[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 154 (2008), Part 10]
[Senate]
[Pages 14151-14154]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




   ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION BUREAUCRACY OF THE UNITED STATES

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, today I wish to discuss the U.S. arms 
control and nonproliferation bureaucracy and its impact on our national 
security.
  Recently, I chaired two hearings of the Oversight of Government 
Management Subcommittee of the Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee concerning the national security 
bureaucracy for arms control and nonproliferation. I examined several 
options for improving our ability to control proliferation. They 
included: Reestablishing an independent arms control and 
nonproliferation agency, creating a semiautonomous arms control and 
nonproliferation agency within the State Department, and reestablishing 
an arms control bureau in the State Department. Other issues discussed 
were elevating the role of the head of the arms control and 
nonproliferation bureaucracy and ensuring that there are enough 
qualified arms control and nonproliferation experts to protect our 
national security and meet our international obligations.
  Witnesses for both hearings had decades of experience in managing our 
nation's arms control and nonproliferation issues. Ambassador Thomas 
Graham and Ambassador Norman Wulf, along with Dr. Andrew Semmel, who 
recently retired as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations, provided perspective 
about the changes to this bureaucracy over the past decade and the need 
for reform. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed into 
the Record, following my remarks, a report submitted by Ambassador Wulf 
which represents consensus findings of a number of experts and former 
U.S. officials experienced in this field.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. AKAKA. The second hearing featured Ms. Patricia McNerney, the 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Security and Nonproliferation, and Ms. Linda Taglialatela, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Resources. They gave greater 
insight into the controversial, and damaging, arms control and 
nonproliferation bureaucracy reorganization at the State Department in 
2005 and the ongoing human capital changes the bureaus involved 
continue to face today. The State Department's use of short-term, Band-
Aid fixes to cover a loss of qualified civil servants and a lack of 
commitment by senior leaders to address the Department's cultural 
tensions, primarily between regional and functional issues, troubled me 
since these problems affect both human capital and organizational 
capacity to confront the evolving threat of weapons of mass 
destruction.
  In 1961, when President John F. Kennedy entered office, the United 
States faced a perceived missile gap against its foe, the Soviet Union. 
The Kennedy administration, confronting the critical challenges of the 
day, advocated a new government ``agency of peace'' which would work 
toward ``ultimate world disarmament.'' This agency, the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, ACDA, helped craft and implement the policy 
decisions that would reduce the nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons threat to Americans through multiple, lasting, and verifiable 
treaties. The world was at a nuclear tipping point, where a small 
change could make a significant difference. The Kennedy administration 
challenged the conventional wisdom that argued for only an increase in 
nuclear weapons. It instead focused on controlling and limiting the 
spread of nuclear weapons by creating the small, but agile, Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency that gradually began to increase 
international security.
  The world appears to be at another nuclear tipping point. Today 
international security does not hinge on an arms race between two 
mighty superpowers. Rather, international security is increasingly 
threatened by the wide proliferation of nuclear programs, material, and 
knowledge. Countries such as India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran 
have either achieved a nuclear weapons program or have aspirations to 
create one. Others soon may follow. Along with these headline-grabbing 
nuclear proliferation concerns, many countries are seeking nuclear 
power and assured access to uranium to satisfy their growing energy 
demands. The peaceful application of civilian nuclear programs 
heightens the risk of diversion or the proliferation of plutonium and 
enriched uranium. Both presidential candidates have expressed their 
commitment to addressing proliferation and working with other nations 
to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict.
  The next administration must confront this tipping point head on and 
solve the problem of our troubled arms control and nonproliferation 
bureaucracy. Along with its organizational structure, fundamental human 
capital issues must be resolved. They include: Addressing what is 
considered by some a cumbersome hiring process; recruiting, developing, 
and retaining a diverse and highly qualified workforce; involving key 
stakeholders during organizational changes; and making it desirable for 
Foreign Service Officers to serve in the fields of arms control and 
nonproliferation.
  We need to consider the gravity of this issue now. I urge my 
colleagues to advocate an arms control and nonproliferation workforce 
and organization that will support effectively the policies of the next 
administration and prepare us for the nuclear threats developing 
throughout the world.

