford it. Therefore, he has to salute his boss. 
His boss is a political appointee--Secretary Gates--and the political 
appointee says we are going to cap it at 187; therefore, that is the 
direction in which we are going to go and the direction in which you 
have to salute the flag and move on.
  I am going to close my comments at this time and turn to my colleague 
from Connecticut. Before I do so, I will quote somebody who is not 
political, somebody who is not an appointee, somebody who is a former 
Chief of Staff of the Air Force. That is GEN Merrill McPeak, who, last 
week, in an unsolicited statement, came out and said, when he talked 
about terminating the F-22 production rate at 187:

       I think it's a real mistake. . . . The airplane is a game-
     changer and people seem to forget that we haven't had any of 
     our soldiers or Marines killed by enemy air since 1951. . . . 
     It's been half a century or more since any enemy aircraft has 
     killed one of our guys.
       The F-22 is at the top end. We have to procure enough of 
     them for our ability to put a lid on, to dictate the ceiling 
     of any conflict. We certainly need some figure well above 
     200. That worries me because I think it is pennywise and 
     pound foolish to expose us in a way this much smaller number 
     does. . . . That's taking too much high-end risk.

  General McPeak is a supporter of this administration and, as far as 
we can tell, he is not a consultant for any major defense contractor. 
For this reason, I think his comments deserve significant attention and 
credibility.
  I will stop at this point, but I will say more later. I now turn to 
my colleague, Senator Dodd, who I will say has been a great champion on 
this issue, a great partner in support of not just the men and women of 
the Air Force and our other branches that depend on this weapon system 
to protect America and our soldiers in the field but also a great 
protector from an economic standpoint.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Connecticut is 
recognized.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, how much time remains for those of us in 
opposition?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. There is 44\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. DODD. I ask to be recognized for 10 minutes, and if I need a 
little more, I will ask for it.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Connecticut is 
recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I commend Senator Chambliss for his eloquent 
and persuasive argument about why this amendment is a dangerous one, 
and I say that respectfully. I have great admiration for Carl Levin and 
John McCain, but there are serious problems with this approach, from a 
national security standpoint as well as a manufacturing and industrial 
base standpoint.
  To put this into context for our colleagues, we are being asked to 
authorize $1.75 billion, or two-tenths of 1 percent of the budget 
before us of $680 billion. We are told there are at least 25,000 direct 
jobs and 95,000 direct and indirect jobs at stake for that $1.75 
billion--again, two-tenths of 1 percent of the budget--which Senator 
Chambliss has offset, by the way. It is not an expenditure that is not 
going to be accounted for.
  We are going to put those jobs at risk--not because this industry is 
in trouble, unlike the automobile industry, which we bailed out to the 
tune of $63 billion, by the way--understanding the reason many of us 
supported that was to maintain an industrial manufacturing base.
  In this case, we lead the world in aerospace. Nobody comes even close 
to the ability of the United States to produce the most sophisticated 
aircraft in the world. Yet with an industry doing relatively well--
although commercial orders are way down, which is causing serious 
problems but that is as a result of the economic conditions. We are 
unwilling to come up with $1.75 billion or two-tenths of 1 percent to 
put those many jobs at risk, not to mention retreating on our air 
superiority.
  One of the critical components of national security is maintaining 
superiority both at sea and in the air. The F-22, by any estimation, is 
the most superior aircraft in the world. It is not even close in terms 
of competitors. Yet with the numbers we have and that we are relying 
on, we leave ourselves way short of the earlier projected numbers.
  As Senator Chambliss pointed out, the testimony over the years of 
those who advocated this program has been significant. In fact, in the 
letter most recently received from General Corley, head of the Air 
Combat Command Office, headquartered at Langley, VA, June 9, it points 
out how serious this would be in terms of exposing our Nation to 
national security risks. The head of the Air National Guard Bureau, 
Lieutenant General Wyatt, makes the same claim. Chief of Staff 
Schwartz, before he changed his mind a week earlier, advocated the F-22 
as well, and its importance.
  From both a manufacturing perspective and job loss, at a time when 
unemployment rates are skyrocketing, this

[[Page 18386]]

body is about to lay off anywhere from 25,000 to 90,000 people--at a 
time when unemployment rates are going up, because we decided that 
$1.75 billion is too expensive at this juncture, even though we have 
offset it, and we have put that many jobs at risk, not because the 
industry is failing or because it is a bad aircraft but because the 
Secretary of Defense and the administration have decided this program 
isn't worthy of our support.
  So explain to those 90,000 people--somewhere in that range--once they 
lose their jobs and get laid off, and they will--why it was we decided 
today, because of two-tenths of 1 percent of the budget, to move in a 
different direction. Put aside, if you will, the $63 billion we spent 
to develop this aircraft.
  I raised these concerns expressed by our military commanders--again, 
most notably, GEN John Corley of the Air Combat Command, LTG Harry 
Wyatt of the Air National Guard--I have mentioned them. In my State, 
there are 2,000 to 3,000 jobs at risk, and 1,000 of the jobs are down 
because commercial orders are down. So it is really 2,000 to 4,000 
people in my State who will lose their jobs.
  No matter how much I care about the people in my State, I could not 
oppose this exclusively on that basis. You ought to look nationwide. It 
is not just my State; it is all across the country.
  I raised concerns about what this amendment would do to our global 
competitiveness and discussed the potential harm to our economy posed 
by terminating the world's most advanced fighter jet.
  I raised concerns over the industry's ability to build the less 
sophisticated F-35--which has only one engine not two, and the word 
``stealthy'' applied to the F-35 is a myth; it is not as stealthy, even 
remotely, as the F-22--that the United States and its allies are 
counting on buying over the next decade.
  Mr. President, before I revisit these critically important arguments, 
let's be clear on the context in which we are having this debate. The 
proponents of this amendment suggest they are saving taxpayers valuable 
resources in terminating the F-22. They claim such cost savings are 
well worth the risk Generals Corley and Wyatt have warned us about.
  But out of a total of $680 billion in the Defense authorization bill, 
this amendment is valued at $1.75 billion. That is two-tenths of 1 
percent of the total authorization. Since the planes are fully offset, 
there are no real savings in this amendment.
  Instead, this amendment will come at enormous cost to our security 
and our economy. We are in the midst of a national manufacturing 
crisis. Everybody has talked about it. It is why we voted for so much 
support for the automobile industry only a few weeks ago right here in 
this body.
  According to the Federal Reserve's July 15, 2009, Industrial 
Production and Capacity Utilization Report, manufacturing production 
has declined 15.5 percent nationwide, between June 2008 and June 2009. 
I will repeat that: There has been an over 15 percent decline in our 
manufacturing sector. This quarter's manufacturing production is the 
lowest in 27 years, which was the previous low point in production 
since 1967, when the Fed started to keep track of the data.
  We in Congress tried to respond to this crisis. We passed the 
Emergency Economy Stabilization Act, designed to relieve credit markets 
and get banks lending again.
  We passed the $787 billion American Reinvestment and Recovery Act to 
stimulate the economy and boost demand in various sectors and put 
people back to work.
  We have provided $63 billion to Chrysler and General Motors to keep 
their production lines running--companies that were brought to their 
knees, in part, due to dismal business planning and severe 
mismanagement of their companies over the years.
  Additionally, the government has acquired unprecedented equity stakes 
in these companies--8 percent in Chrysler and a whopping 60 percent in 
General Motors.
  I have not opposed these efforts. As chairman of the Banking 
Committee, I worked with my colleagues who represent those States to 
provide Federal assistance through the legislative process. But we took 
this step because we were responding to a national manufacturing 
crisis. We did it because we are responding to the dire and credible 
warnings about the potential impact of the auto industry's collapse--
particularly in Midwestern States, which greatly depend on the auto 
business.
  I will discuss briefly another critically important manufacturing 
base and its economic impact: the aerospace industry.
  While my home State of Connecticut ranks 29th in total population, 
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, it ranks sixth in total 
aerospace employment.
  In 2008, according to the Connecticut Department of Labor, aerospace 
employed over 36,000 residents of my State. So any discussion of 
terminating the fighter jet production has an outsize effect on the 
people I represent.
  I would not be arguing this case for the F-22 if it were strictly a 
parochial matter. We don't have a right to ask 99 other people 
exclusively because of something happening in our own States. The truth 
is, halting this production will have consequences for our industry's 
ability to continue to build aircraft for our military. I will lay out 
the argument for you.
  The expertise of these people cannot be duplicated overnight. These 
trained engineers, scientists, manufacturers, and machinists are highly 
skilled and trained. I am concerned their skill sets and experience are 
being taken for granted, without consideration for the peculiarities of 
jet engine construction. That doesn't just hurt the workers and their 
families; it hurts all of us. Let me explain how.
  According to the Defense Contract Management Agency, there is a 20- 
to 24-month lag between payment for and production of jet engines. So 
the number of planes ordered in any 1 given year doesn't correspond 
with the delivery time of those engines.
  Under Secretary of Defense Gates's plan in calendar year 2010, Pratt 
& Whitney is expected to make 48 F-22 engines and 19 F-35 engines, for 
a total of 67 fighter jet engines. The following year, the number will 
drop precipitously to a total of 43 engines, since the F-35 is not 
scheduled to begin what is called ``full-rate production'' until 2014.
  Thus, in calendar year 2011, Pratt & Whitney will be producing 11 F-
22 engines and 32 F-35 engines, for a total of 43 fighter engines. In 
2012, since there will be no F-22 production, there will only be 41 F-
35 engines built.
  The problem is even more acute when you compare overall military 
engines being built in 2010 versus 2011 and 2012. Under current plans, 
Pratt & Whitney is expected to go from building 194 military engines to 
130 in 2011. That is an average drop of 33 percent in work volume.
  What will happen? It is the same thing occurring in manufacturing 
States all across the country: layoffs. Thousands and thousands of 
people--not just in my State but across the country.
  In the absence of military aircraft work orders for 3 years, 
companies will be forced to tell the legions of highly skilled 
engineers, technicians, and machinists--workers such as the Pratt & 
Whitney mechanics I introduced and mentioned last week--that they are 
not needed now. They need to retrain. They need to find another 
vocation.
  Then, 3 years later, after these workers have settled in a new job, 
or have retired, the Department of Defense and our allies will try to 
ramp up production of the F-35. But they will not be able to. They will 
be left scratching their heads, wondering: Why can't industry meet our 
production needs right now? No doubt, we will ask the same question on 
the Senate floor.
  To assume that the thousands of workers across the Nation who work on 
the F-22 will stand idly by until 2014 when we begin to build the F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter is naive at best. This argument I make is not new 
at all. The Defense Department recognized this point in the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense

[[Page 18387]]

Review, published by the military to identify the needs and strategy of 
our Armed Forces.
  The report stated that F-22 production should be extended ``through 
fiscal year 2010 with a multiyear acquisition contract to ensure the 
Department does not have a gap in fifth generation stealth 
capabilities.''
  At the same time, the F-35 was scheduled to begin construction in 
2010. Since then, of course, it has been pushed back 4 years to 2014. 
There are some rumors that this date may be pushed back even further.
  This means the military identified only 3 years ago--36 months ago--
the most recent published report of this type, that our Nation would 
suffer a loss in aerospace manufacturing capability if fighter 
production doesn't have a seamless transition.
  Their response was to ensure that we keep building F-22s until the F-
35 reached full-rate production. Yet when the F-35 production schedule 
was pushed back 4 years, we did not extend the F-22 production to 
stabilize our industrial base. That is why you have the job losses I 
have mentioned.
  Now we find ourselves in the very situation the Department of Defense 
was trying to avoid 36 months ago, as we face looming job losses across 
our Nation, commercial orders down--losing these people on that basis 
and now because of the vote we may take on this issue--and thus a 
degradation of our ability to meet the aerospace production capability 
our national security requires. So I believe it is our duty and 
responsibility to protect these workers from losing their employment 
and make sure our country retains a viable and competitive capacity in 
the years ahead.
  Let me also point out--and I did the other day on a national security 
basis--that, again, superiority is critical. Right now, there are some 
40 nations that have the SU-27, which is a sophisticated aircraft, and 
the MiG-29, which competes with the F-15 and the F-16. Forty nations 
have that capability. I had a larger chart earlier--I don't have it 
with me today--but there are little red and yellow dots all over this 
map that indicate advanced surface-to-air missile capability where 
there have been orders made or they have already been acquired. Our F-
15s and F-16s are vulnerable to those surface-to-air missiles. All over 
the globe they exist.
  The F-22 literally could avoid the kind of detection these surface-
to-air missiles provide. So we now have a capacity to be able to 
respond. Now we may not--and as long as we are dealing with Afghanistan 
and Iraq, that is one issue. But, frankly, we have to prepare for 
situations that could get a lot more dangerous for our Nation. The 
Chinese and the Russians are aggressively pursuing a fifth generation 
aircraft to compete with the F-22. And to say that the F-22 and the F-
35 are virtually alike I think is a mistake. That is not the case at 
all. There is a difference.
  From a national security standpoint as well, there was a reason why 
General Corley and General Wyatt and others have made a case on these 
aircraft. There is a reason why we invested some $65 billion to develop 
this aircraft. There is a reason why the quadrennial report 36 months 
ago warned about these gaps and what it would do to our industrial base 
and manufacturing.
  I hope our colleagues, in the midst of all of this, would understand 
what is at stake. Again, here we are, on an economic basis, where many 
jobs could be lost in our country with critical technology that hangs 
in the balance. It would be one thing if we were arguing here this 
plane was no longer needed, it was not going to do the job we thought 
it would do, it wasn't as sophisticated as we hoped it would be. Then 
you might decide dropping this, giving up some jobs, may make some 
sense. But to give up an aircraft of this sophistication and this 
capability, and simultaneously, in an economic situation such as we are 
in, to lose as we are predicting somewhere between 25,000 and 90,000 
jobs with this decision, for $1.75 billion in this budget--two-tenths 
of 1 percent out of a $680 billion authorization bill, I think is 
terribly shortsighted.
  I hope my colleagues would listen to these arguments, would debate 
and understand there is an ability, to reach a compromise where we can 
go forward with production, reduce some of the cost that the proponents 
argue for in this amendment, and then move toward together. But to make 
the decision that we may make in the next hour and a half or so would 
be a great danger for our Nation.
  I appreciate my colleague Senator Chambliss giving me the opportunity 
to respond on this issue, and I thank him for his work as well in 
making the case to our colleagues, Democrats and Republicans. This 
ought not to be an issue that divides along those lines at all. We need 
to understand what is at stake for our Nation, both in terms of our 
manufacturing base as well as the national security needs that have 
been identified.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
the two letters, one from General Corley and one from General Wyatt.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                      Department of the Air Force,


