[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 154 (2008), Part 16]
[House]
[Pages 22111-22131]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




 UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION APPROVAL AND NONPROLIFERATION 
                            ENHANCEMENT ACT

  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 7081) to approve the United States-India Agreement for 
Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, and for other purposes.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 7081

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``United 
     States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and 
     Nonproliferation Enhancement Act''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

 TITLE I--APPROVAL OF UNITED STATES-INDIA AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION ON 
                    PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

Sec. 101. Approval of Agreement.
Sec. 102. Declarations of policy; certification requirement; rule of 
              construction.
Sec. 103. Additional Protocol between India and the IAEA.
Sec. 104. Implementation of Safeguards Agreement between India and the 
              IAEA.
Sec. 105. Modified reporting to Congress.

TITLE II--STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES NONPROLIFERATION LAW RELATING TO 
                      PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

Sec. 201. Procedures regarding a subsequent arrangement on 
              reprocessing.
Sec. 202. Initiatives and negotiations relating to agreements for 
              peaceful nuclear cooperation.
Sec. 203. Actions required for resumption of peaceful nuclear 
              cooperation.
Sec. 204. United States Government policy at the Nuclear Suppliers 
              Group to strengthen the international nuclear 
              nonproliferation regime.
Sec. 205. Conforming amendments.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Agreement.--The term ``United States-India Agreement 
     for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy'' or 
     ``Agreement'' means the Agreement for Cooperation Between the 
     Government of the United States of America and the Government 
     of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy that was 
     transmitted to Congress by the President on September 10, 
     2008.
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee 
     on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

 TITLE I--APPROVAL OF UNITED STATES-INDIA AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION ON 
                    PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

     SEC. 101. APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding the provisions for 
     congressional consideration and approval of a proposed 
     agreement for cooperation in section 123 b. and d. of the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153 (b) and (d)), 
     Congress hereby approves the United States-India Agreement 
     for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, subject 
     to subsection (b).
       (b) Applicability of Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Hyde Act, 
     and Other Provisions of Law.--The Agreement shall be subject 
     to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
     2011 et seq.), the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful 
     Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8001 et. 
     seq; Public Law 109-401), and any other applicable United 
     States law as if the Agreement had been approved pursuant to 
     the provisions for congressional consideration and approval 
     of a proposed agreement for cooperation in section 123 b. and 
     d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
       (c) Sunset of Exemption Authority Under Hyde Act.--Section 
     104(f) of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful 
     Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8003(f)) is 
     amended by striking ``the enactment of'' and all that follows 
     through ``agreement'' and inserting ``the date of the 
     enactment of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation 
     Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act''.

     SEC. 102. DECLARATIONS OF POLICY; CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT; 
                   RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       (a) Declarations of Policy Relating to Meaning and Legal 
     Effect of Agreement.--Congress declares that it is the 
     understanding of the United States that the provisions of the 
     United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful 
     Uses of Nuclear Energy have the meanings conveyed in the 
     authoritative representations provided by the President and 
     his representatives to the Congress and its committees prior 
     to September 20, 2008, regarding the meaning and legal effect 
     of the Agreement.
       (b) Declarations of Policy Relating to Transfer of Nuclear 
     Equipment, Materials, and Technology to India.--Congress 
     makes the following declarations of policy:
       (1) Pursuant to section 103(a)(6) of the Henry J. Hyde 
     United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 
     2006 (22 U.S.C. 8002(a)(6)), in the event that nuclear 
     transfers to India are suspended or terminated pursuant to 
     title I of such Act (22 U.S.C. 8001 et seq.), the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other 
     United States law, it is the policy of the United States to 
     seek to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment, 
     materials, or technology from other participating governments 
     in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or from any other 
     source.
       (2) Pursuant to section 103(b)(10) of the Henry J. Hyde 
     United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 
     2006 (22 U.S.C. 8002(b)(10)), any nuclear power reactor fuel 
     reserve provided to the Government of India for use in 
     safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be 
     commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements.

[[Page 22112]]

       (c) Certification Requirement.--Before exchanging 
     diplomatic notes pursuant to Article 16(1) of the Agreement, 
     the President shall certify to Congress that entry into force 
     and implementation of the Agreement pursuant to its terms is 
     consistent with the obligation of the United States under the 
     Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at 
     Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into 
     force March 5, 1970 (commonly known as the ``Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty''), not in any way to assist, encourage, 
     or induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
     weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
       (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in the Agreement shall 
     be construed to supersede the legal requirements of the Henry 
     J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy 
     Cooperation Act of 2006 or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

     SEC. 103. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL BETWEEN INDIA AND THE IAEA.

       Congress urges the Government of India to sign and adhere 
     to an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency (IAEA), consistent with IAEA principles, 
     practices, and policies, at the earliest possible date.

     SEC. 104. IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
                   INDIA AND THE IAEA.

       Licenses may be issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
     for transfers pursuant to the Agreement only after the 
     President determines and certifies to Congress that--
       (1) the Agreement Between the Government of India and the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of 
     Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities, as approved by the 
     Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     on August 1, 2008 (the ``Safeguards Agreement''), has entered 
     into force; and
       (2) the Government of India has filed a declaration of 
     facilities pursuant to paragraph 13 of the Safeguards 
     Agreement that is not materially inconsistent with the 
     facilities and schedule described in paragraph 14 of the 
     separation plan presented in the national parliament of India 
     on May 11, 2006, taking into account the later initiation of 
     safeguards than was anticipated in the separation plan.

     SEC. 105. MODIFIED REPORTING TO CONGRESS.

       (a) Information on Nuclear Activities of India.--Subsection 
     (g)(1) of section 104 of the Henry J. Hyde United States-
     India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 
     U.S.C. 8003) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) as 
     subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(B) any material inconsistencies between the content or 
     timeliness of notifications by the Government of India 
     pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of the Safeguards Agreement and 
     the facilities and schedule described in paragraph (14) of 
     the separation plan presented in the national parliament of 
     India on May 11, 2006, taking into account the later 
     initiation of safeguards than was anticipated in the 
     separation plan;''.
       (b) Implementation and Compliance Report.--Subsection 
     (g)(2) of such section is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (K)(iv), by striking ``and'' at the 
     end;
       (2) in subparagraph (L), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(M) with respect to the United States-India Agreement for 
     Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (hereinafter 
     in this subparagraph referred to as the `Agreement') approved 
     under section 101(a) of the United States-India Nuclear 
     Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act--
       ``(i) a listing of--

       ``(I) all provision of sensitive nuclear technology to 
     India, and other such information as may be so designated by 
     the United States or India under Article 1(Q); and
       ``(II) all facilities in India notified pursuant to Article 
     7(1) of the Agreement;

       ``(ii) a description of--

       ``(I) any agreed safeguards or any other form of 
     verification for by-product material decided by mutual 
     agreement pursuant to the terms of Article 1(A) of the 
     Agreement;
       ``(II) research and development undertaken in such areas as 
     may be agreed between the United States and India as detailed 
     in Article 2(2)(a.) of the Agreement;
       ``(III) the civil nuclear cooperation activities undertaken 
     under Article 2(2)(d.) of the Agreement;
       ``(IV) any United States efforts to help India develop a 
     strategic reserve of nuclear fuel as called for in Article 
     2(2)(e.) of the Agreement;
       ``(V) any United States efforts to fulfill political 
     commitments made in Article 5(6) of the Agreement;
       ``(VI) any negotiations that have occurred or are ongoing 
     under Article 6(iii.) of the Agreement; and
       ``(VII) any transfers beyond the territorial jurisdiction 
     of India pursuant to Article 7(2) of the Agreement, including 
     a listing of the receiving country of each such transfer;

       ``(iii) an analysis of--

       ``(I) any instances in which the United States or India 
     requested consultations arising from concerns over compliance 
     with the provisions of Article 7(1) of the Agreement, and the 
     results of such consultations; and
       ``(II) any matters not otherwise identified in this report 
     that have become the subject of consultations pursuant to 
     Article 13(2) of the Agreement, and a statement as to whether 
     such matters were resolved by the end of the reporting 
     period; and

       ``(iv) a statement as to whether--

       ``(I) any consultations are expected to occur under Article 
     16(5) of the Agreement; and
       ``(II) any enrichment is being carried out pursuant to 
     Article 6 of the Agreement.''.

TITLE II--STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES NONPROLIFERATION LAW RELATING TO 
                      PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

     SEC. 201. PROCEDURES REGARDING A SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENT ON 
                   REPROCESSING.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 131 of the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160), no proposed subsequent 
     arrangement concerning arrangements and procedures regarding 
     reprocessing or other alteration in form or content, as 
     provided for in Article 6 of the Agreement, shall take effect 
     until the requirements specified in subsection (b) are met.
       (b) Requirements.--The requirements referred to in 
     subsection (a) are the following:
       (1) The President transmits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report containing--
       (A) the reasons for entering into such proposed subsequent 
     arrangement;
       (B) a detailed description, including the text, of such 
     proposed subsequent arrangement; and
       (C) a certification that the United States will pursue 
     efforts to ensure that any other nation that permits India to 
     reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear 
     material that the nation has transferred to India or nuclear 
     material and by-product material used in or produced through 
     the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or 
     equipment that it has transferred to India requires India to 
     do so under similar arrangements and procedures.
       (2) A period of 30 days of continuous session (as defined 
     by section 130 g.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. 2159 (g)(2)) has elapsed after transmittal of the 
     report required under paragraph (1).
       (c) Resolution of Disapproval.--Notwithstanding the 
     requirements in subsection (b) having been met, a subsequent 
     arrangement referred to in subsection (a) shall not become 
     effective if during the time specified in subsection (b)(2), 
     Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution 
     stating in substance that Congress does not favor such 
     subsequent arrangement. Any such resolution shall be 
     considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 
     130 i. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159 (i)), 
     as amended by section 205 of this Act.

     SEC. 202. INITIATIVES AND NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO AGREEMENTS 
                   FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION.

       Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
     2153) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``e. The President shall keep the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate fully and currently informed 
     of any initiative or negotiations relating to a new or 
     amended agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant 
     to this section (except an agreement arranged pursuant to 
     section 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., or 144 d., or an amendment 
     thereto).''.

     SEC. 203. ACTIONS REQUIRED FOR RESUMPTION OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR 
                   COOPERATION.

       Section 129 a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
     2158 (a)) is amended by striking ``Congress adopts a 
     concurrent resolution'' and inserting ``Congress adopts, and 
     there is enacted, a joint resolution''.

     SEC. 204. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY AT THE NUCLEAR 
                   SUPPLIERS GROUP TO STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL 
                   NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME.

       (a) Certification.--Before exchanging diplomatic notes 
     pursuant to Article 16(1) of the Agreement, the President 
     shall certify to the appropriate congressional committees 
     that it is the policy of the United States to work with 
     members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), individually 
     and collectively, to agree to further restrict the transfers 
     of equipment and technology related to the enrichment of 
     uranium and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.
       (b) Peaceful Use Assurances for Certain By-Product 
     Material.--The President shall seek to achieve, by the 
     earliest possible date, either within the NSG or with 
     relevant NSG Participating Governments, the adoption of 
     principles, reporting, and exchanges of information as may be 
     appropriate to assure peaceful use and accounting of by-
     product material in a manner that is substantially equivalent 
     to the relevant provisions of the Agreement.
       (c) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than six months after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, and every six months 
     thereafter, the President shall transmit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report on efforts by

[[Page 22113]]

     the United States pursuant to subsections (a) and (b).
       (2) Termination.--The requirement to transmit the report 
     under paragraph (1) terminates on the date on which the 
     President transmits a report pursuant to such paragraph 
     stating that the objectives in subsections (a) and (b) have 
     been achieved.

     SEC. 205. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       Section 130 i. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
     2159 (i)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``means a joint 
     resolution'' and all that follows through ``, with the date'' 
     and inserting the following: ``means--
       ``(A) for an agreement for cooperation pursuant to section 
     123 of this Act, a joint resolution, the matter after the 
     resolving clause of which is as follows: `That the Congress 
     (does or does not) favor the proposed agreement for 
     cooperation transmitted to the Congress by the President on 
     _____ .',
       ``(B) for a determination under section 129 of this Act, a 
     joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of 
     which is as follows: `That the Congress does not favor the 
     determination transmitted to the Congress by the President on 
     _____ .', or
       ``(C) for a subsequent arrangement under section 201 of the 
     United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and 
     Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, a joint resolution, the 
     matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: 
     `That the Congress does not favor the subsequent arrangement 
     to the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of 
     the United States of America and the Government of India 
     Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy that was 
     transmitted to Congress by the President on September 10, 
     2008.',
     with the date''; and
       (2) in paragraph (4)--
       (A) by inserting after ``45 days after its introduction'' 
     the following ``(or in the case of a joint resolution related 
     to a subsequent arrangement under section 201 of the United 
     States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and 
     Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, 15 days after its 
     introduction)''; and
       (B) by inserting after ``45-day period'' the following: 
     ``(or in the case of a joint resolution related to a 
     subsequent arrangement under section 201 of the United 
     States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and 
     Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, 15-day period)''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Berman) and the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-
Lehtinen) each will control 20 minutes.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise to claim the time in opposition to 
the bill as I am, in fact, opposed to the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentlewoman from Florida opposed to 
the motion?
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I am not, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 1(c) of rule XV, the 
gentleman from Massachusetts will be recognized for 20 minutes in 
opposition.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.


                             General Leave

  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to 
include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the ranking 
member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, be 
given 10 minutes, one-half of my time, to be put under her control.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself no more than 5 minutes.
  I am a strong advocate of closer U.S.-India ties, including peaceful 
nuclear cooperation. I voted for the Hyde Act, which established a 
framework for such cooperation today. The bill before us today will 
approve the U.S.-India Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.
  Under the Hyde Act of 2 years ago, Congress was to have 30 days to 
review the agreement before beginning the consideration of a privileged 
resolution of approval. Instead, the agreement is now before us in the 
waning days before adjournment. We can approve the agreement now with 
the oversight safeguards built into this bill or we can wait until the 
next Congress and start over, but if we wait, however, we will likely 
only vote on a simple resolution of approval without any of these 
oversight improvements.
  On balance, integrating India into a global nonproliferation regime 
is a positive step. Before anyone gets too sanctimonious about India's 
nuclear weapons program, we should acknowledge that the five recognized 
nuclear weapons states have not done nearly enough to fulfill their 
commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, including making 
serious reductions in their own arsenals, nor in the case of the United 
States in ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  Having said that, I continue to have concerns about ambiguities in 
the agreement, and I, therefore, will insert several documents in the 
Record to clarify the meaning of these and other important issues. It 
is my view that these documents constitute key and dispositive parts of 
the authoritative representations described in section 102 of this 
bill.

                                          Department of State,

                                     Washington, DC, Jan 16, 2008.
     Hon. Tom Lantos,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
         Representatives.
       Dear Chairman Lantos: I am writing in response to your 
     letter of October 5, 2007, concerning Congressional review of 
     the recently-initialed U.S.-India Agreement for peaceful 
     nuclear cooperation (the ``123'' agreement).
       The Department welcomes the opportunity to answer any 
     questions that members of the Foreign Affairs Committee may 
     have concerning the agreement. To that end, please find 
     enclosed the Department's responses to the 45 Questions for 
     the Record that you submitted with your letter.
       Thank you for raising your concerns, as well as those of 
     the other members of your committee, on this important issue. 
     Thank you also for your personal interest in, and support of, 
     the overall Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. We look 
     forward to working with you to secure passage of the 123 
     Agreement when it is submitted to Congress.
           Sincerely,

                                           Jeffrey T. Bergner,

                                              Assistant Secretary,
                                              Legislative Affairs.
       Enclosure. As stated.

