[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 154 (2008), Part 13]
[Senate]
[Pages 18091-18094]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                COLOMBIA

  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise today to talk about the remarkable 
success story in the fight against terrorism and narcotrafficking that 
I believe very strongly needs to be told. It is a story that has 
largely gone unnoticed because it has not taken place in the Eastern 
Hemisphere or east of here, where most of the world's attention is 
focused today. It comes, rather, from the Southern Hemisphere in a 
country where protagonists have surged ahead of narcoterrorists 
militarily, while simultaneously improving the overall security and 
safety of the civilian population. What is most important is they have 
done so while ensuring that protection of human rights and adherence to 
international humanitarian law are fully integrated into the daily life 
of every member of the security forces.
  I am speaking about Colombia, of course. I visited there just a 
couple of weeks ago. I visited Bogota. I also visited Ecuador to find 
out what was going on in Latin America. I was greatly encouraged by the 
tangible evidence I saw in Colombia of a country in complete 
transformation. Most of us probably realize that just about 6 years 
ago, in 2002, as much as 40 percent of the area of Colombia was 
controlled by terrorist groups and ruthless narcotics trafficking. Many 
of my colleagues visited Colombia at the time and brought back grim 
reports, as they should have, of a country apparently descending into 
chaos, with a dim future, as Colombia was on the verge of becoming a 
failed state. The security situation was bleak, the economic outlook 
was decidedly negative, and drug trafficking threatened the very 
culture of Colombia and its people.
  The situation had been slowly deteriorating in Colombia for decades. 
Even before the United States experienced the dramatic acts of 
terrorism of 2001 that would change our national perceptions forever, 
Colombians were dealing with an increasingly dangerous, deadly, and 
brutal form of terrorism that threatened to tear the

[[Page 18092]]

