[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 154 (2008), Part 17]
[Senate]
[Pages 23525-23532]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                          TRIBUTE TO SENATORS

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today, as one of those who made the 
weighty decision not to seek reelection, to share my most personal 
thoughts--tributes--to my esteemed colleagues who will quietly, humbly, 
and with a deep sense of gratitude to their States, to our Nation, 
bring to a conclusion their public service as U.S. Senators.
  This is a diverse group of Senators. Whether we hail from small 
farms, small cities or, in my case, from major metropolitan areas, we 
bring different backgrounds, different interests. That diversity gives 
the Senate its strength to serve equally all Americans. What we share, 
however, is an unwavering love for our States, our country and for the 
institution of the U.S. Senate.
  We aspire to Winston Churchill's quote: ``We make a living by what we 
get; we make a life by what we give.''
  It has been my privilege, over my 30 years in the Senate, to serve 
with a total of 261 Members. Each, almost, shall be remembered as a 
friend.
  I want to say a few special, heartfelt words about Senator Pete 
Domenici.


                             Pete Domenici

  I first came to know Pete Domenici when I arrived in the Senate in 
1979. He beat me here by 6 years, and now has served New Mexico with 
distinction for 36 years. Pete is a veritable renaissance man: baseball 
player, math teacher, lawyer, city commissioner, senator and, most 
importantly, a loving husband, father and grandfather.
  Senator Domenici made his mark with his leadership on fiscal and 
energy issues, especially with his influence in promoting clean, 
carbon-free, nuclear energy and moving America forward now that we have 
the reality of an energy shortage and a mission to lessen America's 
dependence on imported energy. America must move forward by increasing 
and enhancing its capability to develop nuclear powerplants. At one 
time in my career, I was privileged to be secretary of the Navy, and 
during that period, America had, either at sea or in port, some 70-plus 
naval vessels powered by nuclear plants, and we had a safety record 
second to none. That can, and will, be duplicated with our growing 
domestic programs.
  A hallmark of my dear friend Pete, whom we sometimes call a ``grizzly 
old cuss,'' is how he so often expresses his feelings for his fellow 
Senators by saying, ``I love you, brother.'' Pete, we return that deep 
respect and affection.


                              Chuck Hagel

  Senator Chuck Hagel has served his native Nebraska and his country 
with true heroism. When I was privileged to serve in the Department of 
the Navy during the war in Vietnam, Chuck Hagel, together with his 
brother, both served with courage in the same Army unit in South 
Vietnam. He was awarded the Purple Heart not once but twice for his 
heroism and sacrifice in combat leadership.
  His career has spanned the spectrum from public servant to 
entrepreneur, and this has given him a perspective on the world and 
global affairs, as well as of Main Streets in the hometowns and cities 
of his State.
  Senator Hagel will be remembered for his efforts on behalf of his 
fellow veterans and men and women in uniform, together with their 
families. At one time he served as president of the USO.
  One of his proudest achievements will surely be his work with my 
colleague from Virginia, a former highly decorated marine, Senator Jim 
Webb, who also served in Vietnam. The two of them started a very tough 
assignment, and that was to rewrite the existing G.I. bill. And along 
the way, two ``old-timers,'' both World War II veterans--Senator 
Lautenberg and I--enlisted in their ranks as cosponsors.
  Our goal was to try and give to today's generation of men and women 
in uniform a level and diversity of benefits that approaches what the 
World War II generation received from a grateful nation at the 
conclusion of that conflict. The G.I. bill at that time enabled any 
soldier, sailor or airman--and there were up to 16 million who served 
in World War II--to go to almost any university or college of his or 
her choice, and the funds were nearly sufficient to fund the costs for 
tuition, room and board, and school books.
  But through the ensuing years, the successive G.I. bills were not 
quite as fulsome; they did not keep pace with the rising cost of 
education. Prior to the Webb bill, today's generation was barely able 
to get enough funds to attend educational institutions in their home 
States, let alone some of America's better-known educational 
institutions. This bill recognizes the great contributions of our 
military men and women and increases significantly the G.I. bill 
benefits. It will make a great difference in the lives of so many of 
this generation, a generation that I believe is in every way equal to 
the ``Greatest Generation'' of World War II, for it faces even greater 
challenges as the uncertainty of threats and the advance of complexity 
of weapons face them today in a growing number of places worldwide.
  I so admire this strong American, Chuck Hagel, who symbolizes ``duty, 
honor, country.''
  In public service, his compass is precise; for he always follows the 
needle as it points to what course of action is ``best for America.''


                              wayne allard

  I turn now to Senator Wayne Allard, with whom I have been privileged 
to serve on the Armed Services Committee, who told his fellow 
Coloradoans that if they chose him as their senator, he would only 
serve 2 terms. He kept his word, just as he has honorably kept his word 
to his constituents on many issues. I admire this senator and how well 
he has served his state.
  This veterinarian and small-business owner has been a forceful 
advocate for military preparedness, for increased access to health care 
and for cutting spending, leading by example by often returning some of 
his own office's funds to the U.S. Treasury. In a sense, he sent them 
back to his constituents.
  He was also willing to roll up his sleeves and take on the tough task 
of overseeing the construction and budgeting, along with other senators 
and