                              Headquarters Air Combat Command,

                         Langley Air Force Base, VA, June 9, 2009.
     Hon. Saxby Chambliss,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Chambliss: Thank you for your letter and the 
     opportunity to comment on the critical issue of F-22 fleet 
     size. At Air Combat Command we have held the need for 381 F-
     22s to deliver a tailored package of air superiority to our 
     Combatant Commanders and provide a potent, globally arrayed, 
     asymmetric deterrent against potential adversaries. In my 
     opinion, a fleet of 187 F-22s puts execution of our current 
     national military strategy at high risk in the near to mid-
     term.
       To my knowledge, there are no studies that demonstrate 187 
     F-22s are adequate to support our national military strategy. 
     Air Combat Command analysis, done in concert with 
     Headquarters Air Force, shows a moderate risk force can be 
     obtained with an F-22 fleet of approximately 250 aircraft.
       While OSD did not solicit direct input from Air Combat 
     Command, we worked closely with our Headquarters in ensuring 
     our views were available. We realize the tough choices our 
     national leadership must make in balancing current 
     warfighting needs against the fiscal realities our Nation 
     faces.
       The F-22, a critical enabler of air dominance, plays a 
     vital role and indispensable role in ensuring joint freedom 
     of action for all forces and underpins our ability to 
     dissuade and deter. Thank you for your continued support of 
     the U.S. Air Force and Air Combat Command.
           Sincerely,

                                             John D.W. Corley,

                                                    General, USAF,
     Commander.
                                  ____

     Hon. Saxby Chambliss,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Chambliss: Thank you for your inquiry and the 
     opportunity for me to discuss what I believe to be a serious 
     threat to the Air National Guard's ability to fulfill our 
     Nation's highest strategic priority; defending the Homeland. 
     The ANG has proudly performed the bulk of this mission, while 
     simultaneously participating in overseas contingency 
     operations, with aircraft that are rapidly nearing the end of 
     their service life. While I believe our Nation has the 
     capacity to recapitalize the ANG, I am not aware of any plan 
     that commits to doing so. As such, we are in need of an 
     immediate solution in order to ensure that America's most 
     cost effective force can continue to perform its most 
     important mission.
       While a variety of solutions abound, I believe the nature 
     of the current and future asymmetric threats to our Nation, 
     particularly from seaborne cruise missiles, requires a 
     fighter platform with the requisite speed and detection to 
     address them. The F-22's unique capability in this arena 
     enables it to handle a full spectrum of threats that the 
     ANG's current legacy systems are not capable of addressing. I 
     am fond of saying that ``America's most important job should 
     be handled by America's best fighter''.
       Indeed, I am keenly aware of the severe strain that our 
     current economic situation has placed on the Department of 
     Defense as it attempts to modernize for an ever evolving 
     threat environment. Given this reality, finding more 
     efficient ways to protect our Nation's interests at home and 
     abroad is the new imperative. Many say this will mean making 
     tough choices, but I believe we can maintain our vitality by 
     making smart choices; leveraging the cost effective and dual 
     use nature of the ANG is the answer. Basing F-22s (and 
     eventually F-35s) at strategic ANG locations throughout the 
     United States while simultaneously making them available to 
     rotationally support worldwide

[[Page 18388]]

     contingency operations is the most responsible approach to 
     satisfying all of our Nation's needs.
       Again, thank you for your inquiry and your continued 
     support of the Air National Guard.
           Sincerely,

                                           Harry M. Wyatt III,

                                         Lieutenant General, USAF,
                                     Director, Air National Guard.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hagan). The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I yield myself 1 minute to give the 
figures relative to the F-35 production, which are the Pentagon 
figures. I am not sure where my good friend from Connecticut got his 
figures on future F-35 production. But the figures from the Pentagon 
are that there are 30 in this year's budget; in next year's budget, 
fiscal year 2011, they plan 70 F-35s; in fiscal year 2012, 109 F-35s; 
in fiscal year 2013, 119 F-35s. Those are far different than the 
numbers which my friend from Connecticut just gave.
  I am not sure the source of his numbers. Perhaps he can give us those 
numbers at a later time.
  At this point, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, if I may respond.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. I wanted to state where the numbers came from. They are 
from the Defense Contracting Management Agency. That is where the 
numbers came from.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
  Mr. KAUFMAN. Madam President, today, I would like to speak in strong 
support of the Levin-McCain amendment which strips $1.75 billion in 
spending for additional F-22s. These are fighter jets the military does 
not want and does not need. This is a Cold War system, in a post-9/11 
world, that is underperforming and overpriced. To force this purchase, 
against the best judgment of our military leadership and Commander in 
Chief, weakens our ability to keep our Nation safe.
  The White House and Pentagon agree that continuing the F-22 
production line decreases our military readiness by wasting resources 
that could be much more usefully employed. And it is not a partisan 
issue. Presidents Obama and Bush; Defense Secretaries Gates and 
Rumsfeld; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, and 
his two predecessors; and the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force all agree that the F-22 is not the most efficient or effective 
warplane to meet our current and future defense needs.
  The F-22 has not flown one mission over Afghanistan or Iraq, because 
it is not the best weapon to meet the challenges we are currently 
facing.
  This system was designed to counter Soviet fighters at the end of the 
Cold War. And its continued purchase deprives the military of $1.75 
billion it requested for other critical priorities, such as building 
the capability to protect our troops and defeat insurgencies.
  With ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, we cannot afford to 
disregard the views of our military. And in these tough economic times, 
we cannot afford to adopt an irresponsible approach to defense 
spending. These facts speak for themselves, and the stakes are simply 
too high. What more evidence do we need?
  The F-22 prepares us for the wars of the past; the wars we have 
already won. Today, we must look forward and make tough decisions for 
the future. We must heed the advice of our military leaders, such as 
Secretary Gates, to rebalance our defense budget and enhance our 
capabilities to succeed against current and future threats. This 
includes preparing for a wide spectrum of conflict and continuing to 
engage in counterinsurgency.
  Madam President, this debate is not just about the future of F-22s. 
It is about changing the way we do business. It is about accepting this 
rebalancing and ending unnecessary waste. And it is about matching 
vital national security interests with commensurate levels of funding.
  The F-22 is the first test of our willingness to make the tough 
choices necessary to truly prioritize defense spending.
  As Secretary Gates said last week:

       The grim reality is that with regard to the budget, we have 
     entered into a zero-sum game. Every defense dollar diverted 
     to fund excess or unneeded capacity--whether for more F-22s 
     or anything else--is a dollar that will be unavailable to 
     take care of our people, to win the wars we are in, to deter 
     potential adversaries, and to improve capabilities in areas 
     where America is underinvested and potentially vulnerable. 
     That is a risk I cannot accept and I will not take.

  Madam President, I want to align myself with the remarks of Secretary 
Gates, and reiterate to my colleagues that this is a risk none of us 
should be willing to take.
  Many of my colleagues have spoken of the sacrifice and cost such a 
decision incurs in terms of jobs. They are right, and I share their 
concern about jobs; especially in these tough times. I know this makes 
our decision today hard, and no one wants to do anything that will 
hinder job creation and growth. But it is with these economic 
constraints in mind that we must also consider the implications of 
spending nearly $2 billion on a defense program that our military 
leadership says it simply does not need.
  Building more F-22s does not allow for smart or efficient growth of 
our workforce. Moreover, the number of jobs lost on the F-22 will 
likely be matched by increased production of the F-35, which is a newer 
and more capable warplane. American workers are needed to meet this and 
other defense priorities, which strengthen our national security. Jobs 
should follow, as opposed to dictate, our defense needs.
  For those concerned about cuts, I point out that the budget proposed 
by the President and Secretary Gates represents an increase, not a 
decrease, in defense spending. But this is not just an increase for the 
sake of spending.
  Rather, it is a budget that recognizes that over the last two 
decades, the nature of conflict and war has fundamentally changed. It 
recognizes that we must continue to build the capacity to confront a 
wide spectrum of challenges--conventional and unconventional; regular 
and irregular--and better prepare for a future in which we will 
continue to engage in counterinsurgency.
  Today, we must do what is in America's best interest. Today, we must 
focus on weapons systems that offer the maximum versatility and 
effectiveness, and prepare the military against the widest range of 
threats. And today, we must plan for our current and future 
counterinsurgency needs, as shaped by our experiences in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.
  It is in this regard that I urge my colleagues to join me in 
supporting the Levin-McCain amendment, and adopt a better approach to 
defense spending.
  Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KAUFMAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KAUFMAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the time 
during the quorum call be charged equally on both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KAUFMAN. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Washington, Mrs. Murray.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Madam President, I thank the Senator for yielding time 
on this important debate.
  As we consider the future of the F-22 program, it is important for us 
to remember the most fundamental goal we have for our defense industry 
and the

[[Page 18389]]

