[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 154 (2008), Part 5]
[House]
[Pages 6011-6020]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1400
         EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE FOR SECURE ELECTIONS ACT OF 2008

  Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the 
rules and pass the bill (H.R. 5036) to direct the Administrator of 
General Services to reimburse certain jurisdictions for the costs of 
obtaining paper ballot voting systems for the general elections for 
Federal office to be held in November 2008, to reimburse jurisdictions 
for the costs incurred in conducting audits or hand counting of the 
results of the general elections for Federal office to be held in 
November 2008, and for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 5036

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Emergency Assistance for 
     Secure Elections Act of 2008''.

     SEC. 2. PAYMENTS TO CERTAIN JURISDICTIONS CONDUCTING 2008 
                   GENERAL ELECTIONS.

       (a) Reimbursement for Conversion to Paper Ballot Voting 
     System.--
       (1) In general.--The Election Assistance Commission shall 
     pay to each eligible jurisdiction an amount equal to the sum 
     of the following:
       (A) The documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by 
     such jurisdiction to replace any voting systems used to 
     conduct the general elections for Federal office held in 
     November 2006 that did not use or produce a paper ballot 
     verified by the voter or a paper ballot printout verifiable 
     by the voter at the time the vote is cast with paper ballot 
     voting systems.
       (B) The documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by 
     such jurisdiction to obtain non-tabulating ballot marking 
     devices that are accessible for individuals with disabilities 
     in accordance with the requirements of section 301(a)(3) of 
     the Help America Vote Act of 2002.
       (C) The documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by 
     such jurisdiction to obtain ballot marking stations or voting 
     booths for the protection of voter privacy.
       (D) The documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by 
     such jurisdiction to obtain paper ballots.
       (E) The documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by 
     such jurisdiction to obtain precinct-based equipment that 
     tabulates paper ballots or scans paper ballots.
       (F) The documented reasonable administrative costs paid or 
     incurred by such jurisdiction that are associated with 
     meeting the requirements for an eligible jurisdiction.
       (2) Eligible jurisdiction defined.--In this subsection, an 
     ``eligible jurisdiction'' means a jurisdiction that submits 
     to the Commission (and, in the case of a county or equivalent 
     jurisdiction, provides a copy to the State), at such time and 
     in such form as the Commission may require, an application 
     containing--
       (A) assurances that the jurisdiction conducted regularly 
     scheduled general elections for Federal office in November 
     2006 using (in whole or in part) a voting system that did not 
     use or produce a paper ballot verified by the voter or a 
     paper ballot printout verifiable by the voter at the time the 
     vote is cast;
       (B) assurances that the jurisdiction will conduct the 
     regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office to 
     be held in November 2008 using only paper ballot voting 
     systems;
       (C) assurances that the jurisdiction has obtained or will 
     obtain a sufficient number of non-tabulating ballot marking 
     devices that are accessible for individuals with disabilities 
     in accordance with the requirements of section 301(a)(3) of 
     the Help America Vote Act of 2002;
       (D) assurances that the jurisdiction has obtained or will 
     obtain a sufficient number of ballot marking stations or 
     voting booths for the protection of voter privacy;
       (E) assurances that the jurisdiction has obtained or will 
     obtain a sufficient number of paper ballots;
       (F) such information and assurances as the Commission may 
     require to make the determinations under paragraph (1); and
       (G) such other information and assurances as the Commission 
     may require.
       (3) Determinations of reasonableness of costs.--The 
     determinations under paragraph

[[Page 6012]]

     (1) of whether costs paid or incurred by a jurisdiction are 
     reasonable shall be made by the Commission.
       (4) Paper ballot voting system defined.--In this 
     subsection, a ``paper ballot voting system'' means a voting 
     system that uses a paper ballot marked by the voter by hand 
     or a paper ballot marked by the voter with the assistance of 
     a non-tabulating ballot marking device described in paragraph 
     (1)(B).
       (b) Reimbursement for Retrofitting of Direct Recording 
     Electronic Voting Systems to Produce Voter Verifiable Paper 
     Records.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission shall pay to each eligible 
     jurisdiction an amount equal to the documented reasonable 
     costs paid or incurred by such jurisdiction to retrofit 
     direct recording electronic voting systems so that the 
     systems will produce a voter verifiable paper record of the 
     marked ballot for verification by the voter at the time the 
     vote is cast, including the costs of obtaining printers to 
     produce the records.
       (2) Eligible jurisdiction defined.--In this subsection, an 
     ``eligible jurisdiction'' means a jurisdiction that submits 
     to the Commission (and, in the case of a county or equivalent 
     jurisdiction, provides a copy to the State), at such time and 
     in such form as the Commission may require, an application 
     containing--
       (A) assurances that the jurisdiction has obtained or will 
     obtain a printer for and retrofit each direct recording 
     electronic voting system used to conduct the general 
     elections for Federal office held in November 2008 so that 
     the system will produce a voter verifiable paper record of 
     the marked ballot for verification by the voter;
       (B) such information and assurances as the Commission may 
     require to make the determinations under paragraph (1); and
       (C) such other information and assurances as the Commission 
     may require.
       (3) Determination of reasonableness of costs.--The 
     determinations under paragraph (1) of whether costs paid or 
     incurred by a jurisdiction are reasonable shall be made by 
     the Commission.
       (c) Reimbursement for Provision of Backup Paper Ballots by 
     Jurisdictions Using Direct Recording Electronic Voting 
     Systems.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission shall pay to each eligible 
     jurisdiction an amount equal to the documented reasonable 
     costs paid or incurred by such jurisdiction to obtain, 
     deploy, and tabulate backup paper ballots (and related 
     supplies and equipment) that may be used in the event of the 
     failure of a direct recording electronic voting system in the 
     regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office to 
     be held in November 2008.
       (2) Eligible jurisdiction defined.--In this subsection, an 
     ``eligible jurisdiction'' means a jurisdiction that submits 
     to the Commission (and, in the case of a county or equivalent 
     jurisdiction, provides a copy to the State), at such time and 
     in such form as the Commission may require, an application 
     containing--
       (A) assurances that the jurisdiction will post, in a 
     conspicuous manner at all polling places at which a direct 
     recording electronic voting system will be used in such 
     elections, a notice stating that backup paper ballots are 
     available at the polling place and that a voter is entitled 
     to use such a ballot upon the failure of a voting system;
       (B) assurances that the jurisdiction counts each such 
     backup paper ballot cast by a voter as a regular ballot cast 
     in the election, and does not treat it (for eligibility 
     purposes) as a provisional ballot under section 302(a) of the 
     Help America Vote Act of 2002, unless the individual casting 
     the ballot would have otherwise been required to cast a 
     provisional ballot;
       (C) such information and assurances as the Commission may 
     require to make the determinations under paragraph (1); and
       (D) such other information and assurances as the Commission 
     may require.
       (3) Determination of reasonableness of costs.--The 
     determinations under paragraph (1) of whether costs paid or 
     incurred by a jurisdiction are reasonable shall be made by 
     the Commission.
       (d) Amounts.--There are authorized to be appropriated to 
     the Commission such sums as may be necessary for payments 
     under this section. Any amounts appropriated pursuant to the 
     authorization under this subsection shall remain available 
     until expended.

     SEC. 3. PAYMENTS FOR CONDUCTING MANUAL AUDITS OF RESULTS OF 
                   2008 GENERAL ELECTIONS.

