[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 154 (2008), Part 11]
[House]
[Pages 15644-15649]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                AVIATION SAFETY ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2008

  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 6493) to amend title 49, United States Code, to enhance 
aviation safety, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 6493

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Aviation Safety Enhancement 
     Act of 2008''.

     SEC. 2. AVIATION SAFETY WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATION OFFICE.

       Section 106 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(s) Aviation Safety Whistleblower Investigation Office.--
       ``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the Federal 
     Aviation Administration (in this section referred to as the 
     `Agency') an Aviation Safety Whistleblower Investigation 
     Office (in this subsection referred to as the `Office').
       ``(2) Director.--
       ``(A) Appointment.--The head of the Office shall be the 
     Director, who shall be appointed by the Secretary of 
     Transportation.
       ``(B) Qualifications.--The Director shall have a 
     demonstrated ability in investigations and knowledge of or 
     experience in aviation.
       ``(C) Term.--The Director shall be appointed for a term of 
     5 years.
       ``(D) Vacancy.--Any individual appointed to fill a vacancy 
     in the position of the Director occurring before the 
     expiration of the term for which the individual's predecessor 
     was appointed shall be appointed for the remainder of that 
     term.
       ``(3) Complaints and investigations.--
       ``(A) Authority of director.--The Director shall--
       ``(i) receive complaints and information submitted by 
     employees of persons holding certificates issued under title 
     14, Code of Federal Regulations, and employees of the Agency 
     concerning the possible existence of an activity relating to 
     a violation of an order, regulation, or standard of the 
     Agency or any other provision of Federal law relating to 
     aviation safety;
       ``(ii) assess complaints and information submitted under 
     clause (i) and determine whether a substantial likelihood 
     exists that a violation of an order, regulation, or standard 
     of the Agency or any other provision of Federal law relating 
     to aviation safety may have occurred; and
       ``(iii) based on findings of the assessment conducted under 
     clause (ii), make recommendations to the Administrator in 
     writing for further investigation or corrective actions.
       ``(B) Disclosure of identities.--The Director shall not 
     disclose the identity of an individual who submits a 
     complaint or information under subparagraph (A)(i) unless--
       ``(i) the individual consents to the disclosure in writing; 
     or
       ``(ii) the Director determines, in the course of an 
     investigation, that the disclosure is unavoidable.
       ``(C) Independence of director.--The Secretary, the 
     Administrator, or any officer or employee of the Agency may 
     not prevent or prohibit the Director from initiating, 
     carrying out, or completing any assessment of a complaint or 
     information submitted subparagraph (A)(i) or from reporting 
     to Congress on any such assessment.
       ``(D) Access to information.--In conducting an assessment 
     of a complaint or information submitted under subparagraph 
     (A)(i), the Director shall have access to all records, 
     reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, 
     and other material necessary to determine whether a 
     substantial likelihood exists that a violation of an order, 
     regulation, or standard of the Agency or any other provision 
     of Federal law relating to aviation safety may have occurred.
       ``(4) Responses to recommendations.--The Administrator 
     shall respond to a recommendation made by the Director under 
     subparagraph (A)(iii) in writing and retain records related 
     to any further investigations or corrective actions taken in 
     response to the recommendation.
       ``(5) Incident reports.--If the Director determines there 
     is a substantial likelihood that a violation of an order, 
     regulation, or standard of the Agency or any other provision 
     of Federal law relating to aviation safety may have occurred 
     that requires immediate corrective action, the Director shall 
     report the potential violation expeditiously to the 
     Administrator and the Inspector General of the Department of 
     Transportation.
       ``(6) Reporting of criminal violations to inspector 
     general.--If the Director has reasonable grounds to believe 
     that there has been a violation of Federal criminal law, the 
     Director shall report the violation expeditiously to the 
     Inspector General.

[[Page 15645]]

       ``(7) Annual reports to congress.--Not later than October 1 
     of each year, the Director shall submit to Congress a report 
     containing--
       ``(A) information on the number of submissions of 
     complaints and information received by the Director under 
     paragraph (3)(A)(i) in the preceding 12-month period;
       ``(B) summaries of those submissions;
       ``(C) summaries of further investigations and corrective 
     actions recommended in response to the submissions; and
       ``(D) summaries of the responses of the Administrator to 
     such recommendations.''.

