[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 154 (2008), Part 9]
[House]
[Pages 13236-13271]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                      FISA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008

  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1285, I call 
up the bill (H.R. 6304) to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978 to establish a procedure for authorizing certain 
acquisitions of foreign intelligence, and for other purposes, and ask 
for its immediate consideration in the House.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 6304

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 
     2008'' or the ``FISA Amendments Act of 2008''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

               TITLE I--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE

Sec. 101. Additional procedures regarding certain persons outside the 
              United States.
Sec. 102. Statement of exclusive means by which electronic surveillance 
              and interception of certain communications may be 
              conducted.
Sec. 103. Submittal to Congress of certain court orders under the 
              Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 104. Applications for court orders.
Sec. 105. Issuance of an order.
Sec. 106. Use of information.
Sec. 107. Amendments for physical searches.
Sec. 108. Amendments for emergency pen registers and trap and trace 
              devices.
Sec. 109. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Sec. 110. Weapons of mass destruction.

  TITLE II--PROTECTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION SERVICE PROVIDERS

Sec. 201. Procedures for implementing statutory defenses under the 
              Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 202. Technical amendments.

                 TITLE III--REVIEW OF PREVIOUS ACTIONS

Sec. 301. Review of previous actions.

                       TITLE IV--OTHER PROVISIONS

Sec. 401. Severability.
Sec. 402. Effective date.
Sec. 403. Repeals.

[[Page 13237]]

Sec. 404. Transition procedures.

               TITLE I--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE

     SEC. 101. ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES REGARDING CERTAIN PERSONS 
                   OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) In General.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) by striking title VII; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:

 ``TITLE VII--ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES REGARDING CERTAIN PERSONS OUTSIDE 
                           THE UNITED STATES

     ``SEC. 701. DEFINITIONS.

       ``(a) In General.--The terms `agent of a foreign power', 
     `Attorney General', `contents', `electronic surveillance', 
     `foreign intelligence information', `foreign power', 
     `person', `United States', and `United States person' have 
     the meanings given such terms in section 101, except as 
     specifically provided in this title.
       ``(b) Additional Definitions.--
       ``(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     `congressional intelligence committees' means--
       ``(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
     and
       ``(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       ``(2) Foreign intelligence surveillance court; court.--The 
     terms `Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court' and `Court' 
     mean the court established under section 103(a).
       ``(3) Foreign intelligence surveillance court of review; 
     court of review.--The terms `Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court of Review' and `Court of Review' mean the 
     court established under section 103(b).
       ``(4) Electronic communication service provider.--The term 
     `electronic communication service provider' means--
       ``(A) a telecommunications carrier, as that term is defined 
     in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 
     153);
       ``(B) a provider of electronic communication service, as 
     that term is defined in section 2510 of title 18, United 
     States Code;
       ``(C) a provider of a remote computing service, as that 
     term is defined in section 2711 of title 18, United States 
     Code;
       ``(D) any other communication service provider who has 
     access to wire or electronic communications either as such 
     communications are transmitted or as such communications are 
     stored; or
       ``(E) an officer, employee, or agent of an entity described 
     in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D).
       ``(5) Intelligence community.--The term `intelligence 
     community' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

     ``SEC. 702. PROCEDURES FOR TARGETING CERTAIN PERSONS OUTSIDE 
                   THE UNITED STATES OTHER THAN UNITED STATES 
                   PERSONS.

       ``(a) Authorization.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, upon the issuance of an order in accordance with 
     subsection (i)(3) or a determination under subsection (c)(2), 
     the Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence may authorize jointly, for a period of up to 1 
     year from the effective date of the authorization, the 
     targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located 
     outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence 
     information.
       ``(b) Limitations.--An acquisition authorized under 
     subsection (a)--
       ``(1) may not intentionally target any person known at the 
     time of acquisition to be located in the United States;
       ``(2) may not intentionally target a person reasonably 
     believed to be located outside the United States if the 
     purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known 
     person reasonably believed to be in the United States;
       ``(3) may not intentionally target a United States person 
     reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
       ``(4) may not intentionally acquire any communication as to 
     which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the 
     time of the acquisition to be located in the United States; 
     and
       ``(5) shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the 
     fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
       ``(c) Conduct of Acquisition.--
       ``(1) In general.--An acquisition authorized under 
     subsection (a) shall be conducted only in accordance with--
       ``(A) the targeting and minimization procedures adopted in 
     accordance with subsections (d) and (e); and
       ``(B) upon submission of a certification in accordance with 
     subsection (g), such certification.
       ``(2) Determination.--A determination under this paragraph 
     and for purposes of subsection (a) is a determination by the 
     Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
     that exigent circumstances exist because, without immediate 
     implementation of an authorization under subsection (a), 
     intelligence important to the national security of the United 
     States may be lost or not timely acquired and time does not 
     permit the issuance of an order pursuant to subsection (i)(3) 
     prior to the implementation of such authorization.
       ``(3) Timing of determination.--The Attorney General and 
     the Director of National Intelligence may make the 
     determination under paragraph (2)--
       ``(A) before the submission of a certification in 
     accordance with subsection (g); or
       ``(B) by amending a certification pursuant to subsection 
     (i)(1)(C) at any time during which judicial review under 
     subsection (i) of such certification is pending.
       ``(4) Construction.--Nothing in title I shall be construed 
     to require an application for a court order under such title 
     for an acquisition that is targeted in accordance with this 
     section at a person reasonably believed to be located outside 
     the United States.
       ``(d) Targeting Procedures.--
       ``(1) Requirement to adopt.--The Attorney General, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, 
     shall adopt targeting procedures that are reasonably designed 
     to--
       ``(A) ensure that any acquisition authorized under 
     subsection (a) is limited to targeting persons reasonably 
     believed to be located outside the United States; and
       ``(B) prevent the intentional acquisition of any 
     communication as to which the sender and all intended 
     recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be 
     located in the United States.
       ``(2) Judicial review.--The procedures adopted in 
     accordance with paragraph (1) shall be subject to judicial 
     review pursuant to subsection (i).
       ``(e) Minimization Procedures.--
       ``(1) Requirement to adopt.--The Attorney General, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, 
     shall adopt minimization procedures that meet the definition 
     of minimization procedures under section 101(h) or 301(4), as 
     appropriate, for acquisitions authorized under subsection 
     (a).
       ``(2) Judicial review.--The minimization procedures adopted 
     in accordance with paragraph (1) shall be subject to judicial 
     review pursuant to subsection (i).
       ``(f) Guidelines for Compliance With Limitations.--
       ``(1) Requirement to adopt.--The Attorney General, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, 
     shall adopt guidelines to ensure--
       ``(A) compliance with the limitations in subsection (b); 
     and
       ``(B) that an application for a court order is filed as 
     required by this Act.
       ``(2) Submission of guidelines.--The Attorney General shall 
     provide the guidelines adopted in accordance with paragraph 
     (1) to--
       ``(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
       ``(B) the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the 
     House of Representatives; and
       ``(C) the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
       ``(g) Certification.--
       ``(1) In general.--
       ``(A) Requirement.--Subject to subparagraph (B), prior to 
     the implementation of an authorization under subsection (a), 
     the Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall provide to the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court a written certification and any supporting 
     affidavit, under oath and under seal, in accordance with this 
     subsection.
       ``(B) Exception.--If the Attorney General and the Director 
     of National Intelligence make a determination under 
     subsection (c)(2) and time does not permit the submission of 
     a certification under this subsection prior to the 
     implementation of an authorization under subsection (a), the 
     Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the Court a certification for such 
     authorization as soon as practicable but in no event later 
     than 7 days after such determination is made.
       ``(2) Requirements.--A certification made under this 
     subsection shall--
       ``(A) attest that--
       ``(i) there are procedures in place that have been 
     approved, have been submitted for approval, or will be 
     submitted with the certification for approval by the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court that are reasonably designed 
     to--

       ``(I) ensure that an acquisition authorized under 
     subsection (a) is limited to targeting persons reasonably 
     believed to be located outside the United States; and
       ``(II) prevent the intentional acquisition of any 
     communication as to which the sender and all intended 
     recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be 
     located in the United States;

       ``(ii) the minimization procedures to be used with respect 
     to such acquisition--

       ``(I) meet the definition of minimization procedures under 
     section 101(h) or 301(4), as appropriate; and
       ``(II) have been approved, have been submitted for 
     approval, or will be submitted with the certification for 
     approval by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court;

       ``(iii) guidelines have been adopted in accordance with 
     subsection (f) to ensure compliance with the limitations in 
     subsection (b) and to ensure that an application for a court 
     order is filed as required by this Act;
       ``(iv) the procedures and guidelines referred to in clauses 
     (i), (ii), and (iii) are consistent with the requirements of 
     the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United 
     States;

[[Page 13238]]

       ``(v) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
     foreign intelligence information;
       ``(vi) the acquisition involves obtaining foreign 
     intelligence information from or with the assistance of an 
     electronic communication service provider; and
       ``(vii) the acquisition complies with the limitations in 
     subsection (b);
       ``(B) include the procedures adopted in accordance with 
     subsections (d) and (e);
       ``(C) be supported, as appropriate, by the affidavit of any 
     appropriate official in the area of national security who 
     is--
       ``(i) appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
     and consent of the Senate; or
       ``(ii) the head of an element of the intelligence 
     community;
       ``(D) include--
       ``(i) an effective date for the authorization that is at 
     least 30 days after the submission of the written 
     certification to the court; or
       ``(ii) if the acquisition has begun or the effective date 
     is less than 30 days after the submission of the written 
     certification to the court, the date the acquisition began or 
     the effective date for the acquisition; and
       ``(E) if the Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence make a determination under subsection (c)(2), 
     include a statement that such determination has been made.
       ``(3) Change in effective date.--The Attorney General and 
     the Director of National Intelligence may advance or delay 
     the effective date referred to in paragraph (2)(D) by 
     submitting an amended certification in accordance with 
     subsection (i)(1)(C) to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court for review pursuant to subsection (i).
       ``(4) Limitation.--A certification made under this 
     subsection is not required to identify the specific 
     facilities, places, premises, or property at which an 
     acquisition authorized under subsection (a) will be directed 
     or conducted.
       ``(5) Maintenance of certification.--The Attorney General 
     or a designee of the Attorney General shall maintain a copy 
     of a certification made under this subsection.
       ``(6) Review.--A certification submitted in accordance with 
     this subsection shall be subject to judicial review pursuant 
     to subsection (i).
       ``(h) Directives and Judicial Review of Directives.--
       ``(1) Authority.--With respect to an acquisition authorized 
     under subsection (a), the Attorney General and the Director 
     of National Intelligence may direct, in writing, an 
     electronic communication service provider to--
       ``(A) immediately provide the Government with all 
     information, facilities, or assistance necessary to 
     accomplish the acquisition in a manner that will protect the 
     secrecy of the acquisition and produce a minimum of 
     interference with the services that such electronic 
     communication service provider is providing to the target of 
     the acquisition; and
       ``(B) maintain under security procedures approved by the 
     Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
     any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished 
     that such electronic communication service provider wishes to 
     maintain.
       ``(2) Compensation.--The Government shall compensate, at 
     the prevailing rate, an electronic communication service 
     provider for providing information, facilities, or assistance 
     in accordance with a directive issued pursuant to paragraph 
     (1).
       ``(3) Release from liability.--No cause of action shall lie 
     in any court against any electronic communication service 
     provider for providing any information, facilities, or 
     assistance in accordance with a directive issued pursuant to 
     paragraph (1).
       ``(4) Challenging of directives.--
       ``(A) Authority to challenge.--An electronic communication 
     service provider receiving a directive issued pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) may file a petition to modify or set aside such 
     directive with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 
     which shall have jurisdiction to review such petition.
       ``(B) Assignment.--The presiding judge of the Court shall 
     assign a petition filed under subparagraph (A) to 1 of the 
     judges serving in the pool established under section 
     103(e)(1) not later than 24 hours after the filing of such 
     petition.
       ``(C) Standards for review.--A judge considering a petition 
     filed under subparagraph (A) may grant such petition only if 
     the judge finds that the directive does not meet the 
     requirements of this section, or is otherwise unlawful.
       ``(D) Procedures for initial review.--A judge shall conduct 
     an initial review of a petition filed under subparagraph (A) 
     not later than 5 days after being assigned such petition. If 
     the judge determines that such petition does not consist of 
     claims, defenses, or other legal contentions that are 
     warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for 
     extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 
     establishing new law, the judge shall immediately deny such 
     petition and affirm the directive or any part of the 
     directive that is the subject of such petition and order the 
     recipient to comply with the directive or any part of it. 
     Upon making a determination under this subparagraph or 
     promptly thereafter, the judge shall provide a written 
     statement for the record of the reasons for such 
     determination.
       ``(E) Procedures for plenary review.--If a judge determines 
     that a petition filed under subparagraph (A) requires plenary 
     review, the judge shall affirm, modify, or set aside the 
     directive that is the subject of such petition not later than 
     30 days after being assigned such petition. If the judge does 
     not set aside the directive, the judge shall immediately 
     affirm or affirm with modifications the directive, and order 
     the recipient to comply with the directive in its entirety or 
     as modified. The judge shall provide a written statement for 
     the record of the reasons for a determination under this 
     subparagraph.
       ``(F) Continued effect.--Any directive not explicitly 
     modified or set aside under this paragraph shall remain in 
     full effect.
       ``(G) Contempt of court.--Failure to obey an order issued 
     under this paragraph may be punished by the Court as contempt 
     of court.
       ``(5) Enforcement of directives.--
       ``(A) Order to compel.--If an electronic communication 
     service provider fails to comply with a directive issued 
     pursuant to paragraph (1), the Attorney General may file a 
     petition for an order to compel the electronic communication 
     service provider to comply with the directive with the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which shall have 
     jurisdiction to review such petition.
       ``(B) Assignment.--The presiding judge of the Court shall 
     assign a petition filed under subparagraph (A) to 1 of the 
     judges serving in the pool established under section 
     103(e)(1) not later than 24 hours after the filing of such 
     petition.
       ``(C) Procedures for review.--A judge considering a 
     petition filed under subparagraph (A) shall, not later than 
     30 days after being assigned such petition, issue an order 
     requiring the electronic communication service provider to 
     comply with the directive or any part of it, as issued or as 
     modified, if the judge finds that the directive meets the 
     requirements of this section and is otherwise lawful. The 
     judge shall provide a written statement for the record of the 
     reasons for a determination under this paragraph.
       ``(D) Contempt of court.--Failure to obey an order issued 
     under this paragraph may be punished by the Court as contempt 
     of court.
       ``(E) Process.--Any process under this paragraph may be 
     served in any judicial district in which the electronic 
     communication service provider may be found.
       ``(6) Appeal.--
       ``(A) Appeal to the court of review.--The Government or an 
     electronic communication service provider receiving a 
     directive issued pursuant to paragraph (1) may file a 
     petition with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
     Review for review of a decision issued pursuant to paragraph 
     (4) or (5). The Court of Review shall have jurisdiction to 
     consider such petition and shall provide a written statement 
     for the record of the reasons for a decision under this 
     subparagraph.
       ``(B) Certiorari to the supreme court.--The Government or 
     an electronic communication service provider receiving a 
     directive issued pursuant to paragraph (1) may file a 
     petition for a writ of certiorari for review of a decision of 
     the Court of Review issued under subparagraph (A). The record 
     for such review shall be transmitted under seal to the 
     Supreme Court of the United States, which shall have 
     jurisdiction to review such decision.
       ``(i) Judicial Review of Certifications and Procedures.--
       ``(1) In general.--
       ``(A) Review by the foreign intelligence surveillance 
     court.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court shall 
     have jurisdiction to review a certification submitted in 
     accordance with subsection (g) and the targeting and 
     minimization procedures adopted in accordance with 
     subsections (d) and (e), and amendments to such certification 
     or such procedures.
       ``(B) Time period for review.--The Court shall review a 
     certification submitted in accordance with subsection (g) and 
     the targeting and minimization procedures adopted in 
     accordance with subsections (d) and (e) and shall complete 
     such review and issue an order under paragraph (3) not later 
     than 30 days after the date on which such certification and 
     such procedures are submitted.
       ``(C) Amendments.--The Attorney General and the Director of 
     National Intelligence may amend a certification submitted in 
     accordance with subsection (g) or the targeting and 
     minimization procedures adopted in accordance with 
     subsections (d) and (e) as necessary at any time, including 
     if the Court is conducting or has completed review of such 
     certification or such procedures, and shall submit the 
     amended certification or amended procedures to the Court not 
     later than 7 days after amending such certification or such 
     procedures. The Court shall review any amendment under this 
     subparagraph under the procedures set forth in this 
     subsection. The Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence may authorize the use of an amended 
     certification or amended procedures pending the Court's 
     review of such amended certification or amended procedures.
       ``(2) Review.--The Court shall review the following:
       ``(A) Certification.--A certification submitted in 
     accordance with subsection (g) to determine whether the 
     certification contains all the required elements.

[[Page 13239]]

       ``(B) Targeting procedures.--The targeting procedures 
     adopted in accordance with subsection (d) to assess whether 
     the procedures are reasonably designed to--
       ``(i) ensure that an acquisition authorized under 
     subsection (a) is limited to targeting persons reasonably 
     believed to be located outside the United States; and
       ``(ii) prevent the intentional acquisition of any 
     communication as to which the sender and all intended 
     recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be 
     located in the United States.
       ``(C) Minimization procedures.--The minimization procedures 
     adopted in accordance with subsection (e) to assess whether 
     such procedures meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures under section 101(h) or section 301(4), as 
     appropriate.
       ``(3) Orders.--
       ``(A) Approval.--If the Court finds that a certification 
     submitted in accordance with subsection (g) contains all the 
     required elements and that the targeting and minimization 
     procedures adopted in accordance with subsections (d) and (e) 
     are consistent with the requirements of those subsections and 
     with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United 
     States, the Court shall enter an order approving the 
     certification and the use, or continued use in the case of an 
     acquisition authorized pursuant to a determination under 
     subsection (c)(2), of the procedures for the acquisition.
       ``(B) Correction of deficiencies.--If the Court finds that 
     a certification submitted in accordance with subsection (g) 
     does not contain all the required elements, or that the 
     procedures adopted in accordance with subsections (d) and (e) 
     are not consistent with the requirements of those subsections 
     or the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United 
     States, the Court shall issue an order directing the 
     Government to, at the Government's election and to the extent 
     required by the Court's order--
       ``(i) correct any deficiency identified by the Court's 
     order not later than 30 days after the date on which the 
     Court issues the order; or
       ``(ii) cease, or not begin, the implementation of the 
     authorization for which such certification was submitted.
       ``(C) Requirement for written statement.--In support of an 
     order under this subsection, the Court shall provide, 
     simultaneously with the order, for the record a written 
     statement of the reasons for the order.
       ``(4) Appeal.--
       ``(A) Appeal to the court of review.--The Government may 
     file a petition with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court of Review for review of an order under this subsection. 
     The Court of Review shall have jurisdiction to consider such 
     petition. For any decision under this subparagraph affirming, 
     reversing, or modifying an order of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court, the Court of Review shall provide for the 
     record a written statement of the reasons for the decision.
       ``(B) Continuation of acquisition pending rehearing or 
     appeal.--Any acquisition affected by an order under paragraph 
     (3)(B) may continue--
       ``(i) during the pendency of any rehearing of the order by 
     the Court en banc; and
       ``(ii) if the Government files a petition for review of an 
     order under this section, until the Court of Review enters an 
     order under subparagraph (C).
       ``(C) Implementation pending appeal.--Not later than 60 
     days after the filing of a petition for review of an order 
     under paragraph (3)(B) directing the correction of a 
     deficiency, the Court of Review shall determine, and enter a 
     corresponding order regarding, whether all or any part of the 
     correction order, as issued or modified, shall be implemented 
     during the pendency of the review.
       ``(D) Certiorari to the supreme court.--The Government may 
     file a petition for a writ of certiorari for review of a 
     decision of the Court of Review issued under subparagraph 
     (A). The record for such review shall be transmitted under 
     seal to the Supreme Court of the United States, which shall 
     have jurisdiction to review such decision.
       ``(5) Schedule.--
       ``(A) Reauthorization of authorizations in effect.--If the 
     Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
     seek to reauthorize or replace an authorization issued under 
     subsection (a), the Attorney General and the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall, to the extent practicable, 
     submit to the Court the certification prepared in accordance 
     with subsection (g) and the procedures adopted in accordance 
     with subsections (d) and (e) at least 30 days prior to the 
     expiration of such authorization.
       ``(B) Reauthorization of orders, authorizations, and 
     directives.--If the Attorney General and the Director of 
     National Intelligence seek to reauthorize or replace an 
     authorization issued under subsection (a) by filing a 
     certification pursuant to subparagraph (A), that 
     authorization, and any directives issued thereunder and any 
     order related thereto, shall remain in effect, 
     notwithstanding the expiration provided for in subsection 
     (a), until the Court issues an order with respect to such 
     certification under paragraph (3) at which time the 
     provisions of that paragraph and paragraph (4) shall apply 
     with respect to such certification.
       ``(j) Judicial Proceedings.--
       ``(1) Expedited judicial proceedings.--Judicial proceedings 
     under this section shall be conducted as expeditiously as 
     possible.
       ``(2) Time limits.--A time limit for a judicial decision in 
     this section shall apply unless the Court, the Court of 
     Review, or any judge of either the Court or the Court of 
     Review, by order for reasons stated, extends that time as 
     necessary for good cause in a manner consistent with national 
     security.
       ``(k) Maintenance and Security of Records and 
     Proceedings.--
       ``(1) Standards.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court shall maintain a record of a proceeding under this 
     section, including petitions, appeals, orders, and statements 
     of reasons for a decision, under security measures adopted by 
     the Chief Justice of the United States, in consultation with 
     the Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence.
       ``(2) Filing and review.--All petitions under this section 
     shall be filed under seal. In any proceedings under this 
     section, the Court shall, upon request of the Government, 
     review ex parte and in camera any Government submission, or 
     portions of a submission, which may include classified 
     information.
       ``(3) Retention of records.--The Attorney General and the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall retain a directive or 
     an order issued under this section for a period of not less 
     than 10 years from the date on which such directive or such 
     order is issued.
       ``(l) Assessments and Reviews.--
       ``(1) Semiannual assessment.--Not less frequently than once 
     every 6 months, the Attorney General and Director of National 
     Intelligence shall assess compliance with the targeting and 
     minimization procedures adopted in accordance with 
     subsections (d) and (e) and the guidelines adopted in 
     accordance with subsection (f) and shall submit each 
     assessment to--
       ``(A) the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; and
       ``(B) consistent with the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives, the Standing Rules of the Senate, and Senate 
     Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress or any successor Senate 
     resolution--
       ``(i) the congressional intelligence committees; and
       ``(ii) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.
       ``(2) Agency assessment.--The Inspector General of the 
     Department of Justice and the Inspector General of each 
     element of the intelligence community authorized to acquire 
     foreign intelligence information under subsection (a), with 
     respect to the department or element of such Inspector 
     General--
       ``(A) are authorized to review compliance with the 
     targeting and minimization procedures adopted in accordance 
     with subsections (d) and (e) and the guidelines adopted in 
     accordance with subsection (f);
       ``(B) with respect to acquisitions authorized under 
     subsection (a), shall review the number of disseminated 
     intelligence reports containing a reference to a United 
     States-person identity and the number of United States-person 
     identities subsequently disseminated by the element concerned 
     in response to requests for identities that were not referred 
     to by name or title in the original reporting;
       ``(C) with respect to acquisitions authorized under 
     subsection (a), shall review the number of targets that were 
     later determined to be located in the United States and, to 
     the extent possible, whether communications of such targets 
     were reviewed; and
       ``(D) shall provide each such review to--
       ``(i) the Attorney General;
       ``(ii) the Director of National Intelligence; and
       ``(iii) consistent with the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives, the Standing Rules of the Senate, and Senate 
     Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress or any successor Senate 
     resolution--

       ``(I) the congressional intelligence committees; and
       ``(II) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.

       ``(3) Annual review.--
       ``(A) Requirement to conduct.--The head of each element of 
     the intelligence community conducting an acquisition 
     authorized under subsection (a) shall conduct an annual 
     review to determine whether there is reason to believe that 
     foreign intelligence information has been or will be obtained 
     from the acquisition. The annual review shall provide, with 
     respect to acquisitions authorized under subsection (a)--
       ``(i) an accounting of the number of disseminated 
     intelligence reports containing a reference to a United 
     States-person identity;
       ``(ii) an accounting of the number of United States-person 
     identities subsequently disseminated by that element in 
     response to requests for identities that were not referred to 
     by name or title in the original reporting;
       ``(iii) the number of targets that were later determined to 
     be located in the United States and, to the extent possible, 
     whether communications of such targets were reviewed; and
       ``(iv) a description of any procedures developed by the 
     head of such element of the intelligence community and 
     approved by the

[[Page 13240]]

     Director of National Intelligence to assess, in a manner 
     consistent with national security, operational requirements 
     and the privacy interests of United States persons, the 
     extent to which the acquisitions authorized under subsection 
     (a) acquire the communications of United States persons, and 
     the results of any such assessment.
       ``(B) Use of review.--The head of each element of the 
     intelligence community that conducts an annual review under 
     subparagraph (A) shall use each such review to evaluate the 
     adequacy of the minimization procedures utilized by such 
     element and, as appropriate, the application of the 
     minimization procedures to a particular acquisition 
     authorized under subsection (a).
       ``(C) Provision of review.--The head of each element of the 
     intelligence community that conducts an annual review under 
     subparagraph (A) shall provide such review to--
       ``(i) the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court;
       ``(ii) the Attorney General;
       ``(iii) the Director of National Intelligence; and
       ``(iv) consistent with the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives, the Standing Rules of the Senate, and Senate 
     Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress or any successor Senate 
     resolution--

       ``(I) the congressional intelligence committees; and
       ``(II) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.

     ``SEC. 703. CERTAIN ACQUISITIONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES 
                   TARGETING UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE 
                   UNITED STATES.

       ``(a) Jurisdiction of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court shall have jurisdiction to review an application and to 
     enter an order approving the targeting of a United States 
     person reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
     States to acquire foreign intelligence information, if the 
     acquisition constitutes electronic surveillance or the 
     acquisition of stored electronic communications or stored 
     electronic data that requires an order under this Act, and 
     such acquisition is conducted within the United States.
       ``(2) Limitation.--If a United States person targeted under 
     this subsection is reasonably believed to be located in the 
     United States during the effective period of an order issued 
     pursuant to subsection (c), an acquisition targeting such 
     United States person under this section shall cease unless 
     the targeted United States person is again reasonably 
     believed to be located outside the United States while an 
     order issued pursuant to subsection (c) is in effect. Nothing 
     in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of 
     the Government to seek an order or authorization under, or 
     otherwise engage in any activity that is authorized under, 
     any other title of this Act.
       ``(b) Application.--
       ``(1) In general.--Each application for an order under this 
     section shall be made by a Federal officer in writing upon 
     oath or affirmation to a judge having jurisdiction under 
     subsection (a)(1). Each application shall require the 
     approval of the Attorney General based upon the Attorney 
     General's finding that it satisfies the criteria and 
     requirements of such application, as set forth in this 
     section, and shall include--
       ``(A) the identity of the Federal officer making the 
     application;
       ``(B) the identity, if known, or a description of the 
     United States person who is the target of the acquisition;
       ``(C) a statement of the facts and circumstances relied 
     upon to justify the applicant's belief that the United States 
     person who is the target of the acquisition is--
       ``(i) a person reasonably believed to be located outside 
     the United States; and
       ``(ii) a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or an 
     officer or employee of a foreign power;
       ``(D) a statement of proposed minimization procedures that 
     meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 
     101(h) or 301(4), as appropriate;
       ``(E) a description of the nature of the information sought 
     and the type of communications or activities to be subjected 
     to acquisition;
       ``(F) a certification made by the Attorney General or an 
     official specified in section 104(a)(6) that--
       ``(i) the certifying official deems the information sought 
     to be foreign intelligence information;
       ``(ii) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to 
     obtain foreign intelligence information;
       ``(iii) such information cannot reasonably be obtained by 
     normal investigative techniques;
       ``(iv) designates the type of foreign intelligence 
     information being sought according to the categories 
     described in section 101(e); and
       ``(v) includes a statement of the basis for the 
     certification that--

       ``(I) the information sought is the type of foreign 
     intelligence information designated; and
       ``(II) such information cannot reasonably be obtained by 
     normal investigative techniques;

       ``(G) a summary statement of the means by which the 
     acquisition will be conducted and whether physical entry is 
     required to effect the acquisition;
       ``(H) the identity of any electronic communication service 
     provider necessary to effect the acquisition, provided that 
     the application is not required to identify the specific 
     facilities, places, premises, or property at which the 
     acquisition authorized under this section will be directed or 
     conducted;
       ``(I) a statement of the facts concerning any previous 
     applications that have been made to any judge of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court involving the United States 
     person specified in the application and the action taken on 
     each previous application; and
       ``(J) a statement of the period of time for which the 
     acquisition is required to be maintained, provided that such 
     period of time shall not exceed 90 days per application.
       ``(2) Other requirements of the attorney general.--The 
     Attorney General may require any other affidavit or 
     certification from any other officer in connection with the 
     application.
       ``(3) Other requirements of the judge.--The judge may 
     require the applicant to furnish such other information as 
     may be necessary to make the findings required by subsection 
     (c)(1).
       ``(c) Order.--
       ``(1) Findings.--Upon an application made pursuant to 
     subsection (b), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
     shall enter an ex parte order as requested or as modified by 
     the Court approving the acquisition if the Court finds that--
       ``(A) the application has been made by a Federal officer 
     and approved by the Attorney General;
       ``(B) on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant, 
     for the United States person who is the target of the 
     acquisition, there is probable cause to believe that the 
     target is--
       ``(i) a person reasonably believed to be located outside 
     the United States; and
       ``(ii) a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or an 
     officer or employee of a foreign power;
       ``(C) the proposed minimization procedures meet the 
     definition of minimization procedures under section 101(h) or 
     301(4), as appropriate; and
       ``(D) the application that has been filed contains all 
     statements and certifications required by subsection (b) and 
     the certification or certifications are not clearly erroneous 
     on the basis of the statement made under subsection 
     (b)(1)(F)(v) and any other information furnished under 
     subsection (b)(3).
       ``(2) Probable cause.--In determining whether or not 
     probable cause exists for purposes of paragraph (1)(B), a 
     judge having jurisdiction under subsection (a)(1) may 
     consider past activities of the target and facts and 
     circumstances relating to current or future activities of the 
     target. No United States person may be considered a foreign 
     power, agent of a foreign power, or officer or employee of a 
     foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected 
     by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United 
     States.
       ``(3) Review.--
       ``(A) Limitation on review.--Review by a judge having 
     jurisdiction under subsection (a)(1) shall be limited to that 
     required to make the findings described in paragraph (1).
       ``(B) Review of probable cause.--If the judge determines 
     that the facts submitted under subsection (b) are 
     insufficient to establish probable cause under paragraph 
     (1)(B), the judge shall enter an order so stating and provide 
     a written statement for the record of the reasons for the 
     determination. The Government may appeal an order under this 
     subparagraph pursuant to subsection (f).
       ``(C) Review of minimization procedures.--If the judge 
     determines that the proposed minimization procedures referred 
     to in paragraph (1)(C) do not meet the definition of 
     minimization procedures under section 101(h) or 301(4), as 
     appropriate, the judge shall enter an order so stating and 
     provide a written statement for the record of the reasons for 
     the determination. The Government may appeal an order under 
     this subparagraph pursuant to subsection (f).
       ``(D) Review of certification.--If the judge determines 
     that an application pursuant to subsection (b) does not 
     contain all of the required elements, or that the 
     certification or certifications are clearly erroneous on the 
     basis of the statement made under subsection (b)(1)(F)(v) and 
     any other information furnished under subsection (b)(3), the 
     judge shall enter an order so stating and provide a written 
     statement for the record of the reasons for the 
     determination. The Government may appeal an order under this 
     subparagraph pursuant to subsection (f).
       ``(4) Specifications.--An order approving an acquisition 
     under this subsection shall specify--
       ``(A) the identity, if known, or a description of the 
     United States person who is the target of the acquisition 
     identified or described in the application pursuant to 
     subsection (b)(1)(B);
       ``(B) if provided in the application pursuant to subsection 
     (b)(1)(H), the nature and location of each of the facilities 
     or places at which the acquisition will be directed;