                               Exhibit 1

                                Foreword

       This report was prepared by a volunteer task force. The 
     task force solicited views from participants through two 
     general meetings and from contributors via written comments.
       These two groups included many former U.S. officials most 
     with decades of experience in nonproliferation or arms 
     control who graciously gave of their time to this project. 
     They are named below--a short biography of each appears in 
     the annex.
       This report contains a general consensus that the 
     Administration taking office in January 2009 should 
     strengthen the organizational capacity of the State 
     Department to meet critical nonproliferation and arms control 
     challenges. Participants and contributors endorse the general 
     thrust of this report though not necessarily every finding 
     and suggestion.
       Christopher Mitchell of the Institute for Conflict Analysis 
     and Resolution (ICAR) of George Mason University served as 
     convener of the two meetings that were held. Norman Wulf led 
     those discussions and along with Dean Rust and Barclay Ward 
     drafted the discussion papers and this report.
       The task force also included Linda Gallini, Fred 
     McGoldrick, and Sharon Squassoni.
       Participants in at least one of the two meetings included 
     members of the task force and Vic Alessi, Kevin Avruch, 
     Joseph M. DeThomas, James E. Goodby, Allan Krass, Frances 
     Omori, Randy Rydell and Andy Semmel.
       Among those commenting upon various drafts of the paper 
     were William Burns, Ralph Earle II, Mark Fitzpatrick, Bob

[[Page 14152]]

     Gallucci, John Holum, Edward Ifft and John Rhinelander.
       No funds were made available to the task force other than 
     by ICAR for use of their new retreat and conference center 
     located on Mason Neck in Northern Virginia and for 
     refreshments at the two meetings. Special appreciation is 
     expressed to Gina Cerasani and Aneela Shamshad, and Saira 
     Yamin, graduate students at ICAR, who served as volunteer 
     note-takers at the two meetings.

                           Executive Summary

       All three major presidential candidates have endorsed (i.) 
     maintaining and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation 
     regime and (ii.) pursuing nuclear arms control measures with 
     Russia and others. Regrettably, the State Department, which 
     will bear the brunt of the work on nonproliferation and arms 
     control, has lost significant capability--critical personnel 
     have left, the arms control bureau has been abolished, and 
     the bureau whose mandate includes nonproliferation is 
     burdened with tasks outside its traditional purview that 
     dilute its mission. Moreover, the State Department is simply 
     not organized to ensure continued access and accountability 
     to the Secretary of State and President on these critical 
     issues.
       Following the election, the President-elect should appoint 
     a high-caliber individual to head up a task force charged 
     with laying out detailed priorities in nonproliferation and 
     arms control and recommending structural changes needed 
     within the executive branch to achieve those priorities. The 
     White House and National Security Council will need to be 
     well-organized to serve the President, but the task force 
     should direct its primary attention to the Department of 
     State. Restoring focus at State will require creating a 
     bureau focused on arms control, removing non-core tasks from 
     the bureau whose responsibilities include nonproliferation, 
     and limiting the activities of the verification and 
     compliance bureau to those required by law. If there are 
     substantial obstacles to near-term creation of an arms 
     control-focused bureau, then those functions should be 
     consolidated in the verification and compliance bureau 
     effectively making it the arms control and verification 
     bureau while seeking a long-term structure. Aggressive steps 
     must be taken to redress the loss of expert staff. For the 
     civil service, this means rehiring, recruiting, and 
     strengthening career paths for personnel, including physical 
     scientists, with expertise in nonproliferation and arms 
     control. For the foreign service, this means providing 
     training in these topics and career paths that reward those 
     working on these functional issues.
       Particular attention should be focused on ensuring that 
     nonproliferation and arms control views get to the Secretary 
     of State and the President. Both not only need advice but 
     someone accountable in these areas. Existing law makes 
     provision for such advice but it has proven difficult to 
     implement those provisions effectively. Relying on personal 
     relationships can work up to a point, but as personalities 
     change, other priorities intrude, and administrations change, 
     a more enduring channel and focus not dependent upon personal 
     relationships is needed.
       Decisions on these structural issues are critical in the 
     transition period so the new administration can hit the 
     ground running. Iran and North Korea, among others, will not 
     delay their proliferation progress while a new administration 
     organizes itself. Delaying decisions until after the 
     inauguration risks subordinating structural questions to the 
     crisis of the day or decisions being thwarted by ``turf'' 
     issues as political appointees are put into place. A variety 
     of alternatives should be considered ranging from creating a 
     special office attached to the Secretary, or creating a 
     separate agency within the State Department or an independent 
     agency.