[[Page 23526]]

members of the House of Representatives, on the new Capitol Visitors 
Center. I might add, as a footnote, that when I was chairman of the 
Rules Committee, I co-sponsored some of the earliest pieces of 
legislation to provide for this center. Senator Allard can be proud of 
his efforts, which will serve present and future Americans who travel 
from afar to their nation's capital to learn about their government, 
the longest-surviving democratic republic in world history.
  I vividly recall journeying to Colorado, home State of one of my 
children, to travel through a magnificent area of the State with his 
lovely wife and children on behalf of his campaign to get elected to 
the U.S. Senate. Those trips are memories I have and will keep safely 
tucked away.
  I am proud to say I have come to know each of these fine men. And I 
firmly believe that this is but yet another beginning in all of our 
lives, for, to quote Churchill again, ``the chain of destiny can only 
be grasped one link at a time.''
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, our relationship with India is very 
important and I fully support developing closer strategic ties with 
India. I had the opportunity to visit India earlier this year, and I 
returned with a renewed appreciation of the vital relationship between 
our two countries.
  One of the topics I discussed with senior Indian government officials 
was the proposed U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement that we 
are considering today. This agreement does a great deal more than bring 
our two countries closer; it dramatically shifts 30 years of 
nonproliferation policy and seriously undermines our efforts to limit 
the spread of nuclear weapons. If we pass this legislation today, we 
will be making America--and the world--less safe.
  The cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, is based on the central premise that 
non-nuclear weapons states agree not to try to acquire nuclear weapons 
in exchange for cooperation on peaceful civilian nuclear energy 
programs. India chose not to take part in this grand bargain and 
instead decided to become a nuclear weapons state. That is India's 
sovereign right. But it is our sovereign right--and our longstanding 
policy--to not cooperate with any state that chooses to acquire nuclear 
weapons.
  In fact, signatories to the NPT--including the United States--are 
specifically prohibited from assisting, encouraging, or inducing any 
nonsignatory to develop nuclear weapons. And yet it has been made clear 
by numerous experts and even by officials of this administration that 
this agreement could allow India to expand its weapons program by 
freeing up domestically produced nuclear materials.
  If the Senate passes this bill, we will be undermining the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the international nonproliferation regime, 
and U.S. national security. This agreement could fuel an arms race that 
would have direct implications for regional stability--a particularly 
worrisome outcome given the history of turbulence in the region. Given 
the gravity of this issue, I am extremely disappointed that the 
Congress is rushing consideration of the agreement--without time to 
consider the most relevant intelligence, without testimony from 
independent experts, and quite likely in violation of the Hyde Act.
  As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence 
Committees, I have had a chance to study this issue closely. Over the 
past 2 years, I have spoken with a range of individuals from all sides: 
senior Bush administration officials, business groups, nonproliferation 
and arms control experts, senior Indian officials, and concerned 
constituents in my home state of Wisconsin. I have also reviewed the 
supporting classified documents--something I hope all my colleagues 
have also done. After reviewing those documents, I remain deeply 
concerned about how this agreement will impact our national security.
  I laid my concerns last Congress when we first considered this issue. 
Since then, little has been done to address my core concerns. The 
threat of nuclear weapons to the United States, and the spread of these 
weapons and the material needed to make them, are among the gravest 
dangers that our country faces. By passing this legislation, we are 
weakening, not strengthening the international regime created to 
monitor and restrict their proliferation. The United States, as a 
signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, should be working to 
strengthen the international treaties and regimes that have been 
designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. By passing this 
agreement in its current format we are doing exactly the opposite.
  This deal will not only undermine the nonproliferation regime, but it 
may also indirectly benefit India's weapons program. Two weeks ago, at 
a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Secretary Burns 
acknowledged that there can be no way to guarantee that cooperating 
with India's civilian energy program will not indirectly benefit its 
weapons program. And yet despite this frank response, supporters of 
this bill are determined to rush it though Congress. I am concerned 
that Pakistan could feel the need to respond to India's enhanced 
capacity by increasing its own production of nuclear materials, setting 
off an arms race in South Asia. Besides regional instability, there is 
another danger to increased Pakistani nuclear stockpiles: the risk that 
al-Qaida could obtain such weapons. This threat is real and should not 
be ignored.
  In addition to these serious national security concerns, there are 
legitimate procedural ones. This bill appears not to meet the 
requirements of the legislation Congress overwhelmingly adopted to 
authorize the agreement, the Hyde Act. I opposed the Hyde Act because I 
didn't think it went far enough--now it turns out the administration 
does not even feel bound by it. To give just one example, the Hyde Act 
required that any technologies or materials transferred pursuant to 
this agreement must be maintained under safeguards forever. Indian 
officials have balked at this requirement and indicated that they would 
take materials out of safeguards if their fuel supply was interrupted. 
That means that if India tests a nuclear device and we cut off future 
trade, India could turn around and use all of the reactors and fuel we 
have provided for its weapons program, just as it did in 1974. The Bush 
administration couldn't be troubled to even get a promise from India 
that it would honor the safeguards and this legislation does nothing to 
address this problem.
  In late August the 45 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG, 
met in Vienna to discuss whether they should overturn 30 years of 
precedent and open up nuclear trade with India despite the lack of 
comprehensive safeguards on India's nuclear facilities. While some NSG 
members attempted to reduce the negative impact this change will 
inevitably have on our ability to prevent the spread of sensitive 
nuclear materials, in the end they were unsuccessful. In the face of 
the Bush administration's significant pressure for a ``clean'' 
exemption, there wasn't much they could do.
  This undertaking by the Bush administration is particularly troubling 
in light of the recent report by the Institute for Science and 
International Security, ISIS, which indicates that the U.S. Government 
has not devoted sufficient attention to ensuring that India adequately 
protects sensitive nuclear and nuclear-related information. If this 
report is even partially accurate, we should all be gravely concerned. 
Thanks to our efforts, India is now eligible to buy advanced enrichment 
and reprocessing technologies. If these technologies are ever leaked, 
our ability to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism could be greatly 
diminished.
  With everything else going on right now it is clear there has not 
been adequate time to review the agreement and its supporting 
documents. Instead, we are ramming this through Congress so we can hand 
the Bush administration a victory--regardless of the threat it poses to 
our national security.
  Many of my colleagues have said that this agreement will bring India 
into the mainstream but that appears to be