[[Page 13241]]

       ``(C) the nature of the information sought to be acquired 
     and the type of communications or activities to be subjected 
     to acquisition;
       ``(D) a summary of the means by which the acquisition will 
     be conducted and whether physical entry is required to effect 
     the acquisition; and
       ``(E) the period of time during which the acquisition is 
     approved.
       ``(5) Directives.--An order approving an acquisition under 
     this subsection shall direct--
       ``(A) that the minimization procedures referred to in 
     paragraph (1)(C), as approved or modified by the Court, be 
     followed;
       ``(B) if applicable, an electronic communication service 
     provider to provide to the Government forthwith all 
     information, facilities, or assistance necessary to 
     accomplish the acquisition authorized under such order in a 
     manner that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and 
     produce a minimum of interference with the services that such 
     electronic communication service provider is providing to the 
     target of the acquisition;
       ``(C) if applicable, an electronic communication service 
     provider to maintain under security procedures approved by 
     the Attorney General any records concerning the acquisition 
     or the aid furnished that such electronic communication 
     service provider wishes to maintain; and
       ``(D) if applicable, that the Government compensate, at the 
     prevailing rate, such electronic communication service 
     provider for providing such information, facilities, or 
     assistance.
       ``(6) Duration.--An order approved under this subsection 
     shall be effective for a period not to exceed 90 days and 
     such order may be renewed for additional 90-day periods upon 
     submission of renewal applications meeting the requirements 
     of subsection (b).
       ``(7) Compliance.--At or prior to the end of the period of 
     time for which an acquisition is approved by an order or 
     extension under this section, the judge may assess compliance 
     with the minimization procedures referred to in paragraph 
     (1)(C) by reviewing the circumstances under which information 
     concerning United States persons was acquired, retained, or 
     disseminated.
       ``(d) Emergency Authorization.--
       ``(1) Authority for emergency authorization.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, if the 
     Attorney General reasonably determines that--
       ``(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to the 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information for which an 
     order may be obtained under subsection (c) before an order 
     authorizing such acquisition can with due diligence be 
     obtained, and
       ``(B) the factual basis for issuance of an order under this 
     subsection to approve such acquisition exists,
     the Attorney General may authorize such acquisition if a 
     judge having jurisdiction under subsection (a)(1) is informed 
     by the Attorney General, or a designee of the Attorney 
     General, at the time of such authorization that the decision 
     has been made to conduct such acquisition and if an 
     application in accordance with this section is made to a 
     judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as soon 
     as practicable, but not more than 7 days after the Attorney 
     General authorizes such acquisition.
       ``(2) Minimization procedures.--If the Attorney General 
     authorizes an acquisition under paragraph (1), the Attorney 
     General shall require that the minimization procedures 
     referred to in subsection (c)(1)(C) for the issuance of a 
     judicial order be followed.
       ``(3) Termination of emergency authorization.--In the 
     absence of a judicial order approving an acquisition under 
     paragraph (1), such acquisition shall terminate when the 
     information sought is obtained, when the application for the 
     order is denied, or after the expiration of 7 days from the 
     time of authorization by the Attorney General, whichever is 
     earliest.
       ``(4) Use of information.--If an application for approval 
     submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) is denied, or in any 
     other case where the acquisition is terminated and no order 
     is issued approving the acquisition, no information obtained 
     or evidence derived from such acquisition, except under 
     circumstances in which the target of the acquisition is 
     determined not to be a United States person, shall be 
     received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, 
     hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand 
     jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, 
     legislative committee, or other authority of the United 
     States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no 
     information concerning any United States person acquired from 
     such acquisition shall subsequently be used or disclosed in 
     any other manner by Federal officers or employees without the 
     consent of such person, except with the approval of the 
     Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of 
     death or serious bodily harm to any person.
       ``(e) Release From Liability.--No cause of action shall lie 
     in any court against any electronic communication service 
     provider for providing any information, facilities, or 
     assistance in accordance with an order or request for 
     emergency assistance issued pursuant to subsection (c) or 
     (d), respectively.
       ``(f) Appeal.--
       ``(1) Appeal to the foreign intelligence surveillance court 
     of review.--The Government may file a petition with the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review for review 
     of an order issued pursuant to subsection (c). The Court of 
     Review shall have jurisdiction to consider such petition and 
     shall provide a written statement for the record of the 
     reasons for a decision under this paragraph.
       ``(2) Certiorari to the supreme court.--The Government may 
     file a petition for a writ of certiorari for review of a 
     decision of the Court of Review issued under paragraph (1). 
     The record for such review shall be transmitted under seal to 
     the Supreme Court of the United States, which shall have 
     jurisdiction to review such decision.
       ``(g) Construction.--Except as provided in this section, 
     nothing in this Act shall be construed to require an 
     application for a court order for an acquisition that is 
     targeted in accordance with this section at a United States 
     person reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
     States.

     ``SEC. 704. OTHER ACQUISITIONS TARGETING UNITED STATES 
                   PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

       ``(a) Jurisdiction and Scope.--
       ``(1) Jurisdiction.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court shall have jurisdiction to enter an order pursuant to 
     subsection (c).
       ``(2) Scope.--No element of the intelligence community may 
     intentionally target, for the purpose of acquiring foreign 
     intelligence information, a United States person reasonably 
     believed to be located outside the United States under 
     circumstances in which the targeted United States person has 
     a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be 
     required if the acquisition were conducted inside the United 
     States for law enforcement purposes, unless a judge of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has entered an order 
     with respect to such targeted United States person or the 
     Attorney General has authorized an emergency acquisition 
     pursuant to subsection (c) or (d), respectively, or any other 
     provision of this Act.
       ``(3) Limitations.--
       ``(A) Moving or misidentified targets.--If a United States 
     person targeted under this subsection is reasonably believed 
     to be located in the United States during the effective 
     period of an order issued pursuant to subsection (c), an 
     acquisition targeting such United States person under this 
     section shall cease unless the targeted United States person 
     is again reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
     States during the effective period of such order.
       ``(B) Applicability.--If an acquisition for foreign 
     intelligence purposes is to be conducted inside the United 
     States and could be authorized under section 703, the 
     acquisition may only be conducted if authorized under section 
     703 or in accordance with another provision of this Act other 
     than this section.
       ``(C) Construction.--Nothing in this paragraph shall be 
     construed to limit the authority of the Government to seek an 
     order or authorization under, or otherwise engage in any 
     activity that is authorized under, any other title of this 
     Act.
       ``(b) Application.--Each application for an order under 
     this section shall be made by a Federal officer in writing 
     upon oath or affirmation to a judge having jurisdiction under 
     subsection (a)(1). Each application shall require the 
     approval of the Attorney General based upon the Attorney 
     General's finding that it satisfies the criteria and 
     requirements of such application as set forth in this section 
     and shall include--
       ``(1) the identity of the Federal officer making the 
     application;
       ``(2) the identity, if known, or a description of the 
     specific United States person who is the target of the 
     acquisition;
       ``(3) a statement of the facts and circumstances relied 
     upon to justify the applicant's belief that the United States 
     person who is the target of the acquisition is--
       ``(A) a person reasonably believed to be located outside 
     the United States; and
       ``(B) a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or an 
     officer or employee of a foreign power;
       ``(4) a statement of proposed minimization procedures that 
     meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 
     101(h) or 301(4), as appropriate;
       ``(5) a certification made by the Attorney General, an 
     official specified in section 104(a)(6), or the head of an 
     element of the intelligence community that--
       ``(A) the certifying official deems the information sought 
     to be foreign intelligence information; and
       ``(B) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
     foreign intelligence information;
       ``(6) a statement of the facts concerning any previous 
     applications that have been made to any judge of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court involving the United States 
     person specified in the application and the action taken on 
     each previous application; and
       ``(7) a statement of the period of time for which the 
     acquisition is required to be maintained, provided that such 
     period of time shall not exceed 90 days per application.

[[Page 13242]]

       ``(c) Order.--
       ``(1) Findings.--Upon an application made pursuant to 
     subsection (b), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
     shall enter an ex parte order as requested or as modified by 
     the Court if the Court finds that--
       ``(A) the application has been made by a Federal officer 
     and approved by the Attorney General;
       ``(B) on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant, 
     for the United States person who is the target of the 
     acquisition, there is probable cause to believe that the 
     target is--
       ``(i) a person reasonably believed to be located outside 
     the United States; and
       ``(ii) a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or an 
     officer or employee of a foreign power;
       ``(C) the proposed minimization procedures, with respect to 
     their dissemination provisions, meet the definition of 
     minimization procedures under section 101(h) or 301(4), as 
     appropriate; and
       ``(D) the application that has been filed contains all 
     statements and certifications required by subsection (b) and 
     the certification provided under subsection (b)(5) is not 
     clearly erroneous on the basis of the information furnished 
     under subsection (b).
       ``(2) Probable cause.--In determining whether or not 
     probable cause exists for purposes of paragraph (1)(B), a 
     judge having jurisdiction under subsection (a)(1) may 
     consider past activities of the target and facts and 
     circumstances relating to current or future activities of the 
     target. No United States person may be considered a foreign 
     power, agent of a foreign power, or officer or employee of a 
     foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected 
     by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United 
     States.
       ``(3) Review.--
       ``(A) Limitations on review.--Review by a judge having 
     jurisdiction under subsection (a)(1) shall be limited to that 
     required to make the findings described in paragraph (1). The 
     judge shall not have jurisdiction to review the means by 
     which an acquisition under this section may be conducted.
       ``(B)  Review of probable cause.--If the judge determines 
     that the facts submitted under subsection (b) are 
     insufficient to establish probable cause to issue an order 
     under this subsection, the judge shall enter an order so 
     stating and provide a written statement for the record of the 
     reasons for such determination. The Government may appeal an 
     order under this subparagraph pursuant to subsection (e).
       ``(C) Review of minimization procedures.--If the judge 
     determines that the minimization procedures applicable to 
     dissemination of information obtained through an acquisition 
     under this subsection do not meet the definition of 
     minimization procedures under section 101(h) or 301(4), as 
     appropriate, the judge shall enter an order so stating and 
     provide a written statement for the record of the reasons for 
     such determination. The Government may appeal an order under 
     this subparagraph pursuant to subsection (e).
       ``(D) Scope of review of certification.--If the judge 
     determines that an application under subsection (b) does not 
     contain all the required elements, or that the certification 
     provided under subsection (b)(5) is clearly erroneous on the 
     basis of the information furnished under subsection (b), the 
     judge shall enter an order so stating and provide a written 
     statement for the record of the reasons for such 
     determination. The Government may appeal an order under this 
     subparagraph pursuant to subsection (e).
       ``(4) Duration.--An order under this paragraph shall be 
     effective for a period not to exceed 90 days and such order 
     may be renewed for additional 90-day periods upon submission 
     of renewal applications meeting the requirements of 
     subsection (b).
       ``(5) Compliance.--At or prior to the end of the period of 
     time for which an order or extension is granted under this 
     section, the judge may assess compliance with the 
     minimization procedures referred to in paragraph (1)(C) by 
     reviewing the circumstances under which information 
     concerning United States persons was disseminated, provided 
     that the judge may not inquire into the circumstances 
     relating to the conduct of the acquisition.
       ``(d) Emergency Authorization.--
       ``(1) Authority for emergency authorization.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if the 
     Attorney General reasonably determines that--
       ``(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to the 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information for which an 
     order may be obtained under subsection (c) before an order 
     under that subsection can, with due diligence, be obtained, 
     and
       ``(B) the factual basis for the issuance of an order under 
     this section exists,
     the Attorney General may authorize the emergency acquisition 
     if a judge having jurisdiction under subsection (a)(1) is 
     informed by the Attorney General or a designee of the 
     Attorney General at the time of such authorization that the 
     decision has been made to conduct such acquisition and if an 
     application in accordance with this section is made to a 
     judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as soon 
     as practicable, but not more than 7 days after the Attorney 
     General authorizes such acquisition.
       ``(2) Minimization procedures.--If the Attorney General 
     authorizes an emergency acquisition under paragraph (1), the 
     Attorney General shall require that the minimization 
     procedures referred to in subsection (c)(1)(C) be followed.
       ``(3) Termination of emergency authorization.--In the 
     absence of an order under subsection (c), an emergency 
     acquisition under paragraph (1) shall terminate when the 
     information sought is obtained, if the application for the 
     order is denied, or after the expiration of 7 days from the 
     time of authorization by the Attorney General, whichever is 
     earliest.
       ``(4) Use of information.--If an application submitted to 
     the Court pursuant to paragraph (1) is denied, or in any 
     other case where the acquisition is terminated and no order 
     with respect to the target of the acquisition is issued under 
     subsection (c), no information obtained or evidence derived 
     from such acquisition, except under circumstances in which 
     the target of the acquisition is determined not to be a 
     United States person, shall be received in evidence or 
     otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other 
     proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, 
     office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or 
     other authority of the United States, a State, or political 
     subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any United 
     States person acquired from such acquisition shall 
     subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner by 
     Federal officers or employees without the consent of such 
     person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if 
     the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily 
     harm to any person.

       ``(e) Appeal.--
       ``(1) Appeal to the court of review.--The Government may 
     file a petition with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court of Review for review of an order issued pursuant to 
     subsection (c). The Court of Review shall have jurisdiction 
     to consider such petition and shall provide a written 
     statement for the record of the reasons for a decision under 
     this paragraph.
       ``(2) Certiorari to the supreme court.--The Government may 
     file a petition for a writ of certiorari for review of a 
     decision of the Court of Review issued under paragraph (1). 
     The record for such review shall be transmitted under seal to 
     the Supreme Court of the United States, which shall have 
     jurisdiction to review such decision.''

     ``SEC. 705. JOINT APPLICATIONS AND CONCURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS.

       ``(a) Joint Applications and Orders.--If an acquisition 
     targeting a United States person under section 703 or 704 is 
     proposed to be conducted both inside and outside the United 
     States, a judge having jurisdiction under section 703(a)(1) 
     or 704(a)(1) may issue simultaneously, upon the request of 
     the Government in a joint application complying with the 
     requirements of sections 703(b) and 704(b), orders under 
     sections 703(c) and 704(c), as appropriate.
       ``(b) Concurrent Authorization.--If an order authorizing 
     electronic surveillance or physical search has been obtained 
     under section 105 or 304, the Attorney General may authorize, 
     for the effective period of that order, without an order 
     under section 703 or 704, the targeting of that United States 
     person for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence 
     information while such person is reasonably believed to be 
     located outside the United States.

     ``SEC. 706. USE OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED UNDER TITLE VII.

       ``(a) Information Acquired Under Section 702.--Information 
     acquired from an acquisition conducted under section 702 
     shall be deemed to be information acquired from an electronic 
     surveillance pursuant to title I for purposes of section 106, 
     except for the purposes of subsection (j) of such section.
       ``(b) Information Acquired Under Section 703.--Information 
     acquired from an acquisition conducted under section 703 
     shall be deemed to be information acquired from an electronic 
     surveillance pursuant to title I for purposes of section 106.

     ``SEC. 707. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.

       ``(a) Semiannual Report.--Not less frequently than once 
     every 6 months, the Attorney General shall fully inform, in a 
     manner consistent with national security, the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the Committees on the Judiciary 
     of the Senate and the House of Representatives, consistent 
     with the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Standing 
     Rules of the Senate, and Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th 
     Congress or any successor Senate resolution, concerning the 
     implementation of this title.
       ``(b) Content.--Each report under subsection (a) shall 
     include--
       ``(1) with respect to section 702--
       ``(A) any certifications submitted in accordance with 
     section 702(g) during the reporting period;
       ``(B) with respect to each determination under section 
     702(c)(2), the reasons for exercising the authority under 
     such section;
       ``(C) any directives issued under section 702(h) during the 
     reporting period;
       ``(D) a description of the judicial review during the 
     reporting period of such certifications and targeting and 
     minimization procedures adopted in accordance with 
     subsections (d) and (e) of section 702 and utilized

[[Page 13243]]

     with respect to an acquisition under such section, including 
     a copy of an order or pleading in connection with such review 
     that contains a significant legal interpretation of the 
     provisions of section 702;
       ``(E) any actions taken to challenge or enforce a directive 
     under paragraph (4) or (5) of section 702(h);
       ``(F) any compliance reviews conducted by the Attorney 
     General or the Director of National Intelligence of 
     acquisitions authorized under section 702(a);
       ``(G) a description of any incidents of noncompliance--
       ``(i) with a directive issued by the Attorney General and 
     the Director of National Intelligence under section 702(h), 
     including incidents of noncompliance by a specified person to 
     whom the Attorney General and Director of National 
     Intelligence issued a directive under section 702(h); and
       ``(ii) by an element of the intelligence community with 
     procedures and guidelines adopted in accordance with 
     subsections (d), (e), and (f) of section 702; and
       ``(H) any procedures implementing section 702;
       ``(2) with respect to section 703--
       ``(A) the total number of applications made for orders 
     under section 703(b);
       ``(B) the total number of such orders--
       ``(i) granted;
       ``(ii) modified; and
       ``(iii) denied; and
       ``(C) the total number of emergency acquisitions authorized 
     by the Attorney General under section 703(d) and the total 
     number of subsequent orders approving or denying such 
     acquisitions; and
       ``(3) with respect to section 704--
       ``(A) the total number of applications made for orders 
     under section 704(b);
       ``(B) the total number of such orders--
       ``(i) granted;
       ``(ii) modified; and
       ``(iii) denied; and
       ``(C) the total number of emergency acquisitions authorized 
     by the Attorney General under section 704(d) and the total 
     number of subsequent orders approving or denying such 
     applications.

     ``SEC. 708. SAVINGS PROVISION.

       ``Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit the 
     authority of the Government to seek an order or authorization 
     under, or otherwise engage in any activity that is authorized 
     under, any other title of this Act.''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) by striking the item relating to title VII;
       (2) by striking the item relating to section 701; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:

 ``TITLE VII--ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES REGARDING CERTAIN PERSONS OUTSIDE 
                           THE UNITED STATES

``Sec. 701. Definitions.
``Sec. 702. Procedures for targeting certain persons outside the United 
              States other than United States persons.
``Sec. 703. Certain acquisitions inside the United States targeting 
              United States persons outside the United States.
``Sec. 704. Other acquisitions targeting United States persons outside 
              the United States.
``Sec. 705. Joint applications and concurrent authorizations.
``Sec. 706. Use of information acquired under title VII.
``Sec. 707. Congressional oversight.
``Sec. 708. Savings provision.''.

       (c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Title 18, united states code.--Section 
     2511(2)(a)(ii)(A) of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
     by inserting ``or a court order pursuant to section 704 of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978'' after 
     ``assistance''.
       (2) Foreign intelligence surveillance act of 1978.--Section 
     601(a)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1871(a)(1)) is amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``and''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:
       ``(E) acquisitions under section 703; and
       ``(F) acquisitions under section 704;''.

     SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF EXCLUSIVE MEANS BY WHICH ELECTRONIC 
                   SURVEILLANCE AND INTERCEPTION OF CERTAIN 
                   COMMUNICATIONS MAY BE CONDUCTED.

       (a) Statement of Exclusive Means.--Title I of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:


  ``statement of exclusive means by which electronic surveillance and 
        interception of certain communications may be conducted

       ``Sec. 112.  (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the 
     procedures of chapters 119, 121, and 206 of title 18, United 
     States Code, and this Act shall be the exclusive means by 
     which electronic surveillance and the interception of 
     domestic wire, oral, or electronic communications may be 
     conducted.
       ``(b) Only an express statutory authorization for 
     electronic surveillance or the interception of domestic wire, 
     oral, or electronic communications, other than as an 
     amendment to this Act or chapters 119, 121, or 206 of title 
     18, United States Code, shall constitute an additional 
     exclusive means for the purpose of subsection (a).''.
       (b) Offense.--Section 109(a) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1809(a)) is amended by 
     striking ``authorized by statute'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``authorized by this Act, chapter 119, 121, or 206 
     of title 18, United States Code, or any express statutory 
     authorization that is an additional exclusive means for 
     conducting electronic surveillance under section 112.''; and
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Title 18, united states code.--Section 2511(2)(a) of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:
       ``(iii) If a certification under subparagraph (ii)(B) for 
     assistance to obtain foreign intelligence information is 
     based on statutory authority, the certification shall 
     identify the specific statutory provision and shall certify 
     that the statutory requirements have been met.''; and
       (2) Table of contents.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the 
     item relating to section 111, the following new item:

``Sec. 112. Statement of exclusive means by which electronic 
              surveillance and interception of certain communications 
              may be conducted.''.

     SEC. 103. SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS OF CERTAIN COURT ORDERS UNDER 
                   THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 
                   1978.

       (a) Inclusion of Certain Orders in Semiannual Reports of 
     Attorney General.--Subsection (a)(5) of section 601 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1871) is amended by striking ``(not including orders)'' and 
     inserting ``, orders,''.
       (b) Reports by Attorney General on Certain Other Orders.--
     Such section 601 is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(c) Submissions to Congress.--The Attorney General shall 
     submit to the committees of Congress referred to in 
     subsection (a)--
       ``(1) a copy of any decision, order, or opinion issued by 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that includes 
     significant construction or interpretation of any provision 
     of this Act, and any pleadings, applications, or memoranda of 
     law associated with such decision, order, or opinion, not 
     later than 45 days after such decision, order, or opinion is 
     issued; and
       ``(2) a copy of each such decision, order, or opinion, and 
     any pleadings, applications, or memoranda of law associated 
     with such decision, order, or opinion, that was issued during 
     the 5-year period ending on the date of the enactment of the 
     FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and not previously submitted in a 
     report under subsection (a).
       ``(d) Protection of National Security.--The Attorney 
     General, in consultation with the Director of National 
     Intelligence, may authorize redactions of materials described 
     in subsection (c) that are provided to the committees of 
     Congress referred to in subsection (a), if such redactions 
     are necessary to protect the national security of the United 
     States and are limited to sensitive sources and methods 
     information or the identities of targets.''.
       (c) Definitions.--Such section 601, as amended by 
     subsections (a) and (b), is further amended by adding at the 
     end the following:
       ``(e) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Foreign intelligence surveillance court.--The term 
     `Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court' means the court 
     established under section 103(a).
       ``(2) Foreign intelligence surveillance court of review.--
     The term `Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review' 
     means the court established under section 103(b).''.

     SEC. 104. APPLICATIONS FOR COURT ORDERS.

       Section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking paragraphs (2) and (11);
       (B) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (10) as 
     paragraphs (2) through (9), respectively;
       (C) in paragraph (5), as redesignated by subparagraph (B) 
     of this paragraph, by striking ``detailed'';
       (D) in paragraph (6), as redesignated by subparagraph (B) 
     of this paragraph, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)--
       (i) by striking ``Affairs or'' and inserting ``Affairs,''; 
     and
       (ii) by striking ``Senate--'' and inserting ``Senate, or 
     the Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
     if designated by the President as a certifying official--'';
       (E) in paragraph (7), as redesignated by subparagraph (B) 
     of this paragraph, by striking ``statement of'' and inserting 
     ``summary statement of'';

[[Page 13244]]

       (F) in paragraph (8), as redesignated by subparagraph (B) 
     of this paragraph, by adding ``and'' at the end; and
       (G) in paragraph (9), as redesignated by subparagraph (B) 
     of this paragraph, by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     period;
       (2) by striking subsection (b);
       (3) by redesignating subsections (c) through (e) as 
     subsections (b) through (d), respectively; and
       (4) in paragraph (1)(A) of subsection (d), as redesignated 
     by paragraph (3) of this subsection, by striking ``or the 
     Director of National Intelligence'' and inserting ``the 
     Director of National Intelligence, or the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency''.

     SEC. 105. ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER.

       (a) In General.--Section 105 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking paragraph (1); and
       (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (5) as 
     paragraphs (1) through (4), respectively;
       (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``(a)(3)'' and inserting 
     ``(a)(2)'';
       (3) in subsection (c)(1)--
       (A) in subparagraph (D), by adding ``and'' at the end;
       (B) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a period; and
       (C) by striking subparagraph (F);
       (4) by striking subsection (d);
       (5) by redesignating subsections (e) through (i) as 
     subsections (d) through (h), respectively;
       (6) by amending subsection (e), as redesignated by 
     paragraph (5) of this section, to read as follows:
       ``(e)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, 
     the Attorney General may authorize the emergency employment 
     of electronic surveillance if the Attorney General--
       ``(A) reasonably determines that an emergency situation 
     exists with respect to the employment of electronic 
     surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information 
     before an order authorizing such surveillance can with due 
     diligence be obtained;
       ``(B) reasonably determines that the factual basis for the 
     issuance of an order under this title to approve such 
     electronic surveillance exists;
       ``(C) informs, either personally or through a designee, a 
     judge having jurisdiction under section 103 at the time of 
     such authorization that the decision has been made to employ 
     emergency electronic surveillance; and
       ``(D) makes an application in accordance with this title to 
     a judge having jurisdiction under section 103 as soon as 
     practicable, but not later than 7 days after the Attorney 
     General authorizes such surveillance.
       ``(2) If the Attorney General authorizes the emergency 
     employment of electronic surveillance under paragraph (1), 
     the Attorney General shall require that the minimization 
     procedures required by this title for the issuance of a 
     judicial order be followed.
       ``(3) In the absence of a judicial order approving such 
     electronic surveillance, the surveillance shall terminate 
     when the information sought is obtained, when the application 
     for the order is denied, or after the expiration of 7 days 
     from the time of authorization by the Attorney General, 
     whichever is earliest.
       ``(4) A denial of the application made under this 
     subsection may be reviewed as provided in section 103.
       ``(5) In the event that such application for approval is 
     denied, or in any other case where the electronic 
     surveillance is terminated and no order is issued approving 
     the surveillance, no information obtained or evidence derived 
     from such surveillance shall be received in evidence or 
     otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other 
     proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, 
     office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or 
     other authority of the United States, a State, or political 
     subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any United 
     States person acquired from such surveillance shall 
     subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner by 
     Federal officers or employees without the consent of such 
     person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if 
     the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily 
     harm to any person.
       ``(6) The Attorney General shall assess compliance with the 
     requirements of paragraph (5).''; and
       (7) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(i) In any case in which the Government makes an 
     application to a judge under this title to conduct electronic 
     surveillance involving communications and the judge grants 
     such application, upon the request of the applicant, the 
     judge shall also authorize the installation and use of pen 
     registers and trap and trace devices, and direct the 
     disclosure of the information set forth in section 
     402(d)(2).''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 108(a)(2)(C) of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1808(a)(2)(C)) is amended by striking ``105(f)'' and 
     inserting ``105(e)'';

     SEC. 106. USE OF INFORMATION.

       Subsection (i) of section 106 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (8 U.S.C. 1806) is amended by 
     striking ``radio communication'' and inserting 
     ``communication''.

     SEC. 107. AMENDMENTS FOR PHYSICAL SEARCHES.

       (a) Applications.--Section 303 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1823) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking paragraph (2);
       (B) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (9) as 
     paragraphs (2) through (8), respectively;
       (C) in paragraph (2), as redesignated by subparagraph (B) 
     of this paragraph, by striking ``detailed'';
       (D) in paragraph (3)(C), as redesignated by subparagraph 
     (B) of this paragraph, by inserting ``or is about to be'' 
     before ``owned''; and
       (E) in paragraph (6), as redesignated by subparagraph (B) 
     of this paragraph, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)--
       (i) by striking ``Affairs or'' and inserting ``Affairs,''; 
     and
       (ii) by striking ``Senate--'' and inserting ``Senate, or 
     the Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
     if designated by the President as a certifying official--''; 
     and
       (2) in subsection (d)(1)(A), by striking ``or the Director 
     of National Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Director of 
     National Intelligence, or the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency''.
       (b) Orders.--Section 304 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1824) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking paragraph (1);
       (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (5) as 
     paragraphs (1) through (4), respectively; and
       (C) in paragraph (2)(B), as redesignated by subparagraph 
     (B) of this paragraph, by inserting ``or is about to be'' 
     before ``owned''; and
       (2) by amending subsection (e) to read as follows:
       ``(e)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, 
     the Attorney General may authorize the emergency employment 
     of a physical search if the Attorney General--
       ``(A) reasonably determines that an emergency situation 
     exists with respect to the employment of a physical search to 
     obtain foreign intelligence information before an order 
     authorizing such physical search can with due diligence be 
     obtained;
       ``(B) reasonably determines that the factual basis for 
     issuance of an order under this title to approve such 
     physical search exists;
       ``(C) informs, either personally or through a designee, a 
     judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court at the 
     time of such authorization that the decision has been made to 
     employ an emergency physical search; and
       ``(D) makes an application in accordance with this title to 
     a judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as 
     soon as practicable, but not more than 7 days after the 
     Attorney General authorizes such physical search.
       ``(2) If the Attorney General authorizes the emergency 
     employment of a physical search under paragraph (1), the 
     Attorney General shall require that the minimization 
     procedures required by this title for the issuance of a 
     judicial order be followed.
       ``(3) In the absence of a judicial order approving such 
     physical search, the physical search shall terminate when the 
     information sought is obtained, when the application for the 
     order is denied, or after the expiration of 7 days from the 
     time of authorization by the Attorney General, whichever is 
     earliest.
       ``(4) A denial of the application made under this 
     subsection may be reviewed as provided in section 103.
       ``(5) In the event that such application for approval is 
     denied, or in any other case where the physical search is 
     terminated and no order is issued approving the physical 
     search, no information obtained or evidence derived from such 
     physical search shall be received in evidence or otherwise 
     disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or 
     before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, 
     regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of 
     the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, 
     and no information concerning any United States person 
     acquired from such physical search shall subsequently be used 
     or disclosed in any other manner by Federal officers or 
     employees without the consent of such person, except with the 
     approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates 
     a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.
       ``(6) The Attorney General shall assess compliance with the 
     requirements of paragraph (5).''.
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--The Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is 
     amended--
       (1) in section 304(a)(4), as redesignated by subsection (b) 
     of this section, by striking ``303(a)(7)(E)'' and inserting 
     ``303(a)(6)(E)''; and
       (2) in section 305(k)(2), by striking ``303(a)(7)'' and 
     inserting ``303(a)(6)''.

