[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 9]
[House]
[Pages 12191-12221]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 388 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2082.

                              {time}  2156


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 2082) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mrs. Tauscher in the chair.
  Mr. McHENRY. Madam Chair, I raise a question of consideration against 
the legislation before us.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question of consideration is not available in the 
Committee of the Whole.
  Mr. McHENRY. I thank the Chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.

[[Page 12192]]

  The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the gentleman from Michigan 
(Mr. Hoekstra) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.

                              {time}  2200

  Mr. REYES. Madam Chairwoman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Intelligence is our Nation's first line of defense. In a world of 
asymmetrical threats, it is critical that we detect and disrupt the 
plans and intentions of those who would do us harm. And it is critical 
that we conduct intelligence operations in a way that conforms to our 
laws and to our values as a Nation.
  This bill was the product of bipartisan work, and I am pleased that 
the ranking member, Mr. Hoekstra, worked with me over the past several 
weeks and months to draft this bill. We do not agree on every provision 
in this bill, but we agree on the larger points, and we agree that 
intelligence officers in the field deserve our support.
  Let me address up front one area where I think there has been some 
confusion, and that is section 407 of the bill, which asks for a 
national intelligence estimate on the national security impact of 
climate change.
  We heeded the advice of 11 former 3- and 4-star admirals and generals 
who have studied this issue and specifically recommended an NIE. They 
believe that significant changes in global climate may act as a 
``threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile 
regions of our world.''
  The ranking member has argued that this work should not divert 
resources from higher priority items. Our committee staff has spoken 
with senior Intelligence Community leaders in the administration, and 
we have been assured that this will not, I repeat, will not divert 
resources.
  The data needed is already available. The administration is already 
drafting a community assessment on this very issue. And I want to 
assure the ranking member that we will work with the administration to 
ensure that nothing will divert resources away from higher priority 
efforts.
  But I also want to be clear; targeted discussion on this topic is a 
distraction from the key points of this bill. This bill provides 
funding for the men and women in the field. Opposition to this bill 
sends the wrong signal to them.
  We are at war, and we face many threats over the horizon. This bill 
contains robust funding for critical intelligence programs to penetrate 
the hard targets, such as terrorist networks and countries developing 
WMD capabilities.
  We add funds to both CIA and military elements for human intelligence 
training. We invest in language training for collectors and analysts 
and in language translation capabilities. We add funding for sending 
additional analysts overseas, and we strengthen counterintelligence 
field operations.
  We have added funds to broaden our view so that we are spending, not 
just on Iraq, but on some of the other global challenges that we face, 
such as Iran, Russia, East Africa, Latin America and countries in Asia.
  We have several provisions that enhance critical oversight. We 
require quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on the nuclear 
weapons programs of Iran and North Korea.
  We also require that the CIA Inspector General conduct an audit of 
covert activities no less than once every 3 years. And we require the 
administration to provide the Intelligence Committees with a full list 
of all special access programs.
  We also require detailed reports to Congress on the use of 
contractors in the Intelligence Community because their use has grown 
without adequate oversight, both by Congress and even by the executive 
branch.
  We also require a strategy for implementing a multi-level security 
clearance system. This will allow patriotic Americans with much needed 
foreign language skills to serve as translators or linguists in the 
Intelligence Community.
  And we also promote diversity in the Intelligence Community by 
requiring a strategic plan for implementing the recommendations of a 
highly regarded diversity panel.
  I am of the strong view that diversity is a major strategic asset of 
the United States, and we have to leverage that asset to our full 
advantage.
  In sum, Madam Chairman, this bill strengthens U.S. intelligence 
capabilities. This bill, if passed and signed into law, will help the 
courageous women and men of our Intelligence Community accomplish their 
mission. They are counting on our support, and tonight I hope we 
respond.
  I urge all my colleagues to support this critical legislation.
  With that, Madam Chairwoman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairwoman, I would like to yield myself 4 
minutes.
  I would like to begin by thanking my colleague, Chairman Reyes, for 
the cooperative working relationship that we have had as we have gone 
through this process and as we have developed and built this bill. 
There are a number of things in this piece of legislation that I do 
support, so I appreciate the cooperative working relationship we have 
had. I appreciate the hard work by the committee on both staffs.
  You know, it is absolutely important that we provide the Intelligence 
Community with the information or with the resources, the commitment 
and the framework with which they can be the tip of the spear to keep 
us free. We all owe the men and women of the community a deep sense of 
gratitude for the work that they do each and every day, as they risk 
their lives to keep us safe.
  As they well know, let me quote, ``we are in a state of war. And if 
we have not yet realized that we are in a state of war, when will we 
realize that''?
  Some folks may say, well, Pete, what's new? You have been saying that 
for a long period of time.
  Actually, I don't believe that, and I don't like to use the term 
``war.'' We shouldn't elevate the people that pose this threat to the 
United States as being soldiers or representing a nation-state. They 
are thugs. They are murderers, and they are terrorists.
  These are the words of Ayman al-Zawahiri from an interview that he 
just gave last week, a video. Those are the words that he says. He says 
that they are at war. We need to recognize that that is how they view 
the U.S. and how they view the West.
  We have continued a number of initiatives that were begun in the last 
Congress. I feel good about that. Building global collection 
capabilities, rebuilding HUMINT capabilities, working on the overhaul 
of the Intelligence Community.
  But I think we do need to affect and address the weaknesses in this 
bill. This bill significantly cuts from the President's budget request 
in a very important area, human intelligence at the Central 
Intelligence Agency, and cuts that directly affect our efforts in Iraq.
  I agree with the chairman. Passing the wrong bill sends exactly the 
wrong message to our troops. Just like saying we are going to pull out 
of Iraq on a definite date sends the wrong message, sending a bill that 
cuts the funding for our Intelligence Community in Iraq sends exactly 
the wrong message.
  And telling the community that we want to move their priorities from 
radical Islam, North Korea, Syria, Iran, restructuring the community, 
rebuilding HUMINT to focusing on a national intelligence estimate on 
climate change sends exactly the wrong message. As a matter of fact, 
what the community will tell you is this hearkens back to the exact 
things that they experienced in the 1990s, a very depressing decade for 
the Intelligence Community, a dark decade, a decade where budgets were 
cut, where human intelligence was cut, where we changed rules for human 
intelligence and said, we are only going to have good-guy spies. It was 
known as the ``Deutsch doctrine.'' It said, if we have people on the 
payroll or we are working with people who have human rights records, 
criminal violations, we are not going to work with them anymore.
  And the other thing that we did is we did the politically correct 
thing, is we moved resources to spy on the environment. George Tenet 
mentions it in his

[[Page 12193]]

book. He refers to it as those were the days that the community said we 
were focused on bugs and bunnies. And we are going right back to that. 
We are doing the politically correct priorities. We are cutting HUMINT, 
and we are cutting the resources that are directly supporting our 
efforts in Iraq against a very deadly and a very dangerous enemy. That 
is the message that we are sending to the agency that says, we are 
going back to the 1990s.
  The community doesn't want to go back to the 1990s. They recognize 
what had happened at that time.
  Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, it is my privilege to yield to the 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the gentleman from Missouri 
(Mr. Skelton), 3 minutes.
  Mr. SKELTON. Madam Chairman, this evening I rise in strong support of 
H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2008. Let 
me take this opportunity to thank and congratulate the chairman, the 
gentleman from Texas, Silver Reyes, on the work that he does.
  It is especially important, Madam Chairman, that he is a member of 
the Armed Services Committee, and he is the chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee, and it is one of those rare moments where the 
two very important committees are glued together, and he does that. And 
from our perspective, it is a good, good piece of evidence that he is 
the chairman and is doing such an excellent job in both respects.
  Every day American men and women are deployed into harm's way and 
depend on the military intelligence capabilities authorized by this 
bill. It is important for them to achieve their missions. And this 
legislation assures continued delivery of our intelligence to our 
warfighters. It will lead to important improvements in the future.
  I am also pleased to report that this bill reflects a new more 
cooperative relationship, as I mentioned, between the Intelligence 
Committee and the Armed Services Committee in guiding and overseeing 
the Nation's military intelligence program.
  Chairman Reyes and I have been working together to craft common 
approaches on key issues by our shared jurisdiction. For example, both 
this bill and the National Defense Authorization bill that we marked up 
late last night in committee contain provisions requiring reports on 
the national security implications of global warming. And that is no 
small thing.
  And the committees, we are working together on significant changes in 
key space programs to ensure that both the intelligence analysts and 
the warfighter receive critical information in a timely manner, and 
that is so important.
  Again, let me take this opportunity to congratulate Chairman Reyes 
for bringing this to the floor. Intelligence is the key to so many 
areas, in particular the military and security forums of our country. 
So I congratulate the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3 
minutes to a senior member of the committee, Mr. Everett.
  Mr. EVERETT. Madam Chairman, I thank my ranking member, and I thank 
the chairman for the work they have done on this bill. And for many 
years, the chairman of the committee and I have worked closely 
together.
  But, regretfully, I rise today in opposition to the Intelligence 
Authorization bill for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2082. Actions taken in 
the bill regarding human operations, the irresponsible use of our 
intelligence professionals and the short-sighted steps to critical 
space systems justify a ``no'' vote on this legislation.

                              {time}  2215

  The bill slashes funding to HUMINT, or Human Operations, one of our 
most important intelligence collection functions in the global war on 
terrorism. Regardless of your position on the war, we cannot cut a 
primary intelligence function that is critical to protecting our troops 
in combat.
  Like many, I have visited the front line, and we owe our brave 
American military the support they need to be successful in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. I also note that the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence has stated that HUMINT is his number one priority.
  Remarkably, rather than focus on national security, this bill places 
an emphasis on global warming. In the middle of a war which has our 
intelligence community overloaded with real-world intelligence 
missions, this intelligence authorization bill carves out scarce 
intelligence resources for an environmental matter that should be the 
purview of another committee.
  Madam Chairman, we have already had 13 Federal agencies looking at 
the effects of climate change. The administration has requested nearly 
$7.4 billion this year for climate change-related activities. Since 
2001 the Federal Government has devoted $37 billion for climate change-
related activities. We are in the middle of a war against radical 
jihadists, and the terrorist plot of the radical Islamists at Fort Dix 
earlier this week should be a sobering reminder for all of us. It is 
wrong and misguided for Congress to overburden our highly skilled 
intelligence professionals by shouldering them with this unnecessary 
science project.
  Lastly, this measure gives our strategic threat little attention. 
While engaging in the global war on terror, the strategic threat has 
grown. Having the ability to peer into areas that would cause us harm 
is vital to advanced warning, known as ``Persistent Stare.'' We need to 
pay more attention to the architecture of ``stare'' and 
``persistence''; yet this bill provides inadequate resources.
  For example, substantial funds have been added to a space-based 
infrared program, SBIRS, that cannot be wisely used. In fact, if these 
additional funds were obligated, the program would be sent into 
procurement before it is ready, likely to cause schedule delays and 
cost overruns. This funding add was poorly conceived and would cause 
the Defense Department to literally bite off more than it can chew.
  I urge a ``no'' vote on the bill.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, it is now my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to 
the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer), one of our subcommittee 
Chairs.
  Mr. CRAMER. Madam Chair, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 2082, 
and I want to compliment the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, 
the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, and my colleagues on 
both sides of the aisle that I have worked with for a number of years 
to make sure that we give the intelligence agencies the resources and 
the balance that they need to do the job that we want them to do.
  I am sorry that my colleagues from across the aisle can't support 
this bill.
  I am proud to represent an area of the country that has given much to 
the defense of this country including to the intelligence agencies. My 
district is the home of the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, 
known as MSIC, and MSIC is a key DIA facility that helps our country 
understand and prepare against the threat from missiles from foreign 
nations.
  Now, this bill today, H.R. 2082, is a well-crafted bill. It 
strengthens our national security by authorizing the largest amount of 
funding ever for the intelligence community. Let me say that again. 
This bill authorizes the largest amount ever for the intelligence 
community.
  But it is not just the amount that is important. We have got to make 
sure that we perform oversight of the agencies that we give these 
resources to, make sure that the distribution is balanced between the 
needs to be addressed today and the needs that will be faced in the 
future.
  Specifically, this bill provides our intelligence professionals with 
the resources to deal with the immediate threats that we face in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, as well as the emerging challenges from dangerous 
regimes around the world, particularly in Iran and North Korea.
  I also support this bill because it recognizes that simply giving the 
intelligence community considerable resources and hoping for the best 
is not enough. Congress must conduct effective oversight, and this bill 
accomplishes that.

[[Page 12194]]

  Now, Chairman Reyes, as you know, we have worked hard to make sure 
that we continue the bipartisan approach that this committee has a 
history of being the best at, and I think this bill is a product of a 
bipartisan effort to fund our intelligence priorities and strengthen 
our oversight.
  To the ranking member, in the last Congress, we established, I 
believe, set up, the Oversight Subcommittee that Mr. Thornberry chaired 
and I was the ranking member of. I think that subcommittee did an 
excellent job, drafting reports, holding informal hearings, making 
visits out in the field both in this country and out of this country, 
to make sure that together we got off to a better start of performing 
oversight. And I think this bill today continues with that effort.
  We drafted a report on the standup of the DNI in the last Congress. 
We made sure that we let them know that we were there to give them the 
resources that they needed but to hold them accountable for what they 
did as well, and I think this bill strikes that appropriate balance 
between strengthening national security and performing effective 
oversight.
  I urge support of the bill.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3 
minutes to the gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson).
  Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Chair, I would agree with my 
colleague Mr. Cramer that much of this bill was developed in a 
bipartisan way. And one of the reasons that I like the Intelligence 
Committee is we don't have the C-SPAN effect. The cameras are off, and 
we get down to doing some very serious and important business on behalf 
of the country.
  While we fixed a lot of things in the initial draft of the bill in 
committee, particularly with respect to technical intelligence and 
overhead systems, there are two very serious concerns that I still have 
that cause me to stand here today and oppose the bill.
  The first is that there is a significant reduction in human 
intelligence in some very important special accounts, and they are 
reductions that are marked and serious and will impact our ability to 
conduct human intelligence in an area of the world where it is 
absolutely critical, not only for current operations but for our long-
term security in the region.
  We can't cut human intelligence. That was one of the number one 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We have to strengthen human 
intelligence after a decade of neglect.
  The second problem is that this bill fails to address in any way one 
of the most important problems that we face in the intelligence 
community, and that is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The 
Director of National Intelligence came to the committee with written 
recommendations on how we need to update and modernize the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, and this bill does nothing. He said to 
us we are actually missing a significant portion of what we should be 
getting. Because of the way the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
is written, we are not collecting critical intelligence important to 
this country.
  We should have addressed that in this bill. The DNI asked us to 
address that in this bill because we were operating with one hand tied 
behind our back. That is dangerous for this country and causes me to 
oppose this bill.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I would remind the gentlewoman that we 
will be having hearings and addressing the issue of FISA in regular 
order, which is the proper way to handle very serious issues that the 
American people want us to handle.
  Madam Chairman, I now yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California, Ms. Anna Eshoo, who chairs our Subcommittee on Intelligence 
Community Management.
  Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of the 
House Intelligence Committee for yielding.
  I rise in support of H.R. 2082.
  First, I want to make a comment about a requirement that is in the 
bill that has been made fun of, made fun of by our friends on the other 
side of the aisle, and that is that the bill requires a National 
Intelligence Estimate on the national security implications of global 
climate change. I take issue with their diminishment of this issue.
  The American people are ahead of us on this and so are people in the 
intelligence community, including three and four star admirals and 
generals who recently issued a report on the national security impacts 
of global climate change. I will submit their names for the Record.

       * General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA (Ret.)
       * Admiral Frank ``Skip'' Bowman, USN (Ret.)
       * Lieutenant General Lawrence P. Farrell Jr., USAF (Ret.)
       * Vice Admiral Paul G. Gaffney II, USN (Ret.)
       * General Paul J. Kern, USA (Ret.)
       * Admiral T. Joseph Lopez, USN (Ret.)
       * Admiral Donald L. ``Don'' Pilling, USN (Ret.)
       * Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN (Ret.)
       * Vice Admiral Richard H. Truly, USN (Ret.)
       * General Charles F. ``Chuck'' Wald, USAF (Ret.)
       * General Anthony C. ``Tony'' Zinni, USMC (Ret.)

  As they noted, the geopolitical effects of global warming are likely 
to intensify instability in some of the most volatile regions of the 
world as people fight over access to water and food, creating 
humanitarian disasters and failed states that facilitate the 
establishment of terrorist safe havens.
  The intelligence community agrees, and they are already preparing an 
assessment on how our enemies could use global climate change to 
degrade our security interests. This NIE will not divert collection 
assets from other priorities. That's hogwash.
  I would also like to note that we have a growing crisis in our 
overhead architecture. Over the past several years, the intelligence 
community has chosen to take more risk in its management structures 
that have failed. The consequences of these failures are extremely 
serious, threatening our overhead capability and wreaking havoc on the 
industrial base. Some of these risky decisions were made without the 
appropriate congressional notification, and now we have to clean up the 
mess.
  Finally, last September the President acknowledged that the 
intelligence community had kept prisoners in undisclosed detention 
sites and reserved the right to do so in the future. I, as one Member 
of Congress, strongly object to any policy which does so. Generations 
of people, Americans, have come to this Nation to escape regimes that 
make people disappear. We have commitments under the Geneva 
Conventions, international laws and treaties. If we don't live up to 
these standards, we weaken protections for U.S. citizens abroad. I 
think our Nation stands for a higher standard of treatment, and I don't 
think we should ever engage in such practices.
  I am proud to support this bill, Madam Chairman. This is the largest 
single intelligence authorization in the history of our country. And 
for anyone to say that we are shortchanging the people that are working 
so hard to protect our national security is simply and plainly wrong.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3 
minutes to a gentleman on the committee, Mr. Thornberry from Texas.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chairman, I thank the ranking member for 
yielding.
  Madam Chairman, there are many good provisions of this bill, and I 
appreciate the hard work of the staff and the sincerity of the Members 
in attempting to tackle complex, vital issues before this committee. 
And yet I also have concerns with this bill.
  Last July the Oversight Subcommittee of the Intelligence Committee 
issued a unanimous report about the progress of implementing the 
Intelligence Reform Act so far. And what we found was that there was 
some good, there were some disappointments, but yet there was overall a 
lack of a sense of appropriate urgency in doing the things that needed 
to be done to reform intelligence and to make this country safer.
  And that is kind of the sense I get from this bill. There is a lot of 
good in it. There are some significant disappointments. But I worry 
about a

[[Page 12195]]

lack of urgency in a sense because as   9/11 drifts further in the 
past, we have to face up to these very serious threats that are before 
us. And yet in this bill certain efforts and resources are diverted 
from higher priorities to lower priorities.
  And I might point out in the case of one particular lower priority 
that the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo) mentioned, there has 
never been a hearing or, as I understand it, even a question at a 
hearing about intelligence implications of global climate change. And 
yet it is so important, it is a mandatory item in this bill for the 
intelligence community.
  This bill takes significant efforts that the intelligence community 
is making and cuts back or places restriction on them, and yet it 
delays making reforms in essential areas as Mrs. Wilson was talking 
about. So I worry that we are on a path where we will return to 
mistakes of the past and do so at a time when we face a ruthless, 
determined, adaptable adversary.

