[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 154 (2008), Part 17]
[Senate]
[Pages 23008-23009]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                 AFRICA

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, last week I chaired a hearing on the 
``resource curse'' and Africa's management of its extractive 
industries. In too many parts of Africa, a wealth of natural resources 
that should be fueling economic development are instead sources of 
corruption and conflict. This is especially the case with Sub-Saharan 
Africa's leading oil-producing nations. Just a few days ago, 
Transparency International released its corruption index, naming of 
Africa's top 3 oil producers--Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan--among 
the top 10 most corrupt countries. This corruption as well as the 
discrepancy between persisting poverty and skyrocketing revenues is a 
recipe for instability in these countries, breeding weak and failing 
states.
  Nowhere are the consequences of the ``resource curse'' more acute or 
alarming than Nigeria's Delta region. For the last three decades, local 
communities there have been marginalized politically and economically 
as oil companies, with the government's backing, have seized some of 
the world's richest oil deposits. And, while the private sector is 
pervasive, the federal government is virtually absent--replaced by 
roving bands of criminals, working in many cases for local governors. 
The weak infrastructure, lack of opportunities for political 
participation by local communities, endemic poverty, influx of arms, 
and presence of lootable extractives have turned the delta into a 
powder keg over recent years.
  In that swamp--and I say ``swamp'' both literally and 
metaphorically--have arisen several armed groups that seek to appeal to 
the legitimate grievances of communities for both political and 
criminal ends. These groups, many of which claim to be part of a loose 
coalition called the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, 
or MEND, have targeted oil companies operating in the region, 
kidnapping employees for ransom and attacking pipelines and other 
installations. Simultaneously, they have become heavily involved in the 
lucrative trade in oil stolen from the delta's vast pipelines which is 
called ``bunkering.'' Some estimates suggest that as much as 10 percent 
of Nigeria's current production is siphoned off illegally, creating a 
shadow economy that undermines the security of the wider Gulf of Guinea 
region.
  The Nigeria Government's response to the Delta crisis--sporadic 
military campaigns, empty promises of development and half-hearted 
attempts at political dialogue--has only made matters worse. In many 
cases there are definite but ambiguous links between the military and 
the militants--each out for personal gain as the political economy of 
war perpetuates the illicit nature of these activities. In addition, 
the military campaigns to date have only served to provoke the 
insurgency, leading to fighting that has left civilians killed and 
displaced. Furthermore, the lack of clear distinction between the 
security forces of the oil companies and the Nigerian military feeds 
communities' perception that the two are interchangeable. Meanwhile, 
despite promises made, there has still not been a serious initiative to 
address the underdevelopment of the region. The necessary revenues are 
clearly available with Nigeria's economic boom, but a lack of political 
will prevails. This is in part because there are officials at the 
federal, state, and local levels who continue to benefit from the 
instability in the delta, either by their involvement in the illegal 
oil trade or other corruption.
  Without a commitment from the top leadership in Nigeria--as well as 
support from key members in the international community--a growing 
number of individuals at the top will continue to profit, while those 
at the bottom have almost no say in the development of their society. 
Genuine peacemaking in the delta region will require not only 
legitimate political negotiations but a convincing case for 
transforming the illicit war economy into one of peace. There will need 
to be viable institutions, not one hollowed out from corruption, which 
can address economic and political decisionmaking. And there will need 
to be opportunities for local communities to engage and hold their 
leaders accountable. Only then will we begin to see change in the 
delta.
  Under this administration, the United States has made few efforts to 
address the instability in the Niger Delta, despite Nigeria being a key 
U.S. partner and the fifth largest source for U.S. oil imports. I 
recognize that the insecurity in the delta makes it very

[[Page 23009]]

hard for our embassy officials--who are doing great work in an already 
tough posting--to travel there, but without consistent diplomatic 
outreach and presence in the region, our ability to engage is severely 
handicapped. How can we be sure the information we are getting is valid 
if we don't have our own eyes and ears to help inform our strategic 
thinking? The information gap in the Niger Delta is a very real deficit 
even though it may not seem pressing compared to some of the other 
national security threats we face. Getting our diplomatic corps into 
one of the world's most neglected regions will help us identify the 
full scope of the area's problems and come up with a sound plan for 
addressing them.
  In June, I wrote to Secretary Rice, expressing my concern and 
inquiring about the potential for more frequent diplomatic travel to 
the region. I understand that along with the security concerns, 
financial costs also play a role here. But the costs to U.S. long-term 
security of not directly engaging this problem now are much greater.
  The work of our diplomats on the ground though must be backed by 
high-level support from Washington. On the Niger Delta--or Nigerian 
affairs in general, for that matter--we have not seen adequate 
leadership from the Secretary of State or the President. Looking to the 
next administration, we must reengage at all levels. This must be a top 
priority for whoever becomes the next Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs, and I will work in my capacity in Congress to ensure we give 
greater attention to the crisis in the delta. We must think creatively 
about how we can rally our international partners and muster the many 
resources at our disposal to push for a comprehensive solution. In the 
months and years ahead, I believe there are few more pressing issues in 
terms of U.S. security and interests in Africa.
  Now is the moment to engage. Just over a week ago, insurgents in the 
delta declared an ``oil war,'' after accusing the Nigerian military of 
new and unprovoked attacks. The 6 days of conflict that ensued between 
the militants and Nigerian soldiers were the most intense violence the 
region had seen in years. Reports suggest that oil output was cut by at 
least 150,000 barrels, but more importantly the violence left hundreds 
of people killed and many more displaced. I fear that we may only see 
this situation get worse as all sides, regardless of their rhetoric, 
cling to military strategies that only further entrench this conflict.
  Nevertheless, there is an opportunity here to use this escalation to 
refocus international attention on this crisis and jumpstart a 
comprehensive political process to address its underlying causes. In 
the last month, there have been some positive developments that can be 
built upon.
  First, President Yar'Adua recently announced the creation of 40-
person technical committee and an entire ministry for the Niger Delta. 
If managed well and held accountable, these entities hold the potential 
to finally deliver on promises for economic development in the delta, 
especially infrastructure construction and job creation.
  Second, the Government has called for the development of a 
certification scheme to track the theft and lucrative sale of so-called 
``blood oil.'' It is unclear how such a scheme would work or whether 
the will really exists in Abuja to support it, but this provides an 
entry point to discuss ways to improve maritime security. A 2005 report 
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggested that 
better surveillance of two river systems alone could make a huge dent 
in the illicit oil trade in the delta.
  Third and finally, it should be noted that Nigeria's ranking improved 
in this week's Transparency International's corruption index, 
suggesting some progress has been made. Of course, these rankings are 
not precise and far more progress is needed.
  Mr. President, I realize that this situation is very complex and that 
many talented and thoughtful people have met over the last decade in 
various conferences, workshops, and summits to devise plans for peace 
in the delta. I am not under the illusion that stabilizing this region 
will be easy or straightforward, but I do know that the United States 
does not currently have the institutional leadership, resources, or 
coordination that we need to effectively engage in that undertaking and 
wield meaningful leverage. As we look ahead to the next administration 
and Congress, this must change not only the sake of African communities 
caught in the midst of violence and poverty but also for our own 
security.

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