[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 13]
[House]
[Pages 18221-18223]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




  CONDEMNING THE ATTACK ON THE AMIA JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER IN BUENOS 
                            AIRES, ARGENTINA

  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs be discharged from further consideration of the 
concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 156) condemning the attack on the 
AMIA Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in July 1994, 
and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the 
House.
  The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The text of the concurrent resolution is as follows:

                            H. Con. Res. 156

       Whereas, on July 18, 1994, 85 people were killed and 300 
     were wounded when the Argentine Jewish Mutual Association 
     (AMIA) was bombed in Buenos Aires, Argentina;
       Whereas extensive evidence links the planning of the 
     attacks to the Government of Iran, and the execution of the 
     attacks to Hezbollah, which is based in Lebanon, supported by 
     Syria, sponsored by Iran, and designated by the Department of 
     State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization;
       Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of 
     Argentina, an office created by the Government of Argentina, 
     concluded that the AMIA bombing was ``decided and organized 
     by the highest leaders of the former government of . . . 
     Iran, whom, at the same time, entrusted its execution to the 
     Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah'';
       Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of 
     Argentina concluded that the AMIA bombing had been approved 
     in advance by Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i, Iran's 
     then-leader Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's then-Foreign 
     Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and Iran's then-Minister of 
     Security and Intelligence Ali Fallahijan;
       Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of 
     Argentina stated that the Government of Iran uses ``terrorism 
     as a mechanism of its foreign policy'' in support of ``its 
     final aim [which] is to export its radicalized vision of 
     Islam and to eliminate the enemies of the regime'';
       Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of 
     Argentina identified Ibrahim Hussein Berro, a Lebanese 
     citizen and member of Hezbollah, as the suicide bomber who 
     primarily carried out the attack on the AMIA;
       Whereas, on November 9, 2006, Argentine Judge Rodolfo 
     Canicoba Corral, pursuant to the request of the State 
     Prosecutor of Argentina, issued an arrest warrant for Ali 
     Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former leader of Iran and the 
     current chairman of Iran's Assembly of Experts and of Iran's 
     Expediency Council, for his involvement in the AMIA bombing 
     and urged the International Criminal Police Organization 
     (INTERPOL) to issue an international arrest warrant for 
     Rafsanjani and detain him;
       Whereas, on November 9, 2006, Argentine Judge Rodolfo 
     Canicoba Corral, pursuant to the request of the State 
     Prosecutor of Argentina, also issued arrest warrants for Ali 
     Fallahijan, a former Iranian Minister of Security and 
     Intelligence, Ali Akbar Velayati, a former Iranian Foreign 
     Minister, Mohsen Rezaei, a former commander of Iran's Islamic 
     Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Ahmad Vahidi, a former 
     commander of the elite Al-Quds Force of the IRGC, Hadi 
     Soleimanpour, a former Iranian ambassador to Argentina, 
     Mohsen Rabbani, a former cultural attache at the Iranian 
     Embassy in Buenos Aires, Ahmad Reza Asghari, a former 
     official at the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires, and Imad 
     Moughnieh, a leading operations chief of Hezbollah;
       Whereas, on March 5, 2007, the Executive Committee of 
     INTERPOL unanimously supported the issuance of Red Notices 
     for Hezbollah operative Imad Moughnieh and for Iranian 
     officials Ali Fallahijan, Mohsen Rezaei, Ahmad Vahidi, Mohsen 
     Rabbani, and Ahmad Reza Asgari, thereby allowing arrest 
     warrants for those individuals to be circulated worldwide 
     with an eye to their arrest and extradition;
       Whereas, on November 7, 2007, the General Assembly of 
     INTERPOL upheld the Executive Committee's decision to support 
     the issuance of six Red Notices in connection to the AMIA 
     case;
       Whereas, on February 12, 2008, Hezbollah operative Imad 
     Moughnieh reportedly was killed in Syria;
       Whereas in June of 2008, the Government of Saudi Arabia 
     hosted an international Muslim conference that was reportedly 
     attended by Iranian officials Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
     against whom an Argentine arrest warrant has been issued, and 
     Mohsen Rezaei, against whom both an Argentine arrest warrant 
     and INTERPOL Red Notice have been issued;
       Whereas the Government of Saudi Arabia reportedly made no 
     attempt to detain or arrest Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani or 
     Mohsen Rezaei during their time in Saudi Arabia, and the two 
     departed Saudi Arabia without incident;
       Whereas, on May 22, 2008, Argentine prosecutor Alberto 
     Nisman filed a request with Argentine Judge Ariel Lijo for 
     the arrest of Carlos Saul Menem, who was president of 
     Argentina at the time of the AMIA bombing, and four other 
     former Argentine high officials in connection with the AMIA 
     case;
       Whereas Mr. Nisman claimed in his request for an arrest 
     warrant that Menem and the other four officials had attempted 
     to cover up the involvement of a Syrian-Argentine 
     businessman, Alberto Jacinto Kanoore Edul, in the AMIA 
     bombing;
       Whereas Argentine investigators have stated that prior to 
     the AMIA bombing, Mr. Kanoore Edul was in contact with at 
     least two men who have been identified as suspects in the 
     AMIA case;