way we have met that goal for many decades. That goal is to give our 
men and women in uniform technology and equipment that is far superior 
to that of our enemy so they can protect themselves and defend our 
Nation. It has been our mission from the time of the Wright brothers to 
the days of Rosie the Riveter, to the era of stealthy technology.
  But maintaining that technology has depended on an important 
partnership and that is a partnership between the Pentagon, which 
determines the needs of our war fighters, and industry, which does the 
research and design and builds the next generation of military 
equipment that meets those needs. It is a partnership that is vital to 
our military strength, to our economy, and to the health of our 
domestic industrial base.
  Unfortunately, it is also a partnership that is being weakened by 
amendments such as the one we are considering today. Instead of 
treating military procurement such as the partnership that it is, this 
amendment envisions it as a one-way street. This amendment cancels a 
vital military program without adequate thought of the men and women we 
rely on to design and build the equipment our war fighters depend on 
without any consideration of the fact that if we end the F-22 program, 
we are cutting a link in technology that we will not be able to repair 
overnight.
  As many of you know, this is not the first time I have come to the 
floor to talk about the erosion of our Nation's industrial base. It 
likely will not be the last. That is because protecting our domestic 
base is not about just one company or one program or one State or one 
industry. This is about our Nation's economic stability, it is about 
our future military capability, and it is about the ability to retain 
skilled family-wage jobs in communities throughout the country.
  Just last week, the Aerospace Industries Association issued a major 
report that finds the Pentagon failed to consider industrial effects 
when choosing strategies. That report urged the Pentagon to take into 
account the impact decisions such as the one to stop production of the 
F-22 make on our manufacturing base. That report also noted that our 
manufacturing base was not taken into account in past Quadrennial 
Defense Reviews, and when Secretary Gates unveiled his program cuts in 
April, he specifically said defense industry jobs were not a factor in 
his decisions.
  As our country faces two difficult but not unrelated challenges--
safeguarding our country in a dangerous world and rebuilding a 
faltering economy--ignoring the needs of our industrial base should not 
be an option. Whether it is the scientists who are designing the next 
generation of military satellites or whether it is the engineers who 
are improving our radar systems or the machinists assembling our war 
planes, these industries and their workers are one of our greatest 
strategic assets. What if they, all of a sudden, were not available? 
What if we made budgetary and policy decisions that did not take into 
account the need of making sure we have a strong domestic workforce in 
our country?
  Actually, that is not impossible or even unthinkable. It is actually 
happening today. We need to be clear about the ramifications of 
amendments such as the ones we are considering today because once we 
give up on producing this technology, once we say that certain research 
and development is no longer needed, we lose that. We lose it and we 
cannot rebuild it overnight.
  Today, as we consider a critical tool for the future of our military 
across the globe, we have to also remember the partnership we have 
built with our industrial base because, unless we consider the needs of 
that partnership, we are not only going to continue to lose some of our 
best-paying American jobs, we are going to lose the backbone of our 
military might.
  Supporting continued F-22 production will help defend against 
potential threats, it will protect family-wage jobs, and, most 
importantly, it will preserve our domestic base. That is important 
because we do not know what conflict will come in the future. We don't 
know what our challenges will be 10 or 15 or 20 or 30 years from now. 
If we lose our engineering or our production base and we face a 
challenge in the future and go back to rebuild that, it will never 
happen. We will be at a disadvantage in whatever future conflict we 
might face.
  I urge our colleagues to think about the long-term interests of this 
decision. I oppose the amendment and I look forward to further debate.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, how much time remains on our side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The proponents have 35\1/2\ minutes, the 
opponents have 18\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield to the Senator from Arizona as much of that time 
as he requires.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I thank the chair. I, again, thank my 
friend, the distinguished chairman, for proposing this amendment. I 
thank the distinguished chairman for being the sponsor of this 
amendment. It is a privilege to work with him on this as well as many 
other issues.
  This amendment is probably the most impactful amendment I have seen 
in this body on almost any issue, much less the issue of defense. It 
boils down to whether we are going to continue the business as usual of 
once a weapons system gets into full production it never dies or 
whether we are going to take the necessary steps to reform the 
acquisition process in this country.
  The F-22, in itself, is $1.75 billion. That is an impressive number 
anyplace outside the beltway. But more important than that, it is a 
signal that we are not going to continue to build weapons systems that 
are plagued with cost overruns, which outlive their requirements for 
defending this Nation and, very frankly, starts to gain control of the 
acquisition process which is completely out of control.
  The Government Accountability Office recently concluded that there 
were over $295 billion in cost overruns in the last several years--$295 
billion in cost overruns. Recently, a close friend of mine and great 
leader and former Secretary of the Navy wrote an article in the Wall 
Street Journal. He stated:

       When John McCain was shot down over Hanoi in 1967, he was 
     flying an A-4 sky hawk. That jet cost $860,000.

  By the way, I didn't know that cost to the taxpayers I had caused. 
But the jet cost $860,000.

       Inflation has risen by 700 percent since then. So Mr. 
     McCain's A-4 cost $6.1 million in 2008 dollars. Applying a 
     generous factor of three for technological improvements, the 
     price for a 2008 Navy F-18 fighter should be $18 million. 
     Instead, we are paying about $90 million for each new 
     fighter. As a result, the Navy cannot buy sufficient numbers. 
     This is disarmament without a treaty.
       The situation is worse in the Air Force.

  Then Secretary Lehman says:

       In 1983, I was in the Pentagon meeting that launched the F-
     22 Raptor. The plan was to buy 648 jets beginning in 1996 for 
     $60 million each. . . .

  That was in 1983 dollars.

       Now they cost $350 million apiece and the Obama budget caps 
     the program at 187 jets.

  Then he adds:

       At least they are safe from cyberattack since no one in 
     China knows how to program the '83 vintage IBM software that 
     runs them.

  He then goes on to cite other problems, including Navy shipbuilding 
fiascoes, et cetera.

     . . . the Army's Future Combat System that was meant to re-
     equip the entire Army, the 400 percent cost overrun of the 
     new Air Force weather satellite . . .

  And similar cost overruns.
  It is out of control, I say to my colleagues. I will match my 
commitment to equipping the men and women in the military with that of 
anyone in this body, but it has to stop, and this vote on the F-22 will 
determine whether it is business as usual with the earmarking and pork-
barreling of billions of dollars which has bred corruption--we have 
former Members of the Congress residing in Federal prison--or whether 
we are going to finally get it under control.
  Who better to be a spokesperson, in my view, than our Secretary of 
Defense? I have known and admired many

[[Page 18390]]

Secretaries of Defense. I know of no one whom I admire more than 
Secretary Gates. He gave a very important speech, on July 16, at the 
Economic Club of Chicago--a remarkable speech. I hope all my colleagues 
would have the chance to read it. In part of it he says, about the 
problems we are having in defense spending:

       First, there is the Congress, which is understandably 
     concerned, especially in these tough economic times, about 
     protecting jobs in certain states and congressional 
     districts. There is the defense and aerospace industry, which 
     has an obvious financial stake in the survival and growth of 
     these programs.
       And there is the institutional military itself--within the 
     Pentagon, and as expressed through an influential network of 
     retired generals and admirals, some of whom are paid 
     consultants to the defense industry, and some who often are 
     quoted as experts in the news media.

  Secretary Gates goes on to say:

       As a result, many past attempts by my predecessors to end 
     failing or unnecessary programs went by the wayside. 
     Nonetheless, I determined in a triumph of hope over 
     experience, and the President agreed--

  I wish to emphasize my strong support and appreciation for the 
President's stand on this issue.

     --and the President agreed, that given the urgency of the 
     wars we are in, the daunting global security environment we 
     will inhabit for decades to come, and our country's economic 
     problems, we simply cannot afford to move ahead with business 
     as usual.

  Then, later on, he talks about the F-22.

       Air superiority and missile defense--two areas where the 
     budget has attracted the most criticism--provide case 
     studies. Let me start with the controversy over the F-22 
     fighter jet. We had to consider, when preparing for a future 
     conventional state-on-state conflict, what is the right mix 
     of the most advanced fighter aircraft and other weapons to 
     deal with the known and projected threats to U.S. air 
     supremacy. For example, we now have unmanned aerial vehicles 
     that can simultaneously perform intelligence, 
     reconnaissance--

  Et cetera.
       The President's budget would buy 48 of the most advanced 
     UAVs. We also took into consideration the capabilities of the 
     newest manned combat aircraft program, the stealth F-35 Joint 
     Strike Fighter. The F-35 is 10 to 15 years newer than the F-
     22.

  He goes on to say how important the F-35 is, and then he says:

       The F-22 is clearly a capability we do need--a niche, 
     silver-bullet solution for one or two potential scenarios--
     specifically the defeat of a highly advanced enemy fighter 
     fleet. The F-22, to be blunt, does not make much sense 
     anyplace else in the spectrum of conflict.

  I ask my colleagues, would you ask yourselves why the F-22 has never 
flown over Iraq or Afghanistan. It has been in production for nearly 5 
years. It has never flown over Iraq or Afghanistan. And I want to 
emphasize that I think it is an important fighter. We are building 187 
of them. The question before this body is why we continue to build 
more, whether we continue to build more, or the F-35, the Joint Strike 
Fighter, which goes to the Marine Corps and the Navy and the Air Force. 
Is this the weapons system we need to balance our entire capability of 
manned aircraft?
  I would ask my colleagues, since the F-22 was on the drawing boards 
and moved into production, look at the advancement in unmanned aerial 
vehicles. I say that as an old pilot. The unmanned aerial vehicles have 
been performing a magnificent job both in Iraq and Afghanistan. They 
have been a critical element sometimes on the battlefields. And this 
President's budget understands that and gives extreme priority to that.
  So as we go on, in light of these factors, Secretary Gates goes on to 
say:

       With the support of Air Force leadership, I concluded that 
     183--the program of record since 2005, plus four more added 
     in the FY 09 supplemental--was a sufficient number of F-22s 
     and recommended as such to the President.
       The reaction from parts of Washington has been predictable 
     for many of the reasons I described before. The most 
     substantive criticism is that completing the F-22 program 
     means we are risking the future of U.S. air supremacy. To 
     assess this risk, it is worth looking at real-world potential 
     threat and assessing the capabilities that other countries 
     have now or in the pipeline.

  The fact is, in the view of the President of the United States, the 
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and most any objective observer of the 
military scene, they believe the F-22 is important, we need to have 
what we have, but it is now time to move on to the F-35, the Joint 
Strike Fighter.
  So this amendment really means, are we going to look at the real and 
compelling needs we have to have in order to win the war in 
Afghanistan, continue our success in Iraq, and put our funds into that 
kind of equipment and weapons systems or are we going to continue?
  Finally, I have great sympathy for the Senator from Georgia and other 
Senators who have come to the floor. I understand the sincerity of 
their views. I respect them. I would also point out, though, that to 
argue we should build weapons systems in the name of jobs is not what 
we should be about. What we should be about is procuring and building 
the best weapons systems to ensure our national security and how we can 
best equip the men and women who are in harm's way all around the world 
today.
  So I understand the economic impact, particularly in these hard 
times. My sympathy goes out to the communities that are dependent on 
the contracts for the F-22 aircraft. All I can say to them is we will 
do everything we can to help you and your families and make the 
adjustments, and there will be--we continue to increase spending on 
defense. We hope that we will be able to provide you with the necessary 
jobs and manufacturing that would be devoted to what we have 
ascertained as our national defense weapons systems procurement 
priorities, I say with sympathy to my colleagues who are deeply 
concerned about the loss of jobs in these difficult economic times. But 
this is not the way to provide jobs. Our obligation is to defend this 
Nation.
  So I think this amendment is overdue. I think it will be a 
significant, a very significant amendment, as I said before, as to 
whether we will get our priorities straight and listen to our esteemed 
Secretary of Defense, our President, our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, and other military leaders in whose hands we entrust to make 
the tough decisions. I understand the final decision is here in 
Congress, but I also don't think we should dismiss the arguments that 
have been made by I think one of the finest men to ever serve this 
country, and that is Secretary of Defense Gates.
  I yield the floor.
  THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time to the Senator from Utah?
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. I will be happy to yield 7 minutes to the Senator from 
Utah.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah is recognized.
  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, during his July 16 address, the Secretary 
of Defense, Robert Gates, said the military needed maximum versatility 
to bring to bear in a wide range of armed conflicts. Last January, he 
argued that ``our military must be prepared for a full spectrum of 
operations, including the [insurgent] type of combat we are facing in 
Iraq and Afghanistan as well as large-scale threats that we face from 
places like North Korea and Iran.''
  I could not agree more with Secretary Gates. However, just as our 
Nation unwisely disregarded the hard-learned lessons of how to fight 
counterinsurgency operations after Vietnam, the Defense Department 
seems poised to make similar errors by limiting our capability to 
defeat the air threat of today and tomorrow: the integrated air defense 
system.
  This advanced system is composed of extended-range Russian surface-
to-air missiles such as the S-300 and advanced fighters such as the Su-
30, which have already been sold in large numbers to China and India. 
Together, these systems make penetrating hostile airspace extremely 
difficult, if not deadly, for aircraft lacking the F-22's advanced 
stealth technology and capability for sustained supersonic speeds. It 
is these capabilities that enable the Raptor to have the unique 
capability to conduct stealth operations at any time of day or night.
  Secretary Gates argues for ceasing production of the F-22 after only 
187