[[Page 23527]]

wishful thinking. Why should India sign the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty or stop producing weapons grade material if it now has access to 
all the technology and know-how it could need? India can now enjoy 
almost all the benefits afforded under the NPT, regardless of the fact 
that it is still not a signatory.
  Proponents of nuclear trade argue that because certain Indian 
facilities will be placed under safeguards, this agreement will inhibit 
proliferation. This is not true. The purpose of safeguards is to 
prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons programs. By 
providing India new reactors and materials, this agreement frees up 
domestic resources for India's weapons program. Rather than bringing 
India into the ``nuclear mainstream,'' this deal could enable the 
expansion of its weapons program.
  I am pleased to cosponsor the Dorgan-Bingaman amendment that would 
ensure that the United States cuts off trade with India in the wake of 
nuclear tests and that we sanction any other nation that continues such 
trade. I hope the Senate will adopt it, and I applaud the efforts of my 
colleagues to improve this bill. I offered an amendment in committee 
that would have helped close the loophole in the nonproliferation 
regime created by the NSG exemption, and I was disappointed that this 
amendment was defeated. However, after careful review, I have come to 
the conclusion that even if all of these improvements were adopted, 
this deal would be fatally flawed.
  Passing this bill will undermine international nonproliferation 
standards, potentially encourage a disastrous regional arms race and 
threaten our country's security. I intend to vote against this 
agreement and urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for 
the legislation approving the United States--India Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreement.
  While I have concerns about this agreement's impact on the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime and the speed with which it has come to the 
floor for a vote, I have come to the conclusion that it is in the best 
interests of the United States and our relationship with India and, 
with vigorous oversight, will help strengthen our nuclear 
nonproliferation efforts.
  This agreement has wide bipartisan support. The Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee reported this legislation favorably on a 19-2 vote. 
Last Saturday, the House approved this agreement by a vote of 298 to 
117 and I am hopeful the Senate will follow suit tonight.
  While far from perfect, I believe this agreement will mark a first 
step towards bringing India into the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
  For years, India and the United States have failed to take advantage 
of our shared values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in 
developing a closer partnership.
  I am hopeful this agreement will serve as a catalyst for solidifying 
relations with the world's largest democracy in a critical part of the 
world and enhance U.S.-India cooperation on a number of pressing 
issues: global warming, the war on terror, and stability in South Asia.
  I do not take this vote lightly. As a U.S. Senator, I have worked 
hard to stop the development of new nuclear weapons and strengthen our 
nuclear nonproliferation efforts. I have introduced legislation calling 
for a strengthened Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. I have fought 
against the research and development of new nuclear weapons like the 
robust nuclear Earth penetrator and the reliable replacement warhead 
program. I have secured additional funding to remove vulnerable nuclear 
materials around the world. I have supported efforts to accelerate 
Nunn-Lugar threat reduction programs.
  Because of my commitment to nuclear nonproliferation efforts, I 
initially approached plans for a U.S.-India nuclear cooperation 
agreement with some skepticism: 8 of India's 22 nuclear reactors--
including India's fast breeder reactors, which can produce massive 
amounts of plutonium for nuclear weapon--will be classified for 
military uses and thus will remain outside of International Atomic 
Energy Agency safeguards. India will retain the right to designate 
future nuclear reactors as ``military'' and not subject to 
international safeguards. India will continue to manufacture fissile 
material for nuclear weapons and has not signed the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty.
  Nevertheless, I supported the Hyde Act of 2006 which authorized the 
President to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement with India 
because it included provisions which would help preserve the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime.
  Under the terms of that bill any nuclear cooperation agreement will 
be terminated if India conducts a nuclear test, proliferates nuclear 
weapons or nuclear materials, or breaks its commitments to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency; the President must determine that 
India is meeting its nonproliferation commitments; the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group must decide by consensus and according to its rules to 
open nuclear trade with India; the export of any equipment, materials, 
or technology related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of 
spent nuclear fuel, or the production of heavy water is prohibited; the 
President must create a program to monitor the end use of items 
exported to India to ensure that they are not diverted to nonpeaceful 
activities; and no action may be taken to violate U.S. obligations 
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  The question now before us is whether the agreement negotiated by the 
Bush administration conforms with the Hyde Act and U.S. nuclear 
nonproliferation efforts.
  I understand the serious questions that have been raised by many 
nuclear nonproliferation experts and my colleagues about critical parts 
of this agreement. By opening trade in civil nuclear fuel and 
technologies, will this agreement indirectly benefit India's nuclear 
weapons program by freeing up domestic resources for military purposes? 
Does India agree with the administration that, under U.S. law, if India 
breaks its moratorium and tests a nuclear weapon U.S. nuclear trade 
will be terminated? Will our partners in the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
follow suit? Why has India not filed a declaration with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency of its civil nuclear facilities that 
will be subject to international safeguards as required by the Hyde 
Act? Why did the exemption for India approved by the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group not include guidelines baring transfer of sensitive nuclear 
technologies to states, like India, who have not signed the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty?
  I believe the legislation now before us addresses many of these 
concerns. It requires the President to certify that the agreement is 
consistent with our obligations as a party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and will not help India acquire or build nuclear 
weapons; states that it is the policy of the United States that, in the 
event nuclear trade between India and the United States is suspended, 
such as following a Indian nuclear test, the United States will work to 
prevent the transfer of nuclear technologies and materials from other 
members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group or any other source. It also 
requires the President to certify that the safeguards agreement between 
India and the International Atomic Energy Agency has come into force 
and India has filed a declaration of its civil nuclear facilities that 
will be subject to those safeguards before nuclear trade can begin. It 
also requires the President to certify that it is the policy of the 
United States to work with the other members of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group to restrict the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies 
relating to the enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent nuclear 
fuel.
  And while I appreciate the assurances from the administration that, 
in accordance with U.S. law, nuclear trade with India would cease in 
the event a nuclear test, I will support an amendment by Senator Dorgan 
and Senator Bingaman to make this action clear.