     SEC. 108. AMENDMENTS FOR EMERGENCY PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND 
                   TRACE DEVICES.

       Section 403 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1843) is amended--

[[Page 13245]]

       (1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``48 hours'' and 
     inserting ``7 days''; and
       (2) in subsection (c)(1)(C), by striking ``48 hours'' and 
     inserting ``7 days''.

     SEC. 109. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT.

       (a) Designation of Judges.--Subsection (a) of section 103 
     of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1803) is amended by inserting ``at least'' before 
     ``seven of the United States judicial circuits''.
       (b) En Banc Authority.--
       (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 103 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by 
     subsection (a) of this section, is further amended--
       (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2)(A) The court established under this subsection may, 
     on its own initiative, or upon the request of the Government 
     in any proceeding or a party under section 501(f) or 
     paragraph (4) or (5) of section 702(h), hold a hearing or 
     rehearing, en banc, when ordered by a majority of the judges 
     that constitute such court upon a determination that--
       ``(i) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or 
     maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or
       ``(ii) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional 
     importance.
       ``(B) Any authority granted by this Act to a judge of the 
     court established under this subsection may be exercised by 
     the court en banc. When exercising such authority, the court 
     en banc shall comply with any requirements of this Act on the 
     exercise of such authority.
       ``(C) For purposes of this paragraph, the court en banc 
     shall consist of all judges who constitute the court 
     established under this subsection.''.
       (2) Conforming amendments.--The Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 is further amended--
       (A) in subsection (a) of section 103, as amended by this 
     subsection, by inserting ``(except when sitting en banc under 
     paragraph (2))'' after ``no judge designated under this 
     subsection''; and
       (B) in section 302(c) (50 U.S.C. 1822(c)), by inserting 
     ``(except when sitting en banc)'' after ``except that no 
     judge''.
       (c) Stay or Modification During an Appeal.--Section 103 of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1803) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(f)(1) A judge of the court established under subsection 
     (a), the court established under subsection (b) or a judge of 
     that court, or the Supreme Court of the United States or a 
     justice of that court, may, in accordance with the rules of 
     their respective courts, enter a stay of an order or an order 
     modifying an order of the court established under subsection 
     (a) or the court established under subsection (b) entered 
     under any title of this Act, while the court established 
     under subsection (a) conducts a rehearing, while an appeal is 
     pending to the court established under subsection (b), or 
     while a petition of certiorari is pending in the Supreme 
     Court of the United States, or during the pendency of any 
     review by that court.
       ``(2) The authority described in paragraph (1) shall apply 
     to an order entered under any provision of this Act.''.
       (d) Authority of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.--
     Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803), as amended by this Act, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(i) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to reduce or 
     contravene the inherent authority of the court established 
     under subsection (a) to determine or enforce compliance with 
     an order or a rule of such court or with a procedure approved 
     by such court.''.

     SEC. 110. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

       (a) Definitions.--
       (1) Foreign power.--Subsection (a) of section 101 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1801(a)) is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (5), by striking ``persons; or'' and 
     inserting ``persons;'';
       (B) in paragraph (6) by striking the period and inserting 
     ``; or''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(7) an entity not substantially composed of United States 
     persons that is engaged in the international proliferation of 
     weapons of mass destruction.''.
       (2) Agent of a foreign power.--Subsection (b)(1) of such 
     section 101 is amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``or'' at the end; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:
       ``(D) engages in the international proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction, or activities in preparation therefor; 
     or
       ``(E) engages in the international proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction, or activities in preparation therefor 
     for or on behalf of a foreign power; or''.
       (3) Foreign intelligence information.--Subsection (e)(1)(B) 
     of such section 101 is amended by striking ``sabotage or 
     international terrorism'' and inserting ``sabotage, 
     international terrorism, or the international proliferation 
     of weapons of mass destruction''.
       (4) Weapon of mass destruction.--Such section 101 is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(p) `Weapon of mass destruction' means--
       ``(1) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas device that 
     is designed, intended, or has the capability to cause a mass 
     casualty incident;
       ``(2) any weapon that is designed, intended, or has the 
     capability to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 
     significant number of persons through the release, 
     dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or 
     their precursors;
       ``(3) any weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or 
     vector (as such terms are defined in section 178 of title 18, 
     United States Code) that is designed, intended, or has the 
     capability to cause death, illness, or serious bodily injury 
     to a significant number of persons; or
       ``(4) any weapon that is designed, intended, or has the 
     capability to release radiation or radioactivity causing 
     death, illness, or serious bodily injury to a significant 
     number of persons.''.
       (b) Use of Information.--
       (1) In general.--Section 106(k)(1)(B) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1806(k)(1)(B)) is amended by striking ``sabotage or 
     international terrorism'' and inserting ``sabotage, 
     international terrorism, or the international proliferation 
     of weapons of mass destruction''.
       (2) Physical searches.--Section 305(k)(1)(B) of such Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 1825(k)(1)(B)) is amended by striking ``sabotage 
     or international terrorism'' and inserting ``sabotage, 
     international terrorism, or the international proliferation 
     of weapons of mass destruction''.
       (c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--The Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is further amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2) of section 105(d) (50 U.S.C. 1805(d)), 
     as redesignated by section 105(a)(5) of this Act, by striking 
     ``section 101(a) (5) or (6)'' and inserting ``paragraph (5), 
     (6), or (7) of section 101(a)'';
       (2) in section 301(1) (50 U.S.C. 1821(1)), by inserting 
     ``weapon of mass destruction,'' after ``person,''; and
       (3) in section 304(d)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1824(d)(2)), by 
     striking ``section 101(a) (5) or (6)'' and inserting 
     ``paragraph (5), (6), or (7) of section 101(a)''.

  TITLE II--PROTECTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION SERVICE PROVIDERS

     SEC. 201. PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING STATUTORY DEFENSES 
                   UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 
                   OF 1978.

       The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), as amended by section 101, is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following new title:

      ``TITLE VIII--PROTECTION OF PERSONS ASSISTING THE GOVERNMENT

     ``SEC. 801. DEFINITIONS.

       ``In this title:
       ``(1) Assistance.--The term `assistance' means the 
     provision of, or the provision of access to, information 
     (including communication contents, communications records, or 
     other information relating to a customer or communication), 
     facilities, or another form of assistance.
       ``(2) Civil action.--The term `civil action' includes a 
     covered civil action.
       ``(3) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     `congressional intelligence committees' means--
       ``(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
     and
       ``(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       ``(4) Contents.--The term `contents' has the meaning given 
     that term in section 101(n).
       ``(5) Covered civil action.--The term `covered civil 
     action' means a civil action filed in a Federal or State 
     court that--
       ``(A) alleges that an electronic communication service 
     provider furnished assistance to an element of the 
     intelligence community; and
       ``(B) seeks monetary or other relief from the electronic 
     communication service provider related to the provision of 
     such assistance.
       ``(6) Electronic communication service provider.--The term 
     `electronic communication service provider' means--
       ``(A) a telecommunications carrier, as that term is defined 
     in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 
     153);
       ``(B) a provider of electronic communication service, as 
     that term is defined in section 2510 of title 18, United 
     States Code;
       ``(C) a provider of a remote computing service, as that 
     term is defined in section 2711 of title 18, United States 
     Code;
       ``(D) any other communication service provider who has 
     access to wire or electronic communications either as such 
     communications are transmitted or as such communications are 
     stored;
       ``(E) a parent, subsidiary, affiliate, successor, or 
     assignee of an entity described in subparagraph (A), (B), 
     (C), or (D); or

[[Page 13246]]

       ``(F) an officer, employee, or agent of an entity described 
     in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E).
       ``(7) Intelligence community.--The term `intelligence 
     community' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
       ``(8) Person.--The term `person' means--
       ``(A) an electronic communication service provider; or
       ``(B) a landlord, custodian, or other person who may be 
     authorized or required to furnish assistance pursuant to--
       ``(i) an order of the court established under section 
     103(a) directing such assistance;
       ``(ii) a certification in writing under section 
     2511(2)(a)(ii)(B) or 2709(b) of title 18, United States Code; 
     or
       ``(iii) a directive under section 102(a)(4), 105B(e), as 
     added by section 2 of the Protect America Act of 2007 (Public 
     Law 110-55), or 702(h).
       ``(9) State.--The term `State' means any State, political 
     subdivision of a State, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the 
     District of Columbia, and any territory or possession of the 
     United States, and includes any officer, public utility 
     commission, or other body authorized to regulate an 
     electronic communication service provider.

     ``SEC. 802. PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING STATUTORY DEFENSES.

       ``(a) Requirement for Certification.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, a civil action may not lie or be 
     maintained in a Federal or State court against any person for 
     providing assistance to an element of the intelligence 
     community, and shall be promptly dismissed, if the Attorney 
     General certifies to the district court of the United States 
     in which such action is pending that--
       ``(1) any assistance by that person was provided pursuant 
     to an order of the court established under section 103(a) 
     directing such assistance;
       ``(2) any assistance by that person was provided pursuant 
     to a certification in writing under section 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B) 
     or 2709(b) of title 18, United States Code;
       ``(3) any assistance by that person was provided pursuant 
     to a directive under section 102(a)(4), 105B(e), as added by 
     section 2 of the Protect America Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-
     55), or 702(h) directing such assistance;
       ``(4) in the case of a covered civil action, the assistance 
     alleged to have been provided by the electronic communication 
     service provider was--
       ``(A) in connection with an intelligence activity involving 
     communications that was--
       ``(i) authorized by the President during the period 
     beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 
     2007; and
       ``(ii) designed to detect or prevent a terrorist attack, or 
     activities in preparation for a terrorist attack, against the 
     United States; and
       ``(B) the subject of a written request or directive, or a 
     series of written requests or directives, from the Attorney 
     General or the head of an element of the intelligence 
     community (or the deputy of such person) to the electronic 
     communication service provider indicating that the activity 
     was--
       ``(i) authorized by the President; and
       ``(ii) determined to be lawful; or
       ``(5) the person did not provide the alleged assistance.
       ``(b) Judicial Review.--
       ``(1) Review of certifications.--A certification under 
     subsection (a) shall be given effect unless the court finds 
     that such certification is not supported by substantial 
     evidence provided to the court pursuant to this section.
       ``(2) Supplemental materials.--In its review of a 
     certification under subsection (a), the court may examine the 
     court order, certification, written request, or directive 
     described in subsection (a) and any relevant court order, 
     certification, written request, or directive submitted 
     pursuant to subsection (d).
       ``(c) Limitations on Disclosure.--If the Attorney General 
     files a declaration under section 1746 of title 28, United 
     States Code, that disclosure of a certification made pursuant 
     to subsection (a) or the supplemental materials provided 
     pursuant to subsection (b) or (d) would harm the national 
     security of the United States, the court shall--
       ``(1) review such certification and the supplemental 
     materials in camera and ex parte; and
       ``(2) limit any public disclosure concerning such 
     certification and the supplemental materials, including any 
     public order following such in camera and ex parte review, to 
     a statement as to whether the case is dismissed and a 
     description of the legal standards that govern the order, 
     without disclosing the paragraph of subsection (a) that is 
     the basis for the certification.
       ``(d) Role of the Parties.--Any plaintiff or defendant in a 
     civil action may submit any relevant court order, 
     certification, written request, or directive to the district 
     court referred to in subsection (a) for review and shall be 
     permitted to participate in the briefing or argument of any 
     legal issue in a judicial proceeding conducted pursuant to 
     this section, but only to the extent that such participation 
     does not require the disclosure of classified information to 
     such party. To the extent that classified information is 
     relevant to the proceeding or would be revealed in the 
     determination of an issue, the court shall review such 
     information in camera and ex parte, and shall issue any part 
     of the court's written order that would reveal classified 
     information in camera and ex parte and maintain such part 
     under seal.
       ``(e) Nondelegation.--The authority and duties of the 
     Attorney General under this section shall be performed by the 
     Attorney General (or Acting Attorney General) or the Deputy 
     Attorney General.
       ``(f) Appeal.--The courts of appeals shall have 
     jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory orders of the 
     district courts of the United States granting or denying a 
     motion to dismiss or for summary judgment under this section.
       ``(g) Removal.--A civil action against a person for 
     providing assistance to an element of the intelligence 
     community that is brought in a State court shall be deemed to 
     arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States 
     and shall be removable under section 1441 of title 28, United 
     States Code.
       ``(h) Relationship to Other Laws.--Nothing in this section 
     shall be construed to limit any otherwise available immunity, 
     privilege, or defense under any other provision of law.
       ``(i) Applicability.--This section shall apply to a civil 
     action pending on or filed after the date of the enactment of 
     the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.

     ``SEC. 803. PREEMPTION.

       ``(a) In General.--No State shall have authority to--
       ``(1) conduct an investigation into an electronic 
     communication service provider's alleged assistance to an 
     element of the intelligence community;
       ``(2) require through regulation or any other means the 
     disclosure of information about an electronic communication 
     service provider's alleged assistance to an element of the 
     intelligence community;
       ``(3) impose any administrative sanction on an electronic 
     communication service provider for assistance to an element 
     of the intelligence community; or
       ``(4) commence or maintain a civil action or other 
     proceeding to enforce a requirement that an electronic 
     communication service provider disclose information 
     concerning alleged assistance to an element of the 
     intelligence community.
       ``(b) Suits by the United States.--The United States may 
     bring suit to enforce the provisions of this section.
       ``(c) Jurisdiction.--The district courts of the United 
     States shall have jurisdiction over any civil action brought 
     by the United States to enforce the provisions of this 
     section.
       ``(d) Application.--This section shall apply to any 
     investigation, action, or proceeding that is pending on or 
     commenced after the date of the enactment of the FISA 
     Amendments Act of 2008.

     ``SEC. 804. REPORTING.

       ``(a) Semiannual Report.--Not less frequently than once 
     every 6 months, the Attorney General shall, in a manner 
     consistent with national security, the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives, the Standing Rules of the Senate, and Senate 
     Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress or any successor Senate 
     resolution, fully inform the congressional intelligence 
     committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and 
     the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives concerning the implementation of this title.
       ``(b) Content.--Each report made under subsection (a) shall 
     include--
       ``(1) any certifications made under section 802;
       ``(2) a description of the judicial review of the 
     certifications made under section 802; and
       ``(3) any actions taken to enforce the provisions of 
     section 803.''.

     SEC. 202. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.

       The table of contents in the first section of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.), as amended by section 101(b), is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following:

      ``TITLE VIII--PROTECTION OF PERSONS ASSISTING THE GOVERNMENT

``Sec. 801. Definitions.
``Sec. 802. Procedures for implementing statutory defenses.
``Sec. 803. Preemption.
``Sec. 804. Reporting.''.

                 TITLE III--REVIEW OF PREVIOUS ACTIONS

     SEC. 301. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS ACTIONS.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
     ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
       (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
       (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
       (2) Foreign intelligence surveillance court.--The term 
     ``Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court'' means the court 
     established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)).
       (3) President's surveillance program and program.--The 
     terms ``President's Surveillance Program'' and ``Program'' 
     mean the intelligence activity involving communications that 
     was authorized by the President during the period beginning 
     on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17,

[[Page 13247]]

     2007, including the program referred to by the President in a 
     radio address on December 17, 2005 (commonly known as the 
     Terrorist Surveillance Program).
       (b) Reviews.--
       (1) Requirement to conduct.--The Inspectors General of the 
     Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence, the National Security Agency, the Department of 
     Defense, and any other element of the intelligence community 
     that participated in the President's Surveillance Program, 
     shall complete a comprehensive review of, with respect to the 
     oversight authority and responsibility of each such Inspector 
     General--
       (A) all of the facts necessary to describe the 
     establishment, implementation, product, and use of the 
     product of the Program;
       (B) access to legal reviews of the Program and access to 
     information about the Program;
       (C) communications with, and participation of, individuals 
     and entities in the private sector related to the Program;
       (D) interaction with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court and transition to court orders related to the Program; 
     and
       (E) any other matters identified by any such Inspector 
     General that would enable that Inspector General to complete 
     a review of the Program, with respect to such Department or 
     element.
       (2) Cooperation and coordination.--
       (A) Cooperation.--Each Inspector General required to 
     conduct a review under paragraph (1) shall--
       (i) work in conjunction, to the extent practicable, with 
     any other Inspector General required to conduct such a 
     review; and
       (ii) utilize, to the extent practicable, and not 
     unnecessarily duplicate or delay, such reviews or audits that 
     have been completed or are being undertaken by any such 
     Inspector General or by any other office of the Executive 
     Branch related to the Program.
       (B) Integration of other reviews.--The Counsel of the 
     Office of Professional Responsibility of the Department of 
     Justice shall provide the report of any investigation 
     conducted by such Office on matters relating to the Program, 
     including any investigation of the process through which 
     legal reviews of the Program were conducted and the substance 
     of such reviews, to the Inspector General of the Department 
     of Justice, who shall integrate the factual findings and 
     conclusions of such investigation into its review.
       (C) Coordination.--The Inspectors General shall designate 
     one of the Inspectors General required to conduct a review 
     under paragraph (1) that is appointed by the President, by 
     and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to coordinate 
     the conduct of the reviews and the preparation of the 
     reports.
       (c) Reports.--
       (1) Preliminary reports.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspectors General of 
     the Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of 
     National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, the 
     Department of Defense, and any other Inspector General 
     required to conduct a review under subsection (b)(1), shall 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an interim 
     report that describes the planned scope of such review.
       (2) Final report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Inspectors General of the 
     Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence, the National Security Agency, the Department of 
     Defense, and any other Inspector General required to conduct 
     a review under subsection (b)(1), shall submit to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress, in a manner consistent 
     with national security, a comprehensive report on such 
     reviews that includes any recommendations of any such 
     Inspectors General within the oversight authority and 
     responsibility of any such Inspector General with respect to 
     the reviews.
       (3) Form.--A report under this subsection shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex. The unclassified report shall not disclose the name or 
     identity of any individual or entity of the private sector 
     that participated in the Program or with whom there was 
     communication about the Program, to the extent that 
     information is classified.
       (d) Resources.--
       (1) Expedited security clearance.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the 
     investigation and adjudication of an application by an 
     Inspector General or any appropriate staff of an Inspector 
     General for a security clearance necessary for the conduct of 
     the review under subsection (b)(1) is carried out as 
     expeditiously as possible.
       (2) Additional personnel for the inspectors general.--An 
     Inspector General required to conduct a review under 
     subsection (b)(1) and submit a report under subsection (c) is 
     authorized to hire such additional personnel as may be 
     necessary to carry out such review and prepare such report in 
     a prompt and timely manner. Personnel authorized to be hired 
     under this paragraph--
       (A) shall perform such duties relating to such a review as 
     the relevant Inspector General shall direct; and
       (B) are in addition to any other personnel authorized by 
     law.
       (3) Transfer of personnel.--The Attorney General, the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, 
     the Director of the National Security Agency, or the head of 
     any other element of the intelligence community may transfer 
     personnel to the relevant Office of the Inspector General 
     required to conduct a review under subsection (b)(1) and 
     submit a report under subsection (c) and, in addition to any 
     other personnel authorized by law, are authorized to fill any 
     vacancy caused by such a transfer. Personnel transferred 
     under this paragraph shall perform such duties relating to 
     such review as the relevant Inspector General shall direct.

                       TITLE IV--OTHER PROVISIONS

     SEC. 401. SEVERABILITY.

       If any provision of this Act, any amendment made by this 
     Act, or the application thereof to any person or 
     circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the remainder 
     of the Act, of any such amendments, and of the application of 
     such provisions to other persons and circumstances shall not 
     be affected thereby.

     SEC. 402. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Except as provided in section 404, the amendments made by 
     this Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.

     SEC. 403. REPEALS.

       (a) Repeal of Protect America Act of 2007 Provisions.--
       (1) Amendments to fisa.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in section 404, 
     sections 105A, 105B, and 105C of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805a, 1805b, and 1805c) 
     are repealed.
       (B) Technical and conforming amendments.--
       (i) Table of contents.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items 
     relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C.
       (ii) Conforming amendments.--Except as provided in section 
     404, section 103(e) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is amended--

       (I) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or 501(f)(1)'' 
     and inserting ``501(f)(1) or 702(h)(4)''; and
       (II) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or 501(f)(1)'' 
     and inserting ``501(f)(1) or 702(h)(4)''.

       (2) Reporting requirements.--Except as provided in section 
     404, section 4 of the Protect America Act of 2007 (Public Law 
     110-55; 121 Stat. 555) is repealed.
       (3) Transition procedures.--Except as provided in section 
     404, subsection (b) of section 6 of the Protect America Act 
     of 2007 (Public Law 110-55; 121 Stat. 556) is repealed.
       (b) FISA Amendments Act of 2008.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in section 404, 
     effective December 31, 2012, title VII of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 
     101(a), is repealed.
       (2) Technical and conforming amendments.--Effective 
     December 31, 2012--
       (A) the table of contents in the first section of such Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items 
     related to title VII;
       (B) except as provided in section 404, section 601(a)(1) of 
     such Act (50 U.S.C. 1871(a)(1)) is amended to read as such 
     section read on the day before the date of the enactment of 
     this Act; and
       (C) except as provided in section 404, section 
     2511(2)(a)(ii)(A) of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
     by striking ``or a court order pursuant to section 704 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978''.

     SEC. 404. TRANSITION PROCEDURES.

       (a) Transition Procedures for Protect America Act of 2007 
     Provisions.--
       (1) Continued effect of orders, authorizations, 
     directives.--Except as provided in paragraph (7), 
     notwithstanding any other provision of law, any order, 
     authorization, or directive issued or made pursuant to 
     section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978, as added by section 2 of the Protect America Act of 
     2007 (Public Law 110-55; 121 Stat. 552), shall continue in 
     effect until the expiration of such order, authorization, or 
     directive.
       (2) Applicability of protect america act of 2007 to 
     continued orders, authorizations, directives.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, any 
     amendment made by this Act, or the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.)--
       (A) subject to paragraph (3), section 105A of such Act, as 
     added by section 2 of the Protect America Act of 2007 (Public 
     Law 110-55; 121 Stat. 552), shall continue to apply to any 
     acquisition conducted pursuant to an order, authorization, or 
     directive referred to in paragraph (1); and
       (B) sections 105B and 105C of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by sections 2 and 3, 
     respectively, of the Protect America Act of 2007, shall 
     continue to apply with respect to an order, authorization, or 
     directive referred to in paragraph (1) until the later of--
       (i) the expiration of such order, authorization, or 
     directive; or
       (ii) the date on which final judgment is entered for any 
     petition or other litigation relating to such order, 
     authorization, or directive.

[[Page 13248]]

       (3) Use of information.--Information acquired from an 
     acquisition conducted pursuant to an order, authorization, or 
     directive referred to in paragraph (1) shall be deemed to be 
     information acquired from an electronic surveillance pursuant 
     to title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) for purposes of section 106 of 
     such Act (50 U.S.C. 1806), except for purposes of subsection 
     (j) of such section.
       (4) Protection from liability.--Subsection (l) of section 
     105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as 
     added by section 2 of the Protect America Act of 2007, shall 
     continue to apply with respect to any directives issued 
     pursuant to such section 105B.
       (5) Jurisdiction of foreign intelligence surveillance 
     court.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1801 et seq.), section 103(e) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)), as amended by section 
     5(a) of the Protect America Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-55; 
     121 Stat. 556), shall continue to apply with respect to a 
     directive issued pursuant to section 105B of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by section 2 
     of the Protect America Act of 2007, until the later of--
       (A) the expiration of all orders, authorizations, or 
     directives referred to in paragraph (1); or
       (B) the date on which final judgment is entered for any 
     petition or other litigation relating to such order, 
     authorization, or directive.
       (6) Reporting requirements.--
       (A) Continued applicability.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, any amendment made by this Act, the 
     Protect America Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-55), or the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 
     et seq.), section 4 of the Protect America Act of 2007 shall 
     continue to apply until the date that the certification 
     described in subparagraph (B) is submitted.
       (B) Certification.--The certification described in this 
     subparagraph is a certification--
       (i) made by the Attorney General;
       (ii) submitted as part of a semi-annual report required by 
     section 4 of the Protect America Act of 2007;
       (iii) that states that there will be no further 
     acquisitions carried out under section 105B of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by section 2 
     of the Protect America Act of 2007, after the date of such 
     certification; and
       (iv) that states that the information required to be 
     included under such section 4 relating to any acquisition 
     conducted under such section 105B has been included in a 
     semi-annual report required by such section 4.
       (7) Replacement of orders, authorizations, and 
     directives.--
       (A) In general.--If the Attorney General and the Director 
     of National Intelligence seek to replace an authorization 
     issued pursuant to section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by section 2 of the 
     Protect America Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-55), with an 
     authorization under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by section 101(a) of this 
     Act), the Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall, to the extent practicable, submit to the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (as such term is 
     defined in section 701(b)(2) of such Act (as so added)) a 
     certification prepared in accordance with subsection (g) of 
     such section 702 and the procedures adopted in accordance 
     with subsections (d) and (e) of such section 702 at least 30 
     days before the expiration of such authorization.
       (B) Continuation of existing orders.--If the Attorney 
     General and the Director of National Intelligence seek to 
     replace an authorization made pursuant to section 105B of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by 
     section 2 of the Protect America Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-
     55; 121 Stat. 522), by filing a certification in accordance 
     with subparagraph (A), that authorization, and any directives 
     issued thereunder and any order related thereto, shall remain 
     in effect, notwithstanding the expiration provided for in 
     subsection (a) of such section 105B, until the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court (as such term is defined in 
     section 701(b)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978 (as so added)) issues an order with respect to 
     that certification under section 702(i)(3) of such Act (as so 
     added) at which time the provisions of that section and of 
     section 702(i)(4) of such Act (as so added) shall apply.
       (8) Effective date.--Paragraphs (1) through (7) shall take 
     effect as if enacted on August 5, 2007.
       (b) Transition Procedures for FISA Amendments Act of 2008 
     Provisions.--
       (1) Orders in effect on december 31, 2012.--Notwithstanding 
     any other provision of this Act, any amendment made by this 
     Act, or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), any order, authorization, or directive 
     issued or made under title VII of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 101(a), shall 
     continue in effect until the date of the expiration of such 
     order, authorization, or directive.
       (2) Applicability of title vii of fisa to continued orders, 
     authorizations, directives.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, any amendment made by this Act, or the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 
     et seq.), with respect to any order, authorization, or 
     directive referred to in paragraph (1), title VII of such 
     Act, as amended by section 101(a), shall continue to apply 
     until the later of--
       (A) the expiration of such order, authorization, or 
     directive; or
       (B) the date on which final judgment is entered for any 
     petition or other litigation relating to such order, 
     authorization, or directive.
       (3) Challenge of directives; protection from liability; use 
     of information.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
     Act or of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.)--
       (A) section 103(e) of such Act, as amended by section 
     403(a)(1)(B)(ii), shall continue to apply with respect to any 
     directive issued pursuant to section 702(h) of such Act, as 
     added by section 101(a);
       (B) section 702(h)(3) of such Act (as so added) shall 
     continue to apply with respect to any directive issued 
     pursuant to section 702(h) of such Act (as so added);
       (C) section 703(e) of such Act (as so added) shall continue 
     to apply with respect to an order or request for emergency 
     assistance under that section;
       (D) section 706 of such Act (as so added) shall continue to 
     apply to an acquisition conducted under section 702 or 703 of 
     such Act (as so added); and
       (E) section 2511(2)(a)(ii)(A) of title 18, United States 
     Code, as amended by section 101(c)(1), shall continue to 
     apply to an order issued pursuant to section 704 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by 
     section 101(a).
       (4) Reporting requirements.--
       (A) Continued applicability.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act or of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), section 
     601(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1871(a)), as amended by section 
     101(c)(2), and sections 702(l) and 707 of such Act, as added 
     by section 101(a), shall continue to apply until the date 
     that the certification described in subparagraph (B) is 
     submitted.
       (B) Certification.--The certification described in this 
     subparagraph is a certification--
       (i) made by the Attorney General;
       (ii) submitted to the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the House of Representatives, and the Committees on the 
     Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives;
       (iii) that states that there will be no further 
     acquisitions carried out under title VII of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 
     101(a), after the date of such certification; and
       (iv) that states that the information required to be 
     included in a review, assessment, or report under section 601 
     of such Act, as amended by section 101(c), or section 702(l) 
     or 707 of such Act, as added by section 101(a), relating to 
     any acquisition conducted under title VII of such Act, as 
     amended by section 101(a), has been included in a review, 
     assessment, or report under such section 601, 702(l), or 707.
       (5) Transition procedures concerning the targeting of 
     united states persons overseas.--Any authorization in effect 
     on the date of enactment of this Act under section 2.5 of 
     Executive Order 12333 to intentionally target a United States 
     person reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
     States shall continue in effect, and shall constitute a 
     sufficient basis for conducting such an acquisition targeting 
     a United States person located outside the United States 
     until the earlier of--
       (A) the date that authorization expires; or
       (B) the date that is 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1285, debate 
shall not exceed 1 hour, with 30 minutes equally divided and controlled 
by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, and 30 minutes equally divided and controlled by the 
chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence.
  The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Smith), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), and the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) each will control 15 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).


                             General Leave

  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include 
extraneous material on the bill under consideration.