       (a) Payments.--
       (1) Eligibility for payments.--If a State conducts manual 
     audits of the results of any of the regularly scheduled 
     general elections for Federal office in November 2008 (and, 
     at the option of the State, conducts audits of elections for 
     State and local office held at the same time as such 
     election) in accordance with the requirements of this 
     section, the Commission shall make a payment to the State in 
     an amount equal to the documented reasonable costs incurred 
     by the State in conducting the audits.
       (2) Certification of compliance and costs.--
       (A) Certification required.--In order to receive a payment 
     under this section, a State shall submit to the Commission, 
     in such form as the Commission may require, a statement 
     containing--
       (i) a certification that the State conducted the audits in 
     accordance with all of the requirements of this section;
       (ii) a statement of the reasonable costs incurred in 
     conducting the audits; and
       (iii) such other information and assurances as the 
     Commission may require.
       (B) Amount of payment.--The amount of a payment made to a 
     State under this section shall be equal to the reasonable 
     costs incurred in conducting the audits.
       (C) Determination of reasonableness of costs.--The 
     determinations under this paragraph of whether costs incurred 
     by a State are reasonable shall be made by the Commission.
       (3) Timing of payments.--The Commission shall make the 
     payment required under this section to a State not later than 
     30 days after receiving the statement submitted by the State 
     under paragraph (2).
       (4) Mandatory immediate reimbursement of counties and other 
     jurisdictions.--If a county or other jurisdiction responsible 
     for the administration of an election in a State incurs costs 
     as the result of the State conducting an audit of the 
     election in accordance with this section, the State shall 
     reimburse the county or jurisdiction for such costs 
     immediately upon receiving the payment from the Commission 
     under paragraph (3).
       (5) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Commission such sums as may be 
     necessary for payments under this section. Any amounts 
     appropriated pursuant to the authorization under this 
     subsection shall remain available until expended.
       (b) Audit Requirements.--In order to receive a payment 
     under this section for conducting an audit, the State shall 
     meet the following minimum requirements:
       (1) Not later than 30 days before the date of the regularly 
     scheduled general election for Federal office in November 
     2008, the State shall establish and publish guidelines, 
     standards, and procedures to be used in conducting audits in 
     accordance with this section.
       (2) The State shall select an appropriate entity to oversee 
     the administration of the audit, in accordance with such 
     criteria as the State considers appropriate consistent with 
     the requirements of this section, except that the entity must 
     meet a general standard of independence as defined by the 
     State.
       (3) The State shall determine whether the units in which 
     the audit will be conducted will be precincts or some 
     alternative auditing unit, and shall apply that determination 
     in a uniform manner for all audits conducted in accordance 
     with this section.
       (4) The State shall select the precincts or alternative 
     auditing units in which audits are conducted in accordance 
     with this section in a random manner following the election 
     after the final unofficial vote count (as defined by the 
     State) has been announced, such that each precinct or 
     alternative auditing unit in which the election was held has 
     an equal chance of being selected, subject to paragraph (9), 
     except that the State shall ensure that at least one precinct 
     or alternative auditing unit is selected in each county in 
     which the election is held.
       (5) The audit shall be conducted in not less than 2 percent 
     of the precincts or alternative auditing units in the State 
     (in the case of a general election for the office of Senator) 
     or the Congressional district involved (in the case of an 
     election for the office of Representative in, or Delegate or 
     Resident Commissioner to, the Congress).
       (6) The State shall determine the stage of the tabulation 
     process at which the audit will be conducted, and shall apply 
     that determination in a uniform manner for all audits 
     conducted in accordance with this section, except that the 
     audit shall commence within 48 hours after the State or 
     jurisdiction involved announces the final unofficial vote 
     count (as defined by the State) in each precinct in which 
     votes are cast in the election which is the subject of the 
     audit.
       (7) With respect to each precinct or alternative audit unit 
     audited, the State shall ensure that a voter verified paper 
     ballot or paper ballot printout verifiable by the voter at 
     the time the vote is cast is available for every vote cast in 
     the precinct or alternative audit unit, and that the tally 
     produced by counting all of those paper ballots or paper 
     ballot printouts by hand is compared with the corresponding 
     final unofficial vote count (as defined by the State) 
     announced with respect to that precinct or audit unit in the 
     election.
       (8) Within each precinct or alternative audit unit, the 
     audit shall include all ballots cast by all individuals who 
     voted in or who are under the jurisdiction of the precinct or 
     alternative audit unit with respect to the election, 
     including absentee ballots (subject to paragraph (9)), early 
     ballots, emergency ballots, and provisional ballots, without 
     regard to the time, place, or manner in which the ballots 
     were cast.
       (9) If a State establishes a separate precinct for purposes 
     of counting the absentee ballots cast in the election and 
     treats all absentee ballots as having been cast in that

[[Page 6013]]

     precinct, and if the state does not make absentee ballots 
     sortable by precinct and include those ballots in the hand 
     count described in paragraph (7) which is administered with 
     respect to that precinct, the State may divide absentee 
     ballots into audit units approximately equal in size to the 
     average precinct in the State in terms of the number of 
     ballots cast, and shall randomly select and include at least 
     2 percent of those audit units in the audit. Any audit 
     carried out with respect to such an audit unit shall meet the 
     same standards applicable under paragraph (7) to audits 
     carried out with respect to other precincts and alternative 
     audit units, including the requirement that all paper ballots 
     be counted by hand.
       (10) The audit shall be conducted in a public and 
     transparent manner, such that members of the public are able 
     to observe the entire process.
       (c) Collection and Submission of Audit Results; 
     Publication.--
       (1) State submission of report.--In order to receive a 
     payment under this section, a State shall submit to the 
     Commission a report, in such form as the Commission may 
     require, on the results of each audit conducted under this 
     section.
       (2) Commission action.--The Commission may request 
     additional information from a State based on the report 
     submitted under paragraph (1).
       (3) Publication.--The Commission shall publish each report 
     submitted under paragraph (1) upon receipt.
       (d) Delay in Certification of Results by State.--No State 
     may certify the results of any election which is subject to 
     an audit under this section prior to completing the audit, 
     resolving discrepancies discovered in the audit, and 
     submitting the report required under subsection (c).

     SEC. 4. PAYMENTS FOR CONDUCTING HAND COUNTS OF RESULTS OF 
                   2008 GENERAL ELECTIONS.