[[Page 18222]]

       Whereas Mr. Nisman stated in an article published on May 
     29, 2008, that his request for arrest warrants against 
     Argentine nationals in the AMIA case ``does absolutely not 
     change the accusations against Hezbollah and Iran . . . To a 
     certain degree, it reinforces them, because [suspect Alberto 
     Jacinto] Kanoore Edul has many links with Islamist 
     extremists'';
       Whereas, on December 16, 2008, at the AMIA Special 
     Prosecutor's request, the presiding Argentine judge in a 
     civil suit against the Iranian suspects and Hezbollah ordered 
     the attachment of six commercial properties in Argentina 
     allegedly owned by former Iran cultural attache and named 
     suspect Mohsen Rabbani;
       Whereas in December of 2008, the judge also requested that 
     select European governments freeze up to $1 million in bank 
     accounts allegedly belonging to former Iranian leader Ali 
     Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and another Iranian accused of 
     involvement in the attacks;
       Whereas between October of 2008 and March of 2009, nearly a 
     dozen Iranian properties have reportedly been seized in the 
     Buenos Aires area in connection with a civil suit presented 
     by an unnamed survivor of the AMIA bombing;
       Whereas in May of 2009, former IRGC commander Mohsen 
     Rezaei, against whom both an Argentine arrest warrant and an 
     INTERPOL Red Notice have been issued, announced his intention 
     to seek the leadership of Iran;
       Whereas in May 2009, Argentina issued an international 
     arrest warrant for Samuel Salman El Reda, a Colombian citizen 
     of Lebanese descent who Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman 
     believes was the top local connection in the AMIA attack;
       Whereas Mr. Nisman believes El Reda had connections to 
     Hezbollah and the Tri-Border area, a zone between Argentina, 
     Paraguay, and Brazil suspected of being a haven for Islamic 
     radical groups;
       Whereas during the past several years, the Government of 
     Argentina has made significant advances in the AMIA 
     investigation and other counter-terrorism efforts;
       Whereas the issuance of an Argentine arrest warrant for an 
     attache of the Iranian Embassy in Argentina in connection 
     with the AMIA case, indicates that Iran has used its 
     embassies abroad as tools and extensions of radical Islamist 
     goals and attacks;
       Whereas according to news reports published in June of 
     2008, intelligence agencies in the United States and Canada 
     have warned of significant evidence that Hezbollah, with the 
     support of the Government of Iran, plans to launch a major 
     attack against ``Jewish targets'' outside the Middle East, 
     and that possible targeted areas include Canada and Latin 
     America;
       Whereas, on January 27, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert 
     Gates said, ``I'm concerned about the level of . . . 
     subversive activity that the Iranians are carrying on in a 
     number of places in Latin America . . . They're opening a lot 
     of offices and a lot of fronts, behind which they interfere 
     in what is going on in some of these countries.''; and
       Whereas, on March 17, 2009, Navy Admiral James Stavridis, 
     Commander, United States Southern Command, indicated that he 
     shared Secretary Gates's concern, explaining ``We have seen . 
     . . an increase in a wide level of activity by the Iranian 
     government in this region . . . That is a concern principally 
     because of the connections between the government of Iran, 
     which is a state sponsor of terrorism, and Hezbollah'': Now, 
     therefore, be it
       Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
     concurring), That Congress--
       (1) reiterates its strongest condemnation of the 1994 
     attack on the Argentine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) 
     Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, honors 
     the victims of this attack, and expresses its sympathy to the 
     relatives of the victims;
       (2) applauds the Government of Argentina for its ongoing 
     efforts in the AMIA bombing investigation;
       (3) urges the Government of Argentina to continue to 
     dedicate and provide the resources necessary for its judicial 
     system and intelligence agencies to investigate all areas of 
     the AMIA case and to prosecute those responsible;
       (4) expresses grave concern regarding the Government of 
     Saudi Arabia's failure, when given the opportunity, to detain 
     Iranian officials against whom Argentine arrest warrants or 
     INTERPOL Red Notices are pending in connection with the AMIA 
     case;
       (5) urges all responsible nations to cooperate fully with 
     the AMIA investigation, including by making information, 
     witnesses, and suspects available for review and questioning 
     by the appropriate Argentine authorities, and by detaining 
     and extraditing to Argentina, if given the opportunity, any 
     persons against whom Argentine arrest warrants or INTERPOL 
     Red Notices are pending in connection with the AMIA case, 
     including Iranian officials and former officials, Hezbollah 
     operatives, and Islamist militants;
       (6) encourages the President to direct United States law 
     enforcement agencies to provide support and cooperation to 
     the Government of Argentina, if requested, for the purposes 
     of deepening and expanding the investigation into the AMIA 
     bombing; and
       (7) urges governments in the Western Hemisphere, who have 
     not done so already, to draft, adopt, and implement 
     legislation designating Hezbollah as a terrorist 
     organization, banning fundraising and recruitment activities, 
     and applying the harshest penalties on those providing 
     support for activities involving Hezbollah and other such 
     extremist groups.

