[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 154 (2008), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 16589-16591]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                  TOOLS OF PERSUASION AND INSPIRATION

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I would like to bring to the attention of 
my colleagues a speech on July 15 by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
before the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign here in Washington, DC. In 
this remarkable speech, Secretary Gates makes the case for the 
improvement of the Nation's diplomatic and developmental capabilities--
what he calls the ``tools of persuasion and inspiration''--that are as 
``indispensible'' to our security and prosperity as are our Armed 
Forces.
  If we have learned anything over the last 7 years it is that turning 
to our capable and proven military cannot be our only or dominant way 
of dealing with the challenges of a dangerous world. Secretary Gates 
warns us of the ``creeping militarization'' of our Nation's foreign 
policy.
  Too often, and especially in a crisis, we turn to the military as the 
only agency with the capacity and resources necessary and available for 
meaningful action. Secretary Gates acknowledges this reality but 
challenges us to make the changes that will improve the capacity, 
readiness and availability of the Nation's nonmilitary agencies.
  Secretary Gates calls for increasing the Nation's investment in the 
capacity and capability of the Department of State and other 
development agencies. I agree; we have undermanned and underfunded them 
for too long and we realize today more than ever the unwelcome 
consequences of that neglect. This is a striking observation coming 
from the Secretary of Defense and should demand our attention.
  More money alone, however, is not enough to bring our diplomatic and 
development agencies up to the capability and capacity levels needed 
for the complexities and scope of the dangers around us. Secretary 
Gates also calls for a greater integration of diplomatic and 
developmental agencies with the military, international partners, and 
private groups. Current operations have demonstrated the disappointing 
results of the lack of a fully integrated planning and execution system 
that takes appropriate advantage of all the tools--diplomatic, 
developmental, military, international, and private--necessary to 
resolve conflict.
  Secretary Gates has laid before the Nation a very thoughtful and 
convincing assessment of where we are and where we need to go in 
achieving the right balance of diplomatic, economic, and military 
capability to deal with an uncertain and threatening world. I commend 
his remarks to all Senators and ask unanimous consent that the July 15, 
2008, speech of Secretary Gates before the U.S. Global Leadership 
Campaign in Washington, DC, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Speech to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign as Delivered by Secretary 
               of Defense Robert M. Gates, July 15, 2008

