[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 155 (2009), Part 1]
[House]
[Pages 366-367]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                           THE FORGOTTEN WAR

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 6, 2009, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) is recognized 
for 60 minutes.
  Mr. KIRK. Madam Speaker, with a President to inaugurate and a 
troubled economy we can overlook the sacrifice of our troops in 
Afghanistan. This conflict, overshadowed by Iraq, is often called the 
Forgotten War.
  Last month I became the first Member of the House to serve in an 
Imminent Danger Area since 1942. Now, Members of this House have served 
in all of America's wars, from the Revolution through World War II. But 
the Defense Department's policy of 1943 blocked reservist Congressmen 
from serving in Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, Kosovo or Iraq. Senator 
and Colonel Lindsay Graham broke through this barrier 2 years ago, and 
I became the first Member of this House to also serve since World War 
II.
  While our country has moved from a draftee military to an all-
volunteer force, I think it's still important for as many Americans as 
possible to share the burden of our troops. Our military is the 
strongest when it pulls into its ranks Americans from all races, creeds 
and colors and especially all walks of life. It is important for 
Members of this House, where the Constitution places the power to 
declare war, to also serve alongside our troops.
  I voted for the deployment of troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and was 
honored then to be one of the first to join them in Afghanistan.
  As a Naval Reserve Intelligence Officer, I deployed to Southern 
Afghanistan in support of NATO's International Security Assistance 
Force, or ISAF at the headquarters of Regional Command South. I served 
in the command of a Dutch Major General, Mart de Kruif, and on the 
staff of his American Deputy for Stabilization, Brigadier General John 
Nicholson of the U.S. Army.
  I can report to the House that the morale of our troops in 
Afghanistan is high. Americans that I joined feel that this is the 
right mission in the right place. Just because this effort is 10 times 
harder than we first thought, it remains the place where we can best 
support the safety of the American people.
  Our headquarters was located at Kandahar Airfield, known as KAF. We 
located just a few miles from Tarnak Farms, where Osama bin Laden had 
trained many al Qaeda operatives. A few miles further down the road was 
the palace of Mullah Omar, the murderous former dictator of the 
Taliban.
  We face some real challenges in Afghanistan. Our mission has now 
stretched for 7 years, and can wear thin with the Afghan people. As we 
look at Senator Barack Obama becoming our Commander-in-Chief, it's 
important that we review what we have accomplished in Afghanistan, its 
differences from the Iraq mission and what remains to be done.
  First, it's important to note that Afghanistan is not Iraq, and 
almost every comparison between the two leads to people making errors 
with regard to our policy in Afghanistan. While both countries are 
predominantly Muslim, with over 25 million people, there is where the 
similarities end.
  Iraq is a country that has always had a strong central government. 
Afghanistan has always had a certain amount of lawlessness, even during 
the Soviet dictatorship.
  Iraq has an oil industry and a middle class. Afghanistan has neither.
  Iraq was a mission carried out by America and Britain, nearly alone, 
with few allies helping. Afghanistan is home to a NATO mission where a 
very large majority of the troops come from outside America.
  Finally, the insurgency in Iraq was sustained by dictatorships in 
Syria and Iran. In Afghanistan, the principal sustainment in income of 
the Taliban is now heroin, generating billions in profit.
  Our troops have accomplished a great deal already in Afghanistan. We 
destroyed al Qaeda's training bases, and

[[Page 367]]

then deposed the Taliban dictatorship that protected them. We organized 
elections, and then protected a new democratically elected government 
under Hamid Karzai.