   Questions for the Record Submitted to Assistant Secretary Bergner

       Question 1: What is the Administration's expectation 
     regarding the likely economic benefits of this partnership, 
     including India's purchase of U.S. nuclear fuel, reactors, 
     and technology?
       Answer. We are confident that this initiative will yield 
     important economic benefits to the private sector in the 
     United States. India currently has 15 operating thermal power 
     reactors with seven under construction, but it intends to 
     increase this number significantly. Meeting this ramp-up in 
     demand for civil nuclear reactors, technology, fuel, and 
     support services holds the promise of opening new markets for 
     the United States. Indian officials indicate they plan to 
     import at least eight 1000-megawatt power reactors by 2012, 
     as well as additional reactors in the years ahead. Studies 
     suggest that if American vendors win just two of these 
     reactor contracts, it could add 3,000-5,000 new direct jobs 
     and 10,000-15,000 indirect jobs in the United States. The 
     Indian government has conveyed to us its commitment to enable 
     full U.S. participation in India's civil nuclear growth and 
     modernization. At least 15 nuclear-related U.S. firms, 
     including General Electric and Westinghouse, participated in 
     a business delegation led by the Commerce Department in 
     December 2006.
       In addition, participation in India's market will help make 
     the American nuclear power industry globally competitive, 
     thereby benefiting our own domestic nuclear power sector. 
     This initiative will permit U.S. companies to enter the 
     lucrative and growing Indian market--something they are 
     currently prohibited from doing. In addition, access to 
     Indian nuclear infrastructure will allow U.S. companies to 
     build reactors more competitively here and in the rest of the 
     world--not just India.
       Question 2: What scientific and technical benefits does the 
     U.S. expect as a result of this agreement?
       Answer. A successfully implemented civil nuclear 
     cooperation initiative with India will allow scientists from 
     both our nations to work together in making nuclear energy 
     safer, less expensive, more proliferation-resistant, and more 
     efficient. Newly forged partnerships in this area may also 
     facilitate scientific advancement in the many facets of 
     nuclear energy technology. Indian involvement in 
     international fora such as the International Thermonuclear 
     Experimental Reactor and the Generation-IV Forum can expand 
     the potential for innovation in the future of nuclear energy, 
     as well as the stake of emerging countries in developing 
     cheaper sources of energy.
       In addition, we could choose to allow India to participate 
     in the future in the Department of Energy's Global Nuclear 
     Energy

[[Page 22114]]

     Partnership and collaborate with other countries with 
     advanced nuclear technology in developing new proliferation-
     resistant nuclear technology. Such interaction could only be 
     contemplated subsequent to the completion of the civil 
     nuclear cooperation initiative.
       Question 3: Does the Administration believe that the 
     nuclear cooperation agreement with India overrides the Hyde 
     Act regarding any apparent conflicts, discrepancies, or 
     inconsistencies? Does this include provisions in the Hyde Act 
     which do not appear in the nuclear cooperation agreement?
       Answer. In his September 19 statement, Assistant Secretary 
     Boucher twice made clear that ``we think [the proposed 123 
     Agreement with India] is in full conformity with the Hyde 
     Act.'' Indeed, the Administration is confident that the 
     proposed agreement is consistent with the legal requirements 
     of both the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy Act. The proposed 
     agreement satisfies the particular requirements of Section 
     123 of the Atomic Energy Act with the exception of the 
     requirement for full-scope safeguards, which the President is 
     expected to exempt prior to the submission of the agreement 
     to Congress for its approval, as provided for in section 104 
     of the Hyde Act. The agreement is also fully consistent with 
     the legal requirements of the Hyde Act.
       Question 4: Why are dual-use items for use in sensitive 
     nuclear facilities mentioned in the proposed U.S.-Indian 
     nuclear cooperation agreement, when such items are not 
     transferred pursuant to an agreement for cooperation?
       Answer. The Agreement provides for such transfers, 
     consistent with the ``full'' cooperation envisaged by the 
     July 18, 2005 Joint Statement. Article 5(2) of the 123 
     Agreement provides for such transfers by the Parties, 
     however, only ``subject to their respective applicable laws, 
     regulations and license policies.'' It is not unusual for 
     U.S. agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation to provide 
     for transfers of items that would in fact be transferred 
     outside the agreement, if they are to be transferred at all. 
     For example, many U.S. agreements, including the proposed 
     U.S.-India Agreement, cover transfers of ``components'' and 
     ``information,'' even though such transfers would normally 
     take place outside the agreement. Most importantly, it should 
     be noted that while the proposed U.S.-India Agreement 
     provides for transfer of the items in question, as a 
     framework agreement it does not compel any such transfers; 
     and as a matter of policy the United States does not transfer 
     dual-use items for use in sensitive nuclear facilities.
       Question 5: Is it the intention of the U.S. government to 
     assist India in the design, construction, or operation of 
     sensitive nuclear technologies through the transfer of dual-
     use items outside the agreement? If so, how is this 
     consistent with long-standing U.S. policy to discourage the 
     spread of sensitive nuclear technology and with Section 
     103(a)(5) of the Hyde Act? Has the U.S. transferred such 
     dual-use items to sensitive nuclear facilities in other 
     cooperating parties and, if so, to which countries?
       Answer. Consistent with standing U.S. policy, the U.S. 
     government will not assist India in the design, construction, 
     or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the 
     transfer of dual-use items, whether under the Agreement or 
     outside the Agreement. The United States rarely transfers 
     dual-use items for sensitive nuclear activities to any 
     cooperating party and no such transfers are currently 
     pending.
       Question 6. Does the Administration have any plan or 
     intention to negotiate an amendment to the proposed U.S.-
     India agreement to transfer to India sensitive nuclear 
     facilities or critical components of such facilities? If so, 
     how would such transfers be consistent with the above-cited 
     provision of the Hyde Act and the long-standing U.S. policy 
     to discourage the spread of such technologies?
       Answer. The Administration does not plan to negotiate an 
     amendment to the proposed U.S.-India Agreement to transfer to 
     India sensitive nuclear facilities or critical components of 
     such facilities.
       Question 7. Is it the intention of the Administration to 
     transfer or allow the transfer of sensitive nuclear 
     technology outside of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation 
     agreement? If so, how would such transfers be consistent with 
     the Hyde Act and the long-standing U.S. policy to discourage 
     the spread of such technologies?
       Answer. Although the Hyde Act allows for transfers of 
     sensitive nuclear technology under certain circumstances, it 
     is not the intention of the Administration to transfer or 
     allow the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to India 
     outside the U.S.-India Agreement for peaceful nuclear 
     cooperation.
       Question 8. What is the State Department's position 
     regarding the manner by which an amendment to the proposed 
     U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement would be submitted 
     to the Congress? Because it would be an amendment to an 
     exempted agreement, does the Administration agree that it 
     would require a Joint Resolution of Approval before entering 
     into force?
       We would look at any future amendment on a case-by-case 
     basis. Regarding the specific example discussed in the 
     question, the Administration has no plan or intention to 
     negotiate an amendment to the proposed U.S.-India agreement 
     to transfer to India sensitive nuclear facilities or critical 
     components of such facilities.
       Question 9: Would the U.S. limit any transfer of dual-use 
     technology to India's enrichment and reprocessing facilities 
     to those that were participants in a bilateral or 
     multinational program to develop proliferation-resistant fuel 
     cycle technologies?
       Answer. As previously stated, it is not the intention of 
     the U.S. government to assist India in the design, 
     construction, or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies 
     through the transfer of dual-use items, whether under the 
     Agreement or outside the Agreement. India does not have any 
     facilities that participate in a bilateral or multinational 
     program to develop proliferation-resistant fuel cycle 
     technologies. If India were to develop such facilities, 
     potential dual-use transfers could be considered only under 
     the exceptions granted in the Hyde Act.
       Question 10. Why does Paragraph 4 of Article 10 of the 
     U.S.-India agreement rely on an IAEA decision regarding the 
     impossibility of applying safeguards rather than either 
     party's judgment that the Agency is not or will not be 
     applying safeguards? Would this permit a situation to arise 
     in which there were a period of time during which safeguards 
     might not be applied but the IAEA had not reached a 
     conclusion that the application of safeguards was no longer 
     possible?
       Answer. Paragraph 4 of Article 10 addresses one situation--
     the same situation as is addressed in paragraph 4(a) of the 
     Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines--in which fall-back 
     safeguards would be required because the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency has decided that the application of Agency 
     safeguards is no longer possible. It does not, however, 
     constitute the fundamental basis provided by the Agreement 
     for the application, if needed, of fall-back safeguards. That 
     basis is provided by Paragraph 1 of Article 10 which states 
     categorically that ``[s]afeguards will be maintained with 
     respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred 
     pursuant to this Agreement, and with respect to all special 
     fissionable material used in or produced through the use of 
     such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as the material 
     or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the 
     cooperating Party.''
       This guarantee follows the formula prescribed by section 
     123(a)(1) of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. 
     Taken together with paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the 
     Agreement, it provides that safeguards in some form--
     International Atomic Energy Agency or other--must always be 
     maintained with respect to all nuclear items in India subject 
     to the Agreement so long as they remain under the 
     jurisdiction or control of India irrespective of the duration 
     of other provisions in the Agreement or whether the Agreement 
     is terminated or suspended for any reason, precisely as 
     section 123(a)(a) of the Atomic Energy Act requires.
       Regarding the second part of the question, for the reasons 
     just given, Paragraph 1 of Article 10 precludes there arising 
     such a situation.
       Question 11: Why does the provision not call for rectifying 
     measures, as in the Japan agreement? Why does it not call for 
     the parties to immediately enter into arrangements which 
     conform to safeguards principles and procedures of the 
     Agency?
       Answer. Different approaches to fall-back safeguards are 
     possible, consistent with the requirement of section 
     123(a)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act. If for some reason 
     International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards fail to be 
     applied to nuclear items in India subject to the U.S.-India 
     Agreement, the Parties of necessity must enter into 
     arrangements for alternative measures to fulfill the 
     requirement of paragraph 1 of Article 10.
       Question 12. Have ``appropriate verification measures'' 
     been discussed, defined, or otherwise outlined with Indian 
     officials? If Indian officials have shared their views on 
     appropriate verification measures, what are those views? Do 
     U.S. and Indian views diverge and if so, how?
       Answer. The United States has not discussed in detail with 
     India what form ``appropriate verification measures'' might 
     take if the International Atomic Energy Agency decides that 
     it is no longer possible for it to apply safeguards as 
     provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the U.S.-India 
     Agreement. The United States has expressed its view to India 
     that acceptable alternative measures in that case might range 
     from an alternative safeguards arrangement with the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency, to some other form of 
     international verification. The Government of India has 
     expressed its view that for purposes of implementing the 
     U.S.-India Agreement, Agency safeguards can and should be 
     regarded as being ``in perpetuity.'' At the same time it 
     fully appreciates that paragraph 1 of Article 10 of the 
     Agreement does not limit the safeguards required by the 
     Agreement to Agency safeguards.
       Question 13: In the U.S. view, how would potential 
     appropriate verification measures provide effectiveness and 
     coverage equivalent to that intended to be provided by 
     safeguards in paragraph 1 of Article 10?

[[Page 22115]]

       Answer. The ``appropriate verification measures'' referred 
     to in paragraph 4 of Article 10 would be an alternative to 
     International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards applied 
     pursuant to the India-Agency safeguards agreement referenced 
     in paragraph 2 of Article 10, the implementation of which in 
     the normal course of events would satisfy the safeguards 
     requirement of paragraph 1 of Article 10 with respect to 
     India. If it were no longer possible for the Agency to apply 
     safeguards to nuclear items subject to the U.S.-India 
     Agreement in India, alternative verification measures agreed 
     by the Parties would need to be carried out on some other 
     international basis to maintain continuity of safeguards as 
     required by paragraph 1 of Article 10. The United States 
     would expect such measures to provide effectiveness and 
     coverage equivalent to that intended to be provided by the 
     India-Agency safeguards agreement referenced in paragraph 2 
     of Article 10, albeit without a necessary role for the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency in their application.
       Question 14. Which of the commitments that the United 
     States made in Article 5 are of a binding legal character? 
     Does the Indian Government agree?
       Answer. The question quotes paragraph 6 of article 5, which 
     contains certain fuel supply assurances that were repeated 
     verbatim from the March 2006 separation plan. These are 
     important Presidential commitments that the U.S. intends to 
     uphold, consistent with U.S. law.
       Question 15. What is the definition of ``disruption of 
     supply'' as used in Article 5? Do the U.S. and Indian 
     governments agree on this definition?
       Answer. It is the understanding of the United States that 
     the use of the phrase ``disruption of fuel supplies'' in 
     Article 5.6 of the 123 Agreement is meant to refer to 
     disruptions in supply to India that may result through no 
     fault of its own. Examples of such a disruption include (but 
     are not limited to): a trade war resulting in the cut-off of 
     supply; market disruptions in the global supply of fuel; and 
     the potential failure of an American company to fulfill any 
     fuel supply contracts it may have signed with India. We 
     believe the Indian government shares our understanding of 
     this provision.
       Question 16. Would any of these commitments continue to 
     apply if India detonated a nuclear explosive device? If so, 
     under what circumstances?
       Answer. As outlined in Article 14 of the 123 Agreement, 
     should India detonate a nuclear explosive device, the United 
     States has the right to cease all nuclear cooperation with 
     India immediately, including the supply of fuel, as well as 
     to request the return of any items transferred from the 
     United States, including fresh fuel. In addition, the United 
     States has the right to terminate the agreement on one year's 
     written notice. (Notice of termination has to precede 
     cessation of cooperation pursuant to Article 14). In case of 
     termination, the commitments in Article 5.6 would no longer 
     apply.
       Question 17. Do the assurances in Article 5 require the 
     United States to assist India in finding foreign sources of 
     nuclear fuel in the event that the United States ceases 
     nuclear cooperation with India?
       Answer. Ceasing nuclear cooperation with India would be a 
     serious step. The United States would not take such a serious 
     step without careful consideration of the circumstances 
     necessitating such action and the effects and impacts it 
     would entail. Such circumstances would include, for example, 
     detonation of a nuclear weapon, material violation of the 123 
     Agreement, or termination, abrogation, or material violation 
     of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The 
     provisions in article 14 on termination of the agreement and 
     cessation of cooperation would be available in such 
     circumstances, and their exercise would render article 5.6 
     inapplicable. Moreover, such circumstances would likely be 
     inconsistent with the political underpinnings of the U.S.-
     India Initiative upon which the commitments in article 5.6 
     were based.
       Question 18. How is this fuel supply assurance consistent 
     with Section 103(a)(6) of the Hyde Act which states that it 
     is U.S. policy to: ``Seek to prevent the transfer to any 
     country of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from 
     other participating governments in the Nuclear Suppliers 
     Group or from any other source if nuclear transfers to that 
     country are suspended or terminated pursuant to this title, 
     the Atomic Energy Act, or any other United States law''?
       Answer. There is no inconsistency between the fuel supply 
     assurances contained in Article 5 of the U.S.-India Agreement 
     and section 103(a)(6) of the Hyde Act. Paragraph 6 of Article 
     5 of the U.S.-India Agreement records assurances given by the 
     United States to India in March 2006. In particular, the 
     United States conveyed its commitment ``. . . to work with 
     friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear 
     Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India 
     to obtain full access to the international fuel market, 
     including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to 
     fuel supplies from firms in several nations,'' and ``[i]f 
     despite these arrangements a disruption of fuel supplies to 
     India occurs, the United States and India would jointly 
     convene a group of friendly countries . . . to pursue such 
     measures as would restore fuel supply to India.''
       These fuel supply assurances are intended to guard against 
     disruptions of fuel supply to India that might occur through 
     no fault of India's own. Instances of such a disruption might 
     include, for example, a trade war resulting in the cut-off of 
     supply, market disruptions in the global supply of fuel, or 
     the failure of a company to fulfill a fuel supply contract it 
     may have signed with India. In such circumstances the United 
     States would be prepared to encourage transfers of nuclear 
     fuel to India by other Nuclear Suppliers Group members.
       The fuel supply assurances are not, however, meant to 
     insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear 
     explosive test or a violation of nonproliferation 
     commitments. The language of Article 5.6(b), particularly in 
     the context of Article 14, does not provide for any such 
     insulation.
       Question 19. How are these provisions regarding a life-time 
     strategic reserve for the operating life of India's 
     safeguarded reactors consistent with subparagraph (10) of 
     paragraph (a) of Section 103 of the Hyde Act, which states 
     that: ``Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to 
     the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian 
     nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable 
     operating requirements?''
       Answer. We do not read these provisions to be inconsistent. 
     The parameters of the proposed ``strategic reserve'' and of 
     India's capacity to acquire nuclear fuel for its reactors 
     will be developed over time. Thus, it is premature to 
     conclude that the strategic reserve will develop in a manner 
     inconsistent with the Hyde Act.
       Question 20. Do the U.S. and India agree on the definition 
     of reasonable reactor operating requirements for Indian 
     reactors? If yes, what is it? If not, how do they disagree? 
     Does the U.S. have an assessment of how much nuclear material 
     would be required for a life-time strategic reserve for each 
     safeguarded Indian power reactor that could receive fuel 
     pursuant to the proposed agreement?
       Answer. The U.S.-India Agreement does not define 
     ``reasonable operating requirements,'' and the two 
     governments have not discussed a definition. Any definition 
     would have to take into account among other things the 
     physical characteristics of the reactors, their expected 
     operating cycles, their expected time in service, the 
     likelihood of fuel supply disruptions over decades of 
     operation, and many similar factors that are difficult to 
     quantify in the abstract. We would expect that the actual 
     amount of fuel put in the reserve would depend not only on 
     the factors just mentioned, but also on such factors as 
     availability of fuel in the market, price, Indian storage 
     capacity, costs of storage, and similar practical 
     considerations. The Agreement itself establishes neither a 
     minimum nor a maximum quantity of nuclear material to be 
     placed in India's reserve.
       Question 21. How are these assurances consistent with 
     subparagraph (6) of paragraph (a) of Section 103 of the Hyde 
     Act which states that it is U.S. policy to: ``Seek to prevent 
     the transfer to a country of nuclear equipment, materials, or 
     technology from other participating governments in the 
     Nuclear Suppliers Group or from any other source if nuclear 
     transfers to that country are suspended or terminated 
     pursuant to this title, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other United States law''?
       Answer. Please see the response to Question 18.
       Question 22. What impact will these U.S. commitments of 
     nuclear fuel supply to India have on the U.S. initiatives to 
     discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing 
     facilities?
       Answer. We do not foresee any negative impact on these 
     initiatives. India already possesses both types of 
     facilities. We do not believe that the provision of fuel 
     assurances to India will have any effect on our efforts to 
     offer reliable access to nuclear fuel to persuade countries 
     aspiring to develop civil nuclear energy to forgo enrichment 
     and reprocessing capabilities of their own.
       Question 23. Have the Indians explained to the U.S. or to 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency their definition of 
     the term ``an India-specific safeguards agreement?'' If so, 
     what is it?
       Answer. The Indian government has not yet explained to the 
     United States what it means by the term ``India-specific'' 
     safeguards agreement. The Indian government has been in 
     discussions with the IAEA regarding its safeguards agreement. 
     However, these discussions have not concluded. The United 
     States remains confident that the safeguards agreement to be 
     negotiated between India and the IAEA will address all of the 
     concerns associated with the term ``India-specific.''
       Question 24. Which provisions of INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 
     agreements provide for safeguards in perpetuity? Would these 
     apply to civil nuclear reactors that a country such as India 
     requests the IAEA to safeguard?
       Answer. INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 is not a ``model agreement'' as is 
     INFCIRC/153 (the basis for NPT safeguards agreements)--
     INFCIRC/66-type agreements are not as rigidly determined as 
     Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

