[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 154 (2008), Part 10]
[House]
[Pages 14593-14595]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




   NOTICE OF INTENTION TO OFFER RESOLUTION RAISING A QUESTION OF THE 
                        PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE

  Mr. KUCINICH. Madam Speaker, pursuant to clause 2, rule IX, I hereby 
give notice of my intention to raise a question of the privileges of 
the House. The form of the resolution is as follows:


         An Article of Impeachment of President George W. Bush

       Resolved, that President George W. Bush be impeached for 
     high crimes and misdemeanors, and that the following Article 
     of Impeachment be exhibited to the United States Senate:
       An Article of Impeachment exhibited by the House of 
     Representatives of the United States of America in the name 
     of itself and the people of the United States of America, in 
     maintenance and support of its impeachment against President 
     George W. Bush for high crimes and misdemeanors.


Article One--Deceiving Congress with Fabricated Threats of Iraq WMDs to 
Fraudulently Obtain Support for an Authorization of the Use of Military 
                           Force Against Iraq

       In his conduct while President of the United States, George 
     W. Bush, in violation of his constitutional oath to 
     faithfully execute the Office of President of the United 
     States, and to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, 
     and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in 
     violation of his constitutional duty under article II, 
     section 3 of the Constitution ``to take care that the laws be 
     faithfully executed,'' deceived Congress with fabricated 
     threats of Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction to fraudulently 
     obtain support for an authorization for the use of force 
     against Iraq and used that fraudulently obtained 
     authorization, then acting in his capacity under article II, 
     section 2 of the Constitution as Commander in Chief, to 
     commit U.S. troops to combat in Iraq.
       To gain congressional support for the passage of the Joint 
     Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces 
     Against Iraq, the President made the following material 
     representations to the Congress in S.J. Res. 45:
       1. That Iraq was ``continuing to possess and develop a 
     significant chemical and biological weapons capability. . . 
     .''
       2. That Iraq was ``actively seeking a nuclear weapons 
     capability. . . .''
       3. That Iraq was ``continuing to threaten the national 
     security interests of the United States and international 
     peace and security.''
       4. That Iraq has demonstrated a ``willingness to attack, 
     the United States. . . .''
       5. That ``members of al Qaeda, an organization bearing 
     responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens 
     and interests, including the attacks that occurred on 
     September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq. . . .''
       6. The ``attacks on the United States of September 11, 
     2001, underscored the gravity of the threat that Iraq will 
     transfer weapons of mass destruction to international 
     terrorist organizations. . . .''
       7. That Iraq ``will either employ those weapons to launch a 
     surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces 
     or provide them to international terrorists who would do so. 
     . . .''
       8. That an ``extreme magnitude of harm that would result to 
     the United States and its citizens from such an attack. . . 
     .''
       9. That the aforementioned threats ``justify action by the 
     United States to defend itself. . . .''
       10. The enactment clause of section 2 of S.J. Res. 45, the 
     Authorization of the Use of the United States Armed Forces 
     authorizes the President to ``defend the national security 
     interests of the United States against the threat posed by 
     Iraq. . . .''
       Each consequential representation made by the President to 
