[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 154 (2008), Part 11]
[House]
[Pages 15243-15266]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1343 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 5959.

                              {time}  1313


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 5959) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Salazar in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.
  The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the gentleman from Michigan 
(Mr. Hoekstra) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, intelligence is critical to every decision affecting 
America's national security. Whether the challenge is learning the 
intentions of our Nation's adversaries or detecting the location of the 
next roadside IED in Iraq, America needs a well-resourced and well-
managed intelligence community.

                              {time}  1315

  This committee's primary responsibilities are to authorize funds for 
the intelligence agencies, to conduct vigorous oversight over their 
operations and to ensure that those operations are effective, legal and 
an appropriate use of taxpayer money.
  Mr. Chairman, this afternoon I want to thank my colleague, Mr. 
Hoekstra, the gentleman from Michigan, for working with me in a 
bipartisan fashion to bring this bill to the floor. I also want to 
thank the staffs on both sides of the aisle for the great work that 
they have done to bring this bill to the floor today.
  This year, as in years past, I have gone to the front lines to see 
our courageous intelligence professionals perform their jobs. They do 
this quietly, often without recognition or praise. Many spend time away 
from their families, often in very dangerous situations and under very 
dangerous conditions. This bill is the tangible sign of our support for 
the women and men of our America's intelligence agencies.
  We're providing robust funding for our most important priorities 
including HUMINT, language capabilities and technical capabilities.
  Our principal concern continues to be that al Qaeda is stronger today 
than at any time since September 11, 2001. Osama bin Laden and his key 
deputies remain at large. But al Qaeda is not the only terrorist group 
that has gained strength. Over the past 7 years, Hezbollah and Hamas 
have become more capable and even more determined. Dangerous states, 
including Syria, are pursuing nuclear capabilities. There is the 
possibility that one of these states, or even a rogue scientist, could 
transfer fissile material to a terrorist group. This must remain our 
foremost priority and our top concern.
  This bill invests in people, our most precious resource. It adds 
funding to enhance human intelligence collection, not only for 
counterterrorism, but also for enduring and emerging global security 
issues, such as challenges that we face in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, to name a few. This bill also contains a number of provisions 
that promote greater accountability, including the creation of a new 
Inspector General for the intelligence community.
  Our bill will improve language capabilities in the intelligence 
community by adding funding for speakers of critical languages and 
requiring reports to Congress to evaluate progress in this perennial 
problem area. The bill also mandates implementation of security 
clearance reform to make it easier for first and second generation 
Americans, many of whom have critical language skills, to serve in the 
intelligence community with proper clearances.
  I mentioned earlier that one of the responsibilities of this 
committee is oversight. Yet this administration has repeatedly failed 
to comply with the National Security Act of 1947, which mandates that 
our committee be ``fully and currently informed'' of all the 
intelligence activities from the administration. This bill enhances 
congressional oversight by ensuring that the committee receives the 
information that it needs to perform its inherent oversight function.
  Working on a bipartisan basis, our committee adopted two provisions 
to enhance reporting on intelligence activities to the full membership 
of the congressional intelligence committees. One provision would 
restrict 75 percent of all covert action funds until the full 
membership of the intelligence committees is briefed on all covert 
actions in effect as of April 24, 2008. A second provision would 
restrict the administration's attempts to brief only the chairman and 
ranking member and clarifies which information must be reported to our 
full committee.
  This legislation also authorizes much of the requests for the 
foundational activities of the cybersecurity initiative, but it also 
expresses the committee's serious concerns about potential policy, 
implementation and governance issues. Our committee is also concerned 
that Congress does not have a comprehensive understanding of the 
magnitude of human and fiscal intelligence resources that have been 
devoted to Iraq, possibly at the expense of fighting the war on terror. 
H.R. 5959 requires a detailed report to our committee on this very 
topic.
  The bill also addresses a number of long-term technical challenges in 
the intelligence community. It does so by adding significant resources 
to modernize signals intelligence capabilities and integrate them into 
the global enterprise.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, despite the size of the budget request, the 
administration did not include funds adequate to keep the U.S. 
intelligence community competitive in advanced technologies. Research 
and development funding is our Nation's investment in maintaining our 
edge in state of the art technologies. Our bill adds funds to four 
agencies specifically for that purpose. And the committee urges the 
executive branch to sustain, if not increase, this level of funding in 
future budgets.
  In our markup, Mr. Chairman, the committee adopted a number of 
amendments offered by both the majority and minority members. One of 
those important amendments, crafted with bipartisan cooperation, will 
prevent CIA contractors from engaging in interrogations unless the 
Director of National Intelligence provides a waiver.
  Our goal is to put this committee back in the authorization business 
by getting a bill to the President's desk that he can sign. To do that, 
we can't tackle every single important issue in this one bill. But if 
we fail to pass this bill, we risk eroding Congress' ability to 
strengthen and oversee intelligence

[[Page 15244]]

operations that are vital to American national security.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield myself as much time 
as I shall consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the annual Intelligence Authorization Act is one of the 
most important bills that the House passes each year. It provides and 
allocates resources critical to national security programs that are the 
front lines of America's defense and foreign policies and, most 
critically, work to detect, prevent and disrupt potential terrorist 
attacks against the American people. The bill is also essential to 
ensure close and effective congressional oversight of the intelligence 
community.
  There are issues that remain to be worked out as the legislative 
process continues. But I appreciate the work that Chairman Reyes has 
done to avoid many of the contentious items that have recently 
prevented the enactment of an intelligence authorization bill. And I 
appreciate that the bill reflects areas of consensus on critical 
national security issues.
  I believe that this bill is strong in two areas. First, it was 
significantly improved by seven Republican amendments that were adopted 
on a bipartisan basis to address what I believe are important issues in 
priorities facing the intelligence community. Among these, the 
committee adopted my amendment to remove all earmarks from the bill, a 
significant step forward. Our intelligence program should be based on 
only one primary consideration, what best ensures that the intelligence 
community is able to do its job in the interest of the national 
security of the United States.
  The committee adopted an amendment offered by my colleague from 
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) to limit the size and unintended bureaucratic 
growth of the Office of the DNI, the Director of National Intelligence. 
The bill also includes another amendment by Congressman Rogers to 
require a high-level strategic evaluation of the FBI's progress in 
transforming its FBI's intelligence capabilities. This process may not 
be moving forward fast enough to accomplish the needed changes and 
needs close attention.
  The bill is also strengthened by significant provisions to improve 
congressional oversight of the intelligence community and the executive 
branch which addressed issues I have repeatedly raised since serving as 
chairman of the committee. These include provisions to clarify that 
each member of the Intelligence Committee must be fully and currently 
briefed on current activities. Again, I'm pleased that we're able to 
take and improve this oversight on a bipartisan basis. Republicans and 
Democrats on the committee both believe that we need this information 
to be able to effectively do our job. Some work remains to be done to 
smooth this out. But we have taken the right steps to move this 
forward. I appreciate the chairman's work to develop this framework for 
this important reform.
  I understand and he understands that the executive branch may not 
like enhanced oversight and that they have expressed their concern 
about the provisions of the bill that strengthen the oversight process, 
including congressional notification, increased reporting and auditing. 
But there is no single current issue on which there is stronger 
bipartisan consensus on the committee than our concern that the 
administration is not fulfilling its statutory duty to keep each member 
of the committee fully and currently informed with respect to certain 
intelligence matters.
  In the past year alone, I joined with Chairman Reyes to call on the 
President to brief the members of the committee with respect to 
intelligence regarding the al Kibar facility in Syria. The full 
committee was not briefed until the day the information was 
subsequently disclosed to the public. The committee was briefed months 
too late, and we received the information after the media did. On 
another matter, the administration has refused to brief all members of 
the committee even though it has briefed five members of the committee 
staff. It is clear that reforms are necessary.
  In addition to these legislative provisions, I believe that the 
classified annex adequately supports our needs in important areas such 
as human intelligence collection and contains additional provisions to 
enhance oversight. While I may not agree with each of the specific 
authorizations, on balance the classified portion of the bill generally 
reflects consensus on the programmatic requirements needed to protect 
our national security.
  Despite these areas of consensus, I must point out that I have 
concerns with parts of the bill and the action of the Rules Committee 
not to make certain important amendments in order. I'm disappointed 
with certain provisions relating to national intelligence space 
systems. Certain levels of funding fall short, and the bill fails to 
stimulate a sense of urgency in overhead architecture and shortfalls. 
In certain areas, it mandates technical solutions without a complete 
analysis.
  I also have concern with what I believe is an unnecessarily complex 
and unwieldy provision to create a new Inspector General of the 
intelligence community. While I support the enhancement of oversight 
for community-wide issues, this provision would significantly duplicate 
existing efforts and further grow the size of the DNI bureaucracy. I 
hope that we can continue to improve the bill as it moves through the 
process. I also hope that we can work to address concerns that have 
been raised by the intelligence community with respect to section 425 
of the bill concerning the use of contractors.
  Finally, I need to express my strong concern that the Rules Committee 
did not make in order an amendment I submitted that would prevent funds 
authorizing the bill from being used to transfer Guantanamo detainees 
to the United States. This provision should not be necessary. I believe 
that the public consensus that trained terrorists should not be brought 
into the American cities should be clear and overwhelming. However, 
there is a significant possibility that lawyers may try to argue that 
trained terrorist detainees should be released on American streets. 
This would be judicial activism at its worst, unsupported by either 
clear legal precedent or statutory authority. Congress must send a 
clear message immediately on this critical issue. We may have the 
opportunity to do that later today.
  On balance, this bill is a workable bill. It needs to be improved. 
And I look forward to seeing exactly how the amendments process moves 
forward through the day.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, it is now my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to 
the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer) who serves as chairman of our 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. May I add, Mr. Chairman, 
that on a personal note, I'm privileged and proud to have served with 
Mr. Cramer on the Intelligence Committee for about 8 years. This is his 
last authorization bill. He will be retiring at the end of this 
Congress. So I just wanted to thank the gentleman for his service and 
for his work. He has never stopped working up to the very end here in 
his last term.
  Thank you, Mr. Cramer, for your great work.
  Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for those kind words.
  I, too, have enjoyed almost every minute of service on this 
Intelligence Committee. I say to Mr. Hoekstra, as well, the years that 
we put in together trying to steer through post 9/11, the struggles of 
holding the agencies' feet to the fire but at the same time forcing 
them to change, to do things differently to protect this country in a 
more unified way, it has been extremely rewarding to see both sides 
come together.

                              {time}  1330

  I wanted to use my time today to say that I stand in strong support 
of H.R. 5959 because I think this edition of the intelligence 
authorization bill does the same thing, and that is it forces the 
agencies to be more efficient, it forces

[[Page 15245]]

them to work together, and at the same time it is providing our men and 
women around this world the resources that they need to do an even 
better job of protecting us.
  I am particularly concerned about our access to space. It is in the 
national interest of the United States to have domestic capability for 
assured access to space. So as this bill proceeds forward, I hope we 
will make sure that while we are performing oversight and we are 
forcing the agencies to become more efficient, to consolidate what they 
do, that we don't throw the baby out with the bath water.
  I know my colleague from Alabama, Terry Everett, who is going to 
speak in a few minutes as well, has been particularly concerned about 
the access to space issue. My colleague, the gentleman from Alabama 
(Mr. Everett) is leaving the committee as well, so Alabama loses one on 
each side after this Congress.
  Mr. Everett, I want to say that the people of Alabama and the people 
of this country are proud of your career here in the United States 
Congress. We are proud in north Alabama of our partnership with you. 
And as I have watched you through the committee process bring the 
access to space issues to the forefront, this country is a better place 
because of your service here.
  I also want to thank my colleagues. We work hard in cramped, 
windowless rooms to make sure that the agencies answer the questions 
that we want our constituents to have answered. They come sometimes to 
the committee kicking and screaming, but I am proud of the work you do.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to extend my congratulations 
to Mr. Cramer on his retirement. We are going to miss you in the 
committee, Mr. Cramer. Alabama is going to lose two great Members of 
Congress, two members who have helped make the Intelligence Committee a 
better committee, who have studied the issues. We will miss you and 
wish you well, but I am sure we will see you again. Thank you for the 
work and effort you have put on the committee.
  My colleague, the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Everett) is also going 
to be leaving. I am not sure what the folks in Alabama have put in the 
water this year, but they are drinking the same thing and have decided 
to retire. Again, Mr. Everett has also contributed a tremendous amount 
of time, energy and effort in learning the issues of the Intelligence 
Committee and making sure that the work we do on the committee is a 
bipartisan effort, coordinated with the efforts in the Armed Services 
Committee to make sure that the Intelligence Committee and the Armed 
Services Committee are moving in the same direction and doing the 
things that are necessary to keep America safe.
  At this time I would like to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Alabama (Mr. Everett).
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I thank Mr. Hoekstra and Mr. Cramer. I can 
assure the American people that knowing the members on both sides of 
the aisle who serve on the Intelligence Committee and the staff who 
supports them, even though two Alabamians are leaving, the Nation will 
still be safe and in good hands.
  I do rise in support of the Fiscal Year 2009 Intelligence 
Authorization Act. The process for this year's bill was much improved 
over last year; so for that, I thank my friend and chairman, Silvestre 
Reyes, and our ranking member, Mr. Hoekstra. It has been 3 years since 
we have had an intelligence authorization bill, and that has created a 
void in many important policy areas and in programmatic guidance for 
the intelligence community.
  It is critical that we get a bill passed through the House and Senate 
that can be signed by the President, and I hope that can be 
accomplished before we adjourn this year.
  I have a number of concerns about the bill, some of which have been 
detailed in the minority views of the committee report, but I would 
like to focus on a few of the joint programs that have military 
application as well.
  With regard to the national security space systems, the bill falls 
short of fully addressing problems in our overhead architecture. As the 
report notes, ``National security space systems have been and will 
continue to be a cornerstone of the Nation's intelligence collection 
capability.''
  As Mr. Hoekstra pointed out, critical national security space systems 
are not properly funded in conjunction with a complete programmatic 
analysis that shows a way forward. This can be addressed and hopefully 
will be addressed in conference with the Senate.
  As I wind down my career in Congress, this will be my last 
intelligence authorization work. The work we do here is fascinating and 
important to our national security, and I am pleased to have been a 
part of this for the past 6 years. As one of the crossover members from 
the House Armed Services Committee, I want to reiterate----
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield my colleague an additional minute.
  Mr. EVERETT. I want to reiterate the importance of having members 
serve simultaneously on both committees. It is especially important to 
have a member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee serve on HPSCI in 
order to maintain a clear understanding of how the shared military and 
intelligence overhead programs operate so that the right hand, Mr. 
Chairman, knows what the left hand is doing.
  I say again I appreciate having served over the years with the 
members of the committee. I urge my colleagues to support this bill. It 
is not perfect, but it is a very good bill and it needs passing.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, before recognizing a very senior and valued 
member of our committee, I wanted to wish my good friend and former 
chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee on Armed Forces well on 
his retirement. I have had the privilege of working with Mr. Everett 
since I have been in Congress on Armed Services and also on 
Intelligence. I know how much he cares about the issues that affect our 
national security, and so I want to wish him well in his retirement as 
well.
  Good luck, Terry.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Eshoo), a senior member of our committee, who serves as the 
chairwoman of our Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management.
  Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I want to salute the chairman of our 
committee for his superb leadership and caring so much about not only 
the issues of intelligence but everyone that is a part of the 
intelligence community. I want to thank all of the marvelous staff on 
the majority and minority side, and I salute the ranking member of the 
committee as well.
  This is a tough committee to serve on. People don't know what we are 
talking about. We do it in secret. We really can't talk to our 
colleagues very much about it. And yet we make some of the weightiest 
decisions that any Members of Congress would make because we deal with 
what is the most important issue, and that is our national security, 
the protection of the American people and giving the intelligence 
community, making the choices to give the intelligence community all 
the tools it needs in order to function and protect the American people 
and that we weigh and balance and always know that we are working under 
the Constitution of the United States of America. So this is really 
where the rubber meets the road.
  I support the bill. Just like all of the other bills we deal with, 
there are pluses and minuses. I am very pleased that there are no 
earmarks in this bill. That is the first time since I came onto the 
committee that that is the case. I am very glad that 75 percent of the 
dollars for covert action have been fenced. In other words, no 
notification from the administration and from the intelligence 
community, no money. And that's the way it should be because the 
American people expect us to verify. They expect us to know and then we 
can take action. We have to do oversight.
  For the first time in the history of our country, we have brought 
together