                              {time}  2230

  I would like to make one other point. In many respects, I think it is 
a test for Congress as an institution whether we can pass an 
intelligence authorization bill.
  The Intelligence Committees of both Houses were set up in the 1970s 
as the oversight entities for the broad Intelligence Community. The 
fact is, if we don't do it in these two committees in the House and the 
Senate, it will not get done. No one else has insight into the 
programs. No other committees have the time and resources and expertise 
to delve down into the many, many activities that the Intelligence 
Community performs that are essential to our country's security.
  And yet, if we use these intelligence authorization bills to promote 
a political agenda, I think it makes the effectiveness of that 
oversight less so, and particularly if it results in their failure to 
be a bill. I think we can do better, and I hope we do.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I now yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), who serves as our chairman on the 
Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chairwoman, I want to first say that I rise 
in support of H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act.
  Our Nation is at war. We are fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and we 
are battling terrorists worldwide. We are also witnessing the rise of 
nuclear powers in Iran and North Korea. We are facing major challenges 
from China and Russia, who want to gain a technological edge on the 
United States.
  America has to stay on the offensive, and the way to do that is with 
stronger technology. This bill will strengthen our intelligence 
capabilities and invest much needed resources in new research and 
development.
  I am the chairman of the Technical and Tactical Subcommittee, which 
is responsible for overseeing technical intelligence assets, including 
the National Security Agency. The subcommittee has been working hard to 
ensure that this bill provides the necessary resources so that the 
Intelligence Community has the latest cutting-edge research and 
technology. This is the foundation for good intelligence.
  Other countries are gaining the ability to take out intelligence 
assets, such as orbiting satellites. Al Qaeda is finding innovative 
ways to communicate over the internet to plan attacks.
  We need to develop smarter tools to collect this information about 
threats to the U.S. and our allies. This bill refocuses the 
Intelligence Community on these new and emerging threats. The number 
one priority is preserving our technical workforce. This bill invests 
in our scientists and engineers.
  This bill also addresses the future of research and development 
across the Intelligence Community. Let me emphasize; we must invest 
more heavily in research and development. The committee is looking to 
the Director of National Intelligence to establish an aggressive R&D 
investment strategy that promotes cooperation among various agencies 
while allowing each agency to conduct research that fulfills its 
specific needs. During this time of growth, we need to maintain the 
good working relationships the Intelligence Community has with our 
Nation's research centers.
  In closing, we need to maintain our technology. We should vote for 
this bill.
  I have been on the Intelligence Committee for 4 years. I feel very 
strongly that this committee should be USA first. What we have to deal 
with is very important. I am very distressed and concerned that the 
minority at this point, who I have worked with and are excellent 
friends and I respect, the first bill that we have coming out of as a 
majority are voting ``no.''
  We need to bring consensus together. We need to work as a team. There 
are some things that we have and some that we don't, but I hope that we 
will be able to work together in the future and go beyond this tonight.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. At this time, I would like to yield 3 minutes to 
another member of the committee, Mr. McHugh of New York.
  Mr. McHUGH. I thank the distinguished ranking member for yielding to 
me.
  Madam Chair, I would say that I want to begin by expressing my deep 
appreciation and great respect to the bipartisan leadership of the 
committee. To the distinguished ranking member who has provided such a 
steady hand and, certainly during his time as chair, for great guidance 
and leadership. And a particular tip of the hat, Madam Chair, to the 
current chairman. Chairman Reyes I consider to be a personal friend, 
and he is a man of a good heart and great leadership. I would suggest 
respectfully through that good heart and great leadership, this bill 
certainly has some positive aspects. It increases needed 
counterintelligence assets to protect our Nation's military secrets. As 
well, it initiates the movement of supplemental funding to the base 
budget for the better use and planning of those funds. And it 
establishes the requirement to develop an integrated space-based 
collection architect.
  In addition, it places limitation on the termination of the U-2 
program. It also gives added emphasis on language training and 
additional accountability on intelligence contracting. As I said, Madam 
Chair, these are all very positive steps in improving our intelligence 
capabilities, and I commend the chairman and Members on both sides of 
the aisle for working together to make that happen.
  I have to say, regretfully, however, there is much that distresses me 
in this bill. Let me just cite a few examples.
  I am very, very concerned that the legislation before us begins to 
retrace the failed policies of the 1990s that were based on 
underfunding and overtasking of our limited intelligence resources. It 
inadvertently, or not, establishes politically correct restrictions on 
intelligence operations.
  Additionally, at least in my judgment, the bill does not adequately 
support key Intelligence Community activities that directly protect our 
national security. It calls for cuts to human intelligence programs 
which is counter to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. It 
fails to support the Intelligence Community and our national defense by 
rejecting an amendment that our side offered to include important 
legislation to modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
even though this identical language, Madam Chair, was passed 
unanimously by a bipartisan vote previously last year in the House.
  There is no question that our Nation is locked in a struggle with 
radical jihadists and facing continued uncertainty and threats around 
the globe. As well, there is no question that before us lie critical 
questions. And we know what is needed right now is a well-trained, 
well-equipped and capable Intelligence Community. Instead, this bill 
unnecessarily, again in my judgment, diverts the resources of the 
Intelligence Community, as we have heard, to produce unnecessary 
legislation and initiatives.

[[Page 12196]]

  I would hope we could go back, reject this bill and begin anew to 
work together on a bipartisan basis to produce a better product.
  Mr. REYES. Could I inquire of the Chair how much time is remaining on 
both sides?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas has 13 minutes; the gentleman 
from Michigan has 15 minutes.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, it is my pleasure now to yield 3 minutes 
to the gentleman from California (Mr. Thompson), who is the chairman of 
our Subcommittee on Terrorism, Human Intelligence Analysis and 
Counterintelligence.
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. I thank the chairman for yielding.
  Madam Chairman, I am pleased to stand in strong support of this 
authorization bill tonight. I believe that this bill strengthens our 
capabilities to recognize and counter threats to the United States, 
both terrorist threats from groups like al Qaeda and the strategic 
challenges present in regions all over the world, including the Middle 
East, Asia and Latin America. This bill ensures that U.S. troops in 
Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to receive the intelligence support 
they need to conduct their missions.
  The bill authorizes the largest intelligence budget ever. It also 
provides full funding for the intelligence programs related to 
Afghanistan and for U.S. efforts to counter terrorist threats.
  Madam Chairman, terrorism and the war in Iraq are critical issues, 
and they have required intelligence agencies to divert resources away 
from other strategic challenges. This bill funds initiatives to collect 
better intelligence on those that pose threats to our country. It also 
adds funds to enhance coverage of other challenges, such as emerging 
threats in Africa and Latin America, and to ensure that America is not 
caught by surprise in the future.
  The bill makes significant investments to improve the quality of 
intelligence analysts. It provides resources to send more analysts 
overseas so they can gain the real world experiences in the countries 
that they study. It provides funds for expanded foreign language 
training that we all agree is needed, and the development of advanced 
technical tools so both analysts and collectors can better do their 
jobs.
  The bill makes us safer by adding resources for counterintelligence 
investigations, and these provisions will help mitigate efforts by our 
adversaries to steal classified information and advanced technologies, 
keeping the U.S. policy options open and preserving our military edge.
  Despite these additions, the bill promotes efficiency and 
accountability by cutting programs that lack clear objectives and 
measurable results. It also requires the CIA Inspector General to audit 
covert action programs, ensuring regular oversight.
  Madam Chair, this legislation helps us fight terrorists; it supports 
our troops; and it enhances U.S. intelligence capabilities throughout 
the world.
  I support this bill, and I strongly recommend that our colleagues do 
as well.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, at this time I would like to yield 3 
minutes to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Tiahrt), a member of the 
committee.
  Mr. TIAHRT. I thank the gentleman from Michigan.
  Madam Chairman, this bill reduces our human intelligence 
capabilities. Human intelligence is one of the primary tools used to 
keep us informed about the plans and intentions of our adversaries. 
Human intelligence keeps our families and our military personnel safe.
  Today, we are faced by many threats around the world, from radical 
jihadists to the emerging threat from rogue nations. One of our primary 
ways to combat these threats is with human intelligence, but this bill 
distracts us from that. And we have been in this predicament before. It 
is entirely probable that the downsizing of our Intelligence Community, 
and specifically the Central Intelligence Agency, during the decade of 
the 1990s contributed to the intelligence breakdown often associated 
with 9/11. We should have learned that lesson, but instead of putting 
more resources into human intelligence, this bill redirects resources 
to a new top priority.
  The bill requires that the Intelligence Community determine the 
impacts of global warming. How could we have overlooked this? I thought 
the enemy was al Qaeda, who claimed responsibility for September 11, 
2001. I thought it was Iran, who calls us ``the Great Satan'' and is 
actively pursuing nuclear weapons. I thought it was the Islamic 
terrorists that are attacking our young men and women every day. Now we 
find out it is global warming.
  Now, I know that the world is warming. Kansas used to be covered by a 
sheet of ice 14,000 years ago; now it's not. But for the record, I 
would like to point out that the United States has 13 Federal agencies 
currently studying the effects of climate change. In fact, the 
President's 2008 budget request has nearly $7.4 billion associated with 
studying climate change. And according to the Congressional Research 
Service, since 2001, the Federal Government has devoted $37 billion to 
study climate change activities.
  Why is this an intelligence priority? Is it really responsible to 
shift our resources, currently focused on North Korea and Iran and 
other threats, to the impacts of global warming?
  Madam Chairman, this bill is not the right approach, and it does not 
provide the tools to protect our Nation's security. Intelligence is the 
first line of defense. Now is not the time to let down our guard.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against H.R. 2082.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, it is now my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to a 
gentleman from Iowa, an American hero, fellow Vietnam veteran (Mr. 
Boswell), a member of the committee.
  Mr. BOSWELL. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of this bill. I feel 
it is a step in the right direction. I have to take note that there is 
almost a self-righteousness of those that have been in charge for all 
these years and want to criticize, you have only had the driving of 
this ship for 4 months. You're doing a good job. Keep your head up and 
keep going forward and the country will be safer.
  This bill does a number of things. One thing for sure that we 
recognize, all of us that have served in this capacity, that the people 
that go out there and gather intelligence, they put it on the line. The 
things they do, if the Nation understood the risks they take, the 
things they will do to try to make us safe, they would be very 
appreciative.

                              {time}  2245

  This bill also recognizes something that we have been overlooking now 
for several years, that there is a need to increase the gathering of 
information or opportunities for people to learn languages. Around the 
world, this world we live in, there is much need to have innovative 
ways to explore new language opportunities. The need is there. This 
bill will require that, and that is a good step forward at least.
  It also recognizes the need to take an aggressive approach to the 
gaps in our knowledge about Korea and Iran and around the world. We 
know there is a threat there and we are going to have to do more about 
it. We have tried before; we are trying again. This bill will do it and 
require the DNI to report back to us on a quarterly basis so we can 
assess and give oversight and do a better job of recognizing this need.
  So, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your hard work. Keep it up. Support 
the bill.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague from the 
great State of Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I want to congratulate the 
chairman on mostly good work. And a big budget doesn't necessarily mean 
a good budget. We have had some great discussions. There are some 
really good things in this bill. But there are some serious departures 
on the direction in which we take intelligence that I think are so 
important that we need to stand up and oppose this bill.
  This bill jeopardizes our ability to listen to terrorists. It puts it 
at risk. This bill cuts very specific human intelligence programs. They 
will get less

[[Page 12197]]

money this year than they got last year.
  I just want to talk for a minute about global climate change. As 
mentioned earlier, the President's budget proposes over $7 billion for 
climate change activities. This bill should be about securing America. 
Instead, it is being used to secure a political agenda on these items.
  Climate change is an important issue, and it should be taken 
seriously. Thankfully it is. Fourteen Federal agencies already have 
active climate change programs. Let me go through them: Agriculture, 
Commerce, State, Health and Human Services, Interior, Transportation, 
EPA, NASA, NSF, Defense, Treasury, USAID, the Smithsonian, the Army, 
the Navy, the Air Force, DARPA and NASA all have active research, 
development, testing and evaluation programs. NASA's program already 
makes satellite images available to government researchers.
  This legislation assigns intelligence agencies that have limited 
experience in this area the job of researching climate change. We are 
going to take analysts away from looking for Osama bin Laden and we are 
going to put them on the ``March of the Penguins.''
  This bill requires intelligence agencies to use intelligence 
satellites to monitor environmental issues. Many of my colleagues have 
been in the field. You know that imagery is so important and so high in 
demand. This is the wrong direction for their mission accomplishment.
  If you want to break the spirits of our intelligence agencies, if you 
want to destroy their morale, go ahead and give them this assignment. 
Tell them they should spend their day watching the grass grow, and see 
how it works. George Tenet referred to these kinds of assignments as 
``bugs and bunnies assignments.''
  We are making a mockery of the seriousness of climate change and a 
mockery of the important work our intelligence agencies do. If you 
liked building the rain forest in Iowa, you are going to love the 
Department of Environmental Espionage.
  Vote against this legislation. The stakes are too high. The people in 
the field mean too much to us. Their mission is too crucial to have it 
diverted for a political agenda.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, sometimes I feel like we are living in a 
parallel universe here, when I hear the Members of the minority quote 
the ``slam-dunk expert.''
  Madam Chairman, it is my privilege to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), a member of our committee who 
serves as the chairman of the Select Intelligence Oversight Panel.
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Chairman, although the bill before us today does not 
produce the overhaul of intelligence I seek, it does address a number 
of critical deficiencies in the operation and oversight of the 
intelligence community, and I support this important legislation.
  I commend the committee staff. They do excellent work without help 
from outside. And I commend the Chair, the gentleman from Texas, for 
his sensible, considerate approach to his work as Chair.
  There are several specific provisions in this bill that I would like 
to highlight. For example, the bill requires the compilation of a 
comprehensive inventory of special access programs, as well as measures 
to improve the contracting accountability. These provisions will give 
the committee additional tools to hold the intelligence community 
accountable for its actions and the use or misuse of taxpayer funds.
  Again this year we demand more attention to the foreign language 
facility of employees in the intelligence community.
  Of course, we would want the intelligence community to look at 
international and global issues that affect our national security. And 
who could oppose the attention to climate change?
  There are a number of areas where we have had added or reduced 
resources. Overall, the agencies have ample support, the largest budget 
ever. By the way, I would say to my colleague from Kansas, there is no 
reduction in human intelligence collectors. This legislation adds 
resources for their training, it adds analytic capability, it adds 
technologies to help them do their job.
  Let me close by thanking the chairman again for the admirable manner 
that he shows in running this committee. I support this legislation, 
and I urge my colleagues to do so.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague, the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Issa).
  Mr. ISSA. Madam Chairman, I thank the ranking member, and I thank the 
chairman for what we were able to accomplish during the markup. But I 
come to the House floor knowing that in fact in a few short minutes, an 
hour or so, our Members will vote not knowing what is in this bill. Oh, 
they will hear us talking in unclassified terms about the fact that 
HUMINT, contrary to the last speaker, is being cut in absolute dollars. 
The eyes and ears of human beings is being cut in this bill.
  Certainly, with inflation, other things are going up. But as everyone 
knows that has read the Iraq Study Report or the 9/11 report, it is the 
absence of the human resources that we have been investing in that led 
to our vulnerability on 9/11. And I will say that if the people on the 
other side of the aisle want to say we are losing this war, then they 
have to be willing to make a much greater commitment in the diplomatic 
and especially in the human resources and the above-sky resources that 
allow us to know what our enemy is thinking and planning before he 
attacks.
  This bill doesn't do it. This bill does, as many of the speakers have 
said, deal with ``bugs and bunnies.'' Now, I happen to be an advocate 
for global warming research. I happen to believe that the Earth is 
warming, and I happen to believe that CO2 is something we 
have to address. I serve on a committee that has overseen it, that has 
looked at it, that has costed it; and I will continue to do so.
  But I am beyond words, furious, that with no new funding we are 
diverting resources from finding out what bad people want to do to us, 
to a vague, beyond vague, an open-ended statement of over the next 30 
years what is global warming maybe going to do.
  It is a worst case, all-possible-negatives study. It will cost ten or 
hundreds of millions of dollars to begin with. It will cause us to 
divert satellites to do the research. To be honest, the CIA doesn't 
just throw together a report, especially when it is this vague.
  We urged in committee that in fact they put reasonable amendments to 
this. We asked something simple: task them with the U.N.'s finding on 
global warming. Any committee, any group's finding. It is an open-ended 
go-study report. It is going to cost a lot of money, and it is going to 
cost American lives.
  But last but not least, there are unconscionable earmarks in this 
bill which I three times participated and voted for going to closed 
session so the Members would understand that pork and ``unfounded'' 
earmarks are in this bill; that American lives will be lost because we 
divert needed moneys from the human resources we need to invest in to 
pork projects and special interests of Members of the majority.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, so we move from a parallel universe to the 
Twilight Zone.
  Madam Chairman, I would like to yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman 
from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky), a member of our committee.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Madam Chairman, I rise today to address two matters 
in the intelligence authorization bill.
  For too long, the intelligence community has been increasing its use 
of contractors without internal or congressional oversight. For the 
first time, the Director of National Intelligence has conducted a 
contractor survey to begin to get a handle on the situation. A simple 
survey, however, is not sufficient to understand how we are using 
contractors and whether the use of such contractors is appropriate.
  This bill takes an important step towards understanding the use of 
contractors. It requires the DNI Inspector

[[Page 12198]]

