[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 154 (2008), Part 16]
[House]
[Pages 22131-22142]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




  COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DIVESTMENT ACT OF 
                                  2008

  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 7112) to impose sanctions with respect to Iran, to provide 
for the divestment of assets in Iran by State and local governments and 
other entities, and to identify locations of concern with respect to 
transshipment, reexportation, or diversion of certain sensitive items 
to Iran.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                                H.R. 7112

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2008''.
       (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Support for diplomatic efforts relating to preventing Iran from 
              acquiring nuclear weapons.

                           TITLE I--SANCTIONS

Sec. 101. Definitions.
Sec. 102. Clarification and expansion of definitions.
Sec. 103. Economic sanctions relating to Iran.
Sec. 104. Liability of parent companies for violations of sanctions by 
              foreign subsidiaries.
Sec. 105. Increased capacity for efforts to combat unlawful or 
              terrorist financing.
Sec. 106. Reporting requirements.
Sec. 107. Sense of Congress regarding the imposition of sanctions on 
              the Central Bank of Iran.
Sec. 108. Rule of construction.
Sec. 109. Temporary increase in fee for certain consular services.

    TITLE II--DIVESTMENT FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES THAT INVEST IN IRAN

Sec. 201. Definitions.
Sec. 202. Authority of State and local governments to divest from 
              certain companies that invest in Iran.
Sec. 203. Safe harbor for changes of investment policies by asset 
              managers.
Sec. 204. Sense of Congress regarding certain ERISA plan investments.

TITLE III--PREVENTION OF TRANSSHIPMENT, REEXPORTATION, OR DIVERSION OF 
                        SENSITIVE ITEMS TO IRAN

Sec. 301. Definitions.
Sec. 302. Identification of locations of concern with respect to 
              transshipment, reexportation, or diversion of certain 
              items to Iran.
Sec. 303. Destinations of Possible Diversion Concern and Destinations 
              of Diversion Concern.
Sec. 304. Report on expanding diversion concern system to countries 
              other than Iran.

                    TITLE IV--EFFECTIVE DATE; SUNSET

Sec. 401. Effective date; sunset.

     SEC. 2. SUPPORT FOR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS RELATING TO PREVENTING 
                   IRAN FROM ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

       (a) Support for International Diplomatic Efforts.--It is 
     the sense of the Congress that--

[[Page 22132]]

       (1) the United States should use diplomatic and economic 
     means to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem;
       (2) the United States should continue to support efforts in 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations 
     Security Council to bring about an end to Iran's uranium 
     enrichment program and its nuclear weapons program; and
       (3)(A) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 was 
     a useful first step toward pressing Iran to end its nuclear 
     weapons program; and
       (B) in light of Iran's continued defiance of the 
     international community, the United Nations Security Council 
     should adopt additional measures against Iran, including 
     measures to prohibit investments in Iran's energy sector.
       (b) Peaceful Efforts by the United States.--Nothing in this 
     Act shall be construed as authorizing the use of force or the 
     use of the United States Armed Forces against Iran.

                           TITLE I--SANCTIONS

     SEC. 101. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Agricultural commodity.--The term ``agricultural 
     commodity'' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of 
     the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 14(2) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (3) Executive agency.--The term ``executive agency'' has 
     the meaning given that term in section 4 of the Office of 
     Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403).
       (4) Family member.--The term ``family member'' means, with 
     respect to an individual, the spouse, children, 
     grandchildren, or parents of the individual.
       (5) Information and informational materials.--The term 
     ``information and informational materials''--
       (A) means information and informational materials described 
     in section 203(b)(3) of the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)); and
       (B) does not include information or informational 
     materials--
       (i) the exportation of which is otherwise controlled--

       (I) under section 5 of the Export Administration Act of 
     1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2404) (as in effect pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.)); or
       (II) under section 6 of that Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405), to 
     the extent that such controls promote the nonproliferation or 
     antiterrorism policies of the United States; or

       (ii) with respect to which acts are prohibited by chapter 
     37 of title 18, United States Code.
       (6) Investment.--The term ``investment'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 14(9) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (7) Iranian diplomats and representatives of other 
     government and military or quasi-governmental institutions of 
     iran.--The term ``Iranian diplomats and representatives of 
     other government and military or quasi-governmental 
     institutions of Iran'' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 14(11) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 note).
       (8) Medical device.--The term ``medical device'' has the 
     meaning given the term ``device'' in section 201 of the 
     Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
       (9) Medicine.--The term ``medicine'' has the meaning given 
     the term ``drug'' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, 
     and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

     SEC. 102. CLARIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF DEFINITIONS.

       (a) Person.--Section 14(13)(B) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``financial institution, insurer, 
     underwriter, guarantor, and any other business organization, 
     including any foreign subsidiary, parent, or affiliate of the 
     foregoing,'' after ``trust,''; and
       (2) by inserting ``, such as an export credit agency'' 
     before the semicolon.
       (b) Petroleum Resources.--Section 14(14) of the Iran 
     Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to 
     read as follows:
       ``(14) Petroleum resources.--
       ``(A) Petroleum resources.--The term `petroleum resources' 
     includes petroleum, petroleum by-products, oil or liquefied 
     natural gas, oil or liquefied natural gas tankers, and 
     products used to construct or maintain pipelines used to 
     transport oil or compressed or liquefied natural gas.
       ``(B) Petroleum by-products.--The term `petroleum by-
     products' means gasoline, kerosene, distillates, propane or 
     butane gas, diesel fuel, residual fuel oil, and other goods 
     classified in headings 2709 and 2710 of the Harmonized Tariff 
     Schedule of the United States.''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall take effect 120 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.

     SEC. 103. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RELATING TO IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, and in addition to any other sanction in effect, 
     beginning on the date that is 120 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the economic sanctions described in 
     subsection (b) shall apply with respect to Iran.
       (b) Sanctions.--The sanctions described in this subsection 
     are the following:
       (1) Prohibition on imports.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), no 
     article of Iranian origin may be imported directly or 
     indirectly into the United States.
       (B) Exception.--The prohibition in subparagraph (A) does 
     not apply to imports from Iran of information and 
     informational materials.
       (2) Prohibition on exports.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), no 
     article of United States origin may be exported directly or 
     indirectly to Iran.
       (B) Exceptions.--The prohibition in subparagraph (A) does 
     not apply to exports to Iran of--
       (i) agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical 
     devices;
       (ii) articles exported to Iran to provide humanitarian 
     assistance to the people of Iran;
       (iii) information or informational materials; or
       (iv) goods, services, or technologies necessary to ensure 
     the safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft produced 
     in the United States if the exportation of such goods, 
     services, or technologies is approved by the Secretary of the 
     Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, 
     pursuant to regulations for licensing the exportation of such 
     goods, services, or technologies, if appropriate.
       (3) Freezing assets.--
       (A) In general.--At such time as the United States has 
     access to the names of persons in Iran, including Iranian 
     diplomats and representatives of other government and 
     military or quasi-governmental institutions of Iran, that are 
     determined to be subject to sanctions imposed under the 
     authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) or any other provision of law 
     relating to the imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran, 
     the President shall take such action as may be necessary to 
     freeze immediately the funds and other assets belonging to 
     any person so named, and any family members or associates of 
     those persons so named to whom assets or property of those 
     persons so named were transferred on or after January 1, 
     2008. The action described in the preceding sentence includes 
     requiring any United States financial institution that holds 
     funds and assets of a person so named to report promptly to 
     the Office of Foreign Assets Control information regarding 
     such funds and assets.
       (B) Asset reporting requirement.--Not later than 14 days 
     after a decision is made to freeze the property or assets of 
     any person under this paragraph, the President shall report 
     the name of such person to the appropriate congressional 
     committees.
       (4) United states government contracts.--The head of an 
     executive agency may not procure, or enter into a contract 
     for the procurement of, any goods or services from a person 
     that meets the criteria for the imposition of sanctions under 
     section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 
     104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (c) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of the 
     sanctions described in subsection (b) if the President--
       (1) determines that such a waiver is in the national 
     interest of the United States; and
       (2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report describing the reasons for the determination.

     SEC. 104. LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF 
                   SANCTIONS BY FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means a partnership, 
     association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other 
     organization.
       (2) Own or control.--The term ``own or control'' means, 
     with respect to an entity--
       (A) to hold more than 50 percent of the equity interest by 
     vote or value in the entity;
       (B) to hold a majority of seats on the board of directors 
     of the entity; or
       (C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or 
     personnel decisions of the entity.
       (3) Subsidiary.--The term ``subsidiary'' means an entity 
     that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a 
     United States person.
       (4) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a natural person who is a citizen, resident, or 
     national of the United States; and
       (B) an entity that is organized under the laws of the 
     United States, any State or territory thereof, or the 
     District of Columbia, if natural persons described in 
     subparagraph (A) own or control the entity.
       (b) In General.--A United States person shall be subject to 
     a penalty for a violation of the provisions of Executive 
     Order 12959 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) or Executive Order 13059 
     (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), or any other prohibition on 
     transactions with respect to Iran imposed under the authority 
     of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 et seq.), if--

[[Page 22133]]

       (1) the President determines that the United States person 
     establishes or maintains a subsidiary outside of the United 
     States for the purpose of circumventing such provisions; and
       (2) that subsidiary engages in an act that, if committed in 
     the United States or by a United States person, would violate 
     such provisions.
       (c) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of 
     subsection (b) if the President--
       (1) determines that such a waiver is in the national 
     interest of the United States; and
       (2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report describing the reasons for the determination.
       (d) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--Subsection (b) shall take effect on the 
     date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to 
     acts described in subsection (b)(2) that are--
       (A) commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act; or
       (B) except as provided in paragraph (2), commenced before 
     such date of enactment, if such acts continue on or after 
     such date of enactment.
       (2) Exception.--Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect 
     to an act described in paragraph (1)(B) by a subsidiary owned 
     or controlled by a United States person if the United States 
     person divests or terminates its business with the subsidiary 
     not later than 90 days after such date of enactment.