[[Page 18391]]

are built because we will not face what the Pentagon refers to as a 
``near-peer adversary'' for the foreseeable future.
  For the sake of our Nation, I hope he is right. However, I believe 
this statement misses a critical point: advanced integrated air defense 
systems are comparably inexpensive and readily affordable by nations 
such as Iran, with its insistence on developing nuclear weapons.
  History provides ample examples of the effective use of integrated 
air defense systems by nations that lack the resources to be considered 
a near-peer adversary of the U.S. As retired LTG Michael Dunn recently 
noted, North Vietnam defended its territory during the Vietnam war with 
what, at the time, was an advanced air defense system. This system, 
comprised of surface-to-air missiles and fewer than 200 fighters, was 
able to shoot down 2,448 American aircraft.
  The 1973 War between Israel and Egypt is another example. The 
Egyptians learning from their recent defeats built an integrated air 
defense umbrella under which its forces were able to initially make 
significant territorial gains, while the Israeli Air Force faced 
serious losses. Only when the Egyptians advanced beyond the range of 
their surface-to-air missiles' umbrella was the Israeli Air Force able 
to inflict a significant blow.
  A more contemporary example is the loss in the 1990s of an F-117 
Nighthawk to the Serbians, who were not equipped with the latest air 
defense system.
  Despite such examples, some argue additional F-22s are not necessary 
since stealthy jet-powered unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs, which are 
still under development, will play an increasingly vital role in 
destroying critical ground targets. This is true for threats on the 
ground, but I am unaware of any plans to operationally deploy a UAV 
that can dogfight existing or next-generation Russian and Chinese jet 
fighters, which will be hunting these UAVs.
  Our forces could be confronted with the next generation Russian and 
Chinese fighters soon. There have been numerous media reports the 
Russian Government is developing a new stealthy aircraft, presumably to 
counter the F-22. This aircraft called PAK-FA, is being developed 
jointly with the Indian Government. Additional media sources cite 
China's development of a similar twin engine, stealth aircraft known as 
the J-12.
  Some argue that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter can tackle those 
threats and defeat this new generation of advanced aircraft. While the 
F-35 is a very capable stealth aircraft, it was designed to complement 
the F-22, not replace it. The fact is the F-35 is neither as capable a 
fighter nor as stealthy as the F-22. For example, the F-35 does not 
have, nor can be upgraded to use, the supercruise engines increasingly 
needed in today's stealth operations.
  Remember the F-22 is the NASCAR racer of this air-dominance team. 
Fast and unseen, the Raptor will punch a hole in an enemy's defenses, 
quickly dispatching any challenger in the air and striking at the most 
important ground targets. The Joint Strike Fighter is the rugged SUV of 
the team. Impressive, but not as maneuverable or capable of sustained 
supersonic speeds, the F-35 will exploit the hole opened by the F-22 
and attack additional targets and directly support our ground forces. 
This is not to say the F-35 is not a highly capable stealthy aircraft. 
But the F-35's role is to supplement the F-22, not substitute for it. 
Only by utilizing the strengths of both aircraft do we ensure air 
dominance for the next 40 years.
  Furthermore, if the F-22 is such a boondoggle, why do our allies such 
as Japan and Australia want to spend billions to purchase the aircraft? 
Why does Australia, for instance, plan to purchase up to 100 F-35s and 
large numbers of UAVs, and yet remains interested in the F-22? Perhaps 
it is because Australia understands the Russians and the Chinese are 
developing even more sophisticated surface-to-air missile systems and 
stealth fighters, threats the F-22 is uniquely designed and equipped to 
destroy.
  Others point out the F-22 has not been deployed in support of our 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is true. However, there were 
recent plans to deploy the F-22 to the Persian Gulf. But according to 
the July 9, 2008, edition of the widely respected Defense News, the 
Pentagon overruled those plans, citing concerns about ``strategic 
dislocation.'' This means the F-22 is hardly a dinosaur. It is a weapon 
that can change the balance of power in a region and deter our 
adversaries.
  In conclusion, I am reminded of a point author Michael Korda made in 
his book about the Battle of Britain. He observed that even though the 
two British prime ministers before Winston Churchill pursued a policy 
of appeasement, they also committed their government to develop and 
procure the three pieces of equipment: the Spitfire fighter, Hurricane 
fighter and radar, which were to ensure that nation's survival during 
the Battle of Britain.
  I hope the Senate will profit from these lessons of history and vote 
against the McCain-Levin amendment.
  I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. How much time remains for the proponents?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 21 minutes remaining.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask Senator Wyden, how much time does he need?
  Mr. WYDEN. I believe 10 minutes would be plenty.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield 10 minutes to Senator Wyden.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.
  Mr. WYDEN. Madam President, I rise this morning to support the Levin-
McCain amendment. It seems to me that buying more F-22s at this point 
would meet the very definition of government waste.
  What you have is a situation where the Pentagon, which, suffice it to 
say, has not exactly been shy over the years in terms of calling for 
additional weapons, is on record as saying this is unnecessary. 
Further, I have been out talking with members of the Guard at home and 
trying to get their sense of what is needed in this dangerous time, and 
they have never once mentioned something like this.
  They talk, for example, about body armor. They talk about boots. They 
don't talk about more F-22s. Suffice it to say, when the Congress is 
now having a debate about trying to find additional money for health 
care, for example, to go out and spend close to $2 billion to buy seven 
more F-22 fighters the Air Force says it doesn't want defies common 
sense.
  My home State, for example, would love to hire back police and other 
essential workers who have been laid off. Instead of building seven 
planes, we could be restoring infrastructure and developing renewable 
energy. Again, in my home State, we have had budget shortfalls. We have 
seen reductions in essential services, law enforcement being one. The 
debate is not about necessary steps to ensuring a strong national 
defense. The question is about whether the U.S. Congress wants to spend 
close to $2 billion to pay for more fighter jets the Air Force does not 
want.
  It is also important to remember that the F-22 is not being purchased 
for wars the United States is currently fighting. Certainly, the 
Taliban and Iraqi insurgents do not have an Air Force. The F-22 is 
being purchased to fight in possible future conflicts with other 
countries that may have an air force. While I strongly believe the 
Pentagon ought to be able to prepare for such possibilities, it is the 
Pentagon that is telling us we don't need these additional F-22s.
  It is also important to note that the Pentagon has purchased 187 F-
22s. There is not a debate about whether the United States ought to 
have fighters in our arsenal. The question is whether the Air Force 
needs 194 of them instead of 187. We have a very good Secretary of 
Defense, Robert Gates. The Secretary has said that 187 is sufficient to 
combat current and future threats. He is the one who said that more are 
not needed. He is the one who said:

       We must break the old habit of adding layer upon layer of 
     cost, complexity, and

[[Page 18392]]

     delay to systems that are so expensive and so elaborate that 
     only a small number can be built, and that are then usable 
     only in a narrow range of low probability scenarios.

  Secretary Gates has hit the nail about as perfectly on the head as 
one can. He and our country want the strongest defense possible. But 
there are ways to make better use of that $1.75 billion than on seven 
more F-22s.
  I serve on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I know there 
are threats to our forces every single day. I see the Senator from 
Georgia who serves on the Intelligence Committee. He believes strongly 
about this as well. We need to make sure we are protecting our troops 
in harm's way, but we have a variety of choices in order to secure the 
protection our troops have been in need of. I intend to work with 
Chairman Levin, Secretary Gates, the distinguished Senator from 
Arizona, and the President to ensure we replace the current F-15 with 
more capable and safer fighters.
  Last month, I visited with some of the 3,000 members of the Oregon 
National Guard's 41st brigade combat team, as they trained for their 
current deployment to Iraq. Not a one of the soldiers told me that 
their big concern was whether the Air Force would have 194 F-22s 
instead of 187. They talked to me instead about the best vehicles, the 
best medical care if they are injured, about the best body armor. Not 
one of them mentioned the F-22.
  I am not voting against the F-22. I am voting for the soldier, the 
taxpayer. They both deserve our government's greatest protection at 
this critical time in our history.
  I urge colleagues to support the Levin-McCain amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I rise today to address the F-22 program. 
For the past week as the debate has swirled around on this program I 
have not spoken on the subject. My colleagues know that I have strongly 
supported the F-22 program over the past two decades. Why? Because it 
is without question the world's most advanced fighter aircraft. It's 
capabilities far outstrip anything else in the world. There simply is 
no match.
  When the Advanced Tactical Fighter Program began more than 20 years 
ago, no one could foresee what the world would look like in 2009. We 
planned to build 750 F-22s in order to match the Soviet Union's assumed 
far greater number of advanced fighters. The F-22 was designed with a 
goal of defeating 10 Soviet fighters apiece. The strategy was that 
using a combination of stealth and an advanced radar the F-22 would be 
able to attack Soviet fighters long before the adversary knew they were 
there.
  I am pleased to note that 20 years later as we train with the F-22 
our Air Force pilots report that is exactly what it can do. Time after 
time as we exercise with the F-22, the results are nearly the same. The 
F-22 defeats all adversaries nearly with the same predictions as the 
designers hoped it would do.
  What has changed, however, is that the Soviet Union no longer poses 
the threat that was assumed by the Defense Department in the 1980s. So 
then, critics say, why do we need to continue to buy more? We will soon 
have 187 aircraft that should be sufficient.
  They note that the F-22 hasn't been used in Afghanistan. While that 
is considered a clear argument that it isn't needed, it is laughable. 
As far as I know al-Qaida and the Taliban don't have an air force. The 
F-22 is designed to defeat conventional military forces. It is 
designed, for example, to counter a conventional attack by an adversary 
against one of its neighbors. Were the Chinese to attack Taiwan, the F-
22 would provide an incredible counter to the Chinese. The same would 
be true if a resurgent Russia were to try to reclaim countries in the 
Baltics. Unless we truly believe that we will never face another nation 
state in a conventional conflict then the F-22 is indeed necessary.
  At 187 aircraft, the F-22 provides a very credible deterrent to those 
nations. Is it sufficient? Perhaps. Will the Joint Strike Fighter 
replace it, not a chance. The Joint Strike Fighter, we expect, will be 
a terrific aircraft, but it is designed primarily to attack ground 
targets. In a battle against the F-22, it would likely lose each 
engagement. With better trained pilots and tactics, the Joint Strike 
Fighter could probably give the F-22 a run for its money, but it was 
never designed to replace the F-22 and should not be viewed as such.
  To me what is maddening about this debate is the sense that the 
decision is so clear cut that the F-22 program should be killed that it 
is only parochial politics that could keep it alive. That is pure 
hogwash.
  The Nation has invested more than $65 billion to develop and buy 187 
aircraft. If we choose to buy more F-22s we will do so at a very 
reasonable price--about $150 million. While that is not cheap by any 
stretch of the imagination, it is far cheaper than what we paid to 
initiate the program. And, if we kill the program and decide that we 
need to restart it in a few years, it is far cheaper than we would have 
to pay to resuscitate production.
  This is not a boondoggle. We don't have critics saying the program is 
flawed and should be killed. Everyone agrees it is a great aircraft. 
While some of my colleagues obviously support the program because it 
means jobs in their States, others like myself who have no F-22 jobs in 
their States support the program because of its capabilities and their 
concern for the future. Why then has it become an issue over which to 
veto a bill? Why are the stakes so high with this program?
  I have the greatest respect for the President and the current 
Secretary of Defense. I have supported both in almost every initiative 
they have advocated. But I see in this case a pattern that I have 
witnessed over and over again.
  Time after time our new leaders, both civilian and military, look at 
a program and see all the reasons why it isn't the right one. For 
example, in the early days of the Clinton administration the C-17 
program was nearly terminated because the production of the aircraft 
wasn't performing up to expectations. I recall 2 years prior to that 
the Appropriations Committee recommended a pause in funding for the C-
17, not because we had lost confidence in the program. We still 
believed in the requirement for the aircraft, but the program wasn't 
performing. Up to that point, we had appropriated funds for 16 C-17s in 
total, but not a single one had been delivered, and there were very few 
coming together on the factory floor in Long Beach. We weren't 
recommending cancellation, but it served notice that attention was 
needed. However, the attention that the program received was mostly 
from critics who sought its termination.
  When the Clinton administration came into office many of the new 
officials were convinced that the C-17 should be terminated. In that 
instance the Pentagon mandated a study to determine whether the C-17 
was still required. Luckily the conclusion was that yes the plane was 
still needed and those who were calling for its cancellation, including 
some in Congress, would not get their way.
  It was only a few years earlier that Secretary Cheney determined that 
the V-22 should be terminated. He was justifiably concerned that the 
price was increasing and that the program was taking longer than 
planned. It took the concerted effort of the Congress to stand up and 
say that we would not allow the program to be terminated. Certainly 
there were those in the Pentagon who agreed with the Secretary, but the 
Marines did not.
  I am told that a few years prior to that my good friend Senator 
Rudman weighed in with Chairman Stevens to overrule the Air Force who 
wanted to kill the F-117 after the production of only one squadron of 
aircraft. I should point out that the F-117 was not built in New 
Hampshire. There might have been some modest amount of work associated 
with the plane in his state, but the reason that Senator Rudman 
insisted that we keep buying the F-117 was because of its unique 
capabilities not for any parochial reason.
  My colleagues all know the history of the B-2 program. It was started 
as a