[[Page 13249]]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Members of the House, several months ago on October 16, 2007, to be 
exact, the House passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
legislation, known as the RESTORE Act. In the view of this Member, the 
RESTORE Act was a reasonable and balanced one giving the administration 
the power it needs to combat terrorism while protecting our precious 
rights and liberties.
  The legislation before us today, which I concede includes significant 
improvements over the Senate legislation, goes beyond what I think was 
a reasonable bottom line in the form of the RESTORE Act.
  Title I of the bill continues the House approach by providing 
mechanisms to ensure that FISA's longstanding exclusivity is crystal 
clear. It states only a new statute directly addressing the executive 
branch's foreign intelligence surveillance authority can modify FISA. 
Secondly, it provides sunshine by requiring that the government 
requests to private parties for surveillance assistance must actually 
cite the statutory authority under which they're issued.
  Now in earlier versions of FISA reform, the administration claimed 
that prior court approval of procedures for overseas surveillance would 
hurt national security. This matter is now laid to rest with the 
consensus that upfront court review is indeed appropriate. The 
requirement for individual warrants and probable cause determinations 
for Americans overseas is an improvement over even the original FISA 
legislation. There is a provision in the legislation that permits the 
Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence to begin 
surveillance prior to seeking court approval for the necessary 
procedures in exigent circumstances. This is intended to be used 
rarely, if at all, and was included upon assurances from the 
administration that agrees that it shall not be used routinely.
  The measure before us further requires extensive oversight by 
Congress and the independent Inspectors General to prevent abuse. It 
mandates guidelines for targeting minimization and to prevent reverse 
targeting and tasks the Inspector General to monitor compliance with 
those protections.
  Now title II of the legislation concerning telecom liability raises 
the most serious concerns in my view. In the past, I have said I would 
be open to developing a set of procedures that allow both plaintiffs 
and defendants to make their case. Unfortunately, this bill goes well 
beyond that and changes the substantive standard for legal liability by 
the telecom community, by the telecom companies and does so on a 
retroactive basis, retroactive immunity. And so I appreciate that the 
final bill does not send the matter to a new secret court and does 
grant the court a meaningful role in the determination. Unfortunately, 
these improvements do not redeem the overall provision.
  Title III of the bill will also ask the Inspector General to conduct 
independent investigations into the President's warrantless wiretapping 
program. This inquiry will help uncover the truth for the American 
people, hopefully, about the President's activities. And then there is 
a part in here about an emergency provision any U.S. citizen can be 
wiretapped. And I strenuously object to that.
  Six years ago, the Administration unilaterally chose to engage in 
warrantless surveillance of American citizens without court review. We 
are now restoring the balance through enhanced Congressional oversight, 
Inspector General investigations, and procedures to ensure that FISA 
remains the exclusive means for authorizing electronic surveillance.
  This bill continues the House approach by providing mechanisms to 
ensure that FISA's longstanding exclusivity is crystal clear. First, it 
states that only a new statute directly addressing the executive 
branch's foreign intelligence surveillance authority can modify FISA. 
Secondly, it provides sunshine by requiring requests for assistance to 
cite the statutory authority under which they are issued. A conforming 
amendment to Title 18 Section 2511(2)(a) is meant to underscore the 
need to specify the specific statutory language being relied on, and 
must be read in conjunction with the entirety of Sec. 102 of the 
legislation. It should not be read to imply that assistance may be 
sought for electronic surveillance, as defined in the statute, which is 
not specifically authorized by statute.
  In earlier versions of FISA reform, the Administration claimed that 
prior court approval of procedures for overseas surveillance would hurt 
national security. This matter is now laid to rest, with a consensus 
that up-front court review is in fact appropriate. The requirement for 
individual warrants and probable cause determinations for Americans 
overseas is an improvement over even the original FISA legislation.
  There is a provision in the legislation that permits the Attorney 
General and Director of National Intelligence to begin a surveillance 
prior to seeking court approval for the necessary procedures in 
``exigent circumstances.'' This is intended to be used rarely, if at 
all. In the normal course of events the DNI will have ample time to 
submit such procedures to the FISA court for its approval before 
initiating a particular surveillance.
  The Congress provided this authority at the request of the DNI to 
meet unforeseen and extraordinary circumstances, and the Administration 
agrees that it may not be used routinely. The Administration 
understands that the Congress expects its use to be very rare if it is 
used at all.
  The oversight committees will be informed of any use of the exigent 
circumstances provision and are committed to effective oversight to 
insure that it is not used to avoid the requirement to secure court 
approval of the procedures in advance in all but the most extreme 
circumstances. The exception must not swallow the rule.
  The bill requires extensive oversight by Congress and the independent 
Inspectors General to prevent abuse. It mandates guidelines for 
targeting, minimization, and to prevent reverse targeting, and tasks 
the Inspectors General to monitor compliance with those protections.
  ``Reverse targeting'' is specifically prohibited in Section 
702(b)(2). The Intelligence Community agrees that this language 
prohibits the targeting of one or more persons overseas for the purpose 
of acquiring the communications of a specific is person reasonably 
believed to be in the United States. Thus, Section 702(f) requires the 
government to adopt guidelines to insure that this abuse does not occur 
and the FISA court must review and approve these guidelines and assure 
that they are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The oversight 
committees of the Congress intend to conduct rigorous oversight to 
insure that these provisions are faithfully observed. In this 
connection the Committee attaches particular importance to the required 
annual review and the reporting in that review of the number of 
disseminated reports which contain a reference to the identity of a US 
person.
  There is currently ongoing multi-District litigation in which a 
federal District Court is conducting a review of the telecom carriers' 
activities and the lawfulness of the President's warrantless 
wiretapping program. This bill does not strip jurisdiction on that 
Court and provide blanket immunity, as many wanted.
  Instead, in cases where the program was actually designed to detect 
or prevent a terrorist attack, the Court will assess an Attorney 
General certification that can assert--among other reasons for 
dismissal--that the carriers got certain requests and directives from 
the Administration. The Court will look to see if the Attorney 
General's certification is backed up with substantial evidence. That 
means not only the underlying directives and requests, but supplemental 
materials as well. And in cases where the Government claims that the 
company did not provide the alleged assistance, a bald assertion is not 
``substantial evidence''--the Government will have to back up its 
claims to the Court's satisfaction.
  That Title II of this bill provides procedures for assessing lawsuits 
relating to warrantless surveillance since 9/11 does not imply that 
such surveillance was lawful or that the Congress as a whole believes 
that the service providers acted lawfully in providing assistance. Nor 
can the provision remove the power of the courts hearing the cases to 
determine if this provision is constitutional.
  No company or private citizen asked by the executive branch to 
provide assistance in securing the private information of Americans 
without authority of law should read this language as implying that 
Congress will act in the future to provide such a grounds for 
dismissing a lawsuit. On the contrary, companies should be on notice 
that the Congress is very reluctantly providing this defense as a one-
time action in an extremely unusual circumstance. It expects private 
citizens and

[[Page 13250]]

companies to provide assistance only when specifically authorized by 
law.
  For over 30 years we have mandated that telecommunications carriers 
not be a merely unquestioning partner to surveillance activities. This 
bill provides many ways for the companies to question or challenge 
directives or requests for assistance, and we expect these to be used 
any time there is something unusual or novel being requested.
  Today's compromise will give the District Court direction and 
procedures for handling the pending lawsuits. However, it is important 
to note that the question of whether FISA's existing security 
procedures at 50 U.S.C. 1806(f) preempt the state secrets privilege is 
still being litigated in the courts in a case against the Government. 
Nothing in this bill is intended to affect that litigation, or any 
litigation against the Government or Government employees.
  Today's vote is not the end of the matter. The bill provides for a 4-
year sunset, but this doesn't mean we cannot or should not revisit 
these issues in the next congressional session. We will conduct 
vigorous oversight, and will be monitoring the program through the 
reports and audits. We will be keeping a close eye on the development 
and implementation of reverse targeting, minimization, and targeting 
procedures, in order to not only make sure that they are followed, but 
to inform us as we consider what improvements need to be made to this 
legislation.
  On that note, I will reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Speaker, after nearly a year of delays and months of 
negotiations, the House today will finally vote on compromise 
legislation that gives our intelligence community the tools that it 
needs to protect America. I join my colleague, Mr. Hoekstra, ranking 
member of the Intelligence Committee, and Chairman Reyes, as an 
original cosponsor of this compromise bill.
  America's enemies take on many forms, terrorist groups, foreign 
governments and spies who all pose serious threat to America and its 
allies. Last August, Congress passed the Protect America Act which 
provided a temporary solution to the problem. The PAA expired in 
February. As a result, our intelligence community could not gather two-
thirds of the foreign intelligence they needed to protect American 
lives.
  From day one, we insisted that any legislation passed by Congress 
must not interfere with our fundamental ability to collect foreign 
intelligence. This legislation accomplishes that goal. H.R. 6304 does 
not extend constitutional protections to foreign terrorists and other 
foreign targets overseas. The bill does allow the intelligence 
community to target a foreign person overseas without a court order if 
critical intelligence would be lost or not collected in a timely 
manner.
  We insisted that any legislation passed by Congress include strong 
liability protections for telecommunications carriers that assisted the 
government following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as 
well as protections for their assistance in the future. H.R. 6304 
provides these important protections.
  We insisted that Congress enact long-term FISA legislation. The bill 
we have before us today will not sunset until the end of 2012. This 
compromise legislation also provides strong civil liberties protections 
for Americans both within the United States and abroad. And it mandates 
congressional oversight and detailed reports to the House and Senate 
Judiciary and Intelligence committees and requires a review by the 
Inspectors General of the Department of Justice and the intelligence 
agencies. This compromise is long overdue. It is supported by both the 
Department of Justice and the intelligence community.
  Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

  Madam Speaker, I submit the following letter for the Record:

                                                    June 19, 2008.
     Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
     Speaker, House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear-Madam Speaker: This letter presents the views of the 
     Administration on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (``FISA'') Amendments Act of 2008 (H.R. 6304). The 
     bill would modernize FISA to reflect changes in 
     communications technology since the Act was first passed 30 
     years ago. The amendments would provide the Intelligence 
     Community with the tools it needs to collect the foreign 
     intelligence necessary to secure our Nation while protecting 
     the civil liberties of Americans. The bill would also provide 
     the necessary legal protections for those companies sued 
     because they are believed to have helped the Government 
     prevent terrorist attacks in the aftermath of September 11. 
     Because this bill accomplishes these two goals essential to 
     any effort to modernize FISA, we strongly support passage of 
     this bill and will recommend that the President sign it.
       Last August, Congress took an important step toward 
     modernizing FlSA by enacting the Protect America Act of 2007. 
     That Act allowed us temporarily to close intelligence gaps by 
     enabling our intelligence professionals to collect, without 
     having to first obtain a court order, foreign intelligence 
     information from targets overseas. The Act has enabled us to 
     gather significant intelligence critical to protecting our 
     Nation. It has also been implemented in a responsible way, 
     subject to extensive executive, congressional, and judicial 
     oversight in order to protect the country in a manner 
     consistent with safeguarding Americans' civil liberties. 
     Since passage of the Act, the Administration has worked 
     closely with Congress to address the need for long-term FISA 
     modernization. This joint effort has involved compromises on 
     both sides, but we believe that it has resulted in a strong 
     bill that will place the Nation's foreign intelligence effort 
     in this area on a firm, long-term foundation. Below, we have 
     set forth our views on certain important provisions of H.R. 
     6304.


             i. title i--foreign intelligence surveillance

       Title I of H.R. 6304 contains key authorities that would 
     ensure that our intelligence agencies have the tools they 
     need to collect vital foreign intelligence information and 
     would provide significant safeguards for the civil liberties 
     of Americans.
       Court Approval. With respect to authorizations for foreign 
     intelligence surveillance directed at foreign targets outside 
     the United States, the bill provides that the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) would review 
     certifications made by the Attorney General and the Director 
     of NationaI Intelligence relating to these acquisitions, the 
     reasonableness of the procedures used by the Intelligence 
     Community to ensure the targets are overseas, and the 
     minimization procedures used to protect the privacy of 
     Americans. The scope of the FISC's review is carefully and 
     rightly crafted to focus on aspects of the acquisition that 
     may affect the privacy rights of Americans so as not to 
     confer quasi-constitutional rights on foreign terrorists and 
     other foreign intelligence targets outside the United States.
       We have been clear that any satisfactory bill could not 
     require individual court orders to target non-United States 
     persons outside the United States, nor could a bill establish 
     a court-approval mechanism that would cause the Intelligence 
     Community to lose valuable foreign intelligence while 
     awaiting such approval. H.R. 6304 would do neither and would 
     retain for the Intelligence Community the speed and agility 
     that it needs to protect the Nation. The bill would establish 
     a schedule for court approval of certifications and 
     procedures relating to renewals of existing acquisition 
     authority. A critical feature of the H.R. 6304 would allow 
     existing acquisitions, which were the subject of court review 
     under the Protect America Act or will be the subject of such 
     review under the H.R. 6304, to continue pending court review. 
     With respect to new acquisitions, absent exigent 
     circumstances, Court review of new procedures and 
     certifications would take place before the Government begins 
     the acquisition. The exigent circumstances exception is 
     critical to allowing the Intelligence Community to respond 
     swiftly to changing circumstances when the Attorney General 
     and the Director of National Intelligence determine that 
     intelligence may be lost or not timely acquired. Such exigent 
     circumstances could arise in certain situations where an 
     unexpected gap has opened in our intelligence collection 
     efforts. Taken together, these provisions would enable the 
     Intelligence Community to keep closed the intelligence gaps 
     that existed before the passage of the Protect America Act 
     and ensure that it will have the opportunity to collect 
     critical foreign intelligence information in the future.
       Exclusive means. H.R. 6304 contains an exclusive means 
     provision that goes beyond the exclusive means provision that 
     was passed as part of FISA. As we have previously stated, we 
     believe that the provision will complicate the ability of 
     Congress to pass, in an emergency situation, a law to 
     authorize immediate collection of communications in the 
     aftermath of an attack or in response to a grave threat to 
     the national security. Unlike other versions of this 
     provision, however, the one in this bill would not restrict 
     the authority of the Government to conduct necessary 
     surveillance for intelligence and law enforcement purposes in 
     a way that would harm national security.
       Oversight and Protections for the Civil Liberties of 
     Americans. H.R. 6304 contains

[[Page 13251]]

     numerous provisions that protect the civil liberties of 
     Americans and allow for extensive executive, congressional, 
     and judicial oversight of the use of the authorities. The 
     bill would require the Attorney General and the Director of 
     National Intelligence to conduct semiannual assessments of 
     compliance with targeting procedures and minimization 
     procedures and to submit those assessments to the FISC and to 
     Congress. The FISC and Congress would also receive annual 
     reviews relating to those acquisitions prepared by the heads 
     of agencies that use the authorities contained in the bill. 
     Congress would receive reviews from the Inspectors General of 
     these agencies and of the Department of Justice regarding 
     compliance with the provisions of the bill. In addition, the 
     bill would require the Attorney General to submit to Congress 
     a report at least semiannually concerning the implementation 
     of the authorities provided by the bill and would expand the 
     categories of FISA-related court documents that the 
     Government must provide to the congressional intelligence and 
     judiciary committees.
       Title I also includes provisions that would protect the 
     civil liberties of Americans. For instance, the bill would 
     require for the first time that a court order be obtained to 
     conduct foreign intelligence surveillance outside the United 
     States of an American abroad. Historically, Executive Branch 
     procedures guided the conduct of surveillance of a U.S. 
     person overseas, such as when a U.S. person acts as an agent 
     of a foreign power, e.g., spying on behalf of a foreign 
     government. Given the complexity of extending judicial review 
     to activities outside the United States, these provisions 
     were carefully crafted with Congress to ensure that such 
     review can be accomplished while preserving the necessary 
     flexibility for intelligence operations. Other provisions of 
     the bill address concerns that some voiced about the Protect 
     America Act, such as clarifying that the Government cannot 
     ``reverse target'' without a court order and requiring that 
     the Attorney General establish guidelines to prevent this 
     from occurring. We believe that, taken together, these 
     provisions will allow for ample oversight of the use of these 
     new authorities and ensure that the privacy and civil 
     liberties of Americans are well protected.


    ii. title ii--protections for electronic communications service 
                               providers

       Title II of the bill contains, among other provisions, 
     vital protections for electronic communications service 
     providers who assist the Intelligence Community's efforts to 
     protect the Nation from terrorism and other foreign 
     intelligence threats. Title II would provide liability 
     protection related to future assistance while ensuring the 
     protection of sources and methods. Importantly, the bill 
     would also provide the necessary legal protection for those 
     companies who are sued only because they are believed to have 
     helped the Government with communications intelligence 
     activities in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.
       The framework contained in the bill for obtaining 
     retroactive liability protection is narrowly tailored. An 
     action must be dismissed if the Attorney General certifies to 
     the district court in which the action is pending that 
     either: (i) the electronic communications service provider 
     did not provide the assistance; or (ii) the assistance was 
     provided in the wake of the September 11 attack and was the 
     subject of a written request or series of requests from a 
     senior Government official indicating that the activity was 
     authorized by the President and determined to be lawful. The 
     district court would be required to review this certification 
     before dismissing the action, and the provision allows for 
     the participation of the parties to the lawsuit in a manner 
     consistent with the protection of classified information. The 
     liability protection provision does not extend to the 
     Government or to Government officials and it does not 
     immunize any criminal conduct.
       Providing this liability protection is critical to the 
     Nation's security. As the Senate Select Committee on 
     Intelligence recognized, ``the intelligence community cannot 
     obtain the intelligence it needs without assistance from 
     these companies.'' That committee also recognized that 
     companies in the future may be less willing to assist the 
     Government if they face the threat of private lawsuits each 
     time they are believed to have provided assistance. Finally, 
     allowing litigation over these matters risks the disclosure 
     of highly classified information regarding intelligence 
     sources and methods. As we have stated on many occasions, it 
     is critical that any long-term FISA modernization legislation 
     contain an effective liability protection provision. H.R. 
     6304 contains just such a provision and for this reason, as 
     well as those expressed with respect to Title I above, we 
     strongly support its passage.


               III. Title III--Review of Previous Actions

       Title III would require the Inspectors General of the 
     Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and of certain elements of the Intelligence 
     Community to review certain communications surveillance 
     activities, including the Terrorist Surveillance Program 
     described by the President. Although improvements have been 
     made over prior versions of this provision, we believe, as we 
     have written before, that it is unnecessary in light of the 
     Inspector General reviews previously completed, those already 
     underway, and the congressional intelligence and judiciary 
     committee oversight already conducted. Nevertheless, we do 
     not believe that, as currently drafted, the provision would 
     create unacceptable operational concerns. The bill contains 
     important provisions to make clear that such reviews should 
     not duplicate reviews already conducted by Inspectors 
     General.


                     IV. Title IV--Other Provisions

       Title IV contains important provisions that will ensure 
     that the transition between the current authorities and the 
     authorities provided in this bill will not have a detrimental 
     effect on intelligence operations.
       Title IV also states that the authorities in the bill 
     sunset at the end of 2012. We have long favored permanent 
     modernization of FISA. The Intelligence Community operates 
     more effectively when the rules governing our intelligence 
     professionals' ability to track our enemies are firmly 
     established. Stability of law also allows the Intelligence 
     Community to invest resources appropriately. Congress has 
     extensively debated and considered the need to modernize FISA 
     since 2006, a process that has involved numerous hearings, 
     briefings, and floor debates. The process has been valuable 
     and necessary, but it has also involved the discussion in 
     open settings of extraordinary information dealing with 
     sensitive intelligence operations. Every time we repeat this 
     process it risks exposing our intelligence sources and 
     methods to our adversaries. Although we would prefer that 
     H.R. 6304 contain no sunset, a sunset in 2012 is 
     significantly longer than others that were proposed and it is 
     long enough to avoid impairing the effectiveness of 
     intelligence operations.
       Thank you for the opportunity to present our views on this 
     crucial bill. We reiterate our sincere appreciation to the 
     Congress for working with us on H.R. 6304, a long-term FISA 
     modernization bill that will strengthen the Nation's 
     intelligence capabilities while respecting and protecting the 
     constitutional rights of Americans. We strongly support its 
     prompt passage.
           Sincerely,
     Michael B. Mukasey,
       Attorney General.
     J.M. McConnell,
       Director of National Intelligence.

  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Madam Speaker, I rise today as a sponsor of H.R. 6304, the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008. This bill represents the culmination of more 
than a year's work by the members and staff of the House Intelligence 
Committee, together with our colleagues on the Judiciary Committee, to 
bring to the floor a bill that modernizes our surveillance authorities 
while protecting the constitutional rights of Americans.
  I want to thank Chairman Conyers for his efforts to strengthen this 
bill. As always, I greatly appreciate my good friend's commitment to 
protecting our country and the principles that we hold so dear. I also 
want to thank the respective ranking members and all that worked so 
hard to bring this bill to the floor today.
  This bill, Madam Speaker, enjoys wide support inside the Democratic 
Caucus. It has been endorsed by our Democratic whip, by our Democratic 
Caucus chair, by the Blue Dog Coalition, the New Democratic Caucus and 
by a number of our colleagues. For that, I want to thank in particular 
our majority leader, Mr. Hoyer, for leading the effort towards a 
bipartisan compromise. This bill is a far better deal than the Protect 
America Act. And it is far better than the Senate bill that passed 
earlier this year.
  Madam Speaker, intelligence is the first line of defense in our 
Nation's effort to prevent terrorism and to stop the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. This legislation strengthens the ability 
of our intelligence agencies to conduct lawful surveillance of foreign 
targets. But this legislation also serves another very important and 
vital function. It strengthens the constitutional rights of Americans, 
protects them from unlawful surveillance and it stops this President, 
or any President, for that matter, from invoking executive power to 
conduct warrantless surveillance of Americans.

                              {time}  1100

  This bill does more than just retain the original FISA requirements 
for an individual warrant based upon probable cause for surveillance 
targeting Americans here in the United States. For the first time ever, 
this bill requires in statute warrants for Americans anywhere in the 
world. It also requires the

[[Page 13252]]

government to establish clear guidelines to ensure that no American is 
the target of any surveillance without a warrant. It clarifies that 
FISA and Title 18, the Criminal Code, are the exclusive means by which 
the government may conduct domestic surveillance.
  It will prohibit any unlawful, warrantless wiretapping, the kind we 
saw under this administration. It provides accountability by requiring 
the inspectors general of various agencies to compile a comprehensive 
report on the President's surveillance program and that review must be 
given to Congress. It requires prior court approval of the procedures 
used to conduct surveillance of foreign targets, except in an 
emergency, similar to the current FISA law.
  This legislation, Madam Speaker, also addresses the issue of lawsuits 
against telecommunications companies that comply with directives from 
our government. This bill does not grant immunity to any government 
official who might have violated the law, and this bill does not grant 
automatic immunity to telecom companies, as the Senate bill would have.
  Under this legislation, a Federal District Court will review the 
evidence submitted by the Attorney General and then the court will 
decide whether to grant civil liability and protection to a company 
that provided post-9/11 assistance to the government. This bill does 
not grant immunity. Congress isn't deciding the question of immunity; 
the District Court will.
  Finally, Madam Speaker, this bill will sunset in 4\1/2\ years, 
ensuring that the next administration will be in a position to assess 
and review the effectiveness of this legislation.
  This legislation represents a bipartisan compromise, and, as such, 
both sides got less than they wanted. But it is a product of a good 
faith effort by both Republicans and Democrats to give our intelligence 
agencies the tools necessary to keep America safe, while protecting our 
Constitution and our civil liberties.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to vote for this very important piece 
of legislation.
  In addition, Chairman Reyes submitted the following views for the 
Record:


                         Exigent Circumstances

       Prior court review is an absolutely integral part of this 
     bill, but we have also crafted an ``exigent circumstances'' 
     circumstances provision that allows the Administration to 
     commence surveillance immediately in an emergency. This 
     provision should be invoked rarely, if at all. In the normal 
     course of events, the Attorney General and the Director of 
     National Intelligence will have ample time to submit 
     applications for surveillance to the FISA Court for its 
     approval before initiating a particular surveillance.
       When used, this exception should be for purposes of a true 
     emergency, involving unforeseen or extraordinary 
     circumstances. I consider this to be limited to situations 
     where the intelligence sought would serve a critical function 
     in protecting national security and where the failure to act 
     immediately would result in the loss of what might be the 
     only opportunity to collect the information in question.
       The Intelligence Committee intends to engage in regular and 
     vigorous oversight of these new authorities and, in 
     particular, the use of the ``exigent circumstances'' 
     exception to ensure that the important protections in this 
     bill are not circumvented.


                         ``Reverse Targeting''

       The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 regularly uses the term 
     ``targeting.'' We intend this term to mean more than simply 
     the process of selecting a telephone number or an e-mail 
     address to surveil. Rather, it is meant to describe the 
     process of purposely acquiring communications of or 
     information about a specific individual.
       It is in this context that Section 702(b)(2) prohibits what 
     is generally referred to as ``reverse targeting.'' In our 
     discussions with the intelligence agencies, they have agreed 
     that this language prohibits the targeting of one or more 
     persons overseas where the purpose is to acquire the 
     communications of or information about a U.S. person or any 
     specific person reasonably believed to be inside the United 
     States. Accordingly, Section 702(f) requires that the 
     government adopt guidelines to ensure that this does not 
     occur.


           Inadvertent Collection of U.S.-Person Information

       Because of the nature of the new surveillance authorities 
     granted under this bill, we were particularly concerned about 
     the potential for a significant increase in the inadvertent 
     collection of U.S.-person communications and information. For 
     that reason, we have adopted several oversight provisions 
     that require the Intelligence Community to report to Congress 
     on the number of targets later determined to have been 
     located inside the United States, the number of disseminated 
     intelligence reports that contain U.S.-person information, 
     and the number of disseminated intelligence reports that 
     contain information identifying specific U.S. persons. The 
     Intelligence Committee plans to conduct vigorous oversight of 
     the reports.


                              Exclusivity

       The exclusivity provision of this bill is extremely 
     important. This language is designed to prevent any future 
     efforts to conduct surveillance that is not authorized by 
     statute. The bill not only establishes that FISA and Title 18 
     are the exclusive means of conducting surveillance, it 
     requires that any future authorization for surveillance must 
     be explicitly established in statute. The language should in 
     no way be read to imply that there is an inherent power to 
     conduct surveillance beyond what is expressly authorized by 
     statute.
       In particular, the language in Section 102(c)(l)(ii) should 
     be read to require citation to specific statutory authority 
     in all certifications for assistance in conducting electronic 
     surveillance issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B).


                                 Sunset

       This bill is set to expire on December 31, 2012. During the 
     next four years, Congress will continue to assess the 
     surveillance activities of the U.S. Government and assess 
     whether additional changes need to enacted before the sunset 
     date to correct any deficiencies or problems that arise.


                       Civil Liability Provisions

       The provisions in title II of this bill establish a 
     meaningful court review to determine whether 
     telecommunications companies should be protected from civil 
     liability for assistance provided to the government. It is 
     important to state that these provisions are not intended to 
     imply in any way that the President's conduct in connection 
     with the President's warrantless surveillance program was 
     lawful or to excuse the conduct of any government official 
     that might have violated the law.
       Further, no telecommunications company should interpret 
     these provisions to imply that Congress will act in the 
     future to seek the dismissal of any other lawsuits charging 
     improper conduct in connection with surveillance activities. 
     Rather, Congress considers the tragic events of 9/11 to be a 
     unique set of circumstances that require special 
     consideration. As a general matter, we expect companies and 
     private citizens to respect the rule of law and to require 
     the same of its government.
       With respect to the applicable legal standard, we intend 
     ``substantial evidence'' to apply not only to a finding that 
     assistance was provided in response to a request that meets 
     the standard of this bill. That standard should also apply 
     where the court is asked to determine that the alleged 
     assistance was not provided. A simple declaration from the 
     Government or the defendant that the alleged assistance did 
     not occur should be deemed insufficient where there is 
     sufficient evidence to the contrary.
       Similarly, when the Government alleges that a surveillance 
     program was ``designed'' (as opposed to ``intended'') to 
     detect and prevent terrorism, the court should examine the 
     evidence to assess the scope of the program and determine, 
     where appropriate, that indiscriminate surveillance that 
     acquires the communications of millions of Americans is not 
     truly ``designed'' to detect or prevent terrorism.
       Finally, these provisions should also not be interpreted to 
     remove the power of the courts to review the 
     constitutionality of the process this bill establishes.