     the Congress in S.J. Res. 45 in subsequent iterations and the 
     final version was unsupported by evidence which was in the 
     control of the White House.
       To wit:
       1. Iraq was not ``continuing to possess and develop a 
     significant chemical and biological weapons capability . . . 
     ''
       ``A substantial amount of Iraq's chemical warfare agents, 
     precursors, munitions and production equipment were destroyed 
     between 1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert Storm 
     and United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) actions. There 
     is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and 
     stockpiling chemical weapons or whether Iraq has or will 
     establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.''
       The source of this information is the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency, a report called, ``Iraq--Key WMD Facilities--An 
     Operational Support Study,'' September 2002.
       ``Statements by the President and Vice President prior to 
     the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding 
     Iraq's chemical weapons production capability and activities 
     did not reflect the intelligence community's uncertainties as 
     to whether such production was ongoing.''
       The source of this information is the Senate Select 
     Committee on Intelligence, a report entitled ``Report on 
     Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq By U.S. Government 
     Officials Were Substantiated By Intelligence Information.'' 
     June 5, 2008.
       ``In April and early May 2003, military forces found mobile 
     trailers in Iraq. Although intelligence experts disputed the 
     purpose of the trailers, administration officials repeatedly 
     asserted that they were mobile biological weapons 
     laboratories. In total, President Bush, Vice President 
     Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National 
     Security Advisor Rice made 34 misleading statements about the 
     trailers in 27 separate public appearances. Shortly after the 
     mobile trailers were found, the Central Intelligence Agency 
     and the Defense Intelligence Agency issued an unclassified 
     white paper evaluating the trailers. The white paper was 
     released without coordination with other members of the 
     intelligence community, however. It was later disclosed that 
     engineers from the Defense Intelligence Agency who examined 
     the trailers concluded that they were most likely used to 
     produce hydrogen for artillery weather balloons. A former 
     senior intelligence official reported that `only one of 15 
     intelligence analysts assembled from three agencies to 
     discuss the issue in June endorsed the white paper 
     conclusion.'''
       The source of this information is the House Committee on 
     Government Reform, minority staff, ``Iraq on the Record: Bush 
     Administration's Public Statements about Chemical and 
     Biological Weapons.'' March 16, 2004.
       Former chief of CIA covert operations in Europe, Tyler 
     Drumheller, has said that the CIA had credible sources 
     discounting weapons of mass destruction claims, including the 
     primary source of biological weapons claims, an informant who 
     the Germans code-named ``Curveball'' whom the Germans had 
     informed the Bush administration was a likely fabricator of 
     information including that concerning the Niger yellowcake 
     forgery. Two other former CIA officers confirmed Drumheller's 
     account to Sidney Blumenthal who reported the story at 
     Salon.com on September 6, 2007, which in fact is the media 
     source of this information.
       ``In practical terms, with the destruction of the al Hakam 
     facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain advanced 
     biological weapons quickly. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) found 
     no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new 
     biological weapons program or was conducting biological 
     weapons-specific work for military purposes. Indeed, from the 
     mid-1990s, despite