[[Page 23528]]

  As I indicated before, I would have preferred more time to debate 
this critical agreement. Yet I am also conscious of the fact that if we 
had used the full 30 days to consider this agreement, we would be 
presented with a simple up or down vote on a one sentence resolution 
approving the agreement.
  I appreciate the fact that we have the opportunity with this 
legislation to lock in additional requirements and oversight of U.S.-
Indian nuclear trade.
  U.S.-Indian relations have come a long ways since the days of the 
Cold War. We have overcome distrust and skepticism and have begun to 
build a fruitful, mutually beneficial relationship between the world's 
largest democracy and the world's oldest democracy.
  Whatever the problems we will face in the global arena in the next 
century, we will need to work with India.
  By approving this legislation, we will not only open the door to the 
trade in nuclear materials and nuclear technology--and provide new 
opportunities for U.S. businesses--we will open the door to closer 
cooperation on issues vital to U.S. national security interests in 
South Asia and around the world.
  This is not the end of our efforts to bring India into the nuclear 
nonproliferation mainstream. This is one step that should be followed 
by close congressional oversight and robust and sustained American 
diplomacy.
  I urge my colleagues to support the bill.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise to express my opposition to the 
United States-India agreement on nuclear energy.
  The agreement states it is intended for cooperation on the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy and for other purposes. It is the phrase ``for 
other purposes'' that is most troubling. As I have seen over the years, 
it is always prudent that one requests all of the specific details of 
any agreement before approving such a deal. And the details of this 
agreement are most disturbing.
  If you agree with me that the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction is one of the greatest threats to humanity's continued 
existence then you should agree that preventing proliferation should be 
one of the cornerstones of our foreign and national security policy. 
Thus, there are only two reasons to support this agreement: first, it 
would enhance our international efforts to prevent proliferation, and 
second, it would prevent further testing of nuclear weapons on the 
South Asian subcontinent.
  Unfortunately, this agreement does neither. Instead it enhances the 
risk of proliferation and ensures additional testing of nuclear weapons 
in South Asia.
  This agreement undermines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, 
and other agreements that have been essential to our efforts for 
decades to prevent states from developing nuclear weapons. India is one 
of three states that has never signed the NPT, nor has it signed the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CTBT. Nothing in this agreement requires 
India to do either. In effect, India will gain all the rights of a 
nuclear state and bear none of the responsibilities. Nothing in this 
agreement requires India to commit to eventual disarmament--an 
objective that even the United States, as a treaty signatory, accepts. 
It is possible to conceive of an end-state in which the United States 
and Russia disarm, but, in the case of India, there is nothing in this 
agreement that requires India to do so. This agreement would allow 
India to maintain a nuclear arsenal in perpetuity.
  As of today, the United States is a signatory to the CTBT--although 
the Senate has not yet ratified the treaty--but India is not. The 
United States has agreed to greater safeguards and constraints on its 
nuclear weapons program than has India. This is an extraordinary 
exception that the Senate is being asked to accept.
  Equally important, this agreement undermines our efforts to contain 
the spread of nuclear weapons to countries of concern. Right now those 
countries are North Korea and Iran. We do not know what adversaries 
tomorrow will bring. Even so, our concerns over the Iranian and North 
Korean clandestine nuclear programs are sufficient to warrant 
disapproving this exception for India's clandestine program. When the 
United States is trying to encourage Iran and North Korea to scale down 
and eliminate their nuclear weapons programs, to enter into a 
cooperation agreement with India for nuclear energy purposes would be 
sending the wrong message.
  I wish to remind my colleagues that the United States has been 
arguing that the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, and the 
United Nations Security Council should impose stiffer sanctions on Iran 
and North Korea. In addition, pending before the Senate is H.R. 7112, 
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 
2008. This bill would place new sanctions on Iran. I support such 
sanctions, and I support similar efforts to establish accountability to 
the India program.
  Another added concern is that India might support Iran's secret 
weapons program. Already a number of companies in India have been 
sanctioned under U.S. export control law for providing sensitive 
missile technologies to Iran. India's export control regime remains 
deeply flawed. We have a history of this administration not disclosing 
intelligence information that is derogatory to their argument. In the 
case of India, the administration did not report export control 
violations of Indian companies until critical votes had occurred in the 
House.
  What assurances have we received from the administration that they 
are not withholding critical information at this time from the 
Congress? The Senate has received a classified annex to the public 
Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, NPAS, but I would ask, is 
that document complete? Does it address all the critical questions? I 
would suggest to my colleagues that, until there is certainty that all 
the answers to these serious questions are satisfactory; it is better 
to vote no on this agreement.
  Nothing in this agreement would prevent India from further testing of 
nuclear weapons. Some would argue that it makes it certain that India 
will continue testing, and, under this legislation, India can continue 
to receive nuclear materials from other countries even if the United 
States were to suspend any that it is providing. I believe that it is 
unlikely that the United States will find much of a new market for its 
nuclear products should this agreement be approved. India has a history 
of trading with Russia, France, and others in this area, and trade with 
these countries will, in the estimation of many experts, prosper.
  As Michael Krepon, a noted analyst of the Pakistani and Indian 
nuclear programs, has observed, ``The upgrading of New Delhi's nuclear 
forces will most certainly require more nuclear testing.'' In the case 
of a test, I believe that India will argue that it was forced to in 
order to ensure the safety of its nuclear arsenal and India's nuclear 
trading partners will argue against sanctions in the name of preserving 
what few Indian nuclear facilities remain under IAEA safeguards.
  India officials have made it abundantly clear that they maintain the 
right to test. India's Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, said, ``Let 
me hence reiterate once again that a decision to undertake a future 
nuclear test would be our sovereign decision, one that rests solely 
with our government.'' He noted ``We want to keep the option [of 
conducting further nuclear tests] open if the situation demands. If the 
international situation requires, we may have to [conduct nuclear 
tests].'' M.K. Narayanan, a member of India's Atomic Energy Commission, 
observed that ``This deal deals primarily with civil nuclear 
cooperation. There is no reference here to the event of a test. If 
there is a test, we come to that later on.''
  If India does test, Pakistan may retaliate. As Pakistan has already 
indicated, it would match India step by nuclear step. In April 2006, 
Pakistan's National Command Authority stated: ``In view of the fact the 
[U.S.-India] agreement would enable India to produce a significant 
quantity of fissile material