  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Missouri (Mr. Blunt), the distinguished minority whip, who played such 
a critical role in ensuring that this bill made it to the floor today.
  Mr. BLUNT. Madam Speaker, I thank Mr. Hoekstra for yielding me this 
initial time that would have the otherwise gone to you.
  I thank you, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Reyes and Mr. Smith, for bringing this 
important piece of legislation to the floor and for working so hard to 
see that it came to the floor. I would also like to say that I again 
appreciated the opportunity to work with my good friend Mr. Hoyer, as 
he spent so many hours and so much time on this. From his staff, Mariah 
Sixkiller; from my staff, Brian Diffel; Mr. Boehner's staff, Jen 
Stewart worked hard on this; Chris Donesa from Mr. Hoekstra's staff was 
indispensable in his work, as was Caroline Lynch from Mr. Smith's 
staff. And I got to know frankly and work with Jeremy Bash from Mr. 
Reyes' staff and

[[Page 13253]]

Lou DeBaca from Mr. Conyers' staff, and appreciated the real positive 
contributions they bring to this process every day.
  I would also like to suggest that two staffers of my colleague from 
Missouri, Mr. Bond, Louis Tucker, and Jack Livingston, spent lots of 
time and lots of productive work on this.
  Madam Speaker, this represents a compromise, as Mr. Reyes just said, 
as Mr. Smith just said, that was forged with lots of hard work by lots 
of people. It accomplishes the goals of the intelligence community. 
There is no individualized court order for targeting foreign terrorists 
in foreign countries. There are protections here for communications 
providers that may have assisted the government. But, as Mr. Reyes just 
said, those protections will be determined by a court, not by this 
legislation.
  We modernized the law to adapt to changes in technology since the 
1978 FISA statute. The bill would accomplish all this while adding new 
protections and strengthening the individual liberties and privacy 
protections of Americans.
  We also worked closely with the majority to reinforce the FISA 
Court's role in procedural certifications and reviews of administration 
policies, and we created some new obligations for the Attorney General 
to establish guidelines.
  Madam Speaker, like yesterday's vote, this bill is an example of what 
we can do when we work together. I thank all those who worked so hard 
to get it to the floor today. I urge my colleagues to vote for it.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, is it true that I have 10 minutes 
remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan has 10\1/2\ 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. CONYERS. I am going to recognize Mr. Nadler, Ms. Lofgren, Mr. 
Scott, Ms. Jackson-Lee, Mr. Holt, Ms. Lee, Mr. Capuano, Mr. Kucinich 
and Mr. Inslee. A couple of them will get 1\1/2\ minutes.
  The first one to be recognized is the chairman of the Crime 
Subcommittee, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott), for 1\1/2\ 
minutes.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Madam Speaker, I oppose H.R. 6304. It allows 
widespread acquisition of private conversations without meaningful 
court review. The bill actually permits the government to perform mass 
untargeted surveillance of any and all conversations believed to be 
coming into and out of the United States without any individualized 
finding and without a requirement that wrongdoing is believed to be 
involved at all.
  It arguably is not limited just to terrorism. It could be any foreign 
intelligence, which would include diplomacy and anything else. It is 
vague on what can be done with the information after it is acquired and 
who has access to it, and the only court review is a check on whether 
or not the government certifies that the process has been followed. The 
court does not review who, what and where the tapping will take place.
  Furthermore, the collection of all of this data can be done under 
emergency provisions before the court acts, but the collection can 
continue to be done even if the court later rejects the application if 
the administration appeals.
  The bill also provides retroactive immunity to communications 
companies who may have violated people's rights, and whether or not 
those rights have been violated should be reviewed by the courts, not 
decided here in Congress.
  Madam Speaker, we can protect Americans' national security and 
protect civil rights by providing government access to personal 
conversations with meaningful court review. This bill fails to do that, 
and therefore should be defeated.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman 
from Virginia (Mr. Forbes), a member of the Judiciary Committee and the 
Armed Services Committee.
  Mr. FORBES. Madam Speaker, today when the sun comes up on America, 
there are all too many people who spend all too much time criticizing 
and apologizing for this Nation, trying to verbally tear it down. But 
what frightens us most is those people who spend way too much energy 
and way too much time trying to do harm to innocent Americans as they 
go about their day-to-day lives, carrying their children to piano 
recitals, to Little League practice, just going to work. It just makes 
common sense that we would want to know what they were trying to do, 
because if we know, we have at least a chance to stop it.
  This is a bipartisan bill that we should have had a year ago. We 
certainly should have had 4 months ago. Thank goodness we have it 
today. The only unfortunate thing is those who will benefit the most 
will never know it, because they never became victims because we were 
able to stop those terrorist acts before they took place.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee.
  Mr. SKELTON. Madam Speaker, today I rise in strong support of this 
bill, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. The bipartisan compromise before 
us strikes the right balance between providing our intelligence 
community with the tools they need to fight and find terrorists and 
protecting our constitutional rights on the other hand.
  Let me thank my colleagues Sylvester Reyes and John Conyers, our 
Intelligence and Judiciary Committee chairmen, for their hard work. I 
am pleased that we have resolved this critical national security issue 
through bipartisan negotiations between the administration and the 
Congress. I want to particularly commend Steny Hoyer, our majority 
leader, and our Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, for their leadership in reaching 
this landmark legislation.
  The bill before us is a great improvement over the Senate bill in 
that it provides for more rigorous review of electronic surveillance 
activities. It gives the courts a meaningful role in determining if 
telecommunication firms are entitled to civil liability protection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. REYES. I grant the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. SKELTON. From my perspective as chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, the bill strongly supports the intelligence needs of those 
who wear the uniform. Every day, American men and women deployed in 
harm's way depend on electronic surveillance capabilities to achieve 
their missions. Because of this bill and the work that has been done in 
this Congress, especially the Intelligence Committee and the Judiciary 
Committee, I thank them, and at the end of the day the young men and 
young women will be the beneficiaries of this strong legislation.
  Madam Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 6304, the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008.
  The bipartisan compromise before us today strikes the right balance 
between providing our intelligence community with the tools they need 
to find and fight terrorists, and protecting our constitutional rights.
  I want to thank my colleagues, Silvestre Reyes and John Conyers, our 
Intelligence and Judiciary Committee Chairmen, for their hard work in 
bringing a strong bill to the floor today.
  I am pleased that we have resolved this critical national security 
issue through bipartisan negotiations between the Administration and 
the Congress and I want to particularly commend Speaker Nancy Pelosi 
and Steny Hoyer for their leadership in reaching this landmark 
legislation.
  The bill before us today is a great improvement over the Senate bill 
in that it provides for more rigorous review of electronic surveillance 
activities, and gives the courts a meaningful role in determining if 
telecommunications firms are entitled to civil liability protection.
  From my perspective, as the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 
this bill strongly supports the intelligence needs of our soldiers, 
sailors, airmen and marines. Every day, American men and women deployed 
in harm's way depend on the electronic surveillance capabilities to 
achieve their missions. This legislation ensures continued delivery of 
this intelligence to our warfighters.
  Again, I want to congratulate Chairman Reyes and Chairman Conyers or 
bringing this strong bill to the floor, and I urge my colleagues to 
join me in supporting this vital national security measure.

[[Page 13254]]


  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
member of the Intelligence Committee from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Speaker, the compromise bill before us today is 
not the bill that I would have written. As a matter of fact, the 
compromise Senate bill we have been trying to get a vote on since 
February is not the bill I would have written either. But I do believe 
that the bill before us, imperfect as it is, does do what is needed to 
protect the country, and therefore I support it.
  A number of people deserve credit, including Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Blunt 
and Mrs. Wilson on our side. But I also want to commend the majority 
leader, Mr. Hoyer, for the time and energy he put into this issue and 
for his perseverance in pushing it to a resolution. I know a number of 
Members on his side don't want to do anything. They prefer operating 
under an outdated law that makes it impossible to move with the speed 
and agility we need to have to protect the country in an age of 
terrorism. There may be some on this side who would prefer to have a 
political issue for the fall campaign.
  But I believe that every day we grow more vulnerable, and that we 
must act now to give our national security professionals, including our 
troops in the field, the tools and the information they need to do 
their job.
  Madam Speaker, the House has taken some significant steps this week 
toward ending the disturbing practice of playing politics with national 
security. When this House is allowed to vote, we can come together and 
accomplish things for the country. If we can just extend that now into 
energy and other issues and just allow a vote on the proposals that are 
before us, we can do good for the country in other areas as well.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Zoe Lofgren), the Chair of the Immigration 
Subcommittee.
  Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to 
this bill. I appreciate that some improvements have made been made to 
title I of the bill, but even these improvements are undercut by the 
scheme in title II that means there will be no accountability and 
perhaps no adherence to the provisions of title I.
  I cannot support the legislation's deeply flawed provisions relating 
to the issue of immunity for telecommunications companies. These 
provisions turn the judiciary into the administration's rubber stamp. 
The review provided in this bill is an empty formality that will lead 
to a preordained conclusion, dismissing all cases with no examination 
on their merits.
  Under this bill, the courts are not allowed to ask whether the 
conduct of the corporations who assisted was in fact legal. They may 
only note that the administration says that it was legal. In other 
words, the decision on the ultimate question of legality, a decision 
the Constitution dedicates to the judiciary, will instead be made by 
the executive branch with the judiciary acting as a rubber stamp. It 
turns the process of judicial review into a joke and denigrates this 
supposedly independent and coequal branch of government.

                              {time}  1115

  It's all the more aggravating because immunity already exists in the 
law under 18 U.S.C., section 2511. It provides that telecommunications 
companies are immune from suit if the company has been provided with a 
court order or a certification by the Attorney General, in writing, 
that the order has been obtained or is unnecessary.
  I cannot support this.

                     (Effective: November 25, 2002)

                UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED CURRENTNESS

         Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Refs & Annos)

                     Part I. Crimes (Refs & Annos)

   Chapter 119. Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and 
           Interception of Oral Communications (Refs & Annos)

     Sec. 2511. INTERCEPTION AND DISCLOSURE OF WIRE, ORAL, OR 
                   ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PROHIBITED

       (1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this 
     chapter any person who--
       (a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or 
     procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to 
     intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;
       (b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any 
     other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, 
     mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral 
     communication when--
       (i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a 
     signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used 
     in wire communication; or
       (ii) such device transmits communications by radio, or 
     interferes with the transmission of such communication; or
       (iii) such person knows, or has reason to know, that such 
     device or any component thereof has been sent through the 
     mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or
       (iv) such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the 
     premises of any business or other commercial establishment 
     the operations of which affect interstate or foreign 
     commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining 
     information relating to the operations of any business or 
     other commercial establishment the operations of which affect 
     interstate or foreign commerce; or
       (v) such person acts in the District of Columbia, the 
     Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or possession 
     of the United States;
       (c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to 
     any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or 
     electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know 
     that the information was obtained through the interception of 
     a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of 
     this subsection;
       (d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents 
     of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or 
     having reason to know that the information was obtained 
     through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic 
     communication in violation of this subsection; or
       (e) (i) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, 
     to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or 
     electronic communication, intercepted by means authorized by 
     sections 2511(2)(a)(ii), 2511(2)(b)-(c), 2511(2)(e), 2516, 
     and 2518 of this chapter, (ii) knowing or having reason to 
     know that the information was obtained through the 
     interception of such a communication in connection with a 
     criminal investigation, (iii) having obtained or received the 
     information in connection with a criminal investigation, and 
     (iv) with intent to improperly obstruct, impede, or interfere 
     with a duly authorized criminal investigation,

     shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be 
     subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).
       (2)(a)(i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for 
     an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or 
     agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication 
     service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a 
     wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or 
     use that communication in the normal course of his employment 
     while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident 
     to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the 
     rights or property of the provider of that service, except 
     that a provider of wire communication service to the public 
     shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring 
     except for mechanical or service quality control checks.
       (ii) Notwithstanding any other law, providers of wire or 
     electronic communication service, their officers, employees, 
     and agents, landlords, custodians, or other persons, are 
     authorized to provide information, facilities, or technical 
     assistance to persons authorized by law to intercept wire, 
     oral, or electronic communications or to conduct electronic 
     surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, if such provider, its 
     officers, employees, or agents, landlord, custodian, or other 
     specified person, has been provided with--
       (A) a court order directing such assistance signed by the 
     authorizing judge, or
       (B) a certification in writing by a person specified in 
     section 2518(7) of this title or the Attorney General of the 
     United States that no warrant or court order is required by 
     law, that all statutory requirements have been met, and that 
     the specified assistance is required, setting forth the 
     period of time during which the provision of the information, 
     facilities, or technical assistance is authorized and 
     specifying the information, facilities, or technical 
     assistance required. No provider of wire or electronic 
     communication service, officer, employee, or agent thereof, 
     or landlord, custodian, or other specified person shall 
     disclose the existence of any interception or surveillance or 
     the device used to accomplish the interception or 
     surveillance with respect to which the person has been 
     furnished a court order or certification under this chapter, 
     except as may otherwise be required by legal process and then 
     only after prior notification to the Attorney General or to 
     the principal prosecuting attorney of a State or any 
     political subdivision of a State, as may be appropriate. Any 
     such disclosure, shall render such person liable for the 
     civil damages provided for in section 2520. No cause of 
     action shall lie in any court against any provider of

[[Page 13255]]

     wire or electronic communication service, its officers, 
     employees, or agents, landlord, custodian, or other specified 
     person for providing information, facilities, or assistance 
     in accordance with the terms of a court order, statutory 
     authorization, or certification under this chapter.
       (b) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an 
     officer, employee, or agent of the Federal Communications 
     Commission, in the normal course of his employment and in 
     discharge of the monitoring responsibilities exercised by the 
     Commission in the enforcement of chapter 5 of title 47 of the 
     United States Code, to intercept a wire or electronic 
     communication, or oral communication transmitted by radio, or 
     to disclose or use the information thereby obtained.
       (c) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a 
     person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, 
     or electronic communication, where such person is a party to 
     the communication or one of the parties to the communication 
     has given prior consent to such interception.
       (d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a 
     person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, 
     oral, or electronic communication where such person is a 
     party to the communication or where one of the parties to the 
     communication has given prior consent to such interception 
     unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of 
     committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the 
     Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State.
       (e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title or 
     section 705 or 706 of the Communications Act of 1934, it 
     shall not be unlawful for an officer, employee, or agent of 
     the United States in the normal course of his official duty 
     to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 
     of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as 
     authorized by that Act.
       (f) Nothing contained in this chapter or chapter 121 or 206 
     of this title, or section 705 of the Communications Act of 
     1934, shall be deemed to affect the acquisition by the United 
     States Government of foreign intelligence information from 
     international or foreign communications, or foreign 
     intelligence activities conducted in accordance with 
     otherwise applicable Federal law involving a foreign 
     electronic communications system, utilizing a means other 
     than electronic surveillance as defined in section 101 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and procedures 
     in this chapter or chapter 121 and the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by 
     which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of 
     such Act, and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and 
     electronic communications may be conducted.
       (g) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter or chapter 
     121 of this title for any person--
       (i) to intercept or access an electronic communication made 
     through an electronic communication system that is configured 
     so that such electronic communication is readily accessible 
     to the general public;
       (ii) to intercept any radio communication which is 
     transmitted--
       (I) by any station for the use of the general public, or 
     that relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in 
     distress;
       (II) by any governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, 
     private land mobile, or public safety communications system, 
     including police and fire, readily accessible to the general 
     public;
       (III) by a station operating on an authorized frequency 
     within the bands allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or 
     general mobile radio services; or
       (IV) by any marine or aeronautical communications system;
       (iii) to engage in any conduct which--
       (I) is prohibited by section 633 of the Communications Act 
     of 1934; or
       (II) is excepted from the application of section 705(a) of 
     the Communications Act of 1934 by section 705(b) of that Act;
       (iv) to intercept any wire or electronic communication the 
     transmission of which is causing harmful interference to any 
     lawfully operating station or consumer electronic equipment, 
     to the extent necessary to identify the source of such 
     interference; or
       (v) for other users of the same frequency to intercept any 
     radio communication made through a system that utilizes 
     frequencies monitored by individuals engaged in the provision 
     or the use of such system, if such communication is not 
     scrambled or encrypted.
       (h) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter--
       (i) to use a pen register or a trap and trace device (as 
     those terms are defined for the purposes of chapter 206 
     (relating to pen registers and trap and trace devices) of 
     this title); or
       (ii) for a provider of electronic communication service to 
     record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was 
     initiated or completed in order to protect such provider, 
     another provider furnishing service toward the completion of 
     the wire or electronic communication, or a user of that 
     service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of such 
     service.
       (i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a 
     person acting under color of law to intercept the wire or 
     electronic communications of a computer trespasser 
     transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer, if--
       (I) the owner or operator of the protected computer 
     authorizes the interception of the computer trespasser's 
     communications on the protected computer;
       (II) the person acting under color of law is lawfully 
     engaged in an investigation;
       (III) the person acting under color of law has reasonable 
     grounds to believe that the contents of the computer 
     trespasser's communications will be relevant to the 
     investigation; and
       (IV) such interception does not acquire communications 
     other than those transmitted to or from the computer 
     trespasser.
       (3)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this 
     subsection, a person or entity providing an electronic 
     communication service to the public shall not intentionally 
     divulge the contents of any communication (other than one to 
     such person or entity, or an agent thereof) while in 
     transmission on that service to any person or entity other 
     than an addressee or intended recipient of such communication 
     or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient.
       (b) A person or entity providing electronic communication 
     service to the public may divulge the contents of any such 
     communication--
       (i) as otherwise authorized in section 2511(2)(a) or 2517 
     of this title;
       (ii) with the lawful consent of the originator or an 
     addressee or intended recipient of such communication;
       (iii) to a person employed or authorized, or whose 
     facilities are used, to forward such communication to its 
     destination; or
       (iv) which were inadvertently obtained by the service 
     provider and which appear to pertain to the commission of a 
     crime, if such divulgence is made to a law enforcement 
     agency.
       (4)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this 
     subsection or in subsection (5), whoever violates subsection 
     (1) of this section shall be fined under this title or 
     imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
       (b) Conduct otherwise an offense under this subsection that 
     consists of or relates to the interception of a satellite 
     transmission that is not encrypted or scrambled and that is 
     transmitted--
       (i) to a broadcasting station for purposes of 
     retransmission to the general public; or
       (ii) as an audio subcarrier intended for redistribution to 
     facilities open to the public, but not including data 
     transmissions or telephone calls,

     is not an offense under this subsection unless the conduct is 
     for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage 
     or private financial gain.
       [(c) Redesignated (b)]
       (5)(a)(i) If the communication is--

       (A) a private satellite video communication that is not 
     scrambled or encrypted and the conduct in violation of this 
     chapter is the private viewing of that communication and is 
     not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of 
     direct or indirect commercial advantage or private commercial 
     gain; or
       (B) a radio communication that is transmitted on 
     frequencies allocated under subpart D of part 74 of the rules 
     of the Federal Communications Commission that is not 
     scrambled or encrypted and the conduct in violation of this 
     chapter is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for 
     purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or 
     private commercial gain,

     then the person who engages in such conduct shall be subject 
     to suit by the Federal Government in a court of competent 
     jurisdiction.
       (ii) In an action under this subsection--
       (A) if the violation of this chapter is a first offense for 
     the person under paragraph (a) of subsection (4) and such 
     person has not been found liable in a civil action under 
     section 2520 of this title, the Federal Government shall be 
     entitled to appropriate injunctive relief; and
       (B) if the violation of this chapter is a second or 
     subsequent offense under paragraph (a) of subsection (4) or 
     such person has been found liable in any prior civil action 
     under section 2520, the person shall be subject to a 
     mandatory $500 civil fine.
       (b) The court may use any means within its authority to 
     enforce an injunction issued under paragraph (ii)(A), and 
     shall impose a civil fine of not less than $500 for each 
     violation of such an injunction.

  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I will yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pence) who is a member of the Judiciary 
Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee as well.
  Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the FISA Amendments 
Act of 2008.
  America is at war. We have to do all we can to protect our Nation 
from those who seek to harm this country, our communities and our 
families.
  After nearly a year of delays, we finally have before us a bill that 
will institute a long-term fix to our Nation's foreign intelligence 
surveillance laws and provide the intelligence community with the tools 
it needs to protect this country.

[[Page 13256]]

  I rise in particular appreciation of Republican Whip Roy Blunt, 
Ranking Member Smith and Mr. Hoekstra. These Republicans stood firm and 
have succeeded in negotiating a strong 4-year extension to our 
surveillance laws.
  While this bill is tough on terrorists, it includes strong 
protections for civil liberties and Americans that have also been put 
in place by extensive measures of oversight and review in the 
Department of Justice, and it protects those patriotic 
telecommunications companies who assisted the Federal Government in the 
wake of 9/11.
  While I endorse these reforms and safeguards, let me say, Madam 
Speaker, Congress and future administrations must be vigilant to ensure 
that the exigent circumstances exceptions are practiced in a way that 
preserves Presidential discretion when conducting real-time foreign 
intelligence. Speaking less as a Congressman and more as a father, and 
as an American who was here on September 11, I am grateful to my 
colleagues in both parties for bringing this important compromise to 
the floor and making sure that our intelligence community, those who 
work tirelessly every day to protect us, have the tools they need to 
prevent the horrors of that day from ever being visited on our soil 
again.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from California, Ms. Jane Harman, who is the former ranking 
member of the Intelligence Committee.
  Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, my phones are ringing off the hook, and my 
e-mail accounts are full. By the hundreds and hundreds, my constituents 
are saying, ``don't cave in,'' ``don't toss due process out the 
window,'' ``no compromise on our civil liberties'' and ``all 
surveillance of Americans should require a warrant.'' One of the most 
powerful, ``The U.S. Constitution has been `marked up.' Don't shred 
it.''
  I agree, now and always. The hard part is deciding whether the FISA 
compromise before us meets my constituents' requirements and my own.
  After reading every word of it, and after many, many hours working to 
develop and revise portions of it, I conclude that the compromise 
replaces bad law, the Protect America Act, with law that actually 
improves many of the provisions of the underlying FISA law which has 
served our country well for three decades.
  Let me highlight three issues.
  First, this bill makes clear that no president can ignore it ever 
again. FISA is the exclusive means by which our government can conduct 
surveillance. In short, no more warrantless surveillance.
  Second, it expands the circumstances for which individual warrants 
are required, by including Americans outside the U.S., and it protects 
Americans from so-called reverse targeting.
  Third, it requires Federal court review to determine whether 
communications firms, which assisted in post-9/11 activities, get civil 
liability protection. If the evidence is inadequate, courts can deny 
immunity, and immunity does not cover government officials who may have 
violated the law.
  I have lived with FISA up close and personal for many years. I am 
angry about the way the Bush administration abused it and disrespected 
Congress. My constituents are right to demand that Congress show 
courage and stand up for the Constitution. Security and liberty are 
reinforcing values, not a zero-sum gain. This bill, though imperfect, 
protects both.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Boehner) who is the distinguished Republican leader of 
the House.
  Mr. BOEHNER. Let me thank my colleague from Texas for yielding.
  Let me just take a moment to congratulate both Mr. Smith, ranking 
member on the Judiciary Committee, and Mr. Hoekstra, the ranking member 
on the Intelligence Committee, and all of their staff, who have worked 
closely with our Democrat colleagues, both in the House and Senate, to 
craft a bill that will help protect the American people.
  Madam Speaker, America cannot afford to have a pre-9/11 mentality 
when it comes to national security. I think that's why this bill is so 
critical and why Members and staff have been working so hard to craft 
it. I recognize the serious threat that we face, and it keeps our 
Nation on offense when it comes to protecting the American people.
  Our intelligence officials must have the ability to monitor 
terrorists suspected of plotting to kill Americans. This measure 
ensures that the tools that they need will be there to help keep 
America safe. They have retroactive liability protections for firms 
that have aided the government and have worked with our government at 
our request to help detect and prevent attacks. We should protect those 
companies.
  I think it also protects the civil liberties of all Americans. This 
is an important piece of legislation. It has taken an awful lot of time 
to get there.
  But just like yesterday, when Members on both sides of the aisle work 
together, we can come to an agreement. We can come to a compromise 
that's in the best interest of our country.
  Two days in a row we have had two great examples of how we can craft 
very good bills by working in a bipartisan manner. I want to 
congratulate all the Members on both sides of the aisle and their 
staffs who have worked so hard to bring this bill to the floor.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I would like now to yield to the chairman 
of the subcommittee on the Constitution and the Judiciary, the 
gentleman from New York, Jerry Nadler, 1\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, in order to uphold the principle of the 
rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution, we must reject this 
bill. This bill limits the courts hearing lawsuits alleging illegal 
wiretapping, to considering only whether the telecom companies received 
a ``written request or directive indicating that the activity was 
authorized by the President and determined to be lawful,'' not whether 
that request was actually lawful or that telecom companies knew that it 
was unlawful.
  The bill is a fig leaf granting blanket immunity to the telecom 
companies for possibly illegal acts without allowing the courts to 
consider the facts or the law. It denies people whose rights are 
violated their fair day in court, and it denies the American people the 
right to have the actions of this administration subjected to fair and 
independent scrutiny.
  Even the court's limited review will remain secret. The lawsuits will 
be dismissed, but the basis for that dismissal that the defendants were 
innocent of misconduct or that they were guilty, but that Congress 
commands their immunity, must remain secret.
  The constitutionality of the immunity granted by this bill is very 
questionable. As Judge Walker put it in the AT&T case, ``AT&T's alleged 
actions here violate the constitutional rights clearly established in 
the Keith decision. Moreover, because the very action in question has 
previously been held unlawful, AT&T cannot seriously contend that a 
reasonable entity in its position could have believed that the alleged 
domestic dragnet was legal.''
  I would hope that the courts will find that because the 
constitutional rights of Americans have been violated, Congress' 
attempt to prevent court review is unconstitutional. I regret we may 
today abandon the Constitution's protections and insulate lawless 
behavior from legal scrutiny.
  I urge a ``no'' vote on this legislation.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, at this time I would like to yield 3 
minutes to a member of the committee, Mrs. Wilson from New Mexico.
  Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Speaker, in December of 2005, I was 
walking to work and was at 1st and C Street when the front page of the 
New York Times revealed the existence of a program that had not been 
previously briefed to the entire Intelligence Committee and to the 
subcommittee that I, at that time, chaired that oversaw the activities 
of the National Security Agency. That launched a period of extensive 
oversight and draft legislation in 2006.
  In January of 2007, because legislation didn't pass, the 
administration

[[Page 13257]]

made an attempt to put this entire program under a FISA law that was 
not designed and was not updated. I described that at the time as 
trying to put a twin-size sheet on a king-size bed. It didn't work.
  By late summer of 2007, we had lost close to two-thirds of our 
intelligence collection on terrorism. We were unable to respond fast 
enough when we had problems, particularly in war zones.
  Just before Memorial Day in 2007, we had three soldiers who were 
kidnapped in Iraq. We needed an Army of lawyers in Washington D.C. to 
listen to the communications of the people that we thought had 
kidnapped them.
  That delay is not good enough and led to the insistence that we pass 
the Protect America Act, which this Congress did, over the objections 
of the Democratic leadership, in August of 2007. The Protect America 
Act closed an important intelligence gap, but it expired in February of 
this year, and the gap is at risk of ever widening.
  The bill that we pass today will protect the civil liberties of 
Americans and continue to require individualized warrants for anyone in 
the United States or American citizens anywhere in the world. It will 
also allow our intelligence agencies to very rapidly follow up on tips 
and listen to foreigners in foreign countries who are trying to kill 
Americans.
  We have restored FISA to its original intent and modernized it for 
21st century communications and technology. This is an important step 
for our intelligence community and will put it on a sound footing for 
the next several decades.
  Intelligence, good intelligence, is the first line of defense against 
terrorism, and today this body will take the next step in making sure 
we have the tools to be able to listen to our enemies and prevent other 
terrorist attacks.
  I would urge my colleagues to support the legislation.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I would like to yield now to a senior 
member of Judiciary, Sheila Jackson-Lee of Texas, 1 minute.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. I thank the distinguished chairman.
  Madam Speaker, I rise to say that we did have legislation that would 
protect the Constitution and provide the security for our troops and 
those in the intelligence community, and that was the RESTORE Act. 
Today I rise in enormous opposition to H.R. 6304 because, frankly, 
Madam Speaker, it's very difficult to put lipstick on a pig.
  What we have here is the opportunity for the government to conduct 
mass, untargeted surveillance of all communications coming into and out 
of the United States without any individual review and without any 
finding of wrongdoing.
  What Americans don't know is that this government can now surveil you 
for 7 days without any approval. Then if the court denies the 
application, while the application is being appealed from the denial, 
you can be surveilled for 60 days.
  This is not constitutional protection. As it relates to the idea of 
those who are now in court on warrantless searches, now the courts have 
no authority over that, and your cases will be dismissed.
  I ask my colleagues to oppose this because ``significant purpose'' 
has been taken out of this legislation.
  Madam Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 6304, the ``FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008''. This body has worked diligently with our 
colleagues in the Senate to ensure that the civil liberties of American 
citizens are appropriately addressed. Sadly, this compromise bill falls 
short of that aim. I will support no bill that fails to protect 
American civil liberties, both at home and abroad.
  I am unable to support this bill that will overhaul how the 
Government monitors foreign terrorist suspects. I will not support any 
legislation that grants legal immunity to telecommunications companies 
that provide information to Federal investigators without a warrant.
  Madam Speaker, this administration has the law to protect the 
American people. When Americans are involved, the Bill of Rights, the 
fourth amendment, and our civil liberties must be adhered to. This 
legislation does not go far enough to ensure that American rights are 
protected.
  The original legislation offered by the House Majority gave the 
Administration everything that it needed, but today, after months of 
negotiation, if we endorse H.R. 6304, which grants sweeping wiretapping 
authority to the Government with little court oversight and ensures the 
dismissal of all pending cases against the telecommunications 
companies, we are eviscerating the Constitution.
  Let me explain my objections to H.R. 6304. It permits the Government 
to conduct mass, untargeted surveillance of all communications coming 
into and out of the United States, without any individualized review, 
and without any finding of wrongdoing.
  H.R. 6304 permits minimal court oversight. The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISA Court) only reviews general procedures for 
targeting and minimizing the use of information that is collected. 
Under these circumstances, the court may not know what will be tapped 
and where it will occur.
  Furthermore, the bill contains a general ban on reverse targeting, 
but not the strong language I worked so diligently to include in the 
FISA legislation that had passed previously in the House. In my view, 
the RESTORE Act is far superior to this piece of legislation. I wish to 
take a few moments to discuss the improvement that I offered to the 
RESTORE Act in the full Judiciary Committee markup, and which was sent 
over to the Senate for consideration last year.
  My amendment made an essential contribution to the RESTORE Act by 
laying down a clear, objective criterion for the administration to 
follow and the FISA court to enforce in preventing reverse targeting.
  Reverse targeting is the practice where the Government targets 
foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to collect 
information on certain U.S. persons. My language included clear 
statutory directives regarding whom the government should return to the 
FISA court and obtain an individualized order if it would like to 
continue listening to an Americans' communications.
  One of the major concerns that libertarians and classical 
conservatives, as well as progressives and civil liberties 
organizations, have with this legislation, as they did with its 
successor, the Protect America Act, is that the temptation of national 
security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be difficult to 
resist in the absence of certain safeguards in the law to prevent it.
  My amendment attempted to produce such safeguards. My amendment 
reduced even further any such temptation to resort to reverse targeting 
by requiring the administration to obtain a regular, individualized 
FISA warrant whenever the ``real'' target of the surveillance is a 
person in the United States.
  The amendment achieved this objective by requiring the administration 
to obtain a regular FISA warrant whenever a ``significant purpose of an 
acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific person 
reasonably believed to be located in the United States.''
  It is far from clear how the operative language ``reasonably designed 
to ensure that any acquisition authorized . . . is limited to targeting 
persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States; 
and prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to 
which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of 
acquisition to be located in the United States.''
  Yes. It is true that H.R. 6304, the compromise legislation, attempts 
to ensure that American civil liberties are protected, but the 
operative language in the legislation does not provide a paradigm for 
consistency. This is so because it does not provide an objective 
criterion. H.R. 6304 does not go as far as the legislation that the 
House sent over to the Senate a few months ago. H.R. 6304 does not 
retain the objective standards contained in my amendment.
  The language used in my amendment, ``significant purpose,'' is a term 
of art that long has been a staple of FISA jurisprudence and thus is 
well known and readily applied by agencies, legal practitioners, and 
the FISA Court. Thus, the Jackson-Lee amendment provided a clearer, 
more objective criterion for the administration to follow and the FISA 
court to enforce to prevent the practice of reverse targeting without a 
warrant, which all of us can agree should not be permitted.
  A FISA order should be required in those instances where there is a 
particular, known person in the United States at the other end of the 
foreign target's call in whom the Government has a significant interest 
such that a significant purpose of the surveillance has become to 
acquire that person's communications. This protection has been stripped 
from H.R. 6304. I fought hard to keep this language in the bill because 
it is important to me; and it should be very important to members of 
this body and to all Americans. It is important that we require what 
should be required in all cases--warrant any time there is specific, 
targeted surveillance of a United States citizen.