       (a) Payments.--
       (1) Eligibility for payments.--If a State, county, or 
     equivalent location tallies the results of any regularly 
     scheduled general election for Federal office in November 
     2008 by conducting a hand count of the votes cast on the 
     paper ballots used in the election (including paper ballot 
     printouts verifiable by the voter at the time the vote is 
     cast) in accordance with the requirements of this section, 
     the Commission shall make a payment to the State, county, or 
     equivalent location in an amount equal to the documented 
     reasonable costs incurred by the State, county, or equivalent 
     location in conducting the hand counts.
       (2) Certification of compliance and costs.--
       (A) Certification required.--In order to receive a payment 
     under this section, a State, county, or equivalent location 
     shall submit to the Commission (and, in the case of a county 
     or equivalent jurisdiction, shall provide a copy to the 
     State), in such form as the Commission may require, a 
     statement containing--
       (i) a certification that the State, county, or equivalent 
     location conducted the hand counts in accordance with all of 
     the requirements of this section;
       (ii) a statement of the reasonable costs incurred by the 
     State, county, or equivalent location in conducting the hand 
     counts; and
       (iii) such other information and assurances as the 
     Commission may require.
       (B) Amount of payment.--The amount of a payment made to a 
     State, county, or equivalent location under this section 
     shall be equal to the reasonable costs incurred by the State, 
     county, or equivalent location in conducting the hand counts.
       (C) Determination of reasonableness of costs.--The 
     determinations under this paragraph of whether costs incurred 
     by a State, county, or equivalent location are reasonable 
     shall be made by the Commission.
       (3) Timing of payments.--The Commission shall make the 
     payment required under this section to a State, county, or 
     equivalent location not later than 30 days after receiving 
     the statement submitted by the State, county, or equivalent 
     location under paragraph (2).
       (4) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Commission such sums as may be 
     necessary for payments under this section. Any amounts 
     appropriated pursuant to the authorization under this 
     subsection shall remain available until expended.
       (b) Hand Counts Described.--
       (1) In general.--A hand count conducted in accordance with 
     this section is a count of all of the paper ballots on which 
     votes were cast in the election (including paper ballot 
     printouts verifiable by the voter at the time the vote is 
     cast), including votes cast on an early, absentee, emergency, 
     and provisional basis, which is conducted by hand to 
     determine the winner of the election and is conducted without 
     using electronic equipment or software.
       (2) Completeness.--With respect to each jurisdiction in 
     which a hand count is conducted, the State, county, or 
     equivalent location shall ensure that a voter verified paper 
     ballot or paper ballot printout verifiable by the voter at 
     the time the vote is cast is available for every vote cast in 
     the jurisdiction.
       (c) Process for Conducting Hand Counts.--
       (1) In general.--In order to meet the requirements of this 
     section, a hand count of the ballots cast in an election 
     shall be conducted in accordance with the following 
     procedures:
       (A) After the closing of the polls on the date of the 
     election, the appropriate election official shall secure the 
     ballots at the polling place (or, in the case of ballots cast 
     at any other location, at the office of the chief election 
     official of the jurisdiction conducting the hand count).
       (B) Beginning at any time after the expiration of the 8-
     hour period that begins at the time the polls close on the 
     date of the election, the jurisdiction shall conduct an 
     initial hand count of the ballots cast in the election, using 
     the ballots which are eligible to be counted in the election 
     as of the time the polls are closed.
       (C) Any ballot which is eligible to be counted in the 
     election but which is not included in the initial count 
     conducted under subparagraph (B), including a provisional 
     ballot cast by an individual who is determined to be eligible 
     to vote in the election or an absentee ballot received after 
     the date of the election but prior to the applicable deadline 
     under State law for the receipt of absentee ballots, shall be 
     subject to a hand count in accordance with this section and 
     added to the tally conducted under subparagraph (B) not later 
     than 48 hours after the ballot is determined to be eligible 
     to be counted.
       (D) The hand count shall be conducted by a team of not 
     fewer than 2 individuals who shall be witnessed by at least 
     one observer sitting at the same table with such individuals. 
     Except as provided in paragraph (2), all such individuals 
     shall be election officials of the jurisdiction in which the 
     hand count is conducted. The number of such individuals who 
     are members of the political party whose candidates received 
     the greatest number of the aggregate votes cast in the 
     regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office held 
     in the State in November 2006 shall be equal to the number of 
     such individuals who are members of the political party whose 
     candidates received the second greatest number of the 
     aggregate votes cast in the regularly scheduled general 
     elections for Federal office held in the State in November 
     2006.
       (E) After the completion of the hand count, the ballots may 
     be run through a tabulating machine or scanner for comparison 
     with the tally, if such a machine or scanner is available.
       (2) Use of other personnel.--An individual who is not an 
     election official of the jurisdiction in which a hand count 
     is conducted under this section may serve on a team 
     conducting the hand count or may serve as an observer of a 
     team conducting the hand count if the jurisdiction certifies 
     that the individual has completed such training as the 
     jurisdiction deems appropriate to conduct or observe the hand 
     count (as the case may be).
       (3) Location.--The hand counts conducted under this section 
     of the ballots cast in an election shall be conducted--
       (A) in the case of ballots cast at a polling place on the 
     date of the election, at the polling place at which the 
     ballots were cast; or
       (B) in the case of any other ballots, at the office of the 
     chief election official of the jurisdiction conducting the 
     hand count.
       (4) Information included in results.--Each hand count 
     conducted under this section shall produce the following 
     information with respect to the election:
       (A) The vote tally for each candidate.
       (B) The number of overvotes, undervotes, spoiled ballots, 
     and blank ballots cast (or their equivalents, as defined by 
     the State, county or equivalent location).
       (C) The number of write-in ballots and the names written in 
     on such ballots pursuant to State law.
       (D) The total number of ballots cast.
       (E) A record of judgement calls made regarding voter 
     intent.
       (5) Public observation of hand counts.--Each hand count 
     conducted under this section shall be conducted in a manner 
     that allows public observation of the entire process 
     (including the opening of the ballot boxes or removal of 
     machine-printed ballots from their containers, the sorting, 
     counting, and notation of results, and the announcement of 
     final determinations) sufficient to confirm but not interfere 
     with the proceedings.
       (6) Establishment and publication of procedures.--Prior to 
     the date of the regularly scheduled general election for 
     Federal office held in November 2008, a State, county, or 
     equivalent location shall establish and publish procedures 
     for carrying out hand counts under this subsection.
       (d) Application to Jurisdictions Conducting Elections With 
     Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems.--
       (1) Requiring systems to produce voter verifiable paper 
     record.--If a State, county, or equivalent location uses a 
     direct recording electronic voting system to conduct an 
     election, the State, county, or equivalent location may not 
     receive a payment under this section for conducting a hand 
     count of

[[Page 6014]]

     the votes cast in the election unless (in addition to meeting 
     the other requirements applicable under this section) the 
     State, county, or equivalent location certifies to the 
     Commission that each such system produces a paper record 
     printout of the marked ballot which is verifiable by the 
     voter at the time the vote is cast.
       (2) Treatment of paper record printouts.--In applying this 
     section to a hand count conducted by a State, county, or 
     equivalent location which provides a certification to the 
     Commission under paragraph (1), the paper record printout 
     referred to in such paragraph shall be treated as the paper 
     ballot used in the election.
       (e) Announcement and Posting of Results.--Upon the 
     completion of a hand count conducted under this section, the 
     State, county, or equivalent location shall announce the 
     results to the public and post them on a public Internet 
     site.
       (f) Use of Hand Count in Certification of Results.--The 
     State shall use the results of the hand count conducted under 
     this section for purposes of certifying the results of the 
     election involved. Nothing in this section may be construed 
     to affect the application or operation of any State law 
     governing the recount of the results of an election.

     SEC. 5. STUDY, DEVELOPMENT OF TESTING METHODS, AND 
                   ACCELERATION OF DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTS AND 
                   STANDARDS TO ENSURE ACCESSIBILITY OF PAPER 
                   BALLOT VERIFICATION AND CASTING FOR CERTAIN 
                   INDIVIDUALS.

       (a) Study, Testing, and Development.--In accordance with 
     OMB Circular A-119, the Director of the National Institute of 
     Standards and Technology (hereafter in this section referred 
     to as the ``Director'') shall study, develop testing methods, 
     and accelerate the development of products and standards that 
     ensure the accessibility of paper ballot verification and 
     casting for individuals with disabilities, for voters whose 
     primary language is not English, and for voters with 
     difficulties in literacy, including the mechanisms themselves 
     and the processes through which the mechanisms are used. In 
     carrying out this subsection, the Director shall investigate 
     existing and potential methods or systems, including non-
     electronic systems, that will assist such individuals and 
     voters in creating voter verified paper ballots, presenting 
     or transmitting the information printed or marked on such 
     ballots back to such individuals and voters in an accessible 
     form, and enabling the voters to cast the ballots.
       (b) Report.--Not later than June 30, 2009, the Director 
     shall submit a report to Congress on the results of the 
     studying, development of testing methods, and acceleration of 
     the development of products and standards under subsection 
     (a).
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Director such sums as may be 
     necessary to carry out this section, to remain available 
     until expended.

     SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act--
       (1) the term ``Commission'' means the Election Assistance 
     Commission; and
       (2) the term ``State'' includes the District of Columbia, 
     the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and 
     the United States Virgin Islands.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Serrano). Pursuant to the rule, the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Zoe Lofgren) and the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Ehlers) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.