     SEC. 105. INCREASED CAPACITY FOR EFFORTS TO COMBAT UNLAWFUL 
                   OR TERRORIST FINANCING.

       (a) Finding.--Congress finds that the work of the Office of 
     Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the Department of the 
     Treasury, which includes the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
     and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, is critical to 
     ensuring that the international financial system is not used 
     for purposes of supporting terrorism and developing weapons 
     of mass destruction.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations for Office of Terrorism 
     and Financial Intelligence.--There is authorized to be 
     appropriated to the Secretary of the Treasury for the Office 
     of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence--
       (1) $61,712,000 for fiscal year 2009; and
       (2) such sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal years 
     2010 and 2011.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations for the Financial 
     Crimes Enforcement Network.--Section 310(d)(1) of title 31, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking ``such sums as may 
     be necessary for fiscal years 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005'' 
     and inserting ``$91,335,000 for fiscal year 2009 and such 
     sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal years 2010 and 
     2011''.

     SEC. 106. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Foreign Investment in Iran.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report on--
       (A) any foreign investments of $20,000,000 or more made in 
     Iran's energy sector on or after January 1, 2008, and before 
     the date on which the President submits the report; and
       (B) the determination of the President on whether each such 
     investment qualifies as a sanctionable offense under section 
     5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 
     50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (2) Subsequent reports.--Not later than 1 year after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 
     thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report on--
       (A) any foreign investments of $20,000,000 or more made in 
     Iran's energy sector during the 180-day period preceding the 
     submission of the report; and
       (B) the determination of the President on whether each such 
     investment qualifies as a sanctionable offense under section 
     5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 
     50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (b) Form of Reports.--The reports required under subsection 
     (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain 
     a classified annex.

     SEC. 107. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE IMPOSITION OF 
                   SANCTIONS ON THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN.

       Congress urges the President, in the strongest terms, to 
     consider immediately using the authority of the President to 
     impose sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and any other 
     Iranian bank engaged in proliferation activities or support 
     of terrorist groups.

     SEC. 108. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this title shall be construed to affect any 
     provision of title I of the Iran Freedom Support Act (Public 
     Law 109-293; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

     SEC. 109. TEMPORARY INCREASE IN FEE FOR CERTAIN CONSULAR 
                   SERVICES.

       (a) Increase in Fee.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, not later than 120 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall increase 
     by $1.00 the fee or surcharge assessed under section 140(a) 
     of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 
     and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 8 U.S.C. 1351 note) over the 
     amount of such fee or surcharge as of such date for 
     processing machine readable nonimmigrant visas and machine 
     readable combined border crossing identification cards and 
     nonimmigrant visas.
       (b) Deposit of Amounts.--Notwithstanding section 140(a)(2) 
     of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 
     and 1995, fees collected under the authority of subsection 
     (a) shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States.
       (c) Duration of Increase.--The fee increase authorized 
     under subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is nine 
     months after the date on which such fee is first collected.

    TITLE II--DIVESTMENT FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES THAT INVEST IN IRAN

     SEC. 201. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Energy sector.--The term ``energy sector'' refers to 
     activities to develop petroleum or natural gas resources or 
     nuclear power.
       (2) Financial institution.--The term ``financial 
     institution'' has the meaning given that term in section 
     14(5) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 
     50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (3) Iran.--The term ``Iran'' includes any agency or 
     instrumentality of Iran.
       (4) Person.--The term ``person'' means--
       (A) a natural person, corporation, company, business 
     association, partnership, society, trust, or any other 
     nongovernmental entity, organization, or group;
       (B) any governmental entity or instrumentality of a 
     government, including a multilateral development institution 
     (as defined in section 1701(c)(3) of the International 
     Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(3))); and
       (C) any successor, subunit, parent company, or subsidiary 
     of any entity described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
       (5) State.--The term ``State'' means each of the several 
     States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
     Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, 
     and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
       (6) State or local government.--The term ``State or local 
     government'' includes--
       (A) any State and any agency or instrumentality thereof;
       (B) any local government within a State, and any agency or 
     instrumentality thereof;
       (C) any other governmental instrumentality; and
       (D) any public institution of higher education within the 
     meaning of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 
     et seq.).

     SEC. 202. AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO DIVEST 
                   FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES THAT INVEST IN IRAN.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the United States Government should support the decision of 
     any State or local government to divest from, or to prohibit 
     the investment of assets of the State or local government in, 
     a person that the State or local government determines poses 
     a financial or reputational risk.
       (b) Authority to Divest.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, a State or local government may adopt and 
     enforce measures that meet the requirements of subsection (d) 
     to divest the assets of the State or local government from, 
     or prohibit investment of the assets of the State or local 
     government in, any person that the State or local government 
     determines, using credible information available to the 
     public, engages in investment activities in Iran described in 
     subsection (c).
       (c) Investment Activities Described.--A person engages in 
     investment activities in Iran described in this subsection if 
     the person--
       (1) has an investment of $20,000,000 or more--
       (A) in the energy sector of Iran; or
       (B) in a person that provides oil or liquified natural gas 
     tankers, or products used to construct or maintain pipelines 
     used to transport oil or liquified natural gas, for the 
     energy sector in Iran; or
       (2) is a financial institution that extends $20,000,000 or 
     more in credit to another person, for 45 days or more, if 
     that person will use the credit to invest in the energy 
     sector in Iran.
       (d) Requirements.--The requirements referred to in 
     subsection (b) that a measure taken by a State or local 
     government must meet are the following:
       (1) Notice.--The State or local government shall provide 
     written notice to each person to which a measure is to be 
     applied.
       (2) Timing.--The measure shall apply to a person not 
     earlier than the date that is 90 days after the date on which 
     written notice is provided to the person under paragraph (1).
       (3) Opportunity for hearing.--The State or local government 
     shall provide an opportunity to comment in writing to each 
     person to which a measure is to be applied. If the person 
     demonstrates to the State or local government that the person 
     does not engage in investment activities in Iran described in 
     subsection (c), the measure shall not apply to the person.
       (4) Sense of congress on avoiding erroneous targeting.--It 
     is the sense of Congress that a State or local government 
     should not adopt a measure under subsection (b) with respect 
     to a person unless the State or local government has made 
     every effort to

[[Page 22134]]

      avoid erroneously targeting the person and has verified that 
     the person engages in investment activities in Iran described 
     in subsection (c).
       (e) Notice to Department of Justice.--Not later than 30 
     days after adopting a measure pursuant to subsection (b), a 
     State or local government shall submit written notice to the 
     Attorney General describing the measure.
       (f) Nonpreemption.--A measure of a State or local 
     government authorized under subsection (b) is not preempted 
     by any Federal law or regulation.
       (g) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Investment.--The ``investment'' of assets, with respect 
     to a State or local government, includes--
       (A) a commitment or contribution of assets;
       (B) a loan or other extension of credit; and
       (C) the entry into or renewal of a contract for goods or 
     services.
       (2) Assets.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     the term ``assets'' refers to public monies and includes any 
     pension, retirement, annuity, or endowment fund, or similar 
     instrument, that is controlled by a State or local 
     government.
       (B) Exception.--The term ``assets'' does not include 
     employee benefit plans covered by title I of the Employee 
     Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et 
     seq.).
       (h) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), this 
     section applies to measures adopted by a State or local 
     government before, on, or after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.
       (2) Notice requirements.--Subsections (d) and (e) apply to 
     measures adopted by a State or local government on or after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 203. SAFE HARBOR FOR CHANGES OF INVESTMENT POLICIES BY 
                   ASSET MANAGERS.

       (a) In General.--Section 13(c)(1) of the Investment Company 
     Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-13(c)(1)) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     Federal or State law, no person may bring any civil, 
     criminal, or administrative action against any registered 
     investment company, or any employee, officer, director, or 
     investment adviser thereof, based solely upon the investment 
     company divesting from, or avoiding investing in, securities 
     issued by persons that the investment company determines, 
     using credible information available to the public--
       ``(A) conduct or have direct investments in business 
     operations in Sudan described in section 3(d) of the Sudan 
     Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     note); or
       ``(B) engage in investment activities in Iran described in 
     section 202(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2008.''.
       (b) SEC Regulations.--Not later than 120 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Securities and 
     Exchange Commission shall issue any revisions the Commission 
     determines to be necessary to the regulations requiring 
     disclosure by each registered investment company that divests 
     itself of securities in accordance with section 13(c) of the 
     Investment Company Act of 1940 to include divestments of 
     securities in accordance with paragraph (1)(B) of such 
     section, as added by subsection (a).