    Ensuring the U.S. Government Has the Capacity To Meet Critical 
              Nonproliferation and Arms Control Challenges

       This short Report which is the result of meetings and 
     discussions between a number of experts focuses on improving 
     the Nation's capacity for dealing with the increasingly 
     complex issues associated with nonproliferation and arms 
     control. It lays out a number of alternative strategies for 
     improving the Government's currently attenuated capacities 
     for effective nonproliferation and arms control action.


                            I. Introduction

       All three major presidential candidates have endorsed the 
     following objectives: (i.) maintaining and strengthening the 
     nuclear nonproliferation regime and (ii.) pursuing nuclear 
     arms control measures with Russia and others. Regrettably, 
     what the next President will find is a diminished capability 
     within the Executive Branch to achieve either objective.
       The historical leadership role of the United States in 
     nonproliferation and arms control has been severely 
     downgraded and the nonproliferation regime significantly 
     weakened. Along with this overall decline, there has been a 
     loss of valuable expertise and bureaucratic structure 
     diminishing the capacity of the United States to pursue 
     nonproliferation and arms control measures.
       Restoring U.S. leadership in these areas will require a 
     personal commitment by the new President. Within the 
     Executive Branch, there will need to be a strong organization 
     to execute policies and be accountable to the White House. 
     This paper looks at key organizational issues that must be 
     met, particularly in the State Department, if the new 
     administration is to meet its nonproliferation and arms 
     control objectives.


                 II. Critical Proliferation Challenges

       The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the 
     foundation for global cooperation in this area. Its primary 
     goal is to decrease the risk of nuclear war by preventing the 
     spread of nuclear weapons. It also obligates the five states 
     which the NPT recognizes as possessing nuclear weapons--U.S., 
     Russia, UK, France and China--to work toward nuclear 
     disarmament The urgency of dealing with the threat posed by 
     nuclear weapons has been highlighted recently by former 
     senior officials of both political parties--Secretaries of 
     State Kissinger and Shultz, Secretary of Defense Perry, and 
     Senator Nunn--who have called for renewed efforts to work 
     towards a nuclear weapon free world, arguing that ``the world 
     is now on a precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era.'' 
     Their agenda, known as the Hoover plan after the Stanford 
     institute where the group meets, is built around the NPT and 
     focuses on U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control as well as on 
     specific nonproliferation measures. No vision of a nuclear 
     weapon free world or major progress toward that goal can be 
     achieved without an intensive focus on both nonproliferation 
     and arms control.
       The three major candidates for the Presidency have called 
     for strengthening the NPT and other elements of the 
     nonproliferation regime and for reducing the nuclear arsenals 
     of the United States and other nuclear powers; two have 
     endorsed specific portions of the Hoover plan. Any new 
     administration will likely focus on a wide variety of other 
     nuclear-related challenges as well, e.g., Iran and North 
     Korea; protecting against the theft or diversion of nuclear 
     material; strengthening export control and interdiction 
     activities; and developing nuclear fuel cycle strategies to 
     reduce the spread of sensitive nuclear facilities. It may 
     reconsider the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the 
     Senate failed to endorse in 1999, and give higher priority to 
     U.S-Russian cooperation on strategic nuclear and missile 
     defense issues and to a fissile material cutoff treaty. The 
     new administration will have to continue specific measures to 
     prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear, radiological, 
     chemical and biological weapons.