     SEC. 3. MODIFICATION OF CUSTOMER SERVICE INITIATIVE.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) Subsections (a) and (d) of section 40101 of title 49, 
     United States Code, directs the Federal Aviation 
     Administration (in this section referred to as the 
     ``Agency)'') to make safety its highest priority.
       (2) In 1996, to ensure that there would be no appearance of 
     a conflict of interest for the Agency in carrying out its 
     safety responsibilities, Congress amended section 40101(d) of 
     such title to remove the responsibilities of the Agency to 
     promote airlines.
       (3) Despite these directives from Congress regarding the 
     priority of safety, the Agency issued a vision statement in 
     which it stated that it has a ``vision'' of ``being 
     responsive to our customers and accountable to the public'' 
     and, in 2003, issued a customer service initiative that 
     required aviation inspectors to treat air carriers and other 
     aviation certificate holders as ``customers'' rather than 
     regulated entities.
       (4) The initiatives described in paragraph (3) appear to 
     have given regulated entities and Agency inspectors the 
     impression that the management of the Agency gives an unduly 
     high priority to the satisfaction of regulated entities 
     regarding its inspection and certification decisions and 
     other lawful actions of its safety inspectors.
       (5) As a result of the emphasis on customer satisfaction, 
     some managers of the Agency have discouraged vigorous 
     enforcement and replaced inspectors whose lawful actions 
     adversely affected an air carrier.
       (b) Modification of Initiative.--Not later than 90 days 
     after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator of 
     the Federal Aviation Administration shall modify the customer 
     service initiative, mission and vision statements, and other 
     statements of policy of the Agency--
       (1) to remove any reference to air carriers or other 
     entities regulated by the Agency as ``customers'';
       (2) to clarify that in regulating safety the only customers 
     of the Agency are individuals traveling on aircraft; and
       (3) to clarify that air carriers and other entities 
     regulated by the Agency do not have the right to select the 
     employees of the Agency who will inspect their operations.
       (c) Safety Priority.--In carrying out the Administrator's 
     responsibilities, the Administrator shall ensure that safety 
     is given a higher priority than preventing the 
     dissatisfaction of an air carrier or other entity regulated 
     by the Agency with an employee of the Agency.

     SEC. 4. POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS FOR FLIGHT STANDARDS 
                   INSPECTORS.

       (a) In General.--Section 44711 of title 49, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(d) Post-Employment Restrictions for Flight Standards 
     Inspectors.--
       ``(1) Prohibition.--A person holding an operating 
     certificate issued under title 14, Code of Federal 
     Regulations, may not knowingly employ, or make a contractual 
     arrangement which permits, an individual to act as an agent 
     or representative of the certificate holder in any matter 
     before the Federal Aviation Administration (in this 
     subsection referred to as the `Agency') if the individual, in 
     the preceding 2-year period--
       ``(A) served as, or was responsible for oversight of, a 
     flight standards inspector of the Agency; and
       ``(B) had responsibility to inspect, or oversee inspection 
     of, the operations of the certificate holder.
       ``(2) Written and oral communications.--For purposes of 
     paragraph (1), an individual shall be considered to be acting 
     as an agent or representative of a certificate holder in a 
     matter before the Agency if the individual makes any written 
     or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to 
     the Agency (or any of its officers or employees) in 
     connection with a particular matter, whether or not involving 
     a specific party and without regard to whether the individual 
     has participated in, or had responsibility for, the 
     particular matter while serving as a flight standards 
     inspector of the Agency.''.
       (b) Applicability.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall not apply to an individual employed by a certificate 
     holder as of the date of enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 5. ASSIGNMENT OF PRINCIPAL SUPERVISORY INSPECTORS.

       (a) In General.--An individual serving as a principal 
     supervisory inspector of the Federal Aviation Administration 
     (in this section referred to as the ``Agency)'' may not be 
     responsible for overseeing the operations of a single air 
     carrier for a continuous period of more than 5 years.
       (b) Transitional Provision.--An individual serving as a 
     principal supervisory inspector of the Agency with respect to 
     an air carrier as of the date of enactment of this Act may be 
     responsible for overseeing the operations of the carrier 
     until the last day of the 5-year period specified in 
     subsection (a) or last day of the 2-year period beginning on 
     such date of enactment, whichever is later.
       (c) Issuance of Order.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the 
     Federal Aviation Administration shall issue an order to carry 
     out this section.
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Administrator such sums as may be 
     necessary to carry out this section.

     SEC. 6. HEADQUARTERS REVIEW OF AIR TRANSPORTATION OVERSIGHT 
                   SYSTEM DATABASE.