     SEC. 204. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CERTAIN ERISA PLAN 
                   INVESTMENTS.

       It is the sense of Congress that a fiduciary of an employee 
     benefit plan, as defined in section 3(3) of the Employee 
     Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1002(3)), 
     may divest plan assets from, or avoid investing plan assets 
     in, any person the fiduciary determines engages in investment 
     activities in Iran described in section 202(c) of this title, 
     without breaching the responsibilities, obligations, or 
     duties imposed upon the fiduciary by section 404 of the 
     Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 
     1104), if--
       (1) the fiduciary makes such determination using credible 
     information that is available to the public; and
       (2) such divestment or avoidance of investment is conducted 
     in accordance with section 2509.94-1 of title 29, Code of 
     Federal Regulations (as in effect on the day before the date 
     of the enactment of this Act).

TITLE III--PREVENTION OF TRANSSHIPMENT, REEXPORTATION, OR DIVERSION OF 
                        SENSITIVE ITEMS TO IRAN

     SEC. 301. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
       (2) End-user.--The term ``end-user'' means an end-user as 
     that term is used in the Export Administration Regulations.
       (3) Entity owned or controlled by the government of iran.--
     The term ``entity owned or controlled by the Government of 
     Iran'' includes--
       (A) any corporation, partnership, association, or other 
     entity in which the Government of Iran owns a majority or 
     controlling interest; and
       (B) any entity that is otherwise controlled by the 
     Government of Iran.
       (4) Export administration regulations.--The term ``Export 
     Administration Regulations'' means subchapter C of chapter 
     VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.
       (5) Government.--The term ``government'' includes any 
     agency or instrumentality of a government.
       (6) Iran.--The term ``Iran'' includes any agency or 
     instrumentality of Iran.
       (7) State sponsor of terrorism.--The term ``state sponsor 
     of terrorism'' means any country the government of which the 
     Secretary of State has determined, pursuant to--
       (A) section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 
     1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)) (or any successor 
     thereto),
       (B) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2780(d)), or
       (C) section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)),

     is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts 
     of international terrorism.
       (8) Transshipment, reexportation, or diversion.--The term 
     ``transshipment, reexportation, or diversion'' means the 
     exportation, directly or indirectly, by any means, of items 
     that originated in the United States to an end-user whose 
     identity cannot be verified or to an entity owned or 
     controlled by the Government of Iran in violation of the laws 
     or regulations of the United States, including by--
       (A) shipping such items through 1 or more foreign 
     countries; or
       (B) by using false information regarding the country of 
     origin of such items.

     SEC. 302. IDENTIFICATION OF LOCATIONS OF CONCERN WITH RESPECT 
                   TO TRANSSHIPMENT, REEXPORTATION, OR DIVERSION 
                   OF CERTAIN ITEMS TO IRAN.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the Secretary of Commerce, the 
     Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies 
     all countries that the Director determines are of concern 
     with respect to transshipment, reexportation, or diversion of 
     items subject to the provisions of the Export Administration 
     Regulations to an entity owned or controlled by the 
     Government of Iran.

     SEC. 303. DESTINATIONS OF POSSIBLE DIVERSION CONCERN AND 
                   DESTINATIONS OF DIVERSION CONCERN.

       (a) Destinations of Possible Diversion Concern.--
       (1) Designation.--The Secretary of Commerce shall designate 
     a country as a Destination of Possible Diversion Concern if 
     the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State 
     and the Secretary of the Treasury, determines that such 
     designation is appropriate to carry out activities to 
     strengthen the export control systems of that country based 
     on criteria that include--
       (A) the volume of items that originated in the United 
     States that are transported through the country to end-users 
     whose identities cannot be verified;
       (B) the inadequacy of the export and reexport controls of 
     the country;
       (C) the unwillingness or demonstrated inability of the 
     government of the country to control diversion activities; 
     and
       (D) the unwillingness or inability of the government of the 
     country to cooperate with the United States in interdiction 
     efforts.
       (2) Strengthening export control systems of destinations of 
     possible diversion concern.--If the Secretary of Commerce 
     designates a country as a Destination of Possible Diversion 
     Concern under paragraph (1), the United States shall initiate 
     government-to-government activities described in paragraph 
     (3) to strengthen the export control systems of the country.
       (3) Government-to-government activities described.--The 
     government-to-government activities described in this 
     paragraph include--
       (A) cooperation by agencies and departments of the United 
     States with counterpart agencies and departments in a country 
     designated as a Destination of Possible Diversion Concern 
     under paragraph (1) to--
       (i) develop or strengthen export control systems in the 
     country;
       (ii) strengthen cooperation and facilitate enforcement of 
     export control systems in the country; and
       (iii) promote information and data exchanges among agencies 
     of the country and with the United States; and
       (B) efforts by the Office of International Programs of the 
     Department of Commerce to strengthen the export control 
     systems of the country to--
       (i) facilitate legitimate trade in high-technology goods; 
     and

[[Page 22135]]

       (ii) prevent terrorists and state sponsors of terrorism, 
     including Iran, from obtaining nuclear, biological, and 
     chemical weapons, defense technologies, components for 
     improvised explosive devices, and other defense items.
       (b) Destinations of Diversion Concern.--
       (1) Designation.--The Secretary of Commerce shall designate 
     a country as a Destination of Diversion Concern if the 
     Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State and 
     the Secretary of the Treasury, determines--
       (A) that the government of the country is directly involved 
     in transshipment, reexportation, or diversion of items that 
     originated in the United States to end-users whose identities 
     cannot be verified or to entities owned or controlled by the 
     Government of Iran; or
       (B) 12 months after the Secretary of Commerce designates 
     the country as a Destination of Possible Diversion Concern 
     under subsection (a)(1), that the country has failed--
       (i) to cooperate with the government-to-government 
     activities initiated by the United States under subsection 
     (a)(2); or
       (ii) based on the criteria described in subsection (a)(1), 
     to adequately strengthen the export control systems of the 
     country.
       (2) Licensing controls with respect to destinations of 
     diversion concern.--
       (A) Report on suspect items.--
       (i) In general.--Not later than 45 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, the 
     Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     containing a list of items that, if the items were 
     transshipped, reexported, or diverted to Iran, could 
     contribute to--

       (I) Iran obtaining nuclear, biological, or chemical 
     weapons, defense technologies, components for improvised 
     explosive devices, or other defense items; or
       (II) support by Iran for acts of international terrorism.

       (ii) Considerations for list.--In developing the list 
     required under clause (i), the Secretary of Commerce shall 
     consider--

       (I) the items subject to licensing requirements under 
     section 742.8 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations (or 
     any corresponding similar regulation or ruling) and other 
     existing licensing requirements; and
       (II) the items added to the list of items for which a 
     license is required for exportation to North Korea by the 
     final rule of the Bureau of Export Administration of the 
     Department of Commerce issued on June 19, 2000 (65 Fed. Reg. 
     38148; relating to export restrictions on North Korea).

       (B) Licensing requirement.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Commerce shall require a license to export an item on the 
     list required under subparagraph (A)(i) to a country 
     designated as a Destination of Diversion Concern.
       (3) Waiver.--The President may waive the imposition of the 
     licensing requirement under paragraph (2)(B) with respect to 
     a country designated as a Destination of Diversion Concern if 
     the President--
       (A) determines that such a waiver is in the national 
     interest of the United States; and
       (B) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report describing the reasons for the determination.
       (c) Termination of Designation.--The designation of a 
     country as a Destination of Possible Diversion Concern or a 
     Destination of Diversion Concern shall terminate on the date 
     on which the Secretary of Commerce determines, based on the 
     criteria described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of 
     subsection (a)(1), and certifies to Congress and the 
     President that the country has adequately strengthened the 
     export control systems of the country to prevent 
     transshipment, reexportation, and diversion of items through 
     the country to end-users whose identities cannot be verified 
     or to entities owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
     this section.

     SEC. 304. REPORT ON EXPANDING DIVERSION CONCERN SYSTEM TO 
                   COUNTRIES OTHER THAN IRAN.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of 
     State, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that--
       (1) identifies any country that the Director determines may 
     be transshipping, reexporting, or diverting items subject to 
     the provisions of the Export Administration Regulations to 
     another country if such other country--
       (A) is seeking to obtain nuclear, biological, or chemical 
     weapons, defense technologies, components for improvised 
     explosive devices, or other defense items; or
       (B) provides support for acts of international terrorism; 
     and
       (2) assesses the feasability and advisability of expanding 
     the system established under section 303 for designating 
     countries as Destinations of Possible Diversion Concern and 
     Destinations of Diversion Concern to include countries 
     identified under paragraph (1).

                    TITLE IV--EFFECTIVE DATE; SUNSET

     SEC. 401. EFFECTIVE DATE; SUNSET.