                        III. Structural Factors

       The first year of a new administration offers a unique 
     opportunity for progress. Grasping that opportunity requires 
     diligent preparations during the transition period. To 
     prepare, the President-elect should establish a task force to 
     identify key substantive goals and devise a plan for the 
     creation of nonproliferation and arms control structures to 
     achieve those goals. The task force should be led by an 
     individual of stature who is directly accountable to the 
     President-elect and well-known to the Congress. The task 
     force could continue beyond the inauguration but should not 
     be permanent. After the inauguration, the task force leader 
     might be directly attached to the White House with the 
     assignment of ensuring that substantive and structural goals 
     are achieved.
       As cabinet departments with equities in nonproliferation 
     and arms control have appointees put into place, a senior 
     official in each department should be identified to work with 
     the relevant White House and NSC officials. The NSC structure 
     must include interagency groups responsible for integrating 
     the activities and resources of each department, promoting 
     transparency and information flow among agencies, and 
     ensuring the input of the intelligence community. The 
     appointment of a Deputy National Security Adviser for 
     Nonproliferation and Arms Control would demonstrate the 
     priority attached to these issues and allow for greater 
     coordination of interagency activities.
       The task force must pay special attention to the 
     organizational structure under the Secretary of State, as 
     State will bear the brunt of the work. State must be capable 
     of performing a wide range of daily activities such as 
     monitoring information, crafting and implementing policy 
     initiatives, anticipating problems, advising high-level 
     political officials, coordinating with other agencies, 
     consulting with Congress, informing the public, and most 
     importantly engaging in extensive diplomacy to maintain and 
     strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Effective 
     nonproliferation can only be achieved if the U.S. works 
     closely with others.
       A good organizational structure will help to set 
     priorities, allocate resources, maintain the quality and 
     morale of staff, and get issues to decision-makers in a 
     timely manner. Among the key determinants of an effective 
     structure are: (i) enough senior policy officials and 
     supporting bureaus to focus attention on the full range of 
     issues; (ii) an experienced multi-disciplinary career staff 
     with a high percentage of civil servants including physical 
     science officers; and (iii) high-level channels for getting 
     views to the Secretary of State and President.
       As shown below in Section IV, the current structure, which 
     reflects the priorities and approach of this Administration, 
     is entirely

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     inadequate for pursuit of a more comprehensive approach by 
     the new administration. The suggestions offered in Section IV 
     do not require legislation but should lead to near-term 
     improvements in State's capacity. Even though not required, 
     the administration and Congress may decide that it would be 
     beneficial to codify some of these Section IV changes to 
     ensure that the United States maintains over the long term a 
     high level of capability in these critical areas.
       Section V looks at other possible legislative approaches 
     that would create either a semi-autonomous agency within the 
     State Department or a separate agency for nonproliferation 
     and arms control with an independence similar to that 
     possessed by the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
     (ACDA), which was merged with the State Department in 1999.
       If not already decided by campaign commitments, the 
     President-elect should decide during the transition whether 
     to pursue a separate agency or limit structural reforms to 
     near-term changes that do not require legislation. Even if 
     the President decides on a separate agency, some improvements 
     in the State structure will still be desirable while awaiting 
     the necessary legislative action. Thorough consultations with 
     the Congress should occur regardless of which direction is 
     chosen.