country apart. Drug cartels were controlling larger and larger swaths 
of territory and had turned Colombia into the world's leading exporter 
of cocaine. Much of the cocaine was finding its way into the United 
States. Insurgent groups we have come to know as the FARC or the ELN 
were turning Colombia into a war zone, negatively affecting the economy 
and threatening the very stability of the nation.
  That was the situation in 1998 when former Colombian President 
Pastrana conceived Plan Colombia, a 6-year plan to end long-armed 
conflict, to eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economic and 
social development. As you may recall, the United States agreed to take 
a gamble and invest in Colombia. President Clinton, a Democrat, led the 
way, and he was followed by President Bush. Both were strong 
supporters. The good news is that since 1998, the United States has 
continued to be the principal contributor to the plan, mostly through 
the Andean Counterdrug Initiative but also through foreign military 
financing and the central counternarcotics account of the Department of 
Defense.
  Today, our mutual objectives in support of Plan Colombia have evolved 
from a strict counternarcotics focus to encompass counterterrorism 
activities as well. Our investment appears to have paid off with 
dividends. I am happy to report that with U.S. aid to Colombian 
security forces and assistance in trade preferences under the Andean 
Trade Preferences Agreement, or the ATPA, the Colombian people have 
been positively transforming their nation. We owe a great debt of 
gratitude, as the people of Colombia do, to President Alvaro Uribe 
because his programs and policies have dramatically improved the 
security situation in Colombia and demonstrated his personal commitment 
to being a strong and capable partner in fighting drugs, crime, and 
terror.
  Since Uribe took office in 2002, the Colombian Government reports 
that homicides have dropped by 40 percent, murders of union 
representatives have been reduced by 80 percent, kidnapings have 
declined by more than 80 percent, and terrorist attacks are down by 
more than 70 percent. That is a pretty amazing set of numbers, Mr. 
President. They are evidence of nothing less than a complete turnaround 
that has given the people of Colombia hope and a new country to live 
in, one free from constant fear of killings and kidnapings.
  Now, in July of this year, the world watched with admiration and 
amazement as President Uribe and his administration, with their 
security forces, scored an impressive triumph against the Marxist 
terrorists of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the full name 
of the FARC. Members of the Colombian military successfully rescued 15 
hostages, including 3 Americans, being held by FARC. They did it 
through guile, without any armed combat, and with great boldness and 
risk to the members of the participating team. Weeks later, more than 1 
million Colombians marched in their nation's streets, calling on the 
FARC to release its remaining hostages and stop practicing terror.
  Today, President Uribe's approval rating has soared above 90 percent, 
and the FARC, still holding 700 hostages, is now faced with increasing 
evaporation of its now limited popular support base.
  As their security has improved, so has their economy. Last year, 
Colombia's economy saw the largest growth rate in nearly three decades, 
and unemployment and poverty are at the lowest levels in a decade. 
Improvements in security, stability, and economic development are 
adding to Colombia's reputation as a vibrant democracy with a history 
of free elections and solid opposition political parties.
  Americans can be proud that U.S. assistance has been at the center of 
this historic turnaround. Americans can be prouder still of our 
partners in the Colombian Government who have ensured that while 
Colombian military and police forces have made significant strides 
against the FARC and taken back much of the territory once held by 
them, they have done so while completely overhauling their human rights 
programs, policies, and enforcement mechanisms.
  In January of this year, the Colombian Minister of Defense released 
the integrated policy of human rights and international humanitarian 
law, a comprehensive policy that directs the integration of human 
rights and international law into all military instruction, stronger 
compliance and controls, legal defense of military personnel, 
specialized treatment of vulnerable groups, better integration with the 
civilian judiciary, and closer consultation with civil and 
international groups on human rights issues. The U.N. High Commissioner 
for Human Rights in Colombia called this a key step in promoting 
respect for human rights in the military.
  I was told by members of our U.S. country team, at our embassy in 
Bogota, that this policy is a written encapsulation of the remarkable 
changes that have been made over the past several years in the 
Colombian security forces.
  For example, the Defense Minister, Juan Manuel Santos, assigned seven 
colonels as inspector delegates for each division of the Army with 
authority to oversee investigations of human rights abuses committed by 
military personnel in their divisions, including the commanders. As a 
result, U.S. Embassy officials report impressive signs of progress in 
the suspension, arrest, or conviction of military and former military 
violators of human rights, including several general officers and 
greater civilian access and handling of human rights cases involving 
the military.
  In addition, the Colombian Army has now installed judicial 
coordination offices as well as operational legal advisers in all units 
to advise commanders on human rights and international humanitarian 
law, to coordinate with civilian judicial authorities, and to conduct 
liaison with national and international organizations about ongoing 
cases. These legal advisers are present during the planning of any 
military operation to ensure that the targets are legitimate, that 
civilian casualties are avoided, and that the human rights of any 
captured terrorists are protected. The armed forces have designated 
human rights officers in all their battalions to support human rights 
training and instruction at the lowest level of the military. 
Operationally, I am told the Colombian armed forces have changed the 
nature of their missions on the ground against the FARC. What may have 
once been pure military operations conducted to kill terrorists and 
seize territory have become surgical operations specifically designed 
to protect lives and gather evidence for prosecution of terrorists in 
the Colombian judicial system. Legal advisers and prosecutors are 
present during every operation to begin, at the earliest possible time 
in the operation, the difficult task of evidence collection and 
prosecution under the law.
  Mr. President, this is nothing short of an amazing turn of events. I 
have to stress, however, the message our people on the ground and the 
Colombians themselves have delivered to me. They emphasize that while 
the turnaround is dramatic, they are not out of the woods just yet, and 
critical challenges remain.
  The terrorist and paramilitary groups are weakened but not yet 
defeated. Violence still threatens all sectors of Colombian society and 
continues to cause displacement and economic hardship. Defense Minister 
Santos told me they have already come a long way, but they have a 
little ways yet to go until they can stand fully on their own two feet. 
In other words, in the season of football this fall, we would say they 
are on the 10-yard line, and they need our continued support to cross 
the goal.
  As a result of our investment in and support of President Uribe and 
the Colombian Government, Colombia has emerged as possibly our most 
successful bilateral partner in Latin America. It would be hard to find 
a greater friend, a bolder leader, and one who has made more progress 
than President Alvaro Uribe. The Colombians have worked hard in 
fighting against terrorists and drug traffickers, and they have done 
everything we have asked of them.