       Thank you very much for the introductions.
       Thank you Condi Rice for the kind words, and above all, for 
     your principled and visionary leadership of the Department of 
     State.
       One of the reasons I have rarely been invited to lecture in 
     political science departments--including at Texas A&M--is 
     because faculty correctly suspect that I would tell the 
     students that what their textbooks say about government does 
     not describe the reality I have experienced in working for 
     seven presidents. Organization charts, institutions, 
     statistics, structures, regulations, policies, committees, 
     and all the rest--the bureaucracy, if you will--are the 
     necessary pre-condition for effective government. But whether 
     or not it really works depends upon the people and their 
     relationships. For significant periods since I entered 
     government 42 years ago, the Secretary of State and Secretary 
     of Defense were not on speaking terms. The fact that Condi 
     and I actually get along means that our respective 
     bureaucracies understand that trying to provoke us to fight 
     with one another is not career-enhancing. Such efforts still 
     occur, of course. After all, this is Washington. But the 
     bureaucratic battles are a good deal more covert.
       Of course, the human side of government is always a source 
     of both humor and embarrassment. Will Rogers once said, ``I 
     don't make jokes. I just watch the government and report the 
     facts.'' And the conduct of diplomacy, where--as Secretary 
     Rice can attest--protocol and propriety are so very 
     important, provides an especially fertile ground for 
     amusement.
       For example, there was the time that President Nixon met 
     with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, shortly after Nixon 
     had appointed Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State. With 
     Golda Meir in that meeting was her very erudite foreign 
     minister, Abba Eban, a graduate of Cambridge. At one point in 
     the meeting, Nixon turned to Golda Meir and said, ``Just 
     think, we now both have Jewish foreign ministers.'' And 
     without missing a beat Golda Meir said, ``Yes, but mine 
     speaks English.''
       Then there was the time that President Nixon visited Italy 
     and had a meeting with the Pope. Kissinger and Nixon had 
     along with them Secretary of Defense Mel Laird, but they 
     decided that Laird as, in effect, secretary of war shouldn't 
     be invited to meeting with the Pope. So, Nixon the next 
     morning went in for his private audience with the Pope, and 
     the other Americans waited outside for the general audience. 
     And who should come striding down the hall of the papal 
     apartments but Mel Laird smoking an enormous cigar; he had 
     decided he wanted in on the meeting. Kissinger was beside 
     himself, but finally said, ``Well, Mel, at least extinguish 
     the cigar.'' And so Laird stubbed out his cigar and put it in 
     his pocket.
       The rest of the American party a few minutes later went in 
     to their meeting with the Pope, everyone took a seat. A 
     couple of minutes into the Pope's remarks, Kissinger heard 
     this little patting sound going on, he was in the second row 
     with Laird on the end, there was a wisp of smoke coming out 
     of Laird's pocket. Everything seemed under control. A couple 
     of minutes later, Kissinger heard this loud slapping noise. 
     He looked over smoke was billowing out of Laird's pocket. The 
     Secretary of Defense was on fire. Now the rest of the 
     delegation heard this slapping noise, and they thought they 
     were being cued to applaud the Pope. And so they did. And 
     Henry later told us, ``God only knows what his Holiness 
     thought, seeing the American secretary of defense immolating 
     himself, and the entire American party applauding the fact.''
       I am honored to receive this award, and I consider it a 
     privilege to be associated with the United States Global 
     Leadership Campaign. It is a truly remarkable collection of 
     ``strange bedfellows''--from Save the Children to 
     Caterpillar, from Catholic Relief Services to AIPAC, and even 
     Boeing and Northrop Grumman. This organization has been a 
     prescient, and often lonely, advocate for the importance of 
     diplomacy and international development to America's vital 
     national interests--and I commend you for that.
       Though my views on these subjects have become better known 
     through recent speeches, in many ways they originated and 
     were reinforced by my prior experience in government during 
     the Cold War. Looking back, it is clear that the strength of 
     America's military forces and intelligence capabilities--
     along with the willingness to use them--held the Soviets at 
     bay for more than four decades. But there was another side to 
     that story and to that struggle. There was the Agency for 
     International Development overseeing development and 
     humanitarian assistance programs that improved--if not 
     saved--the lives of millions of people from disease, 
     starvation, and poverty. Our diplomats forged relationships 
     and bonds of trust, and built up reservoirs of expertise and 
     goodwill that proved invaluable over time. Countless people 
     in foreign countries wandered into a United States 
     Information Agency library, or heard from a visiting speaker 
     and had their opinions about America transformed by learning 
     about our history and culture and values. Others behind the 
     Iron Curtain were inspired to resist by what they heard on 
     Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America.
       In all, these non-military efforts--these tools of 
     persuasion and inspiration--were indispensable to the outcome 
     of the defining ideological struggle of the 20th century. I 
     believe that they are just as indispensable in the 21st 
     century--and maybe more so.
       Just last month I approved a new National Defense Strategy 
     that calls upon us to ``Tap the full strength of America and 
     its people''--military and civilian, public and private--to 
     deal with the challenges to our freedom, prosperity, and 
     security around the globe.
       In the campaign against terrorist networks and other 
     extremists, we know that direct military force will continue 
     to have a role. But over the long term, we cannot kill or 
     capture our way to victory. What the Pentagon calls 
     ``kinetic'' operations should be subordinate to measures to 
     promote participation in government, economic programs to 
     spur development, and efforts to address the grievances that 
     often lie at the heart of insurgencies and among the 
     discontented from which the terrorists recruit. It will take 
     the patient accumulation of quiet successes over time to 
     discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideology.

[[Page 16590]]