[[Page 18393]]

classified program in 1981. The Air Force was going to build 132 
bombers. We expected it to cost between $20 and $25 billion in total. 
The contractor built a huge state of the art factory out in the high 
desert of California to handle the production of the aircraft. Because 
it was highly classified every precaution had to be taken to protect 
national security all of which dramatically increased the cost to 
produce the aircraft.
  Clearly the contractor and Air Force were overly optimistic on the 
cost and schedule of the program. Within 5 years it was clear that the 
program was not going to be completed within $25 billion. As 
development delays occurred, costs continued to escalate. The Air Force 
was unwilling to devote more resources to the program so in a series of 
moves it consistently delayed production of the aircraft and 
transferred dollars appropriated to build the aircraft to be used 
instead to cover higher development costs. By the time I became 
chairman, it was clear that the program would exceed its budget, but it 
was also clear that if it were successful it would provide an unmatched 
capability to this Nation. As costs mounted, the Defense Department 
determined that it would not be able to purchase all 132 aircraft. 
First production was cut to 75 and eventually it dropped to 20. In 1996 
as the program was being killed, the contractor offered to produce 
three per year for several years at a price of about $600 million per 
copy. However, by that time support for the program had eroded so that 
neither the Pentagon nor the Congress would take up the offer. Instead, 
by only buying a total of 21 aircraft, we invested over $2 billion per 
plane making it the most costly aircraft in history.
  This situation isn't unique to aircraft programs. In the case of 
shipbuilding, I remember vividly Secretary Cheney's decision to cancel 
the Seawolf submarine. As a result of that decision, the three Seawolf-
class submarines that were eventually built were very expensive. 
Because we only bought three, the average cost of each submarine was 
more than $4 billion. Had we built the 29 originally planned, I can 
only speculate about the cost, but it would certainly have been less 
than the price we are now paying for its replacement. What is even more 
galling is that during that time we were still building the capable 
SSN-688 Los Angeles class submarines and only paying about $800 million 
apiece for them. Instead of reinvigorating that program, we cancelled 
the Seawolf program and proceeded with the New Attack submarine, now 
called the Virginia class, in order to move to a cheaper submarine. 
Regrettably, I have to report that the cost of the Virginia class 
submarine is so high that we have only been able to afford to purchase 
one per year. When I became chairman we were buying four Los Angeles 
class submarines a year and paying only 1/3 the cost of the Virginia 
class. Is the Virginia a better submarine? Surely it is. The 
technological advances that the Nation has developed between the time 
the Los Angeles subs were designed and this decade have allowed for 
substantial improvements. Is it better than the Seawolf? That is 
debatable.
  The pattern I have watched during my tenure is a mix of four things. 
First, programs are cancelled before or as they reach maturity. Why? 
Sometimes because new leadership wants to go in a new direction more 
often, and important costs increase and schedules are delayed which 
erode the support for the programs. Sometimes programs are cancelled 
because we believe the promised replacement will be more capable or 
cheaper. And sometimes we argue times have changed and we don't need 
them. In a few cases it is clear that the program wasn't performing as 
expected and should be terminated.
  For the F-22 some will argue it is too expensive. That was the 
argument against the V-22 program. Some say we simply don't need any 
more. That was the argument used to kill the B-2. Would we like to have 
more B-2s in the inventory today? I, for one, surely would.
  Others will say the threat doesn't warrant buying more F-22s. This is 
where I have my gravest concern. Some experts will tell you that we 
know that potential adversaries are working on fifth generation 
fighters. If in 5 years the Chinese unveil a new fifth generation 
fighter and begin to produce it in numbers will we regret the decision 
to kill the F-22, I believe we would.
  I am told that no one is likely to be able to develop and build an F-
22 equivalent aircraft for a generation. The skill and funding required 
to do so exceeds any foreign nation's ability. But in my view, they 
might not be able to design an F-22 themselves, but that doesn't mean 
they can't steal the plans.
  We were told that the North Koreans were years away from a long range 
missile, then were surprised when they unveiled the Taepo dong. We were 
surprised when Pakistan conducted a nuclear test. We were shocked when 
the Soviet Union collapsed and most Americans were shocked when they 
learned about al-Qaida after 9/11. if there is one thing that shouldn't 
surprise us is that we cannot foretell the future.
  So as my colleagues deliberate on the F-22 program I come down on the 
side of caution. I believe it makes more sense at this time to continue 
to produce the program to hedge our bets against the future.
  To my knowledge there isn't a single worker in the State of Hawaii 
whose job is dependent on continuing production of the F-22, but I 
believe the program merits continued production.
  I believe it is unfortunate that the debate on this matter has taken 
on an overblown proportion. One can make the case that 187 could be 
sufficient. Our Secretary and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs agree that 
is the case. But just like the Marines argued for continuing to produce 
the V-22, the leaders of our Air National Guard and those in charge of 
flying the aircraft argue that we need more--even though the Defense 
Secretary said it should be cancelled.
  When some say well, the Air Force leaders say they have enough, I 
will remind my colleagues that the Air Force said the same thing about 
the F-117 after we only produced one squadron.
  When some say we should kill this and move on to the Joint Strike 
Fighter, I remember the Seawolf debate. We killed that submarine to 
build a cheaper alternative. Will we do the same thing here and be 
disappointed in the cost of the so-called alternative?
  On February 2, 1989, I was selected as the chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Defense of the Appropriations Committee. For the past 
20 years, it has been my distinct honor to serve either as the chairman 
or the ranking member of this subcommittee. As my colleagues all know, 
the defense subcommittee has the largest budget of any of our 
appropriations subcommittees, and to many of us it is probably the most 
important of our subcommittees. It has required a great deal of my time 
and attention over the past 20 years. For me it has been a labor of 
love. I have the greatest respect for the men and women of this Nation 
who are willing to serve and who guarantee constitutional freedoms for 
the rest of us. It has been my priority to support their cause during 
this period.
  As I consider the F-22, I do so with the past twenty years as my 
guide. In my opinion what I have learned has taught me to be cautious 
as we kill programs. Therefore today I will cast my vote to continue 
the F-22 program.
  Mrs. BOXER. Madam President, I am going to continue to support 
production of the F-22 Raptor because we are still hearing strong 
indications from top military leaders that we need additional aircraft. 
Last month, General Corley, the Commander of the Air Force Air Combat 
Command, wrote that ending procurement of the F-22 would put our 
ability to execute our nation's military strategy at ``high risk'' over 
the ``near to mid-term.''
  In addition, LTG Harry M. Wyatt III, the Director of the Air National 
Guard, has stated that these aircraft are particularly important for 
homeland defense missions, including addressing potential threats from 
cruise missiles.
  GEN Merrill McPeak, retired, the former Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force, also recently added that ending F-22 procurement ``is a real 
mistake,'' and that ``we certainly need some figure well above 200.''

[[Page 18394]]

  I am also not prepared to vote to end production because I have yet 
to see a conclusive study indicating that 187 F-22s are enough. In 
fact, as late as May 19 of this year, GEN Norman A. Schwartz, the Chief 
of Staff of the Air Force, told the House Armed Services Committee that 
``243 F-22s is the right number. . . .''
  The United States has made a significant investment in the F-22 
program. Before terminating it, we must see in unequivocal terms how 
the defense planning process has determined that requirements and 
threats have changed to stop production at 187.
  The next Quadrennial Defense Review--QDR--which outlines our national 
security strategy--is scheduled for submission by the Department of 
Defense in early 2010. This important document shapes how our military 
will respond to threats to our national security. The timing of today's 
vote ignores this review.
  I will feel more confident making a decision on this important 
program after reading the QDR, as it will shape our national security 
strategy for years to come. As GEN James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said during his confirmation hearing for 
his second 2-year term, ``The military requirement right now [for the 
F-22A] is associated with the strategy that we are laying out in the 
Quadrennial Defense Review.''
  While I realize that there are compelling arguments on both sides of 
this issue, I do not believe we have enough information at this time to 
shut down the F-22 line and terminate the program at 187 aircraft.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. How much time remains on both sides?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia has 11 minutes; the 
Senator from Michigan has 15 minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I am not sure how many other Senators 
want to speak or whether the opponents have speakers remaining on their 
side.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President, Senator Inhofe indicated a desire to 
speak. He is tied up in an EPW Committee hearing. He may be able to get 
here.
  Mr. LEVIN. We would like to be at the end of the line, Senator McCain 
and I.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. I will be happy to make some comments. Then Senator 
McCain and Senator Dodd and the Senator from Michigan could close it 
out. If Senator Inhofe comes in, we will give him a couple of minutes.
  Madam President, would the Chair notify me when I have used 5 
minutes?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will so notify.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President, I want to make a couple of quick 
comments relative to some of what has been said. First, with regard to 
Senator Wyden's comments concerning the National Guard, sure, all of us 
want to make sure we equip our Guard, our Reserve, as well as our 
active-duty force with all the needs they have. I would cite him to the 
letter of General Wyatt, who is the head of the Air Force Guard. 
General Wyatt says the F-22 is uniquely qualified to fill the needs the 
Guard has for its national security mission. To even slightly indicate 
that the Guard has issues with this program is simply not correct. The 
Guard is on record as being a strong supporter of this program.
  I have a letter from retired GEN David Bockel, retired from the 
United States Army. He now is the acting executive director of the 
Reserve Officers Association. Let me quote part of this:

       War plans of the United States are predicated upon 
     technological air dominance to provide asymmetric advantage 
     for victory. Military experts believe the current cap of 187 
     F-22s is an inadequate number of aircraft to ensure no future 
     threat can impede the U.S. air dominance. The minimum number 
     of F-22s required to ensure a strong defense is 250.

  I ask unanimous consent that the letter of retired General Bockel be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                 Reserve Officers Association,

                                    Washington, DC, July 20, 2009.
     Hon. Saxby Chambliss,
     Russell Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Chambliss: The Reserve Officers Association, 
     representing 65,000 Reserve Component members, supports 
     additional procurement of the F-22 Raptor Aircraft. ROA urges 
     Congress to authorize and appropriate funds for continued 
     production of the F-22 Raptor.
       War plans of the United States are predicated upon 
     technological air dominance to provide asymmetric advantage 
     for victory. Military experts believe the current cap of 187 
     F-22 is an inadequate number of aircraft to ensure no future 
     threat can impede U.S. air dominance. The minimum number of 
     F-22s required to ensure a strong defense is 250.
       Potential adversary nations are committed to producing 
     their own fifth-generation aircraft in the immediate future. 
     Not providing further funding for this crucial weapons system 
     places at risk our nation's ability to meet known and near 
     future threats. The United States can ill afford a fighter 
     gap or to rely on legacy aircraft.
       Thank you for your efforts on this key issue, and other 
     support to the military that you have shown in the past. 
     Please feel free to have your staff call ROA's legislative 
     director, Marshall Hanson, with any question or issue you 
     would like to discuss.
           Sincerely,

                                              David R. Bockel,

                                     Major General, USA (Retired),
                                        Acting Executive Director.

  Mr. CHAMBLISS. I also have quoted earlier the comments by an active-
duty general, a guy I consider a great American hero, not just because 
he falls in that category of wearing the uniform of the United States, 
but he is standing up to the personnel at the Pentagon. He is saying: 
You guys are wrong.
  For an active-duty general to do that takes significant courage. This 
is a guy I want in the foxhole with me. That is General Corley, 
commander of Air Combat Command, who very clearly says in a letter that 
we have previously entered into the Record that a fleet of 187 F-22s 
puts execution of our national military strategy at high risk in the 
near to midterm and that the minimum number of F-22s we need, in his 
opinion, is 381.
  I want to also talk for a minute about Senator McCain's comments on 
the cost. This is an expensive weapons system, but it is also the most 
sophisticated weapons system ever designed by mankind. Most 
importantly, it is doing its job. It is doing its job in a very 
professional way. Instead of costing the $350 million Senator McCain 
stated in his earlier statements, because of a multiyear procurement 
contract we entered into between the Pentagon and the Air Force, as 
approved by this body--and I know Senator McCain objected to that and I 
understand that--but by a vote of 70 to 28, that multiyear contract was 
approved by this body as well as by the House. As a result, instead of 
paying the $350 million per copy he alluded to, we are today, under 
that multiyear contract, paying $140 million a copy. That is in 
comparison to the $200 million a copy that will be paid for every 
single F-35 we are buying in this budget. The figure for 200 F-35s in 
this budget exceeds $6 billion.
  There are a number of people who are watching this debate out there 
today. Certainly those folks at the Pentagon are anxiously awaiting the 
results of the vote. The White House is anxiously awaiting the results 
of the vote. The Chinese are anxiously awaiting this vote. Let me tell 
colleagues why. I want to quote from an article of July 19 from a 
gentleman named Robert D. Fisher, Jr., who is a senior fellow with the 
International Assessment and Strategy Center. He writes:

       Though the Chinese government says next to nothing and the 
     U.S. Government says very little, what is known about China's 
     fifth-generation fighter program is disturbing. Both of 
     China's fighter manufacturers, the Shenyang and Chengdu 
     Aircraft corporations, are competing to build a heavy fifth-
     generation fighter, and there are serious indicators China 
     may be working on a medium-weight fifth-generation fighter 
     similar to the F-35. China can be expected to put a fifth-
     generation fighter on its future aircraft carriers, and it 
     can be expected to build more than 187.

  I ask unanimous consent that that article be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

[[Page 18395]]



               [From the Washington Times, July 19, 2009]

                        F-22 Fighters for Japan

                       (By Richard D. Fisher Jr.)