 IV. Suggested Changes to the Current State Department Organizational 
                               Structure

     A. Bureaus and Special Representatives
       At the outset of this Administration, three separate 
     bureaus in State dealt with nonproliferation, arms control, 
     and verification and compliance. The arms control bureau was 
     abolished in 2005. Some of the arms control functions, e.g., 
     START, were taken over by the verification and compliance 
     bureau but that bureau's duties remain largely verification 
     and compliance as prescribed by law. Other arms control 
     duties were transferred to the former nonproliferation 
     bureau, now renamed International Security and 
     Nonproliferation. A quick inventory of this bureau's 
     jurisdiction includes: six treaties, five export control 
     regimes, three international organizations that specialize in 
     nonproliferation or arms control topics, conventional arms 
     proliferation, missile proliferation, missile defense, the 
     Proliferation Security Initiative, implementation of several 
     U.N. Security Council resolutions and negotiation of 
     resolutions in the U.N. General Assembly, combating nuclear 
     terrorism, country strategies, cooperative threat reduction 
     in the former U.S.S.R., and securing and disposing of fissile 
     material.
       Diluting the focus of the bureau charged with 
     nonproliferation by adding such areas as missile defense and 
     General Assembly resolutions makes it much more difficult to 
     achieve priority nonproliferation objectives. Abolishing the 
     arms control focus and scattering its remains renders it 
     unlikely that a renewed arms control agenda as proposed in 
     the Hoover plan can be successfully pursued. Finally, while 
     verification and compliance remain important, the need for 
     U.S. global engagement on nonproliferation and arms control 
     measures should have higher priority and greater focus.
       Suggestions
       1. Establish a bureau focused solely on nonproliferation by 
     shifting all non-core duties, such as missile defense and 
     General Assembly resolutions, to a bureau with an arms 
     control focus.
       2. Revitalize the organizational structure for arms control 
     by bringing back a bureau solely focused on arms control. 
     Given the difference in priorities in 2005 and what will 
     exist in 2009, new priorities can best be met by creating 
     such a single-focus bureau.
       3. Through administrative action, limit the activities of 
     the verification and compliance bureau to the minimum 
     necessary to fulfill its statutory duties. The goal should be 
     to eliminate bureaucratic infighting and free up staff from 
     this bureau for high priority nonproliferation and arms 
     control activities.
       4. If there are substantial obstacles to near-term creation 
     of an arms control focused bureau, then consolidate those 
     functions in the verification and compliance bureau 
     effectively making it the arms control and verification 
     bureau while seeking a long-term structure. This approach 
     should include clearly defining the verification role as 
     suggested above.
       5. Utilize existing statutory authority to appoint 
     ``Special Representatives of the President'' at the 
     ambassadorial level, with at least one dedicated to 
     nonproliferation treaties and related activities; and another 
     to the reemerging arms control agenda. They would work with 
     the assistant secretaries for nonproliferation and arms 
     control and be responsible for negotiations, conferences, and 
     consulting with other governments.
     B. Staffing
       The State Department should have skills and experience 
     relevant to bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and 
     negotiations; the development, testing and manufacture of 
     nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and their delivery 
     systems; the civil nuclear fuel cycle; and to the 
     implementation of interdiction measures, export controls, 
     treaties and international organizations. An 
     interdisciplinary group of civil servants from the physical 
     and social sciences is needed along with foreign service 
     officers (FSOs) and detailees from the military services. 
     This mix has worked well in the past.
       Unfortunately, there has been a significant loss of civil 
     servants from the State Department in recent years, and 
     recruiting physical scientists in particular faces strong 
     competitive pressures outside the government. Moreover, with 
     the elimination of ACDA, it has become more difficult to 
     sustain civil service career patterns up through the office 
     director position. Within the relevant bureaus, the State 
     Department has reduced the number of senior executive service 
     positions (SES) for civil servants and several office 
     director positions have gone to FSOs. Such officers have much 
     to offer, including in some cases as office directors or 
     other senior positions. But FSOs must meet the qualifications 
     of the positions, and in most leadership positions, including 
     office directors; the qualifications require a high level of 
     expertise in the field. Regrettably, the foreign service 
     creates few incentives for FSOs to obtain the requisite 
     knowledge for leadership positions in nonproliferation and 
     arms control.
       Suggestions
       1. Halt any further ``bleeding'' of the career 
     nonproliferation and arms control staff. Encourage those who 
     transferred out of these jobs in recent years to return. 
     Promote a civil service career path leading to office 
     director positions, including at the SES level. Launch a 
     recruiting program to hire the next generation of civil 
     service specialists, including in relevant scientific and 
     technical fields. Seek special hiring authority, if 
     necessary, to recruit individuals with technical competence 
     and to tap the skills of those officers who have retired from 
     State.
       2. Develop the technical competence of FSOs by creating a 
     career path for nonproliferation and arms control with a 
     protocol of training and assignments in these areas. For all 
     FSOs, regardless of their career path, at least one 
     assignment in nonproliferation and arms control or other 
     functional bureaus should be a factor in promotion decisions 
     to mid or senior level FSO positions. Such assignments could 
     reduce some cultural barriers that exist between the regional 
     and functional areas.
     C. Advising the Secretary of State and the President
       Competing interests are a fact of life at the highest 
     political levels and it is important that those advocating on 
     behalf of controlling nuclear weapons be heard. The Under 
     Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 
     Security (``the Under Secretary'') is the most senior State 
     official with clearly defined responsibilities for 
     nonproliferation and arms control, although that position's 
     mandate covers other issues including security assistance and 
     conventional arms. This official is subordinate to the Deputy 
     Secretary of State, is one of six under secretaries and ranks 
     below the Under Secretary for Political Affairs who oversees 
     the powerful regional bureaus. This senior level structure is 
     further complicated by policy officials attached directly to 
     the Office of the Secretary of State for diverse areas, such 
     as reconstruction and stabilization, foreign assistance, 
     development aid, counter-terrorism, and global AIDS programs.
       Seeking to ensure that nonproliferation and arms control 
     were not lost among the competing interests, the legislation 
     merging ACDA into State authorized the Under Secretary to 
     assume the former ACDA Director's role of senior adviser to 
     the Secretary and the President on arms control and 
     nonproliferation and to attend NSC meetings at the 
     President's direction (22 U.S.C. Sec. 2651 a. (b) (2)) 
     (emphasis added). Use of this authority, however, was not 
     embraced by the current Administration.
       It has long been clear that the State Department structure 
     tends to favor regional interests. This tendency is reflected 
     in the fact that the under secretary to whom the regional 
     bureaus report is the third ranking official in the 
     department. This does not mean that functional interests must 
     give way to regional interests but it does mean that a 
     Secretary of State or a President must ensure that functional 
     priorities are clearly understood and always given 
     appropriate weight. For that to happen, a mechanism must be 
     found to ensure that nonproliferation and arms control 
     equities are represented.
       Different approaches--with varying degrees of success--have 
     been taken by different administrations. Some administrations 
     have relied upon the personal relationships among the 
     relevant assistant secretaries, under secretaries, the Deputy 
     Secretary and the Secretary to ensure that nonproliferation 
     and arms control are accorded adequate priority. Others have 
     created various additional mechanisms such as an ambassador-
     at-large to obtain this result. Of course, up to 1999, the 
     ACDA Director had the rank of Deputy Secretary of State and 
     the authority to advise the Secretary and the President.
       Relying solely on personal relationships places at risk 
     over time the capability to sustain the attention of the 
     Secretary of State as personalities change and the inevitable 
     crush of foreign policy issues competes for the Secretary's 
     attention. Continuity of

