[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 154 (2008), Part 9]
[House]
[Pages 12759-12762]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




CATCHING OPERATIONAL VULNERABILITIES BY ENSURING RANDOM TESTING ACT OF 
                                  2008

  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules 
and pass the bill (H.R. 5909) to amend the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act to prohibit advance notice to certain individuals, 
including security screeners, of covert testing of security screening 
procedures for the purpose of enhancing transportation security at 
airports, and for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 5909

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Catching Operational 
     Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Random Testing Act of 2008'' or 
     the ``COVERT Act of 2008''.

     SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF ADVANCE NOTICE OF COVERT TESTING TO 
                   SECURITY SCREENERS.

       Section 111 of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
     (Public Law 107-71; 49 U.S.C. 44935 note) is amended--
       (1) by striking the section enumerator and heading and 
     inserting the following:

     ``SEC. 111. TRAINING, EMPLOYMENT, AND TESTING OF SECURITY 
                   SCREENING PERSONNEL.''

     and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(e) Prohibition of Advance Notice to Security Screeners 
     of Covert Testing and Evaluation.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     ensure that information concerning a covert test of a 
     transportation security system to be conducted by a covert 
     testing office, the Inspector General of the Department of 
     Homeland Security, or the Government Accountability Office is 
     not provided to any individual prior to the completion of the 
     test.
       ``(2) Exceptions.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1)--
       ``(A) an individual may provide information concerning a 
     covert test of a transportation security system to employees, 
     officers, and contractors of the Federal Government 
     (including military personnel); employees and officers of 
     State and local governments; and law enforcement officials, 
     who are authorized to receive or directed to be provided such 
     information by the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security 
     (Transportation Security Administration), the Inspector 
     General of the Department of Homeland Security, or the 
     Comptroller General of the United States, as the case may be; 
     and
       ``(B) for the purpose of ensuring the security of any 
     individual in the vicinity of a site where a covert test of a 
     transportation security system is being conducted, an 
     individual conducting the test may disclose his or her status 
     as an individual conducting the test to any appropriate 
     individual if a security screener or other individual who is 
     not a covered employee identifies the individual conducting 
     the test as a potential threat.
       ``(3) Special rules for the transportation security 
     administration.--
       ``(A) Monitoring and security of testing personnel.--The 
     head of each covert testing office shall ensure that a person 
     or group of persons conducting a covert test of a 
     transportation security system for the covert testing office 
     is accompanied at the site of the test by a cover team 
     comprised of one or more employees of the covert testing 
     office for the purpose of monitoring the test and confirming 
     the identity of personnel involved in the test under 
     subparagraph (B).
       ``(B) Responsibility of cover team.--Under this paragraph, 
     a cover team for a covert test of a transportation security 
     system shall--
       ``(i) monitor the test; and
       ``(ii) for the purpose of ensuring the security of any 
     individual in the vicinity of a site where the test is being 
     conducted, confirm, notwithstanding paragraph (1), the 
     identity of any individual conducting the test to any 
     appropriate individual if a security screener or other 
     individual who is not a covered employee identifies the 
     individual conducting the test as a potential threat.
       ``(C) Aviation screening.--Notwithstanding subparagraph 
     (A), the Transportation Security Administration is not 
     required to have a cover team present during a test of the 
     screening of persons, carry-on items, or checked baggage at 
     an aviation security checkpoint at or serving an airport if 
     the test--
       ``(i) is approved by the Federal Security Director for such 
     airport; and
       ``(ii) is carried out under an aviation screening 
     assessment program of the Department of Homeland Security.
       ``(D) Use of other personnel.--The Transportation Security 
     Administration may use employees, officers, and contractors 
     of the Federal Government (including military personnel) and 
     employees and officers of State and local governments to 
     conduct covert tests.
       ``(4) Impact study and report on covert testing 
     procedures.--
       ``(A) Impact study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall conduct a study of the impact of the implementation of 
     this subsection on the Department of Homeland Security's 
     efforts to improve transportation security.
       ``(B) Requirements.--The study under subparagraph (A) shall 
     include an assessment of--
       ``(i) the impact of the implementation of this subsection 
     on personnel of the Department of Homeland Security;
       ``(ii) the impact of such implementation on information 
     sharing within the Department;
       ``(iii) best practices for integrating the topic of covert 
     testing into existing training and testing programs for 
     personnel of the Department; and
       ``(iv) the effectiveness of covert testing as a method to 
     improve security.
       ``(C) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall submit 
     to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report that contains--
       ``(i) the results of the study under subparagraph (A);
       ``(ii) recommendations for changes to the training of 
     personnel of the Department that are necessary to ensure 
     compliance with the requirements of this subsection; and
       ``(iii) recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the 
     implementation of this subsection.
       ``(5) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection, the 
     following definitions apply:
       ``(A) Appropriate individual.--The term `appropriate 
     individual', as used with respect to a covert test of a 
     transportation security system, means any individual that--
       ``(i) the individual conducting the test determines needs 
     to know his or her status as an individual conducting a test 
     under paragraph (2)(B); or
       ``(ii) the cover team monitoring the test under paragraph 
     (3)(B)(i) determines needs to know the identity of an 
     individual conducting the test.
       ``(B) Covered employee.--The term `covered employee' means 
     any individual who receives notice of a covert test before 
     the completion of a test under paragraph (2)(A).
       ``(C) Covert test.--
       ``(i) In general.--The term `covert test' means an exercise 
     or activity conducted by a covert testing office, the 
     Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security, or 
     the Government Accountability Office to intentionally test, 
     compromise, or circumvent transportation security systems to 
     identify vulnerabilities in such systems.
       ``(ii) Limitation.--Notwithstanding clause (i), the term 
     `covert test' does not mean an exercise or activity by an 
     employee or contractor of the Transportation Security 
     Administration to test or assess compliance with regulations 
     under title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
       ``(D) Covert testing office.--The term `covert testing 
     office' means any office of the Transportation Security 
     Administration designated by the Assistant Secretary of 
     Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration) to 
     conduct covert tests of transportation security systems.
       ``(E) Employee of a covert testing office.--The term 
     `employee of a covert testing office' means an individual who 
     is an employee of a covert testing office or a contractor or 
     an employee of a contractor of a covert testing office.''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Mississippi (Mr. Thompson) and the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Daniel E. Lungren) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi.