[[Page 15246]]

a National Intelligence Assessment on global climate change and the 
effect it will have on national security. I am very proud of the work 
we have been able to do on that.
  For the first time there will be an inspector general in the 
intelligence community; and the administration, believe it or not, is 
still fighting that. Imagine having an inspector general, independent 
oversight of the intelligence community. I think that's a darn good 
idea and I hope it will prevail and that the President changes his mind 
on this.
  We still have a lot of work to do to have more human intelligence in 
countries where we need them. We have a lot of work to do on black 
prison sites, the operation of them by the CIA and renditions. But with 
that, Mr. Chairman, I want to commend especially Congressman Bud Cramer 
for the magnificent, honest work he has done on the Intelligence 
Committee and here in the Congress and wish him well, and Mr. Everett, 
too.
  I ask my colleagues to support the bill. It has good things and it 
has some other things that are missing. But overall, I think it is a 
bill worth supporting.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3 
minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry), a member of the 
committee.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the ranking member for 
yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, this is not the intelligence authorization bill that I 
would have written exactly, but I think it is important to start out by 
thanking the chairman and the ranking member for taking some risk to 
have a bipartisan bill that can have support from both sides of the 
aisle. That is unfortunately fairly rare in this Chamber to be able to 
work together on something that is important, especially in national 
security, and yet that has happened here.
  Intelligence is very important for our country's security. In many 
ways it is the first line of defense. Certainly all our other national 
security efforts depend upon intelligence. And so working together in a 
bipartisan way, even being willing to take some risks to have a bill 
with bipartisan support, means we can't have everything we want, but we 
will work together in order to move this bill forward.
  Secondly, I think it is important to acknowledge the enormous 
influence of three retiring Members, three Members retiring from 
Congress after this Congress: the gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. 
Wilson) whose personal military background, intelligence, and nature of 
her district has made her a leader on many issues, especially in the 
area of technical collection; the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Everett) 
with whom I serve on the Armed Services Committee, and we have worked 
on many issues, but no one is as knowledgeable and passionate about the 
issue of space and space policy as the gentleman from Alabama; and then 
the other gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer), he and I were partners 
in the last Congress when for the first time this Congress stood up an 
oversight subcommittee just also as we were beginning to implement the 
Intelligence Reform Act. The gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer) is one 
of those fairly rare Members who always asks what is in the best 
interest of the country first, and it will be a significant loss to 
this Congress and to the country upon his retirement.
  Mr. Chairman, there are a number of commonsense reforms in this bill 
that may not make headlines. One of the issues Mr. Cramer and I have 
worked on, for example, in the past is how can we measure improvement 
in intelligence, for example, in foreign language capability. There are 
some specific provisions in this bill which do help us have specific 
measurements so we can tell whether we are increasing our capability, 
not just as far as numbers of people but in their fluency in specific 
languages. That is absolutely critical for the purpose of intelligence. 
And yet even for something like that, it is hard for any of us to 
measure whether we are making the improvements that need to be made.
  Making sure that any administration gives this committee the 
information we deserve to do our job is a challenge. This bill deserves 
support.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, it is now my privilege to yield 2 minutes to 
the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) who serves as the 
chairman of our Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence and 
who proudly represents NSA which is in his district.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support H.R. 5959. I 
would first like to thank Chairman Reyes and Ranking Member Hoekstra 
for their leadership in helping us put together a good bipartisan bill. 
I also am going to miss Bud Cramer, Terry Everett, and Heather Wilson. 
We have all worked well together on this committee. You will be missed.
  I ask my colleagues to vote for this bill because it supports the men 
and women who work within the intelligence community. The National 
Security Agency, the NSA, is headquartered in my district. I personally 
know that NSA's employees work very hard to ensure our Nation's 
security.

                              {time}  1345

  We must continue to invest in the people and resources necessary to 
make our intelligence community effective. Intelligence is the best 
defense against terrorism.
  This bill advances the Cybersecurity Initiative to protect our 
computer networks, a very important issue that we will be dealing with 
in the future, cybersecurity attacks. We know now that certain 
countries are attacking the United States of America through the 
Internet.
  Two, it increases research and development so that we can maintain 
our technical advantage; and, three, invests in both satellite and 
airborne collection and in the systems needed to process, exploit and 
distribute this data.
  The intelligence community faces enduring technical challenges, but 
this bill provides our people, who are our most important asset, with 
the tools they need to do their jobs well. In order to protect our 
country from threats from countries such as China and Russia, we must 
continue to invest heavily in science and technology.
  This bill lays the foundation for the future and communicates areas 
of concern to current intelligence leaders and the next Presidential 
administration.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bill and the important work of 
the intelligence community.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3 
minutes to my colleague from the State of Michigan (Mr. Rogers) who was 
successful in the committee in passing two important amendments to 
improve this bill.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I thank the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. Chairman, thank you very, very much for working in such a 
bipartisan way. I often think after some of our most spirited meetings 
in the Intelligence Committee, where we have passionate, civil debates, 
how proud, really, America would be that all of us on both sides of the 
aisle give all of ourselves to the right outcome on these bills. I want 
to thank you for allowing that debate to happen in committee.
  To Mr. Thompson, I have enjoyed working with you on the committee, 
and I think we have done some great things in a bipartisan way.
  Mr. Chairman, this is one of those bills that while I think both 
sides probably would have had a few things different, but because we 
committed ourselves to put the country first and bipartisanship as our 
final goal and what works for America, you have a package here that I 
think sends a great message to the most important group that this bill 
will impact, and that's the men and women who risk their lives every 
single day trying to make sure we have the best intelligence to our war 
fighters, to our police officers, and to keep this country safe. For 
all of that, to the staffs on both sides, thank you very much.
  I want to bring your attention to two particular issues. There are a 
lot of great things in here to think about.

[[Page 15247]]

  One is the FBI policy. Thank you again for working with us on what I 
think is a growing problem with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and this, I think, was the first signal we need to get a handle on it. 
The FBI implemented an ``up or out'' policy for its supervisors that 
was supposed to allow new people in and promote the supervisory special 
agents, people who had over years developed a Rolodex where they could 
call the local police chiefs, work with the local community, get to 
know and understand and gain the trust of these local communities.
  We have hustled them out after 5 years. They may be the best 
performing supervisory agents the Bureau has ever had, but when the 
clock runs out, you're done.
  In that policy, we have lost half. Almost 290 supervisory special 
agents have left management in the FBI, retired, stepped down, quit, 
whatever they have decided to do that wasn't in their interest or their 
family's interest, because of this policy.
  I can think of no policy that discriminates against half of your 
management that we would call successful at a time where we need 
experience to guide these new agents, which are about half of them, by 
the way, are fairly new, I think under 5 years or 7 years, something 
like that. We have tried to work with the Director and say this is the 
wrong approach, this is a punishment approach. You have great men and 
women committing themselves to these careers, dedicating themselves to 
these supervisory positions. We need to reward them, not punish them.
  We have tried to set up a housing policy to entice them. Three years, 
longer than 3 years, even after the agreement from the Director, we 
have been working on this to no avail. It has gone nowhere. Instead, 
they continue to say this is a policy that works.
  They are separating themselves from the field, and it's dangerous. 
Over the last 2 weeks I bet I have talked to a dozen agents, some in 
supervisory roles, others who are not, who are impacted by their 
supervisors either leaving or new ones being hired, 12 agents, 100 
percent unanimity. This is a bad and dangerous plan for the future of 
the FBI.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield an additional minute to my colleague.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I think that this is an issue that we have to 
even pay more attention to. This is an important step to regain the 
confidence of the FBI and its leadership. It has to happen. Thanks for 
your leadership on it.
  Lastly, I just want to talk about the DNI, the Director of National 
Intelligence. I have worked with Mr. Thompson on this. We have spent a 
lot of time understanding this. Our concerns are real, and the 
intelligence community concerns are real.
  We created this new organization. Its job was to coordinate, not be 
operational. We have found that it goes well beyond mission creep, and 
it is in mission grasp. It is bloated, it's too big, and it became an 
agency not that supported the decision and calculations of the field, 
but became supported by the field.
  It's a dangerous development in intelligence. I appreciate working 
with you. I know we have a lot more work to do. Congratulations to all 
on a bill that will, I think and believe, keep America safer.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I now yield 3 minutes to the chairman of the 
Terrorism, Human Intelligence Analysis and Counterintelligence 
Subcommittee, the gentleman from California (Mr. Thompson).
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. I want to thank both Chairman Reyes and 
Ranking Member Hoekstra for their leadership and making sure we had a 
good bipartisan bill that benefits the people of this great country, 
the staff that worked so hard to make this happen on both sides of the 
aisle, and, in particular, the ranking member of my subcommittee, Mr. 
Rogers, for working together to make this a good bill.
  Human intelligence, or HUMINT, is one of the most difficult but 
effective means of understanding our adversaries' plans and intentions. 
This bill adds funds improve HUMINT collection on counterterrorism and 
other critical national security challenges. It also adds HUMINT 
resources for global challenges, such as the political and humanitarian 
crisis in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The events unfolding in those 
regions demonstrate that we must always have the resources to 
understand these threats.
  The information we collect, however, is only useful if analysts 
translate it into actionable intelligence for policymakers and law 
enforcement. For that reason, this bill provides resources to improve 
intelligence analysis across the entire intelligence community. It also 
authorizes additional personnel to support State and local law 
enforcement so they can better address the challenges of border 
security, counterterrorism and infrastructure protection.
  And the bill also calls for fiscal restraint. As Mr. Rogers 
mentioned, since its creation in 2004, the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence has grown into a bloated bureaucracy that 
hinders, rather than facilitates, intelligence complexes and analysis. 
This bill adds an amendment that Mr. Rogers and I introduced in 
committee that prevents further growth in the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, this legislation provides critical 
intelligence resources for our troops and strengthens oversight of 
intelligence support to the military. Many of us have visited our 
troops in Iraq, and we have seen firsthand that good intelligence saves 
American lives on the battlefield.
  This bill will greatly improve our intelligence capabilities and 
enhance our national security. I urge all my colleagues to support it.
  In closing, I too want to add my name to those who are very 
appreciative and thankful for our friends, Mr. Everett and Mr. Cramer, 
who did a great job on the committee. They were a pleasure to work for, 
they are fine Americans, and we are going to miss them.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3 
minutes to another member of the committee, Mr. McHugh from New York.
  Mr. McHUGH. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  We have heard, I would say to my colleagues repeatedly today, this is 
not a perfect bill. We also should hear that shouldn't be a surprise. 
Rarely on the House floor here have perfect bills been delivered. 
Rather, as I think the Founding Fathers would have intended, we see a 
work in progress.
  This is a bill that started off at a certain place, that came through 
the committee process, and although I may be somewhat prejudiced, I 
firmly believe has been far improved from that starting point through 
that committee process. There have been some seven amendments that I 
think have upgraded it and have put us on the right path.
  I want to say Mr. Chairman, I have enormous respect, enormous 
affection for both the distinguished chairman from the great State of 
Texas, my good friend, Silvestre Reyes, as well as the gentleman from 
Michigan, the distinguished ranking member, who have gone so far in 
working together to make such a difference. There are far, far fewer 
bills that reach this House floor that are more important in this day 
and age for the safety and for the security of the American people.
  I have to tell you I share the distinguished ranking member's 
concerns about the failures of this administration to adequately 
inform, to adequately brief all the Members on both sides of the aisle, 
not just so-called leadership, but all the Members, as to the ongoing 
activities with respect to our intelligence systems throughout this 
world.
  I think that the American people need to be assured that as we go 
forward in these very dangerous and uncertain times that there are 
certain individuals in this House that have, as the law intends, the 
opportunity to be fully informed and make sound judgments about what is 
appropriate and what is not.
  Frankly, as a member of this committee, I am somewhat frustrated by

[[Page 15248]]

the lack of total input, the lack of total briefing that has occurred 
from the administration side, and I look forward to a better day.
  I think tomorrow can help us to further improve this bill. We have 
the opportunity now, through the conference process, to continue to 
improve upon it, to continue to make sure that the end product that we 
send to the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, to the President, is a 
good bill, a bill that in these very challenging moments of our lives 
ensures the American people have the best possible, the most well-
resourced, and the most responsible intelligence activities we can 
possibly have.
  This is a very appropriate start. It deserves our support, and I urge 
all my colleagues to support this bill.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I now yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New Jersey, my colleague, Mr. Rush Holt, who also serves as the 
chairman of the Select Intelligence Oversight Panel.
  Mr. HOLT. I thank the Chair, and I rise in support of the bill.
  The work in the Intelligence Committee is some of the most difficult 
work that goes on here in the House, behind closed doors, necessarily 
with little public input, but we are blessed with a good staff and a 
good chairman. We never forget that our work is about people, about the 
safety of the American people and about the hardworking, brave people 
of the intelligence community.
  H.R. 5959 contains some useful provisions that are designed to 
strengthen congressional oversight. Among these is a fence of 75 
percent of covert action funds, fenced until each member of the House 
and Senate intelligence committees has been fully briefed.
  I think it would be sufficient to say that this administration has 
taken a cavalier attitude toward its legal obligations to keep the 
committees fully and currently informed.
  This bill would require the CIA Inspector General to conduct audits 
of all covert action programs regularly. It would increase critical 
research and development activities and improve foreign language 
capabilities. It would prohibit the use of contractors for CIA detainee 
interrogations.
  It would clarify what ``fully and currently informed'' in the law 
means for briefing Congress so that all information necessary for 
Congress would be provided, and it explicitly requires that all 
committee members be notified in general, not just selected members.
  It requires guidelines for the implementation of a multilevel 
security clearance to increase linguistic and cultural expertise. It 
would require reports on the use of contractors, on workforce 
diversity, on foreign language proficiency, on the protection of 
intelligence officers' identities.
  There are a number of good features. This is a good bill that 
strengthens our oversight of the intelligence community. We do have a 
long way to go to provide the kind of oversight needed after many years 
when the intelligence community got almost every wish, billions of 
dollars with insufficient justification.
  I do support the bill and urge that my colleagues do as well.

                              {time}  1400

  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, at this point in time, I have no other 
speakers so I shall reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I now yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky).
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, as you know, bringing accountability 
and transparency to contracting has been a priority of mine, and I have 
worked to ensure that companies that we award contracts to are held 
responsible for any abuses. I believe we must make certain that the 
intelligence community is not using U.S. taxpayer dollars to enter into 
or renew contracts with companies that may be engaging in serious 
abuses of law and violence toward civilians and whose actions go 
unpunished.
  Around the world our country is contracting with private companies 
that employ individuals who do not wear the badge of the United States 
but whose behavior has, on numerous occasions, severely damaged the 
credibility and security of our military and harmed our relationship 
with other governments. Perhaps the most egregious example came on 
September 16, 2007, when private security contractors employed by 
Blackwater Worldwide killed 17 civilians and wounded many more in 
downtown Baghdad. No one has been held accountable for this.
  At a minimum, we need a more transparent process to hold private 
contractors accountable and more information in order to understand 
their impact on our Intelligence Community, our armed forces and our 
larger objectives.
  I thank the chairman for including language prohibiting the use of 
contractors for interrogation, as well as a provision requiring a 
comprehensive report on the use of contractors in the intelligence 
community.
  If I may ask the chairman in a brief colloquy if the chairman will 
work with me to include additional language in the conference report 
calling for a report that examines the extent of criminal activity 
among intelligence community contractors and assesses the effects of 
hiring contracting companies that are responsible for serious legal 
violations.
  Mr. REYES. Will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Yes.
  Mr. REYES. The answer is yes. I will be happy to work with you in 
conference.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am happy to 
support this legislation.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. At this time I would like to continue to reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, can I inquire as to the time on both sides.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas has 7\1/2\ minutes, and the 
gentleman from Michigan has 10 minutes.
  Mr. REYES. And can I inquire of my colleague if he has any additional 
speakers.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I am probably the only speaker left. I will close at 
the appropriate time.
  Mr. REYES. Then I will be pleased to recognize a hardworking member 
of our committee, the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), for 2 
minutes.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the chairman for yielding, and I want to 
commend the chairman and the ranking member on their hard work on this 
bill, particularly staff, who also has worked hard on this legislation.
  I rise today in strong support of H.R. 5959, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
  While the bill contains a number of important provisions to 
strengthen our intelligence community and enhance national security 
that many of my colleagues have already been speaking about, I am 
particularly pleased that it represents a reasonable and measured 
response to the administration's cybersecurity initiative.
  Now, this bill, the cybersecurity initiative, is the administration's 
response to the cybersecurity threats facing the Nation. And although 
the administration has been slow in recognizing this threat, I believe 
the cyber initiative is a move in the right direction, but requires 
careful scrutiny.
  Now, this bill reduces funding in selected areas where it is not 
adequately justified. However, recognizing that cybersecurity is a real 
and growing threat that the Federal Government has been slow in 
addressing, the Intelligence Committee has authorized more than 90 
percent of the administration's requests.
  At the same time, the bill clearly demonstrates that the committee 
does not intend to write the administration a blank check for the 
cybersecurity initiative, which is a multi-year, multi-billion dollar 
project.
  Now, we need a thorough assessment of the technical feasibility and 
scalability of the initiative and a careful balance between 
cybersecurity and privacy protections. Thus, the bill envisions an 
advisory panel of senior representatives of Congress, the Executive

[[Page 15249]]