                             General Leave

  Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their 
remarks on H.R. 5036 and to include extraneous matter.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 5036, the Emergency 
Assistance for Secure Elections Act 2008, is a bill that provides State 
and local governments the opportunity to have safe, secure and 
auditable elections in this, the election, year.
  I commend Congressman Holt and his bipartisan cosponsors for their 
continued dedication to the issue of election reform.
  This bill recognizes that 2008 is quickly approaching and options 
must be provided to ensure the integrity of the vote. Our election 
process must be open and transparent to ensure public confidence. We 
are now 8 months from the general election and cannot place State and 
local governments in a position to require change. Therefore, the bill 
is 100 percent optional.
  State and local governments can choose which provisions they can 
successfully implement. Opting in entitles the State or jurisdiction to 
reimbursement. In committee, several changes were made to this bill 
through bipartisan cooperation, and I want to thank Mr. Ehlers for his 
support during the committee markup. Changes were also made to meet the 
concerns of disability groups, as well as State and local government.
  H.R. 5036, as amended, reimburses jurisdictions for retrofitting 
paperless touch-screen voting machines, or DREs, with systems that 
produce a voter verifiable paper record, allows for reimbursements for 
jurisdictions to obtain backup paper ballots in the event of failure of 
electronic voting systems and authorizes reimbursement for 
jurisdictions which conduct a manual audit of a Federal and any State 
and local election in November, 2008, in no less than 2 percent of the 
precincts.
  During the markup, all the amendments offered by the Republicans were 
accepted by voice vote, and those four amendments were to allow for 
audits to commence within 48 hours after States or relevant 
jurisdictions involved announced the unofficial vote count. It requires 
no hand count to commence until at least 8 hours after the polls close 
and requires the ballots to be in a secured location until the hand 
count commences, and ensures that the hand-counting teams, when 
conducting a hand count of the election results, have equal 
representation from both political parties of the candidates who 
received the two greatest numbers of aggregate votes cast, and requires 
that after the hand count is complete the ballots be run through a 
tabulating machine or scanner for verification of the tally, if such a 
machine or scanner is available.
  Having a voter verified paper trail with an automatic routine audit 
will go a long way to increase voter confidence and deter fraud.
  Post-election audits are an essential tool to increase voter 
confidence in the election process. While the bill authorizes such sums 
as necessary, the CBO has come back to us with a score of $685 million, 
about what we expected, and a sum that was in the original Holt bill.
  The CBO score, however, anticipates the participation of everyone in 
this bill. I think it is highly unlikely that every jurisdiction will 
participate in every aspect of the bill, since they have the 
opportunity to do nothing or to pick and choose portions of the bill. 
It is clear that the actual score or total would be less.
  I would note that we are spending over $10 billion a month in Iraq 
and that we have spent a total of $1.32 billion on democracy-building 
programs in Afghanistan and Iraq. The CBO figure is certainly less than 
that. It seems to me, if we can't protect our elections at home, 
really, how are we supposed to be a model of democracy without safe and 
secure and auditable elections.
  The country could end up revisiting the contentious and mistrusted 
count of 2000 and, even more recently, in the contested election of 
District 13 where people could not verify votes through an actual 
written ballot.
  The bill reported out of committee makes the changes requested by the 
minority to the legislation but keeps the core purpose of the bill, 
providing a voter verifiable paper and auditable paper trail.
  If this bill is enacted promptly, jurisdiction should have adequate 
time to purchase and implement the voting system upgrades and the other 
provisions of this bill and provide voter confidence in the integrity 
of the 2008 election.
  I urge all of my colleagues to support this option bill, this 
bipartisan effort.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss this bill and, first of all, to 
commend Mr. Holt for his efforts and his concerns.
  He is sincerely and extremely concerned about accuracy in voting, and 
what can be done to make certain that the results are accurate. He 
expressed that in his first bill, H.R. 811, which did not receive 
committee consideration.
  I spent considerable time with him trying to work out the details of 
that

[[Page 6015]]

bill, but we simply could not reach agreement or even come close to 
agreement.
  I commend Mr. Holt again for his concern and his persistence, as he 
authored H.R. 5036. When I reviewed it with him I thought this might be 
a much better basis for agreement and, that by working together, we 
might be able to achieve that.
  Unfortunately, we have not achieved full agreement on it, although we 
did get it out of committee. I supported it out of committee because I 
thought it should reach the floor for floor debate. I anticipated that 
it would be taken up under a rule where we might have the possibility 
for an additional compromise, but that has not happened.
  There are a number of issues that still remain. I agree with Mr. Holt 
that we should have some type of redundancy in our recording systems. I 
disagree that it has to be paper. I think there are other methods of 
achieving redundancy.
  Recently we had an exposition in the House Administration Committee 
room where we had demonstrations of equipment which shows redundancy in 
an electronic fashion, and I think would be fully as reliable as 
redundancy in paper.
  Another area where we disagree is in the hand counting of ballots. I 
have enough experience with elections in local politics to recognize 
that hand counting is not as accurate as almost any machine counting 
that I have seen.
  There are ways of achieving what Mr. Holt wishes. I think the 
optical-scan method is certainly a valid one, and that is what the 
State of Michigan uses. Other States are beginning to go use that.
  But the final blow to our efforts was the judgment of the CBO that it 
was $685 million for 1 year. I realize that Mr. Holt had estimated that 
would be the cost in his original bill. In fact he had included it as 
an authorization in his original bill.
  But having the CBO report that large sum that casts a pall over this 
particular bill in respect to the opinions of the Members of this body, 
and I am afraid that is likely to be the death knell.
  In summary, I certainly commend Mr. Holt for his concerns. I commend 
him for his efforts. I just don't think we have achieved enough 
agreement to effectively make this a bipartisan bill. Therefore, I 
suspect it will not pass, and I will have great difficulty supporting 
it at this point.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I would like to recognize 
the author of the bill, Congressman Rush Holt from New Jersey, who has 
been tremendously diligent in pursuing these reform measures. Really, 
without his persistence, we would not be here today.
  I would recognize him for 5 minutes.
  Mr. HOLT. I thank the gentlelady.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise to urge my colleagues to support the Emergency 
Assistance for Secure Elections Act of 2008.
  This is a bill that is optional for counties. It's to encourage 
counties and States to do the right thing. We should all want national 
standards of accessibility, reliability and auditability for our 
elections. This is an emergency stop-gap measure to see that we achieve 
as much of that as possible before the November elections.
  The principle is simple. Anything of value should be auditable. Votes 
are valuable. They should be audited so that voters can have the 
confidence that each vote is recorded the way the voter intended. In 
too many places around the United States, votes are not audited.
  In too many places around the United States, they are not even 
auditable. Voters leave the polling places wondering if their vote will 
be counted as they intended and election losers and their supporters 
are left wondering if they can believe the results.
  Already in this primary season, there have been numerous, numerous 
problems, questions, and unresolved disputes.
  In county after county, in State after State, electronic voting 
systems have failed in many ways, failure to start-up in the morning, a 
mismatch between the electronic count and the end-of-day printout, 
failed memory cards, and on and on and on. In too many places, the 
irregularities can not be resolved. There is no way to resolve them. 
There is no way to know because there is no record of the voter's 
intentions.
  This legislation would reimburse counties and States for allowing 
voters to inspect paper-based records of their vote, in other words, 
paper ballots. That would not only make it possible for audits, but 
this legislation would go further and reward States for putting in 
place procedures to conduct those audits. This would go a long way 
toward restoring confidence in the process.
  There is still time before November to secure our election system. If 
our Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act is enacted, 
localities could choose to convert to paper ballot voting systems, 
offer emergency paper ballots if machines fail, and to conduct audits 
to confirm the accuracy of the electronic tallies.
  I want to stress that this is optional. We took great pains to accept 
the suggestions of the minority party, to take suggestions of election 
officials, to take suggestions of people all over the country, lawyers 
and others who have looked at elections in detail. We simplified this 
so that counties could not object that we were making them do something 
that we weren't going to support them on. This is optional. We have 
simplified it as much as possible so that it could be implemented in 
time for this year's election, and it could be.