General to report on intelligence contractors committing waste, fraud 
or abuse. It also requires a report on contractor accountability and 
their effect on the workforce, all positive steps toward better 
oversight.
  But there is one issue this bill does not address that I firmly 
believe raises a fundamental question as to who we are as a Nation. The 
President has acknowledged that the intelligence community kept 
prisoners in undisclosed detention sites and has reserved the right to 
do so in the future. We should reject this policy.
  In Nazi Germany, millions of people were sent to camps, never to be 
heard from again. During the Cold War, thousands of people disappeared 
into gulags. Saddam Hussein's secret prisons still strike fear into the 
hearts of Iraqis. Each time, our Nation stood as a beacon of human 
rights and strongly objected to those practices. If we endorse any 
policy that allows undisclosed detention, we undermine our moral 
authority to stand against such atrocities in the future.
  The United States should be beyond reproach in its treatment of 
detainees. In the first Gulf War, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross called U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions the best 
of any nation in any conflict in the history of the convention.
  If we lower that standard for how we treat prisoners, we weaken our 
ability to insist on the highest standards of treatment for our own 
military personnel and civilians abroad, thus endangering their safety 
and undermining our standing in the world. More importantly, we 
sacrifice the principles on which this country is based.
  I want to thank the chairman for considering all these important 
matters in the intelligence bill and for his leadership on this good 
bill.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to my colleague and 
classmate from the State of Maryland, Mr. Roscoe Bartlett.
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Madam Chairman, I hold here a major study 
done by the Center for Naval Analysis entitled ``National Security and 
the Threat of Climate Change.'' Their Military Advisory Board contains 
five admirals and four generals, including Sullivan, Lopez and Zinni.
  In their recommendations, ``Recommendation No. 1,'' they say the 
national security consequences of climate change should be fully 
integrated with national security and national defense strategies. Two 
of the specifics of this have been included in the National Defense 
Authorization Act, including the National Security Strategy, the 
National Defense Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review, all of 
which, they say, should consider climate change. A specific related to 
the intelligence community should incorporate climate consequences into 
its National Intelligence Estimate.
  A letter from the chairman of this board said that ``we made that 
call because we are concerned that climate change may affect our 
military.''
  This conservative Republican proudly joined Mr. Markey in requesting 
that this become a part of the base bill; and thank you, Mr. Chairman, 
for making it so.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to my colleague from 
the State of Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I just want to quickly 
respond to my colleague, who I have the greatest amount of respect for. 
Climate change is an important issue, and I think the point we are 
trying to make here is that there are 14 agencies, $7 billion already 
being spent on it. The time to train an analyst and a case officer to 
their optimum performance level is between 5 and 7 years. Five and 7 
years. That is an incredible investment. And I want them looking for 
Osama bin Laden, for the next nuclear program that we don't know about 
around the world. It takes a tremendous amount of effort to get them 
where they need to be. This is the wrong direction for it.
  We have, I am going to read them again, the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
DARPA, NASA, EPA, NSF, Defense, Treasury, USAID, the Smithsonian, 
Transportation, Interior, HHS, State, Energy, Commerce and Agriculture 
all looking at climate change. Don't waste these very precious 
resources.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to 
the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), a member of our 
committee.

                              {time}  2300

  Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Madam Chair, I rise in strong support of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for FY 2008. I particularly want to commend Chairman 
Reyes for his outstanding leadership, vision and work on this bill and 
getting us to where we are today. Equally important, I want to 
recognize the staff for their hard work as well.
  Madam Chair, I have always believed that good intelligence is the 
pointy tip of the spear. This bill provides intelligence support for 
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and strengthens information-sharing 
among Federal, State and local agencies. Most importantly, it enhances 
the full range of intelligence collection capabilities, tactical and 
strategic, near term and long term.
  The United States relies heavily on satellites to gather 
intelligence. Our intelligence agencies, working with industry, have 
developed extraordinary capabilities that build upon proven 
technologies. And to ensure that we maintain our technological edge, 
this bill refocuses the Intelligence Community on evolving satellite 
technology while ensuring that our industrial base also remains strong.
  And because nothing beats having eyes on the ground, this bill 
strengthens human intelligence collection capabilities by adding funds 
to both CIA and military collectors to receive training and operational 
skills in critical foreign languages while providing advanced 
technological tools that support intelligence collection.
  This measure further strengthens intelligence analysis by investing 
in the people of the Intelligence Community. By establishing 
challenging career paths for intelligence professionals at FBI and DHS, 
it rewards good work and encourages America's best and brightest to 
serve. Many of these Americans, because of their personal backgrounds, 
possess a wealth of expertise on foreign cultures, societies and 
languages. But for the Intelligence Community to harness their 
potential, its staff must reflect the myriad experiences, talents and 
perspectives of the American people.
  This bill takes important steps to enhance diversity in the 
Intelligence Community. For example, it requires the DNI to implement a 
multi-level security clearance system to ensure that Americans who are 
ineligible for the highest clearances because they have relatives 
overseas and cannot be investigated, for instance, can still offer 
expertise in their roles.
  It is a good bill, and I urge its passage.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to a former ranking 
member of this committee, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
  Ms. HARMAN. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding and 
commend him for his leadership as chairman of the committee.
  Madam Chair, I spoke earlier during the rule about the specifics in 
this bill, a bill I strongly support. But as the debate closes, I 
thought I might offer just two thoughts from my vantage point as 
someone who has served on this committee for so long and who 
passionately cares about the issues.
  The first is I believe al Qaeda is here and waiting to attack us. I 
believe America is in danger, and if we don't get our intelligence 
right both internationally and domestically, we will be attacked. We 
will fail to prevent or disrupt the harm that is coming our way. That 
is why it is so critical that we pass the best bill that we can.
  My second point is that I have never seen, and I have sat through 
these debates for many years, the kind of partisanship we are now 
seeing in debate on the intelligence authorization bill. It breaks my 
heart.
  And if there is someone out there in an austere, unaccompanied post 
watching C-SPAN, if C-SPAN is available,

[[Page 12199]]

and looking at this debate, that person must wonder: Why can't Congress 
come together and protect America at a time of urgent need? And I have 
to say, I am wondering, too. It is very disappointing to see the 
partisanship. It is very disappointing to hear that members I served 
with are going to oppose this bill. I hope they will reconsider. It is 
very important to reach consensus and pass the strongest bill possible.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Madam Chair, I have a great deal of respect for my colleague, but I 
believe last year, and she can correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe 
she voted against the bill on the floor. And to characterize our 
disagreement with this bill as partisan, and to, I assume perhaps in 
another way, characterize her vote against our base bill last year as 
something else, her vote as something else, is disappointing.
  We had a good partnership when I was chairman and you were ranking 
member. I am disappointed by that. I believe this is a well-founded 
difference of opinion on the content of this bill. There are clear 
differences in priorities. As the gentlelady said and others have said, 
we are a Nation that faces a great threat.
  We saw earlier this week that threat may have evolved and found its 
way once again to our shores, in New Jersey. We believe we need to 
strengthen HUMINT and face the threats that are out there. We believe 
that we can't be working in the politically correct environment.
  The message that people are looking for in the field is, what 
direction is this new majority going to take our Intelligence 
Community? They are seeing cuts in key activities that support the war, 
the effort against the threat that we face from radical jihadists, and 
not applying the resources that we need against targets that we don't 
know enough about.
  I think we would all agree on a bipartisan basis, we don't know 
enough about al Qaeda and how it works and where it is and what its 
resources are and what its plans and intentions are. We don't know 
enough about Iran, Syria, North Korea and the people that are 
proliferating and making this world a much more dangerous place.
  We will see amendments later on from both sides of the aisle that 
acknowledge that we are not where we want to be with the reorganization 
of the Intelligence Community. We have lots of questions about where 
the DNI, the office of the DNI is headed and whether this structure is 
going to work the way that some of us worked in a very bipartisan way 
to reform it with a certain expectation and hope, and what we would get 
as a result of that: An enhanced Intelligence Community that would be 
quicker, more nimble and more effective than the threats that we face 
today. And we need to rebuild HUMINT.
  And at the same time, we see in this bill a commitment that says we 
are going to task the Intelligence Community, and the question that has 
not been answered is what specific skills does the Intelligence 
Community add to the study of climate change when we are already 
spending $7 billion projected for the next fiscal year on climate 
change? What secrets are we going to steal? What are we going to task 
our HUMINT folks for? What are we going to task our limited resources 
with spy satellites to do? To assess the political, social, 
agricultural and economic risk during the 30-year period beginning on 
date of enactment? And don't say it is not going to take resources. 
This is a massive undertaking. It is not a throw-away. This is Congress 
coming and saying the most important national intelligence assessment 
that the community can complete next year, and you need to do it in 180 
days; 180 days with no input from the community on whether they have 
the resources, the capabilities to carry out this task. We are saying 
that it needs to be done in 180 days. You need to do it on a global 
basis, and you need to do it over 30 years, and you need to cover all 
of these different areas. And by the way, we are not going to give you 
a benchmark from where to start.
  Are you going to take the U.N.'s assessment of what may be happening 
with climate change? Are you going to take a university's assessment on 
climate change? Where do you start?
  This is a massive undertaking. It will shift resources because when 
you tell the Director of National Intelligence Congress wants this 
done, and Congress we know has been dissatisfied with the national 
intelligence estimates that we have been given on Iraq and Iran and on 
a number of other issues, they know they need to get this one right or 
it better be a very, very good piece of work. They will take this very, 
very seriously. They will divert resources to get this done, and they 
will divert resources from the things that we need them to be doing.
  This bill sends the wrong message to our men and women in the field. 
I ask my colleagues to vote ``no.''
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Madam Chair, I am very proud of this bill, and I am proud of the work 
we all put into it. I realize there are some political differences. You 
have heard the minority go from characterizing bugs and bunnies. Well, 
I think bogeyman politics doesn't work with the American people. It 
doesn't work with the challenge that we are facing in Iraq, and it is 
not going to fly with what we are doing with this intelligence bill.
  This bill does not make cuts. It adds funds to both CIA and military 
elements for human intelligence training. It adds funding for sending 
additional analysts overseas.
  Yes, I agree with the former ranking member, we should be concerned 
about al Qaeda. The ranking member mentioned the potential attacks 
against Fort Dix last week. So this is serious business. We know it is.
  This is an important piece of legislation that I hope everyone knows 
it is imperative that they support. The men and women of the 
Intelligence Community don't care about mischaracterizations. They 
don't care about talking about slam dunking and bugs and bunnies and 
all of these other rhetorical phrases that the minority likes to engage 
in. They care about support from Congress.
  This bill gives the Intelligence Community the support that they 
need. All you have to do is travel around the world and listen to them. 
I am proud of this legislation.
  By strengthening our Nation's Intelligence Community, we will be able 
to detect and disrupt the plans of those that are threatening our 
national security. I urge my colleagues to support this critical piece 
of legislation.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Madam Chairman, I rise in strong support of 
H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2007. H.R. 2082 
authorizes the largest amount for intelligence ever considered in a 
single bill, which just goes to show you how important intelligence has 
become to our national security and how serious the new Democratic 
majority is about protecting the homeland and defending the nation.
  H.R. 2082 promotes responsible budgeting and oversight by shifting 
resources from the supplemental to the base budget--allowing officers 
in the field to plan their operations properly, particularly in the 
counterterrorism arena, and allowing Congress to review funding 
requests.
  The bill makes key investments to strengthen intelligence by adding 
funds to both CIA and military elements for Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 
training. We increase our investments in language training for 
collectors and analysts and in language translation capabilities. We 
also add funding for sending additional analysts overseas. The bill 
also strengthens counterintelligence field operations.
  Madam Chairman, H.R. 2082 promotes efficiency and effectiveness of 
intelligence programs by streamlining acquisition, trimming the fat 
from ineffective programs, eliminating redundant activities, requiring 
greater strategic focus in some key areas.
  Madam Chairman, this bill does not, as some claim, make deep cuts in 
any intelligence programs. In one area, related to supplemental funding 
for Iraq, the bill reflects bipartisan concerns about excessive 
spending on programs that lack a strategy or metrics for evaluating its 
effectiveness. These funds are shifted to enhance coverage of other 
global challenges, such as Iran, Russia, East Africa, and Asia.
  The bill promotes accountability by requiring quarterly intelligence 
updates to Congress on

[[Page 12200]]

nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. And it requires the CIA 
Inspector General to conduct an audit of each covert action program not 
less than once every three years.
  Finally, Madam, Chairman, H.R. 2082 requires reports to Congress on 
the use of contractors in the Intelligence Community. It requires a 
strategy for implementing a multi-level security clearance system--to 
allow patriotic Americans to serve as translators or linguists in the 
intelligence community. I think it important also that H.R. 2082 
promotes diversity in the intelligence community by requiring a 
strategic plan for implementing the recommendations of a key diversity 
panel.
  Last, the H.R. 2082 follows the recommendations of several former 
military commanders in requesting that the National Intelligence 
Council produce a National Intelligence Estimate on national security 
impact of global climate change.
  Madam Chairman, I strongly support H.R. 2082 and the rule.
  Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Madam Chairman, I rise in strong 
opposition to the amendment offered by Mr. Hoekstra that would strike 
language requesting an assessment of the national security challenges 
posed by global warming. As a member of the House Select Committee on 
Energy Independence and Global Warming and an original cosponsor to 
H.R. 1961, the Global Climate Change Security Oversight Act, I support 
the inclusion of this language in the Intelligence Authorization bill.
  There are serious political, social, economic and national security 
risks associated with climate change. It is only appropriate that our 
nation have a National Intelligence Estimate assessing its global 
warming threat. The National Intelligence Council is already a 
producing a community assessment on this issue, this provision would 
simply require that assessment be elevated to a formal National 
Intelligence Estimate.
  This type of review is supported by a group of 11 retired three-star 
and four-star generals and admirals, who on April 16, 2007, issued a 
report entitled, ``National Security and the Threat of Climate 
Change.'' This report concludes that global warming presents 
significant national security challenges the United States. The effects 
of climate change are projected to have grave consequences for some of 
the poorest areas of the world--already volatile areas, the instability 
of these regions would be multiplied. Projected climate change will 
seriously exacerbate already marginal living standards in many Asian, 
African, and Middle Eastern nations, causing widespread political 
instability and the likelihood of failed states. As retired U.S. 
General Gordon R. Sullivan described before the Select Global Warming 
Committee, the potential national security threat of global warming in 
certain regions of the world could potentially be a Petri dish for 
terror.
  Climate change is yet another front in the war on terror and now is 
the time for the United States to fully understand the implications it 
has on our national security. I urge my colleagues to join me in 
opposing this amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the 
purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered 
read.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

                               H.R. 2082

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Incorporation of reporting requirements.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Technical amendment to mandatory retirement provision.

 TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Clarification of definition of intelligence community under 
              the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 304. Extension to the intelligence community of authority to 
              delete information about receipt and disposition of 
              foreign gifts.
Sec. 305. Modification of requirements for reprogramming of funds for 
              intelligence activities.
Sec. 306. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for 
              intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 307. Report on proposed pay for performance intelligence community 
              personnel management system.
Sec. 308. Plan to increase diversity in the intelligence community.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of 
              the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
              Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology 
              of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.
Sec. 405. Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to the 
              Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 406. Multi-level security clearances.
Sec. 407. National intelligence estimate on global climate change.
Sec. 408. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center 
              efficiency reports.
Sec. 409. Comprehensive inventory of special access programs.
Sec. 410. Quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on Iran and North 
              Korea.

Sec. 411. Accountability in intelligence contracting.
Sec. 412. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the 
              intelligence community.
Sec. 413. Intelligence community reports on foreign language 
              proficiency.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 421. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 422. General authorities of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 423. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the 
              Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 424. Report on audited financial statements progress.

                       Subtitle C--Other Elements

Sec. 431. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the 
              Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
Sec. 432. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the 
              National Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 433. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug 
              Enforcement Administration elements in the intelligence 
              community.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

                Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters

Sec. 501. Aerial reconnaissance platforms.
Sec. 502. Extension of National Commission for Review of Research and 
              Development Programs of the United States Intelligence 
              Community.

                    Subtitle B--Technical Amendments

Sec. 511. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National 
              Intelligence Program.
Sec. 512. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint 
              Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence 
              and Related Activities.
Sec. 513. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 514. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
              Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 515. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 516. Technical amendments relating to titles of Central 
              Intelligence Agency positions.
Sec. 517. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the 
              National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National 
              Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
       (A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives; and
       (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

[[Page 12201]]



                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2008 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2008, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2082 of the One Hundred 
     Tenth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     2008 under section 102 when the Director of National 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that 
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such section for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall promptly notify the congressional 
     intelligence committees whenever the Director exercises the 
     authority granted by this section.

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2008 the sum of $737,876,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2009.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     National Intelligence are authorized 1035 full-time personnel 
     as of September 30, 2008. Personnel serving in such elements 
     may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community 
     Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements 
     of the United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account for fiscal year 2008 such 
     additional amounts as are specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). 
     Such additional amounts for advanced research and development 
     shall remain available until September 30, 2009.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2008, there are also authorized such additional personnel for 
     such elements as of that date as are specified in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations.
       (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during 
     fiscal year 2008 any officer or employee of the United States 
     or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff 
     of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another 
     element of the United States Government shall be detailed on 
     a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, 
     or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a 
     period of less than one year for the performance of temporary 
     functions as required by the Director of National 
     Intelligence.
       (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated in subsection (a), $39,000,000 shall be 
     available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within 
     such amount, funds provided for research, development, 
     testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until 
     September 30, 2009, and funds provided for procurement 
     purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2010.
       (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds 
     available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under 
     paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so 
     transferred for the activities of the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center.
       (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center may not be used for purposes of 
     exercising police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or 
     internal security functions.
       (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the 
     operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.

     SEC. 105. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional 
     intelligence committees that is included in the joint 
     explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on 
     the bill H.R. 2082 of the One Hundred Tenth Congress, or in 
     the classified annex to this Act, is hereby incorporated into 
     this Act, and is hereby made a requirement in law.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2008 the sum of $262,500,000.

     SEC. 202. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT 
                   PROVISION.

       Section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)(A)) is amended to read 
     as follows:
       ``(A) upon reaching age 65, in the case of a participant in 
     the system serving in a position with a Senior Intelligence 
     Service rank of level 4 or above;''.

 TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 
                   1947.

       Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking 
     ``other'' the second place it appears.

     SEC. 304. EXTENSION TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF 
                   AUTHORITY TO DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT RECEIPT 
                   AND DISPOSITION OF FOREIGN GIFTS.

       Section 7342(f)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(4) In transmitting such listings for an element of the 
     intelligence community (as such term is defined in section 
     3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401a(4))), the head of such element of the intelligence 
     community may delete the information described in 
     subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the 
     head of such element of the intelligence community certifies 
     in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of 
     such information could adversely affect United States 
     intelligence sources or methods.''.