Branch and industry who can tackle these issues.
  I was co-chair of the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th 
Presidency, basically a commission that will present a blueprint on 
cybersecurity for the next President. I have been deeply involved in 
developing recommendations for a national cybersecurity plan that 
protects, among other things, our critical infrastructure assets and 
infrastructure itself, as well as Federal networks and also the private 
sector.
  Furthermore, as a member of the House Intelligence Committee, and as 
chairman of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 
Cybersecurity and Science Technology, I will continue to ensure and 
exercise rigorous congressional oversight over this issue as it 
evolves.
  The measure before us is an important first step in addressing our 
cybersecurity threats and closing that vulnerability and it is, 
obviously, a critical national security issue. And I urge my colleagues 
to support passage of this bill.
  Again, I commend Chairman Reyes for his leadership, and also thank 
staff for the great work they have done on this bill today.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I continue to reserve.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, it is now my privilege to yield 3 minutes to 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the chairman for yielding, and rise in support of 
H.R. 5959.
  I want to congratulate our chairman, Mr. Reyes and his staff for 
putting the bill together. In particular, I am proud that this bill 
authorizes the funding that our intelligence community needs to help 
prevent terrorists from attacking the United States with a nuclear 
device.
  A nuclear terrorist attack on the United States or on our troops in 
the field is the greatest national security threat facing our country. 
While part of this fight occurs at our borders, the intelligence 
community is the tip of the spear, at the forefront of our efforts to 
prevent a nuclear terror attack. The many analysts and officers of the 
intelligence community ensure that we know as much as possible, not 
only about the terrorists who would attack us with a nuclear device or 
a radiological disease, but also about those who may sell fissile 
material that they seek. This bill supports our men and women in the 
intelligence community as they attempt to ensure that nuclear material 
stays out of the wrong hands.
  It is much easier to prevent terrorists from getting a hold of 
nuclear material than prevent them from getting nuclear material or a 
nuclear device into the country. Our country is large, our borders are 
porous, and we have to stop the access of people who mean us ill from 
gaining nuclear material.
  The bill protects Americans against nuclear terrorism by funding the 
Nuclear Materials Information Program as well, a Department of Energy-
led effort to understand how much nuclear material is stored worldwide, 
what the security is at these sites, the signatures of this material, 
also a key ingredient of our nuclear forensics efforts.
  But there is more that we still must do. H.R. 1, signed into law by 
the President almost a year ago created the position of the United 
States Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Proliferation and Terrorism. We must have an individual, a single 
person who can marshal all the resources and expertise to prevent the 
most horrific attack imaginable. However, no one has been appointed to 
this post. It remains vacant. I urge the President to fill this 
position as soon as possible.
  Nuclear terrorism is the preeminent threat of our time, and all 
efforts have to be made to mitigate that threat. What we need to do is 
imagine what a post-nuclear 9/11 Commission report would look like, 
what would its recommendations be? And we have to implement those 
recommendations now; not wait until there is a calamity.
  I am proud that this legislation addresses the threat by authorizing 
the resources our intelligence community needs to meet that threat.
  And again, I want to thank you, Chairman Reyes, for your leadership, 
and urge all of the Members to support the bill.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to just inquire of the 
chairman of the committee, you are prepared to close as well?
  Mr. REYES. That was our last speaker. I am prepared to close.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you. I will yield myself the balance of our time.
  I am looking forward to, and I am glad that we have had such a 
collegial discussion about the bill, the process that we have gone 
through in the committee, to get to the point that we are.
  Obviously, we are going to go through a process of trying to improve 
this bill while we are here on the floor today. I can look forward to 
going through that process. I look forward to hopefully passing an 
improved bill out of the floor, and then look forward to going to 
conference and hope that we can continue this same kind of partnership 
in trying to get, not only a bill through the House, but getting it 
through a conference process and getting a bill to the President that 
the President will sign.
  It is important that the Intelligence Committees, that the House and 
the Senate, put their imprint on the intelligence community. We haven't 
been able to do that for 3 years. It is important that we do it and 
that we do it at this time. The intelligence community needs the kind 
of direction and the parameters that we have established in this bill, 
to ensure that Congress can do its work, but also that the intelligence 
community can do its work within a framework that has been established 
by the Congress.
  With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I now yield myself the remainder of our 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, again, I want to say how much I appreciate the 
cooperation and the work that the ranking member has done to bring this 
bill to the floor. I want to thank staffs on both sides in particular. 
I want to thank my Staff Director, Mike Delaney, my Deputy Staff 
Director and General Counsel, Wyndee Parker, and Chief Counsel, Jeremy 
Bash, for the great work that they have done.
  And I also want to thank our Vice Chair of the committee, Congressman 
Leonard Boswell, who, unfortunately, was unable to accompany us here 
today because he is recuperating in the hospital. All of us wish him 
well and we want to see him back as soon as possible. He is a hard 
worker and contributes a lot to our committee.
  And I also want to say that this is a good, solid bill. This is the 
kind of effort that our men and women in the intelligence community 
serving us proudly throughout the world deserve. Each and every one of 
them gives their best effort, and they deserve the respect and the 
support of every Member of this body and everyone in this country. We 
thank them for the effort that they put forward, and we appreciate the 
commitment, the dedication and their professionalism, as well as the 
sacrifices that their families provide for our great country.
  With that, Mr. Chairman, I want to say that it has been a privilege 
to lead this committee. We have great Members on both sides that care 
very much about our national security and work very hard on all the 
issues that are important to our country and our national security.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank all of those who serve 
our country through the gathering of intelligence for the protection of 
the American people. I appreciate their dedication and their attention 
to the gathering facts for deliberations related to our national 
security.
  Regrettably, the current administration has destroyed the credibility 
of the Intelligence Community through the fabrication of intelligence. 
The Bush administration continues a relentless pursuit of a self-
serving agenda rather than an agenda that serves the best interests of 
the American people.
  No single example can more clearly illustrate this point than the 
administration's falsification and cherry-picking of intelligence to 
build a phony case for the war in Iraq. Through the manipulation of 
intelligence, the administration sold a war to the American public 
based on false statements that included a

[[Page 15250]]

connection between Iraq and al Qaeda, Iraq and 9/11, as well as false 
claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and intentions to 
attack the U.S.
  As long as President Bush remains in office the intelligence budget 
will continue to be at risk for being used to support subversive 
intelligence and provide license to the administration to engage in 
criminal activity by shaping intelligence to fit corrupt policies.
  Under the Bush administration there have emerged several high-profile 
classified leaks to the media that have reemphasized the need for 
reform within our intelligence agencies. From these media leaks, we not 
only became aware of the efforts to manipulate intelligence and to 
falsify a cause for war against Iraq but we also became aware of the 
illegal NSA domestic wiretapping program without a court order. We 
became aware of the rumored CIA detention centers in Eastern Europe, 
and the CIA's extraordinary rendition program, used to transport 
suspects to other nations with less restrictive torture policies. It is 
regrettable that intelligence is often reshaped to fit doctrine instead 
of doctrine being reshaped in the face of the facts of intelligence.
  Furthermore, this bill will not stop unilateral covert U.S. 
intelligence operations aimed at bringing about regime change in Iran. 
As reported in a recent article in The New Yorker, the Bush 
administration is already engaged in collecting covert intelligence on 
Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program instead of engaging Iran in 
high-level diplomatic negotiations without preconditions. The 
administration has made clear their thirst for a war with Iran. The 
opportunity for unscrupulous tactics by this administration with 
respect to Iran clearly exists as long as this body stands idly by.
  I strongly oppose this bill.
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 
5959, the Fiscal Year 2009 Intelligence Authorization Act, and the 
important measures to strengthen oversight and accountability of 
contractors that the bill includes.
  I want to first thank Intelligence Committee Chairman Silvestre Reyes 
for his leadership in crafting this bill. Chairman Reyes very 
graciously worked with me to include in this bill major portions of 
legislation I recently introduced along with Representative Jan 
Schakowsky, H.R. 5973, the Transparency and Accountability in 
Intelligence Contracting Act.
  For the last several years, I have been working to correct a serious 
lack of attention to the management and oversight of contractors in the 
Intelligence Community. Press reports indicate that roughly half of the 
Intelligence Community's budget is now contracted out, yet there is 
little understanding of where the money goes, what kinds of activities 
contractors are performing, whether this contracting saves taxpayer 
money, and whether the contracted activities are appropriate for 
private corporations to perform. Additionally, accountability for 
misconduct by contractors has been seriously deficient.
  This rush to outsource sensitive government functions has placed 
private contractors at the center of some of the most significant 
national controversies in recent years. Contractors have been accused 
of torturing or abusing foreign detainees, including the practice of 
waterboarding high-level suspects. Contractors have participated in 
warrantless electronic surveillance and data-mining programs targeting 
U.S. citizens. Contractors have been deeply involved in the analysis of 
critical intelligence on Iraq and al Qaeda, including, reportedly, the 
preparation of the President's Daily Brief on intelligence matters.
  Contractors may very well have a place in the Intelligence Community, 
but their role must be carefully considered, thoroughly managed, and 
strenuously overseen. A national conversation about the appropriate use 
of contractors in our national security apparatus is long overdue. This 
is a conversation the Administration skipped over as it was 
implementing this major shift in the way we conduct intelligence 
operations, but for the sake of the integrity of our national defense, 
we must collectively scrutinize this practice and set clear boundaries.
  H.R. 5959 begins to put Intelligence Community contracting back on a 
rational and stable footing. It incorporates a number of provisions for 
which I have advocated. Let me highlight just a few examples.
  First, the legislation would explicitly prohibit the use of 
contractors for the performance of interrogations. Interrogations 
should be carried out by individuals who are well-trained, fall within 
a clear chain of command, and have a sworn loyalty to the United 
States--not by corporate, for-profit contractors. Given how delicate 
such interrogations are, and how critical the intelligence they obtain 
might be, I believe that drawing this red line is a commonsense step 
with which all members should agree.
  The House passed a similar restriction on Defense Department 
contractors as part of the Defense Authorization bill in May. This bill 
would appropriately extend that limit to intelligence contractors 
outside the DoD.
  Second, the bill would require an assessment of the number and cost 
of contractors employed by the intelligence community, the types of 
activities being performed by contractors, an analysis of cost savings, 
and a description of mechanisms available for ensuring oversight and 
accountability. This assessment will give Congress the data we need to 
ascertain whether the use of contractors for certain activities is 
beneficial and what reforms may be needed.
  Third, the bill would require the Director of National Intelligence 
to assess the appropriateness of using contractors for especially 
sensitive activities, including intelligence collection, intelligence 
analysis, interrogation, detention, and rendition. It will also require 
information on how many contractors are currently employed in the 
performance of these activities. Giving the head of the intelligence 
community the chance to explain the reasoning behind this widespread 
contracting will allow the Congress to carefully weigh the appropriate 
limits for intelligence outsourcing.
  These provisions are not overly prescriptive or restrictive. We fully 
recognize that the Intelligence Community needs flexibility and agility 
to be able to obtain and deliver to decision-makers accurate and timely 
intelligence about matters involving extremely high stakes. Rather, 
this bill gives us the tools we need to initiate a conversation about 
how we can better organize, manage, and oversee contractors. It is a 
first step toward ending the abuses of the past.
  Again, I thank Chairman Reyes and his colleagues on the Intelligence 
Committee for recognizing the importance of addressing contractor 
issues in the intelligence community. I look forward to continuing to 
work with him on this issue.
  I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that the Democratic 
majority has taken a thoughtful and bipartisan approach to this year's 
Intelligence Authorization bill. I have expressed my concerns about the 
health of our intelligence community and appreciate the work that has 
been done to strengthen the Inspector General, increase contractor 
oversight, and invest in the training of our operatives.
  However, I am deeply troubled that this bill does not contain a 
prohibition on torture, which I believe is absolutely critical. Torture 
violates not only the laws and values of our country, but all standards 
of decent human conduct. I have consistently spoken out against the 
stonewalling and equivocation surrounding this administration's 
``interrogation'' of detainees. I find it appalling that it has fallen 
solely to the legislative and judicial branches to set interrogation 
and detention standards worthy of our Nation.
  Yet I remain hopeful that the abuses of this administration will be 
checked by wise and thoughtful policy. I applauded the recent 
``Boumediene v. Bush'' Supreme Court ruling that guarantees Guantanamo 
Bay detainees the right of habeas corpus. Further, I believe that 
extending the rules of the Army Field Manual to U.S. intelligence 
personnel sends a clear signal that we have broken with and are rolling 
back the abuses of this administration.
  I support a great deal of what this bill includes, yet my greatest 
concern is with what this bill omits. It is my hope that Congress will 
come together in conference to send a message to this administration 
and the world at large that Americans do not approve of, and will not 
stand for, torture.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Reyes and Ranking Member 
Hoekstra for their work on this bill and their commitment to protecting 
the security of our Nation.
  Mr. Chairman, recently Americans have read media reports that 
taxpayer funds are being used to destabilize or overthrow governments 
of other countries.
  Regardless of the truth of these reports, the perception that they 
may be true undermines public confidence in U.S. foreign policy and 
harms the reputation of the U.S. abroad.
  That is why I offered an amendment to the bill providing that the 
United States will not engage in covert activities to undermine or 
overthrow member nations of the U.N., including democratically elected 
governments. Such conduct is antithetical to democracy and the rule of 
law.
  Unfortunately, my amendment was not made in order. Consequently, we 
lost an opportunity to repair some of the damage done to America's 
international reputation by the conduct of this Administration during 
the last seven years.

[[Page 15251]]

  Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I support this bipartisan bill, 
which is designed to strengthen and improve America's intelligence 
capabilities.
  The bill strengthens intelligence by adding funding to enhance human 
intelligence collection, strengthening research and development in 
advanced technologies, and improving signals intelligence. Importantly, 
the bill also includes strong provisions to promote accountability, 
including prohibiting the use of CIA contractors to interrogate 
detainees, requiring a report on compliance with the Detainee Treatment 
Act of 2005, and creating a statutory, Senate-confirmed Inspector 
General for the entire Intelligence community.
  I am disappointed in what the bill doesn't include--a provision 
included in last year's authorization bill that would have prohibited 
interrogation techniques not authorized by the Army Field Manual on 
Interrogation.
  Despite White House claims that the United States does not torture 
prisoners, we continue to learn about Administration actions that seem 
to condone the use of coercive techniques in questioning prisoners.
  Last year, we learned about a classified Justice Department memo from 
February 2005 allowing waterboarding and other coercive techniques. 
Then there was the Executive Order signed last year that effectively 
opened a loophole for the CIA to practice interrogation techniques that 
go beyond those allowed by the U.S. military.
  Reports of destroyed interrogation tapes showing CIA operatives using 
waterboarding and other ``enhanced'' techniques are deeply disturbing, 
and suggest a double standard, whereby these techniques are approved 
for use by the CIA but not by the Department of Defense and its 
intelligence agencies. All this points to the need for a common 
standard for humane and effective interrogation techniques across the 
government, which is what the provision called for in last year's bill.
  Sen. John McCain has called the Army Field Manual techniques ``humane 
and yet effective.'' In my view, there is no reason why interrogation 
techniques that work effectively and humanely for our military 
interrogators cannot also work effectively and humanely for CIA and 
other intelligence agency interrogators.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge passage of this legislation, though I hope that 
the provision prohibiting interrogation techniques not authorized by 
the Army Field Manual on Interrogation is included in the conference 
report. I believe it sends a message that the United States believes no 
part of its government is above the law, and that no interrogation 
method is acceptable that could not also be used on Americans in enemy 
custody.
  Mr. WELCH of Vermont. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Chairman 
Reyes and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for 
their great work on this bill and for agreeing to include my amendment 
in the Manager's amendment to the bill.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment recognizes that we have a responsibility 
to the Iraqis and Afghanis who have willingly put a target on their own 
backs by choosing to help our servicemen and women and our diplomats. 
These interpreters put themselves and their families in immense 
jeopardy every single day.
  Unfortunately, Congress has been shamefully slow in ensuring their 
safety. Only now are we beginning to make progress in providing the 
opportunity of resettlement to those whose lives are at risk because of 
their work for us. This has come about largely because of the advocacy 
of our own troops, who have benefited day in and day out from the 
services of these interpreters and who have come to call them their 
brothers. They are asking us to stand up for the people who have stood 
up for them.
  Meanwhile, our intelligence community faces a critical shortfall in 
linguists and cultural experts. Our national security is jeopardized 
daily by our inability to field the specialists necessary to translate 
and interpret valuable intelligence information.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment is simple, it requires the Director of 
National Intelligence to assess whether some of the critical language 
needs in the intelligence community can be met by these Iraqi and 
Afghan interpreters who have already proven their loyalty through their 
service to our government. In doing so, my hope is that we could meet 
this urgent need for translators and interpreters in the intelligence 
community while providing meaningful employment to individuals who have 
risked their lives in service of our country.
  I thank Chairman Reyes and the Committee again for their support of 
my amendment, which is included in the Manager's amendment, and urge my 
colleagues to support it as well.
  Mr. REYES. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN (Mr. Ross). All time for general debate has 
expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the 
purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered 
read.
  The text of the committee amendment is as follows:

                               H.R. 5959

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

              TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Limitation on the use of covert action funds.
Sec. 106. Prohibition on use of funds to implement ``5 and out'' 
              program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision of 
              the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

                     Subtitle A--Personnel Matters

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Enhanced flexibility in nonreimbursable details to elements 
              of the intelligence community.
Sec. 303. Multi-level security clearances.
Sec. 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for 
              intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 305. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence 
              community.
Sec. 306. Comprehensive report on intelligence community contractors.
Sec. 307. Report on proposed pay for performance intelligence community 
              personnel management system.
Sec. 308. Report on plans to increase diversity within the intelligence 
              community.
Sec. 309. Report on security clearance determinations.