                              {time}  1415

  This modest bill simply entitles jurisdictions to reimbursement for 
the costs to conduct fully auditable, fully audited elections. It will 
encourage States and counties that want to do the right thing on behalf 
of their voters. But time is of the essence.
  If we don't take action immediately, we will not leave enough time 
for States that wish to opt to do so before the November election. 
Voters will lose further confidence in the system, and candidates will 
leave on election night wondering if they can trust the results.
  Common Cause wrote: ``The security and reliability problems with 
electronic machines have been well documented. Both the State of 
California with the Top to Bottom Review and the State of Ohio with 
their study have documented numerous security vulnerabilities and have 
systems and have taken action to protect voters. Additionally, a number 
of academic and public policy experts have recommended that the 
shortcomings of these systems be addressed. Finally, there have been a 
number of incidents in which voters have been disenfranchised and 
election outcomes thrown into doubt because the machines have simply 
failed to work properly.''
  The Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of 
Law writes: ``Reports of machine problems during States' recent 
Presidential primary elections provide a preview of potentially 
widespread machine failure and disenfranchisement in November.''
  They and others go on to argue that this simple, straightforward 
legislation will allow many counties and States around the country to 
address these problems in time for their November election so that we 
can have a truly reliable, accessible and auditable election that 
voters can believe in.
  I yield back the balance of my time with thanks to the gentlelady 
from California for her diligent work in putting together such a good 
piece of legislation.
  Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. I thank the gentleman, and I reserve 
the balance of my time.
  Mr. EHLERS. I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Regula).
  Mr. REGULA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 5036.
  CBO estimates that this bill will cost the taxpayers $685 million to 
reimburse jurisdictions for the cost of converting to voting systems 
that produce paper ballots, manual audits and hand recounts. We have 
already provided the States with $3.2 billion in grants to implement 
the Help America Vote Act,

[[Page 6016]]

including $115 million appropriated in fiscal year 2008.
  The administration of elections is a State and local responsibility. 
Many jurisdictions have already decided to change their election 
systems to require paper ballots using their own resources. This bill 
would encourage other jurisdictions to rush the implementation of new 
paper ballot systems for the November election.
  In written testimony before the Appropriations Subcommittee, the 
bipartisan Election Assistance Commission stated: ``Experience has 
taught election officials that a minimum of 6 to 8 months, and 
preferably longer, is needed to effectively implement a new voting 
system and to educate the voting public about how to use the system. 
Consistency in procedures and process is key in creating a secure, 
accurate and effective election. As we have seen in Ohio and in several 
other jurisdictions, the hasty attaching of a printer to some machines 
has led to paper jams, long lines, and confusion. While jurisdictions 
may find a voter verified paper audit trail to be suitable for their 
needs, hastily requiring such a thing for this year's election has the 
potential to lead to more problems than it can possibly solve. At this 
point in the election cycle, election officials are better served by 
sharpening their already existing policies than trying to apply 
patchwork fixes that could lead to greater problems.''
  That was from the Election Assistance Commission which is a 
bipartisan group.
  I would add, this bill will not only put the country further in debt, 
but would encourage jurisdictions to implement new voting systems 
between the primaries and general election, leading to additional 
election problems.
  I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this legislative proposal.
  Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Davis of Virginia is 
a principal cosponsor and I don't see him here, so I will yield to Mr. 
Holt for 1 minute.
  Mr. HOLT. I thank the gentlelady. I just wanted to address a couple 
of the points that the gentleman from Ohio made.
  The first is we don't in this legislation tell the counties how to 
run their elections. We leave this up to them, and it is entirely 
optional. There are States around the country who have instituted 
complete auditable election systems in a matter of months.
  If a county or a State feels they cannot do it, then I would advise 
them not to opt in to this program. But we believe they can. Let's 
leave that to them rather than as the gentleman from Ohio would, try to 
decide for them whether this is something that they would want.
  We believe from a number of indications that this will be useful in 
many counties and States around the country.
  Mr. EHLERS. I yield 4 minutes to the Republican whip, the gentleman 
from Missouri (Mr. Blunt).
  Mr. BLUNT. I thank the gentleman for yielding and I come to the floor 
to talk about this bill with real appreciation for the hard work that 
the gentleman from New Jersey has put into this effort. I know it is a 
heartfelt effort on his part.
  In fact, I first met his mother when we were both serving as the 
Secretaries of State of respective States, West Virginia and Missouri, 
at the time. I just come here to say that the States have handled the 
responsibility of the mechanics of election administration well for a 
very long time.
  The process of voting, how you vote, the mechanics of what the ballot 
looks like, whether you have a straight ballot voting system, all that 
has been left to the States, and I think wisely so.
  In the Help America Vote Act, the Congress provided States with over 
$3 billion to modernize their voting systems, including allowing the 
States to decide whether they wanted to have a paper backup. In my 
State, the State of Missouri, the Secretary of State determined if that 
money was used, there would be no system authorized in our State unless 
the paper backup was part of that system. As it turned out, that was a 
very good decision.
  But in the aftermath of the 2000 elections, many States took that 
incentive, that $3 billion that was out there, and in my view made 
decisions more quickly than they otherwise would have.
  This bill now offers a second round of money that would be available 
to encourage changing their systems, many of them that we know about 
today changing their system from a system they just used Federal money 
to change to. I think this is neither wise nor the responsible thing 
for us to do.
  I also very much think that there is no reason to rush this bill at 
this time. There is not enough time left between now and the November 
election to change voting systems. Over 30 States have already 
conducted primary elections with the system they will use in November. 
The very worst time to change a voting system is an election that has 
overwhelming participation, as we believe this one will.
  Election administration and the mechanics of election grew up in this 
country over decades and generations of voting and voting habits. To 
try to change those voting habits from a primary election some time 
earlier in the year to a new system, to be frankly tested the first 
time in probably the biggest election turnout that we have had or will 
have in a long time, is just a mistake.
  To think that we should pass this bill today for the November 
election, I think, is as far off base as we could be. I am not 
absolutely opposed to the Federal Government encouraging States to do 
better with their election process; I am opposed to this feeling that 
we get into that creates an environment where the States have to make 
these decisions more quickly than they should, and particularly to make 
a decision like this just in advance of a high-participation election.
  I don't think the $3.2 billion so-called solution produced the right 
results. In fact, several States are now complaining that it produced 
problems. But they are the ones that decided that they would deal with 
those problems. Those problems, frankly, become less significant every 
time voters use a system. Maybe you made an investment that you wished 
you didn't make, but you made that investment. It is not impossible to 
either reverse it on your own or decide you are going to make it work.
  I think this is the wrong approach at the wrong time. I encourage my 
colleagues to vote ``no'' on this bill today, not to give up in working 
with our friend from New Jersey to find a bill that would be helpful to 
the States, but not to pass a bill today that would only create with 
certainty more problems in November than we will have without it.
  Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I just want to make it 
clear that the Holt bill is optional for jurisdictions. No one is 
required to opt in, so no one would be rushed unless they wanted and 
felt they could take advantage of this legislation. I would note also 
that several States have undergone very rapid conversion. I would note 
that Governor Crist from Florida was a witness before the Election 
Subcommittee in House Administration, and he had the entire State of 
Florida switch from the electronic machines to optical scan in really a 
matter of months. This is a matter of intention if you want to do it.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. EHLERS. I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Iowa (Mr. King).
  Mr. KING of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Michigan 
for yielding, and I appreciate the privilege to address you here on the 
floor of the House with regard to integrity in the ballot system.
  I will say as a compliment to Mr. Holt, he and I have had a number of 
conversations about integrity in the electoral process. We share 
concern that the electoral process here in America have the highest 
level of integrity. I, for one, actually sat in my chair for all but a 
couple of 37 days following the election of the year 2000 watching 
television, scooting around and surfing the Internet, chasing down the 
rabbit trails. I was on the telephone. At the time I was the chairman