     SEC. 305. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR REPROGRAMMING OF 
                   FUNDS FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       Section 504(a)(3)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(B) the activity to be funded supports an emergent need, 
     improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency; 
     and''.

     SEC. 306. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON 
                   CARRIERS FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.

       (a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director'';
       (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may only delegate'' and 
     all that follows and inserting ``may delegate the authority 
     in subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the 
     intelligence community.''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community 
     to whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant 
     to paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such 
     senior officials of such element as are specified in 
     guidelines prescribed by the Director of National 
     Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''.

[[Page 12202]]

       (b) Submission of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than 
     six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe and submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees the guidelines 
     referred to in paragraph (2) of section 116(b) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).

     SEC. 307. REPORT ON PROPOSED PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

       (a) Prohibition on Pay for Performance Until Report.--The 
     Director of National Intelligence and the head of each 
     element of the intelligence community may not implement a 
     plan that provides compensation to personnel of an element of 
     the intelligence community based on performance until the 
     date that is 45 days after the date on which the Director of 
     National Intelligence submits a report under subsection (b).
       (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     on performance-based compensation for the intelligence 
     community, including--
       (1) an implementation time line, by phase and by element of 
     the intelligence community, which includes target dates for 
     completion of--
       (A) the development of performance appraisal plans;
       (B) establishment of oversight and appeal mechanisms;
       (C) deployment of information technology systems;
       (D) management training;
       (E) employee training;
       (F) compensation transition; and
       (G) full operational capacity;
       (2) an estimated budget, by phase of implementation and 
     element of the intelligence community, for the implementation 
     of the performance-based compensation system;
       (3) an evaluation plan to monitor the implementation of the 
     performance-based compensation system and to improve and 
     modify such system;
       (4) written standards for measuring the performance of 
     employees;
       (5) a description of the performance-based compensation 
     system, including budget oversight mechanisms to ensure 
     sufficient funds to pay employees for bonuses;
       (6) a description of internal and external accountability 
     mechanisms to ensure the fair treatment of employees;
       (7) a plan for initial and ongoing training for senior 
     executives, managers, and employees;
       (8) a description of the role of any advisory committee or 
     other mechanism designed to gather the input of employees 
     relating to the creation and implementation of the system; 
     and
       (9) an assessment of the impact of the performance-based 
     compensation system on women, minorities, persons with 
     disabilities, and veterans.

     SEC. 308. PLAN TO INCREASE DIVERSITY IN THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       (a) Strategic Plan Required.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a plan to increase diversity across the 
     intelligence community. Such plan shall include--
       (1) a description of the long term and short term goals for 
     the intelligence community;
       (2) a description of how the plan will be implemented by 
     each element of the intelligence community, taking into 
     account the unique nature of individual elements of the 
     intelligence community;
       (3) training and education programs for senior officials 
     and managers; and
       (4) performance metrics.
       (b) Restriction on Community Management Funds Until 
     Submission of Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     may only obligate or expend 80 percent of the funds 
     appropriated to the Intelligence Community Management Account 
     pursuant to section 104(a) until the date on which the report 
     required under subsection (a) is submitted.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

     SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON CO-LOCATION OF THE 
                   OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3(e)) is amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of 
     Headquarters With Headquarters of'' ;
       (2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the 
     Office''; and
       (3) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``any other 
     element''.

     SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   ON THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.

       Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United 
     States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the 
     Director's designee.''.

     SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND 
                   TECHNOLOGY OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted 
     by Elements of Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of 
     section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-3e) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (3)(A), by inserting ``and prioritize'' 
     after ``coordinate''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall 
     identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be 
     executed by elements of the intelligence community.''.
       (b) Development of Technology Goals.--Such section is 
     further amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)--
       (A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and
       (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the 
     elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology 
     needs of the intelligence community; and''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence 
     Community.--In carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director 
     of Science and Technology shall--
       ``(1) systematically identify and assess the most 
     significant intelligence challenges that require technical 
     solutions;
       ``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of 
     research programs; and
       ``(3) ensure that programs are designed to meet the 
     technical requirements of the intelligence community.''.
       (c) Report.--(1) Not later than June 30, 2008, the Director 
     of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report 
     containing a strategy for the development and use of 
     technology in the intelligence community through 2018.
       (2) The report shall include--
       (A) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps 
     across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the 
     use of technology;
       (B) goals for basic, advanced, and applied research and 
     development and a strategy to achieve such goals;
       (C) an explanation of how each advanced research and 
     development project funded under the National Intelligence 
     Program addresses an identified intelligence gap;
       (D) a list of all current and projected research and 
     development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or 
     applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation 
     dates, and estimated completion dates; and
       (E) a plan to transition technology from research and 
     development projects into National Intelligence Program 
     acquisition programs.
       (3) The report may be submitted in classified form.

     SEC. 404. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND 
                   OFFICIALS.

       (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``Establishment.--Not later than 18 months 
     after the date of the enactment of the National Security 
     Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting ``(1) 
     Establishment.--The''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter 
     Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National 
     Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the 
     Director of National Intelligence.
       ``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center 
     shall be located within the Office of the Director of 
     National Intelligence.''.
       (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-
     3(c)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new 
     paragraphs:
       ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the intelligence 
     community.
       ``(10) The Inspector General of the intelligence community.
       ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism 
     Center.
       ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation 
     Center.''.

     SEC. 405. ELIGIBILITY FOR INCENTIVE AWARDS OF PERSONNEL 
                   ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 402 of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (50 
     U.S.C. 403e-1) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of 
     National Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in 
     section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to 
     Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or 
     assigned to the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence in the same manner as such authority may be 
     exercised with respect to personnel of the Office.
       ``(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may 
     exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, 
     United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and 
     members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the 
     Central Intelligence Agency in the same manner as such 
     authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of the 
     Agency.''.
       (b) Repeal of Obsolete Authority.--Such section is further 
     amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (c); and
       (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--Such section is further 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (b), by striking ``to the Central 
     Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence

[[Page 12203]]

     Community Staff'' and inserting ``to the Office of the 
     Director of National Intelligence or to the Central 
     Intelligence Agency''; and
       (2) in subsection (c), as redesignated by subsection (b)(2) 
     of this section, by striking ``Director of Central 
     Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National 
     Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency''.
       (d) Technical and Stylistic Amendments.--That section is 
     further amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)--
       (A) by inserting ``Personnel Eligible for Awards.--'' after 
     ``(b)'';
       (B) by striking ``subsection (a) of this section'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (a)''; and
       (C) by striking ``a date five years before the date of 
     enactment of this section'' and inserting ``December 9, 
     1978''; and
       (2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by inserting 
     ``Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--'' after ``(c)''.

     SEC. 406. MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.

       (a) In General.--Section 102A of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(s) Multi-Level Security Clearances.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall establish a multi-level security 
     clearance system for the intelligence community to enable the 
     intelligence community to more efficiently make use of 
     persons proficient in foreign languages or with cultural, 
     linguistic, or other subject matter expertise that is 
     critical to national security.''.
       (b) Establishment Date.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall establish a multi-level security clearance 
     system under section 102A(s) of the National Security Act of 
     1947, as added by subsection (a), not later than 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 407. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON GLOBAL CLIMATE 
                   CHANGE.

       (a) National Intelligence Estimate.--Not later than 270 
     days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a national 
     intelligence estimate on the anticipated geopolitical effects 
     of global climate change and the implications of such effects 
     on the national security of the United States.
       (b) Content.--In preparing the national intelligence 
     estimate required by this section, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall--
       (1) assess the political, social, agricultural, and 
     economic risks during the 30-year period beginning on the 
     date of enactment of this Act posed by global climate change 
     for countries or regions that are--
       (A) of strategic national security importance to the United 
     States and at risk of significant impact due to global 
     climate change; or
       (B) at significant risk of large-scale humanitarian 
     suffering with cross-border implications as predicted on the 
     basis of the assessments;
       (2) assess the capabilities of the countries or regions 
     described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) to 
     respond to adverse national security impacts caused by global 
     climate change;
       (3) assess the strategic challenges and opportunities posed 
     to the United States by the risks described in paragraph (1); 
     and
       (4) assess the impact of global climate change on the 
     activities of the United States intelligence community 
     throughout the world.
       (c) Coordination.--In preparing the national intelligence 
     estimate under this section, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall consult with representatives of the 
     scientific community, and, as appropriate, multilateral 
     institutions and allies of the United States that have 
     conducted significant research on global climate change.
       (d) Form.--The national intelligence estimate required by 
     this section (including key judgments) shall be submitted in 
     unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

     SEC. 408. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA 
                   CENTER EFFICIENCY REPORTS.

       (a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
     develop a plan to implement the recommendations of the report 
     submitted to Congress under section 1 of the Act entitled 
     ``An Act to study and promote the use of energy efficient 
     computer servers in the United States'' (Public Law 109-431; 
     120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later then February 1, 2008, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a 
     report containing the plan developed under subsection (a).
       (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
     annex.

     SEC. 409. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY OF SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.

       Not later than January 15, 2008, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a classified report providing a comprehensive 
     inventory of all special access programs under the National 
     Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3(6) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6))).

     SEC. 410. QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON IRAN 
                   AND NORTH KOREA.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Report.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:


  ``QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON IRAN AND NORTH KOREA

       ``Sec. 508.  (a) Report.--
       ``(1) In general.--On a quarterly basis, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report on the current intentions 
     and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) with 
     regard to the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, 
     respectively, including--
       ``(A) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs;
       ``(B) an evaluation, consistent with existing reporting 
     standards and practices, of the sources upon which the 
     intelligence is based, including the number of sources and 
     the reliability of each source;
       ``(C) a summary of any new intelligence gathered or 
     developed since the previous report, including intelligence 
     collected from both open and clandestine sources; and
       ``(D) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in 
     knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence 
     in the overall assessment.
       ``(2) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) may 
     be submitted in classified form.
       ``(b) Access to Report.--Each report submitted under 
     subsection (a)(1) shall be made available to all members of 
     the congressional intelligence committees and to all staff of 
     the congressional intelligence committees with appropriate 
     security clearance. Other members of the Senate or the House 
     of Representatives may review the reports in accordance with 
     security procedures established by each of the congressional 
     intelligence committees.''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of such Act is amended by inserting after the 
     item relating to section 507 the following new item:

``Sec. 508. Quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on Iran and 
              North Korea.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The first report required to be 
     submitted under section 508(a)(1) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a)(1), shall be 
     submitted not later than 30 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 411. ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTELLIGENCE CONTRACTING.

       (a) Oversight Report on IC Contractors.--
       (1) Report.--
       (A) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is further amended by adding at 
     the end the following new section:


             ``REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS

       ``Sec. 509.  Not later each year than the date provided in 
     section 507, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     on contractors funded under the National Intelligence 
     Program. Such report shall include--
       ``(1) a list of all contractors that--
       ``(A) have been the subject of an investigation completed 
     by the Inspector General of any element of the intelligence 
     community during the preceding fiscal year,
       ``(B) are the subject of an investigation by such an 
     Inspector General during the current fiscal year, or
       ``(C) will be the subject of an investigation that may 
     affect the ability of the contractor to deliver contracted 
     services to the intelligence community by such an Inspector 
     General during the current fiscal year,

     either as a corporate entity or an individual employee, for 
     financial waste, fraud, abuse of government resources, 
     failure to perform a contract, or criminal violations; and
       ``(2) the number of contractors performing services for 
     each element of the intelligence community.''.
       (B) Report date.--Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 
     415b(a)(1)) is amended by--
       (i) redesignating subparagraph (N) as subparagraph (J);
       (ii) adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(K) The annual report on intelligence community 
     contractors required by section 509.''.

       (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of such Act is further amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 508, as added by section 
     410, the following new item:

``Sec. 509. Report on intelligence community contractors.''.
       (b) Report on Regulations and Accountability Mechanisms 
     Governing Intelligence Community Contractors.--
       (1) Report requirement.--Not later than February 1, 2008, 
     the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on 
     accountability mechanisms that govern the ongoing performance 
     of contractors for personal services contracts under the 
     National Intelligence Program.
       (2) Matters covered.--The report submitted under paragraph 
     (1) shall include--
       (A) a list of statutes and regulations that govern the 
     ongoing performance of contractors for services contracts 
     entered into by each element of the intelligence community;
       (B) an analysis of accountability mechanisms within 
     services contracts awarded for intelligence activities by 
     each element of the intelligence community during fiscal 
     years 2006 and 2007;
       (C) an analysis of procedures in use in the intelligence 
     community for conducting oversight of contractors to ensure 
     identification and prosecution of criminal violations, 
     financial waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by 
     contractors or contract personnel; and
       (D) an identification of best practices of accountability 
     mechanisms within services contracts.

[[Page 12204]]

       (3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
     annex.
       (c) Impact of Contractors on the Intelligence Community 
     Workforce.--
       (1) Report requirement.--Not later than March 1, 2008, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on the impact 
     of contractors on the intelligence community workforce under 
     the National Intelligence Program.
       (2) Matters covered.--The report submitted under paragraph 
     (1) shall include--
       (A) an identification of contracts where the contractor is 
     providing a substantially similar functions to a government 
     employee;
       (B) a comparison of the compensation of contract employees 
     and government employees performing substantially similar 
     functions;
       (C) an analysis of the attrition of government personnel 
     for contractor positions that provide substantially similar 
     functions; and
       (D) an estimate of the value of the infrastructure provided 
     to contract employees for government furnished equipment, 
     facilities, or other support, by agency and expenditure 
     center.

     SEC. 412. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN 
                   THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is further amended by adding at 
     the end the following new section:


 ``REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

       ``Sec. 510.  Not later each year than the date provided in 
     section 507, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     on the foreign language proficiency of each element of the 
     intelligence community, including--
       ``(1) the number of positions authorized for such element 
     that require foreign language proficiency and the level of 
     proficiency required;
       ``(2) the number of positions authorized for such element 
     that require foreign language proficiency that are filled 
     by--
       ``(A) military personnel; and
       ``(B) civilian personnel;
       ``(3) the number of applicants for positions in such 
     element in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign 
     language proficiency, including the foreign language 
     indicated and the proficiency level;
       ``(4) the number of persons hired by such element with 
     foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language 
     and proficiency level;
       ``(5) the number of personnel of such element currently 
     attending foreign language training, including the provider 
     of such training;
       ``(6) a description of such element's efforts to recruit, 
     hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a 
     foreign language; and
       ``(7) an assessment of methods and models for basic, 
     advanced, and intensive foreign language training.''.
       (2) Report date.--Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 
     415b(a)(1)) is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subparagraph:
       ``(L) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in 
     the intelligence community required by section 510.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of such Act is further amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 509, as added by section 
     411, the following new item:

``Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence 
              community.''.

     SEC. 413. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE 
                   PROFICIENCY.

       (a) Annual Reports.--
       (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:


            ``ANNUAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

       ``Sec. 120.  (a) In General.--The head of each element of 
     the intelligence community shall annually submit to the 
     Director of National Intelligence a report on the foreign 
     language proficiency of the personnel of such element.
       ``(b) Contents.--
       ``(1) In general.--Each report submitted under subsection 
     (a) shall include, for each foreign language and, where 
     appropriate, dialect of a foreign language--
       ``(A) the number of positions of such element that require 
     proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
       ``(B) the number of personnel of such element that are 
     serving in a position that--
       ``(i) requires proficiency in the foreign language or 
     dialect to perform the primary duty of the position; and
       ``(ii) does not require proficiency in the foreign language 
     or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position;
       ``(C) the number of personnel that are proficient in the 
     foreign language or dialect that--
       ``(i) are authorized for the element of the intelligence 
     community for which the report is submitted; and
       ``(ii) the head of such element considers necessary for 
     such element for each of the five years following the date of 
     the submission of the report;
       ``(D) the number of personnel of such element rated at each 
     level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
       ``(E) whether the number of personnel at each level of 
     proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the 
     requirements of such element;
       ``(F) the number of personnel serving or hired to serve as 
     linguists for such element that are not qualified as 
     linguists under the standards of the Interagency Language 
     Roundtable;
       ``(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists 
     for such element during the preceding calendar year;
       ``(H) the number of personnel serving as linguists that 
     discontinued serving such element during the preceding 
     calendar year;
       ``(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills 
     that is fulfilled by an ally of the United States;
       ``(J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills 
     that is fulfilled by contractors; and
       ``(K) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills 
     that is fulfilled by members of the Armed Forces.
       ``(2) Military personnel.--Except as provided in paragraph 
     (1)(K), a report submitted under subsection (a) shall not 
     include personnel that are members of the Armed Forces on 
     active duty assigned to the element for which the report is 
     submitted.
       ``(c) DNI Report to Congress.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall annually submit to the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Defense of 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and 
     the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate a report containing--
       ``(1) each report submitted to the Director of National 
     Intelligence for a year under subsection (a);
       ``(2) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and 
     capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; and
       ``(3) recommendations for eliminating required reports 
     relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of 
     National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer 
     relevant.''.
       (2) Table of contents.--Such Act is further amended in the 
     table of contents in the first section by inserting after the 
     item relating to section 119B the following new item:

``Sec. 120. Annual reports on foreign language proficiency.''.

       (b) Effective Date.--
       (1) Report by heads of elements of the intelligence 
     community.--The first report required to be submitted by the 
     head of each element of the intelligence community under 
     section 120(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added 
     by subsection (a)(1), shall be submitted not later than 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (2) Report by dni.--The first report required to be 
     submitted by the Director of National Intelligence under 
     section 120(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added 
     by subsection (a)(1), shall be submitted not later than 240 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

     SEC. 421. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Establishment and Duties of the Position of Deputy 
     Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) Title I of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is 
     amended by inserting after section 104A the following new 
     section:


          ``DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

       ``Sec. 104B.  (a) Deputy Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency.--There is a Deputy Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency who shall be appointed by the 
     President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       ``(b) Duties.--The Deputy Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall--
       ``(1) assist the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the 
     Director; and
       ``(2) act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency during the absence or 
     disability of the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, or during a vacancy in the position of Director of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
       (2) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of such Act is amended by inserting after the 
     item relating to section 104A the following new item:

``Sec. 104B. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.

       (b) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating 
     to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting 
     the following new item:
       ``Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.

     SEC. 422. GENERAL AUTHORITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCY.

       Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``any of 
     the functions or activities authorized under paragraphs (2) 
     and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of 
     section 103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and 
     section 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405),'' 
     and inserting ``any functions or activities authorized by law 
     to be conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency''.