[[Page 18093]]

  Mr. President, since Plan Colombia began in 1999, the United States 
has given nearly $6 billion in assistance to Colombia. Yet there is one 
more thing we can do to help them cross the goal line and ensure their 
success for the future. The Senate can and must cement America's long-
term strategic partnership with Colombia by approving the one thing 
every Colombian official, every U.S. Embassy official, everybody we 
talk to who is in America--the U.S. businessman or others have told me 
that they must get--the free-trade agreement. This would be a great 
deal on several accounts for America.
  Our two-way trade with Colombia reached $18 billion last year, making 
Colombia our fourth largest trading partner in Latin America and the 
largest export market for U.S. agricultural products in South America. 
As a representative of an agricultural exporting State, we need to get 
into that country. We need to get into that country without tariffs 
making our products less competitive. Exports to Colombia, despite the 
tariffs that they impose, reached $8.6 billion in 2007. The United 
States-Colombia Free Trade Agreement would open this growing economy 
further to U.S. goods and services. U.S. companies are already doing 
business with and in Colombia. There are 112 U.S. companies operating 
there. All seven of America's largest employers have active commercial 
relations with Colombia. The Colombia Free Trade Agreement would 
definitely benefit U.S. businesses. Upon entry into force of the 
agreement, over 80 percent, close to 90 percent, of U.S. exports of 
consumer and industrial goods to Colombia would enter duty free. U.S. 
farmers and ranchers would benefit by the immediate elimination of 
Colombia's duties on high-quality beef, cotton, wheat, soybeans, key 
fruits, and many processed foods.
  Exports diversify our economy, shield it from shock in the domestic 
market, and help to close the trade deficit which we continue to hear 
so much about. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. exports 
to free-trade countries are at twice the rate of non-free-trade 
countries.
  Frankly, Mr. President, through the ATPA we already offer Colombia 
the advantages, the trade advantages, coming in largely duty free. The 
FTA with Colombia is one-sided. It knocks down their tariff barriers to 
our exports and I am at a loss to explain why we would not quickly 
approve it when our exporters, our farmers, our workers in 
manufacturing sectors, our people in the IT industry, and people 
working in the food industry, all have so much to gain. One might ask 
why the Colombians want this FTA when America would see most of the 
benefit. They gave me the answer to that question when I was in Bogota 
a few weeks ago. They believe the FTA will send a strong signal that 
the United States remains committed to its friends and is supportive of 
a continuation of positive reforms in Colombia, such as those I have 
already mentioned.
  On the flip side, they believe--and I am afraid from everything I 
have seen it is true--if we fail to do it, if we send an adverse 
message, if we do not approve the FTA, it would be bad news, for we 
would be, in effect, telling our best ally we are not as close a 
strategic partner as they thought, and Hugo Chavez, Raoul Castro, and 
other Marxists in the region will have their heyday ridiculing the 
Colombians for having turned to the United States. To continue to delay 
the United States-Colombia free trade agreement would be a refutation 
of our strong friendship of the Colombian people, a dismissal of the 
blood and treasure spent over the last decade to help Colombia and 
eliminate terrorism and improve its economy, and a signal to our allies 
that no matter how hard you cooperate with the United States you will 
be abandoned in the end. As the Colombians told me, if we do not 
approve the FTA, Hugo Chavez and Raoul Castro will rub their noses in 
it, saying: This is the way the devil pays his friends.
  We saw another side of that yesterday in a good op-ed piece in the 
Wall Street Journal by Mary Anastasia O'Grady, ``Latin Americans Want 
Free Trade.'' In that op-ed piece she pointed out what happened the 
last time we imposed tariffs, and when we cracked down on trade with 
Latin America. She quoted Sebastian Edwards that ``protectionist 
policies based on import substitution were well entrenched and 
constituted, by far, the dominant perspective'' in the downturn of 
Latin America. It:

       . . . made a mess out of the region, and not only because 
     spiraling tariffs and nontariff barriers blocked imports and 
     destroyed the export sector. They also . . . had a 
     deleterious effect on politics too, as closed economies 
     spawned powerful interests which seized not only on economic 
     but political control and grew entrenched.

  That is one of the reasons we have so many problems with so many 
countries in Latin America that are not realizing their full potential.
  In sum, a Colombia FTA seems a simple but effective way to help 
solidify our image as a nation committed to helping our strategic 
allies in the world, in the Western Hemisphere, and standing shoulder 
to shoulder with us fighting those who attack our freedom. I urge my 
colleagues to consider seriously the importance of passing a Colombia 
FTA before this Congress ends in a few short weeks. This may be one of 
the few strongly bipartisan actions in the Senate before this session 
ends and, for our Colombian friends who know how important it is, this 
action would be unforgettable.
  I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the Wall Street Journal op-ed 
piece to which I referred as part of my remarks be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             [From the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 8, 2008]

                     Latin America Wants Free Trade

                      (By Mary Anastasia O'Grady)