       We also know that over the next 20 years and more certain 
     pressures--population, resource, energy, climate, economic, 
     and environmental--could combine with rapid cultural, social, 
     and technological change to produce new sources of 
     deprivation, rage, and instability. We face now, and will 
     inevitably face in the future, rising powers discontented 
     with the international status quo, possessing new wealth and 
     ambition, and seeking new and more powerful weapons. But, 
     overall, looking ahead, I believe the most persistent and 
     potentially dangerous threats will come less from ambitious 
     states, than failing ones that cannot meet the basic needs--
     much less the aspirations--of their people.
       In my travels to foreign capitals, I have been struck by 
     the eagerness of so many foreign governments to forge closer 
     diplomatic and security ties with the United States--ranging 
     from old enemies like Vietnam to new partners like India. 
     Nonetheless, regard for the United States is low among the 
     populations of many key nations--especially those of our 
     moderate Muslim allies.
       This is important because much of our national security 
     strategy depends upon securing the cooperation of other 
     nations, which will depend heavily on the extent to which our 
     efforts abroad are viewed as legitimate by their publics. The 
     solution is not to be found in some slick PR campaign or by 
     trying to out-propagandize al-Qaeda, but rather through the 
     steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust 
     and credibility over time.
       To do all these things, to truly harness the ``full 
     strength of America,'' as I said in the National Defense 
     Strategy, requires having civilian institutions of diplomacy 
     and development that are adequately staffed and properly 
     funded. Due to the leadership of Secretary Rice and before 
     her Secretary Powell, and with the continuing strong support 
     of the President, we have made significant progress towards 
     pulling ourselves out of the hole created not only by the 
     steep cutbacks in the wake of the Cold War--but also by the 
     lack of adequate resources for the State Department and the 
     entire foreign affairs account going back decades.
       Since 2001, international affairs spending has about 
     doubled, State has begun hiring again, billions have been 
     spent to fight AIDS and malaria in Africa, the Millennium 
     Challenge Corporation is rewarding better governance in the 
     developing world, and Secretary Rice has launched a program 
     of transformational diplomacy to better posture the 
     diplomatic corps for the realities of this century. The 
     President's budget request this year, as Condi said, includes 
     more than 1,100 new Foreign Service officers, as well as a 
     response corps of civilian experts that can deploy on short 
     notice. And, for the first time in a long time, I sense real 
     bipartisan support in Congress for strengthening the civilian 
     foreign affairs budget.
       Shortfalls nonetheless remain. Much of the total increase 
     in the international affairs budget has been taken up by 
     security costs and offset by the declining dollar, leaving 
     little left over for core diplomatic operations. These 
     programs are not well understood or appreciated by the wider 
     American public, and do not have a ready-made political 
     constituency that major weapons systems or public works 
     projects enjoy. As a result, the slashing of the President's 
     international affairs budget request has too often become an 
     annual Washington ritual--right up there with the blooming of 
     the cherry blossoms and the Redskin's opening game.
       As someone who once led an agency with a thin domestic 
     constituency, I am familiar with this dilemma. Since arriving 
     at the Pentagon I've discovered a markedly different budget 
     dynamic--not just in scale but the reception one gets on the 
     Hill. Congress often asks the military services for lists of 
     things that they need, but that the Defense Secretary and the 
     President were too stingy to request. As you can imagine, 
     this is one congressional tasking that prompts an immediate 
     and enthusiastic response.
       It has become clear that America's civilian institutions of 
     diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned 
     and underfunded for far too long--relative to what we spend 
     on the military, and more important, relative to the 
     responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the 
     world. I cannot pretend to know the right dollar amount--I 
     know it's a good deal more than the one percent of the 
     federal budget that it is right now. But the budgets we are 
     talking about are relatively small compared to the rest of 
     government, a steep increase of these capabilities is well 
     within reach--as long as there is the political will and 
     wisdom to do it.
       But even as we agree that more resources are needed, I 
     believe that there is more to this problem than how much 
     money is in the 150 Account. The challenge we face is how 
     best to integrate these tools of statecraft with the 
     military, international partners, and the private sector.
       Where our government has been able to bring America's 
     civilian and the military assets together to support local 
     partners, there have been incredibly promising results. One 
     unheralded example, one you will not read about in the 
     newspapers, is in the Philippines. There the U.S. 
     Ambassador--Kristie Kenney--has overseen a campaign involving 
     multiple agencies working closely together with their 
     Philippine counterparts in a synchronized effort that has 
     delegitimized and rolled back extremists in Mindanao. Having 
     a strong, well-supported chief of mission has been crucial to 
     success.
       The vastly larger, more complex international effort in 
     Afghanistan presents a different set of challenges. There are 
     dozens of nations, hundreds of NGOs, universities, 
     development banks, the United Nations, the European Union, 
     NATO--all working to help a nation beset by crushing poverty, 
     a bumper opium crop, and a ruthless and resilient insurgency. 
     Getting all these different elements to coordinate operations 
     and share best practices has been a colossal--and often all 
     too often unsuccessful--undertaking. The appointment this 
     spring of a UN special representative to coordinate civilian 
     reconstruction in Afghanistan is an important step forward. 
     And at the last NATO defense ministerial, I proposed a 
     civilian-military planning cell for Regional Command South to 
     bring unity to our efforts in that critically important part 
     of the country. And I asked Kai Eide, when I met with him 
     last week, to appoint a representative to participate in this 
     cell.
       Repeating an Afghanistan or an Iraq--forced regime change 
     followed by nation-building under fire--probably is unlikely 
     in the foreseeable future. What is likely though, even a 
     certainty, is the need to work with and through local 
     governments to avoid the next insurgency, to rescue the next 
     failing state, or to head off the next humanitarian disaster.
       Correspondingly, the overall posture and thinking of the 
     United States armed forces has shifted--away from solely 
     focusing on direct American military action, and towards new 
     capabilities to shape the security environment in ways that 
     obviate the need for military intervention in the future. 
     This approach forms the basis of our near-term planning and 
     influences the way we develop capabilities for the future. 
     This perspective also informed the creation of Africa 
     Command, with its unique interagency structure, a deputy 
     commander who is an ambassador not a general, as well as 
     Southern Command's new orientation and priorities in Latin 
     America.
       Overall, even outside Iraq and Afghanistan, the United 
     States military has become more involved in a range of 
     activities that in the past were perceived to be the 
     exclusive province of civilian agencies and organizations. 
     This has led to concern among many organizations--perhaps 
     including many represented here tonight about what's seen as 
     a creeping ``militarization'' of some aspects of America's 
     foreign policy.
       This is not an entirely unreasonable sentiment. As a career 
     CIA officer I watched with some dismay the increasing 
     dominance of the defense 800 pound gorilla in the 
     intelligence arena over the years. But that scenario can be 
     avoided if--as is the case with the intelligence community 
     today--there is the right leadership, adequate funding of 
     civilian agencies, effective coordination on the ground, and 
     a clear understanding of the authorities, roles, and 
     understandings of military versus civilian efforts, and how 
     they fit, or in some cases don't fit, together.
       We know that at least in the early phases of any conflict, 
     contingency, or natural disaster, the U.S. military--as has 
     been the case throughout our history--will be responsible for 
     security, reconstruction, and providing basic sustenance and 
     public services. I make it a point to reinforce this message 
     before military audiences, to ensure that the lessons learned 
     and re-learned in recent years are not forgotten or again 
     pushed to the margins. Building the security capacity of 
     other nations through training and equipping programs has 
     emerged as a core and enduring military requirement, though 
     none of these programs go forward without the approval of the 
     Secretary of State.
       In recent years the lines separating war, peace, diplomacy, 
     and development have become more blurred, and no longer fit 
     the neat organizational charts of the 20th century. All the 
     various elements and stakeholders working in the 
     international arena-- military and civilian, government and 
     private--have learned to stretch outside their comfort zone 
     to work together and achieve results.
       For example, many humanitarian and international 
     organizations have long prided themselves on not taking sides 
     and avoiding any association with the military. But as we've 
     seen in the vicious attacks on Doctors Without Borders in 
     Afghanistan, and the U.N. Mission in Iraq, violent extremists 
     care little about these distinctions.
       To provide clearer rules of the road for our efforts, the 
     Defense Department and ``InterAction''--the umbrella 
     organization for many U.S.-based NGOs--have, for the first 
     time, jointly developed guidelines for how the military and 
     NGOs should relate to one another in a hostile environment. 
     The Pentagon has also refined its guidance for humanitarian 
     assistance to ensure that military projects are aligned with 
     wider U.S. foreign policy objectives and do not duplicate or 
     replace the work of civilian organizations.
       Broadly speaking, when it comes to America's engagement 
     with the rest of the world,