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     attention to these critical issues could be enhanced by 
     having a structure not dependent upon personalities. Set 
     forth in the suggestions immediately below, which would not 
     require new legislation, and in Section V, which would 
     require new legislation, are various alternatives that should 
     be considered. They could supplement any NSC or White House 
     structural components set up to advise the President. As 
     noted earlier, decisions with respect to these issues should 
     be taken during the transition--delaying those decisions 
     until after the inauguration risks critical substantive 
     issues crowding out attention to structural questions and 
     ``turf'' mentalities developing that hamper organizational 
     change.
       Suggestions
       1. Establish procedures to implement the Under Secretary's 
     already existing statutory role as senior adviser to the 
     Secretary and the President on nonproliferation and arms 
     control matters. This would allow the Under Secretary to 
     weigh in on major policy questions, including with the 
     President. It would elevate this position in relation to the 
     other under secretaries. Implementing such an approach would 
     work only if understood and accepted up front by all 
     involved, including the President. Actual use of this 
     authority by the Under Secretary with the President is likely 
     to be rare, in any event, given this person's subordinate 
     position to the Secretary.
       2. Establish a position in the Secretary's office such as 
     Coordinator, Ambassador-at-Large, or Special Adviser to the 
     Secretary of State and President, that would focus on nuclear 
     policy or nonproliferation. The mandate could be limited to a 
     few critical topics, e.g. Iran, North Korea, anti-nuclear 
     terrorism, and/or elements of the Hoover plan, or could be 
     broad enough to focus on all aspects of nuclear 
     proliferation. This would elevate nuclear issues to the 
     highest level in State and permit more focus than the Under 
     Secretary, whose mandate is far broader. This sort of 
     arrangement was used with varying degrees of success during 
     the Carter, Reagan and Bush I administrations. It would 
     require a high degree of coordination between the Under 
     Secretary and the new position, as well as with the relevant 
     assistant secretaries. It would not create any clearer path 
     to the President for views that are contrary to the 
     Secretary's.