[[Page 22116]]

     safeguards agreements. Because INFCIRC/66-type agreements do 
     not involve fullscope safeguards (safeguards applied to all 
     nuclear material in a state), but have been aimed at the 
     application of safeguard to specific supplied materials or 
     facilities, the scope of safeguards application is delineated 
     uniquely in each agreement.
       This is generally done through the mechanism of a dynamic 
     list of inventory items to which the agreement stipulates 
     that safeguards must be applied. The main part of the 
     inventory list contains facilities and material that are 
     permanently under safeguards. The subsidiary part of the 
     inventory list contains facilities that are temporarily under 
     safeguards due to the presence of safeguarded material. There 
     is a third section of the list that contains nuclear material 
     on which safeguards are suspended or exempted (e.g., because 
     the material has been diluted to the point where it is no 
     longer usable, has been transferred out of the state, etc.). 
     We would expect that the Indian safeguards agreement will be 
     based on this general structure, and that the nuclear 
     facilities India declares to be ``civil'' will be placed in 
     the main (permanent safeguards) part of the inventory list. 
     Also in the main part of the inventory would be nuclear 
     material exported to India, and any nuclear material 
     generated through the use of that material.
       Consistent with International Atomic Energy Agency Board 
     Document GOV/1621 (which is referenced in the Hyde Act, Sec. 
     104(b)2), the safeguards agreement should also contain 
     language that ensures that: (1) the duration of the agreement 
     is related to the period of actual use of the items in the 
     recipient state; and (2) the rights and obligations with 
     respect to safeguarded nuclear material shall apply until 
     such time as the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     terminates safeguards pursuant to the agreement (e.g. the 
     material is no longer usable or has bee transferred from the 
     recipient state).
       Question 25. Has the Indian government provided U.S. 
     officials with a definition of ``corrective measures''? If 
     so, what is it? Does it involve removing IAEA-safeguarded 
     material from such safeguards in certain circumstances? If 
     so, does the U.S. support the conclusion of an Indian 
     agreement with the IAEA that provides for perpetuity of 
     safeguards while at the same time making such perpetuity 
     contingent on the invocation of ``corrective measures?''
       Answer. The Indian government has not provided the United 
     States with a definition of ``corrective measures.'' Until a 
     safeguards agreement is completed between India and the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency and the issue of 
     ``corrective measures'' is clarified, we cannot comment on 
     the appropriateness of the agreement. However, we expect that 
     the Indian government will implement in letter and in spirit 
     its commitment to ``safeguards in perpetuity,'' to which it 
     agreed on March 2, 2006. As Secretary Rice stated during her 
     testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
     April 5, 2006, ``We've been very clear with the Indians that 
     the permanence of safeguards is the permanence of safeguards 
     without condition.''
       Question 26. Since India is not a party to the Nuclear 
     Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not accept full-scope 
     safeguards, does this long-term consent for reprocessing for 
     India change U.S. policy for granting long-term consent to 
     reprocessing and the use of plutonium? If so, what criteria 
     will the U.S. now use to consider requests for reprocessing 
     and the use of plutonium either on a case-by-case basis or 
     for long-term advance programmatic arrangements?
       Answer. The consent to reprocessing is contingent upon the 
     construction of a new, dedicated reprocessing facility that 
     will be under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. 
     The criteria applied by the United States in considering the 
     Indian request were the same as those applied in the earlier 
     instances (EURATOM and Japan). They are that (1) the 
     reprocessing will not be inimical to the common defense and 
     security, and (2) the reprocessing will not result in a 
     significant increase in the risk of proliferation beyond that 
     which exists at the time the approval is requested, giving 
     foremost consideration to whether the reprocessing will take 
     place under conditions that will ensure timely warning to the 
     United States of any diversion well in advance of the time at 
     which the diverted materiel could be transformed into a 
     nuclear explosive device. These are the criteria for granting 
     approval for reprocessing established by section 131 of the 
     Atomic Energy Act.
       Article 6(iii) of the Agreement provides that India and the 
     United States must agree on ``arrangements and procedures'' 
     under which the reprocessing will take place before India can 
     physically reprocess any material subject to the Agreement. 
     The Administration will ensure that the safeguards, physical 
     protection and other measures to be set forth in the agreed 
     ``arrangements and procedures'' will be both rigorous and 
     consistent with the criteria described above.
       Question 27. What special challenges will the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) face in safeguarding a 
     reprocessing plant in a non-NPT state that does not have 
     full-scope safeguards?
       Answer. Assuming that, consistent with the terms of the 123 
     Agreement, India builds a new reprocessing plant dedicated to 
     the processing of material under International Atomic Energy 
     Agency safeguards, there would be little, if any, difference 
     in the technical challenge of applying safeguards to such a 
     facility as opposed to a comparable facility in a State with 
     a comprehensive safeguards agreement. There are some 
     differences under an INFCIRC/66 agreement in the state's 
     record-keeping and material accounting report requirements, 
     but these should not have an impact on safeguards 
     effectiveness. The technical objectives and technical 
     measures applied in the two cases would not differ in any 
     significant way. In each case the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency would seek to provide assurance that the declared 
     material was not diverted, and that the facility was operated 
     in the manner declared. The facility would be under 
     uninterrupted safeguards, and the material entering, exiting, 
     and resident in the facility would all be subject to 
     safeguards. In the case of India, the Agency's safeguards 
     conclusions would have to be limited to the civil facilities 
     and materials under safeguards, and could not be extrapolated 
     to apply to the nuclear program as a whole.
       Question 28. Will the U.S. insist that the safeguards 
     agreement for the planned Indian reprocessing plant include 
     all the safeguards procedure and approaches that the IAEA 
     applies to the Rokkasho reprocessing facility in Japan, 
     including state-of-the-art, near-real-time accountancy and 
     containment and surveillance?
       Answer. U.S. policy is that safeguards should be applied to 
     meet established technical standards of effectiveness, as 
     efficiently as possible; that is the policy we pursue in the 
     context of our bilateral agreements with other states such as 
     Japan, and we would continue to pursue such a policy in 
     discussions with India in connection with arrangements for 
     reprocessing. The safeguards methods employed at the Rokkasho 
     Reprocessing Plant are consistent with both International 
     Atomic Energy Agency safeguards criteria, and with the 
     results of a lengthy international cooperative effort to 
     address the technical problems of safeguarding large 
     reprocessing plants. We would expect the same approaches to 
     apply to a new Indian reprocessing plant dedicated to 
     processing safeguarded material. However, we cannot yet 
     speculate that safeguards would be carried out in exactly the 
     same manner, although containment, surveillance, and some 
     sort of continuous material monitoring would certainly be 
     involved. A new reprocessing plant may well be many years 
     off, and safeguards technology constantly moves forward; by 
     the time a new Indian plant is in operation, there will 
     almost certainly be a new generation of surveillance and 
     radiation measurement devices available, and lessons learned 
     from Rokkasho safeguards.
       Question 29. Will the Administration submit any consent 
     arrangements for Indian reprocessing to Congress as an 
     amendment to the U.S.-India agreement for cooperation so that 
     Congress will have a full 90 days to give adequate time to 
     review its provisions? Or will the Administration submit 
     these only as a subsequent arrangement under section 131 of 
     the Atomic Energy Act, thereby allowing Congress only 15 days 
     of continuous session for review of this complex issue?
       Answer. Section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act provides 
     explicitly for review and execution of subsequent 
     arrangements related to the reprocessing of U.S. origin 
     material. However, if proposed ``arrangements and 
     procedures'' for reprocessing involved changes to provisions 
     in the U.S.-India 123 Agreement, an amendment to the 
     agreement would be required.
       Question 30. Why are the programmatic consent arrangements 
     that the U.S. is proposing to India, a non-NPT signatory, 
     much less specific and rigorous than the procedures that the 
     U.S. required of EURATOM and Japan?
       Answer. The advance, long-term consent accorded to India in 
     the U.S.-India Agreement by Article 6(iii) centers on a new 
     Indian national reprocessing facility that has not yet been 
     designed, let alone built. Many relevant nonproliferation 
     considerations that could readily be dealt with in the texts 
     of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-EURATOM agreements (or in related 
     documents) could not be dealt with immediately in the U.S.-
     India Agreement.
       Nevertheless, the U.S.-India Agreement establishes as 
     fundamental criteria that a new national reprocessing 
     facility must be dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded 
     nuclear material under International Atomic Energy Agency 
     safeguards, and that any special fissionable material (i.e., 
     plutonium) separated by the facility may only be utilized in 
     national facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency 
     safeguards. Further, it provides that the consent does not 
     become effective until the United States and India consult 
     and agree on arrangements and procedures under which 
     activities at the new facility will take place.
       Finally, Article 6(iii) provides that the arrangements and 
     procedures must address nonproliferation considerations 
     identical to those addressed in the procedures relating to 
     the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-EURATOM agreements (e.g. safeguards, 
     physical protection, storage, environmental protection), as 
     well as ``such other provisions as may be agreed

[[Page 22117]]

     by the Parties.'' At the appropriate time the United States 
     will consult with India for the purpose of agreeing on the 
     requisite arrangements and procedures and will ensure that 
     they are no less rigorous than those governing the U.S. 
     consent arrangements with Japan and with EURATOM.
       Question 31. Why are there no notification procedures for 
     adding new Indian facilities to the list of facilities that 
     may use plutonium derived from U.S.-supplied fuel?
       Answer: The procedures established by Article 7.1 of the 
     U.S.-India Agreement whereby each Party records all 
     facilities storing separated plutonium subject to the 
     Agreement on a list and makes its list available to the other 
     Party serve equally to notify to the other Party all 
     facilities utilizing (or potentially utilizing) plutonium 
     subject to the Agreement, since the plutonium-bearing fuel 
     must first be located at the facility before it can be 
     utilized. A similar approach is taken in the U.S.-EURATOM 
     Agreement, where facilities formally notified as being added 
     to a party's ``Delineated Program'' (Annex A) do not include 
     utilization facilities; the latter are notified, as 
     appropriate, when they are added to a ``Storage'' list as 
     provided for by Article 8.3.
       Question 32. Will the United States insist that any 
     plutonium and uranium recovered from the reprocessing of 
     U.S.-origin fuel at the proposed dedicated Indian 
     reprocessing facility be subject to IAEA safeguards and 
     peaceful, non-explosive use assurances in perpetuity, 
     including any such material recycled in Indian reactors?
       Answer. Yes. Article 9, Article 10, and Article 16 of the 
     U.S.-India Agreement guarantee this coverage.
       Question 33. Will the U.S. insist that any uranium or 
     plutonium used in or produced through the use of U.S.-
     supplied material be subject to safeguards in perpetuity if 
     such material is used in India's breeder reactors?
       Answer. Yes. Article 10 of the U.S.-India Agreement 
     guarantees this coverage.
       Question 34. If India decides at some point in the future 
     to reprocess spent breeder reactor fuel that contains U.S.-
     origin material, how will the U.S. ensure that it is subject 
     to all the non-proliferation conditions and controls in the 
     proposed agreement, including safeguards and consent rights?
       Answer. Article 10.6 of the U.S.-India Agreement provides 
     that ``[e]ach Party shall establish and maintain a system of 
     accounting for and control of nuclear material transferred 
     pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or 
     produced through the use of any material, equipment, or 
     components so transferred.'' Article 10.7 provides that 
     [u]pon the request of either Party, the other Party shall 
     report or permit the IAEA to report to the requesting Party 
     on the status of all inventories of material subject to this 
     Agreement.'' Thus, the United States will be able to track 
     all clear material in India subject to the Agreement, 
     including at India's breeder reactors (which would have to be 
     brought under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards 
     before U.S.-obligated nuclear material could be introduced to 
     them), at India's new dedicated reprocessing facility (when 
     built), and at any other Indian facility where U.S.-obligated 
     plutonium may be located. In tracking this material the 
     United States will be able to ensure that all conditions and 
     controls required by the Agreement, including International 
     Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, are in fact being 
     maintained.
       Question 35. In light of these requirements of U.S. law, 
     why doesn't the proposed U.S.-Indian peaceful nuclear 
     cooperation agreement contain an explicit reference to the 
     actions that would give the U.S. the right to terminate 
     nuclear cooperation and to require the return of equipment 
     and materials subject to the agreement, if India detonates a 
     nuclear explosive device?
       Answer. Article 14 of the proposed U.S.-India agreement for 
     cooperation provides for a clear right for the U.S. to 
     terminate nuclear cooperation and a right to require the 
     return of equipment and materials subject to the agreement in 
     all of the circumstances required under the Atomic Energy 
     Act, including if India detonated a nuclear explosive device 
     or terminated or abrogated safeguards (per section 123(a)(4) 
     of the Act). Thus, it fully satisfies the relevant 
     requirements of the Act.
       Question 36. Does the U.S. possess the right under Article 
     14, without any precondition or consent by India, to take 
     back any and all U.S.-origin nuclear material or equipment 
     provided to India pursuant to the nuclear cooperation 
     agreement?
       Answer. Under Article 14 of the proposed agreement, the 
     U.S. would be able to exercise the right to require the 
     return of material and equipment subject to the agreement 
     after (1) giving written notice of termination of the 
     agreement and (2) ceasing cooperation, based on a 
     determination that ``a mutually acceptable resolution of 
     outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be 
     achieved through consultations.'' Thus, both of the actions 
     that must be taken to exercise the right of return would be 
     within the discretion of the U.S. Government, and both 
     actions could be taken at once in the unlikely case that the 
     U.S. believed that a resolution of the problem could not be 
     achieved through consultations.
       Article 14 does not require that the other party consent to 
     the exercise of the right to terminate the agreement, the 
     right to cease cooperation, or the right of return. Prior to 
     the actual removal of items pursuant to the right of return, 
     the parties would engage in consultations regarding, inter 
     alia, the quantity of items to be returned, the amount of 
     compensation due, and the methods and arrangements for 
     removal. These consultations are a standard feature of right 
     of return provisions and are included in all 123 agreements 
     that the United States has signed with other cooperating 
     parties.
       Question 37. Under what circumstances does the termination 
     provision allow the United States to terminate cooperation 
     with India? Does the U.S. have the unconditional right to 
     cease cooperation immediately upon its determination that 
     India has taken action that the U.S. believes constitutes 
     grounds for termination of cooperation?
       Answer. Like all other U.S. agreements for nuclear 
     cooperation, the proposed U.S.-India agreement is a framework 
     agreement and foes not compel any specific cooperation. Thus, 
     a cessation of cooperation would not be inconsistent with the 
     provisions of the agreement. Also, as in other agreements for 
     cooperation, the proposed U.S.-India agreement provides 
     specifically (in article 14) for a right to cease 
     cooperation. Article 14 makes clear that the U.S. would have 
     the right to cease cooperation immediately if it determined 
     that India had taken actions that constituted grounds for 
     such cessation and that a resolution of the problem created 
     by India's actions could not be achieved through 
     consultations. This is a reciprocal right that India enjoys 
     as well. Article 14 does not elaborate the specific 
     circumstances that might bring about such a formal cessation 
     of cooperation. However, the provisions of article 14 
     underscore the expectation of both parties that termination 
     of the agreement, cessation of cooperation, and exercise of 
     the right of return would be serious measures not to be 
     undertaken lightly.
       Question 38. Could the U.S. terminate cooperation pursuant 
     to Article 14 of the nuclear cooperation agreement for 
     reasons other than India's detonation of a nuclear explosive 
     device or abrogating or violating a nuclear safeguards 
     agreement? Does the government of India agree?
       Answer. As noted in the previous answer, Article 14 of the 
     U.S.-India Agreement does not elaborate the specific 
     circumstances that might trigger a cessation of cooperation 
     pursuant to that article. As explained in the answer to 
     question 17, the circumstances for possible termination would 
     include, for example, detonation of a nuclear weapon, 
     material violation of the 123 Agreement, or termination, 
     abrogation, or material violation of a safeguards agreement. 
     The provisions of Article 14 underscore the expectation of 
     both parties that termination of the agreement, cessation of 
     cooperation, and exercise of the right of return would be 
     serious measures not to be undertaken lightly. We believe the 
     language establishing these rights is clear and well 
     understood by both countries.
       Question 39. Do the nonproliferation assurances and 
     conditions in the proposed new agreement apply to the nuclear 
     materials and equipment that the U.S. supplied for the 
     Tarapur reactors, as well as the spent fuel from those 
     reactors? If not, why?
       Answer. The proposed U.S.-India Agreement would not apply 
     retroactively to the spent fuel from the Tarapur reactors. 
     The Atomic Energy Act does not require such retroactive 
     application, but it does impose certain conditions with 
     respect to previously exported material before embarking on 
     new cooperation (see section 127). The Administration 
     believes it will be able to satisfy these requirements of the 
     Atomic Energy Act.
       Question 40. Does the U.S. continue to hold the position 
     that India legally obligated to adhere to the 
     nonproliferation assurances and controls, including peaceful-
     use assurances, safeguards, consent to reprocessing and 
     retransfer to their countries with respect to the nuclear 
     equipment and materials that were subject to the expired 1963 
     agreement for cooperation? Does the Indian Government share 
     the U.S. views?
       Answer. The U.S. and India have maintained differing legal 
     positions on the question of residual conditions and controls 
     on nuclear material subject to the 1963 agreement following 
     expiration of the agreement in 1993. However, India has 
     agreed with the International Atomic Energy Agency on the 
     application of safeguards to nuclear material from the 
     Taracur reactors. Moreover, the material is subject to the 
     INFCIRC/66 Agreement. And the U.S. is confident that there 
     would be consultations between the U.S. and India before any 
     change in the status of the nuclear material (e.g., 
     reprocessing).
       Question 41. Will the Indian Government have any legal 
     right to suspend or eliminate safeguards, reprocess U.S.-
     origin material, or otherwise take any action that would be 
     prohibited under the proposed agreement after the termination 
     by either party of the proposed?
       Answer. Article 16 of the proposed U.S.-India Agreement 
     expressly provides for the survival of essential rights and 
     conditions on items subject to the agreement even after

[[Page 22118]]

     termination or expiration of the agreement, including inter 
     alia with respect to the application of safeguards (article 
     10), reprocessing consent (article 6), and peaceful use 
     (article 9).
       Question 42. Does the Administration agree with Prime 
     Minister Singh that there will be no derogation of India's 
     right to take corrective measure in the event of fuel supply 
     interruption? Will any corrective measures that India might 
     take involve any derogation of the U.S. nonproliferation 
     assurances, rights, and controls that are set out in articles 
     5.6(c), 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10?
       Answer. The language of article 16 clearly provides for the 
     applicability of the referenced provisions to items subject 
     to the proposed agreement even after termination or 
     expiration of the agreement. Until India has completed its 
     safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency and the parameters of ``corrective measures'' are 
     known, we will not be in a position to speak definitively to 
     the potential effect on other provisions of the proposed 
     agreement. That said, it would not be consistent with the 
     proposed agreement text for such corrective measures to 
     extract from the applicability of the provisions referenced 
     in article 16 to items subject to the proposed agreement, 
     including after termination or expiration of the agreement.
       Question 43. What are the explicit linkages and 
     interlocking rights and commitments that Prime Minister Singh 
     was referring to? Do the U.S. and India governments agree on 
     the definition of these linkages and interlocking rights and 
     commitments? If not, how do they differ?
       Answer. International agreements, by their nature, 
     typically involve interlocking rights and commitments, and 
     this is the case with our agreements for nuclear cooperation. 
     The creation of a framework for nuclear cooperation is 
     predicated on a set of rights and conditions that serve 
     essential nonproliferation purposes. Beyond that, we can only 
     say that the quoted statement is at a high level of 
     generality, and we are not in a position to speak for the 
     Indian government as to whether anything more specific was 
     intended by these words.
       Question 44. What is the Administration's understanding of 
     the Prime Minister's statement that India's reprocessing 
     rights are ``permanent''? Specifically, does it mean that the 
     U.S. will not have the right to withdraw its consent to 
     India's reprocessing of U.S.-obligated nuclear material, even 
     if the U.S. determines that the continuation of such 
     activities would pose a serious threat to our national 
     security or nonproliferation?
       Answer. The U.S. has agreed to the reprocessing of U.S.-
     origin materials, to come into effect when the parties agree 
     on ``arrangements and procedures'' and India establishes. a 
     new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing 
     safeguarded material under IAEA safeguards. As with the 
     arrangements governing reprocessing consents granted by the 
     U.S. in connection with the Japan and EURATOM agreements, the 
     proposed arrangements and procedures with India will provide 
     for withdrawal of reprocessing consent. Such a right is also 
     included in Article 14.9 of the U.S.-India Agreement.
       Question 45. In the conference report of the Hyde Act, 
     Congress stated that it intended for the United States to 
     ``seek agreement among Nuclear Suppliers Group members that 
     violations by one country of an agreement with any Nuclear 
     Suppliers Group member should result in joint action by all 
     members, including, as appropriate, the termination of 
     nuclear exports.'' Will the administration be seeking such a 
     commitment when it proposes that the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
     provide a nuclear trade rule exemption for India? If not, why 
     not?
       Answer. Paragraph 16 of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
     Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1) 
     provides that suppliers should (1) consult if, inter alia, 
     one or more suppliers believe there has been a violation of a 
     supplier/recipient understanding; (2) avoid acting in a 
     manner that could prejudice measures that may be adopted in 
     response to such a violation; and (3) agree on ``an 
     appropriate response and possible action, which could include 
     the termination of nuclear transfers to that recipient.'' 
     Assuming the Nuclear Suppliers Group agrees by consensus to 
     an exception for India, this guideline would apply in the 
     case of any nuclear transfers by a Nuclear Suppliers. Group 
     supplier to India. The Administration believes that the 
     existing provisions of paragraph 16 of the Guidelines serve 
     the Congressional concerns expressed in the conference report 
     on the Hyde Act, and therefore no further elaboration is 
     needed in connection with the proposed exception for India. 