[[Page 16591]]

     you probably don't hear this often from a Secretary of 
     Defense, it is important that the military is--and is clearly 
     seen to be--in a supporting role to civilian agencies. Our 
     diplomatic leaders--be they in ambassadors' suites or on the 
     seventh floor of the State Department--must have the 
     resources and political support needed to fully exercise 
     their statutory responsibilities in leading American foreign 
     policy.
       The challenge facing our institutions is to adapt to new 
     realities while preserving those core competencies and 
     institutional traits that have made them so successful in the 
     past. The Foreign Service is not the Foreign Legion, and the 
     United States military should never be mistaken for the Peace 
     Corps with guns. We will always need professional Foreign 
     Service officers to conduct diplomacy in all its dimensions, 
     to master local customs and culture, to negotiate treaties, 
     and advance American interests and strengthen our 
     international partnerships. And unless the fundamental nature 
     of humankind and of nations radically changes, the need--and 
     will to use--the full range of military capabilities to 
     deter, and if necessary defeat, aggression from hostile 
     states and forces will remain.
       In closing, I am convinced, irrespective of what is 
     reported in global opinion surveys, or recounted in the 
     latest speculation about American decline, that around the 
     world, men and women seeking freedom from despotism, want, 
     and fear will continue to look to the United States for 
     leadership.
       As a nation, we have, over the last two centuries, made our 
     share of mistakes. From time to time, we have strayed from 
     our values; on occasion, we have become arrogant in our 
     dealings with other countries. But we have always corrected 
     our course. And that is why today, as throughout our history, 
     this country remains the world's most powerful force for 
     good--the ultimate protector of what Vaclav Havel once called 
     ``civilization's thin veneer.'' A nation Abraham Lincoln 
     described as mankind's ``last, best hope.''
       For any given cause or crisis, if America does not lead, 
     then more often than not, what needs to be done simply won't 
     get done. In the final analysis, our global responsibilities 
     are not a burden on the people or on the soul of this nation. 
     They are, rather, a blessing.
       Thank you for this award and I salute you for all that you 
     do--for America, and for humanity.

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