[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 154 (2008), Part 16]
[Senate]
[Pages 22239-22240]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




       NATIONAL HIGHWAY BRIDGE RECONSTRUCTION AND INSPECTION ACT

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I would like to explain why there are 
objections to bringing up H.R. 3999, the National Highway Bridge 
Reconstruction and Inspection Act of 2008. As has been mentioned by 
several of my colleagues on the floor today, the Highway Bridge Program 
in its current form needs to be reformed to make it more useable for 
States. Unfortunately, H.R. 3999 hinders, rather than strengthens, 
States' abilities to address their greatest bridge priorities. It would 
force States to follow a risk-based system developed in Washington to 
prioritize the replacement or rehabilitation of bridges. There is great 
concern that this one-size-fits-all approach would not allow for 
important local factors, such as seismic retrofit. This legislation 
also forces States to spend scarce resources on new procedures that 
will provide little or no new information to State bridge engineers.
  SAFETEA-LU will expire on September 30, 2009. Any major policy 
changes at this point in the process will distract from the overall 
goal of completing a comprehensive bill on time. For that reason, a 
policy change of this magnitude should be handled in the context of 
reauthorization. Furthermore, it is counterproductive to attempt to fix 
our crumbling infrastructure through piecemeal efforts. Comprehensive 
reform is necessary and should be addressed in a holistic approach in 
the reauthorization bill the Environment and Public Works Committee 
will work on in the coming months.
  There has been a lot of press about the poor condition of the 
nation's bridges in the wake of the Minnesota tragedy. Our bridges are 
certainly in need of additional investment, but the roads on the 
National Highway System, NHS, are actually in greater need. According 
to the Federal Highway Administration, FHWA, the Nation's bridges 
receive an average of 15 percent less funding from all levels of 
government than the maximum amount that could be economically invested. 
In contrast, the roads on the NHS receive 78 percent less funding than 
the maximum economic level.
  This is not to say that there are not enormous bridge needs. These 
are simply 20 year averages, and much more could be economically 
invested in the short term. According to the same study by the FHWA, 
$62 billion could be invested immediately in a cost-beneficial basis. 
It is critical, however, to view investment in the Nation's highways 
and bridges in a comprehensive fashion.
  The authors of H.R. 3999 tout one of the benefits of the bill is that 
it prohibit transfers from the current bridge program to other highway 
programs. I would like to take a few minutes to explain that while that 
sounds good, it will not accomplish what the authors of the bill want. 
Many States rely on the flexibility allowed under the Federal highway 
program to transfer money in between core highway programs as an 
important cash and program management tool. This flexibility in the 
bridge program is needed by States as bridges are enormous, ``lumpy'' 
investments and it often becomes necessary for States to wait a few 
years between major bridge replacements. If they did not do so, bridges 
would consume too much of their highway resources to address nonbridge 
needs. This bill would prohibit all transfers from the bridge program 
on the incorrect assumption that all transfers are bad.
  Many States find the bridge program requirements too bureaucratic and 
prefer to replace or rehabilitate structurally deficient bridges using 
more flexible programs. These States transfer money out of the bridge 
program and then obligate those same dollars to structurally deficient 
bridges. Also, when bridges are being replaced or rehabilitated as a 
part of a larger project, States frequently transfer money into a 
single category of funding that can be used on the entire project. 
Because of the narrow eligibility of Highway Bridge Program funds, the 
flexibility to transfer funds is oftentimes necessary and does not 
necessarily detract from the goals of the Highway Bridge Program.
  H.R. 3999 incorrectly assumes that all bridge construction and 
reconstruction is done through the bridge program. In fact, only about 
55 percent of obligations on bridges are through the Highway Bridge 
Program. The remaining obligations of funds on bridges, about $2.4 
billion, are done using other categories of funding. By prohibiting 
transfers, H.R. 3999 would effectively punish States that are spending 
more on bridges than is provided in bridge funding, by denying them an 
important cash and program management tool.
  In addition, H.R. 3999 requires States to follow a risk-based system 
developed in Washington to prioritize the replacement or rehabilitation 
of bridges. Many fear that this will produce a ``worst first'' approach 
to replacing and rehabilitating our bridges an approach that is widely 
criticized among economists as it costs far more money than a targeted 
approach. In many aspects of government this is a prudent method to 
make decisions, but the approach set forth in this bill lacks the 
cumulative factor analysis required to make

[[Page 22240]]

the most cost-beneficial and safety-driven bridge investment decisions. 
Under H.R. 3999's risk-based system, a lower rated bridge that is 
rarely used and poses no public safety threat could be prioritized 
ahead of a slightly higher rated bridge with more traffic, greater 
relative importance to the rest of the system, and overall more need 
for investment. This bill would create yet another level of bureaucracy 
to a bridge program over-burdened with red tape, as State risk-
management plans will have to be approved by the Department of 
Transportation.
  The requirements for the risk management system set forth in H.R. 
3999 are vague and unspecific. However, there is a wide concern among 
State departments of transportation that they will be interpreted by 
FHWA to force one-size-fits-all Federal standards that ignore local 
considerations and variations in risk factors across the country, such 
as seismic retrofit.
  States are already using a highly effective bridge management system 
to address risk when making State-wide bridge investment decisions; 
this bill will disrupt these efforts.
  In closing I will reiterate that I fully agree that the current 
Highway Bridge Program needs work, but so does the entire Federal 
Highway Program and I believe we need a comprehensive solution. I look 
forward to working with my colleagues to that end.

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