       (a) Reviews.--The Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
     Administration shall establish a process by which the air 
     transportation oversight system database of the Federal 
     Aviation Administration (in this section referred to as the 
     ``Agency'') is reviewed by a team of employees of the Agency 
     on a monthly basis to ensure that--
       (1) any trends in regulatory compliance are identified; and
       (2) appropriate corrective actions are taken in accordance 
     with Agency regulations, advisory directives, policies, and 
     procedures.
       (b) Monthly Team Reports.--
       (1) In general.--The team of employees conducting a monthly 
     review of the air transportation oversight system database 
     under subsection (a) shall submit to the Administrator, the 
     Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, and the Director 
     of Flight Standards a report on the results of the review.
       (2) Contents.--A report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
     identify--
       (A) any trends in regulatory compliance discovered by the 
     team of employees in conducting the monthly review; and
       (B) any corrective actions taken or proposed to be taken in 
     response to the trends.
       (c)  Quarterly Reports to Congress.--The Administrator, on 
     a quarterly basis, shall submit to the Committee on 
     Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
     Transportation of the Senate a report on the results of 
     reviews of the air transportation oversight system database 
     conducted under this section, including copies of reports 
     received under subsection (b).

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mica) each 
will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota.


                             General Leave

  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks 
on the bill, H.R. 6493, and include therein extraneous material.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Minnesota?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in very obvious support of H.R. 6493, the 
Aviation Safety Enhancement Act of 2008.
  I consider this a first or, say, initial legislative step in 
reversing the complacency over safety regulations that has set in at 
the highest levels of the Federal Aviation Administration.
  At the outset, I want to express my appreciation to Mr. Mica, the 
gentleman from Florida, the ranking member on our full Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, Ranking Member Petri from the 
Subcommittee on Aviation, and Chairman Jerry Costello from Illinois, 
chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee. All of us have worked diligently 
on the hearing that we held on aviation safety and on the legislation 
that we bring to the floor today.
  For years, the FAA has earned and held the distinction of the ``gold 
standard for aviation safety'' in the world. Other countries come to 
the United States to emulate the practices of the FAA in overseeing 
safety and setting standards for safety and maintenance of aircraft, 
engine and airframe. And it is, indeed, the charter of the FAA, in the 
very opening paragraph of the Organization Act of 1958, that created 
the Federal Aviation Administration from the old Civil Aeronautics 
Agency, quote, ``Safety in aviation shall be maintained at the highest 
possible level.'' Not the level airlines choose, not the level they can 
afford, but the highest possible level.

[[Page 15646]]

  Safety in aviation must start in the corporate boardroom and permeate 
all through the organization. It is the responsibility of the FAA to 
set minimum standards and expect that not only airlines will meet them, 
but exceed them.
  And there has been, over the years, a partnership in safety between 
the manufacturers of aircraft--whether it's Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, 
Cessna, Cirrus, Piper, or these days Airbus in France--with the FAA in 
establishing standards, seeing that the standards are met, and then 
ensuring that in the course of operation of aircraft and the 
maintenance of aircraft safety is maintained at that highest possible 
level.
  Over the last few years, we've seen a slippage with the FAA from that 
high standard. And following information we received from 
whistleblowers in the committee staff, and it came to my attention 
immediately, we found that there was a change in attitude at the FAA, a 
shift away from insisting on those highest standards, a move from a 
partnership to a customer service initiative in which the FAA directed 
its principal maintenance inspectors to treat airlines as though they 
were customers. I've never heard that term used in aviation in my 25 
years of involvement in oversight of and setting standards for aviation 
safety. If there is a customer, it's the traveling public, not the 
airline. And if the airline is your customer and the customer is 
unhappy with the service he is getting, then that customer can 
complain. And that's what one of the airlines did, complained to the 
FAA about the principal maintenance inspector being too rigorous, 
overseeing too vigorously. And that PMI was removed from that position. 
Until the FAA found out that our committee was investigating a range of 
practices that strayed from the standard of vigorous oversight of and 
enforcement of aviation safety, then they brought the person back. 
Well, we found that one carrier with FAA complicity allowed at least 
177 of its aircraft to fly with passengers in revenue service in 
violation of FAA regulations, the most serious lapse in safety I've 
observed in 23 years.
  The investigation the committee launched led to the discovery of 
other instances in which inspections were not properly conducted and 
repairs were not properly made. The result, after we brought this to 
the attention of the FAA, and to the public in a statement that we 
released about the situation in preparation for our hearings, numbers 
of aircraft, hundreds, 972 aircraft were grounded by not only the 
airline in question, but other air carriers as well. Thousands of 
flights were cancelled. Serious questions were raised about whether 
high-ranking officials in the FAA were carrying out their safety 
responsibilities toward the industry and toward the traveling public.

