[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 10]
[Senate]
[Pages 13644-13647]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                            NUCLEAR WEAPONS

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, today we celebrate the unveiling in the 
Capitol of a statue of Ronald Reagan, one of our country's great 
Presidents and a personal hero to me throughout my political life. 
While there are many aspects of President Reagan's legacy we might 
reflect on today, I would like to take the opportunity to discuss one 
of them--his dream of a world free of nuclear weapons.
  Speaking before the Japanese Diet on November 11, 1983, President 
Ronald Reagan said:

       The only value in possessing nuclear weapons is to make 
     sure they can't ever be used. I know I speak for people 
     everywhere when I say our dream is to see the day when 
     nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth.

  That is my dream, too, and it is one shared by many of our most 
distinguished national security practitioners. In 2007, former 
Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, along with 
former Secretary of Defense William Perry and Senator Sam Nunn, 
authored an article entitled ``A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,'' in 
which they laid out their vision of the globe free of the most 
dangerous weapons ever known.
  This is a distant and difficult goal. We must proceed toward it 
prudently and pragmatically and with a focused concern for our security 
and the security of allies that depend on us. But the Cold War ended 
almost 20 years ago, and the time has come to take further measures to 
reduce dramatically the number of nuclear weapons in the world's 
arsenals. In so doing, the United States can--and indeed must--show the 
kind of leadership the world expects from us, in the tradition of 
American Presidents who worked to reduce the nuclear threat to mankind.
  Our highest priority must be to reduce the danger that nuclear 
weapons will ever be used. Such weapons, while still important to deter 
an attack with weapons of mass destruction against us and our allies, 
represent the most abhorrent and indiscriminate form of warfare known 
to man. We do, quite literally, possess the means to destroy all 
mankind. We must seek to do all we can to ensure that nuclear weapons 
will never again be used. As the administration renews its nuclear 
weapons posture, it should, I believe, seek to reduce the size of our 
nuclear arsenal to the lowest number possible, consistent with our 
security requirements and global commitments. This means a move, as 
rapidly as possible, to a significantly smaller force. As we take such 
steps, it will be crucial to continue to deploy a safe and reliable 
nuclear deterrent, robust missile defenses, and superior conventional 
forces capable of defending the United States and our allies.
  Today, we find ourselves at a nuclear crossroads. As rogue nations, 
including North Korea and Iran, push the nuclear envelope, the perils 
of a world awash in nuclear weapons is clear. Yet we should also 
consider the more hopeful alternative--a world in which there are far 
fewer such weapons than there are today and in which proliferation, 
instability, and nuclear terrorism are far less likely.
  In achieving this world, Ronald Reagan's dream will be more important 
than ever before. As Secretaries Kissinger and Shultz wrote with their 
colleagues in 2008:

       Progress must be facilitated by a clear statement of our 
     ultimate goal. Indeed, this is the only way to build the kind 
     of international trust and broad cooperation that will be 
     required to effectively address today's threats. Without the 
     vision of moving towards zero, we will not find the essential

[[Page 13645]]

     cooperation required to stop our downward spiral.