     SEC. 423. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR 
                   GENERAL OF THE CIA.

       (a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b) is amended by--

[[Page 12205]]

       (1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (g) and 
     transferring such subsection to the end;
       (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
       ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector 
     General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an 
     audit of each covert action at least every three years.
       ``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector 
     General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to 
     conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that 
     has been terminated or suspended if such covert action was 
     terminated or suspend prior to the last audit of such covert 
     action conducted by the Inspector General and has not been 
     restarted after the date on which such audit was completed.
       ``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion 
     of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the 
     Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     containing the results of such audit.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking 
     ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)'';
       (2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by 
     striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''; and
       (3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking 
     ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''.

     SEC. 424. REPORT ON AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS PROGRESS.

       Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended by striking ``the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency,''.

                       Subtitle C--Other Elements

     SEC. 431. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF 
                   THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 
                   YEAR 2004.

       Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 
     U.S.C. 311 note) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
     inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
       (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after 
     ``subsection (a)),''.

     SEC. 432. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE 
                   OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
                   EXECUTIVE.

       (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the 
     Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of 
     Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
       (1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j);
       (2) in subsection (g), by striking paragraphs (3) and (4); 
     and
       (3) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), 
     and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), 
     respectively.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) 
     of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it 
     appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection 
     (e)''; and
       (2) in subsection (e)(2), as so redesignated, by striking 
     ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.

     SEC. 433. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG 
                   ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION ELEMENTS IN THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (H)--
       (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine 
     Corps,''; and
       (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' 
     after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the 
     Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

                Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters

     SEC. 501. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORMS.

       (a) Limitation on Termination of U-2 Aircraft Program.--The 
     Secretary of Defense may not begin the process to terminate 
     the U-2 aircraft program until the Secretary certifies in 
     accordance with subsection (b) that there would be no loss of 
     national or Department of Defense intelligence, surveillance, 
     and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in transitioning from 
     the U-2 aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned 
     aerial vehicle platform.
       (b) Report and Certification.--
       (1) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study 
     of aerial reconnaissance platforms to determine whether the 
     Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle has reached mission 
     capability and has attained collection capabilities on a par 
     with the collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 aircraft 
     program as of April 1, 2006.
       (2) Report.--The Secretary shall submit to the 
     congressional committees specified in subsection (c) a report 
     containing the results of the study. The Secretary shall 
     include in the report the Secretary's determination as to 
     whether the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle--
       (A) has reached mission capability; and
       (B) has attained collection capabilities on a par with the 
     collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 aircraft program 
     as of April 1, 2006.
       (3) Certification.--The Secretary shall include with the 
     report the Secretary's certification, based on the results of 
     the study, as to whether or not there would be a loss of 
     national or Department of Defense intelligence, surveillance, 
     and reconnaissance capabilities with a transition from the U-
     2 aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial 
     vehicle platform.
       (c) Specified Committees.--The congressional committees 
     specified in this subsection are the following:
       (1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.

     SEC. 502. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF 
                   RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED 
                   STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Extension.--
       (1) In general.--Section 1007(a) of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 
     50 U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by striking ``September 1, 
     2004'' and inserting ``September 1, 2008''.
       (2) Effective date.--The amendment made by subsection 
     (a)(1) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of 
     section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2003.
       (b) Funding.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated by this Act for the Intelligence Community 
     Management Account, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall make $2,000,000 available to the National Commission 
     for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of 
     the United States Intelligence Community (in this subsection 
     referred to as the ``Commission'') established under section 
     1002(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2438; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) 
     to carry out title X of such Act.
       (2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission 
     under paragraph (1) shall remain available until expended.

                    Subtitle B--Technical Amendments

     SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 
     U.S.C. 404b) is amended--
       (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and
       (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears.
       (b) Responsibility of DNI.--That section is further 
     amended--
       (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of 
     Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National 
     Intelligence''; and
       (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National 
     Intelligence'' after ``Director''.
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is 
     amended to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.''.

     SEC. 512. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO 
                   JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND 
                   TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.

       Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-1) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets 
     for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical 
     Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual 
     budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor 
     program or programs''; and
       (2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military 
     Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence 
     Program or any successor program or programs''.

     SEC. 513. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT 
                   OF 1947.

       The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) 
     is amended--
       (1) in section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)--
       (A) in subsection (c)(7)(A), by striking ``section'' and 
     inserting ``subsection'';
       (B) in subsection (d)--
       (i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' in 
     the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting 
     ``paragraph (1)(A)''; and
       (ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or personnel'' in 
     the matter preceding clause (i);
       (C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and 
     inserting ``paragraph''; and
       (D) in the heading of subsection (n), by striking 
     ``Acquisition Authorities'' and inserting ``Acquisition and 
     Other Authorities''; and
       (2) in section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by 
     striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.

     SEC. 514. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND 
                   TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.

       (a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act 
     of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 
     2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows:
       (1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by 
     striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and 
     inserting ``Department of Justice''.
       (2) In section 1061 (5 U.S.C. 601 note)--
       (A) in subsection (d)(4)(A), by striking ``National 
     Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of National 
     Intelligence''; and

[[Page 12206]]

       (B) in subsection (h), by striking ``National Intelligence 
     Director'' and inserting ``Director of National 
     Intelligence''.
       (3) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''.
       (4) In section 1072(b), by inserting ``Agency'' after 
     ``Intelligence''.
       (b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) is 
     amended as follows:
       (1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
       (A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before ``an 
     institutional culture'';
       (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National 
     Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 
     112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National 
     Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law''; 
     and
       (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter 
     preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''.
       (2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
       (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and 
     inserting ``Federal''; and
       (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and 
     inserting ``specific''.

     SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

       (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating 
     to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the 
     following new item:
       ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
       (b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating 
     to the General Counsel of the Office of the National 
     Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item:
       ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence.''.

     SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO TITLES OF CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY POSITIONS.

       Section 17(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)(B)(ii)) is amended--
       (1) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive Director'' 
     and inserting ``Associate Deputy Director'';
       (2) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
     Operations'' and inserting ``Director of the National 
     Clandestine Service''; and
       (3) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
     Administration'' and inserting ``Director for Support''.

     SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO REDESIGNATION OF 
                   THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY AS THE 
                   NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Title 5, United States Code.--(1) Title 5, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency'' each place it appears in a provision as 
     follows and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence 
     Agency'':
       (A) Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii).
       (B) Section 3132(a)(1)(B).
       (C) Section 4301(1) (in clause (ii)).
       (D) Section 4701(a)(1)(B).
       (E) Section 5102(a)(1) (in clause (x)).
       (F) Section 5342(a)(1)(K).
       (G) Section 6339(a)(1)(E).
       (H) Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i)(XIII).
       (2) Section 6339(a)(2)(E) of such title is amended by 
     striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Director 
     of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting 
     ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of 
     the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
       (b) Title 44, United States Code.--(1)(A) Section 1336 of 
     title 44, United States Code, is amended by striking 
     ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' both places it 
     appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence 
     Agency''.
       (B) The heading of such section is amended to read as 
     follows:

     ``Sec. 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special 
       publications''.

       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 13 of 
     such title is amended by striking the item relating to 
     section 1336 and inserting the following new item:

``1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special 
              publications.''.

       (c) Homeland Security Act of 2002.--Section 201(f)(2)(E) of 
     the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(f)(2)(E)) is 
     amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' 
     and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
       (d) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H of the 
     Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by 
     striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place 
     it appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence 
     Agency''.
       (e) Ethics in Government Act of 1978.--Section 105(a)(1) of 
     the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is 
     amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' 
     and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
       (f) Other Acts.--(1) Section 7(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Employee 
     Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2006(b)(2)(A)(i)) 
     is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping 
     Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence 
     Agency''.
       (2) Section 207(a)(2)(B) of the Legislative Branch 
     Appropriations Act, 1993 (44 U.S.C. 501 note) is amended by 
     striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and 
     inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.

  The CHAIRMAN. No amendment to the committee amendment is in order 
except the amendments printed in House Report 110-144. Each amendment 
may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member 
designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable 
for the time specified in the report, equally divided and controlled by 
the proponent and an opponent of the amendment, shall not be subject to 
amendment and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the 
question.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House 
Report 110-144.


                Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Hoekstra

  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed 
in House Report 110-144.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Hoekstra:
       Strike section 407 (page 24, line 17 through page 26, line 
     8).

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  As we have already talked about a number of times in general debate, 
the base bill includes a provision that directs the Director of 
National Intelligence to complete a national intelligence estimate on 
climate change where they shall assess the political, social, 
agricultural and economic risk during the 30-year period beginning at 
the date of enactment of this act posed by global climate change.
  This is a global study, 30 years, and it is very clear what we want 
to do with this amendment. We want to make sure that the Intelligence 
Community stays focused on its priorities which is the threat from 
radical jihadists, the proliferation and the threats posed by Iran, 
Syria, North Korea and other countries that over this 30-year period 
may participate in proliferation, the restructuring of the Intelligence 
Community, and the rebuilding of HUMINT.
  These are the key priorities that the Intelligence Community and the 
Intelligence Committees have been focused on over the last number of 
years. We need to continue that focus rebuilding this community, 
rebuilding the resources and the capabilities while, as it was 
discussed, the information that is going to be used is public 
information. The direction in the bill says it will be a public report, 
so the real question comes: What specific value does the Intelligence 
Community add to this process that makes it so important that we will 
divert resources from other key priorities to climate change?

                              {time}  2315

  Why can't this be done in other areas of the government where it is 
already being done, areas that have already been allocated and been 
spending dollars in these areas over a number of years in what is 
projected to be over $7 billion of expenditure in these areas in 2008?
  Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ESHOO. I rise to claim the time in opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairman, as I said when I was speaking a little bit 
ago, and I am going to make some comments about this amendment, I want 
to set something else down which I think is really important, and that 
is, that it's not debatable that this is the largest single 
intelligence authorization in the history of our country.
  Now, we are hearing a lot from the other side, hearing a lot from the 
other side, not enough money, not enough

[[Page 12207]]

money, not enough money. When did you make any amendments to increase 
anything in this authorization, with the exception of an earmark with 
three States specified? That's what you offered, and that's the only 
thing that you offered.
  So I think it's important for the people of our country to know 
what's going on.
  Now, on this amendment that Mr. Hoekstra offers, this is not a study 
of climate change. This is a directive to the intelligence community to 
assess the impacts of climate change; and most frankly, I would go with 
the former Army chief of staff, Retired General Gordon Sullivan, who 
said the national security consequences of global climate change should 
be fully integrated into the national security and national defense 
strategies, including a National Intelligence Estimate. Climate change 
is a national security issue.
  Madam Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the distinguished 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).
  Mr. MARKEY. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentlelady for her leadership 
on this issue.
  As the Chairman of the Select Committee on Global Warming, I 
conducted a hearing 3 weeks ago in which Retired General Gordon 
Sullivan, speaking for eleven senior retired three- and four-star 
admirals and generals, released and testified on a report entitled 
``National Security and the Threat of Climate Change,'' which called 
for global warming to be fully integrated into the military and defense 
planning.
  Here's what General Sullivan testified to. He said that he was the 
Army chief of staff when we lost 19 men in Mogadishu. He testified 
before the Select Committee on Global Warming that with more drought we 
will see more disasters such as Black Hawk Down. Drought caused famine, 
famine caused food relief, food relief caused warlords to fight over 
it, the warlords fighting caused the U.S. to intervene, and 19 U.S. 
fighting men were killed. He added, and I quote, that the same thing is 
what is driving Darfur and there has to be some recognition that these 
issues are at the heart environmentally related.
  These are men who have dedicated their lives to protecting our 
country. They are asking us to do a National Intelligence Estimate 
about what the impact is of climate leading to drought, leading to 
famine, leading to conflicts, leading to the American military or other 
of our allies having been dedicated to preserving the peace. That is no 
small request from 11 retired three-star generals and admirals.
  Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairman, I believe our time has expired?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairwoman, let me just close out this very 
important debate, and it is important to have a debate. It's very 
important to have a debate.
  In listening to it, I see two things: one, a rearview mirror, looking 
to the past, people that are sincere, but nonetheless I think are 
sticking their heads in the sand. When we see whole populations, 
massive movement of populations, moving across borders because of 
drought, moving across borders because of disruption, they cause 
national security issues. We know that.
  This debate is about the future, and I understand why some have 
trouble seeing the future and even embracing it, much less harnessing 
it.
  Mr. MARKEY. Madam Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. ESHOO. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. MARKEY. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentlelady for yielding.
  It is not inappropriate for the CIA to tell us how the increasing 
scarcity of water could exacerbate the very failed state conditions 
which breed terrorism. It is not politically correct to want the 
military services to know how polar ice melt could alter the patrols of 
our submarines or how rising sea levels could threaten not only our 
naval facilities but also our crucial shipbuilding infrastructure.
  It is not pre-9/11 mindset that wants to study how our ability to 
project power from the Pacific would be damaged if our crucial air base 
at Diego Garcia, average elevation 4 feet above sea level, changes from 
a land-based stationary aircraft carrier to a sub-sea ruin.
  That is in the interest of the national security of our country.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  I think as you listen to the discussion, the question almost answers 
itself because the primary question hasn't been answered: Exactly what 
are we going to task our spy satellites to do? Exactly what are we 
going to task our human collectors to do?
  The statistics are very, very obvious in terms of climate change, and 
there's lots of different, competing ones. Exactly what secrets, with 
limited resources, are we going to task the intelligence community to 
go out and collect? And precious analysts that are taking a look at 
northern Africa and trying to determine exactly what the footprint is 
of al Qaeda in Algeria and Morocco, Nigeria, other parts of Africa, are 
we going to ask the CIA stations in those areas to take their time and 
dedicate it to studying climate change for the next 6 months? It's a 
totally new task.
  We have a community that at this point is not even a global 
community. So we are going to dedicate precious resources instead of 
expanding the reach of our intelligence community into places where we 
are not at today, the bigger emphasis is going to be giving them a 
totally new and different assignment?
  Instead of tasking our satellites to take a look at exactly what the 
proliferation capabilities are in China or North Korea, we are going to 
task them to look somewhere else even though that same kind of 
capabilities may be available from commercial imagery? Exactly what 
information does the intelligence community, I mean, it's our business 
to steal secrets, to find out what the plans and intentions are of 
those who want to attack the United States. This is information.
  There are hundreds and probably thousands of people that are very 
skilled at investigating climate change, predicting what may happen in 
certain regions of the country and certain regions of the planet, and 
they are not in the intelligence community. These people have their 
plate full. The threats are real. We should not diminish the threats. 
The information is in the public. These are two missions that do not 
come together.
  Studying climate change can be done by other government agencies. 
Stealing the secrets of al Qaeda and North Korea, Iran, other parts of 
the world, that is the job of the intelligence community. Let them 
focus on the job that we need them to do. Support this amendment and 
strike this National Intelligence Estimate.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan will be 
postponed.


                  Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Holt

  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed 
in House Report 110-144.
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Holt:
       At the end of title III (page 16, after line 25), add the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 309. MODIFICATIONS TO ANNUAL REPORT ON PROTECTION OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES.

       The first sentence of section 603(a) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) is amended by 
     inserting ``, including an assessment of the need for any 
     modification of this title for the purpose of improving legal 
     protections for covert agents'' after ``measures to protect 
     the identities of covert agents''.


[[Page 12208]]


  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from 
New Jersey (Mr. Holt) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey.
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The amendment I am offering would require the President, through the 
Director of National Intelligence, to report annually to Congress on 
the need for any modification to the Intelligence Identity Protection 
Act to improve legal protection for covert agents. This report, along 
with other oversight work the committee will undertake, will help us 
establish what measures need to be taken to minimize the chances in the 
future of compromising the identities of covert operatives.
  These men and women take enormous risks on our behalf. Their covers 
are their only protection when they are working overseas. We owe them 
everything we can do to ensure that their identities are protected from 
exposure both from hostile intelligence services or even from exposure 
within our own government by those who would seek to retaliate against 
them for speaking truth to power.
  This grew out of my consideration, trying to draw lessons from what 
has become a well-publicized example of the outing of a former CIA 
officer. In previous Congresses, on eight separate occasions in 
committees and on this floor, the then-majority voted down every effort 
to obtain information on this matter; and as I repeatedly noted at 
those times, Mr. Fitzgerald's criminal inquiry could never address some 
of the key questions that we sought answers to: How and why did Ms. 
Valerie Plame's cover status come to be known to those with no 
legitimate need to know? How much damage was done to our intelligence 
collection efforts as a result of the outing of Ms. Plame? What 
measures has the Central Intelligence Agency and now the Director of 
National Intelligence taken to prevent similar compromises in the 
future?
  It appears that nothing has changed. So this sort of thing could 
happen again. It's important that we take steps to protect, as I say, 
the only protection that these covert agents have if they are in 
dangerous positions overseas.
  So that is the point of this amendment, and I seek the approval of 
the House.
  Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to claim 
the 5 minutes in opposition to this amendment, although I will not 
oppose the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Michigan is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, as I indicated, I agree with the 
gentleman's amendment, and I will vote for his amendment. However, I 
wish that as we were talking about leaks that we were discussing this 
in a much broader context.
  The issue of leaks has been something that has been plaguing the 
community for an extended period of time, so we were not just talking 
about the leaks of personal identities. We would be talking about the 
leaks of programs and tactics and strategies that were being used by 
the intelligence community and used effectively to keep America safe.
  We have had far too many leaks of highly classified information, and 
some of us would believe that as you take a look at some of these 
leaks, some would say that they perhaps have been made for political 
purposes.
  The gentleman's focus on the identities of covert CIA officers is 
commendable, but should include the loss of capabilities because of 
other leaks as well.

                              {time}  2330

  Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  I support the gentleman's amendment. I am glad that we are able to 
work through this one. I am hoping that, as we move forward into the 
rest of this year, we will be able to develop a process that will 
enable us to more effectively go after all of the different kinds of 
leaks that the community and the country have suffered from over the 
last number of years.
  Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt).
  The amendment was agreed to.


         Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Thompson of California

  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed 
in House Report 110-144.
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Thompson of California:
       At the end of subtitle A of title IV (page 39, after line 
     16), add the following new section:

     SEC. 414. REPORT ON PERSONNEL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report containing--
       (1) the number of intelligence collectors and analysts 
     employed or contracted by each element of the intelligence 
     community; and
       (2) a plan to maximize the number of intelligence 
     collectors employed or contracted by the intelligence 
     community.
       (b) Limitation on Personnel.--
       (1) Limitation.--Subject to paragraph (2), but 
     notwithstanding any other provision of this Act (including 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a)), the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence is authorized not more than--
       (A) the number of personnel employed or contracted by such 
     Office as of May 9, 2007; and
       (B) an additional 15 percent of such number of personnel 
     employed or contracted by such Office as of May 9, 2007.
       (2) Termination of limitation.--The limitation on the 
     number of personnel authorized for the Office of the Director 
     of National Intelligence under paragraph (1) shall no longer 
     apply on or after the date on which the report required under 
     subsection (a) is submitted.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Thompson) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. Madam Chairman, I yield myself as much 
time as I may consume.
  This Congress created the Director of National Intelligence so he and 
a core staff could manage the activities of the different intelligence 
agencies. Congress did not intend to create a new bureaucracy.
  Nevertheless, the office has expanded in size. Many members of the 
Intelligence Committee, myself included, as well as other colleagues in 
the House, are concerned that this growth will complicate, rather than 
streamline, the activities of the intelligence communities. Some 
Members have proposed limiting the number of people who can work for 
the DNI in order to stem this growth.
  But I believe that such a measure, while satisfying on the surface, 
would have harmful consequences. It would eliminate a large number of 
analysts and planners, the experts who actually perform the core 
intelligence functions, not middle managers and bureaucrats.
  The harshest impact would fall on DNI elements like the National 
Counterterrorism Center, which analyzes terrorism information and plans 
counterterrorism operations. This would happen because there are plans 
in play to shift personnel to this specific task. If this other 
amendment were to pass, it would truncate these very important efforts. 
These are the people who play critical roles in our efforts to combat 
terrorism, and our operators around the world cannot do their jobs 
without this critical backstopping. Preventing the DNI from adding 
staff to these missions would gut key counterterrorism capabilities.

[[Page 12209]]

  The real issue, though, is not simply the number of people who appear 
on the DNI's balance sheet, the challenge is to have fewer people 
sitting behind desks in Washington and to place more intelligence 
officers in the field. This is a goal that I think we all share, even 
those with a competing amendment. They need to be in the field where 
they can collect needed intelligence and where they can catch 
terrorists.
  The Intelligence Authorization Act will fund increases in the number 
of intelligence collectors at many agencies, but there is still not 
enough. To push the Intelligence Committee to get its staff out of the 
office and into the field, the amendment that I am offering would 
freeze the number of people working for the DNI at the level specified 
in the fiscal year 2007 Intelligence Authorization Act that was passed 
by this House.
  The freeze wouldn't be lifted until the Director of National 
Intelligence provides the committee, the Intelligence Committees, one, 
a report on the number of analysts and collectors in each element of 
the Intelligence Community, and two, a plan to maximize the number of 
collectors across the community. This plan must be provided within 120 
days of enactment.
  With this information, the Intelligence Committee will be able to 
work with the DNI to ensure that he has the right mix of collectors, 
analysts, technical experts and other staff, and we will be able to 
press the DNI and the individual intelligence agencies to accelerate 
the recruitment, the training and the deployment of core collectors.
  This amendment will enhance congressional oversight of intelligence 
activities and result in improvements to the Intelligence Community's 
ability to collect critical intelligence.
  I am willing to work with, and we have worked with my colleague and 
friend from the committee on this issue. I believe that this amendment 
is the one that will allow us to best collect the information so we 
can, in fact, put together the best policy for America.
  Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I claim the time in 
opposition.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  I have the utmost respect for the gentleman. We have had long 
conversations or at least short interrupted conversations over the past 
several days and in committee. I thought we had a fairly spirited 
debate in the Intelligence Committee about this very issue.
  The good thing is we agree this thing has exponentially grown, not 
the direction Congress intended. It was supposed to be a small, 
efficient organization that was coordinating and not inhibiting 
agencies from doing their work.
  I reluctantly, as we talked earlier, oppose this amendment, because 
really all it does is say give me another report, and you can grow as 
much as you want in 2008. This is what the staggering number is here. 
The number itself is classified, but it is over 37 percent growth from 
where they are right now to 2008, in headquarters.
  Now, they are not catching one spy. They are not recruiting one 
asset. They are not out analyzing any particular image from the sky. 
They are getting more in boxes. They are getting more in computers. 
They are getting more bureaucracies and personnel staff and all of the 
other things that go along with growing your headquarters. That is all 
happening.
  When you travel around the world, the folks who are out there at the 
front end of this store, the analysts and the case officers, will tell 
you, please, enough already, because they took all of those analysts 
out of that community.
  Remember, it takes 5 to 7 years to get somebody to where they are 
really effective in this community. It's very difficult work.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Would my colleague yield?
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I would gladly yield.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I thank you, and I have enormous respect for 
a colleague who has offered an amendment where it appears we are 
competing.
  But I agree our amendment, after his, does, I believe, what is 
necessary, and that is to answer the question that a lot of us have 
with reference to the efficiency and effectiveness of the National 
Director of Intelligence.
  If I could just share one brief anecdote. When the war on poverty 
began in the area that I live in, I was the attorney and original 
scrivener of the development of the program. When that program came 
into existence, within a year they had seven employees. They were 
extremely effective.
  They grew in 6 years to 1,500 employees, and they became much less 
effective, totally disrespected and in disarray. I am fearful that the 
same thing will happen here.
  I thank my colleague for yielding.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Reclaiming my time. I don't know if I can say 
it any better. I hope to work with the gentleman in committee. I wish 
you would consider this.
  One point I think it is very important to make, this does not cut one 
analyst. They didn't even make all the hires they requested in 2007. 
Then they came back and asked for a significant increase in 2008, 
didn't even hire all the people from 2007. So the notion that they put 
forward that this somehow cuts the analyst doing counterterrorism work 
is wrong.
  It scares me more that this bureaucracy is so hell bent on protecting 
itself that it would make that claim. That's why I think we need to 
send this message, work with them to make this right sized, so we 
provide value added to the people risking their lives around the world.
  Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. Madam Chairman, again, I just want to 
reiterate the fact that we all share the same goal, and that's to get 
these folks out from behind the desk and into the field. I have 
tremendous respect for my colleague and friend, Mr. Rogers. He actually 
has real time in the field doing this work. He knows how important that 
is to have folks out in the field.
  As he and my other good friend and colleague, Mr. Hastings, has said, 
we all have the same goal, it's just, how do we get there?
  We believe that by putting this freeze in place, requiring this 
information be provided to the committee, will allow us to best analyze 
this, know where these folks are and force the DNI to put them in the 
right spots.
  The only other thing I would like to add is that it's important to 
note that the majority of this growth consists of transferring 
personnel who already work or should work for the DNI on to their books 
for better management and oversight.
  I ask for your support of this amendment.
  Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Thompson).
  The amendment was agreed to.


           Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan

  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed 
in House Report 110-144.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan:
       Page 5, line 19, strike ``The amounts'' and insert 
     ``Subject to section 106, the amounts''.
       Page 6, line 9, strike ``With the approval'' and insert 
     ``Subject to section 106, with the approval''.
       Page 7, line 11, strike ``The elements'' and insert 
     ``Subject to section 106, the elements''.
       Page 8, line 5, strike ``In addition'' and insert ``Subject 
     to section 106, in addition''.
       At the end of title I (page 10, after line 2), add the 
     following new section:

[[Page 12210]]



     SEC. 106. LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF PERSONNEL OF THE OFFICE OF 
                   THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Office 
     of the Director of National Intelligence is authorized only 
     the number of personnel as were serving in such Office on May 
     1, 2007.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time I 
may consume.
  I want to thank Mr. Hastings for working with me on this amendment. 
We have watched this thing for 3 years, and we have watched it pretty 
closely. We all want it to succeed. There are some really dedicated and 
committed people really trying to make this thing work.
  But one thing I have learned here in watching it in Washington, D.C., 
and going out to the field, where these case officers, the young ones, 
the middle-ranged ones and the older ones in the field, you can get a 
lot of insight about what happens between the difference of between 
there and back here.
  We have seen, I thought, a very poor performance. I have had this 
conversation with many of my colleagues here about their briefings, 
about this increase, and what they really performed, and what their 
mission set was. There are some things that they do and do well and are 
value-added.
  But this exponential growth, at the expense of analysts and officers 
in the field, I think is the wrong direction. I think it's so important 
that we make this statement to them that enough is enough.
  They brought in, remember, everyone of those analysts came from an 
agency that's doing targeted work, the counterterrorism center at the 
CIA. They were doing real work, targeting bad guys, identifying, 
putting them on lists, trying to get our guys to bring them to justice.
  What happened then is they disrupted some of those operations, 
brought those people in, and started tasking back to the people in the 
field. That's not value-added; it's just not.
  We can live with this if we can work out the kinks. As a matter of 
fact, Senator McConnell said, he thought the thing was getting a little 
bit too big. He didn't really influence this budget, 37 percent 
increase. We must do better by the people in the field, 5 to 7 years to 
train a case analyst and an officer.
  Madam Chairman, I yield to my good friend from Florida (Mr. 
Hastings).
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I thank my friend from Michigan and am 
pleased to sponsor this amendment with him.
  Madam Chairman, when Congress established the National Director of 
Intelligence, it fulfilled one of the 9/11 Commission recommendations 
to centralize and concentrate the filtering of intelligence. Since its 
inception, however, the Office of the Director never realized its 
potential, growing in size with indication of limited long-term 
planning. As a result, many of us who are familiar with the office 
question its efficiency and effectiveness.
  Capping the size of the ONDI is a responsible manner by which 
Congress can and should go about holding the administration accountable 
for its decisions and actions. This is not, as some might suggest, an 
anti-NDI amendment.
  On the contrary, my friend, Mr. Rogers, and my amendment, is the 
much-needed solution for Congress to reassert its oversight authority 
over the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. For too long, 
Congress has abdicated its oversight authority and responsibility when 
it comes to American intelligence.
  This amendment says to the administration that, while we support your 
efforts, we will not give you a blank check with which you could 
continue to grow a new bureaucracy before we know what you are doing 
with what you already have. A bigger bureaucracy does not make better 
intelligence.
  I ask my colleagues for their support of the Rogers-Hastings 
amendment and ask them to join us in holding America's Intelligence 
Community accountable for its work.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Reclaiming my time, I just thank the 
gentleman for his work and effort on this, and kind of us coming 
together on this conclusion over the past 3 years watching this 
process. Again, this is not anti-DNI. We think it serves a valuable 
purpose, but it is getting too big too fast.
  Again, this does not cut one analyst from doing work in this country, 
not one. They couldn't even fill the slots we have for 2007 before they 
came back and said we have to get even bigger next year.
  I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  2345

  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition to this 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I have tremendous respect for both of my 
colleagues, and they know that they have my commitment that we will 
continue to do aggressive oversight, because I do understand the 
concerns that they have about Office of the DNI and the way that it has 
grown and become too large. And while I support the goal of the 
amendment, I don't necessarily think this is the best way to proceed.
  The amendment, I believe, will have unintended consequences. For 
example, though the intent of this amendment is to limit the layers of 
unnecessary bureaucracy, this cap would actually eliminate large 
numbers of analysts and planners, with the harshest impact falling on 
the National Counterterrorism Center, which analyzes terrorism 
information and plans counterterrorism operations. It would also have 
the unintended consequence that it would eliminate personnel from the 
National Counterproliferation Center and the Office of Privacy and 
Civil Liberties.
  In addition, this amendment would force the DNI to fire anyone hired 
between May 1 and the date of the enactment of this bill, preventing 
the DNI from increasing capacity in priority areas.
  It is important, I believe, to note that this amendment would not cap 
the number of billets; it would cap the total number of people. Any 
currently unfilled billets would have to remain unfilled. This could 
negatively impact the DNI's ability to perform vital functions.
  Finally, I would ask my colleagues to consider that we do have, as 
Mr. Rogers said, a new DNI, and he deserves an opportunity to do the 
kinds of things that he has articulated to our committee. He is 
reorganizing his office, and I believe that we need to give him the 
flexibility needed to make those changes, while at the same time 
aggressively pursuing the oversight that is the responsibility of our 
committee.
  So, for those reasons, I reluctantly would oppose this amendment.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. REYES. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I know the chairman knows of my immense 
respect for his perspective, and I appreciate very much what you have 
said with regard to how you would carry forth the intent of mine and 
Mr. Rogers' amendment, as well as Mr. Thompson's, in capping this.
  What I say to you, Mr. Chairman, is I don't know in all of my 
experience of any bureaucrat, I respect the new DNI director, but I 
don't know of any bureaucrat that has ever said, I don't need no more 
people. And I also know for a fact that, in this particular case, in 
the standing up of this particular directorate what has happened is it 
has impacted already the infrastructure by virtue of the persons that 
have already moved to that agency. The now-CIA Director came from NSA 
to that deputy position. And I could go on and on and on without giving 
forth that. And that is what we are trying to stop.
  What you do when you want to cut bureaucracy is you say to them, stop 
right where you are. Now, they will be back, and we will then do the 
oversight necessary in order to give them an opportunity to grow the 
way that they should rather than the way that they have been 
exponentially.

[[Page 12211]]


  Mr. REYES. I thank my good friend and colleague. And reclaiming my 
time, again, we want to accomplish the same goal. We just have a 
difference of opinion on how we are going to do it. But it will get 
done, and it will get done by this committee this year. So, again, I 
have deep respect and admiration for both my colleagues.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I just want to clarify again, 
there is no one to be cut, with all due respect to my chairman. What 
they are talking about is what they have future planned, which would be 
pulled from the community as it stands now. It would actually allow the 
DNI to reprioritize the folks that he has in that shop. And many of my 
colleagues will remember that the number that the DNI gave was lower 
than the number that is even in Mr. Hastings' and my amendment. He 
thinks it is too big.
  So there won't be any cuts, there won't be any jeopardizing of 
security, there won't be any analysts that get home once they are 
employed and fully engaged. They may go back to doing counterterrorism 
work, but they will not be sent home.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan will be 
postponed.


                Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Fossella

  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed 
in House Report 110-144.
  Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Fossella:
       At the end of the bill, add the following new title:

  TITLE VI--COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING TERRORIST THREATS

     SEC. 601. IDENTIFICATION OF BEST PRATICES.

       (a) Study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall conduct jointly, or 
     contract with an entity to conduct, a study of the operations 
     of Federal, State, and local government entities to identify 
     best practices for the communication of information 
     concerning a terrorist threat.
       (b) Contents.--
       (1) Identification of best practices.--The study conducted 
     under this section shall be focused on an analysis and 
     identification of the best practices of the information 
     sharing processes of the following government entities:
       (A) Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which are operated by the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigations with the participation of 
     local law enforcement agencies.
       (B) State Homeland Security Fusion Centers, which are 
     established by a State and share information with Federal 
     departments.
       (C) The Homeland Security Operations Center, which is 
     operated by the Department of Homeland Security for the 
     purposes of coordinating information.
       (D) State and local law enforcement agencies that collect, 
     utilize, and disseminate information on potential terrorist 
     attacks.
       (E) The appropriate elements of the intelligence community 
     (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) involved in the sharing of counter-
     terrorism information.
       (F) The Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group at 
     the National Counterterrorism Center.
       (2) Coordination of government entities.--The study 
     conducted under this section shall include an examination of 
     methods for coordinating the activities of Federal, State, 
     and local entities in responding to a terrorist threat, and 
     specifically the communication to the general public of 
     information concerning the threat. The study shall not 
     include an examination of the sources and methods used in the 
     collection of the information.
       (c) Obtaining Official Data.--In conducting the study, the 
     Secretary, in conjunction with the Director, with due regard 
     for the protection of classified information, may secure 
     directly from any department or agency of the United States 
     information necessary to enable the Secretary to carry out 
     this section. Classified information shall be handled through 
     established methods for controlling such information.
       (d) Temporary Duty of Federal Personnel.--The Secretary, in 
     conjunction with the Director, may request the head of any 
     department or agency of the United States to detail to 
     temporary duty personnel within the administrative 
     jurisdiction of the head of the department or agency that the 
     Secretary may need to carry out this section, each detail to 
     be without loss of seniority, pay, or other employee status.
       (e) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 6 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in conjunction with the 
     Director, shall submit to Congress a report that contains--
       (A) a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of 
     the study, including identification of the best practices for 
     the processing, analysis, and dissemination of information 
     between the government entities referred to in subsection 
     (b)(1); and
       (B) recommendations for a formalized process of 
     consultation, communication, and confidentiality between 
     Federal, State, and local governments, incorporating the best 
     practices of the various entities studied, to facilitate 
     communication and help prevent the unauthorized dissemination 
     of information and criticism of decisions concerning 
     terrorist threats.
       (2) Classified information.--To the extent determined 
     appropriate by the Secretary, in conjunction with the 
     Director, the Secretary may submit a portion of the report in 
     classified form.
       (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated to carry out this section $5,000,000 for 
     fiscal year 2008.