  ,Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, this bill also gives the right to 
disapprove a Presidential decision to resume civil nuclear cooperation 
with any country, not just with India, that tests a nuclear weapon. It 
will also ensure that India takes the necessary remaining steps to 
bring its IAEA safeguards agreement fully into force and to conclude an 
additional protocol with the IAEA as India has committed to do. It 
gives Congress the ability to review the future reprocessing 
arrangements that will allow India to reprocess spent U.S. fuel.
  Finally, late yesterday, Secretary of State Rice made a personal 
commitment to me that, in a change of policy, the United States will 
make its highest priority at the November meeting of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group the achievement and the decision by all of the nuclear 
suppliers to prohibit the export of enrichment and reprocessing 
equipment and technology to states that are not members of the treaty 
on nonproliferation. This would be consistent with the intent of the 
Congress as expressed in the Hyde Act.
  In light of the improvements for congressional oversight in this bill 
and in light of the Secretary's commitment, I will be voting for H.R. 
7081.
  Mr. Speaker, I'm a strong advocate of closer U.S.-India ties, and I 
support peaceful nuclear cooperation between our two countries. In 
2006, I voted for the Hyde Act, which established a framework for such 
cooperation. The bill before us today, the ``United States-India 
Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act,'' 
would approve the U.S.-India Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear 
Cooperation, and allow that agreement to come into effect for the 
United States.
  Under the Hyde Act, Congress was to have 30 days to review the 
agreement before beginning consideration of a privileged resolution of 
approval. Unfortunately, because of months of delay in New Delhi and 
the Administration's acceleration of the deliberations of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group to grant India an exemption from its restrictions on 
trade to India, the Agreement is now before us in the waning days 
before adjournment.
  We therefore have two choices: approve the Agreement now, with the 
safeguards built into this bill; or wait until. the next Congress and 
start again. If we wait, however, we will likely only vote on a simple 
resolution of approval, without the safeguards of this bill, and 
without the additional enhancements to Congressional oversight over 
these types of agreements that are required. Our leverage on the 
Administration--this one or the next--will only decrease with time.
  On balance, integrating India into the global nonproliferation regime 
is a positive step. And before anyone gets too sanctimonious about 
India's nuclear weapons program, we should acknowledge that the five 
recognized nuclear weapons states haven't done nearly enough to fulfill 
their commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, including 
making serious reductions in their own arsenals. Nor has the U.S. 
ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  Having said that, I continue to have concerns about ambiguities in 
the nuclear cooperation agreement that the Bush Administration 
negotiated with the government of India, particularly with regard to 
the potential consequences if India tests another nuclear weapon, and 
to the legal status of so-called ``fuel assurances'' made by our 
negotiators.
  Section 102(a) of the legislation before us declares that the 
agreements have the meanings contained in the authoritative 
representations by the President and his representatives.
  I ask unanimous consent to include in the Record a message from the 
President and a letter from the State Department that directly pertain 
to the interpretation of the U.S.-India agreement and that constitute 
some of the authoritative representations made by the President 
described in section 102(a).
  These documents make clear that the assurances contained in Article 
5(6) of the Agreement are political commitments, and do not constitute 
a legal obligation on behalf of the United States or any official, 
agency, or instrumentality of the Government of the United States to 
provide nuclear fuel in any form to the Government of India, or to any 
Indian organization, individual, or entity under any circumstances 
whatsoever. They also make clear that the political commitments 
contained in Article 5(6) of the Agreement do not apply in the event of 
a disruption of the foreign supply of nuclear fuel to India as a 
consequence of a detonation of nuclear explosive device or a violation 
of nonproliferation commitments by India.
  I am also deeply troubled that the Administration completely 
disregarded important nonproliferation requirements in the Hyde Act-- 
thus putting American companies at a competitive disadvantage--when 
seeking a special exemption for India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
  This bill therefore includes a number of provisions designed to 
improve Congressional oversight of the India nuclear cooperation 
agreement and help ensure that the agreement is interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the constraints in the Hyde Act.

[[Page 22119]]

  It gives Congress the right to disapprove, under expedited 
procedures, a Presidential decision to resume civil nuclear cooperation 
with any country--not just India--that tests a nuclear weapon. We, the 
Congress, should be involved in that process.
  And the legislation will ensure that India takes the necessary 
remaining steps to bring its IAEA safeguards agreement fully into 
force, to place the reactors and other facilities under those 
safeguards, and to conclude a more extensive Additional Protocol for 
enhanced safeguards with the IAEA, all of which it has previously 
committed to do.
  And, Mr. Speaker, this legislation gives Congress the ability to 
review the reprocessing arrangement yet to be negotiated that will set 
out the conditions and safeguards to allow India to reprocess spent 
U.S. fuel.
  Finally, late yesterday, Secretary of State Rice made a personal 
commitment to me that--in a change of policy--the United States will 
give its ``highest priority'' to achieving an agreement at the November 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting to prohibit the export of 
enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology to states that are 
not members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT). This would be consistent with the intent of Congress as 
expressed in the Hyde Act to further restrict the international 
transfers of this sensitive technology.
  In light of the improvements for Congressional oversight in this 
bill, I will be voting for H.R. 7081.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lee).
  Ms. LEE. Let me thank the gentleman for yielding and for your loyal 
opposition to this very bad requirement for us now to approve this. Let 
me thank Mr. Berman also for your leadership and for your hard work in 
managing this.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly disapprove of this agreement, and urge my 
colleagues to do likewise. In withholding my approval, I seek not to 
penalize the people of India but, rather, to affirm the principle of 
nuclear nonproliferation and to maintain the integrity of the 
international nonproliferation standards.
  Several years ago, I had the privilege of visiting India, and I 
witnessed firsthand the brilliance, the spirit and the commitment of 
the democracy of the Indian people. The United States and India are the 
two largest democracies in the world and have for many years enjoyed an 
excellent relationship.
  Given the tremendous progress India has made and can be expected to 
make in the future, strengthening the ties that bind our countries 
together is a critically important strategic goal of the United States, 
but the suggestion that we can only do so by jettisoning adherence to 
the international nuclear nonproliferation framework that has served 
the world so well for more than 30 years, as approval of the agreement 
before us would do, is just simply unwise. It is also reckless.
  Approval of this agreement undermines our efforts to dissuade 
countries like Iran and North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. By 
approving this agreement, all we are doing is creating incentives for 
other countries to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
  Why should we expect, for example, Brazil or South Korea to continue 
playing by the rules in foregoing the development of nuclear weapons in 
exchange for civilian technology when they see that India receives the 
benefits while flouting the rules?
  Mr. Speaker, the fact that India is not a signatory to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty is sufficient reason for me to disapprove the 
agreement, but for those of my colleagues who may have supported the 
bill, there are many other compelling reasons to disapprove this 
agreement.
  So I ask all Members to say that we want to adhere to 
nonproliferation and not pass this approval.
  I thank the gentlemen for yielding, I also thank Chairman Berman for 
his hard work in managing the consideration by this body of the U.S.-
India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which comes before the 
Congress for approval pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954.
  I strongly disapprove of this agreement and urge my colleagues to do 
likewise. In withholding my approval I seek not to penalize the people 
of India but rather to affirm the principle of nuclear nonproliferation 
and to maintain the integrity of international nonproliferation 
standards.
  Several years ago I had the privilege of visiting India and witnessed 
firsthand the brilliance, the spirit, and the commitment to democracy 
of the Indian people. The United States and India are the two largest 
democracies in the world and have for many years enjoyed an excellent 
relationship. Given the tremendous progress India has made and can be 
expected to make in the future, strengthening the ties that bind our 
countries is a critically important strategic goal of the United 
States.
  But the suggestion that we can only do so by jettisoning adherence to 
the international nuclear non-proliferation framework that has served 
the world so well for more than 30 years, as approval of the agreement 
before would do, is not simply unwise. It is reckless.
  Approval of this agreement undermines our efforts to dissuade 
countries like Iran and North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. By 
approving this agreement all we are doing is creating incentives for 
other countries to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 
Why should we expect, for example, Brazil or South Korea to continue 
playing by the rules and foregoing development of nuclear weapons in 
exchange for civilian technology when they see India receive the 
benefits while flouting the rules?
  Mr. Speaker, the fact that India is not a signatory to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty is sufficient reason for me to disapprove this 
agreement. But for those of my colleagues who may have supported H.R. 
5682, the Henry J. Hyde United States India Peaceful Atomic Energy 
Cooperation Act (``Hyde Act''), there are two other compelling reasons 
to disapprove this agreement.
  First, the agreement will indirectly assist India's nuclear weapons 
program because foreign supplies of nuclear fuel to India's civil 
nuclear sector will free up electricity generation capacity to produce 
weapons-grade plutonium.
  Second, the Hyde Act requires that the provisions in any agreement 
governing safeguards on civil nuclear material and facilities remain in 
effect ``in perpetuity'' and must be ``consistent with IAEA standards 
and practices.'' The requirement that India be bound to comply with 
these safeguards in perpetuity is not satisfied because Indian 
governmental officials have publicly suggested that India may withdraw 
from the safeguards agreement if fuel supplies are interrupted, even if 
the interruption is the required response to a breach of the agreement 
by India.
  Mr. Speaker, we should not forget that unlike 179 other countries, 
India has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and is 
one of only three countries never to have signed the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty. And it is noteworthy that while it continues 
to produce fissile material, India has never made a legally binding 
commitment to nuclear disarmament or nonproliferation.
  To sum up, this deal will not advance America's interests or make the 
world safer. It will, however, deal a near fatal blow to the stability 
of the international nonproliferation regime. For these reasons, I will 
vote to disapprove the agreement.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I'd like to yield myself 4 minutes.
  I rise in strong support of this bill to approve the U.S.-India 
Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. I've been a strong 
supporter of this increased cooperation between the United States and 
India, including peaceful nuclear cooperation.
  I was an original cosponsor of the Henry Hyde U.S.-India Peaceful 
Nuclear Cooperation Act, which laid the foundation for the agreement 
that we are seeking to implement this week. I have worked hard to 
secure bipartisan support for that legislation and for the agreement on 
nuclear cooperation.
  To ensure that legislation bringing the nuclear agreement into force 
could be adopted by the Congress this week, I introduced, with the 
support of our Republican leadership, H.R. 7039, which is an identical 
version of the text now before the Senate and the text that Chairman 
Howard Berman introduced last night and that we are considering right 
now.
  Mr. Speaker, the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is not one 
that we would offer to just any nation. It is a venture we would enter 
into only with our most trusted democratic allies. I believe that 
stronger economic, scientific, diplomatic, and military cooperation 
between the United States and India is in the national interest of

[[Page 22120]]

 both countries and that our increasingly close relationship will be 
the central factor determining the course of global events in this 
century.
  Among the most important elements of this new relationship is India's 
commitment to cooperate with the United States on major issues such as 
stopping the spread of nuclear weapons material and technology to 
groups and to countries of concern.
  In particular, Mr. Speaker, this nuclear cooperation agreement is 
essential in continuing to ensure India's active involvement in 
dissuading, isolating and, if necessary, sanctioning and containing 
Iran for its efforts to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear weapon 
capabilities and the means to deliver these deadly weapons.
  It will also help secure India's full participation in the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, including a formal commitment to the 
Statement of Interdiction Principles, and it will be a major step 
forward in achieving a moratorium by India, Pakistan and China on the 
production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives.
  In addition, in order to meet the requirements of the Hyde Act, India 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency have negotiated a safeguards 
agreement on several Indian nuclear facilities that will expand the 
ability of the IAEA to monitor nuclear activities in that country.
  Mr. Speaker, these are but a few of the many benefits from our 
nuclear cooperation with India and the strategic cooperation between 
our two countries that have already taken root. I am gratified that we 
are finally considering this legislation so that Congress can approve 
it without delay.
  I urge my colleagues in both the House and the Senate to approve this 
nuclear cooperation agreement with India overwhelmingly. By doing so, 
the United States and India will embrace one another in a strategic 
partnership that will prove to be one of the most principal guarantors 
of the security and prosperity of both countries in this new century.
  I reserve the balance of our time.
  Mr. MARKEY. I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California 
(Mrs. Tauscher).
  Mrs. TAUSCHER. I thank the gentleman for yielding time.
  Mr. Speaker, I oppose the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation 
Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act. This bill flies in the 
face of decades of American leadership to contain the spread of weapons 
of mass destruction. The bill does not include all of the safeguards 
and protections contained in the Henry Hyde Act of 2006.
  A vote for this bill is a vote to approve a rushed process that has 
not allowed hearings, debate or amendment to this deal.
  Most importantly, the India deal would give a country which has a 
dismal record on nonproliferation all of the benefits of nuclear trade 
with none of the responsibilities.
  India has been denied access to the international nuclear market for 
three decades and for good reason. India is not a signatory of the 
nonproliferation treaty, and it has never committed to nuclear 
disarmament nor has it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. India 
has misused civilian nuclear technology to produce its first nuclear 
weapon in 1974, and it continues to manufacture nuclear weapons to this 
day.
  This deal will help India expand its nuclear weapons program. For 
every pound of uranium that India is allowed to import for its power 
reactors, this deal frees up a pound of uranium for its bomb program. I 
was in Pakistan this month, and it is clear that this deal will only 
increase the chances of a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent.
  For all of these reasons, I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill 
and to promote a stronger relationship with India that does not come at 
the expense of our own security and that of our allies.

                              {time}  1900

  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1\1/4\ minutes to the 
Chair of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, someone 
who was involved in this issue since the first announcement of the 
joint declaration in the summer of 2005, which was the first time 
Congress was ever told about this issue, the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Ackerman).
  Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the chairman.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this bill because it will 
give congressional approval to civil nuclear cooperation with India. 
Let me tell you what that means. It means that the IAEA will be able to 
inspect two-thirds of India's civilian nuclear facilities because those 
facilities will be under IAEA safeguards and all future nuclear 
facilities will also be under safeguards.
  It means that India, for the first time ever, has committed to MTCR 
guidelines. It means that India, for the first time ever, will adhere 
to the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. It means that we can send a 
clear message to rogue states, nuclear rogue states, about how to 
behave because it shows that responsible nuclear powers are welcomed by 
the International Community and not sanctions. It means that we can 
finally achieve the broad, deep, and enduring strategic relationship 
with India that all of us in this House support.
  So if you wanted all of these things when you voted overwhelmingly 
for it 2 years ago, then vote for it again tonight.
  There are two options before us today. One is to throw away all of 
the work that's been done and just keep the status quo. India would 
then pursue its national interests, as it's been doing, outside of the 
nonproliferation mainstream and we get to inspect nothing. The other is 
to make a deal with India, and the United States and the International 
Community will get a window in perpetuity into two-thirds of India's 
nuclear facilities and all of its future nuclear facilities.
  The choice is clear, Mr. Speaker. It's time for 21st century policy 
towards India, and it encourages India's emergence as a global nuclear 
power and solidifies our bilateral relationship for decades to come.
  This bill is that new policy, and I urge everyone to support it.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlelady from 
California (Ms. Woolsey).
  Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this bill, 
H.R. 7081. By approving this nuclear agreement, an agreement with 
India, we will permanently and irrevocably undermine decades of 
nonproliferation efforts.
  This agreement says that India, but no other country, can live 
outside the international nuclear control system. It sets a frightening 
precedent. If a country is unhappy about the rules on nuclear 
possession, it can simply go around them breaking them.
  And what does it matter if India ignores international agreements? 
Any sanctions? Any punishment? No. Just a lucrative deal with the 
United States of America.
  If we approve this deal, we lose our moral high ground, Mr. Speaker. 
Who are we to be telling any other nation to adhere to the rules when 
we subvert them ourselves? This is not about our relationship with the 
people of India; this is about a complete obliteration of the nuclear 
security regime.
  The Bush administration is demanding we move with haste without 
looking back. Sound familiar?
  I urge my colleagues to oppose H.R. 7081, stand up for national 
security, stand up for nuclear nonproliferation.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am so proud to yield 2\1/2\ minutes 
to the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) the ranking member on the 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation. I just 
want to commend Chairman Berman and Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen's 
leadership on the issue.
  This has been a long road. In the last Congress, I managed on the 
House floor approval of the Hyde Act, which was a legal framework for 
facilitating civil nuclear cooperation with India. And that was a 
tremendous foreign policy achievement of the last Congress. Failure by 
this Congress to push this agreement across the finish line, I'm 
afraid, would be foreign policy malpractice.