[[Page 6017]]

of the Senate State Government Committee in Iowa, and I didn't want 
Iowa to become a Florida.
  As I educated myself, it was a crash course in the electoral process. 
I found fraud in elections in a number of States, at least solid 
newspaper and journalistic reports of fraud, and I became convinced 
that it was scattered throughout this country. And the pattern is hard 
to follow, but the conclusion I drew was if this country ever loses its 
faith in our electoral system, this constitutional republic will 
collapse due to a lack of faith of the people.
  So integrity in the electoral process is important. I would rather 
lose an election than lose the integrity of the electoral process.
  I come to this floor today to oppose this bill, however, because this 
is Tax Day, 2008, election year 2008, and we are watching the 
Presidential debates unfold and soon we will hear the congressional 
debates light up. To try to jump on this horse in the middle of this 
fast current of stream that we have racing toward an election, I think 
is a bridge too far for us to be able to get there without further 
damaging the integrity, rather than improving it.

                              {time}  1430

  I would urge this House to step back, take a look, take a deep 
breath, and come together with some legislation that would provide, of 
course, for a paper audit trail, which I support, but one that does so 
in a reasoned fashion, not in the middle of an election year, not 
something that's designed to patch some of the flaws that came with the 
Help America Vote Act, but something that's well thought out, something 
that's bipartisan, something that's reasoned, something that's 
cautious, and something that will preserve the integrity of the 
electoral system that we have. And that's why I come to the floor, Mr. 
Speaker, for that purpose.
  And I support the position taken by the ranking member from Michigan 
and my colleagues, although I intend to continue to work with Mr. Holt. 
Another point that I would make is that we do have a disagreement in 
our viewpoint, and that is that I think we should, at the very last 
resort, impose obligations on the States. The States have run this 
electoral process. The Federal Government has a minimal involvement.
  And so my view is, if the States have integrity, we have to be very 
careful because the voters within the States will be determining the 
next leader in the free world. I think the number was just 527 votes in 
Florida made the difference on who the leader of the free world was in 
the year 2000. That integrity is important. We must hold it together.
  But I urge a ``no'' vote on this bill at this time.
  Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I would just like to note 
that this has not been a hurried effort. In fact, we reported out of 
the House Administration Committee the original Holt bill before last 
Easter, Easter of 2007, and have been working with interested parties 
and across the aisle since that time.
  It's worth noting that these changes can happen responsibly and also 
quickly. For example, in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, they're going 
to switch from DREs to optical scan in 7 weeks, before this primary.
  And I would note that the legislature in Iowa has voted, I understand 
the vote was nearly unanimous, to transition from DREs to optical scan, 
and that's going to be done before this November election. So I think 
that this measure would help cities and counties who want to take those 
responsible steps.
  I would yield to the author of the legislation, Mr. Holt, an 
additional minute.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair will note that the gentleman from 
Michigan has 6\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentlewoman from California 
has 6 minutes remaining.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, under this legislation, the States and 
counties still have the responsibility for the mechanics of the 
elections. All we're saying is, if they put in place procedures to make 
them auditable, and procedures to audit the votes, we will assist them 
in the cost.
  There are many things the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. King) said we 
could be dealing with, and, indeed, we are not dealing with questions 
of registration and purging of names on registration lists and absentee 
voting and the openness of the tabulation phase of results. We are just 
talking about what happens in the voting booth, so that each voter will 
be able to verify, on paper, that her vote or his vote is recorded the 
way they intended, and then, those voter verified records be used to 
audit the results. It's that simple.
  I can promise you that if jurisdictions don't take these steps, there 
will be many questions around the country that cannot be resolved. This 
is a simple, straightforward way to take care of it.
  Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Florida, who has considerable voting 
experience, Mr. Mica.
  Mr. MICA. I want to thank Ranking Member Ehlers and others for 
working on this bill.
  I join in opposition to the legislation. First of all, let me say, my 
colleagues, there's nothing more important than the integrity of the 
election process in the United States and confidence that all Americans 
would have in making certain our system of election is secure.
  But let me tell you, folks, this is compounding error and mistake 
Congress made, and here it is on Tax Day, 2008, that we're going to 
commit another two-thirds of a billion dollar mistake.
  I sat on House Administration that oversees elections. I was there in 
2000 when we had the problems in Florida with the hanging chads. We've 
all heard of the hanging chads. And everybody rushed here, and every 
vote's got to count; we've got to spend taxpayer dollars and make sure 
that every vote is counted; and we're going to put in a system, and we 
have to make it look like we're doing something to make certain that 
system's secure.
  Now, we listened to the witnesses and they came before House 
Administration and they told folks that an electronic voting system, 
which would cost billions of dollars to implement, would have the 
possibility of error and just about the same percentage of error if you 
choose a lever, if you use a hanging chad ballot, if you use optical 
scan, if you use a paper ballot. And you can mess up any of those 
elections.
  They told us. And then everybody rushed down. They voted it out of 
committee. We passed it. We spent $2 billion or $3 billion to put in 
place a system that they told us, well, somebody can pull the plug, the 
electronic thing doesn't work. Duh. Somebody can come up with some sort 
of electronic device. Even one of these might set it off and you might 
get some results.
  They told us there might be errors, and they told us they didn't have 
a paper trail. Duh.
  So here we are putting in place the system. On Tax Day, spend another 
two-thirds of a billion dollars. Keep working out there, Americans. 
Send it here because they'll spend it in some dumb fashion, and this 
follows that.
  Now, we do want the system to work, but there are errors in 
everything. You heard them talking about the scan.
  I went down and sat all night and watched the scan voting. It's 
simple. You just take a pen and you fill in the space. My God, I 
couldn't believe, hundreds of people, they put X's all the way around, 
they circled optical scan. They could screw up any kind of a ballot. A 
paper ballot. Actually I'm told that the old levers are probably the 
best, that we took out for $2 billion or $3 billion worth of hard-
earned taxpayer dollars and replaced with these electronic machines 
which now we're coming to correct. But they still have the same rate of 
error.
  I guess it never stops around here. But here we are again spending 
that money on another whim. But we'll do it.
  Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I just want to make a 
couple of comments. In the last several years,