     SEC. 602. CENTERS OF BEST PRACTICES.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, 
     shall make grants for the establishment and operation of 3 
     centers to implement the best practices, identified by the 
     study conducted under section 601, for the processing, 
     analysis, and dissemination of information concerning a 
     terrorist threat (in this section, each referred to as a 
     ``Center'').
       (b) Location of Centers.--In carrying out subsection (a), 
     the Secretary, in consultation with the Director, shall make 
     grants to--
       (1) the State of New York for the establishment of a Center 
     to be located in New York City;
       (2) the State of Michigan for the establishment of a Center 
     to be located in Detroit; and
       (3) the State of California for the establishment of a 
     Center to be located in Los Angeles.
       (c) Purpose of Centers.--Each Center shall--
       (1) implement the best practices, identified by the study 
     conducted under section 601, for information sharing 
     concerning a terrorist threat;
       (2) coordinate the communication of these best practices 
     with other metropolitan areas;
       (3) coordinate with the Secretary and the Director to 
     develop a training curriculum to implement these best 
     practices;
       (4) provide funding and technical assistance to other 
     metropolitan areas to assist the metropolitan areas in the 
     implementation of the curriculum developed under paragraph 
     (3); and
       (5) coordinate with the Secretary and the Director to 
     establish a method to advertise and disseminate these best 
     practices.
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for making grants under this section--
       (1) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2008 for the establishment 
     of the Centers; and
       (2) $3,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2009 through 2013 
     for the operation of the Centers.
       (e) Report to Congress.--Not later than March 31, 2010, the 
     Secretary, in consultation with the Director, shall submit to 
     Congress a report evaluating the operations of the Centers 
     and making recommendations for future funding.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Fossella) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. FOSSELLA. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  On October 6, 2005, New York City was once again the site of a 
potential terrorist attack, an apparent plot to hide bombs in baby 
strollers, briefcases, and packages and set them off in the city's 
subways. Unfortunately, New Yorkers who tuned in to the news that day 
for information received conflicting messages.
  On one hand, local officials announced that a credible threat was 
aimed at the city's subway system; on the other hand, Federal officials 
downplayed the severity of the threat, even describing it as ``specific 
yet noncredible.''
  The incident in New York was not isolated. Just weeks later, Federal 
officials responded to a bomb threat in the

[[Page 12212]]

I-95 tunnel in the Baltimore Harbor, a threat that local officials 
learned about from the news media. The information was either credible 
or not credible, but it certainly wasn't both.
  I strongly support efforts by antiterrorism forces at the Federal, 
State, and local levels; but it disturbed me, and I am sure others, to 
watch the confusion that unfolded in these situations.
  Where improvement is needed is how different levels of government 
interact with each other when terrorist threats are elevated. Everyone 
needs to be on the same page and, when credible threats occur, the 
public needs to be informed in a coordinated manner. In short, what is 
needed is a 911 call center for first responders.
  To achieve that, my amendment works as follows: authorizing a study 
to be conducted by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director 
of National Intelligence to identify the problems and the successes of 
terrorist threat information sharing among the different levels of 
government;
  Recommends a formalized process for that sharing;
  And authorizes centers of best practices spread throughout the 
country, and would allow local governments, State and others, to 
interact and to share that information.
  Because not every city, as we know, can dedicate resources to 
developing advanced techniques to fight terrorism, the Centers for Best 
Practices would be on the front lines providing advice to every city 
and State in our Nation on the most effective strategies to protect 
their citizens from new attacks.
  This amendment would ensure an enhanced level of coordination on 
communicating terrorist threats to the public. But while it comes to 
matters of national security, our government must speak with one voice, 
a knowledgeable voice that can provide accurate information to the 
American people. Government cannot send conflicting messages at such 
critical times.
  Last year during debate of this bill, the House approved this 
amendment by voice vote; and I notice the gentlelady from California 
who is here, Ms. Harman, said it probably best. She said at the time, 
We not only need to share information better horizontally, a point we 
have been making in this committee and one of the reasons we set up the 
Director of National Intelligence, but we need to share it better 
vertically. Some of the best ideas are in our hometowns and some of the 
best people to try to keep us safe are in our hometowns.
  I support the Fossella amendment. It will help us through the 
establishment of Centers of Excellence to develop best practices to 
share information horizontally and vertically, and give best 
information to those in our hometowns trying to protect us.
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York.
  The amendment was agreed to.


                   Amendment No. 7 Offered by Ms. Lee

  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed 
in House Report 110-144.
  Ms. LEE. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 7 offered by Ms. Lee:
       At the end of subtitle A of title V (page 48, after line 
     5), add the following new section:

     SEC. 503. REPORT ON AUTHORIZATION TO OVERTHROW DEMOCRATICALLY 
                   ELECTED GOVERNMENTS.

        Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the President shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report describing any authorization 
     granted during the 10-year period ending on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act to engage in intelligence activities 
     related to the overthrow of a democratically elected 
     government.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lee) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. LEE. Madam Chair, first let me thank the Chair of the 
Intelligence Committee and my friend from my hometown of El Paso, Texas 
(Mr. Reyes) for his support of this amendment and also for his 
tremendous leadership as Chair of this committee. And I know the hour 
is late, so I will keep this short.
  Madam Chair, this amendment is simple and noncontroversial. It merely 
requires the President to submit a report to the House and Senate 
Intelligence Committees describing any authorization granted over the 
last 10 years to engage in intelligence activities related to the 
overthrow of democratically elected governments.
  We all recognize that democracy promotion is at the top of this 
administration's agenda; and I believe that there is no question that 
supporting democracy is and should be a nonpartisan issue that we all 
can agree on. It is, quite simply, fundamental to who we are as a 
people and what we stand for as a Nation.
  But we must be vigilant and safeguard against any actions that would 
undermine or threaten our abilities to really practice what we preach, 
and it is clear that actions that undermine democracies also undermine 
our credibility in the world. Furthermore, it affects our ability to be 
viewed as a serious and legitimate agent of democracy.
  So if the support of people seeking democratic governance and 
democracy is to really remain a critical pillar of our foreign policy, 
we must ensure that we do not interfere with democratically elected 
governments. Who will believe us if our actions are inconsistent with 
our words? And how successful will we be as a Nation in achieving our 
goals?
  So tonight I offer this amendment to support and protect our efforts 
in upholding democracy and to help ensure that our actions are really 
consistent with our values.
  Madam Chair, I want to conclude by thanking you again for your 
support, and I want to strongly urge all of my colleagues here today to 
continue to stand up for democracy and for transparency by supporting 
this amendment.
  Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, while I will not oppose the amendment, I 
ask unanimous consent to control the 5 minutes in opposition to the 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Michigan is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I would like to thank my colleague Ms. Lee for working over the last 
couple of years to get to the point where we have got an amendment that 
I still have a little bit of unease with, but I will not oppose the 
amendment, and look forward to continuing to work with her and my 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle as we do the oversight 
necessary of what goes on in the intelligence community.
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. LEE. Madam Chair, I yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Reyes).
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I just want to thank the gentlelady for 
offering this amendment and offer my support. I think it is an 
important amendment.
  Ms. LEE. Madam Chair, if there are no additional speakers, I close by 
once again thanking all of our leadership on both sides of the aisle. 
And I want to especially thank Congresswoman Harman for her past 
leadership and support of these efforts to make sure that we were able 
to get to this point today.
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).
  The amendment was agreed to.


         Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Price of North Carolina

  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed 
in House Report 110-144.
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

[[Page 12213]]

  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. Price of North Carolina:
       Page 33, after line 13 insert the following new 
     subsections:
       (d) Use of Contractors for Intelligence Activities.--
       (1) Report.--Not later than April 1, 2008, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report on personal services 
     activities performed by contractors under the National 
     Intelligence Program and, at the discretion of the Director 
     of National Intelligence, the Military Intelligence Program. 
     Such report shall include--
       (A) an inventory of the types of functions and activities 
     performed by contractors in fulfillment of contracts for each 
     element of the intelligence community;
       (B) a description of any relevant regulations or guidance 
     issued by the Director of National Intelligence or the head 
     of an element of the intelligence community relating to 
     minimum standards required regarding the hiring, training, 
     security clearance, and assignment of contract personnel;
       (C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings achieved by 
     awarding contracts for the performance of such functions 
     referred to in subparagraph (A) instead of using full-time 
     employees of the elements of the intelligence community to 
     perform such functions;
       (D) a description of the types of functions or activities 
     that the Director of National Intelligence considers 
     appropriate to be carried out by contractors;
       (E) a description of the types of functions or activities 
     that the Director of National Intelligence considers 
     inappropriate to be carried out by contractors;
       (F) an assessment of the appropriateness of using 
     contractors to perform the activities described in paragraph 
     (2); and
       (G) an estimate of the number of contracts, and the number 
     of personnel working under such contracts, related to the 
     performance of activities described in paragraph (2).
       (2) Activities.--Activities described in this paragraph are 
     the following:
       (A) Intelligence collection.
       (B) Intelligence analysis.
       (C) Covert actions.
       (D) Interrogation of a person detained, imprisoned, or 
     otherwise held in the custody or under the control of the 
     United States Government.
       (E) Support for the detention, imprisonment, or holding of 
     a person under the custody or control of the United States 
     Government, including activities relating to the detention, 
     transfer, or transportation of such person across 
     international borders.
       (F) Conduct of electronic or physical surveillance or 
     monitoring of United States citizens in the United States.
       (3) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from 
North Carolina (Mr. Price) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina.
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Madam Chair, I rise to offer an 
amendment on behalf of Ms. Schakowsky and myself that would complement 
the provisions already in this bill related to the use of private 
contractors by intelligence agencies.
  I applaud Chairman Reyes for his leadership in addressing many key 
questions associated with the use of contractors. Last year, I stood at 
this podium and proposed an amendment that would have required an 
extensive look at these questions: How extensively are contractors 
being used? What types of activities are appropriate for contractors? 
How are they held accountable? Are they achieving savings for the 
American people? And what are the impacts of contracting on the 
intelligence workforce?
  My amendment passed the House, but the other body did not act on the 
bill. This year, Chairman Reyes has included language in his bill that 
addresses many of these questions, and I am grateful for his 
leadership.
  I also want to acknowledge the efforts of the new Director of 
National Intelligence, Michael McConnell, who has begun an examination 
of the questions raised by my amendments last year. He and his staff 
have just completed a community-wide survey of contracting and are 
reportedly working on a strategic workforce plan. These efforts are 
important first steps.
  Our amendment today focuses on additional aspects of this situation 
that have not yet been addressed, aspects that are absolutely critical.

                              {time}  0000

  There's a legitimate debate in the Intelligence Community about how 
contractors should be used. Our amendment simply asks the Intelligence 
Community to respond to three basic questions underlying this debate.
  First, what functions may contractors appropriately perform for the 
intelligence communities, and what tasks should be viewed as inherently 
governmental? For example, should they be involved in intelligence 
collection? Should they be involved in analysis? What about 
interrogation? What about covert operations? Are there some activities 
that are so sensitive that they should only be performed by highly 
trained Intelligence Community professionals?
  Secondly, how should contractors be vetted and trained?
  And thirdly, how can we ensure that contractors are as accountable 
for their actions as Federal intelligence professionals are?
  Madam Chairman, service contracts, in some instances, represent an 
acceptable and efficient use of taxpayer dollars. But a decision to use 
contractors should be made deliberately based on a careful analysis of 
the issues raised by this amendment. This is true for any use of 
private contractors. But it is particularly necessary in the context of 
sensitive Intelligence Community activities.
  I urge my colleagues to support our amendment.
  Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague from Illinois (Ms. 
Schakowsky).
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me, and I thank 
him for his leadership on this important amendment.
  After the Cold War, the use of contractors began to grow, and their 
use exploded after September 11, 2001. Contractors now do more than 
just build military equipment and satellites. They also provide 
security, collect and analyze intelligence, provide technical support, 
and even perform planning and management tasks.
  Mr. Price's amendment requires a review of what contractors are doing 
and, importantly, whether contractors are performing inherently 
governmental functions. There are some activities so sensitive that, if 
and when they are done, we must determine whether or not it is 
appropriate to contract these activities out.
  In some cases, U.S. contractors' actions have caused great 
controversy. The Lincoln Group's contract to plant positive news 
stories in Iraq raised questions about manipulation of the Iraqi media. 
Dave Passaro, a CIA contractor was convicted of four counts of 
assaulting an Afghan detainee who later died. Contractors were 
implicated in the detainee abuse cases at Abu Ghraib.
  These activities are controversial enough on their own, and if the 
U.S. engages in them, we should do so while accepting full 
responsibility and not hide behind contractors.
  The Price-Schakowsky amendment would ask the DNI to review whether it 
is appropriate for contractors to engage in intelligence collection, 
analysis, covert actions, interrogations, detentions, rendition or 
electronic surveillance.
  This is an important amendment, and I urge its adoption.
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Madam Chairman, I thank my colleague for 
her leadership on this amendment and on this issue. For a long time now 
she has helped this House focus on the use of private contractors.
  Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of our time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I reluctantly rise in opposition to the amendment, 
recognizing that it's very similar to an amendment that we actually 
accepted last year. And the reason we reluctantly accepted it last 
year, we had a high degree of confidence that if we got into a 
conference, we would be able to work with the author of the amendment 
to take a look at it and to make sure that what was finally in a 
conference report in a bill that we were

[[Page 12214]]

looking forward to sending to the President would make sure that we 
took care of some the redundancies and some of the burdensome elements 
of the amendment. And without necessarily having that same assurance 
this year, I reluctantly oppose the amendment.
  I think that it is absolutely critical that we do measure the 
accountability and the performance of our contractors, but much like 
last year, we are concerned about the redundancy, the bureaucracy that 
may result if this amendment becomes law in its present form. It could 
add significant cost to the contractors as they serve and provide 
services to the Intelligence Community.
  So I hope as we go through this process that we will be able to make 
sure that we work on a bipartisan basis, that we work with the 
community, that we work with the ODNI to structure this in such a way 
that both of the requirements are met, that we see and get the 
performance and, at the same time, that we don't burden contractors or 
the ODNI with additional bureaucracy.
  With that, I'll yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Madam Chairman, as a matter of fact, 
this amendment is drafted very carefully to avoid redundancy. It's 
crafted to deal with a separate area, a different area from those areas 
covered in the bill itself. And it mandates a reporting requirement, 
not to add work to the Executive Branch; to ensure that we get the 
information we need to do our job. Surely, no one would argue that 
Congress shouldn't be able to assess whether our approach to 
intelligence is effective or to conduct oversight on the way billions 
of dollars in taxpayer funds are expended each year. We're not 
establishing new regulations. We are simply requiring contractors to 
report on their activity.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Price).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 9 Offered by Ms. Berkley

  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed 
in House Report 110-144.
  Ms. BERKLEY. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 9 offered by Ms. Berkley:
       At the end of subtitle A of title IV (page 39, after line 
     16), add the following new section:

     SEC. 414. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON 
                   RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR FORMER EMPLOYEES OF AIR 
                   AMERICA.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     advisability of providing Federal retirement benefits to 
     United States citizens for the service of such citizens 
     before 1977 as employees of Air America or an associated 
     company while such company was owned or controlled by the 
     United States Government and operated or managed by the 
     Central Intelligence Agency.
       (b) Report Elements.--
       (1) In general.--The report required by subsection (a) 
     shall include the following:
       (A) The history of Air America and associated companies 
     before 1977, including a description of--
       (i) the relationship between such companies and the Central 
     Intelligence Agency and other elements of the United States 
     Government;
       (ii) the workforce of such companies;
       (iii) the missions performed by such companies and their 
     employees for the United States; and
       (iv) the casualties suffered by employees of such companies 
     in the course of their employment with such companies.
       (B) A description of the retirement benefits contracted for 
     or promised to the employees of such companies before 1977, 
     the contributions made by such employees for such benefits, 
     the retirement benefits actually paid such employees, the 
     entitlement of such employees to the payment of future 
     retirement benefits, and the likelihood that former employees 
     of such companies will receive any future retirement 
     benefits.
       (C) An assessment of the difference between--
       (i) the retirement benefits that former employees of such 
     companies have received or will receive by virtue of their 
     employment with such companies; and
       (ii) the retirement benefits that such employees would have 
     received and in the future receive if such employees had 
     been, or would now be, treated as employees of the United 
     States whose services while in the employ of such companies 
     had been or would now be credited as Federal service for the 
     purpose of Federal retirement benefits.
       (D) The recommendations of the Director regarding the 
     advisability of legislative action to treat employment at 
     such companies as Federal service for the purpose of Federal 
     retirement benefits in light of the relationship between such 
     companies and the United States Government and the services 
     and sacrifices of such employees to and for the United 
     States, and if legislative action is considered advisable, a 
     proposal for such action and an assessment of its costs.
       (2) Views of dcia.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall include in the report any views of the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency on the matters covered by the 
     report that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     considers appropriate.
       (c) Assistance of Comptroller General.--The Comptroller 
     General shall, upon the request of the Director of National 
     Intelligence and in a manner consistent with the protection 
     of classified information, assist the Director in the 
     preparation of the report required by subsection (a).
       (d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (e) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Air america.--The term ``Air America'' means Air 
     America, Incorporated.
       (2) Associated company.--The term ``associated company'' 
     means any company associated with or subsidiary to Air 
     America, including Air Asia Company Limited and the Pacific 
     Division of Southern Air Transport, Incorporated.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentlewoman from 
Nevada (Ms. Berkley) and a Member opposed will each control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Nevada.
  Ms. BERKLEY. Good morning, Madam Chairman.
  I rise today in support of an amendment that would require the CIA to 
issue a report on providing retirement benefits to former employees of 
Air America.
  From 1950 to 1976, employees of Air America faithfully served their 
country doing their part to help win the Cold War. Air America was a 
government corporation covertly owned and operated by the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Under the guise of a civilian airline, these 
pilots conducted flight operations in various countries, including 
China, Laos, Korea and Vietnam on behalf of the Department of Defense 
and the CIA.
  Unfortunately, since it was a closely held secret that Air America 
was a government-owned corporation, these men and women have never been 
credited for their government service. That means they can not receive 
government benefits, retirement benefits for their efforts.
  The amendment I am offering today would require the Director of 
National Intelligence to submit a report to Congress on advisability of 
providing Federal retirement benefits to U.S. citizens employed by Air 
America while it was covertly owned and operated by the CIA. These 
brave men and women should receive the long denied benefits they earned 
for their service to their country.
  I urge you to support this amendment that will bring attention to the 
overlooked dilemma of Air America employees.
  Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I thank the chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee, Mr. Reyes.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim the 
time in opposition to the amendment, although I will not oppose the 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Michigan is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I will yield myself as much time as I 
shall consume.
  There's no doubt that the Air America's personnel deserve the 
recognition for the service that they provided during these critical 
times in our country in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam war.
  But it's very interesting to me that, at this time, as we're 
considering other

[[Page 12215]]

amendments, and much of the debate that I hear about contractors and 
our use of contractors today, contractors are getting hammered each and 
every day. And then we step back and say, well, you know, we ought to 
take a look at the contractors of 50 years ago, and we maybe now ought 
to provide them with government benefits.
  And I just wonder whether, in 50 years, we'll look back at the 
service that is being provided by contractors today that in many 
different areas is not being very well received, and whether we will 
then recognize the service that they're providing. I hope that we do.
  But, under this, under the terms of Air America, legally these 
individuals did not qualify for government benefits. We need to make 
sure that we deal in a way that is fair, especially to the people that 
are serving as contractors today. And we need to make sure that we have 
a consistent pattern of how we deal with contractors in this way, 
recognizing that their pay comes from a private sector entity, and be 
very careful about when and where we are going to involve the Federal 
Government in picking up responsibilities of private corporations.
  Madam Chairman, I will reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. BERKLEY. Madam Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlelady 
from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson-Lee.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Madam Chairman, I thank the sponsor of this 
legislation.
  Human resources and human intelligence are a key element to the 
security of this Nation. Air America employees represent the human 
resources aspect.
  This is a thoughtful amendment that suggests that we should study the 
question of whether or not these individuals in the service of their 
country should be given these kinds of benefits.
  From the perspective of the Department of Homeland Security and 
Homeland Security Committee, human intelligence is important. And I 
want to thank the Chairperson of the full committee for this very 
important bill that focuses on funding intelligence and also funding 
human intelligence.
  Might I also say in closing, as I support the gentlelady's amendment, 
I think it would also be important that we look closely at 
professionals as they leave the CIA, and question whether or not tell-
all books are in the best interest of this Nation, whether language 
such as ``slam dunk'' should be investigated. And I hope, as we pursue 
the idea of oversight, that we'll look into the utilization of such 
information in tell-all books that provide such prosperity for people 
who've been in the service of this country. I hope we will investigate 
that. But when we have good employees like those of Air America, we 
should support them.
  Ms. BERKLEY. In closing, I'd like to once again urge adoption of this 
amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, just in response to my colleague, if we 
investigate ``slam dunk,'' I hope we investigate the term ``bugs and 
bunnies'' as well.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Nevada (Ms. Berkley).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Schiff

  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 printed 
in House Report 110-144.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 10 offered by Mr. Schiff:
       At the end of subtitle A of title V (page 48, after line 
     5), add the following new section:

     SEC. 503. REITERATION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                   SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS 
                   BY WHICH ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE 
                   CONDUCTED FOR GATHERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                   INFORMATION.