[[Page 22121]]

  Indian officials have told me about their ambitious plans to expand 
nuclear power to fuel their growing economy with clean-burning energy 
through this source. And with this deal, the Indian nuclear industry 
will overcome international restrictions and they will reach their full 
potential to do this.
  This deal, frankly, has consumed Indian politics. The far, far left 
in India sought to turn the nuclear deal into a referendum on India's 
relationship with the United States. They lost in that. Let's seal the 
deal today helping cement the new U.S.-India relationship.
  And strictly speaking, this deal really isn't about the United 
States. The Nuclear Suppliers Group, an organization of 45 countries to 
control the spread of nuclear technology, okayed this agreement. That 
NSG decision represents the will of the international community to make 
the nuclear rules conform to the realities of India's energy situation.
  Opponents are deriding the exception made for India as a blow to 
nonproliferation rules. But while this deal may not be a net gain for 
nonproliferation, neither is it a net loss because under the deal, 
India stays outside the NPT, but it separates its civil and military 
nuclear facilities, it gives the IAEA increased access to its nuclear 
facilities, and it continues its unilateral moratorium on nuclear 
testing. Indeed, Mohamed ElBaradei, the chief of the IAEA, supports the 
agreement. Sure it makes changes to the rules that were set down 
decades ago, but the world is not standing still. Critics can not 
ignore the security, political, economic, and environmental reasons, 
frankly, to support it.
  Opposing this won't affect India. It will only hurt our relationship 
with India and U.S. interests. With the NSG agreement, other countries, 
notably France and Russia, can enter the Indian nuclear market--with a 
potential for up to $100 billion in investment. It has been reported 
that India will soon sign their own nuclear cooperation agreements with 
these countries. Now U.S. companies, however, would be blocked out of 
India until Congress finally approves this agreement.
  Mr. Speaker, either we continue to try to box in India and hope for 
the best, or we act to make India a true partner. This agreement works 
through a difficult nonproliferation situation to strengthen a very 
important situation.
  India will be a major power in the 21st century. Let's approve this 
legislation.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I want to begin by acknowledging the fine 
efforts of my colleague and Chairman Howard Berman to approve this 
deal, and I find myself in reluctant opposition.
  I believe our relationship with India is one of our most important. 
Our interests are inextricably linked, and our economies draw ever 
closer. In the past, that relationship has been strained by the issue 
of nuclear proliferation--India never signed the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty and continues to build nuclear weapons.
  The agreement we vote on today began as a valiant attempt to bring 
India into the nuclear mainstream while binding our business 
communities closer together. Unfortunately, it has ended with an 
agreement that falls short of either goal: the safeguards are not 
strong enough, the incentive for other nations to proliferate is too 
great; and while opening India's nuclear market to the world, it places 
American companies at a competitive disadvantage compared to the French 
and Russian firms.
  Even worse, the deal is really no deal at all. The Indian government 
and the administration have been issuing contradictory statements about 
it for the past year. This is not a problem of each side interpreting 
the treaty differently. The two sides have apparently signed different 
treaties. The next time India has a new government, which could be as 
early as winter, it may withdraw from the agreement, and the net result 
of all of this negotiation will allow foreign companies to sell nuclear 
technology to India. No nonproliferation goals would be accomplished, 
no new business would be generated for American companies, and no new 
relationship with India would be achieved.
  When it became clear that the real winners in this deal were the 
Russians and other nuclear powers that indiscriminately and 
irresponsibly sell nuclear technology around the world, why didn't the 
administration pull out? When the administration realized that India 
would not accept the deal that ended cooperation if it decided to test 
a nuclear weapon, a requirement of the Hyde Act, why did they continue 
to negotiate? When the administration realized this deal might 
undermine the MPT, a treaty that has succeeded in dramatically limiting 
the number of nuclear nations, why did they not take steps to 
strengthen other nonproliferation efforts?
  Some proponents of the deal have said that it brings India into the 
nuclear nonproliferation mainstream.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge opposition to the agreement.
  Mr. Speaker, my friend and colleague from California, Chairman 
Berman, has worked tirelessly over the last year to make this deal 
better. He has been a great champion of nonproliferation in this House, 
and he has led many efforts to prod and question the Bush 
administration on the negotiations with India--pressing for a deal that 
would enhance our relationship with the world's largest democracy while 
protecting the global nonproliferation regime and our interests around 
the world. Unfortunately, the administration resisted many of his 
efforts and that of others, and I am forced to oppose the final 
package.
  I believe that our relationship with India is one of our most 
important. Our interests are inextricably linked, and our economies 
draw ever closer. In the past, that relationship has been strained by 
the issue of nuclear proliferation--India never signed the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, and continues to build nuclear weapons. The 
agreement we vote on today began as a valiant attempt to bring India 
into the nuclear mainstream, while binding our business communities 
closer together. Unfortunately, it has ended with an agreement that 
falls short of either goal: the safeguards are not strong enough, the 
incentive for other nations to proliferate is too great, and while 
opening India's nuclear market to the world, it places American 
companies at a competitive disadvantage compared to French and Russian 
firms.
  Even worse, the ``deal'' is not really a deal at all. The Indian 
Government and the administration have been issuing contradictory 
statements about it for the past year. This is not a problem of each 
side interpreting the treaty differently--the two sides have apparently 
signed two different treaties. The next time India has a new 
government, which could be as early as this winter, it may withdraw 
from the agreement, and the net result of all of this negotiation will 
be to allow foreign companies to sell nuclear technology to India. No 
nonproliferation goals would be accomplished, no new business would be 
generated for American companies, and no new relationship with India 
would be achieved.
  So, I have a few questions for the administration, which have not yet 
been answered, and I thInk they're important questions to consider as 
we vote on this proposal.
  When the administration realized that India would not accept a deal 
that ended cooperation if it decided to test a nuclear weapon, a 
requirement of the Hyde Act, why did they continue to negotiate.
  When it became clear that the real winners in this deal were the 
Russians and other nuclear powers that indiscriminately and 
irresponsibly sell nuclear technology around the world, why didn't we 
pull out?
  When the administration realized that this deal might undermine the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a treaty that has succeeded in 
dramatically limiting the number of nuclear nations, why did they not 
take steps to strengthen other nonproliferation efforts?
  When it became clear that we couldn't get the assurances we needed to 
stem proliferation, why didn't we shift gears and produce a deal in 
renewable energy, information technology, or another area that would 
bring actual benefits to the American economy without harming our 
national security?
  Some proponents of the deal have said that it brings India into the 
nonproliferation mainstream. But in fact, India remains free to test 
nuclear weapons, has not agreed to abide by the Nonproliferation 
Treaty, has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and will only 
allow international inspectors access to a few of their civilian power 
plants. That is not the mainstream.
  India has become a vital partner in a world that has grown dangerous 
and unpredictable.

[[Page 22122]]

But tragically, an agreement in any other field of renewable energy 
would have brought us more, without seriously weakening our efforts to 
prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and South Asia.
  As a strong supporter of improving our relationship with India, but a 
firm advocate of nonproliferation, I cannot support this agreement, and 
I must urge my colleagues to oppose it as well.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to yield 2\1/2\ minutes 
to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Wilson), an esteemed member 
of our Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Middle East 
and South Asia, and cochair of the Congressional Caucus on India and 
Indian Americans.
  Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, thank you for this 
opportunity to support the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement.
  As cochair of the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, 
I am grateful for the bipartisan support of this agreement. The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee vote was 19-2 this week. A vote in favor of 
the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement will be a giant step forward 
in strengthening our Nation's partnership with the people of India.
  Our two nations have a vested and shared interest in expanding our 
opportunities to compete in the global economy. This agreement will be 
a landmark accomplishment to do just that. After all, India is the 
world's largest democracy, and America is the world's oldest democracy.
  In my home State of South Carolina, over 50 percent of our 
electricity is generated by nuclear power and has been for over 30 
years. I know firsthand that this is an effective, clean, and safe 
alternative to traditional resources.
  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has estimated that this civilian nuclear 
agreement could create as many as 250,000 high-tech jobs right here in 
America. Moreover, Undersecretary for Political Affairs at the State 
Department, William J. Burns, has made his own estimates that we could 
see anywhere between 3- to 5,000 new direct jobs and 10,0000 to 15,000 
indirect jobs per reactor.
  I am grateful for the leadership of President George W. Bush, 
Secretary of State Dr. Condoleezza Rice, and Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh. Former U.S. Ambassador Robert Blackwill and current U.S. 
Ambassador David Mulford have worked professionally and successfully 
with Indian Ambassador to the United States, Ronen Sen.
  Additionally, this agreement could not be finalized without the hard 
work of Ron Somers, President of the U.S.-India Business Council, 
former Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Jeffrey 
Bergner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs 
Joel Starr, State Department Director of House Affairs Scott Kamins, 
White House members Brian McCormack and Vishal Amin, and South 
Carolina's Second Congressional District Chief of Staff Dino Teppara, 
and senior legislative assistant Paul Callahan.
  This agreement, which is mutually beneficial for the people of India 
and America, have significant support from the 2.2 million Indian 
Americans who are successful members of American Society.
  I want to thank my colleagues on the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
and staff members, particularly Chairman Howard Berman of California, 
Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, former India cochair Ed Royce, and 
former cochair Gary Ackerman.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Nebraska (Mr. Fortenberry).
  Mr. FORTENBERRY. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts for 
yielding time.
  I also wish to thank the ranking member, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, for her 
leadership on this complex issue and her consideration of my differing 
view.
  Mr. Speaker, given the enormous pressures this Congress is facing to 
solve urgent financial problems which threaten the stability and health 
of our economy, I must express my deep reservations about expediting 
approval of the U.S.-India civil Nuclear Agreement at this time.
  While I fully favor strengthening ties, economic, social, cultural, 
and political with our Indian friends, why this most desirable pursuit 
hinges upon the sale of sensitive nuclear technology remains a mystery 
to me.
  The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement sets a groundbreaking 
precedent that could open a floodgate of nuclear commerce worldwide 
that, absent rigorous conditions, safeguards, and oversight, could 
significantly damage the stability and integrity of U.S. and 
international nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
  Just this week, the Russian prime minister announced that Russia was, 
``ready to consider the possibility of cooperation in nuclear energy'' 
with Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez.
  We should not rush this.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the Chair 
of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).
  Mr. ENGEL. I thank the chairman for yielding to me, and I rise in 
strong support of this legislation. For the United States, passage of 
this legislation will clear the way to deepen the strategic 
relationship with India, open significant opportunities for American 
firms, help meet India's surging energy requirements in an 
environmentally friendly manner, and bring India into the global 
nuclear nonproliferation mainstream.

                              {time}  1915

  This agreement marks the culmination of a decade-long process of 
India's emergence on the national stage and the Indian Government's 
effort to steer a more pragmatic and realistic course in foreign 
affairs. We have common strategic interests with India, and this will 
enhance these interests.
  India's energy demand is expected to grow nearly 5 percent per year 
for the next two decades. We should be a partner in that.
  When the Congress passed the Hyde Act, we recognized India's refusal 
to transfer nuclear technology to others. These unique circumstances 
make this change in U.S. nonproliferation policy possible. We're now 
poised to reap the benefits of ending India's nuclear isolation.
  Eligibility to civilian nuclear cooperation is an essential step 
toward bringing India fully into the global effort to prevent onward 
transmission of nuclear weapons know-how.
  I urge my colleagues to support the bill.
  Mr. MARKEY. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina 
(Mr. Spratt).
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I welcome the prospect of peaceful 
cooperation and trade between the United States and India on matters of 
nuclear power. I voted for the Henry J. Hyde United States-India 
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 because I thought it was 
a foundation on which we could build an energy relationship with India, 
one that would be mutually beneficial and, at the same time, reassuring 
to the international community.
  Seeking energy solutions for the world's rapidly developing 
countries, India among them, is an admirable cause. But nuclear 
nonproliferation is also an admirable, compelling cause, and I am not 
frankly convinced that the bill we're considering on this fast track, 
with 40 minutes of debate, will promote India's nuclear energy goals 
without creating exceptions, gaps, and ambiguities that could hamper 
our efforts to police and stop the spread of nuclear weapons and 
materials.
  Many serious questions need to be answered with respect to this 
legislation. Chief among them are questions like these: How well do 
these agreements comport with the letter and spirit of the Hyde Act and 
the Atomic Energy Act? Does the bill take the right course in 
constraining India from breaching the worldwide moratorium to undertake 
nuclear testing? Does the bill indirectly encourage India to enlarge 
its arsenal of nuclear weapons by allocating nuclear materials from 
reactor fuel to warheads? Does it provide international safeguards?

[[Page 22123]]

  Mr. Speaker, it appears that the President is bent upon a hurried 
approval of this agreement. Frankly, I can find no convincing reason to 
treat this issue in such a hasty manner, particularly as we enter the 
waning hours of this session preoccupied with other issues.
  The Atomic Energy Act contemplates a continuous 30-day period of 
congressional review, calling clearly for due diligence on issues of 
this gravity. I say we should abide by this solemn requirement, and if 
necessary, work our will and make improvements to the legislation 
before us.
  The President may want us to move with dispatch, but the American 
people, on matters of this importance, want us to move with diligence 
and deliberation. Due diligence takes time and effort. In this 
instance, if we adopt this bill, we are not applying either.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) who is the ranking member 
of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and 
Oversight.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. I rise in support of this historic effort to 
establish a partnership in helping India meets its energy needs, 
creating a prosperous country through clean and safe nuclear energy.
  I would hope that the nuclear technology utilized by this project and 
by this pact will be based on the high temperature gas cool reactors, 
which are safer and will not produce a byproduct that can be built into 
a bomb. Now, if we use these reactors, that should take care of the 
proliferation concerns of our colleagues they are rightfully concerned 
about.
  During the Cold War, unfortunate ideologically driven issues 
prevented us from a friendship and a close relationship with India. By 
cooperating in good faith to help India meet its energy challenge, we 
are indeed making it a better world and a safer world, and we now have 
an opportunity to have a new beginning with a country that was not in a 
good relationship with us in decades past.
  This can be a mutually profitable relationship, and we can indeed 
embrace the world's largest democracy, as compared to during the Cold 
War when we had too close a relationship, which we are paying for now, 
with China, which is the world's largest and biggest human rights 
abuser.
  So I gladly step forward and proudly step forward to be part of this 
historic effort to build good relations between the United States and 
India by utilizing safe and clean nuclear energy to build a more 
prosperous continent.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for the gentlewoman from Florida 
has now expired.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Holt).
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, my friend, from 
Massachusetts.
  There will be a time when the history of the spread of nuclear 
weapons of mass destruction is written, and we will look back and see 
when the last thread of the international nuclear nonproliferation 
regime was shredded with this agreement. Now, we can talk at length 
about the details of this cooperative agreement. We can talk about what 
a good friend India is and how responsible they have been, but the 
history will say that with this agreement the world lost the last bit 
of an international tool to control the spread of nuclear weapons of 
mass destruction.
  We will be left only with the ability to jawbone with our allies and 
to threaten our enemies. Countries will work out whatever deals they 
can and will, two-by-two.
  If we really believe that nuclear proliferation and loose nukes are 
the greatest threat to world peace and security, as I do, then we 
should be holding on to every tool we can find to prevent that threat. 
We should be working with India to strengthen the international 
nonproliferation regime, not collaborating with India to destroy it.
  I urge a ``no'' vote.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 1 minute to a member of 
our committee, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley).
  Mr. CROWLEY. I thank the gentleman. I thank him for his leadership 
here this evening.
  On July 18, 2005, our government and the government of India entered 
into an agreement that we are here today seeing through. The joint 
statement laid the groundwork for the cooperation of our two countries 
for the engagement of our two countries throughout this next century. 
And today, we're taking the final step needed to put this agreement 
into place.
  This agreement will end India's nuclear isolation and allow them to 
be brought into the nonproliferation tent with the rest of the 
responsible states who seek safe and efficient civilian nuclear 
technology.
  Passage of the agreement is common sense. We are united in the 
world's oldest and the world's largest democracies in an effort to 
expand peaceful and responsible development of nuclear technology. If 
we expect India to be our ally in the 21st century, we must treat them 
as an equal, which is what this cooperation deal does.
  India has never proliferated beyond her borders, unlike her neighbor, 
and I believe that this is an important relationship, an important 
aspect of this relationship that needs to be taken into consideration 
when evaluating this legislation before us.
  I trust my colleagues will recognize what our future with India holds 
and vote for final passage of this historic legislation.
  Mr. MARKEY. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the gentleman.
  As with many Members of this House, I am a strong supporter of India. 
I have had the opportunity to visit the country, meet with leaders, 
meet with people, and I think we could say we have a lot in common.
  India's the world's largest democracy. Someone whose life I have 
admired, the life of Mahatma Gandhi, is synonymous with peace.
  India is a strong ally in the quest for nuclear disarmament. It was 
the first nation to call for a ban on testing back in 1954.
  Regretfully, I rise in opposition to this bill because I believe it 
threatens security in India and the Asian subcontinent and in the 
world. The U.S. should work with India on initiatives to eliminate all 
nuclear weapons for the safety of the global community and for the 
safety of every man, woman, and child.
  The contradictory policies of this administration with respect to the 
nuclear nonproliferation treaty are obvious. The administration has 
repeatedly cited Iran for minor breaches of the nonproliferation treaty 
and has used these breaches to rally support for a military attack on 
Iran.
  Yet the administration is undercutting the nonproliferation treaty by 
seeking to build new nuclear weapons, a major violation of the NPT, 
which states that nuclear weapon states should be seeking to phase out 
nuclear weapons.
  Now the administration would like this body to approve a civilian 
nuclear agreement with India, despite India's refusal to join the NPT 
or sign the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
  India has nuclear weapons. It has no intention of limiting its 
nuclear weapons cache or production capability. The United States 
should be leading in nonproliferation and towards nuclear abolition.
  This legislation undermines global nonproliferation efforts by 
endorsing India's refusal to sign the NPT. We are also extending a more 
favorable civil nuclear trade policy to Indian than that which is 
extended to countries in substantial compliance with the 
nonproliferation treaty.
  Furthermore, by ensuring a foreign supply of uranium fuel to India 
for use in the civilian sector, India will be able to use more of its 
own limited uranium reserves to produce nuclear weapons.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge defeat of this resolution.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from American Samoa, Eni Faleomavaega, chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment.