                             General Leave

  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
that

[[Page 12760]]

all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their 
remarks and include extraneous material on the bill under 
consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Mississippi?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of 
this bill and yield myself as much time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 5909, the Catching Operational Vulnerabilities by 
Ensuring Random Testing Act of 2008, or the COVERT Act of 2008, was 
introduced by Congresswoman Lowey of New York.
  The COVERT Act of 2008 was introduced to eliminate the practice of 
giving advance notice to transportation security workers of covert 
tests before the tests happened. I want to thank Congresswoman Lowey 
and the other members of the Committee on Homeland Security for working 
together in a bipartisan manner to approve this measure unanimously.
  I also want to thank the Transportation Security Administration for 
recognizing the need for this legislation and working with us to ensure 
that the bill accomplishes its goal without impeding the way in which 
TSA conducts its covert testing.
  This legislation is vital to protecting the integrity of covert tests 
of transportation security systems. We know of at least three incidents 
where covert tests were compromised by individuals who inappropriately 
warned security officials.
  This bill will prohibit individuals from providing advance notice of 
these important covert tests to any persons, unless authorized to do so 
by the Assistant Secretary of TSA, the Inspector General of DHS, or the 
Comptroller General of GAO.
  Covert testing efforts by TSA, the DHS IG, and GAO have helped to 
increase the effectiveness of our transportation security systems by 
highlighting vulnerabilities and keeping the screening workforce on 
their toes. Any effort to compromise these important testing efforts, 
whether intentional or accidental, should not be tolerated by this 
Congress.
  If we choose to ignore the problems of the past, we will provide 
future opportunities to compromise a worthy program intended to educate 
the workforce and benefit the security of our transportation security 
systems throughout the country.
  I strongly encourage all my colleagues to support H.R. 5909, which 
complements the work the committee has done on H.R. 1684, the DHS 
authorization bill that is pending before the Senate.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such 
time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 5909, the Catching Operational 
Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Random Testing Act of 2008, otherwise known 
as the COVERT Act.
  This act simply would prohibit the disclosure of information 
concerning a covert test conducted by TSA, the Inspector General of 
DHS, or GAO to any individual prior to the completion of the test. The 
bill also requires any TSA covert testing team to be accompanied by a 
cover team to monitor the covert test and to confirm the identity of 
the covert testing team to any appropriate individual, if an individual 
or security screener not aware of the covert test identifies the covert 
testing team as a threat to security.
  This bill is substantially modified from the bill as originally 
introduced because there was some real give-and-take and compromise 
produced on the part of both sides of the aisle at the subcommittee 
level and with the full committee staff.