                              {time}  1445

  Since the hearing we conducted on April 3, the investigative staff 
has been approached by individuals from other maintenance providers of 
other carriers alleging serious breakdowns in FAA's regulatory 
oversight. As a result of the rigorous investigation and the intensive 
hearing conducted in committee, there has been a shift in the FAA. The 
pendulum swung too far to the cooperation side and is now moving back 
to the middle with a more balanced relationship with airlines instead 
of the carrier-favorable relationship previously.
  On June 30, 2008, the Inspector General of DOT issued a report 
entitled ``Review of FAA's Safety Oversight of Airlines and Use of 
Regulatory Partnership Programs,'' observing that the IG made several 
recommendations to the FAA to strengthen its oversight of air carrier 
safety. Specifically, the IG recommended the FAA periodically rotate 
its flight standards safety inspectors and establish an independent 
investigative organization to examine safety issues found by FAA 
employees.
  The FAA said it did not agree with the recommendation to rotate 
inspectors. It said it only partially agreed to implement the 
recommendation to establish an independent organization to investigate 
employee complaints, FAA employee complaints. The FAA's response has 
been to implement a Safety Issues Report System that duplicates 
existing hotlines, does not provide for independent review outside of 
FAA's Aviation Safety Organization, which in the past had a long and 
successful and effective record of responding to complaints filed by 
whistleblowers. Well, I think FAA's response has been wholly 
inadequate.
  This legislation will move us in the direction of correcting the 
problem and putting aviation safety back on the highest level, the gold 
standard, that has been characteristic of the FAA in years past.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, first of all, I want to pay tribute to 
Chairman Oberstar, the chairman of the Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee, whom I have had the honor of working with and 
leading the Republican side of the committee with him. And I might say 
that when Mr. Oberstar and I get to agree on moving forward a 
transportation initiative that's in the benefit of the Congress and the 
American people that things do happen, and this is a fine example of 
trying to take FAA and its safety measures and make them even better 
for the safety of the American public. So I commend Mr. Oberstar, Mr. 
Costello as the Chair of the Aviation Subcommittee, and Mr. Petri as 
our Republican ranking member all for working together.
  I come to the floor today as the former Chair of the Aviation 
Subcommittee during six very difficult times of trying to take an 
industry that had a number of problems. I became the chairman in 2001, 
the beginning of 2001. When I came to Congress, Mr. Oberstar was the 
chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee and did an outstanding job in his 
service. He was faced with challenges; I was faced with challenges.
  Both of us, though, wanted to construct an FAA inspection system and 
safety system that assured the flying public that we had taken the very 
best measures and put them in place so that we would have a safe 
aviation national system. And I remember instituting early on and 
supporting the institution of a change in the way we did aviation 
inspection. What we did is we switched from sort of a we gotcha, we're-
going-to-catch-you-if-we-can system or sort of a routine inspection 
system where it's Monday, we're going to inspect in Seattle at this 
aviation facility, or it's Tuesday, we're going to be in St. Louis, or 
it's Wednesday, we're going to be in New York and we are going to do 
these inspections whether we need to on a rotating basis or not. We 
switched to a somewhat controversial system of inspection of these 
aircraft called ``self-reporting.'' And some people don't understand 
that, but what we did is we said there are no penalties. Everyone would 
report incidents where there is some problem or they see some defect, 
something that should command attention and should be noted, and we had 
a reporting system. And that's the way we have operated with the self-
reporting system. Some say it got a little too cozy, and probably when 
you repeat things and do things in a certain fashion, that does happen. 
It's part of human nature.
  The reporting system is very important, though, because then we took 
and we adopted a risk-based inspection in going after problems. And 
since we have done that, ladies and gentlemen of the House, my 
colleagues, we have had the safest history for aviation ever in the 
United States and probably in the world. We instituted that. We put in 
some protections but probably not enough.
  Now, as you know, in April of this year, the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure held a hearing on the oversight of 
airline maintenance and brought to our attention, and through the 
investigative resources of the committee, we found lapses of proper 
attention, some conflict of possible interest, and some people who 
maybe got into too cozy a relationship. We held hearings on that, and 
as a result of that across the country, we asked that an audit be 
conducted. We

[[Page 15647]]