                       Subtitle B--Other Matters

Sec. 311. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 312. Clarification of definition of intelligence community under 
              the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 313. Modification of availability of funds for different 
              intelligence activities.
Sec. 314. Protection of certain national security information.
Sec. 315. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt 
              and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations.
Sec. 316. Report on compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
              and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 
              2006.
Sec. 317. Incorporation of reporting requirements.
Sec. 318. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 319. Enhancement of critical skills training program.
Sec. 320. Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative advisory 
              panel.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on colocation of the Office of 
              the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
              Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology.
Sec. 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.
Sec. 405. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy 
              efficiency reports.
Sec. 406. Semiannual reports on nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and 
              North Korea.
Sec. 407. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
              Community.
Sec. 408. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 409. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the 
              intelligence community.
Sec. 410. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the 
              National Counterintelligence Executive.

[[Page 15252]]

Sec. 411. National intelligence estimate on weapons of mass destruction 
              in Syria.
Sec. 412. Report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and 
              Afghanistan.
Sec. 413. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances.
Sec. 414. Security clearance reciprocity.
Sec. 415. Report on international traffic in arms regulations.
Sec. 416. Report on nuclear trafficking.
Sec. 417. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized 
              disclosures of classified information.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 421. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the 
              Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 422. Inapplicability to Director of the Central Intelligence 
              Agency of requirement for annual report on progress in 
              auditable financial statements.
Sec. 423. Technical amendments relating to titles of certain Central 
              Intelligence Agency positions.
Sec. 424. Clarifying amendments relating to section 105 of the 
              Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
Sec. 425. Prohibition on the use of private contractors for 
              interrogations involving persons in the custody or 
              control of the Central Intelligence Agency.

              Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components

Sec. 431. Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into 
              the Defense Intelligence Agency.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

Sec. 441. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug 
              Enforcement Administration as elements of the 
              intelligence community.
Sec. 442. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities of 
              the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

                Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters

Sec. 501. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the 
              Research and Development Programs of the United States 
              Intelligence Community.
Sec. 502. Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 503. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets.
Sec. 504. Notice of intelligence regarding North Korea and China.
Sec. 505. Sense of Congress regarding use of intelligence resources.

                    Subtitle B--Technical Amendments

Sec. 511. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
              1949.
Sec. 512. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National 
              Intelligence Program.
Sec. 513. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint 
              Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence 
              and Related Activities.
Sec. 514. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 515. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
              Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 516. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 517. Technical amendments relating to the National Geospatial-
              Intelligence Agency.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
       (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

              TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2009 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, 
     subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as 
     of September 30, 2009, for the conduct of the intelligence 
     activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through 
     (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the 
     conference report on the bill H.R. 5959 of the One Hundred 
     Tenth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the 
     President. The President shall provide for suitable 
     distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of 
     the Schedule, within the executive branch.
       (c) Earmarks.--
       (1) In general.--Nothing in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations, the joint explanatory statement to accompany 
     the conference report on the bill H.R. 5959 of the One 
     Hundred Tenth Congress, or the classified annex to this Act, 
     shall be construed to authorize or require the expenditure of 
     funds for an earmarked purpose.
       (2) Earmarked purpose defined.--In this subsection, the 
     term ``earmarked purpose'' means a provision or report 
     language included primarily at the request of a Member, 
     Delegate, Resident Commissioner of the House of 
     Representatives or a Senator providing, authorizing, or 
     recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget 
     authority, credit authority, or other spending authority for 
     a contract, loan, loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or 
     other expenditure with or to an entity, or targeted to a 
     specific State, locality, or Congressional district, other 
     than through a statutory or administrative formula-driven or 
     competitive award process.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Increases.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     2009 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to 
     in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines that such action is necessary to the performance 
     of important intelligence functions, except that the number 
     of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized 
     under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such Schedule for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The 
     Director of National Intelligence shall notify the 
     congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 
     days prior to each exercise of an authority described in 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2009 the sum of $648,842,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2010.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     National Intelligence are authorized 772 full-time or full-
     time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2009. Personnel 
     serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the 
     Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel 
     detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
       (c) Construction of Authorities.--The authorities available 
     to the Director of National Intelligence under section 103 
     are also available to the Director for the adjustment of 
     personnel levels within the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account.
       (d) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 2009 such additional amounts as are 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for 
     advanced research and development shall remain available 
     until September 30, 2010.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2009, there are authorized such additional personnel for the 
     Community Management Account as of that date as are specified 
     in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a).

     SEC. 105. LIMITATION ON THE USE OF COVERT ACTION FUNDS.

       (a) In General.--Not more than 25 percent of the funds 
     authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the National 
     Intelligence Program for covert actions may be obligated or 
     expended until the date on which each member of the 
     congressional intelligence committees has been fully and 
     currently briefed on all authorizations for covert actions in 
     effect on April 24, 2008.

[[Page 15253]]

       (b) Covert Action Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``covert action'' has the meaning given the term in section 
     503(g) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     413b(e)).

     SEC. 106. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT ``5 AND 
                   OUT'' PROGRAM OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
                   INVESTIGATION.

       None of the funds authorized to be appropriated in this Act 
     may be used to implement the program of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation requiring the mandatory reassignment of a 
     supervisor of the Bureau after such supervisor serves in a 
     management position for 5 years (commonly known as the ``5 
     and out'' program).

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2009 the sum of $279,200,000.

     SEC. 202. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT 
                   PROVISION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
                   RETIREMENT ACT.

       Subparagraph (A) of section 235(b)(1) of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)) is 
     amended by striking ``receiving compensation under the Senior 
     Intelligence Service pay schedule at the rate'' and inserting 
     ``who is at the Senior Intelligence Service rank''.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

                     Subtitle A--Personnel Matters

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. ENHANCED FLEXIBILITY IN NONREIMBURSABLE DETAILS TO 
                   ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h) and section 904(g)(2) of the 
     Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of 
     Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c(g)(2)) and notwithstanding 
     any other provision of law, in any fiscal year after fiscal 
     year 2008 an officer or employee of the United States or 
     member of the Armed Forces may be detailed to the staff of an 
     element of the intelligence community funded through the 
     Community Management Account from another element of the 
     United States Government on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable 
     basis, as jointly agreed to by the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the head of the detailing element (or the 
     designees of such officials), for a period not to exceed 2 
     years.

     SEC. 303. MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.

       (a) In General.--Section 102A of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(s) Multi-Level Security Clearances.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that 
     the elements of the intelligence community adopt a multi-
     level security clearance approach in order to enable the 
     intelligence community to make more effective and efficient 
     use of persons proficient in foreign languages or with 
     cultural, linguistic, or other subject matter expertise that 
     is critical to national security.''.
       (b) Implementation.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall issue guidelines to the intelligence community on the 
     implementation of subsection (s) of section 102A of the 
     National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), 
     not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.

     SEC. 304. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON 
                   CARRIERS FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.

       (a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director'';
       (2) in paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of 
     this subsection, by striking ``may only delegate'' and all 
     that follows and inserting ``may delegate the authority in 
     subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the 
     intelligence community.''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community 
     to whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant 
     to paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such 
     senior officials of such element as are specified in 
     guidelines prescribed by the Director of National 
     Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''.
       (b) Submission of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than 6 
     months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe and submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees the guidelines 
     referred to in paragraph (2) of section 116(b) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).

     SEC. 305. ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 506A the following new section:


   ``annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence community

       ``Sec. 506B.  (a) Requirement To Provide.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of 
     the element of the intelligence community concerned, prepare 
     an annual personnel level assessment for such element of the 
     intelligence community that assesses the personnel levels for 
     each such element for the fiscal year following the fiscal 
     year in which the assessment is submitted.
       ``(b) Schedule.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence 
     committees each year along with the budget submitted by the 
     President under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.
       ``(c) Contents.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) 
     submitted during a fiscal year shall contain, at a minimum, 
     the following information for the element of the intelligence 
     community concerned:
       ``(1) The budget submission for personnel costs for the 
     upcoming fiscal year.
       ``(2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of 
     such costs as compared to the personnel costs of the current 
     fiscal year.
       ``(3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of 
     such costs as compared to the personnel costs during the 
     prior 5 fiscal years.
       ``(4) The number of personnel positions requested for the 
     upcoming fiscal year.
       ``(5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
     such number as compared to the number of personnel positions 
     of the current fiscal year.
       ``(6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
     such number as compared to the number of personnel positions 
     during the prior 5 fiscal years.
       ``(7) The best estimate of the number and costs of 
     contractors to be funded by the element for the upcoming 
     fiscal year.
       ``(8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
     such costs of contractors as compared to the best estimate of 
     the costs of contractors of the current fiscal year.
       ``(9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
     such costs of contractors as compared to the cost of 
     contractors, and the number of contractors, during the prior 
     5 fiscal years.
       ``(10) A written justification for the requested personnel 
     and contractor levels.
       ``(11) The number of intelligence collectors and analysts 
     employed or contracted by each element of the intelligence 
     community.
       ``(12) A list of all contractors that have been the subject 
     of an investigation completed by the Inspector General of any 
     element of the intelligence community during the preceding 
     fiscal year, or are or have been the subject of an 
     investigation by such an Inspector General during the current 
     fiscal year.
       ``(13) A statement by the Director of National Intelligence 
     that, based on current and projected funding, the element 
     concerned will have sufficient--
       ``(A) internal infrastructure to support the requested 
     personnel and contractor levels;
       ``(B) training resources to support the requested personnel 
     levels; and
       ``(C) funding to support the administrative and operational 
     activities of the requested personnel levels.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of that Act is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 506A the following new item:

``Sec. 506B. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence 
              community.''.

     SEC. 306. COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   CONTRACTORS.

       (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 
     2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to 
     the congressional intelligence committees a report describing 
     the use of personal services contracts across the 
     intelligence community, the impact of such contractors on the 
     intelligence community workforce, plans for conversion of 
     contractor employment into government employment, and the 
     accountability mechanisms that govern the performance of such 
     contractors.
       (b) Content.--
       (1) In general.--The report submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall include--
       (A) a description of any relevant regulations or guidance 
     issued by the Director of National Intelligence or the head 
     of an element of the intelligence community relating to 
     minimum standards required regarding the hiring, training, 
     security clearance, and assignment of contract personnel and 
     how those standards may differ from those for government 
     employees performing substantially similar functions;
       (B) an identification of contracts where the contractor is 
     performing a substantially similar functions to a government 
     employee;
       (C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings achieved by 
     awarding contracts for the performance of such functions 
     referred to in subparagraph (B) instead of using full-time 
     employees of the elements of the intelligence community to 
     perform such functions;
       (D) an assessment of the appropriateness of using 
     contractors to perform the activities described in paragraph 
     (2);
       (E) an estimate of the number of contracts, and the number 
     of personnel working under such contracts, related to the 
     performance of activities described in paragraph (2);
       (F) a comparison of the compensation of contract employees 
     and government employees performing substantially similar 
     functions;
       (G) an analysis of the attrition of government personnel 
     for contractor positions that provide substantially similar 
     functions;

[[Page 15254]]

       (H) a description of positions that will be converted from 
     contractor employment to government employment;
       (I) an analysis of the oversight and accountability 
     mechanisms applicable to personal services contracts awarded 
     for intelligence activities by each element of the 
     intelligence community during fiscal years 2006 and 2007;
       (J) an analysis of procedures in use in the intelligence 
     community for conducting oversight of contractors to ensure 
     identification and prosecution of criminal violations, 
     financial waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by 
     contractors or contract personnel; and
       (K) an identification of best practices for oversight and 
     accountability mechanisms applicable to personal services 
     contracts.
       (2) Activities.--Activities described in this paragraph are 
     the following:
       (A) Intelligence collection.
       (B) Intelligence analysis.
       (C) Covert actions, including rendition, detention, and 
     interrogation activities.

     SEC. 307. REPORT ON PROPOSED PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

       (a) Prohibition on Pay for Performance Until Report.--The 
     Director of National Intelligence and the head of an element 
     of the intelligence community may not implement a plan that 
     provides compensation to personnel of that element of the 
     intelligence community based on performance until the date 
     that is 45 days after the date on which the Director of 
     National Intelligence submits a report for that element under 
     subsection (b).
       (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
     submit to Congress a report on performance-based compensation 
     for each element of the intelligence community, including, 
     with respect to each such element--
       (1) a description of a proposed employee advisory group to 
     advise management on the implementation and management of a 
     pay for performance system in that element, including the 
     scope of responsibility of the group and the plan for the 
     element for ensuring diversity in the selection of members of 
     the advisory group;
       (2) a certification that all managers who will participate 
     in setting performance standards and pay pool administration 
     have been trained on the implementing guidance of the system 
     and the criteria upon which the certification is granted; and
       (3) a description of an external appeals mechanism for 
     employees who wish to appeal pay decisions to someone outside 
     the management chain of the element employing such employee.

     SEC. 308. REPORT ON PLANS TO INCREASE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 
     2008, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination 
     with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on the plans of each element to increase diversity 
     within the intelligence community.
       (b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
     include specific implementation plans to increase diversity 
     within each element of the intelligence community, 
     including--
       (1) specific implementation plans for each such element 
     designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic 
     plan of the Director of National Intelligence on equal 
     employment opportunity and diversity;
       (2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to 
     increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates;
       (3) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to 
     improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the junior, 
     midgrade, senior, and management levels;
       (4) a description of specific diversity awareness training 
     and education programs for senior officials and managers of 
     each such element; and
       (5) a description of performance metrics to measure the 
     success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs 
     described in paragraphs (1) through (4).

     SEC. 309. REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:


             ``report on security clearance determinations

       ``Sec. 508.  Not later than February 1 of each year, the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit 
     to Congress a report on security clearance determinations 
     completed or ongoing during the preceding fiscal year that 
     have taken longer than one year to complete. Such report 
     shall include--
       ``(1) the number of security clearance determinations for 
     positions as employees of the Federal Government that 
     required more than one year to complete;
       ``(2) the number of security clearance determinations for 
     contractors that required more than one year to complete;
       ``(3) the agencies that investigated and adjudicated such 
     determinations; and
       ``(4) the cause of significant delays in such 
     determinations.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401 et seq.) is further amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 507 the following new item:

``Sec. 508. Report on security clearance determinations.''.

                       Subtitle B--Other Matters

     SEC. 311. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 312. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 
                   1947.

       Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking 
     ``other'' the second place it appears.

     SEC. 313. MODIFICATION OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DIFFERENT 
                   INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read 
     as follows:
       ``(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports an 
     emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases 
     efficiency; and''.

     SEC. 314. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY 
                   INFORMATION.

       (a) Increase in Penalties for Disclosure of Undercover 
     Intelligence Officers and Agents.--
       (1) Disclosure of agent after access to information 
     identifying agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by 
     striking ``ten years'' and inserting ``15 years''.
       (2) Disclosure of agent after access to classified 
     information.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by 
     striking ``five years'' and inserting ``10 years''.
       (b) Modifications to Annual Report on Protection of 
     Intelligence Identities.--The first sentence of section 
     603(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     423(a)) is amended by inserting ``including an assessment of 
     the need for any modification of this title for the purpose 
     of improving legal protections for covert agents,'' after 
     ``measures to protect the identities of covert agents,''.

     SEC. 315. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT 
                   RECEIPT AND DISPOSITION OF FOREIGN GIFTS AND 
                   DECORATIONS.

       Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States 
     Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of 
     the intelligence community, the head of such element may 
     delete the information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) 
     of paragraph (2) or in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph 
     (3) if the head of such element certifies in writing to the 
     Secretary of State that the publication of such information 
     could adversely affect United States intelligence sources or 
     methods.
       ``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of 
     State pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be 
     transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence who 
     shall keep a record of such information.
       ``(C) In this paragraph, the term `intelligence community' 
     has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''.