                           V. Separate Agency

       State and ACDA working in tandem over nearly three decades 
     were able to sustain a high level of U.S. global leadership 
     in nonproliferation and arms control. This was in large part 
     due to ACDA's exclusive focus on the mission, its status as 
     an independent sub-cabinet agency with statutory authority to 
     advise the Secretary of State and the President, and a strong 
     cadre of civil service experts. The ten years since ACDA's 
     demise have seen a decline in U.S. diplomacy in this area. 
     That said, there seems little doubt that ACDA-like resources 
     and strengths will be needed for the foreseeable future. The 
     question is will a strengthened State structure as suggested 
     above in Section IV be adequate to the task over the long run 
     or should the new Administration seek legislation to transfer 
     the nonproliferation and arms control functions to a separate 
     agency? Two different approaches to a separate agency are set 
     forth below.
     A. Separate Agency, But Part of State
       A semi-autonomous agency within State would be similar to 
     the concept of the National Nuclear Security Administration 
     within the Department of Energy. The agency's Director would 
     be the nonproliferation and arms control adviser to the 
     Secretary, and have a rank equivalent to the Deputy Secretary 
     of State. The Director would also have the right to 
     communicate directly with the President. The agency would 
     work closely with State regional bureaus and related 
     functional bureaus, but there would be no need for additional 
     nonproliferation and arms control offices elsewhere in State 
     since this agency would represent the coordinated view of the 
     State Department on these issues.
       This approach would ensure optimal access to the Secretary. 
     The agency's unique identity and mission should improve the 
     recruitment and retention of the diverse professional staff 
     needed, including scientists and other technical experts. The 
     elevation of nonproliferation and arms control within State 
     will make clear to other governments the importance placed on 
     these topics by the United States and lead to regular 
     consultations with friends and allies. A separate agency is 
     the best way to promote an enduring focus on nonproliferation 
     and arms control policy, in contrast to embedding it in the 
     Department's traditional structure with the vast array of 
     competing interests and predominant focus on country and 
     regional factors. On the other hand, establishing a separate 
     agency would require legislation and presently Congress is 
     focusing on structural issues relevant to post-conflict 
     stabilization and reconstruction, development aid, and 
     foreign assistance. Some argue that a separate agency is not 
     needed; and that State can be structured so that these issues 
     get the attention they deserve and the Secretary gets the 
     necessary advice.
     B. Independent Agency
       The principal difference from alternative A would be the 
     agency's independence from State. The agency's director would 
     have a seat at NSC meetings dealing with relevant issues, and 
     the agency would participate as a separate entity in 
     interagency deliberations. The agency would have a status 
     similar to that of the former ACDA, which would imply a 
     return to a pre-1999 situation where State had its own 
     nonproliferation and arms control offices. The duties and 
     structure of the new agency, however, would have to reflect 
     the priorities and threats of today. Many of the arguments in 
     alternative A are also applicable here.
       In addition, this approach is the only one guaranteed to 
     ensure that the President could hear the nonproliferation and 
     arms control perspective even when the Secretary of State has 
     a different view. Equally important, having an independent 
     agency would make certain that unfiltered nonproliferation 
     and arms control views are considered at all levels of 
     interagency policy formulation, a situation that gave ACDA 
     influence. On the other hand, as experience with ACDA 
     demonstrated, the option of going to the President in 
     opposition to the Secretary of State can be more theoretical 
     than real, and might rarely be exercised. An independent 
     agency would result in State creating its own 
     nonproliferation and arms control officials and they would 
     have more influence on the Secretary on a day-to-day basis 
     than would a separate agency. Some in Congress would also not 
     be receptive to creating a new agency, believing that more 
     than a decade is needed to determine whether State can 
     effectively do the job on its own.


                             VI. Conclusion

       The above suggestions are, we feel, both practical and 
     necessary although which approach to advising the Secretary 
     of State and the President is actually taken up by a new 
     administration remains a topic for debate and discussion, 
     which we hope will occur over the coming months. These 
     suggestions are offered not as firm conclusions but as 
     alternative ways of improving the country's capacities for 
     planning and implementing a coordinated and flexible, but 
     above all effective, strategy for dealing with 
     nonproliferation and arms control issues.

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