       (a) Effective Date.--Except as provided in sections 102, 
     103, 104 and 202, this Act and the amendments made by this 
     Act take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Sunset.--The provisions of this Act shall terminate on 
     the date that is 30 days after the date on which the 
     President certifies to Congress that--
       (1) the Government of Iran has ceased providing support for 
     acts of international terrorism and no longer satisfies the 
     requirements for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism 
     under--
       (A) section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 
     1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)) (or any successor 
     thereto);
       (B) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2780(d)); or
       (C) section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)); and
       (2) Iran has ceased the pursuit, acquisition, and 
     development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and 
     ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Berman) and the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-
Lehtinen) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.


                             General Leave

  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include 
extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power, to me, is 
one of the great national security challenges of our age. A nuclear-
armed, fundamentalist Iran would become the dominant power in its 
region. The global nonproliferation regime would crumble. Already today 
we know that many of Iran's neighbors are contemplating their own 
nuclear programs. And can anyone be sure that Iran, with a leader who 
speaks like he speaks now, would not resort to either the use of 
nuclear weapons or to the handoff of those weapons to terrorist 
organizations?
  The sanctions that the United States and the international community 
have thus far placed on Iran have squeezed Iran's economy somewhat, but 
clearly not enough to slow down its nuclear program. The present 
strategy is not working. I'm disappointed--and I believe the Iranian 
regime is surely heartened--by the failure of the administration's 
program to produce the kinds of results we need regarding Iran's 
nuclear program.
  We need to make our foreign policy priorities clear. And Iran must be 
at the very top of the agenda in all our dealings with other countries. 
Sanctions will never work unless we have buy-in and support from other 
key countries. And if the process of achieving that buy-in requires us 
to engage directly with Iran, that is certainly something we should do.
  Two months ago, the Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council 
and Germany offered Iran all kinds of generous incentives to persuade 
it to suspend its uranium enrichment program. Just for the sake of 
initiating further talks on this package, they offered what they called 
a ``freeze-for-freeze,'' meaning we will agree not to pursue further 
sanctions for 6 weeks and Iran agrees not to increase the number of its 
centrifuges. But these offers weren't good enough for Iran, which 
responded only with a noncommittal letter.
  If Iran won't change its behavior as a result of the sanctions the 
international community has already imposed, and if it won't change its 
behavior as a result of the generous incentives package offered in 
Geneva, then we should be pursuing tougher and more meaningful 
sanctions.
  The legislation before us won't put an end to Iran's nuclear program, 
but it may help to slow it down. It will send a strong signal to Tehran 
that the U.S. Congress views this matter with urgency. And it will send 
a message to

[[Page 22136]]

companies and countries that invest or consider investing in Iran's 
energy sector.

                              {time}  1945

  This bill before us contains a somewhat diluted version of two 
measures put together in the other body that had previously been passed 
by the House by votes of 397-16 and 408-6.
  This legislation would codify and expand export and import bans on 
goods to and from Iran. It would freeze assets in the U.S. held by 
Iranians closely tied to the regime. It would render sanctionable a 
U.S. parent company if that parent company uses a foreign subsidiary to 
circumvent sanctions. It expands the Iran Sanctions Act to cover not 
only oil and all natural gas but related industries. It authorizes 
State and local governments in the United States to divest from any 
company that invests $20 million or more in Iran's energy sector. It 
increases U.S. export controls on countries that are directly involved 
in trans-shipment or illegal diversion of sensitive technologies to 
Iran. And it requires the administration to report all foreign 
investments of $20 million or more made in Iran's energy sector, an 
action which they have not done notwithstanding the existing law, and 
determining whether each such investment qualifies as sanctionable.
  Since 1996, the executive branch has never implemented the sanctions 
in the Iran Sanctions Act, even though well over a dozen sanctionable 
investment deals have been concluded with Iran by international 
companies. The administration hasn't even made a determination as to 
whether any of those investors are sanctionable. This bill will close 
that loophole.
  This legislation before us also reaffirms our Nation's commitment to 
multilateral diplomacy to increase pressure on Iran to give up its 
nuclear weapons program, and it exclusively states that nothing in this 
act authorizes the use of force.
  Based on previous votes, this body is committed to ending Iran's 
illicit nuclear program by taking measures that are peaceful but 
meaningful. I believe this legislation is a useful step forward toward 
that end.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to yield myself such time 
as I might consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this measure, but with great 
reservations that this weak legislation will send a message to our 
enemies of a weakened U.S. position on the issue of Iran.
  The Iranian threat to the United States, to our allies and to our 
interests could not be more apparent. Only last week the head of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency warned that Iran is probably 
carrying out secret nuclear activities. Then last Saturday the lead 
inspector for the Middle East shared with member nations of the IAEA 
extensive documentation of an Iranian effort to reconfigure the Shahab-
3 long-range missile to carry a nuclear warhead. The range of these 
missiles reach Israel and most of the Middle East.
  And this is a regime whose current leader, Ahmadinejad, has 
consistently called for the destruction of the Jewish State of Israel.
  On October 26, 2005, at the World Without Zionism Conference in 
Tehran, the Iranian leader called for Israel to be ``wiped off the 
map,'' described Israel as ``a disgraceful blot on the face of the 
Islamic world'' and declared that ``anybody who recognizes Israel will 
burn in the fire of the Islamic nation's fury.'' Then on December 12, 
2006, he addressed a conference in Tehran questioning the historical 
veracity of the Holocaust and said that Israel, again, would ``soon be 
wiped out.''
  On Israel's 60th birthday, Ahmadinejad gave a speech in which, 
according to the official Iranian news agency, he stated that Israel 
was ``on its way to total destruction.''
  In a public address which aired on the Iranian news channel on June 2 
of this year, Ahmadinejad again called this ``worm of corruption'' in 
reference to Israel, to be wiped off. He further stated that while 
``some say the ideal of Greater Israel has expired, I say the idea of 
lesser Israel has expired too.'' And earlier this week at the United 
Nations, he continued to invoke anti-Israel and anti-Semitic canards 
when he stated ``the dignity, integrity and rights of the European and 
American people are being played with by a small but deceitful number 
of people call Zionists. These nations are spending their dignity and 
resources on the crimes and the occupations and the threats of the 
Zionist network against their will.''
  But the threat is not just to our friend Israel. Iran is currently 
working on even longer-range missiles directly threatening critical 
U.S. interests. The importance and the urgency of strengthened 
sanctions was underlined just a few days ago, Mr. Speaker, when the 
European Union warned that Iran was approaching a nuclear weapons 
capability. The significance stems from the fact that the European 
Union has long insisted that the West and other countries focus their 
efforts on diplomacy to persuade Iran to suspend its nuclear program.
  This is an acknowledgment that a strategy based on holding out an 
olive branch and engaging directly with the Iranian regime, while 
promising trade agreements and other benefits, has not worked and that 
more concrete economic pressure is needed to compel a change in 
regimes' behavior. Thus the evidence before us makes it clear that we 
must act quickly to impose the greatest pressure possible on the regime 
and its enablers.
  Unfortunately, this bill does not do quite that, Mr. Speaker. My 
colleagues, you all know where I stand on Iran. Last Congress I 
authored the Iran Freedom Support Act which contained very tough and 
quite focused sanctions on the regime in Tehran. Our beloved late 
former chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Tom Lantos, was the 
lead Democrat cosponsor, and the bill enjoyed the support of our 
current chairman, Howard Berman, my good friend, and 360 Members of the 
House.
  The Iran Freedom Support Act was enacted into law 2 years ago almost 
to the day on September 30. Then when Chairman Lantos approached me 
last year and asked that I serve as the lead Republican cosponsor of 
H.R. 1400, the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007, I immediately 
agreed because H.R. 1400 truly does strengthen U.S. law and does 
tighten the economic noose around the regime's elites in Iran.
  H.R. 1400 passed the House a year ago yesterday, September 25, 2007, 
by a vote of 397 in favor and only 16 against. Yet it has been stalled 
in the Senate all this time. Then we have Senate bill 970 which 
currently has the support of 73 Senators. However, action on these 
stronger bills was not to be. Instead, we have a bill which refers to 
certain sanctions already in place, and they call them ``new'' 
sanctions, and then refers to a handful of other important ones while 
providing a meager ``national interest waiver.''
  What does this mean in practice, Mr. Speaker? The next President 
doesn't have to worry about actually implementing or applying these 
sanctions, as a ``national interest waiver'' has been easily justified 
by consecutive administrations to avoid implementing U.S. laws 
concerning state sponsors of terrorism, like Iran.
  So rather than strengthening the sanctions structure, rather than 
limiting the President's flexibility, as we did 2 years ago in the Iran 
Freedom Support Act on proliferation-related sanctions by removing the 
waiver and on the Iran Sanctions Act by raising the threshold to 
``vital to the national security interests of the United States,'' the 
bill before us provides the weakest possible threshold.
  I do not fault my good friend, Chairman Berman. I commend the 
chairman for his efforts. He is in a difficult situation, and this is 
as strong a bill as some of his colleagues will allow the House or the 
Senate to act on.
  This bill is like one of the weak Iran resolutions that the United 
Nations Security Council keeps passing that allows Russia and China and 
others to go along with because they do nothing. In fact, just today, 
the U.N. Security Council moved a measure that contained no new 
sanctions but said that other Security Council resolutions on

[[Page 22137]]