[[Page 13258]]

  Madam Speaker, I have more objections to H.R. 6304 which I will 
quickly note. H.R. 6304 contains an ``exigent'' circumstances loophole 
that thwarts the judicial review requirement. The bill permits the 
Government to start a spying program and wait to go to court for up to 
seven (7) days every time ``intelligence important to the national 
security of the U.S. may be lost or not timely acquired.'' The problem 
with H.R. 6034 is that court applications take time and will delay the 
collection of information. Therefore, it is possible that there will 
not be resort to prior judicial review.
  Under H.R. 6304, the Government is permitted to continue surveillance 
programs even if the application is denied by the court. The Government 
has the authority to wiretap through the entire appeals process, and 
then keep and use whatever it gathers in the meantime.
  I am also troubled by H.R. 6304's dismissal of all cases pending 
against telecommunication companies that facilitated the warrantless 
wiretapping program over the last 7 years. The test in the bill is not 
whether the Government certifications were actually legal--only whether 
they were issued. Because it is public knowledge that they were, all 
the cases seeking to find out what these companies and the Government 
did without communications will be dismissed. Under this bill, we will 
start as a tabula rasa. Telecommunications companies will be prevented 
from having their day in court and we, the American people, will never 
have a chance to know what the companies did and what information is 
collected. I am deeply troubled by this, and frankly, you should be, 
too.
  Madam Speaker, it is important to point out that the loudest demands 
for blanket immunity did not come from the telecommunications companies 
but from the administration, which raises the interesting question of 
whether the administration's real motivation is to shield from public 
disclosure the ways and means by which Government officials may have 
``persuaded'' telecommunications companies to assist in its warrantless 
surveillance programs.
  Madam Speaker, let me be clear in my opposition. Nothing in the Act 
or the amendments to the Act should require the Government to obtain a 
FISA order for every overseas target on the off chance that they might 
pick up a call into or from the United States. Rather, what should be 
required, is a FISA order only where there is a particular, known 
person in the United States at the other end of the foreign target's 
calls in whom the Government has a significant interest such that a 
significant purpose of the surveillance has become to acquire that 
person's communications.
  Nearly two centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville, who remains the most 
astute student of American democracy, observed that the reason 
democracies invariably prevail in any martial conflict is because 
democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and encourages 
those traits that are indispensable to martial success: initiative, 
innovation, resourcefulness, and courage.
  As I wrote in the Politico, ``the best way to win the war on terror 
is to remain true to our democratic traditions. If it retains its 
democratic character, no nation and no loose confederation of 
international villains will defeat the United States in the pursuit of 
its vital interests.''
  Thus, the way forward to victory in the war on terror is for the 
United States country to redouble its commitment to the Bill of Rights 
and the democratic values which every American will risk his or her 
life to defend. It is only by preserving our attachment to these 
cherished values that America will remain forever the home of the free, 
the land of the brave, and the country we love.
  Madam Speaker, FISA has served the Nation well for nearly 30 years, 
placing electronic surveillance inside the United States for foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence purposes on a sound legal footing, 
and I am far from persuaded that it needs to be jettisoned.
  However, I know that FISA as outlined in this bill, H.R. 6304, 
attempts to curtail the Bill of Rights and the civil liberties of the 
American people. I continue to insist upon individual warrants, based 
upon probable cause, when surveillance is directed at people in the 
United States. The Attorney General must still be required to submit 
procedures for international surveillance to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court for approval, but the FISA Court should not be 
allowed to issue a ``basket warrant'' without making individual 
determinations about foreign surveillance.
  In all candor, Madam Speaker, I must restate my firm conviction that 
when it comes to the track record of this President's warrantless 
surveillance programs, there is still not enough on the public record 
about the nature and effectiveness of those programs, or the 
trustworthiness of this administration, to indicate that they require a 
blank check from Congress.
  The Bush administration did not comply with its legal obligation 
under the National Security Act of 1947 to keep the Intelligence 
Committees ``fully and currently informed'' of U.S. intelligence 
activities. Congress cannot continue to rely on incomplete information 
from the Bush administration or revelations in the media. It must 
conduct a full and complete inquiry into electronic surveillance in the 
United States and related domestic activities of the NSA, both those 
that occur within FISA and those that occur outside FISA.
  The inquiry must not be limited to the legal questions. It must 
include the operational details of each program of intelligence 
surveillance within the United States, including: (1) who the NSA is 
targeting; (2) how it identifies its targets; (3) the information the 
program collects and disseminates; and most important (4) whether the 
program advances national security interests without unduly 
compromising the privacy rights of the American people.
  Given the unprecedented amount of information Americans now transmit 
electronically and the post-9/11 loosening of regulations governing 
information sharing, the risk of intercepting and disseminating the 
communications of ordinary Americans is vastly increased, requiring 
more precise--not looser--standards, closer oversight, new mechanisms 
for minimization, and limits on retention of inadvertently intercepted 
communications.
  Madam Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to join me in opposition to 
H.R. 6304, as it grants sweeping wiretapping authority to the 
Government with little court oversight and ensures the dismissal of all 
pending cases against the telecommunications companies. In my view, 
this is wrong and unacceptable.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman 
from Arizona (Mr. Franks) who is a member of the Judiciary Committee 
and a ranking member of the Constitution Subcommittee.

                              {time}  1130

  Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Madam Speaker, the coincidence of jihadist terrorism and nuclear 
proliferation in our world today I believe represents the greatest 
security threat to the human family. Osama bin Laden said ``our 
religious duty is to gain nuclear weapons.'' If that quest should 
succeed, whether it is 100 yards from this Capitol or in one of our 
major cities, it will change our concept of freedom in a way that 
almost none of us can comprehend. And our best hope of preventing that 
is to have effective intelligence capability.
  I believe that the majority has risked the security of this country 
by delaying a vote on this important bill for so long; but I am 
gratified today that at least we are taking the next step in making 
sure that we can see our children and grandchildren walk in the 
sunlight of freedom.
  As we go forward, we should all keep in mind the words of our 
Founding Fathers and the words especially of Thomas Jefferson when he 
said, ``The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.''
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time remains 
on all sides.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) 
has 5 minutes remaining; the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) has 6\1/
2\ minutes remaining; the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith) has 8 
minutes remaining; and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) has 
7\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, I now would like to yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) who serves as 
the chairman of our Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence 
on our Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Speaker, I am proud to rise in support of 
H.R. 6304. I would like to thank Chairman Reyes, Chairman Conyers, 
Majority Leader Hoyer, Minority Leader Blunt, and Ranking Member 
Hoekstra for coming together with a bill that we need on behalf of our 
country.
  My district includes the National Security Agency, and many of NSA's 
employees are my constituents. As a member of the House Committee on 
Intelligence and the chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and 
Tactical Intelligence, which oversees NSA,

[[Page 13259]]

I know that the men and women who work for our Nation's intelligence 
agencies work hard every day to keep our Nation safe.
  The intelligence agencies must do their work within the laws of this 
country, and they need those laws to be clear. The NSA employees in my 
district need a clear law with a bright line between legal and illegal 
surveillance activities, and this bill provides that.
  Our Constitution requires checks and balances for the three branches 
of government. This bill provides that the FISA Court must review 
surveillance requests to protect the constitutional rights of our 
citizens.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bill because it gives our 
intelligence community the tools they need to keep our Nation safe 
while protecting the constitutional rights of Americans.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I would like to yield 3 minutes to another 
distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I want to compliment Mr. 
Reyes. When this happened 124 days ago when it expired, I realized what 
a challenge you had. They were asking you to win the Kentucky Derby by 
entering a donkey in the race. And trying to get all of the folks 
together to get us to the place where we are today was not short feat.
  Mr. Hoekstra and Mr. Reyes, I want to thank you both because what 
this bill does today is reaffirm what we have been saying for the last 
several years, that the due process of the Constitution, the fourth 
amendment, is alive and well and protected in this bill. And any 
rhetoric to the contrary is simply not true. It is fear mongering.
  For any U.S. citizen who believes that their phones are going to be 
unceremoniously and injudiciously tapped or listened to is simply 
wrong, and this bill reaffirms the importance of that fourth amendment 
and due process for every American citizen every day.
  But it also says some very important things. We are going to protect 
the Good Samaritan law that we have known and developed over the last 
200-plus years that if you in good faith help your neighbor or help 
your country, in good faith you will be protected from damages sought 
by anyone else. If you stand up and protect the liberties and justice 
of your country and the lives of your neighbors, you will be protected 
in this law.
  And finally, our foreign intelligence service allies have been 
nervous for 124 days, begging, pleading, cajoling, asking please, step 
up to the plate and reengage in one of the most important intelligence 
elements that we have, that the United States shares with our foreign 
allies to stop suicide bombers, to stop terrorist elements from 
developing plans and plots to kill their citizens as well as our own.
  This bill reaffirms all that we said last year and the year before. 
It reaffirms what we said in the Protect America Act in August of 2007 
that it is absolutely important that we step up to the plate and listen 
to foreign terrorists in foreign lands plotting to kill citizens of our 
allies and here at home.
  I want to congratulate all those who came together today, and urge 
those with the rhetoric to please stand for your country today, stand 
for the soldiers in the field who deserve our protection and the 
protection of the intelligence services, and for every mother and every 
father, every child in America who looks for a better day tomorrow 
knowing that we once again have both our eyes and our ears on the 
problem with terrorism and radical jihadists.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield to the gentleman 
from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), a distinguished member of the Intelligence 
Committee, 1 minute.
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Speaker, I thank the chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee for yielding me time to speak about this.
  Unfortunately, the negotiators who brought this bill to the floor 
bought into the flawed assumptions of the Bush administration that 
because we live in a dangerous world, we must now redefine the fourth 
amendment and thus the fundamental relationship between the government 
and its people.
  If this bill becomes law, it will perhaps be the only lasting legacy 
of the Bush-Cheney administration's overhaul of national security 
policy, a congressionally blessed distortion of congressional checks 
and balances. It permits massive warrantless surveillance in the 
absence of any standard for defining how communications of innocent 
Americans will be protected; a fishing expedition approach to 
intelligence collection that we know will not make Americans more safe.
  Its court review provisions are weak and narrowly defined. I know 
some of those who negotiated this bill say that some court review is 
better than no court review. That is only true if the judge's hands 
aren't tied in the review process. They are in this bill.
  There is a fundamental American principle that those who search, 
seize, intercept and detain should not be the ones who decide who are 
the bad guys.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Issa) who is a member of the Judiciary Committee 
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as well.
  Mr. ISSA. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of this hammered-
out compromise bill.
  You know, Madam Speaker, elections matter. The current balance in the 
House and the Senate played an important part in the administration, 
House Republicans, House Democrats, Senate Democrats, and Senate 
Republicans coming together and figuring out what was needed, what was 
constitutional, in a very much bipartisan fashion.
  Unfortunately, there are those who want to have it both ways, those 
who will talk about how this is balanced, it meets the needs of the 
administration, as the administration is assuring us, and it meets all 
of the constitutional requirements. But there are those who want to 
also play to the other side. While making sure that we are protected by 
a good piece of legislation, there are those who will come on the floor 
and denounce this and then vote against it.
  Madam Speaker, I ask the American people to look long and hard at how 
people vote on this. This is in fact worked out to assure the American 
people, and properly so, that we will protect all of their 
constitutional rights while doing everything we can to ensure their 
safety.
  This is good legislation worked out over a long period of time, and a 
lot of thoughtful work went into it on both sides. But I ask the 
American people to hold accountable those who would want to know that 
the American people are protected, and then vote against it in order to 
play to special interests.
  Madam Speaker, that is the bad part of what will happen today. The 
good part is that America will be safer and the Constitution will be 
secure because of what we are doing here today. I thank you and urge 
support.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I am pleased now to yield to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee), cochair of the Progressive 
Caucus and a leader in the Congressional Black Caucus, 1 minute.
  Ms. LEE. Madam Speaker, let me thank the gentleman for yielding and 
for his leadership.
  I rise in strong opposition to this very terrible bill. It does not 
strike the proper balance between protecting national security and 
preserving our cherished civil liberties.
  Now I know how important those protections are from my personal 
experience with unwarranted domestic surveillance and wiretapping 
during the J. Edgar Hoover period. The government's infamous COINTELPRO 
program ruined the lives of many innocent persons. Others, including 
myself, had their privacy invaded even though they posed absolutely no 
threat to national security. We all remember how Dr. King and his 
family were the victims of the most shameful government-sponsored 
wiretapping. We must never go down this road again. Yet here we are 
again.
  This bill undermines the ability of Federal courts to review the 
legality of

[[Page 13260]]

domestic surveillance programs, it provides de facto retroactive 
immunity to telecom companies and does not sunset until December 31, 
2012. How can we do that? Four years is way too long.
  A good bill will protect Americans against terrorism and not erode 
the fourth amendment. This bill scares me to death, and I urge a ``no'' 
vote.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Daniel E. Lungren), a senior member of the 
Judiciary Committee and the Homeland Security Committee.
  Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Madam Speaker, I thank the 
gentleman for the time.
  Madam Speaker, as some say on radio, ``Now let's hear the rest of the 
story.'' After the arguments just made on this floor, this is actually 
a great day. We and the American people have been waiting for this 
since 12:01 a.m. on February 6 when the Protect America Act expired. 
During the intervening time we have actually been unnecessarily 
vulnerable to those who would do us harm in this era of worldwide 
terrorism.
  In fact, Madam Speaker, I would say that this is the single most 
important bill we will vote on this year, not that I say supporting our 
troops is not important, but the intelligence that we gather as the 
result of the authority granted by this bill may actually create 
conditions under which we do not have to send troops anywhere in the 
world and may be more protective of our rights than any other single 
thing.
  Having come before this body on five different occasions since that 
initial expiration of the Protect America Act, I am greatly relieved 
that we can finally send the intelligence community and the American 
people a bill which will enable the intelligence community to continue 
to protect those American people.
  Although the compromise agreement embodied in the proposal before us 
is not necessarily the one I would have written, it does, in my 
estimation, meet our responsibilities for protecting the American 
people. In other words, Madam Speaker, it is not the Mona Lisa but it 
is not a bad paint job.
  First and foremost, the proposal before us ensures that we will 
continue to have the ability to monitor the conversations of al Qaeda 
overseas. And although there are requirements that the Attorney General 
and the Director of National Intelligence adopt procedures which will 
be submitted to the FISA Court, the bill retains sufficient flexibility 
for our overseas intelligence mission.
  In other words, the intelligence community leadership has assured us 
that this bill will allow them the operational authority to do what 
needs to be done within the parameters of the Constitution. Both the 
safety of the American people as well as their civil liberties are 
protected in this proposal.
  This proposal embodies compromise language which responds to the 
legitimate concerns of telecommunication providers who themselves 
responded to the call of their government in the wake of 9/11. The 
language of the bill not only satisfies the interest of justice, but 
communicates loudly to all Americans that if they are ever confronted 
with such requests, lawful requests, their government will not hang 
them out to dry afterwards.
  Specifically, a Good Samaritan safe harbor will exist with respect to 
any civil action where there is substantial evidence to support the 
certification provided by the Attorney General. The quantum of evidence 
required is merely a showing of more than a scintilla but less than a 
preponderance of evidence.
  And although these provisions in the proposal will contribute to 
securing the safety of our citizens, this is not to suggest that I 
support every provision in the compromise.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman's time has expired.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.
  Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. For example, the so-called 
``exclusive means'' language in the bill is seen by some as an 
assertion of maximal congressional authority. Let me just remind my 
colleagues that the FISA Court of review has said all of the other 
courts to have decided the issue held the President did have inherent 
authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign 
intelligence information. The court stated that ``we take for granted 
that the President does have that authority.''
  So regardless of whether we have a President McCain or a President 
Obama, this language will likely be interpreted in the context of facts 
in individual cases in light of the constitutional jurisprudence which 
has arisen with regard to the collection of foreign intelligence.
  In other words, it does not either trample upon the constitutional 
prerogatives of the Congress nor those constitutional prerogatives of 
the President of the United States. This is a good compromise. It 
protects the American people. We have been waiting for it. It ought to 
be voted on with dispatch.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), a valued member of our 
Intelligence Committee.

                              {time}  1145

  Mr. LANGEVIN. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the FISA Amendments 
Act of 2008. Though not a perfect piece of legislation, it is clearly 
far better than what we have today, and addresses a number of the many 
concerns that were raised about the administration's conduct of 
surveillance in this country.
  As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I know that we must give 
our Intelligence Community the proper tools to protect us, while 
upholding the civil liberties of Americans. Today's compromise 
illustrates what this House can do when it deliberates with care, holds 
steady against fear mongering and acts in the best interests of the 
country and its citizens.
  This bill is strong on civil liberties, and includes protections 
against infringement of our constitutional right to privacy.
  First, the bill clarifies that FISA is the exclusive means by which 
the executive branch may conduct electronic surveillance on U.S. soil. 
No President will have the power to do an end-run around the legal 
requirements of FISA. This provision will prevent the types of abuses 
we've witnessed under this administration.
  Second, this act requires a warrant from the FISA court to conduct 
surveillance of Americans abroad. Americans will no longer leave their 
constitutional protections at home when working, studying or traveling 
abroad.
  Third, it requires prior approval by the FISA court of procedures the 
government will use when carrying out foreign electronic surveillance. 
This will ensure that the government's efforts are not aimed at 
targeting Americans, the so-called reverse targeting that we're all 
concerned about; and that if an American's communications is 
inadvertently intercepted, it is dealt with in a manner that guarantees 
legal protections.
  It also requires and allows for, now, an IG investigation of this 
warrantless surveillance program that took place prior to Congress 
being made aware of this legislation.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman's time has expired.
  Mr. REYES. I grant the gentleman another 15 seconds.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Madam Speaker, as I've said before, this legislation 
will only work if everyone involved follows the rules and remains 
within the confines of the law. Congress must continue to conduct 
robust oversight to make sure that the law is implemented as intended 
to maintain the critical and fragile balance of protecting our Nation 
and protecting civil liberties.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. At this time I would like to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Issa).
  Mr. ISSA. Madam Speaker, in just 1 minute it's impossible to assure 
the American people of everything this bill will do. But I would like 
too, if you will, react to something that was said on the other side 
that just simply isn't true.
  Yes, during J. Edgar Hoover's day, there was warrantless 
surveillance,

[[Page 13261]]

even on political enemies of the people who were President at the time. 
Those days are behind us.
  This act, long since we've taken care of domestic wiretap, but this 
goes one step further. It insures Americans and particularly, I think, 
Arab Americans like myself who might go back and forth between here or 
have relatives in the Middle East, that their conversations will not be 
the subject of warrantless wiretaps, that, in fact, they can be very 
confident that America is going to observe the Constitution for them, 
both when they are here and if they are visiting abroad.
  So it's not easy to undo some of the statements that talk about the 
past, but the truth is, this will protect what has already been 
established for Americans here.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield to the gentleman 
that has more measures in the Judiciary Committee than anybody else in 
Congress, Dennis Kucinich, the distinguished gentleman from Ohio, 1 
minute.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Under this bill, large corporations and big government 
can work together to violate the United States Constitution, use 
massive databases to spy, to wiretap, to invade the privacy of the 
American people. There's no requirement for the government to seek a 
warrant for any intercepted communication that includes a U.S. citizen, 
as long as the program in general is directed towards foreign targets.
  This Congress must not allow the names of innocent U.S. citizens to 
be placed on secret intelligence lists. Under this bill, violations of 
Fourth Amendment rights and blanket wiretaps will be permissible for 
the next 4 years. Massive and untargeted collection of communications 
will continue and with the enactment of this bill.
  Furthermore, it allows the type of surveillance to be applied to all 
communications entering and exiting the United States. These blanket 
wiretaps make it impossible to know whose calls are being intercepted 
by the National Security Agency.
  Let's stand up for the fourth amendment. Let's remember, when this 
country was founded Benjamin Franklin said, those who would give up 
their essential liberties to achieve a measure of security deserve 
neither. Vote against it.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my 
time.
  Madam Speaker, H.R. 6304 may well be one of the most important pieces 
of legislation we pass this Congress.
  For 4 months America has been more vulnerable to attacks by our 
enemies, because of the refusal by some to bring a commonsense bill to 
the floor to help the Intelligence Community protect Americans.
  Many of us would have preferred the bill passed by the Senate. 
Although this bill may not be ideal, it does represent a compromise 
between House and Senate Republicans and Democrats. This compromise 
preserves our ability to conduct a strong, effective foreign 
intelligence program.
  I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 1 minute to 
our esteemed Speaker of the House, Ms. Pelosi.
  Ms. PELOSI. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I 
thank him for his great leadership as the chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee. I commend him.
  I commend Mr. Conyers, the distinguished chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, for although he is not supporting the legislation before us 
today, he certainly had a tremendous impact to improve it. Thank you 
for your relentless championing of civil liberties in our country, Mr. 
Conyers.
  I want to pay special tribute to our majority leader, Mr. Hoyer, for 
making this compromise possible today. It's a very difficult task, many 
competing views as to how we should go forward. Mr. Hoyer handled it 
all with great intellect and great respect for all of those views. 
Thank you, Mr. Hoyer.
  Also want to acknowledge Mr. Smith and Mr. Hoekstra and minority 
whip, Mr. Blunt, for their leadership in giving us this opportunity 
today.
  We've heard it over and over again. Our colleagues say this bill is 
not perfect, this isn't the bill I would write. I prefer this bill, I 
prefer that bill.
  Well, I prefer the House bill that passed and was sent to the Senate. 
It isn't an option for us. I do not, I totally reject the Senate bill 
which is an option, and that is the comparison that we have to make, 
the contrast that we have to make today.
  But in doing so, I think we all understand the important 
responsibility that we have in this Congress, focused on this debate 
today. I always take the debate back to our responsibility when we take 
the oath of office. We take an oath of office to protect and defend the 
Constitution from all enemies, foreign and domestic. In that preamble 
to our Constitution, we must provide for the common defense. Essential 
to honoring that commitment to protect the American people is to have 
the intelligence, operational intelligence that will help us do that.
  When I first went on the Intelligence Committee, our focus was on 
force protection. Our troops in the field depend on timely and reliable 
intelligence to make the decisions necessary to keep them safe and to 
do their job. Force protection, force protection, force protection. It 
is still a primary responsibility of our intelligence.
  In addition to that, we have the fight on the war against terrorism, 
the fight against terrorism, wherever it may exist. Good intelligence 
is necessary for us to know the plans of the terrorists and to defeat 
those plans.
  So we can't go without a bill. That's just simply not an option. But 
to have a bill, we must have a bill that does not violate the 
Constitution of the United States, and this bill does not.
  Some in the press have said that under this legislation, this bill 
would allow warrantless surveillance of Americans. That is not true. 
This bill does not allow warrantless surveillance of Americans. I just 
think we have to stipulate to some set of facts.
  We may have our opinions about the bill, but there have been so many 
versions of the story of different bills that have come up, the PAA 
last year, which I thought was totally unacceptable. The Senate bill, 
also unacceptable. Our House bill, which I mentioned before, which I 
thought was the appropriate way to go, and now this compromise.
  As I was talking with Mr. Hoyer in the course of his negotiations, 
there were certain things that I thought had to be in the bill to make 
it acceptable, certain threshold issues that had to be there, and they 
are.
  In terms of the original FISA bill, it's interesting to note that 
this bill is an improvement on that in three important ways.
  First, we all recognize the changes in technology necessitate a 
change in the legislation, and this legislation today modernizes our 
intelligence-gathering system by recognizing and responding to 
technological developments that have occurred since the original FISA 
Act in 1978. In doing so, we can make the country safer in a more 
advanced technological way.
  Second, and this is very, very important, and there's some 
misunderstanding about this. This bill provides that Americans overseas 
receive the same FISA protection, including an individualized warrant 
based on probable cause, as Americans living within the country. This 
is a very important improvement on the original FISA Act.
  Third, this bill strengthens congressional oversight. And this is 
very important, the transparency. Transparency and intelligence don't 
always go together, but accountability is central to intelligence. This 
strengthens congressional oversight by requiring that the executive 
branch provide more extensive information about the conduct of 
surveillance to both the Intelligence Committee and the Judiciary 
Committee. This is new, this is better. The more we know, the better, I 
think, the law will be enforced.
  If this bill does not pass, we will most certainly be left with the 
Senate bill. I think that's clear. And this bill is an improvement over 
the Senate bill

[[Page 13262]]

in the following ways, just to name a few.
  First of all, it reaffirms that FISA is the exclusive means of 
collecting foreign intelligence, and makes absolutely clear that the 
enactment of an authorization for the use of force does not give the 
President, whoever he may be, any inherent authority to alter the 
requirements of FISA. Very important.
  This is important because President Bush believed, and this was what 
we were told, that he, as President of the United States, had inherent 
authority under the Constitution to do almost anything he wanted.
  And what this bill reaffirms is that the FISA law is the authority 
for collecting foreign intelligence. There is no inherent authority of 
the President to do whatever he wants. This is a democracy. It is not a 
monarchy.
  Secondly, it is an improvement of the Senate bill. And by the way, no 
offense to President Bush. I wouldn't want any President, Democrat or 
Republican, a Democratic President or a Republican President to have 
that authority.
  Secondly, the bill provides that, except in rare circumstances there 
will be pre-surveillance review by the FISA Court.

                              {time}  1200

  And when I say rare circumstance, I mean very, very rare.
  Unlike the Senate bill, this legislation retains FISA's broad 
definition of electronic surveillance and thus guarantees that basic 
protections of FISA apply to all the new forms of collection authorized 
by the bill. There had been an attempt, and that's why the Senate bill 
is inferior in this respect, to just narrow it to certain kinds of 
collection, and this says it applies to all collection, electronic 
surveillance.
  Fourth, it contains specific protections against reverse targeting. 
This reverse targeting is very, very important to the civil liberties 
of the American people, and I am satisfied by the specific provisions 
against reverse targeting. It provides a full and independent review of 
the President's surveillance program by the Inspector General of the 
relevant agencies.
  Of course, there are aspects of this compromise bill that I do not 
like. I don't believe that Congress should be in the business of 
interfering with ongoing lawsuits and attempting to grant immunity to 
telecommunication companies that allegedly violated the law. Those 
companies have not lived up to a standard expected by the American 
people. I don't think today is any cause for celebration for them. They 
come out of this with a taint.
  I do not believe that the pending lawsuits would have achieved what 
we would have liked them to do which is what the Inspector General's 
review would, which is to learn the truth about the President's 
terrorist surveillance program and give us the information we need to 
make sure that never happens again.
  In addition, this legislation makes sure that in the future, the 
telephone companies must fully comply with Federal statutes.
  Again, it would have been my preference to vote for the RESTORE Act 
that the House sent over to the Senate. I do not consider it an option 
to live with the Senate bill. This is the opportunity that we have to 
protect the American people through the gathering of intelligence which 
is essential, as I said earlier, to force protection, to protect our 
men and women in uniform and help them make the decisions they need to 
do their jobs and keep them safe and to fight terrorists by learning 
their plans in advance and squelching them.
  I want to thank those who have worked so hard to bring this bill to 
the floor. Again, it's not a happy occasion, but it's the work that we 
have to do. I think we have to remember getting back to the 
Constitution. The House, article 1, legislates. We pass the laws. The 
judiciary interprets the law. The executive branch enforces the law. 
And what is very important about whatever we pass, especially in 
relating to subjects relating to our security and our liberty, it's 
important that the President of the United States enforce this law 
honoring the Constitution of the United States recognizing the 
responsibility that we all have to protect the American people and 
protect the Constitution of the United States at the same time.
  So again, a difficult decision for all of us. I respect every opinion 
that was expressed on this floor today. The knowledge, the sincerity, 
the passion and the intellect of those who support and oppose this have 
been very, very valuable in making the bill better, if not good enough 
for some, but certainly preferable to the alternative that we have 
which is the Senate bill which must be rejected.
  I'm not asking anybody to vote for this bill. I just wanted you to 
know why I was.
  Thank you, Madam Speaker.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I would like to yield myself the balance 
of my time.
  In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the President, the leaders of 
Congress, faced a very difficult situation: to learn more and to better 
understand the threat that America now faced. They recognized that we 
needed to move from a mentality of being law enforcement to a mentality 
of prevention, that we needed to confront, contain, and ultimately 
defeat radical jihadists if America was going to stay safe.
  The President, the leaders of Congress, many of whom spoke today, 
huddled together and talked about the various strategies that they 
could implement to get a better understanding of this organization 
called al Qaeda, its leaders, its intentions, and its capabilities.
  Overarching in their discussions were making sure that the 
Constitution and the rule of law would guide their behaviors. As they 
considered various alternatives and discussed these, they implemented a 
terrorist surveillance program using the capabilities that in many 
cases are unique to America that could give us insights into al Qaeda, 
its leadership, and its intentions.
  It's not the President's program. This program was put together by 
the President in consultation, sure, with members of his cabinet, but 
also, very importantly, with consultation on a bipartisan basis with 
the leaders of Congress.
  These leaders in Congress were consistently briefed about how the 
program would work, the kinds of information that was being obtained, 
and how it was being used to keep America safe, all the while placing a 
responsibility on yes, the President, but also the leaders of Congress 
to make sure that the intel community was doing the things it was being 
asked and was being asked to do things that would be legal.
  The intel community has performed very well. They have gotten us 
information that has enabled us to keep America safe. The intel 
community, this administration, and Congress asked other parts of our 
economy to participate, private sector companies. They stood up and 
they did the job to keep America safe. Congress did the necessary job 
of doing oversight, and in 2004, we reformed the intelligence 
community.
  So since 9/11, many things have been done properly. The end result, 
as we've gone through this process, is that we have kept America safe.
  I congratulate the Speaker, I congratulate the majority leader, I 
congratulate my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, Mr. Smith, 
for working in a bipartisan basis to recognize what needed to be done 
in allowing this bill to come to the floor and continue to move forward 
in a slightly different way than how we've been moving forward over the 
last 6 years. But the most important thing is in a bipartisan basis, we 
have come together on a national security issue to give our 
intelligence community the tools that they need to keep America safe.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I would like now to recognize the 
distinguished gentleman from Washington, Jay Inslee, for 1 minute.
  Mr. INSLEE. Have we forgotten what our ancestors have done in the 
cause of liberty? Don't we realize there are some lines we can never 
cross? Don't we realize we should never legitimize illegal violations 
of America's privacy rights, which this bill does?