                              {time}  1130

  And for that I am thankful and believe that we have a better product 
as a result of that consultation and that give and take.
  One of the things we wanted to make sure we did not do in attempting 
to prevent people spilling the beans, so to speak, on these kinds of 
covert tests was to have such a heavy-handed approach that it might tip 
off people by the presence of additional folks. We've worked that out 
here, and I thank the gentleman and the gentlelady for being able to do 
that.
  I would just have one small point, perhaps disagreement with the 
chairman. There are reports that there was a tipping off in one 
particular instance that was intentional, seemingly meant to give 
people notice that there was going to be a test or it was about to take 
place. In another case, at least from my review of the files, it 
appears to be inadvertent, and I believe something on the order of 
within 30 seconds the notice that was contained in an e-mail was 
retrieved by the responsible party when he realized someone else had 
put that out. And then there's a third one that's somewhat in dispute 
between TSA and some Members of the House, and others.
  And all I would say is, irrespective of how many there were, if there 
was just one, that's one too many. This bill I think helps us move in 
the direction of improving the circumstances so the likelihood of that 
occurring is much less in the future than it would have been without 
this legislation. And so for those reasons, I would enthusiastically 
support H.R. 5909 and ask my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the 
author and supporter of this legislation, the gentlelady from New York 
(Mrs. Lowey).
  Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 5909 and begin by 
thanking Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, Subcommittee 
Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, and Subcommittee Ranking Member Lungren for 
moving this legislation to the floor.
  My bill, the Catching Operational Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Random 
Testing, or COVERT, Act would prohibit the advance notification of 
covert tests on transportation systems without direct approval from the 
highest officials in our Homeland Security operations.
  This legislation bolsters accountability and integrity for covert 
testing within our transportation systems overseen by the 
Transportation Security Administration and the Department of Homeland 
Security.
  The core principles and goals of covert testing are undermined when 
individuals are alerted in advance that a test or evaluation is 
imminent. In fact, in case we haven't figured it out, there is nothing 
covert about activities employees already know will occur. 
Unfortunately, there have been a number of reported incidents in which 
covert tests may have been compromised as a result of advanced 
notification to Transportation Security officers.
  The Inspector General at the Department of Homeland Security found 
that between August 2003 and May 2004, Transportation Security 
Administration officials at San Francisco International Airport 
compromised covert testing efforts by tracking testers throughout the 
airport utilizing surveillance cameras, then notifying screening 
personnel in advance of the testers arriving at security checkpoints. 
The Inspector General also found that Transportation Security officers 
at Jackson-Evers International Airport in Jackson, Mississippi, 
reported receiving advance notice of covert tests conducted by TSA's 
Office of Inspection on February 12, 2004.
  Finally, led by Chairman Thompson's efforts, the Homeland Security 
Committee discovered on April 2006 an e-mail sent via TSA's net hub 
system from the Office of Security Operations to all Federal security 
directors and other TSA airport officials informing them of testing at 
airports throughout the country.
  In this unfortunate instance, while the e-mail may have violated TSA 
protocols, it did not constitute the sharing of sensitive information 
under the law. My legislation will close that loophole, making it a 
violation to tip off employees before covert tests without high-level 
approval at TSA and DHS.
  During mark-up of this legislation, the Homeland Security Committee 
adopted an amendment allowing local law enforcement to be notified 
prior to