Iran are legally binding and must be carried out. That is almost 
exactly what the bill before us is going to do on the issue of 
sanctions.
  Again, I do not understand why, at a time when the Iranian regime is 
crystal clear in accelerating its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon, 
that we are not considering the Lantos Iran Counter-Proliferation Act 
or Senate bill 970.
  Notably, this body has not even considered the Ackerman-Pence 
resolution, which has 275 cosponsors and is a strong, unequivocal 
message to the regime.
  Yet, Mr. Speaker, despite the many deficiencies of this bill, I want 
to thank my friend, Chairman Berman, for adding a Rule of Construction 
to his version of the Dodd bill which states, ``nothing in this Act 
shall be construed as affecting in any way any provision of the Iran 
Freedom Support Act of 2006, Public Law 109-293.''
  Since the legislation retains a ``notwithstanding'' clause for 
section 103, I hope that the Rule of Construction will be sufficient to 
prevent the unraveling of sanctions codified 2 years ago. Additionally, 
Mr. Speaker, portions of section 104 are essentially a repetition of 
current law as section 2(f) of the Executive Order 13059 codified.
  In this respect, Chairman Berman, I would appreciate or his 
substitute, Mr. Ackerman, clarification that the waiver in section 104 
would not apply to sanctions already in place, even if these have been 
restated in the legislation.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, I appreciate that the reporting requirements 
have been strengthened with respect to investments in Iran's energy 
sector since January 1 of this year. However, I ask to add language to 
the bill before us that would amend current law and force a 
determination on whether foreign investments in Iran's energy sector 
violate the Iran Sanctions Act and whether sanctions should be 
implemented. My proposal was not limited to the last 9 months of 
activity or to simply reporting requirements. But this modification was 
not incorporated in the text that we are considering today.
  Looking to other sections of this House version of the Dodd bill, 
there are provisions seeking to prevent the export or trans-shipment of 
U.S.-origin goods to Iran. Except for the language calling for the 
designation of a country as a Destination of Possible Diversion 
Concern, this bill duplicates most existing laws and regulations on 
these issues, as well as current U.S. Government programs. It does 
provide for the application of licensing controls to the countries 
designated, but immediately affords yet another mere ``national 
interest waiver.''
  There are also stronger bills pending on the issue of trans-shipment, 
such as H.R. 6178, the Security Through Termination of Proliferation 
Act, or the STOP Act. And I hope that we can work together to move that 
legislation in the next Congress.
  My good friend, Howard Berman, shares with me concerns about trans-
shipment and diversion of sensitive materials and technology to Iran. 
We articulated them in our letter of February 5, 2008, a letter to 
Admiral McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence, raising these 
and many other vital issues.
  Mr. Speaker, also on this issue I recently wrote to my chairman, 
Howard Berman, asking for greater scrutiny of foreign military 
financing, foreign military sales and direct commercial sales to 
countries that are a trans-shipment concern for U.S.-origin goods to 
Iran.
  In closing, Mr. Speaker, despite my grave, serious and repeated 
reservations about this weak bill, I will vote for it, and I hope that 
the Iranian regime and its enablers do not see this as a sign of 
weakness on our part.

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                 Washington, DC, February 5, 2008.
     Hon. J. Michael McConnell,
     Director of National Intelligence, Office of the Director of 
         National Intelligence, Washington, DC.
       Dear Admiral McConnell: We are writing to request an 
     assessment of the export control regime in the United Arab 
     Emirates (UAE), especially its effectiveness in preventing 
     the export or transshipment of U.S.-origin goods to Iran. We 
     are also interested in receiving information regarding 
     broader efforts to implement U.S. sanctions against Iran.
       As you are aware, Iran is the one of the UAE's largest 
     trade partners. The UAE is also a world leader in the 
     transshipments of goods from other countries, including the 
     United States. We are concerned by reports that the 
     international sanctions against Iran are being undermined by 
     inadequate end-use controls in the UAE. Obviously, an 
     effective export, re-export, and transshipment control regime 
     in the UAE is a prerequisite to that country's ability to 
     control transshipment of sensitive goods through its ports.
       To enable the House Foreign Affairs Committee to better 
     understand this issue, we request that you provide an 
     assessment of the effectiveness of the UAE's existing export 
     control regime and a translated copy of the DAE's new export 
     control legislation. Among other subjects, the assessment 
     should address overall effectiveness, obstacles to 
     implementation, the extent to which the UAE has complied with 
     U.S. requests to interdict and prevent shipments of concern, 
     and the attitudes and records of specific UAE officials 
     toward preventing exports or transshipments of items of 
     proliferation concern to Iran or Iranian-controlled entities.
       Additionally, we request that you provide the following 
     information pertaining to broader U.S. efforts: the amount of 
     goods seized, penalties imposed, and convictions obtained by 
     U.S. authorities under the trade ban; the type and amount of 
     U.S. sensitive items diverted to Iran through all 
     transshipment points; the extent to which all repeat 
     violators of U.S. Iran-specific sanctions laws have ended 
     their sales of sensitive items to Iran; the total amount of 
     assets frozen due to financial sanctions implemented by both 
     the United States and other nations; and the total impact of 
     U.S. bilateral sanctions on foreign investment in Iran's 
     energy sector.
       This assessment may be in classified form.
       Thank you for your attention to our request.
           Sincerely,
     Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
       Ranking Member, House Foreign Affairs Committee.
     Edward R. Royce,
       Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation 
     and Trade.
     Mike Pence,
       Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South 
     Asia.
     Tom Lantos,
       Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee.
     Howard L. Berman,
       Senior Member, House Foreign Affairs Committee.
                                  ____

                                          House of Representatives


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                               Washington, DC, September 11, 2008.
     Hon. Howard L. Berman,
     Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2170 Rayburn 
         House Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Berman: I am writing regarding the current 
     status of our Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military 
     Sales, and Direct Commercial Sales approval process and 
     criteria toward our Middle East allies. Specifically, I ask 
     you to consider holding on approving the recently notified 
     sale of Terminal High Altitude Air Defense units, missiles, 
     radars, launchers, and related equipment to the United Arab 
     Emirates; the proposed transfer of the AIM-9X Sidewinder air-
     to-air missile to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; and future 
     sales to UAE, and Saudi Arabia until the Department of State 
     and Department of Defense provide the Committee with a 
     detailed written accounting of: (1) procedures for vetting 
     recipient entities and individuals with access to the U.S. 
     equipment proposed to be transferred; (2) procedures for U.S. 
     Government post shipment verification; and (3) safeguards in 
     place to prevent diversion to or sharing of technology with 
     unintended recipients. Further, before clearance is granted 
     for these and future sales, it is imperative that the 
     pertinent USG agencies provide detailed written justification 
     of: (1) how these transfers are necessary to protect U.S. 
     assets and personnel in the region; (2) how they promote 
     specific national security interests and priorities beyond a 
     broad justification relating to the Iran threat; (3) steps 
     undertaken by the recipient government to address such U.S. 
     national security priorities as preventing the transshipment 
     of U.S.-origin goods to Iran through UAE and the closing of 
     madrassas and so-called Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia. 
     Finally, we should require written assurances from the 
     pertinent USG agencies that the provision of defensive 
     weapons and technology cannot be used by our enemies to 
     enhance their offensive capabilities.
       Mr. Chairman, as you know, the United States is facing many 
     challenges in the Middle East--a region described by security 
     officials as the center of an ``arc of instability.''

[[Page 22138]]