  Make no mistake, we must arrest the downward spiral. North Korea's 
recent nuclear test is just the latest provocative demonstration of the 
troubling reality the world faces today. Together with Iran's ongoing 
commitment to nuclear development, we face real dangers in the 
proliferation of the world's most terrible weapons. The United States 
must lead the world not only in reducing the size of existing nuclear 
arsenals but also in reversing the course of nuclear proliferation. 
This requires a tough-minded approach to both Iran and North Korea, 
both of which have gotten away with too much for far too long.
  We must also help ensure that other potential nuclear programs do not 
get off the ground. Last week, former National Security Adviser Brent 
Scowcroft joined two colleagues in calling on the President to promote 
the international ban on the spread of fissile materials that can be 
used in the production of nuclear weapons. I agree and urge the 
President to do so.
  But we must also strengthen enforcement. We must insist that 
countries that receive the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation 
return or dismantle what they have received if, at any point, they 
violate or withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Leading up to 
the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review conference, we should lay the 
groundwork for building an international consensus to ensure that the 
International Atomic Energy Agency has the tools to be a meaningful 
agent for achieving the dream of a nuclear weapon-free world. We should 
work with allies and partners to interdict the spread of nuclear 
weapons and materials--including any borne on vessels traveling to and 
from North Korea--under the Proliferation Security Initiative.
  As a nation, we have a number of important decisions in the coming 
months, including those related to a follow-on to the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty with Russia, the administration's planned resubmission 
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for ratification, and the need for 
a robust missile defense shield.
  As we move ahead with these and other decisions, let us keep in mind 
the dream of a nuclear-free world, enunciated so eloquently by our 40th 
President. As Secretary Shultz has written, this was a dream President 
Reagan pursued with great patience and depth of conviction. We would be 
wise to follow his lead.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
two articles by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam 
Nunn, one of January 4, 2007, and the other of January 15, 2008.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

              [From The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 4, 2007]

                    A World Free of Nuclear Weapons

  (By George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam 
                                 Nunn)

       Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also 
     an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to 
     take the world to the next stage--to a solid consensus for 
     reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital 
     contribution to preventing their proliferation into 
     potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a 
     threat to the world.
       Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international 
     security during the Cold War because they were a means of 
     deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of 
     mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence 
     continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with 
     regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear 
     weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous 
     and decreasingly effective.
       North Korea's recent nuclear test and Iran's refusal to 
     stop its program to enrich uranium--potentially to weapons 
     grade--highlight the fact that the world is now on the 
     precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most 
     alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get 
     their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing. In today's war 
     waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the 
     ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state terrorist 
     groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the 
     bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new 
     security challenges.
       Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions 
     are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new 
     nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically 
     disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold 
     War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can 
     successfully replicate the old Soviet-American ``mutually 
     assured destruction'' with an increasing number of potential 
     nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing 
     the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear 
     states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step 
     safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent 
     nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The 
     United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that 
     were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure 
     that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design 
     or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as 
     fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold 
     War?

                           *   *   *   *   *

       Leaders addressed this issue in earlier times. In his 
     ``Atoms for Peace'' address to the United Nations in 1953, 
     Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged America's ``determination to 
     help solve the fearful atomic dilemma--to devote its entire 
     heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous 
     inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but 
     consecrated to his life.'' John F. Kennedy, seeking to break 
     the logjam on nuclear disarmament, said, ``The world was not 
     meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution.''
       Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the U.N. General Assembly on June 
     9, 1988, appealed, ``Nuclear war will not mean the death of a 
     hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It will 
     mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life 
     as we know it on our planet earth. We come to the United 
     Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a 
     stop to this madness.''
       Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of ``all nuclear 
     weapons,'' which he considered to be ``totally irrational, 
     totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly 
     destructive of life on earth and civilization.'' Mikhail 
     Gorbachev shared this vision, which had also been expressed 
     by previous American presidents.
       Although Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to 
     achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid of all nuclear 
     weapons, they did succeed in turning the arms race on its 
     head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions 
     in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, 
     including the elimination of an entire class of threatening 
     missiles.
       What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan 
     and Mr. Gorbachev? Can a world-wide consensus be forged that 
     defines a series of practical steps leading to major 
     reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to 
     address the challenge posed by these two questions.
       The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of 
     all nuclear weapons. It provides (a) that states that did not 
     possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree not to obtain them, 
     and (b) that states that do possess them agree to divest 
     themselves of these weapons over time. Every president of 
     both parties since Richard Nixon has reaffirmed these treaty 
     obligations, but non-nuclear weapon states have grown 
     increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of the nuclear 
     powers.
       Strong non-proliferation efforts are under way. The 
     Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Global Threat 
     Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative 
     and the Additional Protocols are innovative approaches that 
     provide powerful new tools for detecting activities that 
     violate the NPT and endanger world security. They deserve 
     full implementation. The negotiations on proliferation of 
     nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran, involving all the 
     permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and 
     Japan, are crucially important. They must be energetically 
     pursued.
       But by themselves, none of these steps are adequate to the 
     danger. Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev aspired to 
     accomplish more at their meeting in Reykjavik 20 years ago--
     the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Their vision 
     shocked experts in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, but 
     galvanized the hopes of people around the world. The leaders 
     of the two countries with the largest arsenals of nuclear 
     weapons discussed the abolition of their most powerful 
     weapons.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       What should be done? Can the promise of the NPT and the 
     possibilities envisioned at Reykjavik be brought to fruition? 
     We believe that a major effort should be launched by the 
     United States to produce a positive answer through concrete 
     stages.
       First and foremost is intensive work with leaders of the 
     countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal 
     of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise. 
     Such a joint enterprise, by involving changes in the 
     disposition of the states possessing nuclear weapons, would 
     lend additional weight to efforts already under way to avoid 
     the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran.