     SEC. 316. REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE DETAINEE TREATMENT 
                   ACT OF 2005 AND RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE 
                   MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than November 1, 2008, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive report 
     on all measures taken by the Office of the Director of 
     National Intelligence and by each element, if any, of the 
     intelligence community with relevant responsibilities to 
     comply with the provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 
     2005 (title X of division A of Public Law 109-148; 119 Stat. 
     2739) and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act 
     of 2006 (Public Law 109-366; 120 Stat. 2600).
       (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) A description of the detention or interrogation 
     methods, if any, that have been determined to comply with 
     section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (119 Stat. 
     2739; 42 U.S.C. 2000dd) and section 6 of the Military 
     Commissions Act of 2006 (120 Stat. 2632; 18 U.S.C. 2441 note) 
     (including the amendments made by such section 6), and, with 
     respect to each such method--
       (A) an identification of the official making such 
     determination; and
       (B) a statement of the basis for such determination.
       (2) A description of the detention or interrogation 
     methods, if any, the use of which has been discontinued 
     pursuant to the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 or the 
     Military Commission Act of 2006, and, with respect to each 
     such method--
       (A) an identification of the official making the 
     determination to discontinue such method; and
       (B) a statement of the basis for such determination.
       (3) A description of any actions that have been taken to 
     implement section 1004 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
     (119 Stat. 2740; 42 U.S.C. 2000dd-1), and, with respect to 
     each such action--
       (A) an identification of the official taking such action; 
     and
       (B) a statement of the basis for such action.
       (4) Any other matters that the Director considers necessary 
     to fully and currently inform the congressional intelligence 
     committees about the implementation of the Detainee Treatment

[[Page 15255]]

     Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military 
     Commissions Act of 2006.
       (5) An appendix containing--
       (A) all guidelines for the application of the Detainee 
     Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military 
     Commissions Act of 2006 to the detention or interrogation 
     activities, if any, of any element of the intelligence 
     community; and
       (B) all legal justifications of the Department of Justice, 
     including any office thereof, about the meaning or 
     application of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 or related 
     provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 with 
     respect to the detention or interrogation activities, if any, 
     of any element of the intelligence community.
       (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in classified form.
       (d) Submission to the Congressional Armed Services 
     Committees.--To the extent that the report required by 
     subsection (a) addresses an element of the intelligence 
     community within the Department of Defense, that portion of 
     the report, and any associated material that is necessary to 
     make that portion understandable, shall also be submitted by 
     the Director of National Intelligence to the congressional 
     armed services committees.
       (e) Congressional Armed Services Committee Defined.--In 
     this section, the term ``congressional armed services 
     committees'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives.

     SEC. 317. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional 
     intelligence committees that is included in the classified 
     annex to this Act is hereby incorporated into this Act and is 
     hereby made a requirement in law.

     SEC. 318. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Annual Certification on Counterintelligence 
     Initiatives.--Section 1102(b) of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``(1)''; and
       (2) by striking paragraph (2).
       (b) Report and Certification Under Terrorist Identification 
     Classification System.--Section 343 of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (d); and
       (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as 
     subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively.
       (c) Annual Report on Counterdrug Intelligence Matters.--
     Section 826 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2429; 21 U.S.C. 873 
     note) is repealed.
       (d) Conforming Amendments.--Section 507(a)(2) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b(a)(2)) is 
     amended by striking subparagraph (D).

     SEC. 319. ENHANCEMENT OF CRITICAL SKILLS TRAINING PROGRAM.

       (a) National Security Agency.--Subsection (e) of section 16 
     of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 
     note) is amended by striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all 
     that follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and inserting 
     ``Agency efforts''.
       (b) Other Elements of the Intelligence Community.--
       (1) In general.--The National Security Act of 1947 is 
     amended by inserting after section 1021 (50 U.S.C. 441m) the 
     following new section:


        ``intelligence community acquisition of critical skills

       ``Sec. 1022.  (a) In General.--The head of an appropriate 
     department may assign civilian employees of an element of the 
     intelligence community that is a component of such 
     appropriate department as students at accredited 
     professional, technical, and other institutions of higher 
     learning for training at the undergraduate level in skills 
     critical to effective performance of the mission of such 
     element of the intelligence community.
       ``(b) Payment of Expenses.--The head of an appropriate 
     department may pay, directly or by reimbursement to 
     employees, expenses incident to assignments under subsection 
     (a), in any fiscal year only to the extent that appropriated 
     funds are available for such purpose.
       ``(c) Eligibility.--
       ``(1) In general.--To be eligible for assignment under 
     subsection (a), an employee of an element of the intelligence 
     community must agree in writing--
       ``(A) to continue in the service of such element for the 
     period of the assignment and to complete the educational 
     course of training for which the employee is assigned;
       ``(B) to continue in the service of such element following 
     completion of the assignment for a period of one-and-a-half 
     years for each year of the assignment or part thereof;
       ``(C) to reimburse the United States for the total cost of 
     education (excluding the employee's pay and allowances) 
     provided under this section to the employee if, prior to the 
     employee's completing the educational course of training for 
     which the employee is assigned, the assignment or the 
     employee's employment with such element is terminated either 
     by such element due to misconduct by the employee or by the 
     employee voluntarily; and
       ``(D) to reimburse the United States if, after completing 
     the educational course of training for which the employee is 
     assigned, the employee's employment with such element is 
     terminated either by such element due to misconduct by the 
     employee or by the employee voluntarily, prior to the 
     employee's completion of the service obligation period 
     described in subparagraph (B), in an amount that bears the 
     same ratio to the total cost of the education (excluding the 
     employee's pay and allowances) provided to the employee as 
     the unserved portion of the service obligation period 
     described in subparagraph (B) bears to the total period of 
     the service obligation described in subparagraph (B).
       ``(2) Debt owing the united states.--Subject to paragraph 
     (3), the obligation to reimburse the United States under an 
     agreement described in paragraph (1), including interest due 
     on such obligation, is for all purposes a debt owing the 
     United States.
       ``(3) Reimbursement.--
       ``(A) Bankruptcy.--A discharge in bankruptcy under title 
     11, United States Code, shall not release a person from an 
     obligation to reimburse the United States required under an 
     agreement described in paragraph (1) if the final decree of 
     the discharge in bankruptcy is issued within five years after 
     the last day of the combined period of service obligation 
     described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).
       ``(B) Release.--The head of an appropriate department may 
     release a person, in whole or in part, from the obligation to 
     reimburse the United States under an agreement described in 
     paragraph (1) when, in the discretion of such head of an 
     appropriate department, such head of an appropriate 
     department determines that equity or the interests of the 
     United States so require.
       ``(C) Monthly payments.--The head of an appropriate 
     department shall permit an employee assigned under this 
     section who, prior to commencing a second academic year of 
     such assignment, voluntarily terminates the assignment or the 
     employee's employment with the element of the intelligence 
     community that is a component of such appropriate department, 
     to satisfy the employee's obligation under an agreement 
     described in paragraph (1) to reimburse the United States by 
     reimbursement according to a schedule of monthly payments 
     which results in completion of reimbursement by a date five 
     years after the date of termination of the assignment or 
     employment or earlier at the option of the employee.
       ``(d) Recruitment.--Efforts by an element of the 
     intelligence community to recruit individuals at educational 
     institutions for participation in the undergraduate training 
     program established by this section shall be made openly and 
     according to the common practices of universities and 
     employers recruiting at such institutions.
       ``(e) Inapplication of Provisions on Training.--Chapter 41 
     of title 5 and subsections (a) and (b) of section 3324 of 
     title 31, United States Code, shall not apply with respect to 
     this section.
       ``(f) Regulations.--A head of the appropriate department 
     assigning employees in accordance with this section may issue 
     such regulations as such head of the appropriate department 
     considers necessary to carry out this section.
       ``(g) Rules of Construction.--
       ``(1) Component.--For purposes of this section--
       ``(A) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall be considered a component of such Office; and
       ``(B) the Central Intelligence Agency shall be considered a 
     component of such Agency.
       ``(2) Required education programs.--Nothing in this section 
     shall be construed to modify, affect, or supercede any 
     provision of law requiring or otherwise authorizing or 
     providing for a training program described in this section.
       ``(h) Appropriate Department Defined.--In this section, the 
     term `appropriate department' means--
       ``(1) with respect to the Office of the Director of 
     National Intelligence, the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence;
       ``(2) with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency, 
     Central Intelligence Agency; and
       ``(3) with respect to an element of the intelligence 
     community other than the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
     department of the Federal Government of which such element of 
     the intelligence community is a component.''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating 
     to section 1021 the following new item:

``Sec. 1022. Intelligence community acquisition of critical skills.''.

     SEC. 320. COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE 
                   ADVISORY PANEL.

       Not later than February 1, 2009, the President shall submit 
     to Congress a report on options for creating an advisory 
     panel comprised of representatives of Congress, the Executive 
     Branch, and the private sector to make policy and procedural 
     recommendations for--
       (1) information security for the Federal Government;
       (2) critical infrastructure;
       (3) the authorities, roles, responsibilities of the 
     intelligence community, Department of Homeland Security, and 
     Department of Defense for purposes of supporting the 
     Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative as described 
     in National Security Policy Directive 54/Homeland Security 
     Policy Directive 23 entitled ``Cybersecurity Policy'' signed 
     by the President on January 8, 2008; and

[[Page 15256]]

       (4) other matters related to paragraphs (1) through (3) as 
     the President considers appropriate.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

     SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON COLOCATION OF THE 
                   OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3(e)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of Headquarters 
     With Headquarters of'';
       (2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the 
     Office''; and
       (3) by striking ``any other element'' and inserting ``the 
     headquarters of any other element''.

     SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   ON THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.

       Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United 
     States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence.''.

     SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND 
                   TECHNOLOGY.

       Section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)--
       (A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7);
       (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end; and
       (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
       ``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for basic, 
     applied, and advanced research to meet the technology needs 
     of the intelligence community;
       ``(6) submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
     an annual report on the science and technology strategy of 
     the Director that shows resources mapped to the goals of the 
     intelligence community; and''; and
       (2) in subsection (d)(3)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)--
       (i) by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate''; 
     and
       (ii) by striking ``; and'' and inserting ``;'';
       (B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C); 
     and
       (C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(B) identify basic, advanced, and applied research 
     programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence 
     community; and''.

     SEC. 404. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND 
                   OFFICIALS.

       (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``(a) Establishment.--Not later than 18 
     months after the date of the enactment of the National 
     Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting 
     the following:
       ``(a) In General.--
       ``(1) Establishment.--The''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter 
     Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National 
     Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the 
     Director of National Intelligence.
       ``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center 
     shall be located within the Office of the Director of 
     National Intelligence.''.
       (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-
     3(c)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new 
     paragraphs:
       ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
     Community.
       ``(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
       ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism 
     Center.
       ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation 
     Center.''.

     SEC. 405. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA 
                   CENTER ENERGY EFFICIENCY REPORTS.

       (a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
     develop a plan to implement the recommendations of the report 
     submitted to Congress under section 1 of the Act entitled 
     ``An Act to study and promote the use of energy efficient 
     computer servers in the United States'' (Public Law 109-431; 
     120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later then November 1, 2008, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report containing the 
     plan developed under subsection (a).
       (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
     annex.

     SEC. 406. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF IRAN, 
                   SYRIA, AND NORTH KOREA.

       (a) Reports.--
       (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by title III, is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:


``semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of iran, syria, and north 
                                 korea

       ``Sec. 509.  (a) Requirement for Reports.--Not less 
     frequently than every 180 days, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report on the intentions and capabilities of the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with regard to the 
     nuclear programs of each such country.
       ``(b) Content.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall include, with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
     the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Democratic People's 
     Republic of Korea--
       ``(1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each 
     such country;
       ``(2) an evaluation, consistent with existing reporting 
     standards and practices, of the sources upon which the 
     intelligence used to prepare the assessment described in 
     paragraph (1) is based, including the number of such sources 
     and an assessment of the reliability of each such source;
       ``(3) a summary of any intelligence related to any such 
     program gathered or developed since the previous report was 
     submitted under subsection (a), including intelligence 
     collected from both open and clandestine sources for each 
     such country; and
       ``(4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in 
     knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence 
     in the assessment described in paragraph (1).
       ``(c) National Intelligence Estimate.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence 
     Estimate on the intentions and capabilities of the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, or the Democratic 
     People's Republic of Korea in lieu of a report required by 
     subsection (a) for that country.
       ``(d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) may 
     be submitted in classified form.''.
       (2) Applicability date.--The first report required to be 
     submitted under section 509 of the National Security Act of 
     1947, as added by paragraph (1), shall be submitted not later 
     than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating 
     to section 508 the following new item:

``Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, 
              and North Korea.''.

     SEC. 407. TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
     Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
       (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
     Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
       (3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
     Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and
       (4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
     Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''.

     SEC. 408. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Establishment.--
       (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 103G the following new section:


           ``inspector general of the intelligence community

       ``Sec. 103H.  (a) Office of Inspector General of 
     Intelligence Community.--There is within the Office of the 
     Director of National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector 
     General of the Intelligence Community.
       ``(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector 
     General of the Intelligence Community is to--
       ``(1) create an objective and effective office, 
     appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and 
     conduct independently investigations, inspections, and audits 
     on matters within the responsibility and authority of the 
     Director of National Intelligence;
       ``(2) recommend policies designed--
       ``(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in 
     the administration and implementation of matters within the 
     responsibility and authority of the Director of National 
     Intelligence; and
       ``(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such 
     matters;
       ``(3) provide a means for keeping the Director of National 
     Intelligence fully and currently informed about--
       ``(A) problems and deficiencies relating to matters within 
     the responsibility and authority of the Director of National 
     Intelligence; and
       ``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective 
     actions; and
       ``(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that 
     the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly 
     informed of--
       ``(A) significant problems and deficiencies relating to 
     matters within the responsibility and authority of the 
     Director of National Intelligence; and
       ``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective 
     actions.
       ``(c) Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--(1) 
     There is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, 
     who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General 
     of the Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the 
     President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

[[Page 15257]]