  The concurrent resolution was agreed to.


            Amendment to the preamble Offered by Mr. Berman

  Mr. BERMAN. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Berman:
       Amend the preamble to read as follows:
       Whereas, on July 18, 1994, 85 people were killed and 300 
     were wounded when the Argentine Jewish Mutual Association 
     (AMIA) was bombed in Buenos Aires, Argentina;
       Whereas extensive evidence links the planning of the 
     attacks to the Government of Iran, and the execution of the 
     attacks to Hezbollah, which is based in Lebanon, supported by 
     Syria, sponsored by Iran, and designated by the Department of 
     State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization;
       Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of 
     Argentina, an office created by the Government of Argentina, 
     concluded that the AMIA bombing was ``decided and organized 
     by the highest leaders of the former government of . . . 
     Iran, whom, at the same time, entrusted its execution to the 
     Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah'';
       Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of 
     Argentina concluded that the AMIA bombing had been approved 
     in advance by Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i, Iran's 
     then-leader Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's then-Foreign 
     Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and Iran's then-Minister of 
     Security and Intelligence Ali Fallahijan;
       Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of 
     Argentina stated that the Government of Iran uses ``terrorism 
     as a mechanism of its foreign policy'' in support of ``its 
     final aim [which] is to export its radicalized vision of 
     Islam and to eliminate the enemies of the regime'';
       Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of 
     Argentina identified Ibrahim Hussein Berro, a Lebanese 
     citizen and member of Hezbollah, as the suicide bomber who 
     primarily carried out the attack on the AMIA;
       Whereas, on November 9, 2006, Argentine Judge Rodolfo 
     Canicoba Corral, pursuant to the request of the State 
     Prosecutor of Argentina, issued an arrest warrant for Ali 
     Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former leader of Iran and the 
     current chairman of Iran's Assembly of Experts and of Iran's 
     Expediency Council, for his involvement in the AMIA bombing 
     and urged the International Criminal Police Organization 
     (INTERPOL) to issue an international arrest warrant for 
     Rafsanjani and detain him;
       Whereas, on November 9, 2006, Argentine Judge Rodolfo 
     Canicoba Corral, pursuant to the request of the State 
     Prosecutor of Argentina, also issued arrest warrants for Ali 
     Fallahijan, a former Iranian Minister of Security and 
     Intelligence, Ali Akbar Velayati, a former Iranian Foreign 
     Minister, Mohsen Rezaei, a former commander of Iran's Islamic 
     Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Ahmad Vahidi, a former 
     commander of the elite Al-Quds Force of the IRGC, Hadi 
     Soleimanpour, a former Iranian ambassador to Argentina, 
     Mohsen Rabbani, a former cultural attache at the Iranian 
     Embassy in Buenos Aires, Ahmad Reza Asghari, a former 
     official at the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires, and Imad 
     Moughnieh, a leading operations chief of Hezbollah;
       Whereas, on March 5, 2007, the Executive Committee of 
     INTERPOL unanimously supported the issuance of Red Notices 
     for Hezbollah operative Imad Moughnieh and for Iranian 
     officials Ali Fallahijan, Mohsen Rezaei, Ahmad Vahidi, Mohsen 
     Rabbani, and Ahmad Reza Asgari, thereby allowing arrest 
     warrants for those individuals to be circulated worldwide 
     with an eye to their arrest and extradition;
       Whereas, on November 7, 2007, the General Assembly of 
     INTERPOL upheld the Executive Committee's decision to support 
     the issuance of six Red Notices in connection to the AMIA 
     case;
       Whereas, on February 12, 2008, Hezbollah operative Imad 
     Moughnieh reportedly was killed in Syria;
       Whereas in June of 2008, the Government of Saudi Arabia 
     hosted an international Muslim conference that was reportedly 
     attended by Iranian officials Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
     against whom an Argentine arrest warrant has been issued, and 
     Mohsen Rezaei, against whom both an Argentine arrest warrant 
     and INTERPOL Red Notice have been issued;
       Whereas the Government of Saudi Arabia reportedly made no 
     attempt to detain or arrest Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani or 
     Mohsen Rezaei during their time in Saudi Arabia, and the two 
     departed Saudi Arabia without incident;
       Whereas, on May 22, 2008, Argentine prosecutor Alberto 
     Nisman filed a request with Argentine Judge Ariel Lijo for 
     the arrest of