[[Page 12761]]

a test if directed by the administrator providing for personnel 
flexibility by clarifying that only one individual is necessary to 
serve as a cover agent supervising testing, and including a study on 
implementation of these procedures and their impact on the Department's 
effort to improve transportation security.
  I want to make it very clear to my colleagues that this bill does not 
tie the hands of DHS or TSA. It simply ensures that any decision to 
notify personnel in advance must come directly from the TSA 
administrator, the Inspector General of the Department, or the 
Comptroller General at GAO to ensure the safety of the traveling public 
and the testers.
  I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 5909.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentlelady an 
additional minute.
  Mrs. LOWEY. I will probably need an additional 4 minutes to respond, 
if you have it, Mr. Chairman, to Mr. Lungren on this very, very 
important issue that he has been referencing concerning drilling.
  We've been hearing frequently from my colleagues, my good friends 
like Mr. Lungren, from President Bush, and from other Republicans in 
the Congress. They continue to argue that opening more of the Outer 
Continental Shelf to oil and gas drilling will lower gasoline prices. 
But we can't drill our way to energy independence. The United States 
has only 1.6 percent of the world's oil reserves, but Americans consume 
25 percent of the oil used around the world every day. Nearly 80 
percent of oil and 82 percent of natural gas believed to exist on the 
Outer Continental Shelf is located in areas that are now open for 
leasing.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentlelady an 
additional 3 minutes to complete her statement.
  Mrs. LOWEY. I thank the distinguished Chair.
  Only 10.5 million of the 44 million leased offshore acres are 
actually producing oil or gas. So oil companies, my colleagues, are 
reaping billions in record profits, $123 billion in 2007 alone, 
received billions in subsidies in the 2005 energy bill, but they are 
not using the Federal lands already open to development. Given this, 
opening sensitive areas to drilling makes no sense.
  For example, ExxonMobil made $40 billion in profits last year alone, 
but has only increased investment in drilling and production by $3 
billion over the last 5 years. Oil and gas companies have stockpiled 
9,000 drilling permits--9,000--my good friends--drilling permits--
without expanding domestic production.
  The New Direction Congress is working to make America more energy 
independent and secure, lower costs to consumers, grow our economy with 
hundreds of thousands of new green jobs, and reduce global warming. 
This Congress has fought for historic new commitments to American-grown 
biofuels, sustained investments in clean renewable energy, large-scale 
efficiency improvements to buildings and transportation, enhanced tools 
to crack down on OPEC price fixing and price gouging, and to 
investigate the effects on price of rampant commodity speculation. And 
this Congress has forced the President to increase supply and thereby 
lower costs by not continuing to fill the almost full Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve starting June 30.
  I'm sure this debate will continue, my colleagues. And it seems to be 
a mantra of many of my good friends on the other side of the aisle, but 
I do wish there would be more focus on the oil companies using the 
drilling leases that they have and taking some of those profits and 
investing them and producing the oil that we need.
  So I thank you, I thank the Chair, and I thank my good friend on the 
other side of the aisle for focusing on this issue. I'm sure we'll 
continue this discussion. But I would like to conclude by thanking 
everybody, because it has been a bipartisan effort, and I encourage 
support of H.R. 5909.
  Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. May I inquire as to how much 
time I have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 17 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such 
time as I may consume.
  Again I rise in support of H.R. 5909, the Catching Operational 
Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Random Testing Act of 2008. I just wish we 
had the Catching Operational Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Real Energy 
Production in this Country Act of 2008.
  The gentlelady from New York has suggested that it's almost 
insignificant what we do offshore and that we are not actually going 
after those things right now. Well, let me just put some facts on the 
table.
  According to the U.S. Minerals Management Service--not a Republican 
or Democratic operation--America's deep seas on the Outer Continental 
Shelf contain 420 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Now, to put that 
in perspective, the United States consumes 23 trillion cubic feet per 
year; so 20 times, almost, what we get per year.
  And 86 billion barrels of oil contained in the deep seas on the Outer 
Continental Shelf; 86 billion barrels of oil, and currently the U.S. 
imports 4.5 billion barrels of oil per year. So that's about the 
equivalent of a little less than 20 years of our imports. But 85 
percent of the lower 48 Outer Continental Shelf energy resources remain 
under the lock and key of the Federal Government.
  Now, why do I say this deals with operational vulnerabilities? We 
have said in this bill that if you tip off people that they're being 
investigated, they might not act as they normally do. They might take 
advantage of you because they know that you are doing these covert 
operations. Similarly, we are the only developed Nation in the world 
that forbids safe energy production on our Outer Continental Shelf. No 
other country in the world does that. Brazil just explored on theirs, 
and they found the largest single gas find in modern history. In fact, 
some people are saying that Brazil will now be energy independent and 
not even have to deal with their ethanol production by way of sugar. 
Oh, by the way, we could be importing ethanol from sugar from Brazil at 
much lower costs than ethanol produced by corn in the United States. We 
have a 53 cent per gallon subsidy for corn-based ethanol, and we have 
something on the order of a 51 cent tariff on any ethanol brought in 
produced by sugar from Brazil or anywhere else, and I believe the farm 
bill brings it down to 45 cents. So we basically have put ourselves in 
the hole by about 90 cents per gallon with respect to ethanol that 
makes more cents from sugar than that that we're producing in corn.
  But even though Brazil is the leader in the world in ethanol produced 
by sugar, it went ahead and explored on their Outer Continental Shelf. 
And what did they find? The largest single find. Now, if you had looked 
a year ago or 2 years ago about the proven reserves for Brazil, that 
would not even be there because we didn't know about it.
  The other thing is, with technology, already known fields can produce 
more than they ever did before. One of the reasons I have a little bit 
of knowledge of this, I grew up in Long Beach, California.