       If Japan's long-standing effort to acquire the Lockheed-
     Martin F-22 Raptor fifth-generation superfighter falls victim 
     to Washington power politics, the United States may 
     inadvertently encourage an Asian arms race over which it may 
     have little control.
       It is fortunate for the United States that in what may be 
     the last year a deal is possible, Senate Appropriations 
     Committee Chairman Daniel K. Inouye and his supporters have 
     decided to lead an effort to reverse a 1998 law barring 
     foreign sale of the F-22.
       Through Mr. Inouye's efforts Japan now knows a slightly 
     degraded export model of the Raptor may take five years to 
     develop and cost about $290 million a plane for about 40, 
     compared to the estimated $150 million the U.S. Air Force 
     pays.
       Japan's long-standing quest to obtain the F-22, however, 
     may be shot down amid the intense political struggle over the 
     F-22s very future. President Obama and Defense Secretary 
     Robert M. Gates have made termination of F-22 production at 
     187 planes a symbolic goal of their effort to cut defense 
     spending and reorient U.S. military strategy. This has been 
     challenged recently by the House Armed Services Committee, 
     which approved the production of 12 more Raptors, and a 
     Senate committee that approved production of seven more. 
     However, the administration immediately threatened a veto, 
     and the F-22's opponents are working hard to ensure that 
     production ends in 2011 as currently planned.
       After 2011, the F-22's costs will grow significantly, so 
     Japan and its U.S. supporters have little time to nail down a 
     deal. However, some U.S. officials have long doubted that 
     Japan can afford to pay for the F-22, which is why the George 
     W. Bush and Obama administrations have not seriously promoted 
     the F-22 for Japan. Mr. Gates reportedly favors selling Tokyo 
     the smaller, somewhat less capable and less expensive 
     Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lighting II.
       While Japan may also purchase the F-35, there are two 
     important reasons Washington should fully support Japan's 
     goal to acquire the F-22. First, the F-22 will be the only 
     combat aircraft capable of countering China's expected fifth-
     generation fighters. Second, selling Japan the Raptor may 
     become a critical nonnuclear means for Washington to help 
     Japan deter a China on its way to becoming a military 
     superpower by the 2020s. If Washington cannot provide 
     decisive nonnuclear means to deter China, Japan may more 
     quickly consider decisive deterrents such as missiles and 
     nuclear weapons.
       Though the Chinese government says next to nothing and the 
     U.S. government says very little, what is known about China's 
     fifth-generation fighter program is disturbing. Both of 
     China's fighter manufacturers, the Shenyang and Chengdu 
     Aircraft corporations, are competing to build a heavy fifth-
     generation fighter, and there are serious indicators China 
     may be working on a medium-weight fifth-generation fighter 
     similar to the F-35. China can be expected to put a fifth-
     generation fighter on its future aircraft carriers, and it 
     can be expected to build more than 187.
       Furthermore, China's development of anti-access 
     capabilities such as anti-ship ballistic missiles, its 
     buildup of nuclear-missile and anti-missile capabilities and 
     space-warfare weapons will increasingly undermine U.S. 
     strategic guarantees for Japan. China's development of long-
     range anti-air and surface-to-air missiles also threatens the 
     electronic support aircraft critical to the ``networked'' 
     U.S. air-warfare paradigm, meaning that jet fighters could 
     quickly lose force-multiplying radar aircraft, tankers and 
     communication satellites. As such, Japan is correct to prefer 
     the F-22, which reportedly can fly 300 to 400 mph faster and 
     two miles higher than the F-35--an aircraft optimized for 
     attack, not air-superiority missions.
       If Japan is serious about the F-22 and its military 
     security, it will have to pay for both. But if Washington is 
     serious about sustaining a strategic alliance, it should sell 
     the Raptor to Japan and be prepared to do more as China's 
     military looms larger.

  Mr. CHAMBLISS. There is another group watching very anxiously out 
there. It is a group of men and women who wear the uniform of the U.S. 
Air Force. They are lieutenants, captains, and majors. They are 
watching this anxiously because they are saying to themselves: I signed 
up to be a part of a U.S. Air Force that believes in putting men and 
women in cockpits, men and women who are going to carry the fight to 
the enemy. What am I hearing from Members of Congress? What am I 
hearing from the leadership at the Pentagon? That we are going to move 
away from the most advanced fighter in the world today and move to a 
smaller fighter? That we are going to move away from fighters maybe 
even altogether by going to UAVs? Is this the Air Force I signed up 
for?
  I can tell my colleagues why they are anxiously awaiting the outcome. 
They have talked to me time and time again about the fact that they are 
concerned about their future in the U.S. Air Force. The worst thing we 
can do is to discourage those brave men and women who want to make a 
career of the Air Force and want to be wearing the two, three, and four 
stars one of these days. I assure my colleagues those lieutenants and 
those captains and those majors are watching what this body does from a 
policy standpoint today. They know where their leadership at the 
Pentagon is coming from. They don't like what they are hearing. They 
are now looking to Congress to fulfill the role that John Hamre, the 
director of CSIS, has said time and time again, and that is to 
objectively review the budget the Pentagon sends to the hill. We are in 
the process of doing that and exercising the type of oversight we 
should exercise.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment.
  I yield 2 minutes to Senator Inhofe.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, I know almost everything that can be 
said has been said. Having served on the Armed Services Committee for 
quite some time and having watched this, what is kind of worrisome to 
me is that when we started out the F-22 program, the fifth generation 
fighter program, at that time they were talking about 750. Then the 
numbers started coming down and approached, I guess, 243. The Air Force 
officials have repeatedly stated that no fewer than that would be 
sufficient with a moderate level of risk.
  My concern has been the same concern I have when we are talking about 
ground capability, when we see countries such as China and Russia 
passing us up in areas. I will not bring up the NLOS cannon right now. 
But there are many places where our prospective enemies have better 
equipment than we do. We do know China has their J-12s; and Russia, I 
believe they are calling theirs the T-50s. We do know those are fifth-
generation fighters. It is very disturbing to me that we would consider 
stopping at this point when this is not going to be adequate to get us 
out of the medium-risk category.
  So I certainly support the effort to maintain those seven. Quite 
frankly, when Senator Chambliss offered the amendment to expand it by 
seven, I was thinking we should really be shooting for more, and I 
think he agreed with that. However, apparently with the exports out 
there and with the additional seven that were put in, in the committee, 
that would be enough to keep the line open. So I strongly support the 
effort to keep those numbers where they are.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fourteen minutes 45 seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. How much time do the opponents have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-five seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. Well, if the Senator from Arizona would go, and then 
Senator Dodd, and then myself.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President, how much time do we have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-five seconds.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, we would be glad to yield a couple more 
minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I yield 2 additional minutes to the 
Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. McCAIN. Three, four. I ask the Senator, do you want to go ahead 
now?
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I will wait a couple of minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I will be fairly brief. This argument 
has been made, and we pretty well covered most of the issue. I would 
remind my colleagues that all the things we do are a matter of choice 
because we do not

[[Page 18396]]

have unlimited amounts of funding, obviously, and if you spend money on 
one project, then obviously you may have to spend less on another. That 
is the case of the F-35, if we do not eliminate this $1.75 billion.
  But most importantly, I want to point out again, this amendment is 
more than just about a weapons system. This amendment is about whether 
we will stop doing business as usual; that is, continuing to fund 
weapons systems that are no longer needed and unnecessary. We are not 
saying the F-22 is not a good aircraft. We are saying it is time to end 
the production of the F-22.
  The President of the United States has threatened to veto this entire 
bill. That is not good for the men and women in the military to have to 
go through this whole process over again. The Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and, very 
importantly, the Secretary of Defense, who has served now under two 
Presidents and has gained the respect and appreciation of all of us for 
his service--Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Secretary of 
Defense Gates' speech last July 16 to the Economic Club of Chicago be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant 
           Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

                        Economic Club of Chicago

  (As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Chicago, IL, 
                        Thursday, July 16, 2009)

       Thank you, Secretary Daley, for that kind introduction.
       It's an honor to be at the Economic Club of Chicago. I 
     certainly appreciate the special arrangements you made to 
     have me here this afternoon.
       I thank all the distinguished citizens of this great city 
     who came here today. I am mindful I am speaking in the 
     adopted hometown of my boss. President Obama sends his 
     greetings, as do Rahm Emanuel and David Axelrod and the rest 
     of the Chicago crew. They are no doubt discovering that 
     Washington is the true ``Windy City.''
       The issue that brings me here today is central to the 
     security of all Americans: the future of the United States 
     military: How it should be organized, equipped--and funded--
     in the years ahead, to win the wars we are in while being 
     prepared for threats on or beyond the horizon. Earlier this 
     year, I recommended to President Obama--and he 
     enthusiastically agreed--that we needed to fundamentally 
     reshape the priorities of America's defense establishment and 
     reform the way the Pentagon does business--in particular, the 
     weapons we buy, and how we buy them. Above all, to prepare to 
     wage future wars, rather than continuing the habit of 
     rearming for previous ones.
       I am here on relatively short notice to speak publicly 
     about these matters because Congress is, as we speak, 
     debating the president's defense budget request for the next 
     fiscal year, a budget request that implements many needed 
     reforms and changes. Most of the proposals--especially those 
     that increase support for the troops, their families, and the 
     war effort--have been widely embraced. However, some of the 
     crucial reforms that deal with major weapons programs have 
     met with a less than enthusiastic reaction in the Congress, 
     among defense contractors, and within some quarters of the 
     Pentagon itself. And so I thought it appropriate to address 
     some of these controversial issues here--in a place that is, 
     appropriately enough not only the adopted home of our 
     Commander-in-Chief, but also a symbol of America's industrial 
     base and economic power.
       First, some context on how we got to this point. President 
     Obama's budget proposal is, I believe, the nation's first 
     truly 21st century defense budget. It explicitly recognizes 
     that over the last two decades the nature of conflict has 
     fundamentally changed--and that much of America's defense 
     establishment has yet to fully adapt to the security 
     realities of the post-Cold War era and this complex and 
     dangerous new century.
       During the 1990s, the United States celebrated the demise 
     of the Soviet Union and the so-called ``end of history'' by 
     making deep cuts in the funding for, and above all, the size 
     of the U.S. military, including a 40 percent drop in the size 
     of the Active Army. This took place even as a post-Cold War 
     world grew less stable, less predictable, and more turbulent. 
     The U.S. military, with some advances in areas such as 
     precision weaponry, essentially became a smaller version of 
     the force that held off the Soviets in Germany for decades 
     and expelled Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. There was little 
     appetite for, or interest in, preparing for what we call 
     ``irregular warfare''--campaigns against insurgents, 
     terrorists, militias, and other non-state groups. This was 
     the bipartisan reality both in the White House and in 
     Congress.
       Of course, after September 11th, some things did change. 
     The base defense budget--not counting spending for the wars--
     increased by some 70 percent over the next eight years. 
     During this period there were important changes in the way 
     U.S. forces were organized, based and deployed, and 
     investments were made in new technologies such as unmanned 
     aerial vehicles. However, when all was said and done, the way 
     the Pentagon selected, evaluated, developed, and paid for 
     major new weapons systems and equipment did not fundamentally 
     change--even after September 11th.
       Indeed, the kinds of equipment, programs, and capabilities 
     needed to protect our troops and defeat the insurgencies in 
     Iraq and Afghanistan were not the highest priority of much of 
     the Defense Department, even after several years of war.
       I learned about this lack of bureaucratic priority for the 
     wars we are in the hard way--during my first few months on 
     the job as the Iraq surge was getting underway. The 
     challenges I faced in getting what our troops needed in the 
     field stood in stark contrast to the support provided 
     conventional modernization programs--weapons designed to 
     fight other modern armies, navies, and air forces--that had 
     been in the pipeline for many years and had acquired a loyal 
     and enthusiastic following in the Pentagon, in the Congress, 
     and in industry. The most pressing needs of today's 
     warfighter--on the battlefield, in the hospital, or at home--
     simply lacked place and power at the table when priorities 
     were being set and long-term budget decisions were being 
     made.
       So the most important shift in President Obama's first 
     defense budget was to increase and institutionalize funding 
     for programs that directly support those fighting America's 
     wars and their families. Those initiatives included more 
     helicopter support, air lift, armored vehicles, personnel 
     protection equipment, and intelligence, surveillance, and 
     reconnaissance assets for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
     In addition, we also increased funding for programs that 
     provide long-term support to military families and treatment 
     for the signature wounds of this conflict--such as traumatic 
     brain injury and post traumatic stress.
       But, while the world of terrorists and other violent 
     extremists--of insurgents and IEDs--is with us for the long 
     haul, we also recognize that another world has emerged. 
     Growing numbers of countries and groups are employing the 
     latest and increasingly accessible technologies to put the 
     United States at risk in disruptive and unpredictable ways.
       Other large nations--known in Pentagon lingo as ``near-
     peers''--are modernizing their militaries in ways that could, 
     over time, pose a challenge to the United States. In some 
     cases, their programs take the form of traditional weapons 
     systems such as more advanced fighter aircraft, missiles, and 
     submarines.
       But other nations have learned from the experience of 
     Saddam Hussein's military in the first and second Gulf wars--
     that it is ill-advised, if not suicidal, to fight a 
     conventional war head-to-head against the United States: 
     fighter-to-fighter, ship-to-ship, tank-to-tank. They also 
     learned from a bankrupted Soviet Union not to try to outspend 
     us or match our overall capabilities. Instead, they are 
     developing asymmetric means that take advantage of new 
     technologies--and our vulnerabilities--to disrupt our lines 
     of communication and our freedom of movement, to deny us 
     access, and to narrow our military options and strategic 
     choices.
       At the same time, insurgents or militias are acquiring or 
     seeking precision weapons, sophisticated communications, 
     cyber capabilities, and even weapons of mass destruction. The 
     Lebanese extremist group Hezbollah currently has more rockets 
     and high-end munitions--many quite sophisticated and 
     accurate--than all but a handful of countries.
       In sum, the security challenges we now face, and will in 
     the future, have changed, and our thinking must likewise 
     change. The old paradigm of looking at potential conflict as 
     either regular or irregular war, conventional or 
     unconventional, high end or low--is no longer relevant. And 
     as a result, the Defense Department needs to think about and 
     prepare for war in a profoundly different way than what we 
     have been accustomed to throughout the better part of the 
     last century.
       What is needed is a portfolio of military capabilities with 
     maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of 
     conflict. As a result, we must change the way we think and 
     the way we plan--and fundamentally reform--the way the 
     Pentagon does business and buys weapons. It simply will not 
     do to base our strategy solely on continuing to design and 
     buy--as we have for the last 60 years--only the most 
     technologically advanced versions of weapons to keep up with 
     or stay ahead of another superpower adversary--especially one 
     that imploded nearly a generation ago.
       To get there we must break the old habit of adding layer 
     upon layer of cost, complexity, and delay to systems that are 
     so expensive and so elaborate that only a small