     It is therefore incumbent upon us to work together to 
     identify and address those variables that pose the preeminent 
     threats to our nation's security, our interests, and our 
     allies. Chief among these is Iran's development of 
     conventional and unconventional capabilities--to include both 
     symmetric and asymmetric threats to its neighbors, and, above 
     all nuclear aspirations--aimed at establishing its hegemony 
     in its immediate neighborhood and enhancing its role in the 
     Middle East and beyond.
       As a means to confront the Iranian threat, and other 
     threats facing the region, we have provided congressional 
     approval for significant new and increasingly sophisticated 
     military sales to U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf region, as 
     part of a broader American strategy aimed at containing 
     Iranian influence by strengthening Iran's neighbors.
       On balance, we recognize that the Foreign Military 
     Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and Direct Commercial 
     Sales programs represent a constructive element in a larger 
     strategy to reassure our regional friends and deter Tehran. 
     However, these arms sales and associated efforts cannot 
     continue to be provided in a vacuum, nor should they be 
     viewed by recipient nations as an entitlement. In this 
     context, any long-term U.S. strategy to bolster Gulf security 
     through such programs must include the following principles.
       The first is that our Gulf allies cannot undermine the 
     American position in the region--and with it vital U.S. 
     national security objectives--while simultaneously relying on 
     it. They cannot expect to receive such security guarantees to 
     guard against a nuclear Iran if they: (1) fail to publicly 
     support the U.S. and UN Security Council position that Iran 
     must unconditionally cease its uranium enrichment and 
     reprocessing activities and address all pending questions 
     concerning its nuclear program; (2) fail to take steps to 
     fully implement UNSC sanctions targeting the Iranian regime; 
     and (3) are in violation of U.S. sanctions laws regarding 
     Iran.
       Second, out military assistance and sales to Saudi Arabia, 
     Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, in particular, and our 
     regional allies in general, must be contingent upon their 
     cooperation to combat extremists-- both those that pose a 
     threat to their governments and those who intend to harm the 
     U.S. and its allies.
       For example, combating terrorist financing is one of the 
     most critical components of our anti-terror efforts in the 
     region. Yet, significant concerns remain regarding 
     fundraising activities, and the transfer of funds to 
     terrorist organizations in countries such as Saudi Arabia, 
     Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, among others. In particular, the 
     failure to address the financing of terrorist organizations 
     such as Hamas directly impacts and undermines efforts to 
     disrupt the same and similar networks that provide financing 
     to al-Qaeda. Persons, governments and governing entities that 
     actively or passively allow fundraising activities or the 
     transfer of funds to terrorist organizations bear 
     responsibility for the actions taken by terrorists 
     themselves. As a result, Congress must expect these and other 
     FMF, FMS and DCS recipients to show tangible progress towards 
     addressing the concerns listed above, and ceasing other 
     counterproductive actions.
       The third principle is that the military sales component of 
     this strategy must be accompanied by cooperation of the Gulf 
     States with the U.S. and others in addressing critical 
     challenges in the region. In this respect, we will expect GSD 
     participant countries, support for and participation in U.S. 
     and international non-proliferation and counter-terror 
     policies and programs, such as the Proliferation Security 
     Initiative.
       The failure of GCC states to develop a proper degree of 
     integration, interoperability and effectiveness in performing 
     key military missions, in particular, remains a primary 
     concern. Since the founding of the GCC, Gulf leaders have 
     done little to reach beyond national boundaries and create 
     effective deterrence and defense throughout the Gulf. They 
     continue to buy more sophisticated weapons systems; but have 
     failed to come to grips with the details of creating 
     effective joint forces. This has been coupled with a de facto 
     acceptance of dependence on the US, rather than efforts to 
     create an effective partnership based on creating effective 
     local deterrent and defense capabilities mixed with 
     reinforcement and support by US forces. We must see 
     demonstrative progress toward addressing these concerns if we 
     are to approve the sale of future sophisticated weapons 
     systems under these programs.
       Third, we not-only remain concerned that prospective U.S. 
     transfers of advanced military technologies could erode 
     Israel's ``qualitative edge'' over its Arab neighbors, but 
     that this hardware could be utilized against Israel or other 
     U.S. allies in the event that a conflagration were to erupt 
     within the region. We should not approve new sales of 
     sophisticated defense technologies to the region without 
     iron-clad guarantees on these two concerns.
       Finally, current U.S. law bars American arms sales to any 
     country that enforces the primary and secondary Arab League 
     boycott of Israel. While the provision has been waived for 
     the Gulf states every year since enactment, we should insist 
     on its full implementation.
       Our allies in the region must show demonstrable progress on 
     the above issues as a prerequisite to Committee approval of 
     FMF, FMS and DCS programs and sales in the region. Thank you 
     for your time and consideration, and I look forward to 
     receiving your response.
           Sincerely,

                                          Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,

                                Ranking Member, House Committee on
                                                  Foreign Affairs.

  With that, Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from New 
York will control the remaining time of the gentleman from California.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 4 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Ohio, Dennis Kucinich.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the gentleman.
  I rise in opposition. What we see here at work is the Bush 
administration's flawed national security doctrine. They are staging an 
attack on Iran. Their Navy is in the gulf. There have been overflights. 
There are covert operations and assassinations. The administration 
recently sent weapons to Israel which can be used for an attack on 
Iran: 1,000 so-called smart bombs, the GBU 39s, which could be used to 
attack the nuclear power sites that would produce a catastrophe, 
according to the Physicians for Social Responsibility report.
  I believe it is adverse to the security of Israel to continue to 
follow the United States' current national security doctrine. And it's 
also adverse to continue to insist that nuclear power is to be equated 
with nuclear weapons.
  Now, if we want diplomacy, and we should, we should be listening to 
five former Secretaries of State who have said that diplomacy is what 
we should pursue.
  I would like to enter their names into the Record.

                              {time}  2000

  Sanctions are not to be confused with diplomacy, any more than war is 
to be confused with diplomacy. Nuclear power, I want to repeat, does 
not equate with a nuclear weapons program.
  I want to cite our own CRS report which was given to the Congress on 
August 11, 2008, just a little more than a month ago, which cites the 
2007 National Intelligence Estimate, that says according to the 2007 
National Intelligence Estimate, and that is from December of 2007, 
``Iranian military entities were working under government direction to 
develop nuclear weapons'' until fall 2003, but then halted its nuclear 
weapons program ``primarily in response to international pressure.''
  I would like to enter the CRS report into the Record.
  Furthermore, the International Atomic Energy Agency has recently 
released a report which states very clearly, and this report is 4 days 
ago, September 22, 2008, by the Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, 
with respect to the implementation of safeguards in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, ``The Agency has been able to continue to verify the 
non-diversion of nuclear material in Iran.'' It goes on to say, ``I 
note that the agency has not detected the usual use of nuclear material 
in connection with the alleged studies, nor does it have information 
apart from uranium metal document on the actual design or manufacture 
by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon.''
  I would like to include this in the Record.
  I would also like to include in the Record a quote from a piece by 
historian William Polk, who has said, ``Ironically the U.S. has three 
times actually helped Iran move towards nuclear weapons. Under the 
Shah, the Nixon administration gave Iran a big push in that direction. 
Then 6 years ago in Operation Merlin, the CIA provided Iran with plans 
for the central explosive charge for a nuclear weapon. The idea was to 
mislead the Persians into working on an unworkable model for the bomb, 
but the ploy was so crude that Iran probably profited from it. Finally, 
it turns out the U.S. Department of Energy has been subsidizing Russian 
organizations that have been helping Iran's nuclear program.''

[[Page 22139]]

  Now, one of my many concerns with this legislation is it sanctions 
the Central Bank of Iran. In doing that, I raise a question with regard 
to our current liquidity problems on Wall Street, whether or not the 
sanctioning of Iran's Central Bank will be a problem for our own 
economy, as well as the sanctions here on oil transactions, which could 
affect the price of energy.
  I want to submit this for the Record as well.

                      Precis of Understanding Iran

                      (By William Polk, Historian)

       Ironically, the U.S. has three times actually helped Iran 
     move toward nuclear weapons: Under the Shah the Nixon 
     administration gave Iran a big push in that direction; then 
     six years ago in ``Operation Merlin,'' the CIA provided Iran 
     with plans for the central explosive charge for a nuclear 
     weapon. The idea was to mislead the Persians into working on 
     an unworkable approach to the bomb but the ploy was so crude 
     that Iran probably profited from it. Finally, it turns out 
     that the U.S. Department of Energy has been subsidizing 
     Russian organizations that have been helping Iran's nuclear 
     program.
                                  ____


CRS Report for Congress: Iran's Nuclear Program: Status, Updated August 
                                11, 2008


                The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate

       According to the 2007 NIE, ``Iranian military entities were 
     working under government direction to develop nuclear 
     weapons'' until fall 2003, but then halted its nuclear 
     weapons program ``primarily in response to international 
     pressure.'' The NIE defines ``nuclear weapons program'' as 
     ``Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and 
     covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-
     related work.''
                                  ____


           5 Former Secretaries of State Urge Talks With Iran

       Washington (AP)--Five former secretaries of state, 
     gathering to give their best advice to the next president, 
     agreed Monday that the United States should talk to Iran.
       The wide-ranging, 90-minute session in a packed auditorium 
     at The George Washington University, produced exceptional 
     unity among Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell, Warren 
     Christopher, Henry A. Kissinger and James A. Baker.
                                  ____


            Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors

            (By IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei)


      Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran

       The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-
     diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Regrettably, 
     the Agency has not been able to make substantive progress on 
     the alleged studies and associated questions relevant to 
     possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. 
     These remain of serious concern.
       I note that the Agency has not detected the actual use of 
     nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor 
     does it have information--apart from the uranium metal 
     document--on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of 
     nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon.