[[Page 13646]]

       The program on which agreements should be sought would 
     constitute a series of agreed and urgent steps that would lay 
     the groundwork for a world free of the nuclear threat. Steps 
     would include:
       Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons 
     to increase warning time and thereby reduce the danger of an 
     accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.
       Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear 
     forces in all states that possess them.
       Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be 
     forward-deployed. Initiating a bipartisan process with the 
     Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and 
     provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent 
     technical advances, and working to secure ratification by 
     other key states.
       Providing the highest possible standards of security for 
     all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly 
     enriched uranium everywhere in the world.
       Getting control of the uranium enrichment process, combined 
     with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear power reactors 
     could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from the 
     Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other controlled international 
     reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with 
     proliferation issues presented by spent fuel from reactors 
     producing electricity.
       Halting the production of fissile material for weapons 
     globally; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in 
     civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium from 
     research facilities around the world and rendering the 
     materials safe.
       Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations 
     and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers.
       Achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will 
     also require effective measures to impede or counter any 
     nuclear-related conduct that is potentially threatening to 
     the security of any state or peoples.
       Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear 
     weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal 
     would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative 
     consistent with America's moral heritage. The effort could 
     have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future 
     generations. Without the bold vision, the actions will not be 
     perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision 
     will not be perceived as realistic or possible.
       We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear 
     weapons and working energetically on the actions required to 
     achieve that goal, beginning with the measures outlined 
     above.
                                  ____


          [From the Wall Street Journal Online, Jan. 15, 2008]

                      Toward a Nuclear-Free World

  (By George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam 
                                 Nunn)