[[Page 13263]]

  This bill says if the telecommunication companies violated America's 
privacy willfully, knowingly, knowing it was illegal, we are giving 
them immunity. Where is the excuse for that? Where is the excuse for 
turning a Nation of laws into a Nation that will be led by a President 
who knows how to manipulate our fears?
  We have got to know the law is our ultimate guardian of liberty, and 
those on this side have accused us of having a pre-9/11 mentality. Let 
me remind them that July 4, 1776, was pre-9/11. And heaven help us the 
day that those values are shucked aside at the service of fear.
  Reject this bill.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I will take this time to use the 
remaining time that is allotted me.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 1 minute.
  Mr. CONYERS. I would like to point out that the grant of retroactive 
immunity to the telecoms is inconsistent with our basic principles 
because we are breaking with a very proud tradition of intervening for 
the first time in a pending court decision in an effort to reach a 
preordained legal outcome. This is a bad precedent.
  And may I point out, too, that we are in a period in which the 
executive branch has been deemed by many constitutional authorities to 
be very near the description of an imperial Presidency. We've gone too 
far.
  I hope that we will get a strong vote against this because the 
struggle for restoring our precious rights and liberties must continue.
  I return all time that may be remaining on our side.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, how much time remains?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas has 2\1/4\ minutes.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, it is my privilege to yield 1 minute to our 
distinguished majority leader, Mr. Hoyer, who in this case deserves MVP 
status for having the wisdom of Solomon and the patience of Job.
  Mr. HOYER. I thank my friend, the chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee. I thank the Speaker. I thank the Speaker not only for giving 
me the responsibility for trying to work with some extraordinarily 
talented people but also for having the courage to lead and the courage 
to express her convictions.
  And I want, at the outset, to share her view that every Member who 
has spoken on this floor has spoken out of a sense of conviction and 
out of a sense of responsibility to the Constitution of the United 
States and to the protection of our great Nation and our great people.
  Mr. Reyes, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Smith have all worked to 
come together, realizing that there were significant differences. Those 
four have been assisted by some extraordinary people, and at the 
outset, I want to mention them.
  First of all, I want to mention my own staff without whom I think we 
would not be at this day. She sits on the floor. She worked for my 
colleague and dear friend Senator Paul Sarbanes for a number of years. 
One of the benefits of Senator Sarbanes retiring was that she came to 
my staff. Mariah Sixkiller has expended too much time, perhaps, but 
with great talent and great ability to reach this day. Thank you, 
Mariah Sixkiller.
  I want to thank Chairman Conyers because Chairman Conyers, as you've 
heard on the floor, has been conflicted but he has been focused on the 
necessity to respond to issues that are real and also to help us move 
forward so that we did not, in the minds of many of us, have a bill 
pass that we thought was unacceptable, a bill passed by the Senate with 
68 of 100 votes. We would not be here, in my opinion, without Chairman 
Conyers' leadership, not because he supports this alternative, but 
because he saw the ability to work together.
  I want to thank his staff, Lou DeBaca, Perry Apelbaum. And Lou 
DeBaca, in particular, who sat for hours and hours and hours in a room 
trying to reach agreement as we made compromises. Mr. Reyes' staff, 
Mike Delaney, the staff director. Jeremy Bash. Jeremy Bash did 
extraordinary work. Jeremy Bash was hired by the former Chair of the 
Intelligence Committee, Jane Harman.
  Jane Harman is probably as knowledgeable as almost anybody on this 
floor, other than perhaps the Speaker who served on the Intelligence 
Committee longer than anybody in this House. Jane Harman's leadership, 
concern, focus on constitutional rights, focus on the security of our 
country, was outstanding. She played a significant role in trying to 
get us to this day.

                              {time}  1215

  Eric Greenwald of Mr. Reyes' staff also played a significant role.
  Without Mike Sheehy and Joe Onek of the Speaker's staff, we would not 
be here today. We would not have reached the good compromises that we 
reached. Joe Onek and Mike Sheehy, if they were writing this bill, 
would have written a different bill, much closer to what we passed on 
our side of the aisle and sent to the Senate, which they rejected. Mike 
Sheehy has served the House and the Speaker for a very long time in the 
intelligence field.
  I want to thank Senator Rockefeller. We would not be here today on 
this floor if it were not for Senator Rockefeller. Senator Rockefeller 
very early on had discussions with me about what could they do to try 
to move towards the bill that we passed. He made some suggestions. 
Those suggestions are in this bill today. He facilitated our actions. 
Andy Johnson, Mike Davidson, Alissa Starzak of his staff were very, 
very helpful.
  Senator Bond, Senator Bond and I did not see necessarily eye-to-eye 
on these issues as we began, but at the end, we came to an agreement. 
Louis Tucker and Jack Livinston of his staff were very helpful.
  Chairman Hoekstra, or former Chairman Hoekstra, now Ranking Member 
Hoekstra, I want to thank Chairman Hoekstra, but particularly, I want 
to thank Chris Donessa who was very helpful, gave us great assistance 
and advice.
  Lamar Smith and Caroline Lynch of his staff, thank you very much for 
your efforts as you sat in that room, as we all sat around, every one 
of the committees sat around the table, as we came to the final 
agreement.
  Then I want to thank, of course, Jen Stewart and the minority leader, 
without whom we could not have gotten to this day.
  Lastly, I want to thank my friend. There's an article going to be 
written. It's going to speculate whether or not he and I hurt one 
another by saying the other is his friend. I don't think that's the 
case. I said that Roy Blunt and I often disagree on substantive issues, 
but what we agree on very strongly is that this House needs to sit down 
and talk to one another and try to reach resolution on difficult 
issues, not hard-to-reach compromise on easy issues. It's on the 
difficult issues.
  Roy Blunt is a man of this House, who cares about this House, who 
cares about this country. And he cares about drafting legislation that 
can be agreed upon by a broad section of this House and the American 
people. He has an extraordinary staff of Brian Diffell, who I want to 
thank for his efforts, but in particular, I want to thank Roy Blunt for 
his friendship, for his integrity, and for his willingness to take 
risks to reach compromise. Thank you, Roy.
  Madam Speaker, today we conclude one step in a long, continuing 
process. Just under a year ago, the House came under great pressure 
from the administration and the Senate to pass the Protect America Act, 
a bill I could not support and spoke out against for its lack of civil 
liberties protections.
  Since then, there have been other attempts to modernize the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act: first, the RESTORE Act passed by the 
House last November with my strong support, with Mr. Conyers' strong 
support, Mr. Reyes' strong support, and the support of this House; that 
was followed by the Senate bill which passed, as I said earlier, with 
68 votes in February; and most recently, the FISA Amendments Act, 
passed by the House last March. I supported that bill as well. I think 
it was a better bill. It would be my alternative. It was our 
alternative on this

[[Page 13264]]

side of the aisle, but it was not the consensus alternative, and we 
needed to reach consensus to move forward.
  I was proud to support the two House bills, which I believe struck 
the right balance between giving our intelligence community the tools 
to go after those who seek to harm and protecting the constitutional 
rights of American citizens.
  Today, I stand in support of a different kind of bill, a compromise. 
To be clear, this is not the bill that I would have written or that 
perhaps anybody individually on this floor would have written. However, 
in our legislative process, no one gets everything he or she wants. 
Different parties, often with deeply competing interests, come together 
here to produce a consensus product, where each side gives and takes. I 
don't believe we've given on the ultimate principles on either side.
  Over the past few months, I've been involved in almost daily 
discussions with the stakeholders on this important issue, Members in 
both Chambers, in both parties, as well as outside organizations and 
experts. I want to thank all of the outside organizations, whether they 
agree with our product or do not. Their contribution has been an 
important one. I particularly want to thank those who take very 
unpopular positions to protect the rights of perhaps just one of us 
among the 300 million, who in the land of the free and the home of the 
brave deserve to have that one individual right protected, and I 
appreciate their efforts to ensure that that country remains that kind 
of country.
  Together, we have worked to develop a bill that strikes a sound 
balance. This measure provides the intelligence community with the 
strong authority to surveil foreign terrorists who seek to harm this 
country and our people. As the Speaker said, that is our 
responsibility, and we intend to meet it.
  It provides for enhanced civil liberties protections for Americans 
and insists on meaningful judicial scrutiny.
  It includes critical new oversight and accountability requirements 
that both address the President's warrantless surveillance program and 
ensures that any surveillance going forward comports with the fourth 
amendment and will be closely monitored by the Congress.
  Of vital importance, my colleagues, this legislation makes clear that 
FISA is the exclusive means by which the government may conduct 
surveillance, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Contrary to 
the administration's previous actions, in which it did not comply with 
the FISA statute, this statute makes it very clear, this and this alone 
is the process through which we will intercept communications, an issue 
of great importance to the Speaker, as she has said.
  Notably, this bill does not address or excuse any actions by the 
government or government officials related to the President's 
warrantless surveillance program, nor does it include any statement by 
the Congress or conclusion on the legality of that program.
  Indeed, it mandates for the first time ever a robust accounting by 
the Inspectors General of the warrantless surveillance program, which 
Congress will receive and act on.
  Madam Speaker, in closing, let me say again, this bill is a 
compromise, but in my opinion, it is a compromise worth supporting. And 
the conclusions drawn by editorials in the New York Times, Wall Street 
Journal and Washington Post over the last 2 days reflect this 
compromise.
  Today, for example, the Washington Post recognized that this is a 
reasonable effort to strike a compromise, stating: ``Striking the 
balance between liberties and security is never easy, and the new FISA 
bill is not perfect. But it is a vast improvement over the original law 
and over the earlier, rushed attempts to revise that law.''
  As I said at the beginning, this bill is one step in a long, 
continuing process of updating this critical legislation, ensuring that 
our national security and our civil liberties are both protected.
  This legislation sunsets at the end of 2012, and it's imperative that 
we scrutinize its implementation in the future and make any necessary 
changes. I believe we have the best bill before us that we could 
possibly get in the current environment. It is a significant 
improvement over the Senate-passed bill and, I suggest, existing law.
  I look forward to working with my colleagues in the years ahead to 
ensure that both our national security and our civil liberties are 
protected. That is our responsibility. That is our pledge to our 
constituents. I urge passage of this legislation.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of the time.
  I just wanted to thank everyone again, as Mr. Hoyer indicated. I 
believe every Member in this body cares about our national security, 
and I also believe that this is a good bill, a good compromise and is 
worthy of supporting.
  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Madam Speaker, on March 14th I voted in favor of H.R. 
3773 which modernized the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This 
bill successfully updated the law to accommodate the current day 
communications technology while at the same time providing the much-
needed protection of the court in sanctioning the surveillance of 
Americans. Moreover, the bill was also remarkable for what it did not 
contain; it did not provide retroactive immunity for telephone 
companies who are defendants in pending lawsuits. These suits have been 
brought to uncover the full extent of the Administration's program to 
conduct unauthorized surveillance on Americans.
  I am deeply troubled that the Senate does not have the votes to pass 
the House bill. The Senate instead passed its own bill, S. 2248, which 
was unacceptable to me from the outset because it reduced the role of 
the FISA Court to merely review the procedures for targeting 
surveillance subjects and minimizing the information collected. 
Moreover, the Senate bill established retroactive immunity for the 
phone companies that have been used to carry out the Administration's 
illicit surveillance program.
  To be sure, the Senate bill is completely unacceptable. Majority 
Leader Hoyer worked tirelessly to improve upon the Senate bill to forge 
an acceptable compromise. The bill before us today, however, does not 
go far enough to include sufficient safeguards of court involvement in 
the surveillance of Americans. Moreover, it continues to provide 
retroactive immunity for those companies that carried out the 
Administration's unauthorized surveillance. Finally, it fails to hold 
the Administration accountable for its past illicit surveillance 
activities and its disregard of the Fourth Amendment protections of 
Americans. As a result, I must vote against this bill.
  Ms. SPEIER. Madam Speaker, when are we going to stop pulling the wool 
over the eyes of the American people? The proposed FISA law protects no 
one other than the administration and those within it who may use this 
new-found power to snoop and spy in areas where they have no business 
looking. We are giving broad new powers to political appointees who 
have repeatedly disregarded the Constitution and ignored the most basic 
rights of Americans to live their lives without Big Brother peeking his 
nose into their private matters.
  This FISA bill gives the federal government sweeping powers to gather 
wide swaths of information from foreign sources while providing little 
or no justification for the national security value of that 
information.
  The FISA Court set up to police the process isn't a court at all. 
Under this bill, the government can gather as much intelligence as it 
chooses for seven days prior to going to the court. Then, if the court 
says ``No'' to the request, the government can continue to gather 
intelligence for 60 days while they appeal.
  Any first year law student knows that is not how courts work. If this 
were a real court, the government would be required to abide by the 
decision of the court and seek the warrant prior to conducting 
surveillance.
  It is fundamentally untrue to say that Americans will not be placed 
under surveillance after this bill becomes law. The truth is, any 
American will subject their phone and e-mail conversations to the broad 
government surveillance web simply by calling a son or daughter 
studying abroad, sending an e-mail to a foreign relative, even calling 
an American company whose customer service center is located overseas.
  Once again, our government puts a feel-good name on something that 
doesn't live up to its billing. Calling the FISA rubber stamp panel a 
court is akin to the President's ``Clear Skies Initiative'' which 
relaxed pollution regulations or ``No Child Left Behind'' which instead 
of helping schools, punishes them if they have children who are, 
indeed, lagging behind.
  This bill sets out to reassure Americans that, because there are 
warrants and a ``court'', due process is taking place. But like the 
pseudo-court, FISA warrants aren't warrants at all.

[[Page 13265]]

  A warrant is permission by the court to look for a specific thing 
from a specific person or group for a specific reason. The FISA warrant 
is given after the fact and can be as broad as gathering all electronic 
communication coming into or out of a foreign country.
  Madam Speaker, America isn't simply `guided'' by our Constitution, it 
isn't a set of ``suggestions'' but rather, the law of the land. It is 
the existence of this great document and our unswerving loyalty to it 
that makes America the greatest nation in the history of our planet. We 
can't be sacrificing basic constitutional principles like the fourth 
amendment simply because it's an election year and we want to make it 
look like we're fighting terrorism.
  I join my colleagues in our unified fight to defeat the global 
terrorist movement. But we don't do that by sacrificing our hard-earned 
Constitutional rights and forgiving telephone companies who knowingly 
violate those rights.
  The bottom line is, this FISA bill permits the collection of 
Americans' emails and phone calls if they are communicating with 
someone outside of the U.S. This is especially true when it comes to 
emails, because the World Wide Web has no area codes, so it is 
impossible to tell where email communications originate from. The 
Government is under no obligation to seek a warrant in order to monitor 
an email account unless it knows the account belongs to an American.
  And once your email account is swept up in the system, it can be 
monitored. Regardless of the relevance of your personal information, 
once it is gathered by the government, it is never destroyed. One only 
has to recall the recent incident in the State Department where 
candidates' passport information was breached to know that this 
information isn't handled by robots, but people. And people can do any 
number of things with personal informations.
  Out of respect to the United States Constitution and the basic rights 
of Americans to live free of intrusive eavesdropping by their 
government, I strongly oppose HR 6034, the FISA Reauthorization Act.
  Ms. ESHOO. Madam Speaker; first I want to commend the Chairman and 
the Majority leader for the work they've done to bring this legislation 
to the floor of the House. It has been a challenge for all of us on the 
Intelligence Committee and in the Congress.
  This legislation is a vast improvement over the previous law, and 
indeed over the Protect America Act passed by the House last August 
which I opposed.
  The bill very importantly establishes a process for electronic 
surveillance that includes prior approval by the independent courts, 
and in some respects, this legislation goes even further than the 
existing FISA statute or the House-passed RESTORE Act in protecting the 
civil liberties of U.S. persons. Under this bill the Administration 
would have to seek a court order before conducting surveillance on U.S. 
persons abroad. Until now and under the Protect America Act, the 
executive branch could conduct electronic surveillance of U.S. persons 
without prior judicial approval. This legislation also allows the 
lawsuits against the telecommunications companies to go forward in a 
limited fashion, which would not have occurred at all under current 
law.
  Having said this I must oppose this bill.
  Under the original structure of FISA, telecommunications carriers 
served an important gate-keeping function. They were not permitted to 
provide access to private communications in the United States unless 
the government made a lawful request to conduct surveillance, pursuant 
to a FISA order. For decades, the government has sought and obtained 
thousands of FISA warrants prior to beginning surveillance, or in 
urgent cases shortly thereafter. We all remember the shocking news when 
the President had to acknowledge that his Administration created an 
illegal, warrantless electronic surveillance program outside of the 
FISA legal framework.
  This legislation would essentially grant retroactive immunity to 
telecommunications carriers who relied on statements made by this 
Administration that the program was lawful. However, as we've seen in 
numerous instances, this Administration pushed new and aggressive 
interpretations of the law, including in this area. We all recall 
vividly the days following \9/11\, and the urgency that prevailed, but 
suspending our laws and allowing the Attorney General to unilaterally 
issue a ``get out of jail free card'' is not appropriate under any 
circumstances. There should be at least some minimal inquiry into 
whether the telecommunications carriers reliance on the statements made 
by this Administration was reasonable. If so, the they would be able to 
assert their existing statutory immunity defenses.
  Throughout our Nation's history, the judiciary has been the most 
important check on an overzealous executive, and it is often through 
the judicial process that we uncover and remedy some of the most 
egregious executive misconduct. This legislation undermines and 
effectively nullifies the courts' ability to hold the Administration 
accountable for its actions, which likely violated the Constitution.
  Our Nation was founded on the principle of separation of powers. The 
executive branch should be subject to independent oversight by the 
judicial branch. This legislation does not go far enough to allow the 
judicial branch to conduct an independent, reasoned inquiry into this 
critical issue. Therefore, I must oppose this legislation.
  Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Madam Speaker, I will support this bill.
  I will do so because, as I have consistently said, I do think the 
basic law in this area--the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or 
FISA--needs to be updated to respond to changes in technology, which 
was the purpose of the current, temporary law.
  That is why, last August, I voted for a bill (H.R. 3356) to provide 
such an update--a bill that was supported by a majority of the House, 
but did not pass because it was considered under a procedure that 
required a two-thirds vote for passage, which did not occur because of 
the opposition of the Bush Administration. It was supported by all but 
three of our Republican colleagues.
  That is also why I voted for another bill to update FISA--H.R. 3773, 
the ``Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseer, Reviewed, 
and Effective'' (or RESTORE) Act--which the House passed on November 
15th of last year. Like those bills I supported earlier, this bill will 
replace the Protect America Act, enacted in August 2007--which I 
opposed.
  The bill makes it very clear that to conduct surveillance targeting a 
person in the United States, the government first must obtain an 
individual warrant from the FISA Court, based upon probable cause.
  And, importantly, it explicitly states that FISA and Title III of the 
U.S. criminal code are the exclusive means by which the government may 
conduct surveillance on American soil, and adds that any future statute 
must expressly authorize surveillance if the government is going to 
rely on it to conduct domestic surveillance.
  It also includes new legal protections for Americans abroad, 
requiring an individual probable cause determination by the FISA Court 
when the government seeks to conduct surveillance of U.S. persons 
located outside the United States.
  It requires prior review and approval by the FISA Court of the 
targeting and minimization procedures used to conduct surveillance of 
any foreign targets (unless in an emergency, in which case the 
government may authorize the surveillance and then apply to the FISA 
Court for approval within 7 days), and requires that this surveillance 
be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. And it requires 
the government to establish guidelines to ensure that Americans are not 
targeted by this surveillance (``reverse targeting guidelines''), and 
requires the government to provide those reverse targeting guidelines 
to Congress and the FISA Court.
  The legislation also includes important provisions to increase 
transparency and accountability. For example, it requires there be a 
comprehensive review of the President's warrantless surveillance 
program by the Inspectors General of the Justice Department, the 
Directorate of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, and 
the Defense Department--and it provides for them to report the results 
to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees.
  This report will review ``all of the facts necessary to describe the 
establishment, implementation, product, and use of the Program,'' as 
well as ``communications with, and participation of, individuals and 
entities in the private sector related to the Program.''
  I do not find equally satisfactory another aspect of the bill that 
involves accountability--the treatment of pending lawsuits against 
various telecommunication companies that acted to implement President 
Bush's clandestine surveillance program.
  Like the bills I supported earlier, this measure would provide civil 
liability protection for private sector companies that provide lawful 
assistance to the government in the future. But it differs 
significantly in the way it addresses those pending lawsuits, which 
deal with the previous actions of the defendant companies.
  Those lawsuits have been consolidated and are pending in one court, 
but evidently have made little progress because of the Administration's 
argument, still awaiting court resolution, that the suits are barred 
because they involve state secrets. My understanding is that the 
defendant companies have argued that government's invocation of the 
state-secrets privilege has had the result of preventing them from 
defending themselves, although at least one company has stated in 
regulatory filings that the cases against it are without merit.

[[Page 13266]]

  President Bush has insisted that Congress throw these cases out of 
court by giving the companies retroactive immunity for whatever they 
might have done in connection with the surveillance program, even 
though the Administration and the companies themselves insist that 
those actions were lawful and that the plaintiffs' complaints against 
the companies have no merit.
  Regrettably, the Senate decided to comply with the president's demand 
on this point, and its version of this legislation would provide that 
retroactive immunity. I do not think that was the right decision 
because I agree with the Rocky Mountain News, which in a February 15th 
editorial said ``Letting this litigation proceed would not, as Bush 
[has] said . . .punish companies that want to `help America.' 
Businesses that want to help America need to be mindful of the 
Constitution--and so should the government.''
  I supported removing that ``state secret'' barrier and allowing the 
companies to defend themselves by demonstrating to the court the 
evidence they say supports their arguments in a way that assures the 
continued security of that evidence and that avoids the public 
disclosure the Administration says would be adverse to the national 
interest. This is a process that has worked well in criminal cases, and 
while I am certainly not an expert on the matter, I think it can work 
when applied to these civil cases.
  In that respect, this bill is similar to the legislation I supported 
earlier this year. But it is not identical, and I do not think it is 
quite as sound.
  Under this bill, a district court hearing such a case will decide 
whether the Attorney General's certification attesting that the 
liability protection standard has been met and is supported by 
substantial evidence. In making that determination, the court will have 
the opportunity to examine the highly classified letters to the 
providers that indicated the President had authorized the activity and 
that it had been determined to be lawful.
  That is not as strong a requirement for accountability as I would 
prefer. However, in such cases both plaintiffs and defendants will have 
the opportunity to file public briefs on legal issues and the court 
should include in any public order a description of the legal standards 
that govern the order.
  And, importantly, this immunity provision does not apply to any 
actions against the Government for any alleged injuries caused by 
government officials.
  Madam Speaker, as Benjamin Franklin has warned us, people who value 
security over liberty will get neither--and the Bush Administration has 
finally agreed to end its disregard for liberty and agree to effective 
judicial oversight and involvement in intelligence surveillance.
  That agreement that is embodied in this bill, and the choice before 
us now is whether to reject it or to support the compromise measure now 
before us.
  After careful review, I have concluded that the bill adequately meets 
the test of protecting civil liberties while giving our country tools 
needed to effectively combat terrorism.
  So, while--like any compromise--the bill is not ideal, I have decided 
the correct decision--the one that will fulfill my responsibility to 
protect both our national security and the civil liberties that make 
our nation worth defending--is to vote for it.
  Mr. ETHERIDGE. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 6304, FISA 
Amendments Act. This bipartisan bill takes steps to increase our 
Nation's security while also protecting Americans' civil liberties.
  H.R. 6304, FISA Amendments Act, provides the critical tools that our 
intelligence community needs to ensure the safety of our Nation. With 
many surveillance warrants set to expire in the coming weeks, the 
intelligence community needs a strong and dependable set of guidelines 
to follow while conducting surveillance. H.R. 6304 allows the 
Government to authorize surveillance in the case of an emergency 
situation, provided that they return to the FISA court within 7 days to 
apply for a warrant.
  This bill also includes a number of provisions that significantly 
strengthen the protection of our civil rights. H.R. 6304 clarifies that 
FISA is the exclusive means for conducting surveillance in the United 
States, prohibiting any President from using executive power to conduct 
a warrantless wiretapping program. This bill also requires the 
Government to obtain an individual warrant from the FISA Court before 
conducting surveillance on a United States citizen. This warrant must 
be based on probable cause, and the provision now includes American 
citizens abroad as well. H.R. 6304 requires prior review and approval 
of the intelligence community's targeting and minimization procedures 
that ensure that any inadvertently intercepted communications by 
American citizens are destroyed. Finally, the FISA Amendments Act adds 
a strong layer of oversight to this process by directing the Inspectors 
General from Justice, State, Defense, the DNI, and NSA to review 
surveillance procedures and submit their findings to Congress.
  H.R. 6304 rejects blanket immunity for telecommunications companies 
that may have participated in the administration's warrantless 
wiretapping program. Under this bill, lawsuits against these companies 
would be determined by Federal district courts. These 
telecommunications companies will have to prove that the Administration 
provided written assurance that their activities were legal. There is 
no immunity for any government official who may have violated the law 
included in this legislation.
  This bill is much stronger than the Senate version, and will protect 
both our security and the civil liberties that we enjoy. I support the 
passage of H.R. 6304, FISA Amendments Act, and I urge my colleagues to 
vote in favor of this bipartisan measure as well.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the FISA Amendments 
Act of 2008. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I know we must 
give our intelligence community the proper tools to protect us while 
upholding the civil liberties of Americans. Today's compromise 
illustrates what this House can do when it deliberates with care, holds 
steady against fear-mongering, and acts in the best interest of the 
country and its citizens.
  This bill is strong on civil liberties, and includes protections 
against infringement of our Constitutional right to privacy.
  First, the bill clarifies that FISA is the exclusive means by which 
the executive branch may conduct electronic surveillance on U.S. soil. 
No President will have the power to do an end-run around the legal 
requirements of FISA. This provision will prevent the types of abuses 
we have witnessed under this administration.
  Second, this Act requires a warrant from the FISA court to conduct 
surveillance of Americans abroad. Americans will no longer leave their 
constitutional protections at home when working, studying, or traveling 
abroad.
  Third, it requires prior approval by the FISA court of procedures the 
Government will use when carrying out foreign electronic surveillance. 
This will ensure that the Government's efforts are not aimed at 
targeting Americans, and that, if an American's communication is 
inadvertently intercepted, it is dealt with in a manner that guarantees 
legal protections.
  One issue that has been repeatedly addressed is whether 
telecommunications companies should be granted immunity against pending 
lawsuits for their involvement in the earlier surveillance program. For 
a long period of time, the Bush Administration stonewalled and did not 
provide Congress the documents we demanded to ascertain the role that 
the telecommunications companies played. Since then, I have reviewed a 
large number of classified documents on this matter, and I am deeply 
concerned about the manner in which the Bush administration conducted 
its surveillance program. Therefore, I am pleased that this legislation 
preserves a role for the U.S. court system, which will review the 
documents produced by the White House and other relevant documents to 
decide independently whether the telecommunications companies acted in 
good faith when cooperating with the Government. Only after that review 
would the courts decide whether the telecommunications companies 
deserve any form of liability protection. Furthermore, the legislation 
authorizes a joint investigation by the Inspectors General from the 
U.S. Department of Justice, National Security Agency, Department of 
Defense, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence to review 
the past actions of the U.S. Government and report to Congress on their 
findings so that we may take appropriate action.
  Many today have said that the legislation before us is not a perfect 
bill, and I agree. Nevertheless, it is significantly better than the 
bill passed by the Senate and an immense improvement over the Bush 
administration's program, neither of which took sufficient steps to 
protect Americans' civil liberties. I know that the Democratic 
leadership negotiated a good compromise, and I will support it. 
However, as I have said before, this legislation will only work if 
everyone involved follows the rules and remains within the confines of 
the law. Congress must continue to conduct robust oversight to make 
sure the law is implemented as intended to maintain the critical and 
fragile balance of protecting our Nation and protecting civil 
liberties.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to the bill. I 
appreciate the hard work that Mr. Hoyer and others have done on this 
legislation. The bill before the House is a vast improvement over the 
administration's Protect America Act, which I strongly opposed last 
August. The legislation is also a significant improvement over the 
seriously flawed FISA legislation approved by the Senate earlier this