[[Page 22124]]


  Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the distinguished chairman of our committee 
and also commend our distinguished ranking member of the committee for 
their leadership and support of this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, on every level it is long overdue and I believe it's 
long overdue that we should strengthen our relations with India. It has 
been stated many times before, India lives in one of the world's 
toughest neighborhoods, and the U.S. is the world's oldest democracy 
and the world's largest democracy. It is time for the United States and 
India to live together as friends and partners committed to promoting 
the values we share.
  We have come a long way, and I am pleased that Congress will now vote 
in favor of supporting the use of India's civil nuclear cooperation 
which will lift millions out of poverty and will help us begin to 
address the global energy crisis which now confronts us.
  Two major factors that I think I want to share with my colleagues and 
I think it's important in this agreement, the fact that it has the 
IAEA's approval and the fact that 45 members of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group has also given approval to this agreement.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 7081, the United States-
India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement 
Act, and commend Chairman Howard L. Berman of the House Foreign 
Relations Committee for his leadership in bringing this deal to the 
floor for an historic vote. Without his support, this deal would have 
gone nowhere. I also want to thank the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. 
Ros-Lehtinen, our senior ranking member of the committee, for her 
leadership and support.
  Before agreeing to allow this bill to move forward, Chairman Berman 
insisted that U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice offer assurances 
that, in a change of policy, ``the United States will makes its highest 
priority at the November meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
the achievement of a decision to prohibit the export of enrichment and 
reprocessing equipment and technology to states that are not 
signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). I fully agree 
with Chairman Berman's decision, and applaud him for making sure this 
agreement is interpreted in a manner consistent with the intent of 
Congress as expressed in the Hyde Act to further restrict international 
transfers of this sensitive technology.
  I also want to pay tribute to our former and esteemed colleagues, the 
Honorable Henry J. Hyde and the Honorable Tom Lantos, who both served 
with distinction as chairmen of the House Foreign Relations Committee, 
and did everything they could to ensure that this day would come and 
that the U.S. would enter into a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement 
with the Government of India.
  I also want to acknowledge the efforts of the Indian-American 
community which has been galvanized in support of this deal. Like House 
Majority Leader Steny Hoyer said, ``I commend Mr. Sanjay Prui, 
President of USIBA, for the important work he has done on the U.S.-
India nuclear deal, in cooperation with the Congressional Taskforce on 
U.S.-India Trade.''
  As Co-Chair of the Congressional Taskforce on U.S.-India Trade, I 
believe, as Chairman Berman has so eloquently stated, we should have no 
illusions that India will give up its nuclear weapons, ``so long as the 
five recognized nuclear weapons states fail to make serious reductions 
in their arsenals.'' But, like Chairman Berman, I also agree that this 
deal is a ``positive step to integrate India into the global 
nonproliferation regime.''
  On every level, Mr. Speaker, I believe it is way overdue that we 
strengthen U.S.-India relations. As has been stated many times before, 
India lives in one of the world's toughest neighborhoods and, the U.S. 
as the world's oldest democracy and the world's largest democracy, it 
is time for the U.S. and India to stand together as friends and 
partners committed to promoting the values we share.
  I also recognize, again, the important contributions of former Under 
Secretary of State Nicholas Burns who, as lead negotiator for this 
agreement, represented our Nation's interest with distinction. I am 
honored to have worked with Under Secretary Burns during a time when 
the deal was first proposed to the Congress.
  I also appreciate the support of the Honorable Richard Boucher, 
Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, who, 
at the invitation of the Congressional Taskforce on U.S.-India Trade, 
in cooperation with USIBA, was first on the Hill from the U.S. 
Administration to brief Members of Congress, staffers, professionals in 
the field, and the Indian-American community since India was given a 
waiver by the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) on Saturday, 
September 6, 2008.
  We have come a long way, and I am pleased that Congress will now vote 
in favor of supporting U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation which will 
lift millions out of poverty, and will help us begin to address the 
global energy crisis which now confronts us.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 1 minute to a very 
active member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the gentlelady 
from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson-Lee.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. I thank the chairman very much, and let me 
quickly thank him for the thoughtfulness on this legislation, and as 
well the ranking member, Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
  I am a strong supporter of nuclear nonproliferation. I am a supporter 
of India. And I also believe in balancing the needs of India and our 
friend and ally against terrorism, Pakistan. But this is an important 
statement about our friendship with India, and I believe that this 
nuclear civil agreement is just that, 1.1 billion people who are 
attempting to invest and grow their economy.
  The restrictions that we have are meaningful: no stockpiles; fuel 
supplies should match the nuclear reactor needs; no accumulation, as I 
said, of stockpiles; Congress having the right to disapprove by 
resolution any agreement that permits India to extract plutonium and 
uranium from U.S. fast reactor fuel.
  It is important to note that this particular agreement is one that we 
should support. The Indian Government has put forward their best 
effort. They are our friend, and I ask my colleagues to support this 
legislation.

                              {time}  1930

  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Massachusetts is 
recognized for 7 minutes.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to this 
bill and to the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal.
  Most people think that this is a debate about India. It is not. We 
are all friends of India, and we are all united in our view that the 
United States and India share a bright future of strong relations. This 
is a debate about Iran. This is a debate about North Korea, about 
Pakistan, about Venezuela, about any other country in the world that 
harbors the goal of acquiring nuclear weapons.
  With this vote, we are shattering the nonproliferation rules. And the 
next three countries to march through the broken glass will be Iran, 
North Korea, and Pakistan. And there are others with their nose up 
against the window getting ready as well. Flashing a green light to 
India sends a dangerous signal to all of those countries because these 
policies are interconnected.
  We are now seeing the devastating financial consequences of years of 
Wall Street recklessness. The subprime mortgage pushers pretended that 
the laws of supply and demand no longer applied and that home values 
would always go up. Well, they were wrong. The Bush administration 
argues that breaking the nuclear rules for India will not lead to 
broken rules for anyone else. The Bush administration is wrong. And 
this deal will have serious consequences for our national security. 
Like the financial crisis that is now gripping the globe, this 
disastrous nuclear deal will come back to haunt us because there is no 
bailout for a nuclear bomb.
  Nonproliferation experts tell us that India will be able to increase 
its annual nuclear weapons production from seven bombs per year to 40 
or 50 bombs per year. That is absolutely a crazy situation for us to be 
engaging in. Does the Bush administration think that nobody is watching 
what we are doing? Pakistan is watching. Pakistan is watching its arch 
rival get welcomed into ``the nuclear club.'' Does the Bush 
administration think that Pakistan will just watch India ramp up its 
nuclear weapons production and do nothing? Pakistan will respond. 
Pakistan warned us

[[Page 22125]]

this summer that this deal, and I quote, ``threatens to increase the 
chances of a nuclear arms race.''
  Right now, according to nonproliferation experts, Pakistan is 
building two new reactors to dramatically increase its nuclear weapons 
production. The first of these new reactors could come online within a 
year. Pakistan is essentially telling India, ``We're in this game, too. 
We will match you step to step.''
  This is an all out nuclear arms race. That is what President Bush 
should be working on, not fueling it, but trying to negotiate an end to 
it. This is what a nuclear arms race looks like. We lived through one 
with the Soviet Union, now we are fueling one in Southeast Asia.
  And who is Pakistan? A.Q. Khan, right here, the world's number one 
nuclear proliferator, a criminal against humanity, he is in Pakistan. 
Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, the people that actually attacked us on 
9/11--and we know have attempted to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction--they are in Pakistan. And the Pakistani government, upon 
which we are relying to safeguard the nuclear weapons and materials, is 
dangerously unstable. We are feeding the fire of a nuclear arms race in 
the one country, Pakistan, where we can least afford to do so.
  It's incredibly ironic that next here on the House floor we will 
consider a bill to increase sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program 
because the bill we're considering now makes an Iranian nuclear weapon 
much harder to prevent. By breaking the rules for India, we're making 
it less likely that the rules will hold against Iran or anyone else.
  Iran is looking at this deal for India and they're saying, ``Where 
can I sign up?'' ``I want that deal.'' And where is it written that 
once these new rules are set up, that the Venezuelans can't cut the 
same deal with the Chinese, that the Iranians and the Russians will 
just continue merrily along the way? They will be pointing at us. They 
will be pointing at our explanation that we can cut a separate deal 
here with India. That is what we are establishing in this bill. This is 
the new regime for the world, not a comprehensive policy, but each big 
country who wants to cut a deal with a nuclear aspiring country can do 
so.
  The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is the bedrock of our efforts to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It is the foundation upon which 
all of our work rests. And this deal is ripping that foundation up by 
its roots.
  Ladies and gentlemen, we are at an historic point. This deal allows 
for a country which is not a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty to be exempted from it. It's an historic moment not only in the 
history of the United States, but of the world.
  This nuclear nonproliferation regime that President Kennedy told us 
we had to establish has worked. In 1963, when he said, by the year 2000 
we might have to count the countries that don't have nuclear weapons 
because they will be fewer than those that do unless we put a regime in 
place, was accurate. And if you look now, in 2008, almost no new 
countries have obtained nuclear weapons since 1963; quite an 
achievement. But here tonight, we're about to create a new global 
regime. And we will look back on this in the same way that we look back 
on the day when we began to allow subprime loans, and we will wonder 
how a global nuclear catastrophe was created, and we will point back to 
this evening.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remaining time to the gentleman 
from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone).
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 1\3/4\ 
minutes.
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I beg to disagree with my colleague from 
Massachusetts for several reasons. First of all, this is not about 
Iran. India's entire history with regard to nuclear weapons has been 
defensive, completely defensive, not offensive in the way Iran speaks 
and its President speaks.
  In addition, India is very much like the United States. We know it's 
a democracy. We know there has always been very strict civilian control 
of its nuclear weapons. This is really not about nuclear weapons at 
all. It's about a civilian nuclear agreement between the United States 
and India.
  And we know very much that India is similar to the United States; it 
seeks energy independence, it does not want to be dependent upon Mid 
East oil and the Mid East countries in the same way that we are.
  By putting this agreement together, by passing this agreement 
tomorrow, basically we will be making India part of our partnership and 
saying that we will share civilian nuclear purposes. We will strengthen 
not only our own independence from Mid East oil, we will also 
strengthen India's.
  And the bottom line is that there is only a history of cooperation 
between the United States and India. India has a strong record--and I 
heard some of my colleagues say to the contrary, it simply is not 
true--India has a strong record of trying to create a situation of 
nuclear nonproliferation. It has been a leader, in fact, on that. And 
this agreement is simply going to strengthen that even more.
  I think that we can trust India in the way that we can trust our own 
leaders. And the fact that we are going to work and have this agreement 
passed tomorrow--and I know that it will pass and it will pass on a 
bipartisan basis--will simply strengthen the alliance between our two 
countries, which is so important to both countries' future.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I have reservations about the 
rapid way in which H.R. 7081, the United States-India Nuclear 
Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, was brought 
to the House floor without consideration and amendment in the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of which I am a member. However, despite my concerns 
and my steadfast commitment to non-proliferation, I rise in support of 
this legislation and our Nation's important relationship with India.
  The United States' relationship with India is of paramount importance 
to our nation's political and economic future. With the receding of the 
Cold War's global divisions and the new realities of globalization and 
trans-national terrorism, we have embarked on a new era of promise, 
possibility and uncertainty. This means the United States bears an 
especially heavy responsibility to remain engaged in all regions of the 
world, with all nation-states. It is in the national interest for the 
United States to continue our policy of engagement, collaboration, and 
exchange which has served the nation well in the past, particularly in 
the South Asia region.
  This legislation approves the U.S.-India Agreement for Peaceful 
Nuclear Cooperation, notwithstanding the procedures in the Atomic 
Energy Act and the Hyde Act. It declares that the Bush Administration's 
past statements are authoritative interpretations of the agreement, but 
also reiterates the policy directives in the Hyde Act that the U.S. 
will seek to prevent other nations from nuclear trade with India if 
U.S. halts U.S. trade to India because of a nuclear test. Furthermore, 
the supply of U.S. fuel supply to India should match India's reactor 
needs, rather than a stockpile to weather an international fuel 
sanction should India resume nuclear testing.
  Importantly, this legislation ensures Congress retains the ability to 
review and disapprove (via a joint resolution of disapproval enacted 
within 30 days) a subsequent agreement to permit India to extract 
plutonium and uranium from U.S.-origin spent reactor fuel. It re-
establishes Congressional authority to legislatively reject (via a 
joint resolution of disapproval within 60 days) a Presidential decision 
to resume nuclear trade with any country that detonates a nuclear 
explosive device. It is also vital that this legislation requires the 
President to certify that the India Agreement is consistent with U.S. 
NPT commitment not to assist in any way in the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons.
  Mr. Speaker, I visited India and met with India's Prime Minister in 
July of this year where we discussed how our two Nation's continue to 
collaborate economically, politically, and technologically. In this 
Nation and in my city of Houston, we have a large and vibrant Indian-
American community which makes significant contributions to the 
vitality of our democracy. I am confident that we can work with India 
so that they can meet their energy needs through nuclear technology. 
Accordingly, that is why it is important that this legislation urges 
India to sign and implement an IAEA Additional Protocol for Safeguards, 
as India has committed to do. It also restricts issuance of U.S. export 
licenses under the Agreement (which has entered into force) until India 
completes the process of bringing its Safeguards Agreement with

[[Page 22126]]

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into force.
  Mr. Speaker, this legislation also requires the Administration to 
keep the Congress fully and completely informed regarding new 
initiatives for civil nuclear cooperation agreements. It requires 
additional reporting requirements for an Annual Report to Congress on 
implementation of the Agreement required by the Hyde Act. It also 
requires a Presidential certification that it is U.S. policy to seek 
greater restrictions on transfer or uranium enrichment or plutonium 
reprocessing equipment technology at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
or with NSG governments before entry-into-force of the India Agreement. 
Finally, this legislation declares that the India Agreement does not 
supersede the Atomic Energy Act or Hyde Act.
  Peaceful nuclear cooperation with India can serve multiple U.S. 
foreign policy objectives so long as it is undertaken in a manner that 
minimizes potential risks to the nonproliferation regime. This will be 
best achieved by sustained and active engagement and cooperation 
between the India and the United States.
  This landmark legislation serves both our strategic interests and our 
long-standing nonproliferation objectives. We should heed the sage 
words of the Iraq Study Group which recommends engaging rather than 
abandoning the possibilities dialogue offers. Our engagement and 
subsequent abandonment of Iran has resulted in their current pursuit of 
nuclear technology. We should not make the same mistake in South Asia. 
We need to remain engaged with India and Pakistan so that they remain 
our most important allies rather than our adversaries.
  We are on the path to fostering an enduring relationship of mutually 
beneficial cooperation with India. The new realities of globalization 
and interdependence have brought a convergence of interests between the 
world's largest democracy and the world's most powerful one. I 
accompanied President Clinton in his groundbreaking trip to India 
marking a new phase in the bonds that bind our two countries. This 
legislation builds on this relationship by permitting an invigorated 
relationship in the field of nuclear cooperation, an area of critical 
importance given India's increasing energy demands.
  I am hopeful that the nonproliferation measures in this legislation 
anchor India in the international nonproliferation framework by 
including: safeguards between India and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA); end use monitoring of U.S. exports to India; and 
strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which are the group of 
countries that restrict nuclear proliferation throughout the world.
  In addition, this legislation maintains Congressional oversight over 
the ongoing relationship of nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and 
India. We must continue to enhance our nonproliferation policy and 
bolster our argument that the rest of the world should agree to this 
robust inspection regime.
  In conclusion, I support this legislation, and I urge my colleagues 
to do the same.
  Mrs. BIGGERT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 
7081, the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and 
Nonproliferation Enhancement Act. This landmark legislation will ensure 
India's continued access to safe, clean carbon-free nuclear power while 
guaranteeing, through international inspections, that India's nuclear 
ambitions remain peaceful.
  Mr. Speaker, I have been a strong proponent of nuclear power because 
it is an efficient and inexpensive way to meet our growing energy 
needs. In fact, my state of Illinois derives 50% of its power from 
nuclear energy. In my district, Argonne National Laboratories has been 
at the cutting edge of the next generation of nuclear power.
  Most recently, they have helped to develop an advanced nuclear 
reprocessing technology called UREX, which literally re-burns spent 
fuel to extract more energy. At the same time, it improves efficiency 
and vastly reduces the toxicity, volume, and danger of the final waste 
product.
  As the global appetite for energy continues to a row, nuclear 
technology will become increasingly important if we are to meet this 
unprecedented demand. This agreement will allow India, which has one of 
the fastest growing economies in the world, access to advanced nuclear 
technology. Cheap and abundant nuclear power will ensure that their 
economy can continue to flourish, without the pollution that plagues 
many other rapidly modernizing nations.
  This agreement also has built in safeguards to ensure that sensitive 
nuclear technology is not compromised. India has agreed to prevent any 
third-parties from accessing their nuclear technology and to allow 
international inspectors into 14 nuclear sites around the country to 
enforce this agreement. These provisions will ensure that sensitive 
nuclear info does not end up in the hands of terrorists or rogue 
nations that would seek to do us harm.
  The United States and India have a long history of cooperation 
stretching back over half a century, and I am pleased that we can 
continue this productive partnership. I urge all of my colleagues to 
support this historic legislation.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition today to the United 
States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation 
Enhancement Act. If this body ratifies this agreement today, it will be 
the first time that a country that is not a member of the 
Nonproliferation Treaty will have the benefits of nuclear trade without 
any of the responsibilities associated with possessing unstable, 
dangerous material on the planet.
  Earlier this month, the Nuclear Suppliers Group made the ill-fated 
decision to approve an India-specific waive from its guidelines 
requiring full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as a 
condition for nuclear supply and trade. The decision ends the 34-year 
global ban on nuclear trade with India, a nation which has defied 
international norms regarding responsible and acceptable nuclear energy 
use.
  Now, the Bush Administration is attempting bilateral deal with India 
that would exacerbate and codify the NSG's mistake. Under the deal, 
India would only have to separate its unregulated military and 
regulated civilian nuclear programs, not cease the pursuit of 
additional nuclear weapons. Additionally, India is allowed to keep 
1,000 bombs worth of nuclear material outside of IAEA safeguards. In 
other words, by agreeing to provide material to satisfy India's 
civilian nuclear needs, America would be freeing up unregulated 
material for use in its military bomb production program.
  How a deal like this brings India into conformance with international 
norms of state nonproliferation behavior--something the administration 
claims--is beyond me. Freeing up more unregulated nuclear material for 
bomb making doesn't sound like a safety measure. It sounds like a 
recipe for irresponsible use.
  The economic benefits of this deal have also been greatly exaggerated 
by the Bush Administration. Russia and other regional states are 
already actively negotiating supply deals with India; leaving little 
opportunity for US energy companies half a world away.
  However, more important than the potential economic aspects of the 
deal for our domestic energy production industry, or even the increased 
ability of India to create nuclear weapons, is the drastic effect the 
deal would have on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, one of the most 
sacrosanct and honored multilateral agreements in international law.
  The NPT is the single most effective bulwark against the spread of 
nuclear weapons materials and technology. The treaty currently has 189 
signatories and only four non-signatories. Under the treaty, NPT 
countries which possess nuclear weapons agree not to share weapon 
making materials or information. Similarly, NPT countries without 
weapons agree not to pursue these materials or information.
  By agreeing to supply a nation that has not agreed to abide by these 
solemn pledges, this agreement would blow a hole in the NPT. 
Previously, our government required states to sign the NPT if they 
wanted to engage in nuclear trade with us. With this deal, the leverage 
inherent in that tradeoff will be gone. What moral authority will we or 
the international community have over Iran, or any other NPT signatory 
for that matter, if it actively seeks nuclear materials in violation of 
the treaty?
  In the waning days of an administration that has shredded 
international law and our credibility around the world, why is this 
body prepared today to add to this tarnished legacy? Let there be no 
doubt, a vote for this bill is a vote for a more dangerous world. For 
the sake of peace and the sanctity of the rule of law, I encourage my 
colleagues to oppose the bill.
  Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this 
legislation. India is the world's largest and most diverse democracy 
and a strong ally and friend of the United States. As a member of the 
India Caucus, I recognize the benefits of increased economic, security, 
and cultural cooperation between India and the United States, and am 
proud that in recent years the relationship between our two countries 
has made rapid advances in so many areas.
  Because of the growing importance of that relationship, it made sense 
for the Bush administration to consider expanding the U.S.-India 
strategic partnership to include civilian nuclear energy development. 
In the context of our friendship with India, I support the concept of 
civilian nuclear cooperation, and I will support this legislation 
today.