[[Page 6018]]

the United States has spent at least $240 million to make sure that 
democratic elections in other countries met the same standards that 
we're hoping elections will be held to here. And so, obviously, every 
dollar that we have is precious tax money, but I would hope that we 
would be at least as interested in protecting the integrity of the 
elections in America as we are in protecting the integrity of the 
elections in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the like.
  Secondly, I was not a member of the House Administration Committee 
when Mr. Mica, the gentleman from Florida, was. But I was on the 
Florida 13 Task Force, and we reached a conclusion. It was unanimous 
and it was bipartisan, and I don't second-guess them. We had GAO go in 
and they gave us a report, and we accepted that report. But had there 
been a paper trail we wouldn't have had to have the GAO go in and 
examine these machines.
  And I would finally note that the gentleman is right. If you can mess 
it up, it will be messed up. But at least, with a paper ballot, you can 
discern intent. And if somebody circles the name instead of fills it 
in, and there is a recount, you can see what a voter meant to do. You 
cannot see that with an electronic machine.
  So with that, and I understand the points being made, but I would 
hope that we can come together and support this bipartisan bill.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. EHLERS. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Mica).
  Mr. MICA. I didn't get a chance to say this, but there is a quote 
that I think should be part of the Record. And the quote is: ``An 
informed electorate is the cornerstone of democracy and an educated 
electorate.'' And that's what we need to do.
  And they make errors. Folks make errors. They just don't circle one 
and it's very clear. I'd love to bring the ballots here. Sometime I'll 
have to do that to show you how people can mess it up. But an informed 
electorate is the cornerstone of democracy. And, yes, we need to do all 
we can to make certain that they're provided with all the assistance 
from the Federal level to make certain that we have a fair, open, 
honest election.
  Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. We don't have additional speakers. I 
wonder if the gentleman has additional speakers.
  Mr. EHLERS. We have no further speakers. If you have none then I will 
make some concluding remarks.
  I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  We've heard a good deal of discussion on this bill. Some of you may 
recall Parkinson's laws from some years ago in which he commented that 
when there's a debate on a subject, the more the people know, the 
longer the debate. And I suspect we could go on considerably longer if 
we had more of the Members of Congress here simply because all of us 
have experience with elections.
  I would like to point out a few items. First of all, the comments 
about the integrity of the system. I agree totally. The objective 
should be the complete integrity of the system to insure that every 
vote is counted accurately, and that every voter can be assured that 
their vote is not cancelled out by someone who has illegally voted the 
wrong way; in other words, through fraud or through mistakes by the 
machine.
  I believe that the audits that Mr. Holt has proposed are very 
important and should be developed. It should be developed with the help 
of the Secretaries of State and local election officials to develop a 
system that works, so that we can ensure that the count is as accurate 
as possible.
  I also want to comment that the White House also has taken a dim view 
of this. They've issued a SAP this afternoon, somewhat to my surprise, 
that indicates that they oppose this bill and urge Members of the 
Congress to vote against it.
  But I do want to look at this from the historical perspective, and as 
an older person, I've been around a while, and I've seen a lot of 
different elections. Recalling the early history of our country, all 
balloting was with paper. But because there was too much miscounting on 
opportunity for fraud, machines were developed: the iron monsters, as 
they called them, meaning the lever machines. And those were used for 
years, even though their error rate also was note zero. And then we've 
gone to many other voting methods over the years.
  Now we're using high tech approaches with computers, and we have 
encountered some of the same difficulties.
  I am not saying that you can't make a perfect machine. I am saying 
that as long as people are involved in operating them, there are likely 
to be mistakes.
  And one of my classics that I remember is from the presidential 
election in 2004, when in Los Angeles County there were something like 
nine candidates for President listed on the ballot. This was an optical 
scan ballot. Over 3,600 voters crossed through the oval for candidates 
other than President Bush and left his blank.
  Now, how is one to interpret that? Did these voters think they should 
leave the Bush oval blank because that was who they wanted to vote for? 
Or were they saying ``Anyone but the President? Who knows. As long as 
those types of mistakes are possible, they will be made. And we have to 
do our best here to work diligently, with, and I emphasize ``working 
with'' very strongly, working with the local elected officials, the 
State-elected officials, and continue to do as best we can to perfect 
the best possible voting system.
  And with that, I will yield back.
  Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I urge that we pass this 
important legislation today.
  I will confess that I am disappointed that the ranking member is not 
today in support of this measure. We, on the majority side, accepted 
every amendment offered by Republicans in the committee mark-up on this 
bill, and I had hoped and expected that we would be able to continue to 
work together and support this measure on the floor.
  We reported the original Holt bill out of the committee over 1 year 
ago, and in that time, between now and then, we have worked with 
Secretaries of State, the National Association of Counties, disability 
rights groups, voting rights groups, civil rights groups, to try and 
get a measure that could garner broad support across the country. And I 
believe that we have that measure before us today.
  I will say that the White House issuing an SAP today, after a year's 
work, I think, is really bad faith. We have worked very hard, and to 
come out at the last minute is really very unprofessional.
  I'd finally like to say that the dollar amount estimated by the 
Congressional Budget Office is a worst-case scenario. There's no way 
that that would be the full amount.
  But even if it were, I would ask Members to think of this: Isn't the 
American democracy worth as much as the Iraqi or the Pakistani 
democracy?

                              {time}  1445

  Aren't we willing to spend as much to make sure that our precious 
American votes are counted as we are the votes of foreigners in other 
countries? I would hope that as we consider our responsibility as 
Members of Congress to our wonderful America and our wonderful country, 
that the answer to that would be yes and therefore, a ``yes'' on the 
whole bill.
  There have been various quotes made today, but I think back of the 
second Californian to ever be President of the United States, his 
phrase was not used about voting, but it was this: Trust but verify. 
That's what the Holt bill would do. It would trust but verify, and I 
hope that Members today can come together and support the Holt bill.
  I would like to commend once again Congressman Holt for his enormous 
efforts that brought us here today.
  Mrs. CAPPS. Mr. Speaker, as a cosponsor of the Emergency Assistance 
for Secure Elections Act, I rise in strong support of the bill.
  Voting is the most fundamental element of democracy. It is the 
mechanism by which citizens hold their government accountable for its 
actions. This most critical of democratic actions depends, however, on 
voters' confidence that their votes are counted fairly and accurately.

[[Page 6019]]