                              {time}  1145

  We have been producing offshore Long Beach since before I was born. 
Every single citizen of the State of California who has any interest in 
the schools of California is proud of the fact, frankly, that there are 
subsidies that go to our schools from the royalties paid as a result of 
producing offshore Long Beach.
  Now we haven't had a major oil spill in my lifetime. We have I think 
over 1,000 rigs in the gulf coast that have been sitting there during 
these tremendous storms that we call hurricanes, including Katrina, 
that came through that area in the last few years. Not a single drop of 
oil has resulted, even though we have had massive destruction of all 
other kinds of facilities in that area.

[[Page 12762]]

  The United States companies, that some on this floor have berated, 
have spent billions of dollars in development of new technology to make 
it safer. And the suggestion that somehow they are hiding, somehow they 
are not utilizing these leases that they have, is just a fantastic 
claim, because it is utterly preposterous that they would pay money for 
leases and then not try to see what is there. The fact of the matter is 
that 52 percent of the oil and gas wells that have been drilled by 
American companies, 52 percent over the last 5 years, have turned out 
dry. Now, did they get these leases because they wanted to find dry 
wells? No. They went because there is a certain risk.
  It is not as easy as is suggested on this floor of the House that, 
okay, I am an oil company. I make money. I have friends who have worked 
on oil rigs who are missing fingers from the work that goes on there. I 
have friends that have worked in South and Central America who have 
worked on rigs at all time using what is called drilling mud, using 
those drill bits, losing fingers, working hard at it, realizing that 
you don't have a guarantee of every time you put a well down, you are 
going to get oil up.
  So I just find it fantastic that in this argument, number one, we are 
told, well, we don't have that much oil. It is really the fault of 
Americans because they use so much oil. I don't know whether that sells 
too much, blaming Americans for using energy that allows their lives to 
be better than our parents' and grandparents' generation was in terms 
of the standard of living. And secondly, to berate American companies 
that are leaders in the world in technology around the world.
  It is strange to me that some on the other side of the aisle believe 
that it is important for us to make sure we don't have any Outer 
Continental Shelf drilling off Florida, for instance, when Cuba has 
lease agreements with a number of countries, including China, although 
they haven't yet started to drill, that would allow them to drill 
within either 45 miles or 60 miles of our Florida coast. Now maybe it 
makes sense to tell the American people that they are at fault. I don't 
believe they are at fault. I think they are looking at us for some 
solutions.
  We have a solution here to the problem of the possibility of tipping 
people off to testing. It makes no sense to me, and most on my side of 
the aisle, for us to be the only developed nation in the world tipping 
off the rest of the world that we are going to close off most of our 
areas of natural resources. Remember, when we got Alaska, some referred 
to it as Seward's Folly. Maybe we didn't realize the folly until now 
when we intentionally cut off our ability to be able to environmentally 
and safely explore and produce energy in Alaska.
  But we divert a little bit from this bill. This bill is the Catching 
Operational Vulnerabilities By Ensuring Random Testing Act of 2008, 
COVERT testing. I congratulate the gentlelady for bringing this bill 
forward. I congratulate the chairwoman of the subcommittee for working 
on this along with those of us on this side. I congratulate the 
chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, for bringing 
this forward.
  With that, Mr. Speaker, I will yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as 
I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I cannot emphasize how important these covert tests are 
to protecting the country's transportation security systems. A single 