       ``(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as 
     Inspector General shall be made--
       ``(A) without regard to political affiliation;
       ``(B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with the 
     security standards of the intelligence community, and prior 
     experience in the field of intelligence or national security; 
     and
       ``(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, 
     financial analysis, law, management analysis, public 
     administration, or auditing.
       ``(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be 
     under the general supervision of the Director of National 
     Intelligence.
       ``(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only 
     by the President. The President shall immediately communicate 
     in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the 
     reasons for the removal of any individual from the position 
     of Inspector General.
       ``(d) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to subsections 
     (g) and (h), it shall be the duty and responsibility of the 
     Inspector General of the Intelligence Community--
       ``(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, 
     conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the 
     investigations, inspections, and audits relating to matters 
     within the responsibility and authority of the Director of 
     National Intelligence to ensure they are conducted 
     efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and 
     regulations;
       ``(2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence fully 
     and currently informed concerning violations of law and 
     regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, fraud 
     and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may 
     occur in matters within the responsibility and authority of 
     the Director, and to report the progress made in implementing 
     corrective action;
       ``(3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence 
     sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued 
     by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with 
     the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures 
     as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of 
     intelligence sources and methods described in such reports; 
     and
       ``(4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities 
     under this section, to comply with generally accepted 
     government auditing standards.
       ``(e) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The Director of 
     National Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of 
     the Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or 
     completing any investigation, inspection, or audit if the 
     Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to 
     protect vital national security interests of the United 
     States.
       ``(2) If the Director exercises the authority under 
     paragraph (1), the Director shall submit an appropriately 
     classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such 
     authority within 7 days to the congressional intelligence 
     committees.
       ``(3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at 
     the time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to 
     the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence 
     sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a 
     copy of such report.
       ``(4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the 
     Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the 
     Inspector General considers appropriate.
       ``(f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to 
     the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any 
     purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the 
     Inspector General.
       ``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any 
     employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of 
     the intelligence community whose testimony is needed for the 
     performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
       ``(B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all 
     records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, 
     recommendations, or other material which relate to the 
     programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector 
     General has responsibilities under this section.
       ``(C) The level of classification or compartmentation of 
     information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient 
     rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any 
     materials under subparagraph (B).
       ``(D) Failure on the part of any employee, or any employee 
     of a contractor, of any element of the intelligence community 
     to cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for 
     appropriate administrative actions by the Director or, on the 
     recommendation of the Director, other appropriate officials 
     of the intelligence community, including loss of employment 
     or the termination of an existing contractual relationship.
       ``(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and 
     investigate complaints or information from any person 
     concerning the existence of an activity constituting a 
     violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, 
     gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial 
     and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once 
     such complaint or information has been received from an 
     employee of the Federal Government--
       ``(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity 
     of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless 
     the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is 
     unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the 
     disclosure is made to an official of the Department of 
     Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution 
     should be undertaken; and
       ``(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of 
     reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any 
     employee in a position to take such actions, unless the 
     complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the 
     knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its 
     truth or falsity.
       ``(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to 
     administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, 
     or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the 
     duties of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or 
     affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee 
     of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community designated by the Inspector General shall have the 
     same force and effect as if administered or taken by, or 
     before, an officer having a seal.
       ``(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the 
     Inspector General is authorized to require by subpoena the 
     production of all information, documents, reports, answers, 
     records, accounts, papers, and other data and documentary 
     evidence necessary in the performance of the duties and 
     responsibilities of the Inspector General.
       ``(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other 
     elements of the United States Government, the Inspector 
     General shall obtain information, documents, reports, 
     answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and 
     evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph (A) using 
     procedures other than by subpoenas.
       ``(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, 
     or on behalf of, any other element of the intelligence 
     community, including the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence.
       ``(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a 
     subpoena issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be 
     enforceable by order of any appropriate district court of the 
     United States.
       ``(g) Coordination Among Inspectors General of Intelligence 
     Community.--(1)(A) In the event of a matter within the 
     jurisdiction of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community that may be subject to an investigation, 
     inspection, or audit by both the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community and an Inspector General, whether 
     statutory or administrative, with oversight responsibility 
     for an element or elements of the intelligence community, the 
     Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and such 
     other Inspector or Inspectors General shall expeditiously 
     resolve the question of which Inspector General shall conduct 
     such investigation, inspection, or audit.
       ``(B) In attempting to resolve a question under 
     subparagraph (A), the Inspectors General concerned may 
     request the assistance of the Intelligence Community 
     Inspectors General Forum established under subparagraph (C). 
     In the event of a dispute between an Inspector General within 
     an agency or department of the United States Government and 
     the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that has 
     not been resolved with the assistance of the Forum, the 
     Inspectors General shall submit the question to the Director 
     of National Intelligence and the head of the agency or 
     department for resolution.
       ``(C) There is established the Intelligence Community 
     Inspectors General Forum which shall consist of all statutory 
     or administrative Inspectors General with oversight 
     responsibility for an element or elements of the intelligence 
     community. The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community shall serve as the chair of the Forum. The Forum 
     shall have no administrative authority over any Inspector 
     General, but shall serve as a mechanism for informing its 
     members of the work of individual members of the Forum that 
     may be of common interest and discussing questions about 
     jurisdiction or access to employees, employees of a 
     contractor, records, audits, reviews, documents, 
     recommendations, or other materials that may involve or be of 
     assistance to more than 1 of its members.
       ``(2) The Inspector General conducting an investigation, 
     inspection, or audit covered by paragraph (1) shall submit 
     the results of such investigation, inspection, or audit to 
     any other Inspector General, including the Inspector General 
     of the Intelligence Community, with jurisdiction to conduct 
     such investigation, inspection, or audit who did not conduct 
     such investigation, inspection, or audit.
       ``(h) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Inspector General 
     of the Intelligence Community shall be provided with 
     appropriate and adequate office space at central and field 
     office locations, together with such equipment, office 
     supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities 
     and services as may be necessary for the operation of such 
     offices.
       ``(2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the 
     Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General 
     shall select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees 
     as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the 
     Inspector General. The Inspector General shall ensure that 
     any officer or employee so selected, appointed, or employed 
     has security clearances appropriate for the assigned duties 
     of such officer or employee.
       ``(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the 
     Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and 
     employees have the requisite training and experience to 
     enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the 
     Inspector General effectively.
       ``(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the 
     Inspector General shall create within the Office of the 
     Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a career 
     cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity 
     and objectivity needed for the effective performance of the 
     duties of the Inspector General.
       ``(3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the 
     Inspector General may request such

[[Page 15258]]

     information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying 
     out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General 
     from any department, agency, or other element of the United 
     States Government.
       ``(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information 
     or assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the 
     department, agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is 
     practicable and not in contravention of any existing 
     statutory restriction or regulation of the department, 
     agency, or element, furnish to the Inspector General, or to 
     an authorized designee, such information or assistance.
       ``(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
     may, upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the 
     intelligence community, conduct, as authorized by this 
     section, an investigation, inspection, or audit of such 
     element and may enter into any place occupied by such element 
     for purposes of the performance of the duties of the 
     Inspector General.
       ``(i) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall, not later than January 31 and 
     July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director of 
     National Intelligence a classified, and, as appropriate, 
     unclassified semiannual report summarizing the activities of 
     the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community during the immediately preceding 6-month period 
     ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, 
     respectively. The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community shall provide any portion of the report involving a 
     component of a department of the United States Government to 
     the head of that department simultaneously with submission of 
     the report to the Director of National Intelligence.
       ``(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a 
     minimum, the following:
       ``(i) A list of the title or subject of each investigation, 
     inspection, or audit conducted during the period covered by 
     such report, including a summary of the progress of each 
     particular investigation, inspection, or audit since the 
     preceding report of the Inspector General under this 
     paragraph.
       ``(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and 
     deficiencies relating to the administration and 
     implementation of programs and operations of the intelligence 
     community, and in the relationships between elements of the 
     intelligence community, identified by the Inspector General 
     during the period covered by such report.
       ``(iii) A description of the recommendations for corrective 
     or disciplinary action made by the Inspector General during 
     the period covered by such report with respect to significant 
     problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii).
       ``(iv) A statement whether or not corrective or 
     disciplinary action has been completed on each significant 
     recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, 
     in a case where corrective action has been completed, a 
     description of such corrective action.
       ``(v) A certification whether or not the Inspector General 
     has had full and direct access to all information relevant to 
     the performance of the functions of the Inspector General.
       ``(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena 
     authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General 
     during the period covered by such report.
       ``(vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General 
     considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy, 
     efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and 
     implementation of matters within the responsibility and 
     authority of the Director of National Intelligence, and to 
     detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such matters.
       ``(C) Not later than the 30 days after the date of receipt 
     of a report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall 
     transmit the report to the congressional intelligence 
     committees together with any comments the Director considers 
     appropriate. The Director shall transmit to the committees of 
     the Senate and of the House of Representatives with 
     jurisdiction over a department of the United States 
     Government any portion of the report involving a component of 
     such department simultaneously with submission of the report 
     to the congressional intelligence committees.
       ``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to 
     the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of 
     particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or 
     deficiencies relating to matters within the responsibility 
     and authority of the Director of National Intelligence.
       ``(B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) 
     within 7 calendar days of receipt of such report, together 
     with such comments as the Director considers appropriate. The 
     Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and 
     of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a 
     department of the United States Government any portion of 
     each report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, 
     abuse, or deficiency related to a component of such 
     department simultaneously with transmission of the report to 
     the congressional intelligence committees.
       ``(3) In the event that--
       ``(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any 
     differences with the Director affecting the execution of the 
     duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General;
       ``(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by 
     the Inspector General focuses on any current or former 
     intelligence community official who--
       ``(i) holds or held a position in an element of the 
     intelligence community that is subject to appointment by the 
     President, whether or not by and with the advice and consent 
     of the Senate, including such a position held on an acting 
     basis;
       ``(ii) holds or held a position in an element of the 
     intelligence community, including a position held on an 
     acting basis, that is appointed by the Director of National 
     Intelligence; or
       ``(iii) holds or held a position as head of an element of 
     the intelligence community or a position covered by 
     subsection (b) or (c) of section 106;
       ``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General 
     to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by 
     a current or former official described in subparagraph (B);
       ``(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the 
     Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of 
     possible criminal conduct of any current or former official 
     described in subparagraph (B); or
       ``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible 
     alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary 
     information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or 
     audit,

     the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a 
     report on such matter to the congressional intelligence 
     committees.
       ``(4) Pursuant to title V, the Director shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees any report or findings 
     and recommendations of an investigation, inspection, or audit 
     conducted by the office which has been requested by the 
     Chairman or Vice Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of 
     either committee.
       ``(5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence 
     community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of 
     the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to 
     the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress 
     a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern 
     may report such complaint or information to the Inspector 
     General.
       ``(B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period 
     beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a 
     complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the 
     Inspector General shall determine whether the complaint or 
     information appears credible. Upon making such a 
     determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the 
     Director a notice of that determination, together with the 
     complaint or information.
       ``(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector 
     General under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 
     calendar days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to 
     the congressional intelligence committees, together with any 
     comments the Director considers appropriate.
       ``(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible 
     under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted 
     under subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or 
     information to the Director in accurate form under 
     subparagraph (B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may 
     submit the complaint or information to Congress by contacting 
     either or both of the congressional intelligence committees 
     directly.
       ``(ii) An employee may contact the intelligence committees 
     directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
       ``(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the 
     Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the 
     employee's complaint or information and notice of the 
     employee's intent to contact the congressional intelligence 
     committees directly; and
       ``(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through the 
     Inspector General, direction on how to contact the 
     intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate 
     security practices.
       ``(iii) A member or employee of 1 of the congressional 
     intelligence committees who receives a complaint or 
     information under clause (i) does so in that member or 
     employee's official capacity as a member or employee of such 
     committee.
       ``(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who 
     reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General 
     under this paragraph of each action taken under this 
     paragraph with respect to the complaint or information. Such 
     notice shall be provided not later than 3 days after any such 
     action is taken.
       ``(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector 
     General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial 
     review.
       ``(G) In this paragraph, the term `urgent concern' means 
     any of the following:
       ``(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of 
     law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the 
     funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence 
     activity involving classified information, but does not 
     include differences of opinions concerning public policy 
     matters.
       ``(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful 
     withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact 
     relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an 
     intelligence activity.
       ``(iii) An action, including a personnel action described 
     in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, 
     constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under 
     subsection (f)(3)(B) of this section in response to an 
     employee's reporting an urgent concern in accordance with 
     this paragraph.
       ``(H) In support of this paragraph, Congress makes the 
     findings set forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 
     701(b) of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection 
     Act of 1998 (title VII of Public Law 105-272; 5 U.S.C. App. 
     8H note).
       ``(6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United 
     States Code, the Inspector General shall

[[Page 15259]]

     report to the Attorney General any information, allegation, 
     or complaint received by the Inspector General relating to 
     violations of Federal criminal law that involves a program or 
     operation of an element of the intelligence community, or in 
     the relationships between the elements of the intelligence 
     community, consistent with such guidelines as may be issued 
     by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such 
     section. A copy of each such report shall be furnished to the 
     Director.
       ``(j) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures to be 
     issued by the Director in consultation with the congressional 
     intelligence committees, include in the National Intelligence 
     Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector 
     General of the Intelligence Community.
       ``(k) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of 
     Intelligence Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to 
     subsection (g), the performance by the Inspector General of 
     the Intelligence Community of any duty, responsibility, or 
     function regarding an element of the intelligence community 
     shall not be construed to modify or effect the duties and 
     responsibilities of any other Inspector General, whether 
     statutory or administrative, having duties and 
     responsibilities relating to such element.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 103G the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 103H. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.

       (b) Repeal of Superseded Authority To Establish Position.--
     Section 8K of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
     App.) is repealed.
       (c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new item:
       ``Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.

     SEC. 409. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN 
                   THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 406 of 
     this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:


 ``report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community

       ``Sec. 510.  Not later than February 1 of each year, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
     proficiency in foreign languages and, if appropriate, in 
     foreign dialects of each element of the intelligence 
     community, including--
       ``(1) the number of positions authorized for such element 
     that require foreign language proficiency and the level of 
     proficiency required;
       ``(2) an estimate of the number of such positions that each 
     element will require during the 5-year period beginning on 
     the date of the submission of the report;
       ``(3) the number of positions authorized for such element 
     that require foreign language proficiency that are filled 
     by--
       ``(A) military personnel; and
       ``(B) civilian personnel;
       ``(4) the number of applicants for positions in such 
     element in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign 
     language proficiency, including the foreign language 
     indicated and the proficiency level;
       ``(5) the number of persons hired by such element with 
     foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language 
     and proficiency level;
       ``(6) the number of personnel of such element currently 
     attending foreign language training, including the provider 
     of such training;
       ``(7) a description of such element's efforts to recruit, 
     hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a 
     foreign language;
       ``(8) an assessment of methods and models for basic, 
     advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
       ``(9) for each foreign language and, where appropriate, 
     dialect of a foreign language--
       ``(A) the number of positions of such element that require 
     proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
       ``(B) the number of personnel of such element that are 
     serving in a position that requires proficiency in the 
     foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of 
     the position;
       ``(C) the number of personnel of such element that are 
     serving in a position that does not require proficiency in 
     the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty 
     of the position;
       ``(D) the number of personnel of such element rated at each 
     level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
       ``(E) whether the number of personnel at each level of 
     proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the 
     requirements of such element;
       ``(F) the number of personnel serving or hired to serve as 
     linguists for such element that are not qualified as 
     linguists under the standards of the Interagency Language 
     Roundtable;
       ``(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists 
     for such element during the preceding calendar year;
       ``(H) the number of personnel serving as linguists that 
     discontinued serving such element during the preceding 
     calendar year;
       ``(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills 
     that is fulfilled by an ally of the United States; and
       ``(J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills 
     that is fulfilled by contractors;
       ``(10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and 
     capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; and
       ``(11) recommendations for eliminating required reports 
     relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of 
     National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer 
     relevant.''.
       (2) Report date.--Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 
     415b(a)(1)) is amended--
       (A) by redesignating subparagraph (N) as subparagraph (J); 
     and
       (B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(K) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in 
     the intelligence community required by section 510.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of such Act is further amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 509 the following new 
     item:

``Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence 
              community.''.

     SEC. 410. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE 
                   OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
                   EXECUTIVE.

       (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the 
     Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of 
     Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
       (1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); and
       (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), 
     and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), 
     respectively; and
       (3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by 
     striking paragraphs (3) and (4).
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--Such section 904 is further 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) 
     of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it 
     appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection 
     (e)''; and
       (2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (e)(1)'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.

     SEC. 411. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON WEAPONS OF MASS 
                   DESTRUCTION IN SYRIA.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to Congress a National Intelligence 
     Estimate on the history, status, and projected development of 
     any weapons of mass destruction development program 
     undertaken by the Government of Syria, or by any person on 
     behalf of the Government of Syria.
       (b) Form.--The National Intelligence Estimate required 
     under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.

     SEC. 412. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES DEDICATED TO IRAQ 
                   AND AFGHANISTAN.

       Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees a report on 
     intelligence collection resources dedicated to Iraq and 
     Afghanistan during fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Such report 
     shall include detailed information on fiscal, human, 
     technical, and other intelligence collection resources.

     SEC. 413. OMBUDSMAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY 
                   CLEARANCES.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 103H, as added by section 409 of this Act, the 
     following new section:


       ``ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances

       ``Sec. 103I.  (a) Appointment.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence 
     community security clearances.
       ``(b) Provision of Information.--The head of an element of 
     the intelligence community shall provide a person applying 
     for a security clearance through or in coordination with such 
     element with contact information for the ombudsman appointed 
     under subsection (a).
       ``(c) Report.--Not later than November 1 of each year, the 
     ombudsman appointed under subsection (a) shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report containing--
       ``(1) the number of persons applying for a security 
     clearance who have contacted the ombudsman during the 
     preceding 12 months; and
       ``(2) a summary of the concerns, complaints, and questions 
     received by the ombudsman from persons applying for security 
     clearances.''.
       (b) Appointment Date.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence 
     community security clearances under section 103I(a) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), 
     not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is further 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 103H 
     the following new item:

``Sec. 103I. Ombudsman for intelligence community security 
              clearances.''.

     SEC. 414. SECURITY CLEARANCE RECIPROCITY.

       (a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community shall conduct an audit of the reciprocity of 
     security clearances in the intelligence community.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector

[[Page 15260]]

     General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report containing the 
     results of the audit conducted under subsection (a). Such 
     report shall include an assessment of the time required to 
     obtain a reciprocal security clearance for--
       (1) an employee of an element of the intelligence community 
     detailed to another element of the intelligence community;
       (2) an employee of an element of the intelligence community 
     seeking permanent employment with another element of the 
     intelligence community; and
       (3) a contractor seeking permanent employment with an 
     element of the intelligence community.

     SEC. 415. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS 
                   REGULATIONS.

       (a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2009, the Director 
     of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report assessing--
       (1) the threat to national security presented by the 
     efforts of foreign countries to acquire, through espionage, 
     diversion, or other means, sensitive equipment and 
     technology, and the degree to which United States export 
     controls (including the International Traffic in Arms 
     Regulations) are adequate to defeat such efforts; and
       (2) the extent to which United States export controls are 
     well matched to the scope of the foreign threat such controls 
     are designed to defeat and whether other means could more 
     successfully defeat such threats.
       (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (c) International Traffic in Arms Regulations Defined.--The 
     term ``International Traffic in Arms Regulations'' means 
     those regulations contained in parts 120 through 130 of title 
     22, Code of Federal Regulations (or successor regulations).

     SEC. 416. REPORT ON NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING.