[[Page 18223]]

     Carlos Saul Menem, who was president of Argentina at the time 
     of the AMIA bombing, and four other former Argentine high 
     officials in connection with the AMIA case;
       Whereas Mr. Nisman claimed in his request for an arrest 
     warrant that Menem and the other four officials had attempted 
     to cover up the involvement of a Syrian-Argentine 
     businessman, Alberto Jacinto Kanoore Edul, in the AMIA 
     bombing;
       Whereas Argentine investigators have stated that prior to 
     the AMIA bombing, Mr. Kanoore Edul was in contact with at 
     least two men who have been identified as suspects in the 
     AMIA case;
       Whereas, on December 16, 2008, at the AMIA Special 
     Prosecutor's request, the presiding Argentine judge in a 
     civil suit against the Iranian suspects and Hezbollah ordered 
     the attachment of six commercial properties in Argentina 
     allegedly owned by former Iran cultural attache and named 
     suspect Mohsen Rabbani;
       Whereas in December of 2008, the judge also requested that 
     select European governments freeze up to $1 million in bank 
     accounts allegedly belonging to former Iranian leader Ali 
     Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and another Iranian accused of 
     involvement in the attacks;
       Whereas between October of 2008 and March of 2009, nearly a 
     dozen Iranian properties have reportedly been seized in the 
     Buenos Aires area in connection with a civil suit presented 
     by an unnamed survivor of the AMIA bombing;
       Whereas in May of 2009, former IRGC commander Mohsen 
     Rezaei, against whom both an Argentine arrest warrant and an 
     INTERPOL Red Notice have been issued, announced his intention 
     to seek the leadership of Iran;
       Whereas in May 2009, Argentina issued an international 
     arrest warrant for Samuel Salman El Reda, a Colombian citizen 
     of Lebanese descent who Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman 
     believes was the top local connection in the AMIA attack;
       Whereas Mr. Nisman believes El Reda had connections to 
     Hezbollah and the Tri-Border area, a zone between Argentina, 
     Paraguay, and Brazil suspected of being a haven for Islamic 
     radical groups;
       Whereas during the past several years, the Government of 
     Argentina has made significant advances in the AMIA 
     investigation and other counter-terrorism efforts;
       Whereas the issuance of an Argentine arrest warrant for an 
     attache of the Iranian Embassy in Argentina in connection 
     with the AMIA case, indicates that Iran has used its 
     embassies abroad as tools and extensions of radical Islamist 
     goals and attacks;
       Whereas, on January 27, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert 
     Gates said, ``I'm concerned about the level of . . . 
     subversive activity that the Iranians are carrying on in a 
     number of places in Latin America . . . They're opening a lot 
     of offices and a lot of fronts, behind which they interfere 
     in what is going on in some of these countries.''; and
       Whereas, on March 17, 2009, Navy Admiral James Stavridis, 
     Commander, United States Southern Command, indicated that he 
     shared Secretary Gates's concern, explaining ``We have seen . 
     . . an increase in a wide level of activity by the Iranian 
     government in this region . . . That is a concern principally 
     because of the connections between the government of Iran, 
     which is a state sponsor of terrorism, and Hezbollah'': Now, 
     therefore, be it
  Mr. BERMAN (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The amendment to the preamble was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________