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I continue to reserve, Mr. Speaker.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, in considering this bill, this package of sanctions and 
divestment authorities for states and localities, we should keep 
foremost in our minds we are in a race. I am not referring to our 
upcoming elections, but rather the race between the civilized world and 
the nuclear ambitions of Iran.
  One of us will win, and one will lose. If the world wins, Iran will 
not become a nuclear weapons state, there will not be a nuclear arms 
race in the Middle East and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty will 
not collapse. If Iran wins, the chief sponsor of terrorism in the 
Middle East, the patron of Hamas and Hezbollah, a hegemonic nation led 
by fanatical religious zealots will be able to threaten the global 
economy and the security of the United States and the civilized world 
from behind a nuclear shield.
  And we are just about to lose this race. Iran is not only ahead, it 
is sprinting to the finish. Its proliferation potential is now a simple 
math problem. Iran is now producing 2.5 kilograms of low-enriched 
uranium per day, and has produced an estimated 200 to 250 kilograms of 
LEU just since this past May.
  For a crash bomb program, Iran could use the LEU as feedstock, 
dramatically shortening the time to produce nuclear weapons grade 
uranium. With 700 to 800 kilograms of LEU set into centrifuges, Iran 
could produce the 20 to 25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium required 
for a crude atomic bomb. Other estimates suggest that 1,000 to 1,700 
kilograms of LEU would be necessary. Regardless of whether it is 700 or 
1,700 kilograms, Iranian proliferation is no longer a question of if, 
but when.
  The President has known about this threat since day one. He has 
known, and done next to nothing. The Bush administration has adamantly 
refused to use existing U.S. sanction laws against foreign companies 
investing in Iran's oil sector. But far worse, the Bush administration 
has actively worked to stop Congress from adopting the tough and 
necessary legislation that we have before us today.
  Why? Do they believe that the past 5 years of slow motion, U.S.-in-
the-back-seat diplomacy is about to make a huge breakthrough? In the 
light of Russia's recent announcement that they have no intention of 
supporting additional UN Security Council sanctions in Iran, I would 
like someone to explain how this huge breakthrough is supposed to 
happen.
  With our administration tied up in an ideological knot, opposed to 
U.S. sanctions and unwilling to engage effectively itself, the question 
for Congress is what can we do to stop Iran. With so little time, our 
thinking on this problem needs to change. Options that years ago may 
have seemed reckless, like sanctioning firms in allied countries and 
applying unilateral economic levers, now have been become essential if 
we are going to be successful in peacefully getting Iran to back down.
  Likewise, continuing doggedly with the current take-no-chances, 
small-carrots-and-no-sticks diplomacy which the Bush administration has 
insisted on, today looks like a roadmap to disaster.
  Iranian proliferation is mere months away. That fact makes what is 
feckless, by definition, reckless. I am not calling for another war. I 
do not want air strikes or a blockade. I want to avoid all that. But if 
we don't want war, and we really don't want a nuclear Iran, then we 
have an obligation to use every peaceful, diplomatic, political and 
economic weapon at our disposal. If you don't want bombs, then you have 
to have an alternative, and that is sanctions. Abjuring sanctions is a 
de facto call to those who want arms.
  I am very grateful to Chairman Berman and Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen 
for their efforts in bringing this critical package of sanctions of 
legislation to the floor today. It deserves the enthusiastic support of 
every Member of the House, and there isn't a moment to lose.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I reserve my time.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman) from the Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Let me quickly respond to the comments of the gentleman 
from Ohio. He can attack this bill as he will, except he cannot say 
that it is related to George Bush. Bush stalled and weakened this 
legislation throughout the 110th Congress. It would be law today 
without the opposition of the Bush administration.
  He also tells us, he quotes from the NIE, that Iran seems to have 
suspended its weaponization program. Weaponization is the small, easy 
and delayable part of developing a nuclear weapon. The tough part is 
getting enough highly enriched uranium, and Iran is working full bore 
and proudly unveiled 3,000 and more centrifuges to do that. They can 
wait a couple of years, and then work on the engineering of how to take 
that enriched uranium and turn it into an atomic weapon, without 
delaying for a day the day they have become a nuclear power state.
  I also want to agree with the ranking member when she states that 
this bill does not waive or make waivable any sanction in existing law. 
The sole purpose of this law is to increase and apply new sanctions to 
Iran, not to waive or make waivable any sanction under existing law.
  The goal of this bill is to drive home to the people and elites of 
Iran that

[[Page 22140]]

they face economic isolation if they do not abandon their nuclear 
program. But let's not exaggerate its impact. It is long overdue, 
modest steps in that direction.
  The bill includes concepts from two important Iran sanctions bills 
that passed the House overwhelmingly in 2007. Within 6 months of our 
taking office, with the strong support of Speaker Pelosi and Majority 
Leader Hoyer, under the leadership of Chairman Lantos and Chairman 
Frank, the House passed the two Iran sanctions bills that have become 
the centerpiece legislation of efforts on Iran in the 110th Congress: 
H.R. 1400, the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act, authored by the late Tom 
Lantos; and H.R. 2347, the Iran Sanctions Enabling Act, authored by 
Chairman Frank and introduced in the Senate by Senator Obama.
  We have worked over the opposition of the Bush administration to pass 
these bills through the House. Then they got bogged down in the Senate. 
Now the Senate, with Senators Dodd and Shelby, have reached consensus 
on an Iran package that encompasses the concepts in the House bills, 
though weakens them. This bill would already be in the Senate DOD 
authorization bill had a bipartisan consensus not broken down.
  So now we have this imperfect bill which we need to enact, and 
hopefully the Senate will act on it in the next few days.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.
  Mr. SHERMAN. The bill takes important steps like reinforcing the 
embargo on Iranian goods. We don't import oil from Iran. We only import 
the stuff that we don't need and they couldn't sell elsewhere. 
Unfortunately, this provision is waivable.
  If it clarifies that a U.S. company, and I take some pride in 
authoring this provision, may not use its overseas subsidiaries to do 
business with Iran that it could not do on its own. Unfortunately, this 
provision is also waivable.
  I would hope that people would understand, you get overwhelming 
rhetoric from the administration about how much they hate Ahmadinejad. 
The little secret is they have a love for the total independence of 
multinational oil corporations that exceeds their hatred of 
Ahmadinejad, and that is something the country does not understand. 
That is why the Bush administration has bottled up this legislation. We 
need to pass it now.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to yield myself such time 
as I may consume.
  I would like to point out that the reports that we are getting about 
the threat of a nuclear-powered Iran are coming from all corners of the 
world, and I would like to read just segments of the online edition of 
The Jerusalem Post posted by Herb Keinon. It says, ``Military 
Intelligence: Iran Halfway to First Nuclear Bomb.'' It reads, ``Iran is 
halfway to a nuclear bomb, and Hezbollah, Hamas and Syria are using 
this period of relative calm to significantly rearm.''
  This is according to the Head of Research from the Israeli Military 
Intelligence, and that is the information that he gave and he shared 
with members of the Israeli Cabinet and the Israeli Parliament on 
September 21st, in the Knesset. He said there was a growing gap between 
Iran's progress on the nuclear front and the determination of the West 
to stop it. A growing gap. Iran gets closer, our determination is 
stopped. Iran is concentrating on uranium enrichment and is making 
progress.

                              {time}  2015

  He noted that they have improved the function of their 4,000 
centrifuges. According to this military intelligence head of research, 
Iranian centrifuges have so far produced between one-third to one-half 
of the enriched material that is needed to build a nuclear bomb. The 
time that they will have crossed the nuclear point of no return is fast 
approaching.
  Although he stopped short of giving a firm deadline, last week in the 
Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, he put the date at 
2011. Tick tock, the clock is ticking. He said that their confidence is 
growing with the thought that the international community is not strong 
enough to stop them. He said that the Iranians were playing for time 
and that time was working in their favor because the longer the process 
dragged on, the wider the riffs appearing among the countries in the 
west, then Iran is in control of the technology and continues to move 
forward with determination toward a nuclear bomb.
  In addition to their nuclear efforts, Iranians were also deepening 
their influence throughout the region, because they are cooperating 
with Syria. They are cooperating with the Palestinian terrorist 
organization, as well as being the main arms supplier to another 
terrorist group, Hezbollah.
  While I appreciate the intentions of my good friend, Chairman Berman, 
this bill does fall far short of the type of comprehensive sanctions 
that would truly cripple the Iranian economy, which is dependent on 
investments in its energy sector. Setting aside the weakness of the 
bill regarding the U.S. direct sanctions on the regime, it does nothing 
tangible to force the executive branch's hand to fully implement the 
Iran Sanctions Act.
  It could have, but language to include an automatic trigger for a 
determination of sanctions was not in place in this bill, and it was 
not to be. This bill had great promise. It does deliver on some of 
those promises. I wish that it could have gone further, but I hope that 
my colleagues will adopt this important bill tonight.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of our time.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield now to the 
gentleman from New York, the distinguished gentleman from the 
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Mr. Engel, 1 minute.
  Mr. ENGEL. I thank my colleague and good friend from New York.
  I rise to support this very important bill. Iran continues to defy 
Security Council resolutions by continuing to develop its nuclear 
program. The U.S. and our allies in the U.N. Security Council have 
recognized the danger that would be posed by a nuclear Iran and have 
repeatedly demanded that Iran suspend uranium enrichment.
  To change Iran's course, the U.S. must increase pressure with every 
appropriate diplomatic and political tool. U.S. sanctions have already 
helped to discourage investment in Iran, and further pressure may yet 
convince the regime in Iran to comply with international obligations 
and drop its nuclear program.
  This bill will counter Iran's illicit nuclear weapons program by 
sending a clear message that if Iran does not end its quest to obtain 
nuclear weapons, and its support for terrorism, it will face strong 
economic sanctions. The legislation imposes sanctions that will 
undercut Iran's nuclear program and support for terrorism.
  Moreover, the legislation reaffirms our commitment to multilateral 
diplomacy to increase pressure on Iran to beef up its program. Finally, 
it explicitly states that nothing in the act authorizes the use of 
force against Iran.
  I urge my colleagues to support this very important measure.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield to the 
gentleman from California, the distinguished chairman of the full 
committee, Mr. Howard Berman.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California is recognized 
for 1\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, two issues: first, the gentlelady has 
mentioned several times that this bill is not as strong as we wanted, 
and she is right. But it does many good things, many important things.
  If we went on and fully extrapolated her comments, we would know the 
reason it isn't quite as strong as we wanted. It is because the White 
House, working with the other body, has worked very hard to not make it 
as strong as we would like.
  Even this good, but not good as we wanted bill, would have been much 
stronger. I would love to see a letter of

[[Page 22141]]

support from the administration for this measure.
  On the issue she asked me to clarify, she got a very important piece 
of legislation through a couple of years ago that codified our 
sanctions and did not contain waiver authority. We don't believe this 
bill did, but we have made clear, by the language in section 108, that 
this waiver does not affect the provisions of the executive order 
codified by the Iran Freedom Support Act, that the waiver in this 
legislation has no impact whatsoever on her legislation, which passed 
in 2006, I am glad of that, and the specific provisions of section 108.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to place two exchanges of letters with the 
Committee on Financial Services and the Committee on Ways and Means in 
the Record.