wanted to see if what we saw in a limited incident or incidents was 
being repeated around the system.
  The audit found that the United States carriers complied with more 
than 99 percent of the airworthiness directives sampled, and it's the 
remaining 1 percent that we want to make certain are addressed. So we 
instituted a new way of inspections. We instituted a new way of 
reporting. We found that we had some problems, and in this bipartisan 
effort, we are instituting corrective measures.
  One of the things to deal with the cozy relationship is that we do 
establish a post-employment restriction for some of these FAA 
inspectors going back into industry for 2 years. I have some questions 
about the 2 years, but the other side of the aisle and the 
administration support the 2 years. I thought it might be a little bit 
too long. We will have to see how that works. It also requires that FAA 
principal supervisory inspectors rotate the office every 5 years, and 
we found also the cozy relationships, staying at one place, getting 
these relationships that sometimes might have a conflict of interest. 
We instituted that particular provision in this legislation. I have 
some questions about that too because it is difficult for these 
professionals and we want the very best to rotate and move their 
families around every 5 years, but we will see how that measure works. 
So those are the two questions that I probably have remaining. And what 
we have reached is a bipartisan accord.
  But our intent here is to take a safe system where we found some 
problems and to correct it, institute some changes that will make 
certain that the system is even safer and that the problems that we 
have identified are corrected.
  So I think this is an excellent measure. It shows what Congress can 
do working together to take a safe aviation system, make it even safer, 
correct some problems that we've identified, and make certain that the 
American public has the greatest confidence and that there are, in 
fact, measures being taken and having been instituted that will ensure 
that safety.
  So with those comments, Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I 
reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield such time as he may 
consume to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LaTourette).
  Mr. LaTOURETTE. I thank the gentleman from Florida, the ranking 
member of the full committee, for yielding.
  I rise today, Mr. Speaker, in support of H.R. 6493, the Aviation 
Safety Enhancement Act of 2008.
  Commercial aviation is enjoying the safest period in the history of 
flight. In fact, there hasn't been a wide-body aircraft passenger 
fatality since 2001. This excellent record is the result of the hard 
work of the FAA's Office of Aviation Safety, which has some 6,900 
dedicated employees, including 3,800 FAA aviation safety inspectors, 
who oversee approximately 19,000 aircraft, including the 7,000 aircraft 
that make up the entire U.S. commercial airline fleet. Their charge is 
as important as it is large.
  Even with such an excellent record, however, the aviation community 
and the FAA must remain vigilant in protecting the traveling public. 
H.R. 6493 is an important bipartisan bill that will go a long way 
towards addressing the inadequacies in the FAA's oversight programs 
discovered during the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector 
General audit earlier this year.
  In addition to efforts already undertaken by the FAA, this 
legislation creates an Aviation Safety Whistleblower Office; requires 
modification of Customer Service Initiative to eliminate references to 
airlines and certificate holders as customers; establishes post-
employment restrictions for FAA flight standards inspectors, a 2 year 
``cooling-off'' period; requires reassignment of FAA principal 
supervisory maintenance inspectors, rotates the SPMIs every 5 years; 
requires an FAA headquarters review of the Air Transportation Oversight 
System database with the establishment of a team to review the ATOS 
database every month, requires monthly reports of any regulatory 
trends, which a description of any should include corrective actions if 
appropriate. A quarterly report to Congress is also required.
  I want to applaud the FAA for the level of safety it's overseen in 
recent years, and I urge my colleagues to support this legislation that 
will continue to build upon the already impressive safety record of the 
Federal Aviation Administration.
  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The issues at stake in the hearing that we held relate principally to 
two major issues of aviation safety: One was hull inspection, and the 
other was inspection of the power control unit on 737 aircraft that 
regulate the movement of the rudder onboard those aircraft.
  Both of these air worthiness directives and Federal air regulations 
that govern oversight of maintenance performed on high-time aircraft 
and on aircraft that have this unique power control unit resulted from 
accidents that involved loss of life.
  The 737 of Aloha Airlines en route to Honolulu lost 18 feet of its 
hull in the air. The flight attendant was pulled to her death. 
Passengers strapped in suffered rapid, severe decompression injury but 
no other loss of life. The investigation that followed showed that 
there was extensive corrosion and metal fatigue and perhaps also 
improper technology used in putting the plates together in the hull of 
the aircraft.
  There followed a worldwide conference on aging aircraft, which I was 
the lead speaker. We gathered aviation manufacturers, airline 
operators, and aircraft inspection agencies from every nation in the 
world that had commercial aviation operation.

                              {time}  1500

  And out of that conference resulted a number of recommendations which 
we crafted together in a bill that my then partner on the Aviation 
Subcommittee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Clinger, and I moved 
through subcommittee, full committee, to the House floor and through to 
enactment.
  The language reads: The administrator of the Federal Aviation 
Administration shall prescribe regulations that ensure the continuing 
airworthiness of aging aircraft. The regulations prescribed shall at 
least require that the administrator make inspections and review the 
maintenance and other records of each aircraft and air carrier used to 
provide air transportation that the administrator decides may be 
necessary to enable the administrator to decide whether the aircraft is 
in safe condition and maintained properly for operation and air 
transportation.
  The air carrier shall at least demonstrate that as part of the 
inspection, maintenance of the aircraft's age, sensitive parts and 
components has been adequate and timely enough to ensure the highest 
degree of safety. And work performed under this section shall be 
carried out after the 14th year in which the aircraft has been in 
service.
  That was not just a happenstance. It was a very specific directive 
dealing with high time aircraft, a very specific directive to the FAA 
and to airlines to undertake this rigorous inspection. The FAA failed 
to maintain that level of vigilance. The air carrier failed to maintain 
its level of vigilance. And on some of those aircraft, there were found 
to be small cracks. But it's those small cracks that led to failures, 
the small cracks that led to life lost.
  In another instance, the power control unit on 737 aircraft, 
something happened to an aircraft to cause the flight deck crew to lose 
control of that aircraft when the rudder made an uncommanded movement. 
And 137 people died in Pennsylvania. In the investigation conducted by 
the National Transportation Safety Board pursuant to the accident, it 
was found that this very small unit, this big, had failed. Up to that 
time, there had been 93 million hours of operation of 737s, and Boeing 
Company said, we haven't had any failures. But when the NTSB looked 
back in the record of other unexplained accidents, they were traced to 
this power