       (a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2009, the Director 
     of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services and 
     the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives, and the Committee on Armed Services and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the 
     illicit trade of nuclear and radiological material and 
     equipment.
       (b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall include, for a period of time including at least the 
     preceding three years--
       (1) details of all known or suspected cases of the illicit 
     sale, transfer, brokering, or transport of nuclear or 
     radiological material or equipment useful for the production 
     of nuclear or radiological material or nuclear explosive 
     devices;
       (2) an assessment of the countries that represent the 
     greatest risk of nuclear trafficking activities; and
       (3) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in 
     knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence 
     in the assessment referred to in paragraph (2).
       (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted 
     in classified form, but shall include an unclassified 
     summary.

     SEC. 417. STUDY ON REVOKING PENSIONS OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT 
                   UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED 
                   INFORMATION.

       (a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
     conduct a study on the feasibility of revoking the pensions 
     of personnel in the intelligence community who commit 
     unauthorized disclosures of classified information, including 
     whether revoking such pensions is feasible under existing law 
     or under the administrative authority of the Director of 
     National Intelligence or any other head of an element of the 
     intelligence community.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report containing the results of the study conducted under 
     subsection (a).

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

     SEC. 421. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR 
                   GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b) is amended by--
       (1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (g) and 
     transferring such subsection to the end; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
       ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector 
     General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an 
     audit of each covert action at least every 3 years. Such 
     audits shall be conducted subject to the provisions of 
     paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (b) of section 17 of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q).
       ``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector 
     General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to 
     conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that 
     has been terminated or suspended if such covert action was 
     terminated or suspended prior to the last audit of such 
     covert action conducted by the Inspector General and has not 
     been restarted after the date on which such audit was 
     completed.
       ``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion 
     of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the 
     Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     containing the results of such audit.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking 
     ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)'';
       (2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by 
     striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''; and
       (3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking 
     ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''.

     SEC. 422. INAPPLICABILITY TO DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL 
                   REPORT ON PROGRESS IN AUDITABLE FINANCIAL 
                   STATEMENTS.

       Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended by striking ``the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency,''.

     SEC. 423. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO TITLES OF CERTAIN 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY POSITIONS.

       Section 17(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)(B)(ii)) is amended--
       (1) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive Director'' 
     and inserting ``Associate Deputy Director'';
       (2) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
     Operations'' and inserting ``Director of the National 
     Clandestine Service'';
       (3) in subclause (III), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
     Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of Intelligence'';
       (4) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
     Administration'' and inserting ``Director of Support''; and
       (5) in subclause (V), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
     Science and Technology'' and inserting ``Director of Science 
     and Technology''.

     SEC. 424. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF 
                   THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 
                   YEAR 2004.

       Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 
     U.S.C. 311 note) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
     inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
       (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after 
     ``subsection (a)),''.

     SEC. 425. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS FOR 
                   INTERROGATIONS INVOLVING PERSONS IN THE CUSTODY 
                   OR CONTROL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall 
     not expend or obligate funds for payment to any contractor to 
     conduct the interrogation of a detainee or prisoner in 
     custody or under the effective control of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency.
       (b) Exception.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency may request, and the Director of National Intelligence 
     may grant, a written waiver of the requirement under 
     subsection (a) if the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency determines that--
       (A) no employee of the Federal Government is--
       (i) capable of performing such interrogation; and
       (ii) available to perform such interrogation; and
       (B) such interrogation is in the national interest of the 
     United States and requires the use of a contractor.
       (2) Clarification of applicability of certain laws.--Any 
     contractor conducting an interrogation pursuant to a waiver 
     under paragraph (1) shall be subject to all laws on the 
     conduct of interrogations that would apply if an employee of 
     the Federal Government were conducting the interrogation.

              Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components

     SEC. 431. INTEGRATION OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD 
                   ACTIVITY INTO THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Report.--Not later than November 1, 2008, the Under 
     Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence and armed services committees a 
     report outlining the process by which the Counterintelligence 
     Field Activity is to be integrated into the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency. Such report shall include--
       (1) a description of the nature of any law enforcement 
     authorities to be delegated to the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency;
       (2) the authority under which the delegation of authority 
     referred to in paragraph (1) would occur; and
       (3) the guidelines for the implementation of such law 
     enforcement authorities.
       (b) Congressional Intelligence and Armed Services 
     Committees.--In this section, the term ``congressional 
     intelligence and armed services committees'' means--
       (1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives;
       (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (3) the Committees on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

     SEC. 441. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG 
                   ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AS ELEMENTS OF THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended--

[[Page 15261]]

       (1) in subparagraph (H)--
       (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine 
     Corps,''; and
       (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' 
     after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the 
     Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''.

     SEC. 442. REPORT ON TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
                   INVESTIGATION.

       Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report describing the Director's long term vision for 
     transforming the intelligence capabilities of the Bureau and 
     the progress of the internal reforms of the Bureau intended 
     to achieve that vision. Such report shall include--
       (1) the direction, strategy, and goals for transforming the 
     intelligence capabilities of the Bureau;
       (2) a description of what the fully functional intelligence 
     and national security functions of the Bureau should entail;
       (3) a candid assessment of the effect of internal reforms 
     at the Bureau and whether such reforms have moved the Bureau 
     towards achieving the goals of the Director for the 
     intelligence and national security functions of the Bureau; 
     and
       (4) an assessment of how well the Bureau performs tasks 
     that are critical to the effective functioning of the Bureau 
     as an intelligence agency, including--
       (A) identifying new intelligence targets within the scope 
     of the national security functions of the Bureau, outside the 
     parameters of an existing case file or ongoing investigation;
       (B) collecting intelligence domestically, including 
     collection through human and technical sources;
       (C) recruiting human sources;
       (D) training Special Agents to spot, assess, recruit, and 
     handle human sources;
       (E) working collaboratively with other Federal departments 
     and agencies to jointly collect intelligence on domestic 
     counterterrorism and counterintelligence targets;
       (F) producing a common intelligence picture of domestic 
     threats to the national security of the United States;
       (G) producing high quality and timely intelligence 
     analysis;
       (H) integrating intelligence analysts into its intelligence 
     collection operations; and
       (I) sharing intelligence information with intelligence 
     community partners.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

                Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters

     SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF 
                   THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Extension.--
       (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public 
     Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking 
     ``September 1, 2004'' and inserting ``December 31, 2009''.
       (2) Effective date.--Subject to paragraph (3), the 
     amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if 
     included in the enactment of such section 1007.
       (3) Commission membership.--
       (A) In general.--The membership of the National Commission 
     for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of 
     the United States Intelligence Community established under 
     subsection (a) of section 1002 of such Act (Public Law 107-
     306; 116 Stat. 2438) (referred to in this section as the 
     ``Commission'') shall be considered vacant and new members 
     shall be appointed in accordance with such section 1002, as 
     amended by subparagraph (B).
       (B) Technical amendment.--Paragraph (1) of section 1002(b) 
     of such Act is amended by striking ``The Deputy Director of 
     Central Intelligence for Community Management.'' and 
     inserting ``The Principal Deputy Director of National 
     Intelligence.''.
       (4) Clarification of duties.--Section 1002(i) of such Act 
     is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking 
     ``including--'' and inserting ``including advanced research 
     and development programs and activities. Such review shall 
     include--''.
       (b) Funding.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated by this Act for the Intelligence Community 
     Management Account, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall make $2,000,000 available to the Commission to carry 
     out title X of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2437).
       (2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission 
     pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available until 
     expended.

     SEC. 502. AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

       (a) General Congressional Oversight.--Section 501(a) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(a)) is amended 
     by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall 
     provide to the congressional intelligence committees all 
     information necessary to assess the lawfulness, 
     effectiveness, cost, benefit, intelligence gain, budgetary 
     authority, and risk of an intelligence activity, including--
       ``(A) the legal authority under which the intelligence 
     activity is being or was conducted;
       ``(B) any legal issues upon which guidance was sought in 
     carrying out or planning the intelligence activity, including 
     dissenting legal views;
       ``(C) any specific operational concerns arising from the 
     intelligence activity, including the risk of disclosing 
     intelligence sources or methods;
       ``(D) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will 
     exceed the planned or authorized expenditure of funds or 
     other resources; and
       ``(E) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will 
     fail.''.
       (b) Reporting on Activities Other Than Covert Actions.--
     Section 502 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413a) is amended by adding 
     at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Distribution of Information.--
       ``(1) Request.--Information or material provided in 
     accordance with subsection (a) shall be made available to 
     each member of the congressional intelligence committees, 
     unless the President requests that access to the information 
     or material be limited after determining that limiting such 
     access is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances 
     affecting vital interests of the United States. A request 
     under this paragraph and the extraordinary circumstances 
     referred to in this paragraph shall be detailed in writing to 
     the Chair and ranking minority member of the congressional 
     intelligence committees.
       ``(2) Distribution.--If the President submits a request 
     under paragraph (1), the Chair and ranking minority member of 
     each congressional intelligence committee may jointly 
     determine whether and how to limit access to the information 
     or material within such committee. If the Chair and ranking 
     minority member of such committee are unable to agree on 
     whether or how to limit such access, access to the 
     information or material will be limited. Any information or 
     material to which access is limited shall subsequently be 
     made available to each member of the congressional 
     intelligence communities at the earliest possible time and 
     shall include a detailed statement of the reasons for not 
     providing prior access.''.
       (c) Approval of Covert Actions.--Section 503(d) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b(d)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``(d) The President'' and inserting 
     ``(d)(1) The President''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) For purposes of this subsection, an activity shall 
     constitute a `significant undertaking' if the activity--
       ``(A) involves the potential for loss of life;
       ``(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities, 
     including authorities relating to research, development, or 
     operations;
       ``(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds or 
     other resources;
       ``(D) requires notification under section 504;
       ``(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing 
     intelligence sources or methods; or
       ``(F) could cause serious damage to the diplomatic 
     relations of the United States if such activity were 
     disclosed without authorization.''.

     SEC. 503. REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST 
                   ASSETS.

       (a) Annual Reports.--Section 118 of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404m) is amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``semiannual'' and 
     inserting ``annual''; and
       (2) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in the heading, by striking ``Semiannual'' and 
     inserting ``Annual'';
       (B) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
       (i) by striking ``semiannual basis'' and inserting ``annual 
     basis''; and
       (ii) by striking ``preceding six-month period'' and 
     inserting ``preceding year'';
       (C) by striking paragraph (2); and
       (D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs 
     (2) and (3), respectively.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 507 of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1), by adding at the end the 
     following new subparagraph:
       ``(L) The annual report on financial intelligence on 
     terrorist assets required by section 118.''; and
       (2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (6).

     SEC. 504. NOTICE OF INTELLIGENCE REGARDING NORTH KOREA AND 
                   CHINA.

       Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     413) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(f) A notification to the congressional intelligence 
     committees regarding intelligence information relating to 
     North Korea or China after all or part of the information has 
     been communicated to the governments of North Korea or China, 
     respectively, shall not be construed to fulfill the duty 
     under this title to keep the congressional intelligence 
     committees fully and currently informed of the intelligence 
     activities of the United States.''.

     SEC. 505. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING USE OF INTELLIGENCE 
                   RESOURCES.

       It is the sense of Congress that the resources authorized 
     under this Act should not be diverted from human intelligence 
     collection and other intelligence programs designed to combat 
     al Qaeda in order to study global climate change.

                    Subtitle B--Technical Amendments

     SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCY ACT OF 1949.

       Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is

[[Page 15262]]

     amended by striking ``authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) 
     of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, 
     subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 
     403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting 
     ``authorized under section 104A of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a)''.

     SEC. 512. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 
     U.S.C. 404b) is amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and
       (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears.
       (b) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence.--
     That section is further amended--
       (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of 
     Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National 
     Intelligence''; and
       (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National 
     Intelligence'' after ``Director''.
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is 
     amended to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.''.

     SEC. 513. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO 
                   JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND 
                   TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.

       Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-1) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets 
     for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical 
     Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual 
     budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor 
     program or programs''; and
       (2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military 
     Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence 
     Program or any successor program or programs''.

     SEC. 514. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT 
                   OF 1947.

       The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) 
     is amended as follows:
       (1) In section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)--
       (A) in subsection (d)--
       (i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' in 
     the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting 
     ``paragraph (1)(A)'';
       (ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or personnel'' in 
     the matter preceding clause (i); and
       (iii) in paragraph (5)(B), by striking ``or agency 
     involved'' in the second sentence and inserting ``involved or 
     the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case 
     of the Central Intelligence Agency)'';
       (B) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and 
     inserting ``paragraph''; and
       (C) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' after 
     ``Acquisition''.
       (2) In section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by 
     striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.
       (3) In section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 
     432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), by striking ``responsible'' and inserting 
     ``responsive''.

     SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND 
                   TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.

       (a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act 
     of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 
     2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643) is 
     amended as follows:
       (1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by 
     striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and 
     inserting ``Department of Justice''.
       (2) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''.
       (3) In section 1072(b), in the subsection heading by 
     inserting ``Agency'' after ``Intelligence''.
       (b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 
     Stat. 3638) is amended as follows:
       (1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
       (A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before ``an 
     institutional culture'';
       (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National 
     Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 
     112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National 
     Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law''; 
     and
       (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter 
     preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''.
       (2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
       (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and 
     inserting ``Federal''; and
       (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and 
     inserting ``specific''.

     SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

       (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating 
     to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the 
     following new item:

     ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.

       (b) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating 
     to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting 
     the following new item:

     ``Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.

       (c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating 
     to the General Counsel of the Office of the National 
     Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item:

     ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence.''.

     SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL 
                   GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Title 5.--Title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place 
     it appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence 
     Agency''.
       (b) Title 44.--Title 44, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in section 1336--
       (A) in the heading, by striking ``National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-
     Intelligence Agency''; and
       (B) by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' 
     each place it appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-
     Intelligence Agency''; and
       (2) in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 
     13, by striking the item relating to section 1336 and 
     inserting the following new item:

``1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special 
              publications.''.

       (c) Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.--
     Section 201(f)(2)(E) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
     U.S.C. 121) is amended by striking ``National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-
     Intelligence Agency''.

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. No amendment to the committee amendment is in 
order except those printed in House Report 110-759. Each amendment may 
be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member 
designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable 
for the time specified in the report, equally divided and controlled by 
the proponent and an opponent of the amendment, shall not be subject to 
amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the 
question.


                  Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Reyes

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 
printed in House Report 110-759.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Reyes:
       At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 321. EXCEPTION TO ALTERNATIVE FUEL PROCUREMENT 
                   REQUIREMENT.

       Section 526(a) of the Energy Independence and Security Act 
     of 2007 (42 U.S.C. 17142(a)) does not prohibit an element of 
     the intelligence community from entering into a contract to 
     purchase a generally available fuel that is not an 
     alternative or synthetic fuel or predominantly produced from 
     a nonconventional petroleum source, if--
       (1) the contract does not specifically require the 
     contractor to provide an alternative or synthetic fuel or 
     fuel from a nonconventional petroleum source;
       (2) the purpose of the contract is not to obtain an 
     alternative or synthetic fuel or fuel from a nonconventional 
     petroleum source; and
       (3) the contract does not provide incentives for a refinery 
     upgrade or expansion to allow a refinery to use or increase 
     its use of fuel from a nonconventional petroleum source.
       Page 70, line 3, strike ``and''.
       Page 70, strike line 7 and insert the following: ``dated or 
     no longer relevant; and''.
       Page 70, after line 7 insert the following:
       ``(12) an assessment of the feasibility of employing 
     foreign nationals lawfully present in the United States who 
     have previously worked as translators or interpreters for the 
     Armed Forces or another department or agency of the Federal 
     Government in Iraq or Afghanistan to meet the critical 
     language needs of such element.''.
       Page 72, line 18, insert ``and analysis'' after 
     ``collection''.
       Page 72, line 21, insert ``and analysis'' after 
     ``collection''.