[[Page 18397]]

     number can be built, and that are then usable only in a 
     narrow range of low-probability scenarios.
       We must also get control of what is called ``requirements 
     creep''--where more features and capabilities are added to a 
     given piece of equipment, often to the point of absurdity. 
     The most flamboyant example of this phenomenon is the new 
     presidential helicopter-- what President Obama referred to as 
     defense procurement ``run amok.'' Once the analysis and 
     requirements were done, we ended up with a helicopter that 
     cost nearly half a billion dollars each and enabled the 
     president to, among other things, cook dinner while in flight 
     under nuclear attack.
       We also had to take a hard look at a number of weapons 
     programs that were grotesquely over budget, were having major 
     performance problems, were reliant on unproven technology, or 
     were becoming increasingly detached from real world 
     scenarios--as if September 11th and the wars that followed 
     had never happened.
       Those of you with experience in the technology or 
     manufacturing sectors have at some point probably faced some 
     combination of these challenges in your own businesses. But 
     in the defense arena, we faced an additional, usually 
     insurmountable obstacle to bring rationality to budget and 
     acquisition decisions. Major weapons programs, irrespective 
     of their problems or performance, have a habit of continuing 
     long after they are wanted or needed, recalling Ronald 
     Reagan's old joke that a government program represents the 
     closest thing we'll ever see to eternal life on this earth.
       First, there is the Congress, which is understandably 
     concerned, especially in these tough economic times, about 
     protecting jobs in certain states and congressional 
     districts. There is the defense and aerospace industry, which 
     has an obvious financial stake in the survival and growth of 
     these programs.
       And there is the institutional military itself--within the 
     Pentagon, and as expressed through an influential network of 
     retired generals and admirals, some of whom are paid 
     consultants to the defense industry, and some who often are 
     quoted as experts in the news media.
       As a result, many past attempts by my predecessors to end 
     failing or unnecessary programs went by the wayside. 
     Nonetheless I determined in a triumph of hope over 
     experience, and the president agreed, that given the urgency 
     of the wars we are in, the daunting global security 
     environment we will inhabit for decades to come, and our 
     country's economic problems, we simply cannot afford to move 
     ahead with business as usual.
       To this end, the president's budget request cut, curtailed, 
     or ended a number of conventional modernization programs--
     satellites, ground vehicles, helicopters, fighters--that were 
     either performing poorly or in excess to real-world needs. 
     Conversely, future-oriented programs where the U.S. was 
     relatively underinvested were accelerated or received more 
     funding.
       For example, we must sustain and continually improve our 
     specialized strategic deterrent to ensure that our--and our 
     allies'--security is always protected against nuclear-armed 
     adversaries. In an initiative little noticed, the President's 
     program includes money to begin a new generation of ballistic 
     missile submarines and nearly $700 million in additional 
     funds to secure and assure America's nuclear deterrent.
       Some of our proposed reforms are meeting real resistance. 
     They are called risky. Or not meeting a certain military 
     requirement. Or lacking in study and analysis. Those three 
     words--requirements, risk, and, analysis--are commonly 
     invoked in defense matters. If applied correctly, they help 
     us make sound decisions. I've found, however, that more often 
     they have become the holy trinity of the status quo or 
     business as usual.
       In truth, preparing for conflict in the 21st century means 
     investing in truly new concepts and new technologies. It 
     means taking into account all the assets and capabilities we 
     can bring to the fight. It means measuring those capabilities 
     against the real threats posed by real world adversaries with 
     real limitations, not threats conjured up from enemies with 
     unlimited time, unlimited resources, and unlimited 
     technological acumen.
       Air superiority and missile defense--two areas where the 
     budget has attracted the most criticism--provide case 
     studies. Let me start with the controversy over the F-22 
     fighter jet. We had to consider, when preparing for a future 
     potential conventional state-on-state conflict, what is the 
     right mix of the most advanced fighter aircraft and other 
     weapons to deal with the known and projected threats to U.S. 
     air supremacy? For example, we now have unmanned aerial 
     vehicles that can simultaneously perform intelligence, 
     reconnaissance, and surveillance missions as well as deliver 
     precision-guided bombs and missiles. The president's budget 
     request would buy 48 of the most advanced UAVs--aircraft that 
     have a greater range than some of our manned fighters, in 
     addition to the ability to loiter for hours over a target. 
     And we will buy many more in the future.
       We also took into consideration the capabilities of the 
     newest manned combat aircraft program, the stealth F-35 Joint 
     Strike Fighter. The F-35 is 10 to 15 years newer than the F-
     22, carries a much larger suite of weapons, and is superior 
     in a number of areas--most importantly, air-to-ground 
     missions such as destroying sophisticated enemy air defenses. 
     It is a versatile aircraft, less than half the total cost of 
     the F-22, and can be produced in quantity with all the 
     advantages produced by economies of scale--some 500 will be 
     bought over the next five years, more than 2,400 over the 
     life of the program. And we already have eight foreign 
     development partners. It has had development problems to be 
     sure, as has every advanced military aircraft ever fielded. 
     But if properly supported, the F-35 will be the backbone of 
     America's tactical aviation fleet for decades to come if--and 
     it is a big if--money is not drained away to spend on other 
     aircraft that our military leadership considers of lower 
     priority or excess to our needs.
       Having said that, the F-22 is clearly a capability we do 
     need--a niche, silver-bullet solution for one or two 
     potential scenarios--specifically the defeat of a highly 
     advanced enemy fighter fleet. The F-22, to be blunt, does not 
     make much sense anyplace else in the spectrum of conflict. 
     Nonetheless, supporters of the F-22 lately have promoted its 
     use for an ever expanding list of potential missions. These 
     range from protecting the homeland from seaborne cruise 
     missiles to, as one retired general recommended on TV, using 
     F-22s to go after Somali pirates who in many cases are 
     teenagers with AK-47s--a job we already know is better done 
     at much less cost by three Navy SEALs. These are examples of 
     how far-fetched some of the arguments have become for a 
     program that has cost $65 billion--and counting--to produce 
     187 aircraft, not to mention the thousands of uniformed Air 
     Force positions that were sacrificed to help pay for it.
       In light of all these factors, and with the support of the 
     Air Force leadership, I concluded that 183--the program of 
     record since 2005, plus four more added in the FY 09 
     supplemental--was a sufficient number of F-22s and 
     recommended as such to the president.
       The reaction from parts of Washington has been predictable 
     for many of the reasons I described before. The most 
     substantive criticism is that completing the F-22 program 
     means we are risking the future of U.S. air supremacy. To 
     assess this risk, it is worth looking at real-world potential 
     threat and assessing the capabilities that other countries 
     have now or in the pipeline.
       Consider that by 2020, the United States is projected to 
     have nearly 2,500 manned combat aircraft of all kinds. Of 
     those, nearly 1,100 will be the most advanced fifth 
     generation F-35s and F-22s. China, by contrast, is projected 
     to have no fifth generation aircraft by 2020. And by 2025, 
     the gap only widens. The U.S. will have approximately 1,700 
     of the most advanced fifth generation fighters versus a 
     handful of comparable aircraft for the Chinese. Nonetheless, 
     some portray this scenario as a dire threat to America's 
     national security.
       Correspondingly, the recent tests of a possible nuclear 
     device and ballistic missiles by North Korea brought scrutiny 
     to the changes in this budget that relate to missile defense. 
     The risk to national security has again been invoked, mainly 
     because the total missile defense budget was reduced from 
     last year.
       In fact, where the threat is real or growing--from rogue 
     states or from short-to-medium range missiles that can hit 
     our deployed troops or our allies and friends--this budget 
     sustains or increases funding. Most of the cuts in this area 
     come from two programs that are designed to shoot down enemy 
     missiles immediately after launch. This was a great idea, but 
     the aspiration was overwhelmed by the escalating costs, 
     operational problems, and technological challenges.
       Consider the example of one of those programs--the Airborne 
     Laser. This was supposed to put high-powered lasers on a 
     fleet of 747s. After more than a decade of research and 
     development, we have yet to achieve a laser with enough power 
     to knock down a missile in boost phase more than 50 miles 
     from the launch pad--thus requiring these huge planes to 
     loiter deep in enemy air space to have a feasible chance at a 
     direct hit. Moreover, the 10 to 20 aircraft needed would cost 
     about $1.5 billion each plus tens of millions of dollars each 
     year for maintenance and operating costs. The program and 
     operating concept were fatally flawed and it was time to face 
     reality. So we curtailed the existing program while keeping 
     the prototype aircraft for research and development.
       Many of these decisions--like the one I just described--
     were more clear-cut than others. But all of them, insofar as 
     they involved hundreds of billions of dollars and the 
     security of the American people, were treated with the utmost 
     seriousness by the senior civilian and military leadership of 
     the Pentagon. An enormous amount of thought, study, 
     assessment, and analysis underpins these budget 
     recommendations including the National Defense Strategy I 
     issued last summer.
       Some have called for yet more analysis before making any of 
     the decisions in this budget. But when dealing with programs 
     that were clearly out of control, performing poorly, and 
     excess to the military's real requirements, we did not need 
     more study,

[[Page 18398]]