[[Page 22127]]

  U.S. law prohibits nuclear cooperation with countries that have not 
pledged under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty--like India--to forgo 
nuclear weapons. The U.S.-India agreement carves out an exception for 
India to allow it to gain access to long-denied civilian nuclear 
technology in exchange for opening 14 out of 22 of its nuclear 
facilities to inspections under the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Importantly, India and the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, 
have negotiated a safeguards agreement and the 45-nation Nuclear 
Suppliers Group has approved an exemption for India, requirements that 
needed to be met before Congress could vote on the final cooperation 
agreement.
  Under existing law, Congress would have 60 days to consider the 
agreement, an important provision given that the agreement before us is 
complex and requires time for hearings and debate. But because there is 
little time left on the legislative calendar, we're forced to vote to 
waive the consultation period and consider the agreement today without 
the benefit of sufficient review. The bill is also being considered 
under suspension of the rules, which provides for only limited debate 
and no amendments.
  Mr. Speaker, I am uncomfortable with this process. I am also 
disappointed that the legislation does not resolve what appear to be 
conflicting interpretations between U.S. officials and Indian officials 
about key points of the agreement. But I do believe that ultimately 
this agreement will help bring India closer to the global 
nonproliferation regime--a better outcome than if we leave it on the 
outside. And fo that reason, I will support this legislation today.
  In exchange for getting access to sensitive nuclear technology and 
fuel supplies, India has committed to continue its moratorium on 
nuclear weapons testing; separate its civilian and military nuclear 
programs; place all current and future civil nuclear facilities under 
IAEA safeguards; implement a strong national export control system; 
work with the U.S. to conclude a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff 
Treaty; and not transfer nuclear technologies to states that do not 
already possess them. Although the agreement does not specifically 
require the U.S. to cut off nuclear cooperation if India tests another 
weapon or violates the IAEA safeguards, Secretary Rice has promised 
that the ``deal . . . would at that point be off.'' I have no doubt 
that an Obama or McCain administration would follow that same course. I 
have confidence that as a strong democracy and a responsible actor on 
the world stage, India will abide by its commitments--but I also take 
comfort in the agreement's stipulations that we can terminate the 
agreement and seek the return of any transferred materials and 
technology should circumstances require such a step.
  So in conclusion, I believe this agreement strikes the right balance 
between strengthening our relationship with India and also maintaining 
our robust and time-tested international nuclear nonproliferation 
regime. I will support the bill today, but I plan to carefully 
scrutinize the agreement's implementation to ensure that India is 
abiding by its commitments.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 7081, the 
United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation 
Enhancement Act.
  Today, the House will consider the culmination of 3 years of 
difficult work in Washington and New Delhi and take the final step to 
fashion a new policy toward India, one that reflects the realities of 
the 21st century and acknowledges India's emergence onto the world 
stage.
  The bill before us will give Congressional approval to civil nuclear 
cooperation with India. Let me tell you what that means. It means that 
the IAEA will be able to inspect two-thirds of India's civilian nuclear 
facilities, because those facilities will be under IAEA safeguards and 
all future civilian nuclear facilities will also be under safeguards. 
It means that India, for the first time ever, has committed to MTCR 
guidelines. It means that India, for the first time ever, will adhere 
to Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. It means that India and the IAEA 
are making substantial progress toward an Additional Protocol. It means 
that India is committed to working with us to conclude a Fissile 
Material Cut-off Treaty. It means that we can send a clear message to 
nuclear rogue states about how to behave, because it shows that 
responsible nuclear powers are welcomed by the international community 
not sanctioned; and it means that we can finally achieve the broad, 
deep and enduring strategic relationship with India, that all of us in 
this House support. So if you wanted all these things 2 years ago when 
we established this process, then you are for this bill now.
  Some Members have expressed concern that the agreement with India 
doesn't go far enough, that it doesn't rollback India's nuclear weapons 
program, that it doesn't include all of India's nuclear facilities, and 
that it sends the wrong message to rogue regimes like Iran and North 
Korea.
  For 30 years Mr. Speaker, U.S. policy toward India has been defined 
and constrained by our insistence on punishing India for its sovereign 
decision not to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Truth be 
told, had India conducted its nuclear tests earlier, it would have been 
treated like China, Russia, France, Britain, and the United States: In 
short, as a grandfathered member of the nuclear weapons club. But they 
did not and nothing we have tried over the last 3 decades has convinced 
them to give up their nuclear weapons. And nothing we say over the next 
3 decades will convince them either. India is a responsible nuclear 
power and deserves to be treated that way. The bill before us does just 
that.
  Critics have expressed concerns regarding the agreement's impact on 
our nonproliferation policy and clearly Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea 
are all looking for clues about what this deal means for them and their 
nuclear programs. I think the message is clear: If you want to be 
treated like India, be like India. Be a responsible international actor 
with regard to WMD technologies, don't sell your nuclear technologies 
to the highest bidder, don't provide it to terrorists, be a democracy, 
a real democracy, and work with us on important foreign policy 
objectives not against us. That's the message we send today.
  Does it warm your heart and make you comfortable that Iran and North 
Korea signed the NPT and are now running away from their freely 
accepted obligations and away from IAEA inspections?
  True, India did not sign the NPT yet it is embracing the IAEA, 
embracing global nonproliferation norms and is a democracy. India's 
attitude should be recognized and commended.
  There are two options before us today. One is to throw away all the 
work that has been done since July 2005 and keep the status quo. India 
will pursue its national interests as it has been doing outside the 
nonproliferation mainstream and we inspect nothing. The other is to 
make the deal with India and get for the United States and the 
international community a window in perpetuity into two-thirds of 
India's existing nuclear facilities and all of its future civilian 
nuclear facilities.
  I think the choice is clear. This bill before us brings India into 
the nonproliferation mainstream and gets the United States and the 
international community access to India's civilian nuclear facilities.
  Mr. Speaker, it is time for a 21st century policy towards India, one 
that supports and encourages India's emergence as a responsible global 
power and solidifies the United States-India bilateral relationship for 
decades to come. The bill before us today is that new policy. Vote yes 
on H.R. 7081.
  Mr. FORTENBERRY. Mr. Speaker, given the enormous pressures this 
Congress is facing to solve urgent financial problems which threaten 
the stability and health of our economy, I must express my deep 
reservations about expediting approval of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear 
Agreement at this time.
  While I fully favor strengthening economic, social, cultural, and 
political ties with our Indian friends, why this most desirable pursuit 
hinges upon the sale of sensitive nuclear technology--remains a mystery 
to me.
  The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement sets a groundbreaking 
precedent that could open a floodgate for worldwide nuclear commerce 
that, absent rigorous conditions, safeguards, and oversight, could 
significantly damage the stability and integrity of U.S. and 
international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Just this week, the 
Russian Prime Minister announced that Russia ``was ready to consider 
the possibility of cooperation in nuclear energy'' with Venezuela's 
President Hugo Chavez.
  As you know, in 2006 Congress passed the Hyde Act, which waives key 
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act to enable our consideration of the 
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. Absent the Hyde Act, the agreement 
would violate the Atomic Energy Act, which has regulated U.S. nuclear 
commerce since 1954 to prevent the dangerous proliferation of nuclear 
technology and materials.
  Upon a preliminary review, the agreement does not address the Hyde 
Act's prohibition on nuclear cooperation in the event of nuclear 
testing. Also, I understand that the terms of this agreement and 
India's safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency would permit the removal of tritium from heavy water in 
safeguarded reactors, possibly enhancing nuclear weapons yields, in 
contravention of U.S. law and the NPT.
  Moreover, I am deeply concerned that international guidelines 
recently eased to pave the

[[Page 22128]]

way for this agreement and exempt India from longstanding rules of 
nuclear commerce that have applied equally to all nations are 
insufficiently rigorous to prevent the potential erosion of decades of 
global nonproliferation gains.
  Let us remember that the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, the NPT, which India has not signed, is the nonproliferation 
mainstream.
  This bill also waives the 30-day period provided in the Hyde Act for 
congressional consideration of the underlying agreement. As co-chair of 
the Nuclear Security Caucus and the author of a Hyde Act amendment that 
seeks to prevent potential diversion of fissile material for military 
purposes, I oppose waiving the 30-day requirement to permit thoughtful 
consideration of whether this agreement in fact complies with the law 
we passed to condition its implementation.
  Mr. Speaker, we should not rush this. We are accountable to the 
American people for conducting rigorous oversight on matters of nuclear 
security, and I am concerned that short-circuiting the review process 
for this agreement is not consistent with that obligation. The Hyde Act 
was the result of precise and painstaking negotiations. I urge my 
colleagues to allow for adequate ,due diligence of this complex matter.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this bill 
which will do unacceptable damage to the international nuclear 
nonproliferation regime.
  I have worked for over three years in opposition to the U.S.-India 
nuclear cooperation agreement because of its disastrous implications 
for nonproliferation. I've been called the ``Arch-Critic'' of the deal; 
but really I see myself as the ``Arch-Defender'' of nuclear 
nonproliferation. Halting the spread of nuclear weapons is not 
something over which the United States can afford to compromise; this 
issue is central to both international stability and our own security 
here at home. I'm not ``attacking'' India, I am defending the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  My goal has been to get meaningful nonproliferation conditions 
included in the agreement at all levels, including at the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). But 
the Bush administration fought this at every turn.
  The legislation I introduced in 2005, H. Con. Res. 318 outlined the 
serious nonproliferation problems of the proposed India nuclear 
cooperation agreement.
  I testified before the House International Relations Committee on May 
11, 2006 and explained the incredible dangers of the President's 
proposal. I told them that the deal was ``ill-conceived, that it 
undermines U.S. national security interests, and that it sets a 
dangerous precedent that will be exploited by our adversaries and 
rivals.'' I continue to believe that this is the case.
  In response to the issues I and others raised regarding the threat to 
Congressional prerogatives from the administration's draft bill, the 
bill that was actually introduced removed many of the worst ``blank 
check'' provisions of the Administration bill. For instance, the 
administration bill would not have allowed the Congress to even see 
India's IAEA Safeguards Agreement or the Nuclear Suppliers' Group rule 
change before we voted on whether or not to give final approval.
  The Motion to Recommit which I offered during floor debate on July 
26, 2006 focused on India's dangerous relationship with Iran. My motion 
would have required India to help us halt Iran's nuclear program. It 
received 192 votes--the strongest vote that opponents of the deal were 
able to muster. Sadly, however, it was not included in the final bill.
  But after the Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde Act of 2006, to allow 
in principle nuclear trade with India, the Bush Administration ignored 
many of the most important nonproliferation-related conditions and 
requirements which were contained in that legislation. President Bush 
has negotiated a deal with India which is universally recognized by 
nonproliferation experts as ripping an enormous hole in the 
nonproliferation regime by granting unprecedented concessions to India, 
a country that has never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
  I would like to take this opportunity to explain for the Record, the 
problems inherent with this bill, and more generally with President 
Bush's now three-year campaign to carve out a massive loophole to the 
nonproliferation rules on behalf of India.


             Administration Arguments Fail the Reality Test

  In selling its proposal for the nuclear cooperation agreement with 
India, the Bush Administration relied on arguments which simply fail 
the realty test. Among the most glaringly false arguments on which the 
administration continues to rely to this day are that the nuclear deal 
will unlock India for American commerce, and that India will be a 
natural strategic partner with the United States.
     The U.S.-India trade relationship
  The Bush Administration has argued that the nuclear cooperation 
agreement will exponentially boost commerce with India. They also 
argued repeatedly that if the nuclear deal were not immediately 
approved by the Congress, the U.S. would lose the benefit of this 
trade.
  But in reality, we already have strong and growing trade ties with 
India, and there is no reason to believe that this will be 
substantially altered by the nuclear cooperation agreement. 
Furthermore, I believe that the Bush Administration has sought to use 
this false economic argument to rush Congressional approval.
  The truth is that since 2000, Indian exports to the United States 
have doubled, and U.S. exports to India have almost tripled. In the 
last 30 years, total bilateral trade has grown almost 8-fold, an 
enormous increase. In 2006, our total bilateral trade topped $31.9 
billion, growing at a whopping 18.9% over the previous year. Even 
during the worst moments of the U.S.-India relationship, for instance 
after the 1974 and 1998 Indian nuclear tests, trade continued to grow 
at rapid rates.
  The bottom line is that trade between the United States and India 
will continue to grow, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the 
nuclear cooperation agreement.
     The U.S.-India strategic relationship
  The Bush administration has repeatedly called the U.S.-Indian 
relationship a ``Strategic Partnership.'' I am a strong supporter of 
India, and I believe that the United States and India must, and will, 
continue to have a relationship marked by mutual cooperation and shared 
values. But I do not believe, as the Bush Administration has 
essentially argued, that India will become a subservient partner to the 
United States.
  The reality is that India has always followed a fiercely independent 
foreign policy, and will certainly continue to do so. In fact, Indian 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told his Parliament in August of 2006 
that, ``Our sole guiding principle in regard to our foreign policy, 
whether it is on Iran or any other country, will be dictated entirely 
by our national interest.''
  The first major test of the U.S.-India strategic partnership is the 
question of how to deal with Iran's nuclear program. If lndia really 
were a steady strategic partner to the United States, New Delhi would 
be actively supporting the U.S. in halting the Iranian nuclear program. 
But instead of assisting the U.S. with Iran, India's longstanding 
strategic relationship with Iran has only grown stronger.
  Let me list some of India's actions vis-a-vis Iran which have led me 
to conclude that India is not fully and actively supporting United 
States' efforts to sanction and isolate Iran for its ongoing nuclear 
program: India has repeatedly defended Iran's nuclear program; India 
has developed intelligence outposts in Iran near the Pakistani border; 
India and Iran have held two joint naval exercises, in March 2003 and 
March 2006; The 2003 Iranian-Indian New Delhi Declaration explicitly 
raised concerns about U.S. unilateralism in Iraq; Indian scientists 
have been sanctioned by the U.S. for WMD-related transfers to Iran, 
most recently in July 2006; India is pursuing an $8 billion gas 
pipeline from Iran. India has committed to help Iran build a Liquefied 
Natural Gas terminal; the two countries established the Indian-Iranian 
Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism in 2003; and India is 
developing a port in south-east Iran which analysts believe will be a 
naval base.
  The other major test of the U.S.-India strategic partnership is how 
to address the rise of China. Some supporters of the nuclear deal will 
admit, in their more candid moments, that the real driver behind this 
enormous change is a desire on the part of the Bush Administration that 
India become the U.S. ``hedge'' to contain China's rise in Asia.
  But India has no desire for conflict of any kind with China, and 
India will not act as an American proxy. To put it simply, it is not in 
India's interest to risk poor relations with China. China is India's 
second largest trading partner. India and China signed an energy 
agreement to prevent them from bidding for the same resources and 
driving up prices, in January 2006. Total bilateral India-China trade 
has grown at over 30% every year since 1999, even faster than India-
U.S. trade has grown.
  China is simply too valuable as a partner, and too potentially 
threatening as an enemy, for India to seek anything but positive 
relations. And all the armchair strategists who have been trying to 
sell the idea of India as an American proxy against China are 
absolutely foolish. It's not going to happen.
  I am not arguing that India cannot or should not have an independent 
foreign policy. I'm arguing it inevitably will chart its own course, as

[[Page 22129]]

any powerful nation would be expected to do. My colleagues should be 
realistic about what we can expect from India in terms of support for 
U.S. foreign policy priorities. The Bush Administration seems to think 
that by granting India international nuclear trade we are locking them 
into a permanent foreign policy alliance with the U.S. That is 
absolutely naive, and I believe that the Bush Administration's 
strategic calculation that they are getting a permanent ally in 
exchange for a wholesale change of international nonproliferation rules 
is simply wrong.