                              {time}  1530

  These missions were no small feat in a country that has proven to be 
the graveyard of the Soviet military and that has seen no elections for 
three generations.
  Since 2006, the mission in Afghanistan has stalled as the Taliban has 
morphed into a new and deadly force. The tenets of Islam are generally 
anti-narcotic. The Taliban first eradicated poppy and heroin 
production, but now has changed its practice. Once the Taliban no 
longer had easy access to bin Laden or to Saudi charity money, they 
went into the heroin business big time. Today, they are more accurately 
described as the narco-Taliban, backed by at least $500 million in 
annual drug profits. Some of Afghanistan's wealthiest warlords are 
Taliban leaders who produce heroin to support jihad and terror against 
the elected Government of Afghanistan and of the nations of the West.
  The narco-Taliban are not evenly distributed across Afghanistan. They 
are concentrated in the heroin heartland of the Helmand River valley 
and in the nearby city of Kandahar. There is a growing misperception 
that the war in Afghanistan is fiercest near Pakistan's border. While 
that may have been true last year, the key to fighting this year is 
along the heroin river of Helmand in southern Afghanistan. The Afghan 
Government and NATO are fighting pitched battles in the strategic rear 
of NATO where support and funding for the Taliban are actually the 
greatest.
  Our effort there has been expensive both in blood and in treasure. In 
my area, the U.S. has lost over 80 soldiers, but the Canadians have 
lost over 90 and the British over 110. I cannot emphasize enough the 
dedication and professionalism and commitment of our troops and 
especially of our NATO allies.
  I, personally, served with British Royal Marine Commandos, with 
Canadian troops, with Dutch armor officers and enlisted, with Danish 
armor officers and enlisted, and with Romanian infantry. Along with our 
service men and women from the Army, the Marines, the Air Force, and 
the Navy, I found these troops from the West to be young, idealistic 
and some of the most dedicated people I've ever served with. In short, 
I worked with heroes whom I admire a great deal.
  When I deployed to Afghanistan, I thought I might serve as a Fobbit. 
A ``Fobbit'' is a person who works on a Forward Operating Base, or a 
FOB, who never leaves its border, who simply shuttles between the chow 
hall, the office, the gym, and the rack. Thanks to my command, I was 
not a Fobbit. I spent a great deal of my time outside the wire in 
Kandahar, in Geresk, in Lashkar Gah, and in Qalat. This experience gave 
me a much greater understanding of the opportunities that we share with 
NATO and with the Afghan Government.
  With all of this effort, we should ask the question: What is at stake 
in Afghanistan? Should we pull out? Should we stay put or should we 
double down?
  In my view, what is at stake is that the safety of American families 
is at risk especially if you live in the target cities of New York, 
Washington or Chicago. These are the cities most emphasized by al Qaeda 
and the Taliban. The dream of many Talib and foreign fighters is to 
depose the democratically elected government of Afghanistan and then 
move jihad back into the cities of Europe and the United States.
  Most of the NATO troops whom I met remember not just 9/11, which they 
watched on TV, but also the Madrid Metro attack, the London bus 
bombings, and the murder of intellectuals in Amsterdam. They believe as 
I do, which is the best way to face the Talib is in Afghanistan with 
Afghan allies who know how to fight them best.
  Should we keep the mission in Afghanistan as it is today?
  If we do that, we risk a bloody stalemate that would definitely 
protect the capital of the Afghan Government in Kabul but would 
surrender much of the territory of the country to the Talib. The Talib 
is also wearing our allies thin, especially in Canada and in the 
Netherlands, and it would strain our alliance. The Taliban now attacks 
young girls, who dare to go to school, with acid in their faces, and it 
has assassinated Afghanistan's only female police officer because she 
was a woman. We know who they are. They are brutal dictators who want 
to set society back to the 13th century.
  As Americans, we cannot go back to the 13th century. Our culture and 
our country don't even go back that far. Most Afghans support our 
values of reform, of rights for women, of the vote, and especially of 
modernity. But simply to protect their families, many in Afghanistan 
want to be with the winning side, and right now, many families in 
Afghanistan don't know who the winning side will be--the Afghan 
Government and NATO or the Taliban.
  Should we double down?
  NATO allies clearly believe that we should double down, but they are 
waiting for a call from our new President. Our best allies--the U.K., 
Spain, France, and several other NATO countries--are already planning 
to add their troop commitment to Afghanistan. Other close allies of the 
United States, especially Canada and the Netherlands, need to be asked 
before making the painful decision for themselves to hang in there. 
Most expect that the U.S. will be part of a 60,000 troop commitment to 
Afghanistan, one-third being Americans, who will then move to attack 
the heroin production heartland that sustains the Taliban. If this 
happens, we can expect some tough days ahead. Hard fighting and 
casualties would ensue. The Taliban cannot survive without the heroin 
income that comes from this region. If we succeed, we will rip the 
financial engine out from the Taliban, securing a future for central 
Asia that does not include terror.
  In the end, we should ask this key question: What is our exit 
strategy?
  Currently, the Afghan police and army are much, much smaller than 
their counterparts in Iraq, a country that has an equal number of 
people. We need to double the size of Afghanistan's police and army so 
that they can take this mission from NATO and so that we can wind up 
our own effort. It will take at least 2 or 3 years to accomplish this 
objective, which is why our NATO mission is needed now.
  I want to thank the men and women with whom I served. Our Dutch 
allies sent us General de Kruif, and our British allies sent us 
Brigadier General Hook of the Royal Marine Commandos, both of whom I 
served with closely.
  I also want to thank the men with whom I most closely worked: Majors 
Will Daniel and Fred Tanner of the U.S. Army. I also want to thank them 
for their dedication. I think about them here from the floor each and 
every day.
  I especially want to thank my boss, Brigadier General John Nicholson, 
of the U.S. Army. I count myself lucky that, at this later stage in my 
life, I have served briefly with such an inspirational leader.
  To the mothers and fathers of this country, I would say that, if your 
sons or daughters serve in southern Afghanistan, they will work under 
one of the most able military leaders whom I have ever met.
  As we leave Iraq, it is likely that Afghanistan will no longer be the 
forgotten war. Members of this House should take note that our troops 
have already accomplished a great deal there, but more remains to be 
done.
  For my part, I am honored to have served there, and I will be on this 
House floor the voice of the troops, of the Americans whom we have 
stationed in the land far above the Khyber Pass.
  I yield back the balance of my time.

                          ____________________