[[Page 15648]]

control unit which was subsequently redesigned and retested under the 
extreme conditions that aircraft fly at high altitudes and rebuilt and 
reinstalled and a vigorous airworthiness directive put in place to 
require periodic inspections of the power control unit. Those 
inspections were missed. And the airlines involved, having missed the 
deadline, had to go back, take those aircraft out of service and 
inspect those parts. That is what we're talking about, vigilance at the 
highest possible level.
  And I have seen a situation where in safety, a very comfortable 
relationship can exist between the overseer and the practitioner of 
safety. To say, as we do in the Congress, to say as we do about other 
members of the executive branch, that you must move around from one 
position to another in the executive branch, and we say to those who 
leave service, leave the Federal public service, ``you cannot come back 
and lobby the Congress for a period of time'' is an already established 
practice. To say that in a period of 2 years, a person who leaves the 
FAA to go work elsewhere outside of government, is not to say to that 
person that your service is not valued. We just want to make sure 
you're not using it to a contrary purpose to that which the person had 
served for all those years.
  We only in this language prevent that person from working for the 
carrier they once oversaw. I think that is a reasonable step. It is one 
recommended by the Inspector General. I think it is in the best 
interest of safety to do this. It is in the best interest of safety to 
continue the Air Transportation Oversight System, ATOS, where airlines 
and manufacturers are engaged in developing trend lines, by watching 
these trend lines where we know and see certain things happening and 
take action before there is a failure and before there is a 
catastrophe, to prevent a tragedy. ATOS is a very good system. But it 
should not be transformed into one in which the airline is in the 
command position. There is a proper balance. And I think this 
legislation will bring the FAA back into proper balance.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MICA. I yield myself such time as I might consume.
  Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, as we conclude the debate on H.R. 
6493, which makes changes to the way we conduct FAA airline inspections 
and how we make certain that we have the safest aviation system 
possible, I believe that it is important to point out just a couple of 
things. First of all, since November of 2001, there has not been a 
single large passenger aircraft fatality in the United States. We have 
had several commuter airlines, smaller aircraft, I know at least one in 
Charlotte, another in Lexington, and any loss of life in any size 
aircraft is not acceptable. Some of those did not relate to the 
inspection. The reasons for the air crash or fatalities was not as a 
result of inspections or the procedures we have before us today.
  What we do have historically is again instituted a self-reporting 
system, probably a half a dozen years ago we shifted to this system. We 
do collect that data. That data is supposed to be acted upon by 
inspectors on a risk base. So we look at the data where there is a 
problem. And that is where we put our resources to make certain that 
the aircraft is operating, inspected and mechanically sound. And that 
has worked fairly well.
  We have, again, to reiterate what I said before, the committee did 
investigate when whistle-blowers came to us. We found an instance or 
instances of this cozy relationship, and we felt that we should take 
some steps to first eliminate sort of the revolving door, stop the 
revolving door, put some time between those that worked for the FAA and 
then going out to the airlines, and also instituting some other 
protective measures.
  Now I must say that even when the inspector general of the Department 
of Transportation investigated what was going on and what we found, 
they did not find the problem systemic. What they did say was that the 
data that was being collected on which we based our inspections and 
assessed risk was not adequately being adhered to. That data and the 
information was not being adhered to by all levels of FAA, for example, 
management, and eventually the Congress. So we also changed in this 
bill the recommendation that the inspector general made when they found 
that, again, the problem wasn't just the revolving door, but paying 
attention to the red flags and the signals that were being sent by the 
data.
  So this is a good bill. This is a bipartisan effort to take a safe 
system, make it even safer, make certain that those warning signs are 
paid attention to both by FAA at all levels, inspectors, managers in 
this self-reporting system, and also by Congress who has the ultimate 
responsibility.
  Also, I might say that how did this affect folks? Well, when Congress 
started to say we weren't properly inspecting or there were conflicts, 
FAA said, we're going to give you inspections. And they did give us 
inspections. And we closed down thousands of flights. And hundreds of 
thousands of people paid the price. And the airlines paid the price to 
make sure that zero tolerance was applied and that we did inspect those 
planes. But that is not exactly what we want to happen in the future.
  H.R. 6493 will help us to avoid any future mass airlines groundings 
like the ones we saw this spring and the horrible inconveniences 
suffered by hundreds of thousands of people in the traveling public. 
This is an important bill that will ensure our national aviation system 
remains the safest in the world and that FAA provides the proper 
oversight of airlines and their maintenance programs that are so 
important to that safety.
  I commend Chairman Oberstar, Mr. Costello, Mr. Petri, who is not with 
us, our ranking member, the staffs that worked on both sides. This is a 
good bill. I support it. It will make a good system even better.
  And I think with that, Mr. Speaker, to assist the House in moving 
forward with the business of the day, I will yield back the balance of 
my time.
  Mr. OBERSTAR. I yield myself the balance of our time. And I will not 
take all of whatever time remains.
  An observation, and I appreciate the remarks of the gentleman from 
Florida, committing himself and the committee as a whole to vigorous 
oversight of safety. It is a good record, as the gentleman said, in air 
carrier safety over the last few years. What I have learned in my 
experience with safety in aviation, highways, railways, waterways and 
airways, is that that safety is just around the corner from the next 
accident. And while it may have been an inconvenience for passengers 
for the airlines to pull aircraft out of service, it's a horrible 
inconvenience to be dead or injured because of an airline accident. Had 
the airlines been conducting their inspections appropriately, 
vigorously and in keeping with the airworthiness directives in the time 
frames envisioned, it would not have had to pull these aircrafts out of 
service to do major inspections in blocks, as was done this spring. And 
as the gentleman from Florida said, this legislation, enacted, carried 
out by the FAA, will make sure that aviation stays on a steady path of 
constancy in oversight of aviation safety. That is what we want. That 
is the objective of this legislation. It is the continuity of 
inspection and of oversight of the air carriers who have the prime 
responsibility to maintain their aircraft in safe, airworthy condition.
  And that is what we will achieve when we get this legislation enacted 
into law. I'm very hopeful that the other body will act promptly on 
this legislation, that it will be signed and carried out vigorously by 
the FAA and reestablish its standing in the world community, which 
looks to the United States to set and maintain the gold standard for 
aviation safety.
  Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in 
strong support of H.R. 6493--The Aviation Safety Enhancement Act of 
2008.
  Mr. Speaker, as many of us know, FAA's stated mission is ``to provide 
the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world.''
  Regrettably, recent aircraft groundings and flight cancellations by 
our Nation's air carriers to ensure compliance with safety directives