[[Page 23529]]

and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA 
expressed firm resolve that our credible minimum deterrence 
requirements will be met.'' There is already a nuclear and missile 
weapons race in South Asia. This agreement will only accelerate it, and 
nuclear tests will fan the flames even hotter. Is this prospect in the 
interest of the United States? Has a National Intelligence Estimate 
concluded that such a scenario would enhance our national security?
  I return to the questions I posed at the beginning of my statement: 
does this agreement enhance our international efforts to prevent 
proliferation, and secondly, will it prevent the further testing of 
nuclear weapons on the South Asian subcontinent? The answer in both 
instances is a resounding no, and I urge my colleagues to oppose this 
legislation.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to speak in 
support of H.R. 7081, the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation 
Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act.
  I had the privilege to be serving as the Democratic leader in the 
U.S. Senate in late 2006 when, on an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis, 
we passed the Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation 
Promotion Act, which laid out the specific steps that needed to be 
taken in order for our country to achieve a civilian nuclear agreement 
with the nation of India. At the time, I felt it was important for the 
Congress to pass the Hyde Act as a critical step in further 
strengthening the growing political, economic, and security partnership 
between the United States and India. Today, 2 years later, the Indian 
government has acted to meet the guidelines set forth in that piece of 
legislation, allowing us to consider H.R. 7081.
  After our two countries reached a consensus on the text of the 
nuclear cooperation pact this past July, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh faced a tough domestic battle to approve the agreement. However, 
his government worked diligently to form a coalition of supporters for 
the nuclear deal, and it eventually passed the Indian Parliament. On 
Saturday, in the House, Democrats and Republicans approved H.R. 7081 by 
a landslide: 298 to 117. Now, we are here today to take the next step 
in approving this agreement and sending it to the President.
  As I did back in late 2006, I would like to remind my fellow Senators 
how important it is that we approve this measure to expand civilian 
nuclear cooperation with India. For much of the cold war, America's 
relationship with India--a leader in the movement of nonaligned 
countries--was too often characterized by ambivalence on both sides. 
But in the nearly 20 years since the walls that separated East from 
West have come down, our two countries have enjoyed an unprecedented 
level of engagement with one another that has proven truly beneficial 
for both parties. And the citizens of our two countries are 
increasingly interconnected through business, educational, and social 
linkages.
  India has emerged as one of the world's most important leaders of the 
21st century. India has experienced significant growth in the 
technological and service sectors, foreign investment has ballooned, 
and India has become a global center for cultural and artistic 
expression. The entrepreneurial spirit of the Indian people, coupled 
with their strong commitment to democratic values, has formed the 
backbone of a society whose potential for growth knows few boundaries.
  By voting for this agreement, the Senate will cement the gains that 
we have achieved in our bilateral relationship and open two of the 
world's top scientific communities to the type of civilian nuclear 
cooperation befitting our strong alliance.
  I would like to thank my colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee who, in conjunction with the Department of State, took the 
time to examine this agreement over the past 2 weeks. I am equally 
grateful to Senators Dorgan and Bingaman for their willingness to work 
with the Senate leadership on this important bill. As these two 
Senators, and others, have pointed out, we cannot undermine the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime's decades of successes, and I appreciate the 
goals of the Dorgan-Bingaman amendment to ensure the strength of our 
continued commitments to the nonproliferation regime. I certainly 
understand the concerns expressed in their amendment, but I believe 
that this historic agreement provides the necessary safeguards and 
oversight to ensure that our nonproliferation objectives will be 
respected.
  I also am heartened by the repeated public and private commitments by 
officials of the U.S. Government to upholding nonproliferation. Because 
of Senator Dorgan and Bingaman's work, the Secretary of State stated in 
a letter to me today, which has been entered into the record, a clear 
commitment in the event of a nuclear test. Secretary Rice's letter 
states: ``We've been very clear with the Indians . . . should India 
test, as it has agreed not to do, or should India in any way violate 
the IAEA safeguard[s] agreements to which it would be adhering, the 
deal, from our point of view, would at that point be off.'' With this 
commitment in hand, I am reluctant to vote for an amendment that I feel 
might jeopardize the important progress we have made over the past few 
years in securing this deal with the Government of India. The strong 
and growing partnership between India and the United States must move 
forward, and I am proud that Senate passage of H.R. 7081 tonight will 
further deepen this partnership.
  In closing, I would like to remind my friends in the Chamber that the 
United States is the proud home to a large and vibrant community of 
Indian-Americans--my State of Nevada being no exception. America is a 
country that was built on the strength of our immigrants, and the 
contributions of the nearly 3 million Indian Americans currently living 
in the United States have enriched our society immeasurably. We in the 
Senate have a tremendous opportunity to show them our commitment to 
improving relations with the country of their ancestry. With that, I 
urge my colleagues to support this landmark agreement and vote to 
expand civilian nuclear cooperation between our great country and the 
world's largest democracy.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, India has over 1 billion people and a 
rapidly growing economy. They recognize the need to provide electricity 
that does not increase air pollution or greenhouse gases.
  With this agreement we can help export U.S. technology and safeguards 
to monitor and support India's inevitable nuclear expansion or ignore 
India's growth as a nuclear power as we have for the past 30 years.
  This agreement is good for the U.S. economy, good for international 
nuclear safeguards, and good for the environment.
  As a rapidly growing economy, India will see an increased need for 
electricity over the coming decades. As India--and the world--seeks to 
find ways to increase generation while reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, nuclear power will continue to grow. The civilian nuclear 
agreement with India will allow us to help export U.S. technology to 
monitor this expansion and will facilitate a global approach to the 
challenges of climate change.
  India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, yet 
they have agreed to inspections by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency.
  This will improve our ability to monitor and protect against 
proliferation of nuclear material.
  India's growing civilian nuclear program will now be subject to 
international inspections.
  India would like to cooperate with the United States in developing 
safer nuclear technology consistent with the administration's goals.
  From a practical standpoint, this agreement will increase 
inspections, verify compliance, and encourage cooperation on new 
technology.
  I would also point out that this agreement has the support of the 
world's leading nonproliferation watchdog, Mohammed El Baradei, 
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