  Voters have lost this confidence.
  Election after election, year after year, millions of voters cast 
votes not knowing if their votes will count because the machines 
produce no paper records.
  The Help America Vote Act of 2002 was supposed to resolve these 
problems. However, it failed to address several major issues that 
continue to plague the system and undermine the legitimacy of our 
elections.
  This so-called response to the 2000 election debacle in Florida 
failed to implement accountability measures to ensure that every vote 
is cast and counted accurately.
  The Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act would address this 
problem by providing funding for states and counties to implement safe, 
secure and auditable voting systems in time for the 2008 general 
election.
  It would reimburse jurisdictions that choose to convert to paper-
based voting systems. The reimbursements also cover emergency paper 
ballots used in the event of machine failure, and the cost of 
conducting hand-counted audits or hand counting the results of 
elections.
  We must act to restore confidence in our election system. The 
Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act will help restore this 
confidence and help ensure that all votes are counted and recorded 
properly. I urge my colleagues to fulfill their responsibility to 
American voters by voting yes on this critical bill.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 5036, the 
Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act of 2008.
  I think everyone in the chamber today remembers the frustration and 
disbelief we all felt in November 2000 as hundreds of volunteers poured 
into Dade County Florida to oversee the recount of the Presidential 
election. As the future of our nation swayed in the balance, we all 
thought to ourselves, Can this actually be happening in America?
  The answer, unfortunately, was yes. As devastating as that event was, 
I think we learned two very important lessons. The first is that every 
vote really does count. Every person who is eligible must get to the 
polls. The second lesson learned is that our system of elections is 
broken. Changes must be mandated, improvements must be made.
  That is why I am proud to rise in support of H.R. 5036. This bill 
takes real steps to improve the transparency and accuracy of electoral 
process by minimizing the financial burden placed on local governments 
to ensure the accuracy of election results.
  H.R. 5036 fully reimburses jurisdictions that choose to offer paper 
ballots on Election Day. In the 2006 election cycle, we learned that 
electronic voting machines are not always reliable, often 
malfunctioning and creating substantial complications on Election Day. 
H.R. 5036 also subsidizes manual recounts of elections results if basic 
minimum requirements are met. We must provide resources to the states 
to ensure that the elections they conduct are fair and accurate.
  Both provisions provide absolutely necessary funding to alleviate the 
significant burden placed on local and county governments when holding 
elections. This relief is critical to ensure that local government 
entities can protect the legitimacy of election results without 
enduring financial hardship.
  While, I recognize the fact that more must be done, I also believe 
that this bill is a very good start and I want to commend my good 
friend and colleague, Rush Holt, for his leadership on this issue. Even 
a month ago, it appeared that passing this bill was impossible. 
However, thanks to Representative Holt's tireless efforts to work with 
members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, that impossibility 
becomes reality today. America will be a better for place for his 
efforts on this Issue.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, elections are the bedrock of our republic. 
Our capacity to function as a tripartite government of co-equal 
branches rests in the public's assurance that those of us entrusted to 
administer and legislate assumed our offices through free, fair and 
open elections.
  I laud Congressman Rush Holt and his efforts to ensure the integrity 
and accuracy of our voting system. However, today I must rise in 
opposition to H.R. 5036, the Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections 
Act of 2008.
  H.R. 5036 acknowledges that problems exist in our system of voting, 
and that without action now these problems will grow. For this reason 
the legislation has merit. While H.R. 5036 includes a provision to 
reimburse jurisdictions that convert their paperless voting system to 
one that includes a paper trail, it may also include optical scan 
technology. I have serious concerns with optical scan technology and 
its susceptibility to hacks and security breaches. Recent tests and 
research have demonstrated the ease with which a person can manipulate 
the configuration files to change votes. What's more, most of the 
equipment necessary to accomplish this can be purchased off-the-shelf 
at most technology stores.
  Indeed, our voting system needs improvement, but replacing one flawed 
technology with another will do little to garner public faith in the 
electoral process. Let us make comprehensive electoral system reform a 
priority, and let us enact a policy that ensures system integrity, 
system security, and that each and every vote is counted.
  Mrs. JONES of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the 
Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act because I believe it is 
essential that we ensure every American's basic right to vote and to 
have that vote counted.
  Currently, 15 states still use paperless voting machines which have 
been proven to be unreliable and vulnerable to hacking. In the past two 
election cycles, voting machines have malfunctioned and votes have been 
lost forever. Computer scientists across the country have shown how 
easy it is to hack these voting systems.
  This bill will address these problems by providing the states with 
financial backing from the Federal Government in order to convert from 
electronic voting systems to paper ballot voting systems in time for 
the November 2008 elections. The bill also provides emergency paper 
ballots if the jurisdiction uses a direct recording electronic voting 
system which happens to fail.
  Today, 9 percent of the U.S. population records their votes 
electronically. These numbers vary greatly from State to State. Twelve 
percent of Ohio votes are recorded electronically; 80 percent of 
Kentucky voters use electronic ballots. Without an adequate 
confirmation method. mechanical deficiencies could have a drastic 
impact on close elections. This problem must not go unnoticed, and must 
be addressed.
  Considering the tremendous election discrepancies that we have seen 
take place in this country in 2000 and 2004, we know that we are still 
dealing with a flawed system. I believe that the passage of this 
legislation is paramount to ensuring that people throughout this 
country are not disenfranchised when they attempt to exercise their 
right to vote.
  The right to vote is a right every citizen of this country deserves. 
As Members of Congress, we all have an obligation to make sure all of 
our constituents' votes are counted through the most fair and accurate 
means available. The right to vote should not be reserved for just some 
of our constituents, but for all of our constituents. It is for this 
reason that I introduced the Count Every Vote Act of 2007 which seeks 
to provide an all-encompassing solution to a broad range of voting 
irregularities that occurred during the 2004 presidential election. It 
is for the same reason that I urge my colleagues to support the passage 
of H.R. 5036, the Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act of 
2008.
  Mr. HONDA. Mr. Speaker, while I was unfortunately absent for the vote 
on H.R. 5036 due to commitments in my home state of California, I would 
have voted in support of this legislation had I been present. I am 
deeply dismayed that the bill failed to pass by a wide margin.
  As an original cosponsor of H.R. 5036, the Emergency Assistance for 
Secure Elections Act, I thank Congressman Holt for his vigorous efforts 
to provide emergency support to states and counties that wish to ensure 
that all votes are accurately counted through the use of paper ballots. 
This bill would provide assistance to states and counties that 
voluntarily choose to use paper-based voting systems. States would be 
able to seek federal reimbursements for emergency paper ballots that 
are offered in the event of technological failures. The bill would make 
funding available for the development of procedures to conduct hand-
counted audits or to hand-count the results of elections.
  Free and fair elections are fundamental aspects of a representative 
democracy like the United States, and we must provide the necessary 
support to our state and local governments to strengthen the integrity 
of our democracy. In the 2004 election, while widespread usage of 
electronic voting machines helped standardize our nation's voting 
system and prevented some of the problems that occurred with punch-card 
ballots in the 2000 election, there were reports of voting 
irregularities, some of which were due to glitches in electronic voting 
machine software. This is why it is absolutely necessary to make 
available paper receipts that each voter can verify for themselves.
  To this end, I am also a cosponsor of H.R. 811, the Voter Confidence 
and Increased Accessibility Act. The legislation would require voting 
systems to produce a voter-verified paper record suitable for a manual 
audit equivalent or superior to that of a paper ballot box system.

[[Page 6020]]

  A few years ago, I held a town hall meeting on electronic voting at 
Santa Clara University to expand my knowledge and public awareness of 
direct recording electronic (DRE) devices. The program provided much 
insight into the development of DREs but it also left many unanswered 
questions about their security and reliability. Since then, I have 
supported legislation that seeks to ensure a voter verifiable record 
and greater openness in the testing and certification process of DREs.
  Even as secure technology is developed, voter verifiable records will 
sustain the high integrity of our voting processes. It is imperative 
that Congress helps support those states and counties that are willing 
to use paper ballots to strengthen our democracy until electronic 
systems that produce a paper trail are available, and to ensure that 
all American votes cast will be counted.
  Mr. CAPUANO. Mr. Speaker, I rise to share my views on H.R. 5036, the 
Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act.
  As both a Member of the Committee on House Administration which has 
considered this issue for many months and a former mayor who was 
responsible for overseeing elections for many years, I know how 
important it is that people have confidence in their votes. This bill 
is part of an effort to ensure that we improve that confidence, which 
has waned in recent years.
  There are good provisions in this bill. I believe firmly that the 
best way to ensure that votes are cast as intended and counted 
accurately, is to provide paper ballots that the voters themselves 
mark. This bill helps move the Nation in that direction by providing 
optional funding for many localities that wish to switch to paper 
ballots. For this reason, I support it.
  However, there are some shortcomings in this legislation that I feel 
must be stated for the Record. I do not personally believe that it is 
the most effective use of Federal resources to give states funding in 
order for them to add on printers to Direct Recording Electronic 
devices (DREs). I don't believe that ``paper trails'' are an adequate 
substitute for real paper ballots and for this reason, I have concerns 
about giving states the funding to retrofit their DREs rather than 
simply incentivizing the switch to real paper ballots.
  Similarly, I am discouraged that the bill does not allow 
jurisdictions with DREs that produce a paper trail access to Federal 
funds to switch to real paper ballots. Many jurisdictions across the 
country have come to the conclusion that paper ballots, not electronic 
voting machines with paper trails, are the most reliable type of voting 
system. By denying some jurisdictions the Federal resources to make 
that positive switch, the bill fails to reward those who are making the 
commitment to switch to what many believe is the best system.
  However, I am supporting this bill. Because is not overly 
prescriptive, I hope that many jurisdictions consider utilizing its 
positive provisions, should it become law. I look forward to continuing 
to work with my colleagues on the committee and in the full House 
toward a better and more trustworthy vote.
  Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance 
of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Zoe Lofgren) that the House suspend 
the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 5036, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the 
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be 
postponed.

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