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 1343, the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, the revised Reyes/Murphy manager's amendment 
does several things. First, it makes clear that the intelligence 
community may enter into a contract to purchase a generally available 
fuel that is not an alternative or synthetic fuel or produced from a 
non conventional petroleum source provided that certain criteria are 
met. Some members of our committee were interested

[[Page 15263]]

in addressing this issue, and we, Mr. Chairman, have done our best to 
handle it within the jurisdiction of our committee.
  Second, we included an amendment offered by Mr. Welch to require an 
assessment of the feasibility of employing individuals who have worked 
for the Federal Government in Iraq or Afghanistan as translators or 
interpreters. It fits very well with the committee's other reporting 
requirements on foreign languages. I believe it will be helpful to know 
whether the intelligence community can benefit from those individuals 
who have already served our government in Iraq or Afghanistan.
  And finally, Mr. Chairman, the manager's amendment makes a technical 
correction to a report on intelligence resources devoted to Iraq and 
Afghanistan. This correction is designed to ensure that the report 
captures both collection and analysis resources.
  So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the 
manager's amendment, and reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1415

  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to claim the time in 
opposition to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. While I will not oppose this amendment, I do want to 
note my concern that it includes substantive provisions that were not 
included in the amendment when it was originally submitted to the 
Committee on Rules.
  On this side, we did not have an opportunity to review those 
provisions before the amendment was made in order. I'm disappointed 
that in this case, the process that has been so successful in terms of 
working together was not continued. In the future, I hope that the 
process will be more transparent and enable a fair opportunity to 
review and understand the provisions that are being included in the 
manager's amendment before they are submitted to the Rules Committee 
and before we are required to go to the Rules Committee to testify.
  We support the manager's amendment. We don't support the process. But 
we continue to work on the process and those things as we go through 
that.
  With that, I will yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, while we have no additional speakers, I just 
wanted to assure the ranking member that, as has been stated, like the 
bill, this is not a perfect bill. We're still working through the 
process, and I assure him we will continue to work together.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Hoekstra

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 
printed in House Report 110-759.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to, as the designee of Mr. 
Blunt, call forward the second amendment.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Hoekstra:
       At the end of subtitle A of title V, add the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 506. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING COLOMBIAN PARAMILITARY 
                   ORGANIZATIONS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the permanent defeat of the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
     of Columbia (FARC), United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
     (AUC), National Liberation Army (ELN), and other Colombian 
     paramilitary organizations is in the national interest of the 
     United States;
       (2) the Colombian operation that liberated Americans Keith 
     Stansell, Marc Gonsalves, and Thomas Howes and Ingrid 
     Betancourt and 11 other Colombian hostages from the FARC on 
     July 2, 2008, demonstrated the professionalism of Colombian 
     security forces and intelligence operatives;
       (3) intelligence and other cooperation by the United States 
     has played a key role in developing and reinforcing the 
     capabilities of the Government of Colombia to address 
     terrorist and narcoterrorist threats;
       (4) intelligence and other cooperation by the United States 
     has significantly contributed to the continued success of the 
     Government of Colombia in impacting the capabilities of 
     terrorist and narcoterrorist groups that have threatened the 
     national security of Colombia and the United States; and
       (5) it is critical that such assistance continue in order 
     to support the Government of Colombia in its efforts to 
     continue to capitalize on those successes.

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 1343, the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support this amendment. It was 
originally going to be offered by my colleague, the distinguished 
Republican whip. He was called to the White House, and I consider it an 
honor to move this amendment forward on his behalf.
  The amendment highlights not only the absolute success of the 
Colombian Government in its rescue of American and Colombian hostages 
that had been held for years by a narcoterrorist organization, but also 
the clear successes of the Colombian Government's efforts after years 
of close cooperation with the United States.
  I want to take this opportunity to commend President Uribe and the 
Armed Forces and the National Police of Colombia on their efforts on 
this rescue and their many successes in implementing Plan Colombia. The 
amendment emphasizes the strong need to continue our close cooperation 
to work towards finishing the job in Colombia. We will continue to 
follow these issues closely and carefully in the committee, and I 
appreciate the Whip's efforts to focus attention on this important 
issue.
  With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition to 
the amendment, but I support this amendment.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Texas is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. REYES. This amendment expresses congressional support of Colombia 
in its most recent success against the FARC. I thank the minority 
leader for offering it.
  The United States should support democratic nations in their efforts 
against violent terrorist groups such as FARC. We are all proud of the 
recent rescue of U.S. and Colombian hostages held by the FARC. This 
operation shows the strength, resourcefulness, and valor of the 
Colombian military. These qualities were developed through cooperation 
between the U.S. and Colombia.
  In the past years, Colombia has made great strides against the FARC 
and greatly has reduced their strength. Republicans and Democrats alike 
have supported assistance to Colombia for the past decade. We must 
continue to do so.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan has 4 minutes 
remaining. The gentleman from Texas has yielded back his remaining 
minutes.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to yield myself 
1 minute.
  Again, this is an amendment that talks about the success of the 
programs that we have been working on in a bipartisan basis with the 
Colombian Government, highlighted, of course, by the recent rescue of 
the American and Colombian and other hostages that had been held for 
years; but more importantly, we have worked in a participative way, in 
a collaborative way, in a number of different areas, on the diplomatic 
front, political front, and also on an intelligence and military front 
and continue to do that, not only to free the hostages but also to make 
a firm statement against narcotraffickers that the Colombian 
Government, the U.S. Government, and others are committed to stopping 
the narcotraffic

[[Page 15264]]

which is kind of performing and acting as a cancer in both the United 
States and Colombia.
  This amendment by Mr. Blunt that I have the privilege of offering 
recognizes the participation and the work of the various governments, 
the various agencies, and the various individuals that have enabled 
this program to be successful.
  With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield 2 minutes to my 
colleague from Illinois (Mr. Weller).
  Mr. WELLER of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this 
amendment.
  If you travel in Latin America and you ask someone in Latin America 
who is America's best friend, who is America's most reliable partner 
and ally, they would say President Uribe of the Republic of Colombia.
  Ladies and gentlemen, I'm here today to stand in support of this 
amendment that thanks America's best friend, America's most reliable 
and partnered ally, particularly on the war on narcotics and 
counterterrorism, and to thank them for the successful rescue of three 
Americans. And it was done without a shot being fired, without loss of 
life.
  It was an incredible operation, an operation based on good 
intelligence, on good work by the Colombian military and the resources 
that had been made available thanks to the work of many in this 
Congress. That's good news, and we want to say thank you to our friend 
and ally.
  You know, there's a reason that President Uribe today enjoys an 
approval rating of almost 90 percent. He's the most popular elected 
official in the entire Western Hemisphere. And that's because he's made 
tremendous progress in dealing with the FARC and the ELN and the 
paramilitaries, those who have threatened the peace and security of 
that great nation for the last four decades. He has made tremendous 
progress.
  And his record is successful. You look at it. Poverty has decreased 
by 10 percent. Today, 40 percent of the national budget is spent on 
social needs, as they made progress in bringing down violence. The 
murder rate has been reduced by 40 percent. In fact, for labor 
unionists, trade activists, trade union activists, it's down about 85 
percent. Tremendous.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. WELLER of Illinois. I urge bipartisan support for this amendment.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I believe I have 1 minute remaining; is 
that correct?
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has 1 minute remaining.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I would like to yield my last minute to my colleague 
from Florida (Mr. Mario Diaz-Balart).
  Mr. MARIO DIAZ-BALART of Florida. I want to thank the sponsor of this 
sense of Congress.
  We saw just a few weeks ago what happened in Colombia where the 
Colombian military and that democratically elected government freed a 
number of hostages, including Americans, that had been held hostage for 
over 5 years. If there's ever been a time when U.S. aid has been used 
effectively, we saw it just a few days ago.
  It is time that this Congress stop criticizing the democratically 
elected government of Colombia. Stop criticizing the Colombian people 
and start putting the blame where the blame needs to be, and that is on 
those murderous FARC. The Colombian Government is doing an incredible 
job, a wonderful job fighting those narcoterrorist thug murderers, and 
they're doing it with our help. It's great that we're finally going to 
commend them.
  I hope that this is just the first step. I hope we pass a free trade 
deal with Colombia because they deserve it. The democracy in Colombia 
deserves it, and we cannot turn our back. I hope we also stop that cut 
to our friend Colombia that reduces the funding to the Government of 
Colombia.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chairman announced that the 
ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan 
will be postponed.


                  Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Holt

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 
printed in House Report 110-759.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Holt:
       At the end of subtitle A of title IV, add the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 418. MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   ESTIMATE ON IRAN.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall issue a 
     memorandum to holders of the National Intelligence Estimate 
     entitled ``Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities'' 
     regarding any intelligence on the nuclear program of Iran 
     that has been gathered or emerged since the publication of 
     such National Intelligence Estimate in October, 2007.

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 1343, the gentleman 
from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I need not be long.
  This is a straightforward, simple amendment that I hope will be 
without controversy. My amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act 
would require the Director of National Intelligence to inform all 
recipients of the October 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's 
nuclear program of any new intelligence on this subject that has 
emerged since the publication last fall.
  The October 2007 NIE was prepared with new and, I would say, improved 
procedures and provided us with insights into the status of the Iranian 
nuclear program. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the intelligence process is 
not static. This amendment is designed to ensure that Congress and 
others in the executive branch get the very latest information on 
Iran's nuclear program in a timely fashion and developed with good 
intelligence procedures.
  I believe I have no other speakers, but I will reserve my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to take the time 
in opposition, although I will not oppose the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Michigan 
is recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
  I support this amendment. In the committee, I offered a similar 
amendment that would have required a revised National Intelligence 
Estimate on Iran. The discovery of the al Kibar facility in Syria 
shortly after the original National Intelligence Estimate on Iran came 
out clearly suggested that prior assessments with respect to 
proliferation should be reviewed and reevaluated and the confidence 
level reassessed.
  The previous NIE on Iran was so poorly drafted and so seriously 
undermined by subsequent developments in intelligence that I thought it 
was necessary for the DNI to go back to the drawing board and start 
over. While my amendment was not successful, I believe that this 
amendment helps to address the issues I was attempting to raise.
  Therefore, I will support this amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt).
  The amendment was agreed to.

                              {time}  1430


                Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Hoekstra

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 
printed in House Report 110-759.

[[Page 15265]]


  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Hoekstra:
       At the end of subtitle A of title V, add the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 506. JIHADISTS.

       None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act 
     may be used to prohibit or discourage the use of the words or 
     phrases ``jihadist'', ``jihad'', ``Islamo-fascism'', 
     ``caliphate'', ``Islamist'', or ``Islamic terrorist'' by or 
     within the intelligence community or the Federal Government.

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 1343, the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. At this time, I yield myself whatever time I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of my amendment to prohibit the 
use of funds in this bill to discourage analysts from using the words 
``jihadist,'' ``jihad,'' ``caliphate,'' ``Islamist'' or ``Islamic 
terrorist'' by or within the intelligence community or the United 
States Government.
  We are dealing with an enemy that speaks in no uncertain terms about 
its desire to attack our homeland and kill innocent Americans. In a 
statement released in March, Osama bin Laden said the following:
  ``God, make the mujahedin in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, the 
Islamic Maghreb, the Arabian Peninsula, Somalia, Chechnya, and 
everywhere victorious. God, defeat our enemies of the Jews, the 
Christians, and their supporters.''
  More recently, in May bin Laden said the following:
  ``O youths of the generation: Jihad is the only way to liberate 
Palestine and al-Aqsa Mosque and to regain the orthodox caliphate, God 
willing.''
  Al Qaeda itself uses these terms to describe its fight against 
America, our allies, and moderate Muslims around the world. Why then 
would we prohibit our intelligence professionals from using the same 
words to accurately describe al Qaeda's stated goals?
  Yet that is exactly what some in Washington are attempting to do. I 
was dismayed to learn that over the past few months, intelligence 
bureaucrats at the State Department, the National Counterterrorism 
Center, and the Department of Homeland Security have issued memos 
imposing speech codes on how their employees can describe al Qaeda and 
other radical jihadist groups. They won't even be able to use the words 
these groups use themselves to describe themselves. These agencies 
within the intelligence community won't be able to use those words.
  Mr. Chairman, free speech should not be controversial, nor should 
candid, accurate, and fair discussion of the self-professed goals of 
the terrorists that attack our homeland and have sworn to kill more 
Americans.
  I find it more than ironic that some who have complained the loudest 
about politicization in the intelligence community would oppose this 
simple amendment to prevent the politically correct politicization of 
our Nation's intelligence community. We all know that political 
correctness can be the enemy of clarity.
  We also know that radical jihadists have made repeated efforts to 
stifle free speech in the West, including the murder of Dutch film 
maker, Theo van Gogh, and frequent death threats against authors, 
cartoonists, and journalists.
  Let's not give the radical jihadists a victory here by imposing a 
speech code on America's intelligence community.
  With that, I will reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition to 
this amendment.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment, which incidentally 
was offered in our committee but which was not agreed to.
  For years, Members have come to this floor to talk about the need to 
win the hearts and minds of moderate Muslims. This was one of the 
central recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
  The Department of Homeland Security, the National Counterterrorism 
Center, and the State Department have issued careful guidance to their 
employees saying in effect, when you see the term ``jihad'' to describe 
a violent form of terrorism, you might be alienating those moderate 
Muslims who want to join us in the fight against terrorism.
  The government must consider how its words will be interpreted by its 
audience. If Muslims around the world hear something other than what we 
want to say, we will simply not achieve our goals.
  This is sensible guidance, not political correctness. Language is a 
strategic weapon in the war of ideas. We should, therefore, use it 
wisely. The administration has obviously realized this and has provided 
appropriate guidance.
  Congress should not try to undermine this effort by sending 
contradictory messages about the use of these terms.
  I oppose this amendment, Mr. Chairman.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan has 2\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. At this time, I'd like to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my 
colleague from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. This is the one thing that just has me 
scratching my head. Every day, analysts in the IC community will hear 
those words, ``caliphate,'' ``jihadist,'' ``Muslim extremism,'' because 
those are the words of our enemy. And what we're telling this whole 
community, whose job it is to keep us informed and keep people who are 
going to do these intelligence investigations informed, is who they 
are, what they are, and how they use words, including coming up and 
briefing members of the State Department, ambassadors, and other 
things.
  So what you're saying is no more free speech; we're going to hurt 
somebody's feelings. We don't want to say that terrorists are using 
words like ``caliphate,'' they're using words like ``jihad.''
  This is the craziest thing I have ever heard. It is political 
correctness that is dangerous.
  If you ask the average American, should we shut down these people's 
use of the words in describing it to public officials, they will 
scratch their head and laugh. But that's exactly what you do when you 
create these artificial systems of the speech police.
  Do you want them to walk around the halls and police those who may 
slip and use the word ``jihadist'' after quoting Osama bin Laden in 
trying to get somebody to understand the dangers that they pose to the 
United States of America?
  I would just ask my colleagues, please, use a little common sense. 
This surpasses any, any commonsense test you can put together when it 
comes to free speech, number one, and accurately communicating between 
the powers that be, the intelligence community and policy-makers that 
need to have the same language that our enemy does to understand who 
they are and how dangerous they are.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas has 3\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, with that, I will yield the gentlelady from 
California (Ms. Harman), former ranking member of this committee, 2\1/
2\ minutes.
  Ms. HARMAN. I thank the chairman for yielding to me, and I commend 
him and the ranking member for crafting a very good bill. Many parts of 
this bill that reflect work we did together in this committee in years 
past, and it's wonderful that we will act on it later this afternoon.
  With respect to this amendment, I rise in reluctant opposition which 
I want to explain. I do understand the point that we should not be 
engaged in political correctness or censorship. I don't think my 
opposition is based on either of those things.

[[Page 15266]]

  Former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld once wrote a snowflake which asked, 
Are we capturing and killing them faster than they are rising up 
against us? The answer was no, and it's still no.
  It does matter that we try to win the argument, and not just with the 
next generation who could become suicide bombers or build the next 
lethal generation of IEDs, but we win the argument with moderate 
Muslims, many of whom live in the United States and want to help us.
  And their guidance has gone into this guidance, published by the 
Homeland Security Department, which is that we not use language that 
inflames.
  To the gentleman from Michigan, there is no prohibition in this to 
quoting the statements of Osama bin Laden and others who use these 
hateful words. Why would we want to censor that? The prohibition is 
directed at ourselves, words that will inflame the very communities 
we're trying to convince.
  I would just close with the observation that if we had thought a 
little longer about using the phrase ``axis of evil'' we might have, it 
seems to me, engendered more cooperation on the part of some countries 
that have, sadly, moved far away from us, and engendered more 
cooperation on the part of populations which now look at America with 
disapproval.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I believe I have the right to close, so I 
will reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I will just yield myself the remainder of my 
time to say that this is not about political correctness. This is about 
recognizing that words matter and the way we use words matter, 
particularly to those that we're trying to influence and those that 
we're trying to bring over in this war of ideas.
  I think it's important to recognize that, again, it's not about 
political correctness. It's about using common sense.
  And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  This is absolutely about political correctness. If we can't use the 
words that our enemies use to describe themselves and their activities, 
when they say jihad is the only way to liberate Palestine, and we go to 
local law enforcement, when we go to others in America and we describe 
the motivations and the intentions of those who wish to do us harm, I 
ask my colleagues, how do you expect the intelligence community to 
explain the behavior or the motivation of our enemies? Do we expect the 
intelligence community to say these are kind of bad people that may 
want to do us harm? We can't really use the words that they use to 
describe themselves because we've restricted the access of those words.
  How will America understand the nature and the character of our enemy 
if we can't use the words that they use to describe themselves and we 
need to come up with a whole new language that is totally out of 
context with the enemy and the nature of the threat that we face today?
  I urge my colleagues to support this commonsense amendment.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chairman announced that the 
noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan 
will be postponed.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Committee will rise informally.
  The Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Hinchey) assumed the chair.

                          ____________________