[[Page 14594]]

     evidence of continuing interest in nuclear and chemical 
     weapons, there appears to be a complete absence of discussion 
     or even interest in biological weapons at the Presidential 
     level. In spite of exhaustive investigation, the Iraq Survey 
     Group found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was 
     developing, biological weapon agent production systems 
     mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons. The Iraq Survey 
     Group harbors severe doubts about the source's credibility in 
     regards to the breakout program.'' That's a direct quote from 
     the ``Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the 
     Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's WMD,'' commonly 
     known as the Duelfer report by Charles Duelfer.
       ``While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions 
     have been discovered, the Iraq Survey Group judges that Iraq 
     unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons 
     stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications that 
     Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, 
     a policy the Iraq Survey Group attributes to Baghdad's desire 
     to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear 
     of force against it should WMD be discovered.''
       The source of this information, the ``Comprehensive Report 
     of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central 
     Intelligence on Iraq's WMD,'' Charles Duelfer.
       2. Iraq was not ``actively seeking a nuclear weapons 
     capability.''
       The key finding of the Iraq Survey Group's report to the 
     Director of Central Intelligence found that ``Iraq's ability 
     to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively 
     decayed after that date. Saddam Husayn (sic) ended the 
     nuclear program in 1991 following the Gulf War. Iraq Survey 
     Group found no evidence to suggest concerted efforts to 
     restart the program.''
       The source of this information, the ``Comprehensive Report 
     of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central 
     Intelligence on Iraq's WMD,'' Charles Duelfer.
       Claims that Iraq was purchasing uranium from Niger were not 
     supported by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence 
     and Research in the National Intelligence Estimate of October 
     2002.
       The CIA had warned the British Government not to claim Iraq 
     was purchasing uranium from Niger prior to the British 
     statement that was later cited by President Bush, this 
     according to George Tenet of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     on July 11, 2003.
       Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency, in a ``Statement to the 
     United Nations Security Council on The Status of Nuclear 
     Inspections in Iraq: An Update'' on March 7, 2003, said as 
     follows:
       ``One, there is no indication of resumed nuclear activities 
     in those buildings that were identified through the use of 
     satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected 
     since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited 
     activities at any inspected sites. Second, there is no 
     indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 
     1990. Three, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted 
     to import aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. 
     Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have 
     been--it would have encountered practical difficulties in 
     manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminum tubes in 
     question. Fourthly, although we are still reviewing issues 
     related to magnets and magnet production, there is no 
     indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in a 
     centrifuge enrichment program. As I stated above, the IAEA 
     (International Atomic Energy Agency) will naturally continue 
     to further scrutinize and investigate all of the above 
     issues.''
       3. Iraq was not ``continuing to threaten the national 
     security interests of the United States.''
       ``Let me be clear: analysts differed on several important 
     aspects of [Iraq's biological, chemical, and nuclear] 
     programs and those debates were spelled out in the Estimate. 
     They never said there was an `imminent' threat.''
       George Tenet, who was Director of the CIA, said this in 
     Prepared Remarks for Delivery at Georgetown University on 
     February 5, 2004.
       ``We have been able to keep weapons from going into Iraq. 
     We have been able to keep the sanctions in place to the 
     extent that items that might support weapons of mass 
     destruction have had some controls on them. It's been quite a 
     success for 10 years.'' The source of this statement, Colin 
     Powell, Secretary of State, in an interview with Face the 
     Nation, February 11, 2001.
       On July 23, 2002, a communication from the Private 
     Secretary to Prime Minister Tony Blair, ``Memo to British 
     Ambassador David Manning'' reads as follows:
       ``British Secret Intelligence Service Chief Sir Richard 
     Billing Dearlove reported on his recent talks in Washington. 
     There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action 
     was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam 
     through military action, justified by the conjunction of 
     terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being 
     fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the 
     U.N. route and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the 
     Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in 
     Washington of the aftermath after military action. The 
     Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin 
     Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his 
     mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet 
     decided. But the case was thin. Saddam Hussein was not 
     threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less 
     than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a 
     plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the U.N. 
     weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal 
     justification for the use of force.''
       4. Iraq did not have the ``willingness to attack, the 
     United States.''
       ``The fact of the matter is that both baskets, the U.N. 
     basket and what we and other allies have been doing in the 
     region, have succeeded in containing Saddam Hussein and his 
     ambitions. His forces are about one-third their original 
     size. They really don't possess the capability to attack 
     their neighbors the way they did 10 years ago.'' The source 
     of this quote, Colin Powell, Secretary of State, in a 
     transcript of remarks made to German Foreign Minister Joschka 
     Fischer in February 2001.
       The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate concluded 
     that ``Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of 
     conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or chemical or 
     biological weapons against the United States, fearing that 
     exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a 
     stronger case for making war.''
       5. Iraq had no connection with the attacks of 9/11 or with 
     al Qaeda's role in 9/11.
       ``The report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
     documents significant instances in which the administration 
     went beyond what the intelligence community knew or believed 
     in making public claims, most notably on the false assertion 
     that Iraq and al Qaeda had an operational partnership and 
     joint involvement in carrying out the attacks of September 
     11.'' This is a quote from Senator John D. Rockefeller, IV, 
     the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
     entitled ``Additional Views of Chairman John D. Rockefeller, 
     IV'' on page 90.
       Continuing from Senator Rockefeller:
       ``The President and his advisors undertook a relentless 
     public campaign in the aftermath of the attacks to use the 
     war against al Qaeda as a justification for overthrowing 
     Saddam Hussein. Representing to the American people that the 
     two had an operational partnership and posed a single, 
     indistinguishable threat was fundamentally misleading and led 
     the Nation to war on false premises.'' Senator Rockefeller.
       Richard Clarke, a National Security Advisor, in a memo of 
     September 18, 2001 titled ``Survey of Intelligence 
     Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 
     Attacks'' found no ``compelling case'' that Iraq had either 
     planned or perpetrated the attacks, and that there was no 
     confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with bin Laden on 
     unconventional weapons.
       On September 17, 2003, President Bush said: ``No, we've got 
     no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September 
     11. What the Vice President said was is that he (Saddam) has 
     been involved with al Qaeda.''
       On June 16, 2004, a staff report from the 9/11 Commission 
     stated: ``There have been reports that contacts between Iraq 
     and al Qaeda also occurred after bin Laden had returned to 
     Afghanistan in 1996, but they do not appear to have resulted 
     in a collaborative relationship. Two senior bin Laden 
     associates have adamantly denied that any ties existed 
     between al Qaeda and Iraq. We have no credible evidence that 
     Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United 
     States.''
       ``Intelligence provided by former Undersecretary of Defense 
     Douglas J. Feith to buttress the White House case for 
     invading Iraq included `reporting of dubious quality or 
     reliability' that supported the political views of senior 
     administration officials rather than the conclusions of the 
     intelligence community, this according to a report by the 
     Pentagon Inspector General.
       ``Feith's office `was predisposed to finding a significant 
     relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda,' according to 
     portions of the report released by Senator Carl Levin. The 
     Inspector General described Feith's activities as `an 
     alternative intelligence assessment process.' '' The source 
     of this information is a report in the Washington Post dated 
     February 9, 2007, page A-1, an article by Walter Pincus and 
     Jeffrey Smith entitled ``Official's Key Report on Iraq is 
     Faulted, `Dubious' Intelligence Fueled Push for War.''
       6. Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction to 
     transfer to anyone.
       Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction to transfer. 
     Furthermore, available intelligence information found that 
     the Iraq regime would probably only transfer weapons of mass 
     destruction to terrorist organizations if under threat of 
     attack by the United States.
       According to information in the October 2002 National 
     Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq that was available to the 
     administration at the time that they were seeking 
     congressional support for the authorization of use of force 
     against Iraq, the Iraq regime would probably only transfer 
     weapons to a terrorist organization if ``sufficiently 
     desperate'' because it feared that ``an attack