       Of the two U.S. presidential candidates, one promises to 
     expand international trading opportunities for American 
     producers and consumers. The other pledges to raise the 
     barriers that Americans already face in global commerce.
       For Latin America, this is the single most important policy 
     issue in the campaign. If Republican candidate John McCain 
     wins, he says he will lead the Western Hemisphere toward 
     freer trade. Conversely, Democratic candidate Barack Obama 
     has promised that he will craft a U.S. trade policy of 
     greater protectionism against our Latin neighbors. The former 
     agenda will advance regional economic integration, the latter 
     will further Latin American isolation.
       Anyone who has read 20th-century history knows the 
     seriousness of this policy divide. The last time Washington 
     adopted a protectionist stance toward our southern neighbors 
     was in 1930, when Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley tariffs. 
     It took more than 50 years to even begin to climb out of that 
     hole.
       Many economists blame Smoot-Hawley for the depths of the 
     U.S. depression. But Latin Americans have suffered even more 
     over a longer period. Their leaders chose to retaliate at the 
     time with their own protectionist tariffs, but the damage 
     didn't end there.
       In his 1995 book ``Crisis and Reform in Latin America,'' 
     UCLA professor Sebastian Edwards writes that though there was 
     a brief period of liberalization in Argentina, Brazil and 
     Chile in the late 1930s, it didn't last long. Adverse 
     conditions brought about by World War II prompted the 
     region's policy makers to restore tariffs, in the hope that 
     protectionism would stimulate economic development.
       ``By the late 1940s and early 1950s,'' writes Mr. Edwards, 
     ``protectionist policies based on import substitution were 
     well entrenched and constituted, by far, the dominant 
     perspective.'' The U.N.'s Economic Commission on Latin 
     American and the Caribbean, he adds, provided the 
     ``intellectual underpinning for the protectionist position.''
       Protectionism made a mess out of the region, and not only 
     because spiraling tariffs and nontariff barriers blocked 
     imports and destroyed the export sector. They also provoked 
     an intellectual isolation as the information and new ideas 
     that flow with trade dried up, along with consumer choice and 
     competition. This had a deleterious effect on politics too, 
     as closed economies spawned powerful interests which seized 
     not only economic but political control and grew entrenched.
       According to Mr. Edwards, it was only in the late 1980s and 
     early 1990s that U.S. and Latin leadership (not counting 
     Chile, which liberalized earlier) began to recognize the twin 
     unintended consequences of this model--poverty and 
     instability--and decided to act. ``Tariffs were drastically 
     slashed, many countries completely eliminated import licenses 
     and prohibitions and several countries began negotiating free 
     trade agreements with the United States.''
       Mexico and Canada signed the North American Free Trade 
     Agreement with the U.S. in 1993, but the regional opening 
     process continued well into this decade. A U.S.-Chile 
     bilateral agreement kicked off in 2004. Five Central American 
     countries and the Dominican

[[Page 18094]]

     Republic signed their own FTA (CAFTA) with the U.S. in 2006. 
     Peru's FTA with the U.S. was finalized in 2007. Colombia and 
     Panama have signed agreements with the U.S. that are awaiting 
     ratification by the U.S. Congress.
       It is true that unilateral opening would have been a 
     superior path. Yet for a variety of reasons--not the least 
     the political attraction of reciprocity--FTAs have become 
     fashionable. And there is no doubt that the agreements, warts 
     and all, have aided in the process of dismantling trade 
     barriers, strengthening the rule of law, and moving the 
     region in the direction of democratic capitalism.
       Mr. McCain wants the U.S. to continue its leadership role 
     in opening markets in the region. He favors ratification of 
     the Colombia and Panama FTAs, which the Democratic-controlled 
     Congress is blocking. He also wants to lift the U.S.'s 54-
     cent tariff on Brazilian ethanol, and he wants to preserve 
     NAFTA.
       Mr. Obama would reverse regional trade progress. He 
     supports House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's opposition to the 
     Colombia FTA, even though it will open new markets for U.S. 
     exporters. He promises to ``stand firm'' against pacts like 
     CAFTA and proposes to force a renegotiation of NAFTA, which 
     is likely to disrupt North American supply chains and damage 
     the U.S. economy. By heaping new labor and environmental 
     regulations on our trading partners, his ``fair trade'' 
     proposal will raise costs for our trading partners and reduce 
     their competitiveness.
       Perhaps worst of all, his antitrade bias will signal the 
     region that protectionism is back in style in the U.S., and 
     encourage new trade wars. No good can come from that, for the 
     U.S. or for Latin America.

  Mr. BOND. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sanders). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

                          ____________________