[[Page 23530]]

  He said, ``this agreement is an important step towards satisfying 
India's growing need for energy. It would also bring India closer as an 
important partner in the nonproliferation regime.'' He went on to say, 
``It would be a step forward toward universalization of the 
international safeguards regime.''
  I am of the belief that we need to advance the goals of the Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty by opening up cooperation and transparency in 
India. Under this agreement, the United States and India will expand 
the use of safeguards on critical nuclear technology and processes in 
that country--something that is beyond our reach today.
  India has developed its nuclear program for the past three decades 
and has not exported material or technology. However, there are strong 
and powerful political forces within India that would like to disclose 
less and make fewer sites subject to civilian inspection. This 
agreement subjects most of India's reactors to civilian inspection, 
including all of the breeder reactors. I believe if we reject this 
package, it will be years before we are able to negotiate another deal, 
and it is unlikely to provide as much openness and transparency as we 
have today.
  With regard to the amendment offered by Senators Dorgan and 
Bingaman--two Members for whom I have enormous respect--I believe this 
amendment is duplicative and would only serve to delay, if not derail, 
this important agreement.
  This administration has been very clear that India would face severe 
consequences if they tested another nuclear device. Also, this language 
duplicates the export controls and reporting requirements of Sections 
103, 104 and 105 of the Hyde Act.
  I do not believe this amendment will provide any additional 
protection or controls that are not already in place today, so I must 
recommend my colleagues oppose this amendment and adopt the India 
civilian nuclear agreement without changes.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, over the years it has become more and more 
apparent that two great democracies, the United States and India, are 
well suited for not only a partnership but also a friendship. Our 
cooperation could mean not just increased economic opportunities for 
both nations but also the opportunity for the United States and India 
to join together to spread the fundamental principles of freedom, 
democracy, tolerance, and the rule of law throughout the world.
  As a founder and cochair of the Senate India Caucus, I have had the 
privilege to work closely with Indian officials, Indian Americans, and 
many other friends of India here in the United States to help promote 
the already flourishing relationship between our two countries. There 
is no clearer evidence of this great friendship than the revolutionary 
civilian nuclear agreement before us, which the House recently passed 
and we will vote on today.
  This landmark agreement represents the latest example of the United 
States and India, the world's largest democracy, working together on 
issues of mutual benefit. It will bring about an unprecedented level of 
cooperation between us, helping India to meet its growing energy 
demands, while forging new economic opportunities for everyone 
involved.
  The initiative will serve both the interests of the United States and 
the interests of India, with its more than 1 billion citizens. In light 
of its track record as a responsible actor on nonproliferation issues, 
India is an appropriate and worthy partner in this historic deal. The 
agreement will pave the way for cooperative efforts in peaceful 
civilian nuclear power, while simultaneously addressing concerns about 
nuclear proliferation.
  I understand well the need for careful monitoring to protect against 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and I am pleased with the 
safeguards contained in this agreement. But as the nation of India 
continues to grow, their need for new, clean, and affordable energy 
sources grows as well.
  Helping India develop a safe and responsible nuclear industry will 
give its people the resources they need to grow their economy and 
strengthen their nation, while helping America's nuclear industry in 
the process.
  Most importantly, if we do nothing, the people of India will have no 
option but to look elsewhere for nuclear assistance. That would be 
unfortunate for both nations. We must remain a strong partner for 
India, not just in the area of civil nuclear cooperation but also on 
larger geopolitical matters.
  If we approve this long-overdue agreement, we will send a strong 
message that India and the United States stand together as friends to 
face even the most difficult and pressing issues of our time. As we 
look ahead to the future, each of our nations will do so with the 
confidence that it has a friend, ready to work together.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am very pleased that the Senate has the 
opportunity to vote on the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation 
Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act and to finally approve 
the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States 
and India. This bill will seize the opportunity to build on the 
foundation laid by President Bill Clinton and cement a new, cooperative 
relationship with India, the world's largest democracy.
  Two years ago, Chairman Lugar and I worked with the administration to 
enact legislation that changed 30 years of U.S. non-proliferation 
policy. We agreed to let the administration negotiate and submit to 
Congress a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with India, despite 
the fact that India has a nuclear weapons program. That wasn't easy. It 
took soul-searching and compromise on the part of many Members of the 
Senate regarding the standards for such an agreement and for U.S. 
policy.
  Since the President's submittal of the proposed Agreement three weeks 
ago, Senator Dodd and Senator Lugar have worked hard with the other 
Members of the Foreign Relations Committee, the chairman of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives Howard Berman, the 
ranking Republican member of that committee, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and 
with the administration, to forge a bipartisan compromise on this 
important and complex issue. Senator Dodd and Senator Lugar especially 
deserve a great deal of thanks for all the efforts that have been 
required of them to bring this bill, and this historic agreement, to 
this point.
  Enactment of this bill will help the U.S.-India relationship grow, 
while advancing India's ability to meet its energy needs in a way that 
fits within the cooperation framework Congress has worked so hard to 
establish. It will help ensure that the agreement and any exports that 
flow from it will be consistent with U.S. law and our national security 
interests, by adding to the tools that the Congress and future 
administrations will have to keep watch over this agreement.
  I look forward to the passage of this bill, its enactment into law, 
and the beginning of a stronger relationship between our two great 
democracies.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I rise today to express my opposition to 
the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy.
  I do not feel any better about this agreement than I did when the 
Senate passed the Hyde Act back in November 2006. At that time, I 
strongly felt that the administration was giving up more than it was 
getting in return, and that India was essentially being rewarded for 
its continued failure to join the nonproliferation mainstream and sign 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  Today, I remain particularly concerned about two factors--the 
possibility that this deal will free up additional fissile material for 
India's nuclear weapons program and India's continued military 
cooperation with Iran.
  While I am pleased that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
included language in the legislation requiring the President to certify 
that approving the agreement is consistent with our

[[Page 23531]]

obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty not to assist or 
encourage India to produce nuclear weapons I am afraid that this does 
not go far enough.
  Some experts believe that this deal could allow India to vastly 
increase its production of nuclear weapons from an estimated 6 to 10 
per year to several dozen a year, touching off an arms race in a region 
that is already facing significant security challenges.
  I simply do not understand how the United States could champion a 
deal that rewards a country for producing nuclear weapons outside of 
the NPT at the same time we are trying so hard to get Iran and North 
Korea to give up their pursuit of illicit nuclear programs.
  I also remain concerned about India's continued relationship with 
Iran, including its military relationship.
  In 2006, Defense News reported that Iranian warships visited a port 
in the Indian city of Kochi to participate in a military training 
program. In 2007--nearly a year later--Defense News again reported on 
the military relationship between Iran and India, citing an agreement 
between the two nations to form a joint defense working group.
  This continued military-to-military cooperation is particularly 
troublesome as Iran continues its reckless support of international 
terrorism and continues to enrich uranium in defiance of the United 
Nations Security Council--making the Middle East an infinitely more 
dangerous place.
  Furthermore, Iran has supported Shiite militias in Baghdad who have 
in turn murdered American troops. It has also continued its support for 
Hezbollah and Hamas, and Iran's President has denied the Holocaust and 
threatened to ``wipe Israel off the map.''
  Let me be clear--I value strong United States-India ties, and 
appreciate that it is in the United States interest that these ties are 
deepened.
  But I regret that the Bush administration was unable to negotiate a 
better deal with India. Unfortunately the deal now before us has 
significant shortcomings that cannot be overlooked.
  This is why I must vote against this bill today.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I will vote against H.R. 7081, a bill to 
approve the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy. This agreement represents a major shift in U.S. 
nonproliferation policy, with widespread ramifications for regional and 
global security, yet it is being rushed through the Congress with 
unseemly haste and reckless disregard for the deliberative process 
outlined for such agreements in the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. There is no 
need for this rush to judgment; far from it, the Senate and the Nation 
would be better served, in my opinion, to put this off until the heat 
and fury of the election season has passed and we can give this 
agreement the prudent consideration that it merits.
  The world recognizes India as an economic and a nuclear power. Its 
growing economy, large population and soaring energy requirements make 
nuclear power generation an attractive option. However, we cannot 
address assistance for India's electrical power needs without also 
considering that India is a military power with a sophisticated 
technological base that includes the ability to build and launch 
nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles and ballistic 
missile defense systems.
  India has conducted nuclear tests since 1974 and has been under a 
global ban on trade in nuclear fuels and technology since that date. On 
September 27, after the House of Representatives voted in favor of this 
agreement, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh addressed the Indian 
community in New York with these words: ``India will be liberated from 
the constraints of technology denial of 34 years. It will add an 
important strategic pillar to our bilateral partnership. We will widen 
our clean energy options.'' However, the Indian military and civilian 
nuclear programs are closely intertwined, and this new agreement will 
require new program separation measures that may prove difficult to 
ensure or fully enforce. There is a real risk in that providing U.S. 
technology and materials to the civilian side of that equation may 
result in enhancements in India's military nuclear program.
  If the Congress approves this agreement, we must be prepared for the 
potential backlash of a nuclear arms race in the region. Pakistan, 
which has long had border disputes with India, has threatened to match 
any Indian nuclear capabilities. Pakistan has, like India, 
clandestinely developed a nuclear weapon capability and has conducted 
nuclear tests. Like India, Pakistan has not signed the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or 
other nonproliferation agreements. But India will be rewarded for its 
three decades of defiance of international nonproliferation accords 
with access to nuclear technology and materials provided in this 
agreement, and it will not, in return, give up one iota of its military 
nuclear facilities or programs.
  This agreement may have been a long time coming, but it is not yet 
final. In 2006, the Congress rejected President Bush's original U.S.-
