[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 154 (2008), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 11788-11790]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                PAKISTAN

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, during the Senate recess at the end of 
last month, I visited the central front in our Nation's fight against 
al-Qaida: Pakistan. During my 4-day stay, I met with a broad range of 
political officials from numerous parties, including the Pakistan 
People's Party of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the PLM-N of 
former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, as well as with President Pervez 
Musharraf, Pakistani intelligence officials, the ousted chief justice, 
and representatives of Pakistan's civil society. Outside of Islamabad, 
my visit included a trip to Peshawar, in the tumultuous Northwest 
Frontier Province, where I met with local officials, and Kashmir, where 
the United States has funded numerous successful humanitarian and 
development programs in the wake of the devastating 2005 earthquake.
  The breadth of this trip was commensurate with the critical 
importance of Pakistan to our country's national security. Despite 
recent claims by CIA Director Michael Hayden that al-Qaida is now on 
the defensive, including in its

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safe haven in Pakistan, I traveled there because it is out of that 
country that we face our most serious national security threat. As the 
intelligence community has said again and again, the fight against al-
Qaida begins in Pakistan. According to the State Department's 2007 
terrorism report which was released this past April, al-Qaida and 
associated networks remain the greatest terrorist threat to the United 
States. That threat emanates from the reconstitution of some of al-
Qaida's pre-9/11 capabilities ``through the exploitation of Pakistan's 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas.'' The report added that 
instability in Pakistan, ``coupled with the Islamabad brokered cease-
fire agreement in effect for the first half of 2007 along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan frontier, appeared to have provided AQ leadership greater 
mobility and ability to conduct training and operational planning, 
particularly that targeting Western Europe and the United States.''
  During my visit, I conducted extensive discussions with Pakistani 
leaders about ceasefire negotiations, in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas, FATA, as well as in the Swat region of the NWFP. I remain 
skeptical about those negotiations and am particularly concerned that 
those in the FATA region will give al-Qaida room to plot against our 
troops in Afghanistan and our citizens here in the United States. The 
new civilian-led Government in Pakistan is seeking a different approach 
from that of President Musharraf, and that is understandable--it has, 
in fact, been mandated by the people of Pakistan, and it is high time 
they have a responsive government that heeds their call. A key part of 
this new approach will require success in reining in the military 
apparatus, which has historically controlled much of Pakistan's foreign 
policy--sometimes overtly with a military dictator running the country 
and other times more discreetly from behind a screen of a civilian-led 
government. But as Pakistan's new Government seeks to reconcile these 
complex, multilayered issues, it must not do so at the expense of the 
grave threats emanating from the border region. We must address those 
threats head-on because what happens in the terrorist safe haven of 
FATA is central to our national security, and we cannot afford to be 
distracted or complacent. To do so would be to the detriment of our 
safety and security as well as that of our friends and allies.
  At the same time, any long-term counterterrorism strategy in the FATA 
must include serious economic reforms, legal political party 
development, and initiatives to integrate FATA with the rest of 
Pakistan. This will not be easy, but it is long overdue and will help 
ensure we are using all the tools at our disposal to fight al-Qaida and 
associated terrorist threats. The growing extremism and creation of a 
terrorist safe haven in FATA has emerged out of decades of political 
marginalization and ensuing poverty. In working closely with the FATA 
political agents and local law enforcement, as well as the Government 
of Pakistan, we need to help create sustainable development strategies 
that provide opportunities for engagement while ensuring sufficient 
financial resources are allocated to those in need now and in the years 
to come.
  This must include not only traditional development projects but 
institution building and political engagement in a region long deprived 
of such opportunities. The people of the FATA must have alternative 
livelihood options that help facilitate opposition to terrorists and 
extremists.
  At the same time, we must find Osama Bin Laden and his senior 
leaders, and we must work to neutralize forces that plot or carry out 
attacks against Americans. But that cannot be our only goal. This fight 
runs much deeper than a simple manhunt--if we are serious about 
countering al-Qaida, and preventing another Bin Laden from emerging, we 
must shift our assistance to be more aligned with the needs of the 
local population and expand our development assistance throughout a 
country where poverty and anti-Western sentiment are pervasive.
  This administration's policies toward Pakistan have been highly 
damaging to our long-term national security. By embracing and relying 
on a single, unpopular, antidemocratic leader--namely, President 
Musharraf--President Bush failed to develop a comprehensive 
counterterrorism strategy that transcends individuals. He also 
encouraged Pakistanis to be skeptical about American intentions and 
principles. The recent elections provide a window of opportunity as the 
people of Pakistan soundly rejected President Musharraf's leadership in 
favor of political parties that promised a new direction. Although 
domestic politics remain fragile, we have an opportunity to reverse our 
history of neglect and mixed signals by expanding our relationships and 
supporting fundamental democratic institutions instead of one strong 
man--something the President may still be reluctant to do. We must do 
this so that our counterterrorism partnership can withstand the ups and 
downs of Pakistan's domestic politics, reflecting a more wide-ranging 
approach that does not ratchet up the already high levels of anti-
American sentiment in that country.
  Any enduring counterterrorism partnership must recognize that 
Pakistan, despite the coups and military dictatorships that have marred 
its history, has a democratic tradition, a vibrant civil society, and a 
large and educated middle class whose interests and values frequently 
coincide with ours. By working with those Pakistanis and supporting 
their desire to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, 
we align ourselves with the moderate forces that are critical to the 
fight against extremism. Supporting the Pakistani people as they seek 
to strengthen democratic institutions is not just an outgrowth of our 
values--it is in our national security interests. The counterterrorism 
efforts we need from Islamabad must be serious and sustained in a way 
that only democratic processes can ensure.
  For these reasons, I have been deeply disappointed by the Bush 
administration's failure to condemn the illegal dismissal of the chief 
justice of Pakistan and scores of other judges and its refusal to call 
for their reinstatement. The ousting of the judges has become a cause 
celebre for Pakistan's civil society. It prompted the creation of a 
``Lawyers' Movement''--a moderate, democratic uprising that Americans 
should embrace. During my time in Pakistan, I visited with the chief 
justice and shortly thereafter called for the judges to be reinstated 
because it is a clear violation of the basic tenets of the rule of law. 
I was asked whether I had made such a call in support of a particular 
political party and whether I also sought the removal of President 
Musharraf. I responded that those are issues for the Pakistanis to 
determine, and I continue to believe that is the case. Indeed, while 
the political landscape in Pakistan remains turbulent and fragile, I 
have no intention of meddling in domestic affairs. Nonetheless, it is 
unacceptable for the United States to sit back in the face of such 
fundamentally undemocratic actions. We cannot be selective in the 
democratic principles we support--that is not consistent with our 
values, and it is shortsighted in terms of our national security.
  Mr. President, the emergence of a new civilian leadership in Pakistan 
provides an opening for us to develop a new approach--a new 
relationship--that includes a sustainable, comprehensive 
counterterrorism partnership. We must seize this opportunity because, 
despite a great deal of anti-American sentiment, in many areas the 
Pakistanis are ready and willing to work with us. This is not to say 
that this process will be free from challenges--there are already 
serious hurdles that must be dealt with, including negotiations in the 
FATA and NWFP, both of which are cause for concern. In the end, we must 
recognize that the new leadership reflects a broad cross-section of 
Pakistan, and by fully engaging them, we can take an important step 
toward defending our national security interests in the central front 
in the fight against al-Qaida.

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