[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 10]
[Senate]
[Pages 13519-13520]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                         SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

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 SENATE RESOLUTION 164--AMENDING SENATE RESOLUTION 400, 94TH CONGRESS, 
  AND SENATE RESOLUTION 445, 108TH CONGRESS, TO IMPROVE CONGRESSIONAL 
   OVERSIGHT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES, TO 
PROVIDE A STRONG, STABLE, AND CAPABLE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE STRUCTURE 
 TO PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY APPROPRIATE OVERSIGHT, SUPPORT, 
 AND LEADERSHIP, AND TO IMPLEMENT A KEY RECOMMENDATION OF THE NATIONAL 
         COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

  Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Mr. Burr, Mr. Bayh, Ms. Snowe, and Mr. 
McCain) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 
Committee on Rules and Administration:

                              S. Res. 164

       Whereas the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
     the United States (hereinafter referred to as the ``9/11 
     Commission'') conducted a lengthy review of the facts and 
     circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 
     11, 2001, including those relating to the intelligence 
     community, law enforcement agencies, and the role of 
     congressional oversight and resource allocation;
       Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission found that 
     congressional oversight of the intelligence activities of the 
     United States is dysfunctional;
       Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further 
     found that under the rules of the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives in effect at the time the report was 
     completed, the committees of Congress charged with oversight 
     of the intelligence activities lacked the power, influence, 
     and sustained capability to meet the daunting challenges 
     faced by the intelligence community of the United States;
       Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further 
     found that as long as such oversight is governed by such 
     rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the 
     people of the United States will not get the security they 
     want and need;
       Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further 
     found that a strong, stable, and capable congressional 
     committee structure is needed to give the intelligence 
     community of the United States appropriate oversight, 
     support, and leadership;
       Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further 
     found that the reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission in 
     its final report will not succeed if congressional oversight 
     of the intelligence community in the United States is not 
     changed;
       Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission 
     recommended structural changes to Congress to improve the 
     oversight of intelligence activities;
       Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further 
     recommended that the authorizing authorities and 
     appropriating authorities with respect to intelligence 
     activities in each house of Congress be combined into a 
     single committee in each house of Congress;
       Whereas Congress has enacted some of the recommendations 
     made by the 9/11 Commission and is considering implementing 
     additional recommendations of the 9/11 Commission; and
       Whereas the Senate adopted Senate Resolution 445 in the 
     108th Congress to address some of the intelligence oversight 
     recommendations of the 9/11 Commission by abolishing term 
     limits for the members of the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence, clarifying jurisdiction for intelligence-
     related nominations, and streamlining procedures for the 
     referral of intelligence-related legislation, but other 
     aspects of the 9/11 Commission recommendations regarding 
     intelligence oversight have not been implemented: Now, 
     therefore, be it
       Resolved,

     SECTION 1. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of this resolution are--
       (1) to improve congressional oversight of the intelligence 
     activities of the United States;
       (2) to provide a strong, stable, and capable congressional 
     committee structure to provide the intelligence community 
     appropriate oversight, support, and leadership;
       (3) to implement a key recommendation of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 
     ``9/11 Commission'') that structural changes be made to 
     Congress to improve the oversight of intelligence activities; 
     and
       (4) to provide vigilant legislative oversight over the 
     intelligence activities of the United States to ensure that 
     such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and 
     laws of the United States.

     SEC. 2. INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT.

       (a) Authority of the Select Committee on Intelligence.--
     Paragraph (5) of section 3(a) of Senate Resolution 400, 
     agreed to May 19, 1976 (94th Congress), is amended in that 
     matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking the comma 
     following ``authorizations for appropriations'' and inserting 
     ``and appropriations,''.
       (b) Abolishment of the Subcommittee on Intelligence.--
     Senate Resolution 445, agreed to October 9, 2004, (108th 
     Congress), is amended by striking section 402.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am introducing today, along with 
Senators Burr, Bayh, Snowe and McCain, a resolution that will implement 
a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission-- the granting of 
appropriations authority to the Senate Intelligence Committee. This 
effort to reform and improve congressional oversight has a long 
bipartisan history. It began as an amendment offered by Senator McCain 
to the 2004 reorganizing resolution that accompanied the intelligence 
reform bill. And, in the last Congress, this resolution was introduced 
by Senator Burr. It should also be noted that it has the same 
bipartisan set of cosponsors as it did last year, despite the

[[Page 13520]]

change of administration. This underscores the principle that effective 
congressional oversight is neither a partisan nor political issue and 
that it has nothing to do with who the President is. It is about 
ensuring that the Intelligence Community is keeping America safe, 
complying with the Constitution and laws of our country, and using 
taxpayer dollars in an appropriate manner.
  Next month will mark the 5th anniversary of the release of the 9/11 
Commission's report. The country is by now familiar with the many 
recommendations of the Commission that have been implemented, including 
the establishment of the DNI and the National Counterterrorism Center. 
Yet, the Commission stressed that, ``Of all our recommendations, 
strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult 
and important.''
  In November 2007, Lee Hamilton, the former Vice Chairman of the 
Commission testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee on behalf of 
himself and former Chairman Tom Kean and again emphasized what needs to 
be done. He testified that:

       The single most important step to strengthen the power of 
     the intelligence committees is to give them the power of the 
     purse. Without it, they will be marginalized. The 
     intelligence community will not ignore you, but they will 
     work around you. In a crunch, they will go to the 
     Appropriations Committee. Within the Congress, the two bodies 
     with the jurisdiction, time and expertise to carry out a 
     careful review of the budget and activities of the 
     Intelligence Community are the Senate and House intelligence 
     committees. Yet all of us have to live by the Gold Rule: That 
     is, he who controls the Gold makes the Rules.

  The testimony of the former Chairman and Vice Chairman highlighted 
three practical examples of why this particular reform is so critical. 
First, if and when the U.S. goes to war, the decision will ride largely 
on intelligence--and oversight is critical to ensuring that the 
intelligence community gets it right. Second, oversight is necessary to 
safeguard the privacy and civil liberties of Americans in an age of 
enhanced collection capabilities and data mining. Third, the success of 
intelligence reform requires sustained congressional oversight.
  Vigorous, effective, independent congressional oversight is 
fundamental to the checks and balances of our constitutional system. In 
recent years, we have seen outright contempt for this oversight, 
particularly as the previous administration sought to hide the CIA's 
detention and interrogation and the NSA's warrantless wiretapping 
programs from Congress. But the inauguration of a new president has not 
removed all impediments to effective oversight, nor is it a guarantee 
that serious abuses won't occur in the future. That is why the 
implementation of this reform is just as important as ever and why this 
resolution has bipartisan support.
  In the end, this reform is not just about our constitutional system, 
as important as that is. It is about how best to protect the American 
people. As Lee Hamilton testified, ``the strong point simply is that 
the Senate of the U.S. and the House of the U.S. is not doing its job. 
And because you are not doing the job, the country is not as safe as it 
ought to be, because one of my premises is that robust oversight is 
necessary for a stronger intelligence community.''
  The implementation of this reform is long overdue. It has been more 
than seven and a half years since the attacks of 9/11, almost 5years 
since the 9/11 Commission made this recommendation, and a year and a 
half since the Senate Intelligence Committee heard directly from former 
Chairman Hamilton and former Vice Chairman Kean. There should be no 
more excuses, or delays.

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