India nuclear cooperation agreement. Instead, the Congress adopted the 
Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation 
Act of 2006, which proposed several additional safeguards requirements 
to the agreement. President Bush signed the act, but the agreement he 
is now pushing so hard to get approved before he leaves office neither 
meets all the requirements of the Hyde Act nor the procedures for 
consideration of these agreements outlined in the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954.
  India has not yet filed its declaration of the facilities to be 
safeguarded with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Nor has the 
Indian government publicly acknowledged that the safeguards would last 
``in perpetuity.'' There is no provision to terminate this agreement 
immediately in the event that India conducts another nuclear test, as 
it last did in 1998. Even though this is the first agreement of its 
kind to require an exemption under the Atomic Energy Act, because India 
is not a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Congress 
is being pushed to override the statutory period for consideration of 
the agreement.
  At a time when the United States is strengthening its sanctions on 
Iran to halt its uranium enrichment, India has joined in non-aligned 
movement statements supporting Iran's nuclear position in its 
negotiations with the West and is a major supplier of refined petroleum 
products for Tehran. In addition, shortly after the House vote on the 
Hyde Act in 2006, the State Department reported that Indian entities 
were believed to have sold sensitive missile technologies to Iran.
  According to those in the non-proliferation community, this agreement 
creates a dangerous distinction between ``good'' proliferators and 
``bad'' proliferators and sends misleading signals to the international 
community with regard to Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty norms, making 
the task of winning international support to contain and constrain the 
nuclear programs of North Korea, Iran, and potential proliferators more 
difficult.
  We need to let the process work. There is no rush. The Congress will 
still be here come January. India will still be around come January. 
The Indian government may even have filed its facilities declaration 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency by January. Only President 
Bush will be leaving in January, but, if this agreement is approved, I 
can assure him that his Administration will get all due credit for 
negotiating it. Let us take a step back from this mad rush we are in, 
and do our job as the Founders intended, as a deliberative body, not a 
rubber stamp.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, momentarily we will be introducing a bill, 
but my colleague from New York is here and wants to be heard. I just 
wanted to take 30 seconds, if I could. We have wrapped up the debate on 
the U.S.-India nuclear accord and there will be no more discussion I 
know of about

[[Page 23532]]

that at this point. I will maybe insert some materials in the Record 
but I did want to thank Senator Biden's staff and others. There is a 
list which I will put in the Record, but Brian McKeon, Ed Levine, 
Anthony Wier, Fulton Armstrong, and, from Senator Lugar's staff, Kenny 
Myers and Tom Moore, just did a great job on this. I want my colleagues 
to reflect the effort of staff who have worked for years on this. I 
appreciate immensely their efforts. There will be a vote later this 
evening on that matter.
  I yield the floor to my colleagues whom I know want to address the 
financial crisis issue or some other points. As soon as I have the 
amended version of the bill, I will send it to the desk for their 
consideration.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from New York is 
recognized.
  Mr. GREGG. Will the Senator from New York yield for a unanimous-
consent request?
  Mrs. CLINTON. Yes.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the 
conclusion of the statement of the Senator from New York, I be 
recognized for 10 minutes, and then other Republicans speaking on the 
rescue plan be allotted 10-minute segments from the Republican side.
  Mr. DODD. Reserving the right to object, I am going to offer a 
unanimous-consent request that covers that. I will have my colleague 
look at it as well, so we may need some modification.
  Mr. GREGG. I don't believe it covers the 10 minutes.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Senator 
from Montana is recognized.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I would 
like to be able to get in this line too, so I ask unanimous consent 
that I speak following the Senator from New Hampshire.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?.
  Mr. DODD. Let me object to this particular request of my colleague, 
and I will get back to it in a minute. I don't want to get to a 
situation where there are limits without some consideration to make 
sure there is a balance to it.
  Mr. GREGG. Let's go forward with the Senator from New York.
  Mr. DODD. Then the Senator from Montana.

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