[[Page 14595]]

     that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or 
     unavoidable.''
       ``The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) probably has been 
     directed to conduct clandestine attacks against the United 
     States and Allied interests in the Middle East in the event 
     the United States takes action against Iraq. The IIS probably 
     would be the primary means by which Iraq would attempt to 
     conduct any chemical and biological weapon attacks on the 
     U.S. homeland, although we have no specific intelligence 
     information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks against 
     U.S. territory.''
       7. Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction and therefore 
     had no capability of launching a surprise attack against the 
     United States or its Armed Forces and no capability to 
     provide them to international terrorists who would do so.
       Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction to transfer. 
     Furthermore, available intelligence information found that 
     the Iraq regime would probably only transfer weapons of mass 
     destruction to terrorist organizations if under severe threat 
     of attack by the United States.
       According to information in the October 2002 National 
     Intelligence Estimate on Iraq that was available to the 
     administration at the time they were seeking congressional 
     support for the authorization of the use of force against 
     Iraq, the Iraqi regime would probably only transfer weapons 
     to a terrorist organization if ``sufficiently desperate'' 
     because it feared that ``an attack that threatened the 
     survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable.'' That, 
     again, from the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate 
     on Iraq.
       ``The Iraqi Intelligence Service probably has been directed 
     to conduct clandestine attacks against U.S. and Allied 
     interests in the Middle East in the event the United States 
     takes action against Iraq. The Iraq Intelligence Service 
     probably would be the primary means by which Iraq would 
     attempt to conduct any chemical or biological weapons attacks 
     on the U.S. homeland, although we have no specific 
     intelligence information that Saddam's regime has directed 
     attacks against U.S. territory.''
       As reported in the Washington Post on March 1, 2003, in 
     1995, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, had 
     informed U.S. and British intelligence officers that ``all 
     weapons--biological, chemical, missile, nuclear--were 
     destroyed.'' That from the Washington Post, March 1, 2003, 
     page A15, an article entitled ``Iraqi Defector Claimed Arms 
     Were Destroyed By 1995,'' by Colum Lynch.
       The Defense Intelligence Agency, in a report called 
     ``Iraq--Key WMD Facilities--An Operational Report Study'' in 
     September 2002, said this:
       ``A substantial amount of Iraq's chemical warfare agents, 
     precursors, munitions and production equipment were destroyed 
     between 1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert Storm 
     and United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) actions. There 
     is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and 
     stockpiling chemical weapons or whether Iraq has or will 
     establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.''
       8. There was not a real risk of an ``extreme magnitude of 
     harm that would result to the United States and its citizens 
     from such an attack'' because Iraq had no capability of 
     attacking the United States.
       Here's what Colin Powell said at the time: ``Containment 
     has been a successful policy, and I think we should make sure 
     that we continue it until such time as Saddam Hussein comes 
     into compliance with the agreements he made at the end of the 
     Gulf War.'' Speaking of Iraq, Secretary of State Powell said, 
     ``Iraq is not threatening America.''
       9. The aforementioned evidence did not ``justify the use of 
     force by the United States to defend itself'' because Iraq 
     did not have weapons of mass destruction, or have the 
     intention or capability of using nonexistent WMDs against the 
     United States.
       10. Since there was no threat posed by Iraq to the United 
     States, the enactment clause of the Senate Joint Resolution 
     45 was predicated on misstatements to Congress.
       Congress relied on the information provided to it by the 
     President of the United States. Congress provided the 
     President with the authorization to use military force that 
     he requested. As a consequence of the fraudulent 
     representations made to Congress, the United States Armed 
     Forces, under the direction of George Bush as Commander in 
     Chief, pursuant to section 3 of the Authorization for the Use 
     of Force which President Bush requested, invaded Iraq and 
     occupies it to this day, at the cost of 4,116 lives of 
     servicemen and -women, injuries to over 30,000 of our troops, 
     the deaths of over 1 million innocent Iraqi civilians, the 
     destruction of Iraq, and a long-term cost of over $3 
     trillion.
       President Bush's misrepresentations to Congress to induce 
     passage of a use of force resolution is subversive of the 
     constitutional system of checks and balances, destructive of 
     Congress' sole prerogative to declare war under article I, 
     section 8 of the Constitution, and is therefore a High Crime. 
     An even greater offense by the President of the United States 
     occurs in his capacity as Commander in Chief, because he 
     knowingly placed the men and women of the United States Armed 
     Forces in harm's way, jeopardizing their lives and their 
     families' future, for reasons that to this date have not been 
     established in fact.
       In all of these actions and decisions, President George W. 
     Bush has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President 
     and Commander in Chief, and subversive of constitutional 
     government, to the prejudice of the cause of law and justice 
     and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States 
     and of those members of the Armed Forces who put their lives 
     on the line pursuant to the falsehoods of the President. 
     Wherefore, President George W. Bush, by such conduct, is 
     guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from 
     office.


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair will remind all persons in the 
gallery that they are here as guests of the House and that any 
manifestation of approval or disapproval of proceedings or other 
audible conversation is in violation of the House rules.
  Under rule IX, a resolution offered from the floor by a Member other 
than the majority leader or the minority leader as a question of the 
privileges of the House has immediate precedence only at a time 
designated by the Chair within 2 legislative days after the resolution 
is properly noticed.
  Pending that designation, the form of the resolution noticed by the 
gentleman from Ohio will appear in the Record at this point.
  The Chair will not at this point determine whether the resolution 
constitutes a question of privilege. That determination will be made at 
the time designated for consideration of the resolution.

                          ____________________