[[Page 15649]]

calls into question whether or not the principal Agency charged with 
protecting the flying public is living up to its mission.
  I think it goes without saying that over the years, the standing of 
our Nation's aviation system as one of the safest in the world can be 
directly attributed to the diligent efforts of dedicated inspection and 
maintenance personnel.
  However, these respective personnel are only as good as their 
managerial and operational framework, and according to the U.S. Office 
of Special Counsel and our own Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee's Oversight and Investigations staff, serious flaws exist 
within the management of FAA's safety inspection framework.
  In a letter dated December 20, 2007, to Department of Transportation 
Secretary Mary Peters outlining allegations of two FAA inspectors, now 
known as the whistleblowers, the U.S. Office of Special Counsel states, 
``The whistleblowers allege that safety and adherence to regulatory 
compliance have taken a back seat to personal friendships and favors at 
the Southwest Certificate Management Office.
  They have disclosed serious allegations of a compromise of the public 
safety mission at FAA. ``Even in the face of investigations 
substantiating wrongdoing and safety breaches [with respect to the ADs] 
FAA does not appear to have held management and safety inspectors 
appropriately accountable for their actions and inaction. The 
information disclosed by [the whistleblowers] reveals a substantial 
likelihood that serious safety concerns persist in the management and 
operation of the inspection and maintenance programs at FAA.''
  Mr. Speaker, this type of behavior is simply unacceptable and 
warrants a complete overhaul of how the FAA goes about its business of 
safety inspections and over-reliance on Voluntary Disclosure Reporting 
Programs. H.R. 6493 is a step in this direction.
  The bill establishes an Aviation Safety Whistleblower Investigation 
Office with an independent Director; modifies the Agency's customer 
service initiative; imposes post-employment on FAA inspectors; 
restricts the time a principal maintenance inspector may oversee a 
single carrier; and increases scrutiny of the Agency's air transport 
oversight system database.
  When it comes to the proper adherence to safety protocols, FAA should 
be in the business of zero tolerance. If a plane is out of compliance 
for whatever reason, it should be grounded until it comes into 
compliance--period.
  Yes, the American economy is dependent on the movement of people and 
goods, but this movement should not and cannot come at the expense of 
safety. Given the current, delicate nature of the airline industry, I 
cannot imagine that there exists a single airline executive in this 
country that would sanction the operation of a noncompliant or unsafe 
plane.
  As I close I want to thank the leadership of the Aviation 
Subcommittee, in addition to the leadership of the Full Committee for 
advancing this vital piece of legislation to the floor.
  Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Speaker, today, we are considering H.R. 6493, the 
Aviation Safety Enhancement Act of 2008.
  This important legislation was introduced in a bipartisan manner and 
I want to thank Chairman Oberstar and Ranking Members Mica and Petri 
for working with me on this legislation.
  The United States has the safest air transportation system in the 
world; however, I have said time and again, we must not become 
complacent about our past success.
  The Committee's April 3 hearing on the failure of the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) to properly oversee air carrier 
maintenance programs demonstrates the need for this Committee to ensure 
vigorous oversight by the FAA to maintain the highest level of safety.
  Following the April 3 hearing, the Department of Transportation 
Inspector General (DOT IG) made several recommendations to the FAA to 
ensure proper safety oversight. The FAA's reluctance to accept the IG's 
recommendations, including establishing an independent entity within 
the FAA to review FAA employee safety concerns and rotating certain 
safety inspectors to ensure objective safety oversight is unacceptable. 
That is why I strongly support H.R. 6493, which establishes an 
independent Aviation Safety Whistleblower Investigation Office within 