tip-off of a covert test is too many. We have already had three we know 
of. We must do our part to stop the next one from happening. We must do 
whatever we can to ensure that these tests remain covert and candid so 
we can truly evaluate our transportation security workers.
  I look forward to working with my colleagues as we move forward on 
this important legislation that will make our transportation systems 
more secure. I ask my colleagues to support this important legislation.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support 
of H.R. 5909, Catching Operational Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Random 
Testing Act of 2008, introduced by my distinguished colleague from New 
York, Representative Lowe. This important legislation will further 
shore up the gaps in our testing and evaluation protocols for 
transportation security.
  As we've seen just in the past year, the details of covert tests and 
evaluations have been disseminated to the screener workforce, thereby 
``tipping-off' those we are trying to accurately and responsibly test. 
The Committee on Homeland Security has been extremely concerned about 
this issue and I have held hearings in the Subcommittee on 
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, of which I am 
the chair, in order to examine what exactly has gone wrong.
  Any efforts to compromise these important testing efforts, whether 
intentional or on accident, should not be tolerated. Some have claimed 
that one of these incidents--the April 2006 e-mail from TSA's Office of 
Security Operations that tipped TSA field staff off to covert tests--
was unintentional, but evidence suggests otherwise. The April 2006 e-
mail clearly referenced that individuals who were probing the system 
were Federal employees and even provided a physical description of one 
of the employees conducting the tests. This bill is necessary to 
prohibit individuals from providing advance notice of covert tests to 
any persons, unless authorized to do so by the Assistant Secretary of 
the Transportation Security Administration, the Inspector General of 
the Department, or the Comptroller General of the United States.
  The COVERT Act of 2008 explicitly prohibits the advance notice or 
notification to individuals by those employees who are participating in 
a covert test or evaluation, which will ensure that the integrity of 
all covert testing efforts--across all modes of transportation--are 
protected, not just aviation. This legislation puts in place controls 
to monitor the testing personnel and the testing and evaluation 
procedures by building in accountability. It establishes the presence 
of a second team of covert test and evaluation employees with the first 
team in order to monitor and confirm their actions. Finally, the act 
requires an impact study to evaluate covert testing and evaluation and 
how it could be incorporated into other training and testing programs. 
The study is required to include: Recommendations on the implementation 
and execution of this section; an assessment on the results of covert 
testing; a summary of best practices on how to best integrate covert 
testing into other programs; and recommendations for additional 
personnel training necessary to fulfill this act. The study and report 
will also provide an assessment on the test and evaluation results and 
recommendations for personnel training required to fulfill the act.
  Mr Speaker, if we choose to ignore these past disclosures, we provide 
future opportunities to compromise a worthy program intended to educate 
the workforce and benefit the security of our transportation systems 
throughout the country. One tip-off of a covert test is one too many. 
We've already had three that we know of. Let's do our part to stop any 
future tip-offs.
  I am proud to support this incredibly important and timely 
legislation and I strongly encourage my colleagues to support this 
important legislation.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of 
my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson) that the House suspend the 
rules and pass the bill, H.R. 5909, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the 
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________