[[Page 13267]]

year. In many respects, the bill before the House strikes a reasonable 
balance between giving the Government the tools it needs to protect 
U.S. national security and protecting Americans' constitutional rights.
  In particular, I am pleased that the bill reaffirms that the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act is the exclusive legal means by which the 
Government may conduct surveillance. This stands in stark contrast to 
the Bush administration's warrantless surveillance program. I also 
support the provisions of this bill that protect Americans traveling 
abroad. They need no longer leave their constitutional protections at 
home.
  At the end of the day, I oppose this bill because of the provisions 
that would confer retroactive immunity on the telecommunications 
companies that participated in the Bush administration's warrantless 
surveillance program. We are a nation of laws, and it sets a dangerous 
precedent for Congress to approve a law that dismisses ongoing court 
cases simply on the basis that the companies can show that the 
administration told them that its warrantless surveillance program was 
legal. A program is not legal just because the administration claims 
that it is. The retroactive immunity provisions in this bill shield the 
administration from accountability for its actions. The goal here is 
not to harm the telecommunications carriers, but rather to get to the 
truth of what happened. A much better alternative would be to grant 
indemnification to the companies and go forward with the trials.
  Irrespective of the outcome of today's vote, we need a full 
accounting of the administration's surveillance program, and the bill 
before the House provides for an Inspectors General audit describing 
all Federal programs involving warrantless surveillance conducted since 
September 11, 2001. The audit is to be completed within 1 year. 
Congress must get to the bottom of what happened and prevent it from 
happening again. It is essential that Congress follow up on the audit's 
findings with robust oversight.
  Mr. DINGELL. Madam Speaker, while l cannot support the legislation 
before us today, I commend Majority Leader Hoyer for the work he has 
done to negotiate a bill that is substantially better than the version 
that passed in the Senate. This legislation, which will be the 
exclusive mechanism for the Government to conduct surveillance within 
the United States, contains provisions that will provide greater 
protections against unwarranted and unconstitutional searches of 
American citizens.
  Despite the many improvements Mr. Hoyer was able to obtain, I 
unfortunately still cannot support this legislation because it contains 
a provision that will grant immunity to the telecommunications 
companies that assisted the President with his illegal and unauthorized 
warrantless wiretapping program. I have consistently said that it is 
not appropriate for Congress to grant these companies immunity for 
their actions without having an understanding of what it is that they 
did. This is not only because it will hold the telecommunications 
companies accountable for their actions, but because it is the only way 
of finding out just how extensive the President's illegal wiretapping 
program really was. In other words, this provision will enable the Bush 
administration to continue suppressing facts and information about the 
Government's own misbehavior and wrongdoing.
  The immunity provision contained in this bill purporting to allow for 
judicial review to determine whether immunity is appropriate is a sham. 
As drafted, courts will have no real discretion and will be forced to 
grant immunity so long as the Government claims its actions were legal. 
However, the court is under no obligation to investigate whether the 
Government's claims are true. Anyone following the headlines recently, 
who has read about the recent Supreme Court decision overturning the 
administration's argument that it has the authority to detain people 
indefinitely in Guantanamo Bay, or about the hearings held by Senator 
Carl Levin and the Senate Armed Services Committee uncovering evidence 
that top civilian leadership at the Department of Defense authored 
memos arguing it was legal for the military to torture detainees, 
should be extremely wary of trusting President Bush to decide whether 
or not it is legal to spy on Americans.
  Mr. HALL of New York. I have consistently supported modernizing the 
existing FISA law to give our Government the tools it needs to identify 
and defeat terrorists in today's high-tech world, while at the same 
time preserving the freedoms and rights that define America. I have 
voted three times to pass legislation that would strengthen and 
modernize FISA and reaffirm the rule of law. Despite some improvements 
over previous attempts to update FISA, the bill considered by the House 
today regrettably falls short of achieving that critical balance. The 
rule of law lies at the core of America's founding principles, and the 
language in this bill was too weak to ensue that any breach of our laws 
that may have occurred under the warrantless wiretapping program will 
be fully addressed. It is not appropriate to deny Americans the right 
to pursue these matters in court, or to short-circuit the judicial 
review that lies at the heart of our system of checks and balances, 
which is the bedrock of our Constitution. Accordingly, I voted against 
this bill.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Madam Speaker, I appreciate the hard work put in by 
my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and in both chambers. For the 
past year we've participated in substantial and sometimes heated debate 
on the issue of surveillance and foreign intelligence. I appreciate the 
good faith efforts of our leadership, particularly Mr. Hoyer, as we try 
to craft legislation that keeps both our liberties and our persons 
safe.
  For the past seven years I have been highly critical of Republican 
wiretapping legislation. I voted against past efforts to expand this 
administration's ability to intrude in the lives of unknowing and 
innocent Americans. I supported the expiration of the disgraceful 
Protect America Act. And I remain confident that the dedicated members 
of the intelligence community do not need to violate the rights of 
Americans in order to protect them.
  I have heard some say that the enemies of America take on many forms. 
To them I say: Let us be sure one of those forms is not our own 
government.
  Ultimately this is a compromise that falls short. Any gains in 
security that may be achieved are temporary and are more than 
outweighed by the longer-term loss of civil liberties and oversight. 
Although this bill is comparatively better than the Senate's version, I 
am troubled by the lack of robust government oversight, the absence of 
meaningful court review, and the risk to American liberties.
  Of particular concern is the granting of de facto retroactive 
immunity to the telecommunications companies that cooperated with the 
administration. A `doctor's note' from the Attorney General cannot be 
allowed to circumvent the entire judicial process.
  I am equally concerned with the timeline of this bill, and strongly 
oppose authorizing this legislation for four years. This will extend 
the Bush legacy throughout the next administration and the next two 
sessions of Congress. Frankly I see no reason to rush into a compromise 
that comes up this short. The American people would be better served if 
we continued to debate this issue and took up a bill after we have seen 
the last of this administration. Americans demand and deserve 
protection of their basic civil rights and this can be accomplished 
while providing the means necessary for our intelligence community to 
do its job.
  Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, Members of the House must decide today 
whether to uphold the rule of low and the supremacy of the Constitution 
or whether to protect and reward the lawless behavior of the 
administration and of the telecommunications companies that 
participated in its clearly illegal program of spying on innocent 
Americans.
  This bill limits the courts hearing lawsuits alleging illegal 
wiretapping to consider only whether the telecom companies received a 
``written request or directive . . . indicating that the activity was [ 
] authorized by the President; and [ ] determined to be lawful''--not 
whether the request was actually lawful or whether the telecom 
companies knew that it was unlawful.
  The bill is a fig-leaf, granting blanket immunity to the telecom 
companies for illegal acts without allowing the courts to consider the 
facts or the law. It denies people whose rights were violated their 
fair day in court, and it denies the American people their right to 
have the actions of the administration subjected to fair and 
independent scrutiny.
  Even the courts' limited review will remain secret. The lawsuits will 
be dismissed, but the basis for the dismissal--that the defendants were 
innocent of misconduct, or that they were guilty but Congress commands 
their immunity--must remain secret.
  And the constitutionality of the immunity granted by this bill is 
very questionable. As Judge Walker put it in the AT&T case:

       AT&T's alleged actions here violate the constitutional 
     rights clearly established in [the] Keith decision. Moreover, 
     because `the very action in question has previously been held 
     unlawful,' AT&T cannot seriously contend that a reasonable 
     entity in its position could have believed that the alleged 
     domestic dragnet was legal.

  I would hope that the courts will find that, because the 
Constitutional rights of Americans have been violated, Congress' 
attempt to prevent court review is unconstitutional.
  The bill also reiterates than FISA and specified other statutes are 
the exclusive legal authority for electronic surveillance. The Act has

[[Page 13268]]

always said that. This bill adds some new mechanisms to ensure that any 
future legislation may not be read to override this exclusivity by 
implication, but only by explicitly saying that that is its purpose.
  No one and no court should draw the false conclusion that we are 
thereby implying that the exclusivity provision was, or could have 
been, overridden either by the President's claim of inherent authority 
under Article II of the Constitution, or by the Authorization for the 
Use of Military Force of 2001. This bill does not say or imply that. If 
there is any doubt of this point, the blanket immunity provisions of 
this bill reflect Congress' understanding that this domestic spying was 
not legal. If it were, there would not be any necessity for these 
provisions.
  This bill abandons the Constitution's protections and insulates 
lawless behavior from legal scrutiny.
  I urge a ``no'' vote.
  Mr. BOSWELL. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 6304.
  This is the kind of work I came to Congress hoping for--bipartisan 
legislation that protects our security and our liberty. It's a solid 
compromise that does what it needs to do for the country.
  One of my specific concerns in FISA reform over the last year has 
been finding a way to protect reasonable private companies, who 
assisted government out of patriotism.
  This bill does that. It doesn't give anyone a free pass, but it 
allows companies to come before the courts and make their case in order 
to be protected from lawsuits.
  That's a good result, and I thank Chairman Reyes for his work in 
reaching this reasonable bipartisan compromise.
  I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes.''
  Ms. GINNY BROWN-WAITE of Florida. Madam Speaker, I rise today in 
support of H.R. 6304, a bill to reauthorize the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act and to protect America from foreign threats.
  For the past several months, I have heard from hundreds of 
constituents on the issue of FISA.
  Each one of them expressed their alarm and disbelief that the House 
Majority would repeatedly refuse to call a vote on bipartisan 
legislation to extend FISA and address our grave vulnerability to 
terrorist attacks.
  Today I am pleased that the Majority leadership has finally reached 
across the aisle to put together a compromise bill, and fulfill one of 
its fundamental tasks--to ensure the security of this great Nation.
  This compromise is also a reminder of what I have always believed, 
that no one side can do it alone; both parties must work together to 
ensure our safety.
  In such uncertain times, when it is essential that our government 
utilize every available tool to protect American citizens, having the 
ability to collect intelligence responsibly is essential.
  While there is no excuse for the delay in bringing this critical bill 
to the floor, we must now move forward together to pass H.R. 6304 and 
restore our Nation's intelligence capabilities.
  Ms. BALDWIN. Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 6304, the 
FISA Amendments Act.
  Two hundred and twenty-two years ago our Nation's Founders enshrined 
in our Constitution the values and principles upon which our Nation was 
founded, defining what it meant to be an American. Its first words, 
``We the people . . .'' make clear to all that our Government derives 
its power from the people.
  Our Nation's Founders recognized that the full definition of what it 
meant to be an American required a clear statement of the protection of 
individual liberties. The protections enshrined in the Bill of Rights 
cannot be waived by the President and are not statutorily amendable by 
Congress. Those rights belong to the people--they are, in part, what it 
means to be an American.
  Since our founding, the world has looked to the United States as a 
beacon of freedom, a Nation leading by example, a Nation governed by 
the rule of law. As we act on this legislation the world watches to see 
whether we as a Nation still have a commitment to the very principles 
we seek to spread around the world.
  There are those who see this legislation primarily in the context of 
granting retroactive immunity to telecommunications companies, merely 
transactional legislation. But, in fact, this is about something far 
more important and fundamental.
  Today, this House seeks to legislatively amend the fourth amendment. 
This bill retroactively denies to Americans the protections of the 
fourth amendment. It retroactively insulates Government from 
accountability for infringing upon one of the most basic rights of 
Americans.
  This infringement is not theoretical. Today there are more than 40 
pending lawsuits alleging that our Government illegally and 
unconstitutionally violated the privacy rights of citizens by 
conducting a warrantless spying program. Through this bill, Congress 
now seeks to deny these individuals a remedy. Moreover, if this 
legislation becomes law, Americans may never learn the full extent of 
the Bush administration's illegal wiretapping program.
  Further, the bill establishes a permanent framework for the violation 
of the civil liberties of our citizens. This legislation permits the 
Government to conduct mass, untargeted surveillance of communications 
coming into and out of the United States, without any individualized 
review, and without any finding of wrongdoing. And it permits only 
minimal court oversight.
  Some argue that this legislation is necessary to protect our Nation 
from terrorists. I reject this argument. The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (which this bill seeks to amend), has, since 1978, 
provided a legal framework for law enforcement to secure a secret 
warrant to intercept electronic communications related to national 
security. In emergencies, the Attorney General may authorize emergency 
employment of electronic surveillance as long as he or she makes the 
requisite application for approval from the FISA court as soon as 
practicable within 72 hours.
  By authorizing a program to conduct illegal surveillance on 
Americans, the President and his Attorneys General have chosen to 
ignore the law and the Constitution. Today by passing this legislation, 
Congress chooses to stand with the President.
  By voting no, today I will stand with the American people in the 
defense of their civil liberties and their Constitution.
  Mr. BACA. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of 6304, Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act of 2008.
  This bill gives the intelligence community the tools it needs to keep 
America safe from terrorists, and at the same time protects the 
constitutional rights of all Americans. The FISA Amendments Act is a 
balanced bill that is tough on terrorists while also protecting the 
rights of Americans and increasing oversight of U.S. intelligence 
activities. H.R. 6304 allows the intelligence community to conduct 
foreign electronic surveillance for the purpose of defending against 
terrorism and national security without the need for individual court 
orders.
  But in situations where these investigations would involve 
surveillance of American citizens, the Courts will have the oversight 
to review and approve the surveillance to ensure constitutional rights 
are upheld. We must remember that the United States has enemies abroad 
who wish to do us harm.
  Under this bill, Americans will have stronger protections of their 
constitutional freedoms than the current foreign surveillance policy 
allows, and at the same time, the intelligence needed to protect our 
country will not be compromised. The legislation protects American 
civil liberties and upholds constitutional values by clarifying that 
FISA and Title III of the criminal code are the exclusive means by 
which the government may conduct surveillance on U.S. soil. This will 
prevent any President from using executive power to conduct warrantless 
domestic surveillance.
  The legislation also clarifies that to conduct surveillance of a 
person in the United States, the government must first obtain an 
individual warrant from the FISA Court based on probable cause. H.R. 
6304 ensures compliance measures, but not automatic immunity, for 
private-sector companies that allegedly participated in anti-terrorism 
surveillance programs. Federal district courts will be allowed to 
determine whether substantial evidence supports civil liability 
protection for companies which assisted in post-9/11 activities.
  The bill also ensures liability protections for companies which 
provide lawful assistance to the government in the future. This is good 
legislation that reaches the necessary balance between keeping the 
American people safe and protecting our civil rights.
  We will have greater oversight of our nation's surveillance programs, 
while at the same time encouraging greater compliance with our private 
sector partners in the ultimate goal of keeping America and her people 
secure. Please vote in support of H.R. 6304.
  Ms. DeGETTE. Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 6304, the 
``FISA Amendments Act of 2008.''
  I first want to thank Majority Leader Hoyer and other Members who 
worked very hard to arrive at a compromise with the Senate. I think 
this bill is an improvement over S. 1927, the ``Protect America Act,'' 
and the Senate bill we considered earlier this year. For example. H.R. 
6304 makes it crystal clear that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, FISA, is the exclusive means under which surveillance is conducted 
and states that any exceptions in the future must be specifically 
authorized.

[[Page 13269]]

  However, I cannot support H.R. 6304 because of the issues of reverse 
targeting and retroactive immunity for telecommunications companies. 
The strong protections against reverse targeting contained in prior 
House measures, which I supported, are absent from this bill. Reverse 
targeting, which refers to spying on Americans by targeting those 
abroad with whom they are believed to be communicating, opens a 
loophole for the Federal Government to violate the privacy of American 
citizens.
  Most significantly, the retroactive immunity provisions will block 
the American public's ability to hold the telecommunications companies 
accountable for participating in the Federal Government's domestic 
warrantless surveillance program. Courts will have no real power to 
review the administration's prior orders for surveillance activities. 
We may never learn the extent of the violations of Americans' privacy 
which may have occurred or companies which may have participated.
  I ask my colleagues to stand up for our values and vote no on this 
flawed bill.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Madam Speaker, I rise today to oppose H.R. 6304, the 
FISA Amendments Act.
  Among the casualties of the ``war on terror'' has been the guarantee 
of civil liberties and right to privacy of American citizens upon which 
our nation was founded. Time and again, throughout his Presidency, 
George Bush has shown absolute indifference to the Constitution and the 
principles upon which it stands.
  This disregard for the Constitution was never clearer than last 
summer when President Bush signed into law the Protect America Act, 
which I opposed then and continue to oppose to this day, a law that 
gave the President unprecedented authority to spy on Americans.
  As Congress began to consider new legislation, I had hoped that we 
could reach a compromise that strikes the right balance between 
protecting the rights of individual Americans and protecting our 
nation's security. Like all of my colleagues in Congress, I believe 
that our nation must aggressively pursue terrorist targets in the 
United States and abroad. However, I know the United States is capable 
of doing so within a framework that respects the Constitution of the 
United States.
  Many provisions within this bill are an improvement over the Protect 
America Act, especially the provision on exclusively, which affirms 
that the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is the exclusive 
means to conduct electronic surveillance of Americans for the purpose 
of foreign intelligence collection.
  However, I believe firmly that the bill before us today does not do 
enough to protect the privacy rights of individual Americans and 
therefore I cannot in good conscience vote for its passage. Here are 
some of the problems with the bill before us today:
  H.R. 6304 contains an ``exigent circumstances'' loophole that permits 
the Administration to conduct surveillance on Americans without getting 
a warrant for up to seven days every time ``intelligence important to 
the national security of the US may be lost or not timely acquired.'' 
The problem with language this open-ended is that an Administration, 
like the Bush Administration, can use this language as an invitation to 
repeatedly spy on Americans without a court order and in each case 
claim that circumstances demanded it.
  Secondly, while H.R. 6304 contains a general prohibition on 
``reverse'' targeting, it lacks clear statuary directives about when 
the government should return to the FISA court and obtain a warrant. 
Reverse targeting refers to the possibility that the Government will 
try to subvert FISA by wiretapping someone overseas, when the real 
target is an American with whom that foreign person is communicating. 
As is the case with the exigent circumstances provision, this open-
ended language leaves the law vulnerable to misuse by an 
Administration.
  Lastly, the retroactive immunity language in Title II virtually 
ensures the dismissal of all cases pending against the 
telecommunications companies that facilitated warrantless wiretapping 
over the last seven years. This violates the fundamental American 
principle that people are entitled to their day in court, and that the 
courts, not Congress, should decide whether people were injured by the 
illegal acts of others. It is unacceptable for Congress to protect 
private companies from lawsuits filed by people the may have harmed 
through illegal actions.
  Ultimately, I believe that the President has presented Congress with 
a false choice. Ever since September 11, the Bush Administration has 
put forward the idea that Congress must choose between the liberties we 
cherish and the security we demand. I disagree wholeheartedly with this 
premise. The Congress can and must take stronger steps to protect the 
civil liberties of ever American, to do anything less is simply 
contrary to everything for which this country has stood.
  I would like to close by reading a quote from Benjamin Franklin. 
Though delivered centuries ago, it remains salient to today's debate. 
He said ``Those Who Sacrifice Liberty For Security Deserve Neither.''
  I urge my colleagues to consider Benjamin Franklin's views as they 
vote today.
  Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, I regret that due to the unexpected last-
minute appearance of this measure on the legislative calendar this 
week, a prior commitment has prevented me from voting on the FISA 
amendments. I have strongly opposed every previous FISA overhaul 
attempt, and I certainly would have voted against this one as well.
  The main reason I oppose this latest version is that it still clearly 
violates the Fourth Amendment by allowing the Federal Government to 
engage in the bulk collection of American citizens' communications 
without a search warrant. That U.S. citizens can have their private 
communication intercepted by the government without a search warrant is 
anti-American, deeply disturbing, and completely unacceptable.
  In addition to gutting the Fourth Amendment, this measure will 
deprive Americans who have had their rights violated by 
telecommunication companies involved in the Administration's illegal 
wiretapping program the right to seek redress in the courts for the 
wrongs committed against them. Worse, this measure provides for 
retroactive immunity, whereby individuals or organizations that broke 
the law as it existed are granted immunity for prior illegal actions 
once the law has been changed. Ex post facto laws have long been 
considered anathema in free societies under rule of law. Our Founding 
Fathers recognized this, including in Article I section 9 of the 
Constitution that ``No bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be 
passed.'' How is this FISA bill not a variation of ex post facto? That 
alone should give pause to supporters of this measure.
  Madam Speaker, we should understand that decimating the protections 
that our Constitution provides us against the government is far more 
dangerous to the future of this country than whatever external threats 
may exist. We can protect this country without violating the 
Constitution and I urge my colleagues to reconsider their support for 
this measure.
  Ms. WOOLSEY. Madam Speaker, today Congress is yet again faced with 
the choice of approving the Bush administration's unconstitutional 
expansion of executive branch authority in the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, FISA, or defending the Constitution and protecting 
the civil liberties of Americans. The choice could not be more clear 
and consequences more grave.
  Passing this legislation today will be the enduring legacy of the 
Bush administration. It will provide the Congressional seal of approval 
for years of the White House's stonewalling on Congressional oversight, 
eroding Congress's authority, and violating the Constitution. A vote in 
favor of H.R. 6304, the FISA Amendments Act, is a vote for the Bush 
administration's expansive interpretation of executive power and 
against the Constitution. That's why I must oppose this legislation.
  H.R. 6304 permits mass, untargeted surveillance of all phone and 
email conversations entering or leaving the U.S. without basic, let 
alone adequate, protections for Americans' civil liberties. 
Communications of millions of Americans will be swept up because of 
reduced reverse targeting protections and minimized court oversight. 
This bill enables the Government to walk through an enormous loophole 
by suspending prior court review of intelligence surveillance 
applications at their discretion. Additionally, there are no safeguards 
to protect Americans whose information is unintentionally obtained. 
H.R. 6304 dispenses with real oversight by the court, a requirement 
fundamental to upholding the Constitution.
  Furthermore, this legislation provides nothing less than de facto 
immunity for telecommunications companies that broke the law. District 
courts will be forced to dismiss pending cases if they receive a 
certification from the Attorney General that telecommunication 
companies were asked to turn over their customers' records. There is no 
determination if the request was legal. No due process. No penalty. No 
accountability. Exactly what the Bush administration wanted all along.
  We should never sacrifice commitment to the rule of law and our 
system of checks and balances for broad, unbridled power to suspend 
Americans' civil liberties at will. Unfortunately, this new FISA bill 
does just that. Elected officials have a solemn responsibility to 
defend our country, and, like my colleagues, I support a modernization 
of our intelligence

[[Page 13270]]

laws. But being asked to support either our intelligence community or 
protecting civil liberties is a false and dangerous dichotomy. Benjamin 
Franklin once wrote that, ``those who would trade liberty for some 
temporary security, deserve neither liberty nor security.'' With this 
bill, I believe we have proven him right.
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Madam Speaker, I risk today in opposition 
to H.R. 6304, The FISA Amendments Act of 2008. As a representative from 
New York City, I know how important good intelligence is in ensuring 
that our Nation does not face another terrorist attack. However, we 
must ensure that we do not trample on civil liberties in the process. 
This administration has expanded the powers of the government to 
monitor the actions of American citizens with, unfortunately, too 
little oversight from Congress or the courts.
  While I appreciate the efforts to reach a compromise on this 
legislation, H.R. 6304 does not go far enough to protect the rights of 
the American people. The legislation allows for retroactive immunity 
for telecommunication companies that participated in the Bush 
administration's warrantless wiretapping program. I also am concerned 
that most Members of Congress will not have access to important reports 
issued by the Attorney General and the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  We should stand up for the Constitution and for the rights of our 
constituents by ensuring that their privacy is better protected.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I would also like to clarify a number of 
aspects of this legislation on behalf of myself and the distinguished 
Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Smith.
  We have faced substantial challenges in reconciling fundamentally 
different philosophies on how to modernize the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA). The text of H.R. 6304 was carefully, 
deliberately crafted on a bipartisan basis to reconcile these 
differences. Other statements by media reports, or the reports or work 
product of any of outside groups reflect their own views and should not 
be construed as determinative guidance with respect to legislative 
intent. While the text of the bill ultimately controls interpretation 
of the bill, we would like to note our understanding of H.R. 6304 as 
the Ranking Members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
and the Committee on the Judiciary respectively on three matters within 
this legislation.


          role of the foreign intelligence surveillance court

  The authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) 
or any court in approving foreign intelligence collection generally, 
and specifically the surveillance of foreigners located in other 
countries, was an issue of great debate during negotiations and the 
resulting text was delicately constructed. For the first time ever, 
this bill will statutorily insert the FISA court in a limited way into 
the Executive's Constitutional authority to collect foreign 
intelligence information targeting foreign persons in foreign 
countries. This unprecedented move was an accommodation to those who 
believed that the court could provide some sort of additional check to 
ensure that the IC is properly using its procedures to target a 
foreigner abroad and to minimize U.S. person information that may be 
incidentally obtained. There is no mechanism included in the text that 
would provide for a probable cause or similar type of review that the 
FISC has done in the past with respect to traditional FISA 
applications, but rather a method for the FISC to verify that the 
Intelligence Community is following the law and its own procedures when 
it targets foreigners abroad for surveillance under this law. The FISC 
is also required to approve procedures developed and used by the 
Intelligence Community. It is important for the FISC to adhere to the 
limited role set forth in the text of this bill, and to recognize that 
it is a different role from that which it has traditionally held with 
regard to traditional, individual FISA applications. This should not be 
construed as an opening to insert the courts further into foreign 
intelligence matters that properly lie within the Executive's purview.
  It is also important to note the flexibility that remains with the 
Executive Branch to prevent gaps from forming in the future that are 
similar to those we saw last August before the Protect America Act was 
passed. This bill permits the Attorney General and Director of National 
Intelligence to immediately authorize intelligence collection, as 
provided for under the law, upon a determination that ``exigent 
circumstances'' exist. While the text of the bill uses the term 
``exigent circumstances,'' the use of this term is not intended to 
implicate in any way the use of that term in criminal procedure 
jurisprudence as an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement. See, e.g., U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); Warden v. 
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); McDonald v. U.S., 335 U.S. 451 (1948). 
Rather, section 702 specifically defines its use of the term ``exigent 
circumstances'' for purposes of targeting a foreign person reasonably 
believed to be located outside the United States as those circumstances 
that will result in the loss or failure to timely acquire intelligence 
important to the national security of the United States. The compromise 
text was delicately drafted and reaching compromise on the bill was 
premised, in part, on maintaining flexibility for the Intelligence 
Community to immediately initiate surveillance in situations where 
intelligence may be lost, or not gathered in time to act on in a way 
that best protects the United States. This section is designed to 
prevent the type of intelligence gaps that put us in a critical 
situation during the summer of 2007.


                            exclusive means

  Section 102 of the bill provides that the procedures in FISA and in 
the relevant provisions of the federal criminal code are the exclusive 
means for electronic surveillance. It is important to note that section 
102 of H.R. 6304 denotes the statutory exclusive means for acquiring 
foreign surveillance. In enacting this section, Congress did not intend 
legislatively abrogate any inherent Article II powers of the Executive 
Branch. See In re Sealed Case No. 02-001 (FISCR 2002) (citing the 
holding in U.S. v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980) that 
the President has inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to 
obtain foreign intelligence information).


      protections for electronic communications service providers

  The provisions in Title II set forth a process under which the 
Federal district courts would have jurisdiction to review both 
prospective and retroactive claims relating to alleged assistance to 
the intelligence community. The standard and type of review by the 
courts with respect to the retroactive liability protections were 
issues of great and delicate debate while this bill was being drafted. 
Careful and lengthy discussions took place about which court would 
review the Attorney General certifications, what the certifications 
would contain, and what the standard of review would be, and all of 
these considerations culminated in the text of H.R. 6304 as it passed 
the House on June 20, 2008.
  With respect to retroactive liability protection, the Attorney 
General must certify to the district court that one of two situations 
is present. Either the assistance alleged to have been provided by the 
carrier was authorized by the President, designed to detect or prevent 
a terrorist attack against the U.S. after the September 11th attacks, 
and was the subject of a written request or series of requests to the 
carrier, or the carrier did not provide the alleged assistance. The 
aforementioned written request or series of requests must have informed 
the communications provider that the activity requested was authorized 
by the President, and was determined to be lawful.
  The statute expressly requires the Attorney General's certification 
to be given effect unless the court finds that the Attorney General's 
certification is not supported by substantial evidence that the 
statutorily required elements of the certification have been fulfilled. 
The provision also allows the court to review only certain specified 
supplemental materials (any relevant court order, certification, 
written request or directive) when considering the certification, and 
permits plaintiffs or defendants in civil actions to participate in 
briefing or argument of legal issues to the extent that such 
participation does not require the disclosure of classified information 
to such parties. Careful consideration went into the drafting of this 
provision, and the final text is very clear about what the federal 
district court may consider in its review under this section. The bill 
is intended to require and authorize the district courts to review 
exactly what the text of H.R. 6304 specifies, which does not include a 
review of the underlying legal basis for any representations that may 
have been made in a written request or series of requests for 
assistance to a company during the life of the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program. Rather, these provisions were intended to ensure that any 
companies that may have provided assistance to the government did so 
based on their good faith reliance on specified representations made to 
it by the Government.
  Mr. HOYER. Madam Speaker, this bill provides mechanisms to ensure 
that FISA's longstanding exclusivity is crystal clear. It states that 
only a new statute directly addressing the Executive branch's foreign 
intelligence surveillance authority can modify FISA. It provides 
clarity for the public and for telecommunications carriers by requiring 
requests for assistance to cite the statutory authority uuder which 
they are issued.
  In a January 19, 2006 White Paper on NSA Legal Authorities, the 
Justice Department made public a legal justification for the 
President's Terrorist Surveillance Program, TSP. It

[[Page 13271]]

claimed that the President had an extra-statutory legal basis for 
foreign intelligence surveillance outside of FISA, both implicitly 
through an Authorization for the Use of Military Force or through a 
broad reading of Article II of the Constitution. Those arguments fly in 
the face of the longstanding doctrine of FISA exclusivity and are 
contrary to the plain language of the FISA statute. To be clear, the 
inclusion of these additional exclusivity mechanisms in this measure 
does not ratify the Administration's arguments with respect to the TSP. 
Nor does the bill's treatment of liability issues in Title II stand for 
a Congressional ratification of the Administration's actions under the 
TSP.
  In conclusion, I would like to extend my thanks to a few additional 
staff who worked tirelessly over the past few months on this FISA 
compromise, including Margaret Cantrell of the Whip's staff, Ted Kalo 
and Mark Dubester of the Judiciary Committee, Wyndee Parker of the 
Intelligence Committee, and Chris Healey of Senator Rockefeller's 
Intelligence Committee staff.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, I yield back the remainder of our time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 1285, the bill is considered read and 
the previous question is ordered.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 293, 
nays 129, not voting 13, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 437]

                               YEAS--293

     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baird
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bean
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boozman
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boustany
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cantor
     Capito
     Cardoza
     Carney
     Carter
     Castle
     Castor
     Cazayoux
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Childers
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Cooper
     Costa
     Cramer
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Davis, Lincoln
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Donnelly
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Edwards (TX)
     Ehlers
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     English (PA)
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Giffords
     Gillibrand
     Gingrey
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Gutierrez
     Hall (TX)
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     Kanjorski
     Keller
     Kildee
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Klein (FL)
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Latta
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Mahoney (FL)
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Marshall
     Matheson
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Mitchell
     Moore (KS)
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murphy, Tim
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Ortiz
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (WI)
     Salazar
     Sali
     Saxton
     Scalise
     Schiff
     Schmidt
     Scott (GA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Sestak
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuler
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sires
     Skelton
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Space
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Terry
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield (KY)
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (OH)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman (VA)
     Wolf
     Yarmuth
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--129

     Abercrombie
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Blumenauer
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Carnahan
     Carson
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Edwards (MD)
     Ellison
     Eshoo
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Foster
     Frank (MA)
     Gonzalez
     Grijalva
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kilpatrick
     Kucinich
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lynch
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Matsui
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Price (NC)
     Rangel
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schwartz
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Shea-Porter
     Slaughter
     Solis
     Speier
     Sutton
     Thompson (CA)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wu

                             NOT VOTING--13

     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Cannon
     Gilchrest
     Gohmert
     Jones (NC)
     Paul
     Peterson (PA)
     Reynolds
     Rush
     Stark
     Tiahrt
     Visclosky
     Weller


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There are 2 minutes 
remaining in this vote.

                              {time}  1248

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, Mr. JEFFERSON, Mrs. CAPPS and Ms. KAPTUR 
changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Mr. BERMAN changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated against:
  Mr. VISCLOSKY. Madam Speaker, had I been present for rollcall 437, 
H.R. 6304, on passage of a measure to amend the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 to establish a procedure for authorizing 
certain acquisitions of foreign intelligence, and for other purposes, I 
would have voted ``nay.''

                          ____________________