     more debate, or more delay--in effect, paralysis through 
     analysis. What was needed were three things--common sense, 
     political will, and tough decisions. Qualities too often in 
     short supply in Washington, D.C.
       All of these decisions involved considering trade-offs, 
     balancing risks, and setting priorities--separating nice-to-
     haves from have-to-haves, requirements from appetites. We 
     cannot expect to eliminate risk and danger by simply spending 
     more--especially if we're spending on the wrong things. But 
     more to the point, we all--the military, the Congress, and 
     industry--have to face some iron fiscal realities.
       The last defense budget submitted by President George W. 
     Bush for Fiscal Year 2009 was $515 billion. In that budget 
     the Bush administration proposed--at my recommendation--a 
     Fiscal Year 2010 defense budget of $524 billion. The budget 
     just submitted by President Obama for FY 2010 was $534 
     billion. Even after factoring inflation, and some of the war 
     costs that were moved from supplemental appropriations, 
     President Obama's defense request represents a modest but 
     real increase over the last Bush budget. I know. I submitted 
     them both. In total, by one estimate, our budget adds up to 
     about what the entire rest of the world combined spends on 
     defense. Only in the parallel universe that is Washington, 
     D.C., would that be considered ``gutting'' defense.
       The fact is that if the defense budget had been even 
     higher, my recommendations to the president with respect to 
     troubled programs would have been the same--for all the 
     reasons I described earlier. There is a more fundamental 
     point: If the Department of Defense can't figure out a way to 
     defend the United States on a budget of more than half a 
     trillion dollars a year, then our problems are much bigger 
     than anything that can be cured by buying a few more ships 
     and planes.
       What is important is to have a budget baseline with a 
     steady, sustainable, and predictable rate of growth that 
     avoids extreme peaks and valleys that are enormously harmful 
     to sound budgeting. From the very first defense budget I 
     submitted for President Bush in January 2007, I have warned 
     against doing what America has done multiple times over the 
     last 90 years by slashing defense spending after a major 
     conflict. The war in Iraq is winding down, and one day so too 
     will the conflict in Afghanistan. When that day comes, the 
     nation will again face pressure to cut back on defense 
     spending, as we always have. It is simply the nature of the 
     beast. And the higher our base budget is now, the harder it 
     will be to sustain these necessary programs, and the more 
     drastic and dangerous the drop-off will be later.
       So where do we go from here? Authorization for more F-22s 
     is in both versions of the defense bill working its way 
     through the Congress. The president has indicated that he has 
     real red lines in this budget, including the F-22. Some might 
     ask: Why threaten a veto and risk a confrontation over a 
     couple billion dollars for a dozen or so planes?
       The grim reality is that with regard to the budget we have 
     entered a zero-sum game. Every defense dollar diverted to 
     fund excess or unneeded capacity--whether for more F-22s or 
     anything else--is a dollar that will be unavailable to take 
     care of our people, to win the wars we are in, to deter 
     potential adversaries, and to improve capabilities in areas 
     where America is underinvested and potentially vulnerable. 
     That is a risk I cannot accept and I will not take.
       And, with regard to something like the F-22, irrespective 
     of whether the number of aircraft at issue is 12 planes or 
     200, if we can't bring ourselves to make this tough but 
     straightforward decision--reflecting the judgment of two very 
     different presidents, two different secretaries of defense, 
     two chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff, and the current 
     Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff, where do we draw the 
     line? And if not now, when? If we can't get this right--what 
     on earth can we get right? It is time to draw the line on 
     doing Defense business as usual. The President has drawn that 
     line. And that red line is a veto. And it is real.
       On a personal note, I joined CIA more than 40 years ago to 
     help protect my country. For just about my entire 
     professional career in government I have generally been known 
     as a hawk on national security. One criticism of me when I 
     was at CIA was that I overestimated threats to the security 
     of our country.
       Well, I haven't changed. I did not molt from a hawk into a 
     dove on January 20, 2009. I continue to believe, as I always 
     have, that the world is, and always will be, a dangerous and 
     hostile place for my country with many who would do America 
     harm and who hate everything we are and stand for. But, the 
     nature of the threats to us has changed. And so too should 
     the way our military is organized and equipped to meet them.
       I believe--along with the senior military leadership of 
     this nation--that the defense budget we proposed to President 
     Obama and that he sent to Congress is the best we could 
     design to protect the United States now and in the future. 
     The best we could do to protect our men and women in uniform, 
     to give them the tools they need to deter our enemies, and to 
     win our wars today and tomorrow. We stand by this reform 
     budget, and we are prepared to fight for it.
       A final thought. I arrived in Washington 43 years ago this 
     summer. Of all people, I am well aware of the realities of 
     Washington and know that things do not change overnight. 
     After all, the influence of politics and parochial interests 
     in defense matters is as old as the Republic itself. Henry 
     Knox, the first secretary of war, was charged with building 
     the first American fleet. To get the support of Congress, 
     Knox eventually ended up with six frigates being built in six 
     different shipyards in six different states.
       But the stakes today are very high--with the nation at war, 
     and a security landscape steadily growing more dangerous and 
     unpredictable. I am deeply concerned about the long-term 
     challenges facing our defense establishment--and just as 
     concerned that the political state of play does not reflect 
     the reality that major reforms are needed, or that tough 
     choices and real discipline are necessary.
       We stand at a crossroads. We simply cannot risk continuing 
     down the same path--where our spending and program priorities 
     are increasingly divorced from the very real threats of today 
     and the growing ones of tomorrow. These threats demand that 
     all of our nation's leaders rise above the politics and 
     parochialism that have too often plagued considerations of 
     our nation's defense--from industry to interest groups, from 
     the Pentagon to Foggy Bottom, from one end of Pennsylvania 
     Avenue to the other. The time has come to draw a line and 
     take a stand against the business-as-usual approach to 
     national defense. We must all fulfill our obligation to the 
     American people to ensure that our country remains safe and 
     strong. Just as our men and women in uniform are doing their 
     duty to this end, we in Washington must now do ours.

  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I am a student of history, and there is 
one particular President whom I have grown, along with historians, to 
appreciate more and more for his two terms as President of the United 
States; that is, Dwight David Eisenhower. We were at peace during 
President Eisenhower's term, and many believe that perhaps the war in 
Vietnam might have been avoided if we had heeded his wise counsel. 
There are many things President Eisenhower did to contribute to this 
Nation both in war and in peace.
  On several occasions, I have reread his farewell speech of January 
17, 1961. In his speech, President Eisenhower said:

       In the councils of government, we must guard against the 
     acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or 
     unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential 
     for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will 
     persist. We must never let the weight of this combination 
     endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should 
     take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable 
     citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge 
     industrial and military machinery of defense with our 
     peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may 
     prosper together.

  He also said:

       To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much 
     the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather 
     those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and 
     without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex 
     struggle with liberty at stake.

  I would only add to President Eisenhower's farewell address to the 
Nation--which is compelling in many ways--that the words should be 
changed from ``military-industrial complex'' to ``military-industrial-
congressional complex.''
  What we are seeing here, with the advice and counsel of our 
President, of our Secretary of Defense, of our uniformed military, with 
rare exception, is a recommendation that we stop with this aircraft and 
build another--not that we stop building fighter aircraft for our 
inventory, not that we stop defending this Nation with weapons systems 
we need. We are even defending a weapons system's continued production 
that has never flown in the two wars in which we are engaged.
  So I urge my colleagues to understand the impact of this amendment. 
If we are able to succeed, it is going to send a signal that we are 
stopping business as usual, and we must move forward providing the men 
and women with the necessary means to win the struggles we are in 
throughout the world, especially two wars. So I urge my colleagues to 
understand that sacrifices will be made. Jobs will be lost. It will 
cause disruption in some communities. But our first obligation is the 
defense of this Nation and the use of scarce defense dollars in the 
most effective fashion.
  I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of this amendment.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.

[[Page 18399]]


  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I have 2 minutes; is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Correct.
  The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, first of all, let me begin where I did a 
few moments ago; that is, with my great respect for Carl Levin and John 
McCain and for their work in this area.
  Let me begin with a point my friend from Arizona has made. There is 
nothing more important than the national security of our Nation. It is 
that very argument which brings those of us on this side of the table 
in support of this program and in opposition to this amendment.
  This program is a critically important program to maintain 
superiority--not parity but superiority--which has always been our goal 
in protecting our national security interests. It was the very Pentagon 
itself which advocated we move forward with this program only 36 months 
ago. Obviously, people can change their minds. But over the months, 
when they were preparing for the needs of our Nation, it was the 
Commission on the Future of Aerospace, authorized by this Congress, 
which concluded the following. They said that ``the Nation immediately 
reverse the decline in and promote the growth of a scientifically and 
technologically trained U.S. aerospace workforce,'' adding that ``the 
breakdown of America's intellectual and industrial capacity is a threat 
to national security and our capability to continue as a world 
leader.''
  It was the Pentagon, only 36 months ago in their Quadrennial Review, 
that said the following--and they said in this report--that: The F-22 
production should be extended through fiscal year 2010 with a multiyear 
acquisition contract to ensure the Department does not have a gap in 
fifth-generation stealth capabilities.
  There are reports that the F-35 could be delayed an additional 11 
months--what we have already heard about. That creates a gap of 5 years 
that we are talking about. The danger of losing not just any jobs, 
anywhere from 25,000 to 90,000 aerospace workers is not insignificant.
  Four days ago, we were warned there has been in excess of a 15-
percent decline in our industrial capacity in the aerospace industry. 
This will hit us even further. The ability to have a workforce capable 
of building these aircraft we need in the 21st century is at risk. That 
is why the issue not only of the technical capability of the aircraft 
but the workforce to produce it is at stake with this amendment. And I 
say that respectfully. But we have this gap in production, which we 
have been warned about now by the Pentagon--not by the industry itself, 
by the Pentagon, by the very Commission this Congress authorized to 
determine what our capacities were and the industrial capacity in 
aerospace. We are defying both reports and both recommendations by 
canceling this program at this number and placing at risk the future 
generation of superior aircraft that we need in the 21st century.
  So again, Madam President, I urge my colleagues, respectfully, to 
reject this amendment. There is a compromise, in my view, available to 
end up with a number far less than the originally projected numbers. 
But to cancel the program prematurely and create the gap in our 
production capabilities is a great danger for our Nation, not to 
mention these jobs which are critically important to our Nation and its 
future.
  For those reasons, I urge the rejection of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Five minutes 45 seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from 
Delaware.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. CARPER. Madam President, I commend the leaders of the committee. 
I also commend Senator Chambliss and Senator Dodd for their Herculean 
efforts here to try to stave off the closure of the line. I try to put 
myself in the shoes of others when I take a position on an issue. What 
I say comes from the heart and not because of a lack of respect for the 
efforts they have shown in support of their constituents.
  We have just come out of 8 years where we have seen our national debt 
double. We have incurred as much new debt for our country over the last 
8 years as we did in the previous 208 years. We are looking, this year, 
at a 1-year deficit higher than any in the history of our country. It 
is believed to be well over $1 trillion.
  If you go back to 2001 and look at the cost overruns for major 
weapons systems, in 2001 it was about $45 billion. Last year, that 
number had grown to almost $300 billion. We say to our folks who are 
running the Pentagon, the Department of Defense: Tell us which weapons 
systems you need and those you do not. And Secretary Gates has said 
very clearly, as Gordon England did as well, his deputy, and the last 
President and this President: We do not need more F-22s. We have F-15s. 
We have F-16s. We have F-18s. Before too many more years, we will have 
about 2,500 F-35s.
  My hope is we will be smart enough--if people are displaced, if the 
F-22 is not continued in production--my hope is we will be smart 
enough, since Lockheed has a role in building the F-35, some of the 
folks--hands that can build an F-22 can certainly help build F-35s. I 
would hope that would be the case.
  The last thing I would ask everyone to keep in mind--as an old naval 
flight officer, I used to think about and I still think about how much 
it costs to fly an aircraft for an hour. It is anywhere from $20,000 to 
$40,000 for the F-22. It is just too much money.
  Thanks very much.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, in terms of the alleged gap, there is no 
gap. The QDR said we should be building fighters, F-22 production, into 
fiscal year 2010. As a matter of fact, what we are now doing is 
exceeding that production with F-35s. We have 30 F-35s in this fiscal 
year 2010 budget. There is no gap in fighter production.
  As to whether the F-35 is a capable fighter, let me just read from 
what Secretary Gates says:

       The F-35 is 10 to 15 years newer than the F-22, carries a 
     much larger suite of weapons, and is superior in a number of 
     areas--most importantly, air-to-ground missions such as 
     destroying sophisticated enemy air defenses. It is a 
     versatile aircraft, less than half the total cost of the F-
     22. . . .

  The F-22 is costing an awful lot more than has been represented here 
because they are asking now, if this amendment is defeated, that we 
would be spending $1.75 billion for seven F-22s, which is approximately 
$250 million a copy for the ones the opponents of this amendment want 
to build this year.
  The President of the United States, the last President of the United 
States, the previous one; two Secretaries of Defense, this one and the 
previous one; two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 
Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force say 
it is time to end production of the F-22 to move into greater 
production of the F-35 which will serve three services, not just one. 
If not now, when? If not now, when? When will we end production of a 
weapons system, if not now, when we have both President Obama and 
President Bush trying to end it, Secretaries of Defense trying to end 
it, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs trying to end the production of the F-
22? We must now do what is sensible, that which is requested by 
Secretary Gates, not because he is saluting the Commander in Chief, as 
has been suggested. He is not just saluting the Commander in Chief; he 
feels deep in his gut that we must change the way we do business. We 
must finally bring some of these systems to an end. That is why 
Secretary Gates so passionately believes we must bring production of 
the F-22 to an end and move into greater production of the F-35--more 
F-35s produced in this budget than would be produced of the F-22 if 
this amendment is defeated.
  Madam President, I don't know if there is any more time. If there is, 
I yield back the remainder of my time, and I ask for the yeas and nays.

[[Page 18400]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be.
  The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 1469.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Kennedy) and the Senator from Maryland (Ms. Mikulski) are necessarily 
absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 58, nays 40, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 235 Leg.]

                                YEAS--58

     Alexander
     Barrasso
     Bayh
     Bennet
     Bond
     Brown
     Burris
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Coburn
     Conrad
     Corker
     DeMint
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Franken
     Gillibrand
     Graham
     Gregg
     Hagan
     Harkin
     Johnson
     Kaufman
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     McCain
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Nelson (NE)
     Nelson (FL)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Shelby
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Udall (CO)
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse
     Wyden

                                NAYS--40

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Begich
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burr
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Chambliss
     Cochran
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Crapo
     Dodd
     Feinstein
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Johanns
     Lieberman
     Martinez
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Risch
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Shaheen
     Snowe
     Tester
     Thune
     Udall (NM)
     Vitter
     Wicker

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Kennedy
     Mikulski
       
  The amendment (No. 1469) was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. DURBIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

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