         U.S. Violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

  Article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which the 
United States is a signatory, states that, ``Each nuclear-weapon State 
Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices 
directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or 
induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over 
such weapons or explosive devices.'' However, the U.S.-India nuclear 
agreement could put the United States in violation of this central 
obligation, since India's nuclear weapons program is likely to both 
indirectly and directly benefit from the terms of civilian nuclear 
trade, and since the United States could therefore be said to be 
``encouraging'' India's manufacture of nuclear weapons.
  The non-partisan Congressional Research Service analyzed at my 
request the question of whether the U.S.-India nuclear agreement could 
violate the United States' obligations under the NPT, and identified 
three ways in which this could occur. First, it analyzed the 
``separation plan'' under which India's civilian and military nuclear 
facilities will be disentangled. Second, it investigated whether U.S. 
de-facto recognition of lndia as a nuclear power could encourage India 
to continue its production of weapons. And third, it examines the most 
significant issue of U.S. assistance to India's weapons program: how 
imported nuclear fuel would free up India's domestic uranium for use in 
its weapons program.
  Without a credible separation plan, the United States could wind up 
transferring technology directly into India's weapons program. The CRS 
analysis states:

       It should be noted that while IAEA safeguards ensure that 
     nuclear material is not diverted, there are no procedures or 
     measures in place to ensure that information, technology and 
     know-how are not transferred from the civil sector to the 
     military sector. This could become a key loophole, 
     particularly because the separation plan places 8 indigenous 
     power reactors under safeguards, while leaving at least 8 
     indigenous power reactors outside of safeguards. Without 
     additional measures to prevent the transfer of personnel or 
     knowledge from the safeguarded program to the unsafeguarded 
     program, there would be little assurallce that assistance to 
     the safeguarded program could not migrate to the military 
     program.

  By changing U.S. law to allow for nuclear trade with India, the 
United States will grant international legitimacy to India's nuclear 
arsenal. The CRS analysis states:

       The United States is not granting de jure recognition to 
     India as a nuclear weapon state, because doing so would 
     require amendment of the NPT, a prospect that is 
     unattainable, according to most experts. Nonetheless, a 
     successful U.S. effort to gain an exemption in U.S. nuclear 
     cooperation law would place India in the company of only four 
     other nations--the United Kingdom, France, China, and 
     Russia--all de jure nuclear weapon states. While this may not 
     constitute formal recognition of India as a nuclear weapon 
     state, many observers believe that it legitimizes India's 
     nuclear weapons program, thus providing de facto recognition.

  Critics of the President Bush's plan for the U.S.-India nuclear 
agreement long argued that allowing India to import uranium for its 
civilian reactors would free up its domestic fuel sources to 
concentrate exclusively on weapons production, giving India a vast new 
capacity for the manufacture of fissile material for weapons. The CRS 
analysis agreed with this argument, calling this indirect benefit to 
India's weapons program ``a clear consequence of such cooperation.'' 
The analysis continues:

       Secretary Rice seemed to be suggesting that having more 
     uranium would not encourage or assist India's nuclear weapons 
     program because it already had the fissile material it 
     needed. If, as Secretary Rice suggests, the military 
     requirements are dwarfed by civilian requirements, then 
     finding international sources for civilian requirements could 
     result in a windfall for the weapons program.

  It is my strong belief that the NPT is the single most important 
international security agreement in existence. Furthermore the United 
States has a unique responsibility as the sole remaining superpower, as 
well as the driving force behind the drafting of the NPT in the middle 
of the last century, to exert constant vigilance on behalf of this 
extraordinarily significant treaty. If the United States does not 
strictly adhere to its NPT commitments then we are likely to see a 
dramatic and dangerous deterioration in the strength and stability 
ofthe Treaty.


     Inconsistencies between the Hyde Act and the ``123'' Agreement

  The Hyde Act of 2006 set numerous requirements for the negotiation of 
the technical bilateral agreement for nuclear cooperation, known as the 
``123 Agreement'' in reference to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954. However, the Bush Administration did not meet these 
requirements, and the 123 Agreement is therefore inconsistent with the 
law.
  The most important inconsistencies between the Hyde Act and the 123 
Agreement are: nuclear testing and the termination of U.S. nuclear 
supply; assurances of nuclear supply to India in the case of supply 
``disruption;'' and, the reprocessing of U.S.-origin nuclear material.
     Nuclear Testing and the Termination of U.S. Nuclear Supply
  The Atomic Energy Act requires, and the Hyde Act reinforces, that 
nuclear trade with any nation will terminate if that nation conducts a 
nuclear test. In addition, U.S. law provides that the United States may 
demand the return of all transferred nuclear materials and technology 
in case of a test.
  Almost all other 123 Agreements state these requirements and rights 
explicitly. But the U.S.-India 123 Agreement doesn't. The India 123 
Agreement provides no detail at all on the kinds of actions that will 
result in termination. Given the difficult disagreements in the past 
with India on nuclear rights and responsibilities, this is not wise. In 
addition, the India 123 Agreement does not state that the United States 
has the right to demand the return of all transferred nuclear materials 
and technology if India conducts a test.
  Because the 123 Agreement lacks these specific statements of the 
consequences of an Indian nuclear test, many in India argue that they 
not only have an unfettered right to test their nuclear weapons, but 
that no consequences will follow if they do. This is not what Congress 
intended with the Hyde Act, which specifically requires that 
cooperation end if India tests a nuclear bomb.
     Assurances of Nuclear Supply to India in the Case of Supply 
         ``Disruption''
  The 123 Agreement contains two unprecedented clauses with respect to 
assuring India a supply of nuclear fuel under all scenarios, even if 
they test a bomb.
  First, the 123 Agreement commits the United States to ``support an 
Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard 
against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of the reactor.'' 
This means that the United States will assist India in stockpiling 
uranium from international suppliers. If supply was terminated for any 
reason, even if India failed to uphold its nonproliferation 
commitments, such as by testing a nuclear bomb, India could use this 
stockpile of fuel as a cushion against another supply cutoff. This 
clause flies in the face of the Hyde Act, which states that any fuel 
reserve should not exceed normal reactor operating requirements.
  Second, if India should ever have a fuel supply disruption, the U.S. 
is to convene ``a group of friendly supplier countries . . . to pursue 
such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.'' Again, this 
would take place in the event of any disruption of supply, including 
due to India exploding a nuclear bomb.
  This renders toothless the requirement in the Atomic Energy Act to 
stop nuclear exports to a country that tests a nuclear weapon. Will 
India care that U.S. cooperation is cut off if the U.S. itself is 
turning around and asking other countries to step in and provide the 
nuclear fuel to India? Would you think twice about illegally parking if 
you know your ticket will be paid for?
  The Hyde Act specifically states that the United States is to seek to 
prevent other countries from providing India with nuclear material or 
technology if our own cooperation is cut off. The 123 Agreement should 
say the same thing, but it doesn't.
     Reprocessing U.S.-origin nuclear material
  As a matter of policy, the United States doesn't transfer enrichment, 
reprocessing, or heavy water production equipment to any state because 
of the dangerous utility of those technologies for nuclear weapons 
programs. In fact, in February 2004, President Bush said that 
``enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to 
harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.'' And he had it right!
  And reinforcing the point, the Hyde Act states that, ``Given the 
special sensitivity of

[[Page 22130]]

equipment and technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the 
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy 
water,'' the United States will work to further restrict the transfers 
of such technologies to India.
  Yet, the U.S. has given India the right to reprocess our nuclear 
material, and promised cooperation in reprocessing technologies! How 
will the U.S. be able to stop other countries from transferring 
reprocessing technologies and other sensitive technologies if we are 
making such transfers ourselves?
  The fact of the matter is that President Bush negotiated an agreement 
with India that does not meet the requirements of U.S. law, on testing, 
on assurances of supply, and on reprocessing.


   Problems relating to International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards

  The Hyde Act of 2006 set numerous requirements relating to India's 
negotiations and declarations to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). While a number of these key requirements have not met, 
President Bush made a formal declaration that all of the Hyde Act 
requirements were fulfilled.
     Separation plan
  Section 104(b)(1) of the Hyde Act requires the President to determine 
that India must provide to the United States and the IAEA ``a credible 
plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and 
programs.'' However, the separation plan that India has provided is not 
credible from a nonproliferation perspective, since it will not prevent 
all materials from moving between the civilian and military spheres.
  Under the separation plan, India will be allowed to use domestically 
produced heavy water to moderate its safeguarded civilian reactors. 
However, the domestically produced heavy water itself will not be 
safeguarded, and safeguards will be removed from old heavy water as it 
is removed from the reactor in exchange for new heavy water. This 
creates a serious problem within the separation plan, as the old heavy 
water will contain tritium, a nuclear byproduct material which is used 
to boost the yield of nuclear weapons.
  India will be able to use tritium generated in its ``safeguarded'' 
reactors to boost the yield of its nuclear weapons, making the 
civilian-military separation plan utterly meaningless from a 
nonproliferation perspective. Yet, on September 10, 2008, President 
Bush made a formal declaration that ``India has provided the United 
States and the IAEA with a credible plan to separate civil and military 
nuclear facilities, materials, and programs.''
     India's declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency
  Section 104(b)(1) of the Hyde Act requires the President to determine 
that:
  India has ``filed a declaration regarding its civil facilities and 
materials with the IAEA.''
  However, India has not filed such a declaration with the lAEA, and 
has stated that it will not do so until after the 123 Agreement has 
been approved.
  Yet, on September 10, 2008, President Bush made a formal declaration 
that, India . . . has ``filed a declaration regarding its civil 
facilities and materials with the IAEA.''
     India's progress towards concluding an Additional Protocol
  Section 104(b)(3) of the Hyde Act requires the President to determine 
that:

       India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward 
     concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA 
     principles, practices, and policies that would apply to 
     India's civil nuclear program.

  The ``substantial progress'' required by the Hyde Act has simply not 
occurred. India and the lAEA have met just one time to discuss 
negotiations of an Additional Protocol, and one concept paper has been 
exchanged. No one knows what the final Additional Protocol will look 
like, if indeed one is ever successfully negotiated.
  Yet, September 10, 2008, President Bush made a formal declaration 
that, ``India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward 
concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA principles, 
practices, and policies that would apply to India's civil nuclear 
program.''


        Problems relating to the Nuclear Suppliers' Group Waiver

  The Hyde Act of 2006 set numerous statements of United States policy 
relating to the negotiation of a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers' 
Group (NSG) guidelines for international nuclear trade with India. 
However, the Bush Administration ignored many of these statements of 
policy, and in at least one instance aggressively pursued a policy 
which was directly contradicted by the Hyde Act.
     Termination of NSG supply in response to violations
  Section 103(a)(4) of the Hyde Act states that it is the policy of the 
United States to:

       Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning 
     consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and 
     recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a 
     timely and coordinated response by NSG members to all such 
     violations, including termination of nuclear transfers to an 
     involved recipient, that discourages individual NSG members 
     from continuing cooperation with such recipient until such 
     time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has been 
     achieved.

  However, the United States did not seek to establish strengthen the 
NSG guidelines to require a termination of NSG supply to a recipient 
states in the event of a violation of supplier and recipient 
understandings. In fact, many NSG member states sought to strengthen 
the NSG guidelines in this manner but could not because opposition by 
the Bush Administration. In this case the Bush Administration actively 
worked to thwart the policy of the United States as set by Congress in 
the Hyde Act.
     Enrichment and reprocessing restriction
  Section 103(a)(5) of the Hyde Act states that it is the policy of the 
United States to:

       Given the special sensitivity of equipment and technologies 
     related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of 
     spent nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water, work 
     with members of the NSG, individually and collectively, to 
     further restrict the transfers of such equipment and 
     technologies, including to India.

  However, the United States did not seek to strengthen NSG guidelines 
to restrict the transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, 
despite having sought such a restriction for four years. In 2004, 
President Bush declared in a major speech on nonproliferation that 
achieving a historic international restriction on transfers of 
enrichment and reprocessing was one of his administration's highest 
priorities. For the next four years, the Bush Administration sought to 
achieve such a restriction at the NSG, yet abandoned this issue during 
the negotiations regarding India.
     Universalizing U.S. termination triggers
  Section 103(a)(6) of the Hyde Act states that it is the policy of the 
United States to:

       Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear 
     equipment, materials, or technology from other participating 
     governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear 
     transfers to that country are suspended or terminated 
     pursuant to this title, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other United States law.

  However, the United States did not seek to amend NSG guidelines to 
ensure that all international nuclear supply to India would be 
terminated if U.S. law required U.S. nuclear trade to be terminated. 
Such a rule would not only have significantly strengthened 
international nonproliferation policy, but it would have protected 
American firms from the possibility of being the only firms in the 
world barred from trade with India.
  Madam Speaker, this bill, and the nuclear cooperation agreement with 
India which it approves, will do great damage to the international 
nuclear nonproliferation regime. Can we afford to undermine the 
nonproliferation rules at the very moment when Iran is speeding toward 
a viable nuclear capability, when North Korea is redoubling its 
intransigence and throwing out IAEA observers, and when Venezuela is 
requesting nuclear cooperation from Russia? No, we cannot. I urge my 
colleagues to think carefully about the implications of this bill for 
international stability and U.S. security, and vote against H.R. 7081.
  Mr. SCHIFF.  Mr. Speaker, my friend and colleague from California, 
Chairman Berman, has work tirelessly over the last year to make this 
deal better. He has been a great champion of nonproliferation in this 
House, and he has led many efforts to prod and question the Bush 
administration on the negotiations with India--pressing for a deal that 
would enhance our relationship with the world's largest democracy while 
protecting the global nonproliferation regime and our interests around 
world. Unfortunately, the administration resisted many of his efforts, 
and those of others, and I am forced to oppose the final package.
  I believe that our relationship with India is one of our most 
important. Our interests are inextricably linked, and our economies 
draw ever closer. In the past, that relationship has been strained by 
the issue of nuclear proliferation--India never signed the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, and continues to build nuclear weapons. The 
agreement we vote on today began as a valiant attempt to bring India 
into the nuclear mainstream, while binding our business communities 
closer together. Unfortunately, it has ended with an agreement that 
falls short of either goal: the safeguards are not strong enough, the 
incentive for other nations to proliferate is too great, and while

[[Page 22131]]

opening India's nuclear market to the world, it places American 
companies at a competitive disadvantage compared to French and Russian 
firms.
  Even worse, the ``deal'' is not really a deal at all. The Indian 
government and the Administration have been issuing contradictory 
statements about it for the past year. This is not a problem of each 
side interpreting the treaty differently--the two sides have apparently 
signed two different treaties. The next time India has a new 
government, which could be as early as this winter, it may withdraw 
from the agreement, and the net result of all of this negotiation will 
be to allow foreign companies to sell nuclear technology to India. No 
nonproliferation goals would be accomplished, no new business would be 
generated for American companies, and no new relationship with India 
would be achieved.
  So, I have a few questions for the administration, which have not 
been answered, and I think they're important questions to consider as 
we vote on this proposal.
  When the administration realized that the Indians would not accept a 
deal that punished them if they decided to test a nuclear weapon, a 
requirement of the Hyde Act, why did they continue to negotiate?
  When it became clear that the real winners in this deal were the 
Russians and other nuclear powers that indiscriminately and 
irresponsibly sell nuclear technology around the world, why didn't we 
pull out?
  When the administration realized that this deal might undermine the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a treaty that has succeeded in 
dramatically limiting the number of nuclear nations, why did they not 
take steps to strengthen other nonproliferation efforts?
  When it became clear that we couldn't get the assurances we needed to 
stem proliferation, why didn't we shift gears and produce a deal in 
renewable energy, information technology, or another area that would 
bring actual benefits to the American economy without harming our 
national security?
  Some proponents of the deal have said that it brings India into the 
nonproliferation mainstream. But in fact, India remains free to test 
nuclear weapons, has not agreed to abide by the Nonproliferation 
Treaty, has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and will only 
allow international inspectors access to a few of their civilian power 
plants. That is not the mainstream.
  India has become a vital partner in a world that has grown dangerous 
and unpredictable. But tragically, an agreement in any other field 
would have brought us more, without seriously weakening our efforts to 
prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and South Asia.
  As a strong supporter of improving our relationship with India, but a 
firm advocate of nonproliferation, I cannot support this agreement, and 
I must urge my colleagues to oppose it as well.
  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my reluctant 
support for the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and 
Nonproliferation Enhancement Act.
  I support this legislation because, on balance, I think it advances 
U.S. national security and other national interests. I do so 
reluctantly because of the risk that it weakens our efforts to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear material and nuclear technology.
  I ultimately support this measure for three major reasons:
  First, this agreement will create more international supervision of 
India's nuclear fuel cycle than there would be without it. India and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency have agreed to new safeguards 
for Indian civilian nuclear plants. In addition, over the last 30 years 
India has voluntarily imposed safeguards on its nuclear program and has 
established an excellent record on non-proliferation. While India is 
not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it has 
maintained strict controls on its nuclear technology and has 
demonstrated that it is committed to being a responsible nuclear 
steward. That is one the reasons that the 45 nation Nuclear Suppliers 
Group granted India a waver to permit it to purchase fuel and 
technology.
  Second, India is a country with a large, well-established, 
multicultural and multireligious democracy. Building a strategic 
relationship with India will further our interests in the region and 
send a strong signal that responsible conduct is recognized. India's 
conduct stands in stark contrast to that of North Korea, which is a 
signatory of the NPT but has violated its responsibilities under that 
agreement by building and testing nuclear weapons.
  Third, this bill is important for how it may impact India's growing 
contribution to global warming. India's economy is growing rapidly, 
swelling at more than 7 percent per year. That economic growth is fed 
by a voracious appetite for electricity. More than half of India's new 
power supplies come from coal. Displacing coal use in India with 
nuclear power could prevent the release of millions of tons of carbon 
dioxide each year into the atmosphere.
  Last, in recent weeks, secret correspondence between the White House 
and Congress has further clarified the U.S. position on many important 
questions about this deal. Assistant Secretary Bergner wrote 
Representative Tom Lantos in January of this year and stated in no 
uncertain terms that the United States will not sell sensitive nuclear 
technologies to India and would immediately terminate the agreement if 
India conducted a nuclear test.
  For these reasons, I will support this agreement. But I support it 
with the caveat that, in the event that India tests a nuclear weapon, I 
will actively and strongly work to terminate the agreement.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 7081.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the 
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be 
postponed.

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