                                         House of Representatives,


                                  Committee on Ways and Means,

                               Washington, DC, September 26, 2008.
     Hon. Howard L. Berman,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing regarding H.R. 7112--to 
     amend the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, to expand and clarify 
     the entities against which sanctions may be imposed--is 
     expected to be on the suspension calendar today.
       As you know, the Committee on Ways and Means has 
     jurisdiction over import matters, such as the import ban and 
     restrictions on imports imposed by the Iran Sanctions Act and 
     the International Emergency Powers Act. Accordingly, the 
     certain provisions of H.R. 7112 fall under the Committee's 
     jurisdiction.
       There have been some very productive conversations between 
     the staffs of our committees, during which we have proposed 
     some changes to H.R. 7112 that I believe help clarify the 
     intent and scope of the measure. My understanding is that 
     there is an agreement with regard to these changes.
       In order to expedite this legislation for floor 
     consideration, the Committee will forgo action on this bill 
     and will not oppose its consideration on the suspension 
     calendar. This is done with the understanding that it does 
     not in any way prejudice the Committee or its jurisdictional 
     prerogatives on this, or similar legislation in the future.
       I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming 
     our understanding with respect to H.R. 7112, and would ask 
     that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be 
     included in the Record.
       I look forward to the bill's consideration on the floor and 
     hope that it will command the broadest possible support.
           Sincerely,
                                                Charles B. Rangel,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                               Washington, DC, September 26, 2008.
     Hon. Charles B. Rangel,
     Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
     7112, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2008.
       I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this 
     legislation and the mutually agreed upon text that is being 
     presented to the House. I recognize that the bill contains 
     provisions that fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee 
     on Ways and Means. I agree that the inaction of your 
     Committee with respect to the bill does not in any way 
     prejudice the Committee on Ways and Means or its 
     jurisdictional prerogatives on this or similar legislation in 
     the future.
       I will ensure that our exchange of letters be included in 
     the Congressional Record.
           Cordially,
                                                 Howard L. Berman,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                              Committee on Financial Services,

                               Washington, DC, September 26, 2008.
     Hon. Howard Berman,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing concerning H.R. 7112, the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment 
     Act of 2008. This bill was referred to the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, and in addition, to this Committee, among 
     others.
       There is an agreement with regard to this bill, and so in 
     order to expedite floor consideration, I agree to forego 
     further consideration by the Committee on Financial Services. 
     I do so with the understanding that this decision will not 
     prejudice this Committee with respect to its jurisdictional 
     prerogatives on this or similar legislation. I request your 
     support for the appointment of conferees from this Committee 
     should this bill be the subject of a House-Senate conference.
       Please place this letter in the Congressional Record when 
     this bill is considered by the House. I look forward to the 
     bill's consideration and hope that it will command the 
     broadest possible support.
                                                     Barney Frank,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                               Washington, DC, September 26, 2008.
     Hon. Barney Frank,
     Chairman, Committee on Financial Services,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
     7112, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2008.
       I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this 
     legislation and the mutually agreed upon text that is being 
     presented to the House. I recognize that the bill contains 
     provisions that fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee 
     on Financial Services. I agree that the inaction of your 
     Committee with respect to the bill does not in any way 
     prejudice the Committee on Financial Services or its 
     jurisdictional prerogatives on this or similar legislation in 
     the future.
       I will ensure that our exchange of letters be included in 
     the Congressional Record.
           Cordially,
                                                 Howard L. Berman,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation to 
increase some sanctions against Iran in response to it's ongoing 
nuclear program. One important provision, which I have fought for in my 
state of Massachusetts, is to grant State governments the authority to 
divest their funds from companies investing in Iran's petroleum sector.
  But ladies and gentlemen, who are we kidding here? We just passed a 
bill which will break all the nonproliferation rules for India. And 
somehow we think doing that won't have any impact on our ability to 
prevent an Iranian bomb?
  These policies are interconnected.
  By breaking the rules for India, we're making it less likely that the 
rules will hold against Iran, or anyone else.
  Iran is looking at the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal and they are saying, 
``Where can I sign up? I want that deal!''
  In our efforts to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons, this 
bill moves us one step forward, but the India Nuclear Deal takes us 20 
steps back.
  If you want to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb, you should vote for 
this bill, and you must vote against the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I would like the record to show that I 
oppose this bill. I am concerned that this bill is a continuation of 
the lopsided ``sanctions-only'' approach to Iran that only undermines 
the potential for constructive engagement through diplomacy.
  Iran poses a particular challenge because as much as we are horrified 
by the regime's support for terrorism, threatened by its nuclear 
adventurism, and troubled by the lack of democracy and human rights, we 
also know that the Iranian people are as opposed to foreign 
manipulation as they are to authoritarian rule and that both the 
Iranian and American people want to avoid war.
  The steps that the Iranian regime should take are clear. They should 
stop their support for terrorism, end their development of nuclear 
weapons capability, and begin the process of free, fair, and open 
elections. But it is naive to think that the United States can merely 
tell them what to do, sanction them for not doing it, and expect 
success. We need, instead, to develop a smart, strong and constructive 
plan to deny Iran nuclear weapons and halt its support for terrorists, 
to help keep us and our allies secure.
  The first place to look for lessons is our success with Libya, where 
a unified international front convinced one of the world's most 
dangerous state-sponsors of terror to give up its nuclear weapons 
program in exchange for the benefits of membership in the international 
community. Iran must be given a similar choice and we must provide both 
credible incentives for negotiations to work and muscular sanctions if 
they fail.
  This bill offers a piecemeal approach: sanctions without credible 
negotiations. I oppose it and other short-sighted efforts in our 
approach to Iran.
  Mr. GARRETT of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that the House 
recently considered and passed H.R. 7112, a bill that expands the Iran 
Sanctions Act and authorizes state and local governments to divest from 
certain companies that hold Iranian assets.
  The timing of this legislation could not be more appropriate. This 
past week, the president of Iran visited the United Nations in New York 
City and gave two addresses. Not surprisingly, he took advantage of the 
platform and condemned ``a small but deceitful number of people called 
Zionists'' for using their influence in Europe and the U.S. in ``a 
deceitful, complex, and furtive manner.'' He also referred to ``Zionist 
murders'' and accused Jews of having an ``underhanded'' role in the 
crisis in Georgia.

[[Page 22142]]

  But President Ahmadinejad didn't limit his attacks to Israelis. He 
boasted that ``the American empire. . . is reaching the end of the 
road.'' Clearly, Tehran has malicious intentions and especially detests 
the United States and Israel. That's why H.R. 7112 is critical to 
improving our national security and stability. While Iran points out 
alleged flaws in American and Israeli policy, it continues to defy the 
Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, numerous U.N. Security Council 
resolutions, and International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.
  Of course, Iran claims to be enriching uranium for energy use, but 
U.N. inspectors have found elements that are constructive only in 
weapons. If Iran did indeed develop a nuclear bomb, the repercussions 
would be felt throughout the region, including in Iraq, India, 
Pakistan, Turkey, and Israel, as well as in the U.S. Since Iran is 
already supplying weapons to terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and 
Hamas, it is important that we act now to prevent the sale of sensitive 
material to Tehran.
  Finally, I would also like to mention another bill that recently 
passed the House: H. Res. 1361. While this Resolution rightly condemns 
the anti-Semitic language of the 2001 Durban Conference (Durban I), I 
urge my fellow Members to take the next step and support my 
legislation, H.R. 5847 or the United Nations Durban Review Conference 
(Durban II) Funding Prohibition Act.
  Ms. BERKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support for this bill. 
There is no doubt about Iran's intentions any longer: they are 
determined to do everything they can to harm the U.S. and annihilate 
our ally, Israel. They are well on their way to developing a nuclear 
weapon and they will not hesitate to use it against innocent civilian 
populations throughout the Middle East. They have armed terrorists in 
the past, they have built up their conventional weapons, and now they 
are doing everything they can to obtain the ultimate weapon.
  A nuclear armed Iran is a threat to everyone, everywhere and no one 
can afford any longer to sit back and wait for our allies to do the 
``dirty work'' for us and disarm Iran. We, too, must act.
  The time is long past due for us to pass these sanctions against that 
regime and stop their nuclear ambitions before they wipe our allies off 
the map.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 7112.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the 
rules were suspended and the bill was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

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