       The accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-
     how and nuclear material has brought us to a nuclear tipping 
     point. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest 
     weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands.
       The steps we are taking now to address these threats are 
     not adequate to the danger. With nuclear weapons more widely 
     available, deterrence is decreasingly effective and 
     increasingly hazardous.
       One year ago, in an essay in this paper, we called for a 
     global effort to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, to 
     prevent their spread into potentially dangerous hands, and 
     ultimately to end them as a threat to the world. The 
     interest, momentum and growing political space that has been 
     created to address these issues over the past year has been 
     extraordinary, with strong positive responses from people all 
     over the world.
       Mikhail Gorbachev wrote in January 2007 that, as someone 
     who signed the first treaties on real reductions in nuclear 
     weapons, he thought it his duty to support our call for 
     urgent action: ``It is becoming clearer that nuclear weapons 
     are no longer a means of achieving security; in fact, with 
     every passing year they make our security more precarious.''
       In June, the United Kingdom's foreign secretary, Margaret 
     Beckett, signaled her government's support, stating: ``What 
     we need is both a vision--a scenario for a world free of 
     nuclear weapons--and action--progressive steps to reduce 
     warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in 
     security policy. These two strands are separate but they are 
     mutually reinforcing. Both are necessary, but at the moment 
     too weak.''
       We have also been encouraged by additional indications of 
     general support for this project from other former U.S. 
     officials with extensive experience as secretaries of state 
     and defense and national security advisors. These include: 
     Madeleine Albright, Richard V. Allen, James A. Baker III, 
     Samuel R. Berger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Warren 
     Christopher, William Cohen, Lawrence Eagleburger, Melvin 
     Laird, Anthony Lake, Robert McFarlane, Robert McNamara and 
     Colin Powell.
       Inspired by this reaction, in October 2007, we convened 
     veterans of the past six administrations, along with a number 
     of other experts on nuclear issues, for a conference at 
     Stanford University's Hoover Institution. There was general 
     agreement about the importance of the vision of a world free 
     of nuclear weapons as a guide to our thinking about nuclear 
     policies, and about the importance of a series of steps that 
     will pull us back from the nuclear precipice.
       The U.S. and Russia, which possess close to 95% of the 
     world's nuclear warheads, have a special responsibility, 
     obligation and experience to demonstrate leadership, but 
     other nations must join.
       Some steps are already in progress, such as the ongoing 
     reductions in the number of nuclear warheads deployed on 
     long-range, or strategic, bombers and missiles. Other near-
     term steps that the U.S. and Russia could take, beginning in 
     2008, can in and of themselves dramatically reduce nuclear 
     dangers. They include:
       Extend key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction 
     Treaty of 1991. Much has been learned about the vital task of 
     verification from the application of these provisions. The 
     treaty is scheduled to expire on Dec. 5, 2009. The key 
     provisions of this treaty, including their essential 
     monitoring and verification requirements, should be extended, 
     and the further reductions agreed upon in the 2002 Moscow 
     Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions should be completed 
     as soon as possible.
       Take steps to increase the warning and decision times for 
     the launch of all nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, thereby 
     reducing risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks. 
     Reliance on launch procedures that deny command authorities 
     sufficient time to make careful and prudent decisions is 
     unnecessary and dangerous in today's environment. 
     Furthermore, developments in cyber-warfare pose new threats 
     that could have disastrous consequences if the command-and-
     control systems of any nuclear-weapons state were compromised 
     by mischievous or hostile hackers. Further steps could be 
     implemented in time, as trust grows in the U.S.-Russian 
     relationship, by introducing mutually agreed and verified 
     physical barriers in the command-and-control sequence.
       Discard any existing operational plans for massive attacks 
     that still remain from the Cold War days. Interpreting 
     deterrence as requiring mutual assured destruction (MAD) is 
     an obsolete policy in today's world, with the U.S. and Russia 
     formally having declared that they are allied against 
     terrorism and no longer perceive each other as enemies.
       Undertake negotiations toward developing cooperative 
     multilateral ballistic-missile defense and early warning 
     systems, as proposed by Presidents Bush and Putin at their 
     2002 Moscow summit meeting. This should include agreement on 
     plans for countering missile threats to Europe, Russia and 
     the U.S. from the Middle East, along with completion of work 
     to establish the Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow. 
     Reducing tensions over missile defense will enhance the 
     possibility of progress on the broader range of nuclear 
     issues so essential to our security. Failure to do so will 
     make broader nuclear cooperation much more difficult.
       Dramatically accelerate work to provide the highest 
     possible standards of security for nuclear weapons, as well 
     as for nuclear materials everywhere in the world, to prevent 
     terrorists from acquiring a nuclear bomb. There are nuclear 
     weapons materials in more than 40 countries around the world, 
     and there are recent reports of alleged attempts to smuggle 
     nuclear material in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The 
     U.S., Russia and other nations that have worked with the 
     Nunn-Lugar programs, in cooperation with the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), should play a key role in 
     helping to implement United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 1540 relating to improving nuclear security--by 
     offering teams to assist jointly any nation in meeting its 
     obligations under this resolution to provide for appropriate, 
     effective security of these materials.
       As Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger put it in his address at our 
     October conference, ``Mistakes are made in every other human 
     endeavor. Why should nuclear weapons be exempt?'' To 
     underline the governor's point, on Aug. 29-30, 2007, six 
     cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads were loaded on a 
     U.S. Air Force plane, flown across the country and unloaded. 
     For 36 hours, no one knew where the warheads were, or even 
     that they were missing.
       Start a dialogue, including within NATO and with Russia, on 
     consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for forward 
     deployment to enhance their security, and as a first step 
     toward careful accounting for them and their eventual 
     elimination. These smaller and more portable nuclear weapons 
     are, given their characteristics, inviting acquisition 
     targets for terrorist groups.
       Strengthen the means of monitoring compliance with the 
     nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a counter to the 
     global spread of advanced technologies. More progress in this 
     direction is urgent, and could be achieved through requiring 
     the application of monitoring provisions (Additional 
     Protocols) designed by the IAEA to all signatories of the 
     NPT.
       Adopt a process for bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban 
     Treaty (CTBT) into effect, which would strengthen the NPT and