the FAA; rotates principal supervisory inspectors every 5 years; 
mandates modification to FAA's customer service initiative; and 
requires monthly reviews of the FAA's Air Transportation Oversight 
System (ATOS) database. H.R. 6493 is a positive first step to ensure 
that FAA maintains safety as its highest priority.
  In my capacity as Chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee, I have 
noticed a pattern with the FAA--the FAA is a reactive agency--not a 
proactive agency. We have seen it in the area of runway safety; 
improving conditions at our air traffic control facilities; congestion 
and delays at our airports and in the sky; and now in safety oversight.
  It is a continuous pattern--the FAA only acts when pushed into action 
by the Aviation Subcommittee or the Full Committee. It is my hope that 
H.R. 6493 spurs the FAA to be proactive instead of reactive and make 
the necessary changes to ensure effective oversight of our Nation's 
aviation system. The American traveling public deserves no less.
  With that, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 6493.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 6493, the Aviation 
Safety Enhancement Act.
  Over the last few years we have heard a number of disturbing reports 
that the Federal Aviation Administration, FAA, is failing in its 
mandate to ensure the safety of airline passengers. Last year we 
discovered that the FAA had allowed Southwest Airlines to fly 117 
planes that had not received their mandatory inspections. We learned of 
two near midair collisions at Newark Airport in my home state of New 
Jersey. In meetings with Air Traffic Controllers I have been told that 
these near misses were caused by pilot confusion over last minute and 
unpublished route changes by the FAA. Rather than address serious 
concerns about the safety of our nation's air travelers, the FAA has 
attempted to hide these complaints and issues. In some of these cases, 
the FAA has retaliated against whistleblowers who disclosed these 
issues and the number of whistleblower protection claims filed by FAA 
employees has tripled over the last year.
  It is difficult to overstate how important whistleblowers are in the 
policy process. They are often the human face that confirms the 
existence of a tangible, even life-threatening problem in a federal 
agency. Bush Administration officials threatened Jack Spadaro, the 
former head of the National Mine Health and Safety Academy, MSHA, with 
the loss of his job when he tried to investigate a mining accident that 
occurred in 2000. In 2005, the Forest Service fired Douglas Parker, a 
40 year employee of the service, after he filed a whistleblower 
complaint about the improper use of pesticides across several forests 
in New Mexico and Arizona. Fredrick Whitehurst, a long-time FBI bomb 
residue expert, filed whistleblower complaints after he pointed out 
major problems in the FBI's crime lab. I could go on at length about 
these kinds of cases, but I think you get my point. Outside of the 
national security community, protecting whistleblowers is perhaps more 
important in the transportation sector than anywhere else. If the FAA 
is being too cozy with industry and pressuring maintenance personnel to 
reduce the number of violations they cite among the carriers, we need 
to know that so we can stop it. If the FAA is trying to implement a 
dangerous and inadequately tested national air traffic pattern change 
and air traffic controllers believe people will die as a result, we 
need to know that so we can stop it. This legislation would help us to 
do that.
  Among its provisions, H.R. 6493 would create an independent office of 
Aviation Safety Whistleblower Protection within the FAA. This office 
would be responsible for receiving complaints and information from FAA 
and airline employees about possible violations of safety regulations, 
federal laws, and standards. This office would allow FAA and airline 
employees to disclose anonymously their safety concerns without fear of 
retaliation.
  Mr. OBERSTAR. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar) that the House suspend the 
rules and pass the bill, H.R. 6493, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the 
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be 
postponed.

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