[[Page 13647]]

     aid international monitoring of nuclear activities. This 
     calls for a bipartisan review, first, to examine improvements 
     over the past decade of the international monitoring system 
     to identify and locate explosive underground nuclear tests in 
     violation of the CTBT; and, second, to assess the technical 
     progress made over the past decade in maintaining high 
     confidence in the reliability, safety and effectiveness of 
     the nation's nuclear arsenal under a test ban. The 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization is putting in 
     place new monitoring stations to detect nuclear tests--an 
     effort the U.S should urgently support even prior to 
     ratification.
       In parallel with these steps by the U.S. and Russia, the 
     dialogue must broaden on an international scale, including 
     non-nuclear as well as nuclear nations.
       Key subjects include turning the goal of a world without 
     nuclear weapons into a practical enterprise among nations, by 
     applying the necessary political will to build an 
     international consensus on priorities. The government of 
     Norway will sponsor a conference in February that will 
     contribute to this process.
       Another subject: Developing an international system to 
     manage the risks of the nuclear fuel cycle. With the growing 
     global interest in developing nuclear energy and the 
     potential proliferation of nuclear enrichment capabilities, 
     an international program should be created by advanced 
     nuclear countries and a strengthened IAEA. The purpose should 
     be to provide for reliable supplies of nuclear fuel, reserves 
     of enriched uranium, infrastructure assistance, financing, 
     and spent fuel management--to ensure that the means to make 
     nuclear weapons materials isn't spread around the globe.
       There should also be an agreement to undertake further 
     substantial reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces 
     beyond those recorded in the U.S.-Russia Strategic Offensive 
     Reductions Treaty. As the reductions proceed, other nuclear 
     nations would become involved.
       President Reagan's maxim of ``trust but verify'' should be 
     reaffirmed. Completing a verifiable treaty to prevent nations 
     from producing nuclear materials for weapons would contribute 
     to a more rigorous system of accounting and security for 
     nuclear materials.
       We should also build an international consensus on ways to 
     deter or, when required, to respond to, secret attempts by 
     countries to break out of agreements.
       Progress must be facilitated by a clear statement of our 
     ultimate goal. Indeed, this is the only way to build the kind 
     of international trust and broad cooperation that will be 
     required to effectively address today's threats. Without the 
     vision of moving toward zero, we will not find the essential 
     cooperation required to stop our downward spiral.
       In some respects, the goal of a world free of nuclear 
     weapons is like the top of a very tall mountain. From the 
     vantage point of our troubled world today, we can't even see 
     the top of the mountain, and it is tempting and easy to say 
     we can't get there from here. But the risks from continuing 
     to go down the mountain or standing pat are too real to 
     ignore. We must chart a course to higher ground where the 
     mountaintop becomes more visible.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennet). The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________