       (a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which 
     electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of 
     gathering foreign intelligence information.
       (b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.--
     Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory 
     authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an 
     amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific 
     statutory authorization shall be the only exception to 
     subsection (a).
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Electronic surveillance.--The term ``electronic 
     surveillance'' has the meaning given the term in section 
     101(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1801(f)).
       (2) Foreign intelligence information.--The term ``foreign 
     intelligence information'' has the meaning given the term in 
     section 101(e) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1801(e)).

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Madam Chair, today I offer an amendment with my Republican colleague 
Jeff Flake from Arizona that would respond to the President's 
unilateral assertion of power with regard to the electronic 
surveillance of Americans on U.S. soil and reassert that our existing 
statutes govern the operation of such surveillance.
  Madam Chair, the Federal Government has a duty to pursue al Qaeda and 
other enemies of the United States with all available tools, including 
the use of electronic surveillance, to thwart future attacks on the 
United States and to destroy the enemy.
  While the President possesses the inherent authority to engage in 
electronic surveillance of the enemy outside the country, Congress 
possesses the authority to regulate such surveillance within the United 
States.
  When Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, it 
intended for this statute to provide the sole authority for 
surveillance of Americans on American soil for the purpose of gathering 
foreign intelligence information. Our amendment reiterates this 
important principle.
  The President has argued that the authorization for the use of 
military force provided him with the authority to engage in warrantless 
electronic surveillance of Americans.

                              {time}  0015

  It is hard to believe that any of us contemplated, when we voted to 
authorize the use of force to root out the terrorists who attacked us 
on September 11, that we were also voting to nullify FISA. Our 
amendment makes clear that in the absence of explicit statutory 
authority, FISA is the exclusive authority for the conduct of domestic 
electronic surveillance of Americans. While the administration appears 
to have finally agreed that electronic surveillance occurring as part 
of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, or TSP, should cease to operate 
without the approval of the FISA court, the administration has not 
conceded that it cannot conduct such electronic surveillance of 
Americans unilaterally outside of FISA with no judicial oversight 
either now or in the future.
  While we have been told that surveillance in this program was limited 
to phone calls where one of the parties is outside of the United 
States, there appears to be no limiting principle to the Executive's 
claim of authority provided by the military force resolution. In fact, 
when we questioned the Attorney General on this point in the last 
session, he would not rule out the proposition that the Executive has 
the authority to wiretap purely domestic calls between two Americans 
without seeking a warrant.
  No one in Congress would deny the need to tap certain calls under 
court order, but if the government can tap purely domestic phone calls 
between Americans without court approval, there is no limit to 
executive power. Congress cannot be silent in the face of this 
assertion of authority.
  In working to meet the real national security needs of the country, 
we must also ensure that Congress does not abdicate its responsibility 
to ensure that fundamental liberties are not compromised. Absent 
congressional action, law-abiding U.S. citizens may continue

[[Page 12216]]

to have reasonable fear of being the subject of extra-judicial 
surveillance.
  Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Chairman, I rise to claim the time 
in opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time 
as I may consume.
  When the President acknowledged the existence of the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program, he claimed the inherent authority, under article 
II of the Constitution, as the Commander in Chief to be able to conduct 
that surveillance. Now, whether you agree or don't agree with his 
interpretation of the Constitution, this amendment, and a bill with 
this amendment in it, does not change the Constitution.
  I will admit to the gentleman from California I personally believe 
that the legal arguments that were presented in favor of the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program were not strong. They weren't strong at all. And 
that is why I demanded more rigorous oversight to the program and 
proposed legislation to change the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act so that we can listen to our enemies and protect the civil 
liberties of Americans.
  The sad thing is that the bipartisan leadership of this body, 
Democrat and Republican, knew for 5 years this program was going on and 
did nothing to update the laws or even propose that perhaps this was 
wrong to do this this way. They remained silent. The failure is in the 
Congress.
  We now know that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as it is 
currently written, is not getting us critical information about our 
enemies and also, frankly, not protecting the civil liberties of 
Americans. It is broken and not working.
  The Director of National Intelligence testified last week in the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, saying that we are missing 
important information because this law is trapped in 1970s technology.
  In January of this year, the Attorney General wrote to the Congress 
and said that we now have innovative orders from the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court. By ``innovative'' what he really meant 
is that we are on very fragile legal ground. I describe it as putting a 
twin-size sheet on a king-size bed, and everybody on the Intelligence 
Committee knows exactly what I mean. We have one judge, in a 
nonadversarial proceeding, in secret session, who has approved some 
innovative orders. He is way out on a legal limb. So what will the next 
judge do? And after this amendment passes saying, by golly, we are 
determined to stay in the 1970s, the Congress is happy with a 1970s law 
governing 1970s technology, what is the next judge going to do? And how 
does that compromise our national security? We have a problem.
  In 1978 almost all local communications went over a wire and almost 
all long-haul communications went over the air. The statute sets up 
different regimes for what to do for over-the-wire communications that 
you need a warrant for to collect foreign intelligence information. 
Over the air the sky is the limit. We now, in the 21st century, have 
things completely reversed. Now almost all local calls are over the 
air. 230 million Americans have cell phones, and yet almost all long-
distance calls are over wires. The information that we critically need 
is on the wires.
  This law is outdated, and we are stuck with our heads in the sand in 
1970s law. And your amendment insists that we stay there.
  I will oppose this amendment and urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairman, as my colleague from California (Ms. 
Harman) points out, FISA has been amended 12 times, and, moreover, we 
have proposed to amend FISA to modernize it at present, and Mr. Flake 
and I propose to amend it as well.
  The argument of my colleague seems to be that FISA needs to be 
amended, it hasn't been amended yet; so we should allow the President 
to simply ignore it. That, I submit, is not constitutional and not 
desirable.
  Madam Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my colleague from Arizona 
(Mr. Flake).
  Mr. FLAKE. Madam Chairman, I thank Mr. Schiff for yielding, and I 
appreciate working with him on this important amendment and on this 
issue for a long time.
  Madam Chairman, this amendment would reiterate that FISA is the 
exclusive means by which domestic electronic surveillance can be 
conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence 
information.
  As has been stated before, we have, on the Judiciary Committee, for 
years been asking the administration what can we not do within FISA, do 
we need to change FISA in order to be able to conduct surveillance we 
need within FISA. We have never been given compelling information or 
evidence why we can't do what we need to do within FISA. As Mr. Schiff 
mentioned, if we do need to change FISA to update it again, as it has 
been changed and updated multiple times, then we should do it. However, 
we simply can't say FISA is insufficient; so go around it, and we don't 
want to know what goes on outside of it. Go ahead with the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program. We will have no congressional oversight. That is 
simply unacceptable. If we do need to change FISA, if we do need to 
modernize it, let's modernize it again, again, and again. But let's 
make sure that Congress maintains its prerogative to regulate the 
surveillance that goes on to make sure that it is done with civil 
liberties in mind. That is what this amendment seeks to do, and I am 
pleased to work with Mr. Schiff on it.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California's time has expired.
  Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance 
of my time.
  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has been amended since 1978 
several times. But what has not changed is the basic structure of the 
law, that it treats wire communications differently than it treats 
over-the-air communications.
  You do not need a warrant to gather foreign intelligence information 
that is flowing through the air by radio waves or cell tower or 
microwave or anything else. We do it. You do need it over a wire. The 
law needs to be technology neutral and it is not. What you are doing by 
your amendment is reaffirming that this House tonight is determined to 
stay with the 1970s law and 1970s technology. And this House also 
rejected an amendment that would have updated these statutes.
  My colleague from Arizona says do we need to change FISA? We really 
don't know.
  We have a written submission from the Director of National 
Intelligence telling us the changes that need to be made.
  I urge my colleagues to look to the 21st-century technology to 
protect this country and reject the gentleman's amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California will be 
postponed.


                      Announcement by the Chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings will 
now resume on those amendments on which further proceedings were 
postponed, in the following order:
  Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Hoekstra of Michigan.
  Amendment No. 5 by Mr. Rogers of Michigan.
  Amendment No. 10 by Mr. Schiff of California.
  The Chair will reduce to 2 minutes the time for any electronic vote 
after the first vote in this series.


                Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Hoekstra

  The CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded

[[Page 12217]]

vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Hoekstra) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the 
noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 185, 
noes 230, not voting 22, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 337]

                               AYES--185

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barton (TX)
     Bean
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boren
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Drake
     Duncan
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Jindal
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     Melancon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pence
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (TX)
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--230

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Castle
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     Davis, Tom
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Faleomavaega
     Farr
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Giffords
     Gilchrest
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Klein (FL)
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shays
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth

                             NOT VOTING--22

     Bordallo
     Brady (PA)
     Carson
     Christensen
     Cleaver
     Conyers
     Cuellar
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Engel
     Fattah
     Fortuno
     Grijalva
     Hinojosa
     Jefferson
     Mahoney (FL)
     McMorris Rodgers
     Norton
     Peterson (PA)
     Radanovich
     Souder


                      Announcement by the Chairman

  The CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised 2 minutes remain 
on this vote.

                              {time}  0046

  Mrs. LOWEY and Messrs. ELLSWORTH, SHULER and JOHNSON of Illinois 
changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. McHENRY changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. DREIER. Madam Chairman, on rollcall No. 337 I was inadvertently 
detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''


           Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan

  The CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded 
vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Rogers) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the 
noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 2-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 297, 
noes 122, not voting 18, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 338]

                               AYES--297

     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bean
     Berkley
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blumenauer
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boren
     Boucher
     Boustany
     Boyd (FL)
     Brady (TX)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson
     Carter
     Castle
     Castor
     Chabot
     Clarke
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cohen
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Conyers
     Costa
     Costello
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Davis, Lincoln
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeFazio
     Delahunt
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dingell
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ellison
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Faleomavaega
     Fallin
     Farr
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Green, Al
     Grijalva
     Hall (TX)
     Hare
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth Sandlin
     Hill
     Hobson
     Hodes
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hooley
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Jefferson
     Jindal
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Jordan
     Keller
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Klein (FL)
     Kline (MN)

[[Page 12218]]


     Knollenberg
     Kucinich
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Latham
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Lynch
     Mack
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McNerney
     Meek (FL)
     Melancon
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Obey
     Paul
     Payne
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Sarbanes
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schmidt
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Solis
     Space
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Taylor
     Terry
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Towns
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Wasserman Schultz
     Watson
     Watt
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (OH)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--122

     Abercrombie
     Allen
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Becerra
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (NY)
     Boswell
     Boyda (KS)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Chandler
     Cooper
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Davis (CA)
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Giffords
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Gene
     Hall (NY)
     Harman
     Higgins
     Hinchey
     Hirono
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kind
     Kirk
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     LaTourette
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McIntyre
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Perlmutter
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Sestak
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Waters
     Waxman
     Welch (VT)
     Woolsey
     Young (AK)

                             NOT VOTING--18

     Bordallo
     Brady (PA)
     Christensen
     Cleaver
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Engel
     Fattah
     Fortuno
     Gutierrez
     Hinojosa
     McKeon
     McMorris Rodgers
     Norton
     Peterson (PA)
     Radanovich
     Souder
     Sullivan


                      Announcement by the Chairman

  The CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised 1 minute remains 
on this vote.

                              {time}  0050

  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                 Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Schiff

  The CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded 
vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Schiff) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the 
ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 2-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 245, 
noes 178, not voting 14, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 339]

                               AYES--245

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Bartlett (MD)
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, David
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Faleomavaega
     Farr
     Filner
     Flake
     Frank (MA)
     Giffords
     Gilchrest
     Gillibrand
     Gillmor
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inglis (SC)
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Klein (FL)
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mack
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Markey
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sali
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walberg
     Walz (MN)
     Wamp
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth

                               NOES--178

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, Lincoln
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Edwards
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Issa
     Jindal
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Marshall
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     Melancon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Pearce
     Pence
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Sullivan

[[Page 12219]]


     Tancredo
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--14

     Bordallo
     Brady (PA)
     Christensen
     Cleaver
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Engel
     Fattah
     Fortuno
     Hinojosa
     McMorris Rodgers
     Norton
     Peterson (PA)
     Radanovich
     Souder


                      Announcement by the Chairman

  The CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised 1 minute remains 
on this vote.

                              {time}  0055

  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the committee amendment in the 
nature of a substitute, as amended.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, 
was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Weiner) having assumed the chair, Mrs. Tauscher, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2082) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to 
House Resolution 388, she reported the bill back to the House with an 
amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment 
reported from the Committee of the Whole? If not, the question is on 
the amendment.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


          Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. In its present form, I am.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Rogers of Michigan moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 
     2082, to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with 
     instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith 
     with the following amendments:
       Page 8, line 25, strike ``$39,000,000'' and insert 
     ``$16,000,000''.
       Page 9, after line 20 insert the following new subsection:
       (f) Human Intelligence Activities of the CIA.--In addition 
     to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the human 
     intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     under this Act (including those specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a)), 
     there is also authorized to be appropriated for the human 
     intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     $23,000,000.
       At the end of subtitle A of title V (page 48, after line 
     5), add the following new section:

     SEC. 503. AUDIT OF THE NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER.

       (a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Department of 
     Justice shall conduct an audit of the effectiveness and role 
     of the National Drug Intelligence Center, including any 
     problems with duplication of effort and lack of coordination 
     with other intelligence providers and consumers.
       (b) Requirements.--The audit conducted under subsection (a) 
     shall include--
       (1) an examination of whether the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center duplicates functions carried out by the 
     Drug Enforcement Administration, the El Paso Intelligence 
     Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or other 
     components of the Department of Justice;
       (2) an examination of the overall effectiveness of the 
     National Drug Intelligence Center;
       (3) an examination of whether current activities of the 
     National Drug Intelligence Center dealing with international 
     drug intelligence are consistent with the provisions of the 
     General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan designating it as the 
     principal center for strategic domestic counterdrug 
     intelligence; and
       (4) an examination of whether the document exploitation 
     functions of the National Drug Intelligence Center could 
     effectively be transferred to a component of the intelligence 
     community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) or the Department of 
     Justice.
       (c) Submission Date.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of 
     the Department of Justice shall submit to the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     a report containing the results of the audit conducted under 
     subsection (a).

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask 
unanimous consent that the motion to recommit be considered as read and 
printed in the Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion to 
recommit.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I know the hour is late, but 
this is such an important issue. There are some good things in this 
bill, and my colleagues have rightly said this is the biggest 
expenditure we have ever seen in a very long time, as a matter of fact, 
ever, in our intelligence bill. But bigger isn't always better, because 
the priorities in the bill are what is important.
  The folks who are on the front lines, our analysts, our case 
officers, our soldiers who are being protected by the feed of 
information that flows to them, are incredibly important. And make no 
doubt about it, my friends, this is a huge shift philosophically from 
where we have been in the past.
  Nothing in here, nothing in here fixes the problem that we have today 
in not being able to listen to certain phone calls that might lead to 
an attack on the United States of America. Nothing. That lack of 
urgency should scare us all.
  The fact that we cut human intelligence programs in this bill, they 
will get less money this year, some of them very sensitive, very 
classified, specifically cut out of this bill, jeopardizes soldiers in 
the field in not getting the proper assistance and information that 
they need.
  We also take a political bent. There are also some disturbing things, 
things that we all sometimes don't like about the House that we serve 
in. Sometimes it was said because we did things that way for a long 
time, we should continue to do it. Those are the things that we can 
change tonight. Those are the things that we can at least tell the 
American people with this motion to recommit we believe in getting that 
information, we believe in human intelligence. Certainly the 9/11 
Commission did. We believe in regular order and the rules, so that when 
earmarks go into very sensitive bills like this, and we have seen what 
happens when we don't follow the rules, it can cause trouble.
  Think about what we are talking about. Right before Afghanistan, we 
dropped seven CIA officers in very remote places in a very difficult 
neighborhood, and on their own they committed to get around with this 
Northern Alliance that was together, but not really. They had tribal 
problems. They had cultural problems among themselves. And their duty, 
these seven CIA officers, was to pull things together. Human 
intelligence got us where we needed to be.

                              {time}  0100

  Many would say it saved thousands and thousands of lives of U.S. 
soldiers because of their brave actions in the mountains of Afghanistan 
in very difficult territory because we had human-on-human contact that 
gave us the information and the operations that we needed to be 
successful.
  And in this bill, in this bill, they take away precious resources for 
those kind of human collection activities. When we have soldiers in the 
field, that

[[Page 12220]]

is a philosophical departure from where we have been in the past.
  We can't stand for that. We can't stand for the fact that we may lose 
our ears on terrorist activities being planned today. And we also can't 
take wasteful programming in something that is this important.
  You know, for a time of war, the priorities of this bill are 
completely misplaced in critical areas. The motion to recommit would 
readjust those priorities by increasing human intelligence funding for 
the Central Intelligence Agency by $23 million. That money would come 
from an earmark funding for the National Drug Intelligence Center which 
a formal oversight report of the House Committee said: ``An expensive 
and duplicative use of scarce Federal drug enforcement resources.'' And 
the U.S. News & World Report called it a ``boondoggle.''
  The motion to recommit would also direct the Department of Justice 
Inspector General to conduct an audit of the National Drug Intelligence 
Center to determine if this center was wasteful and duplicative.
  For all of the talk about reform, the majority has blocked an audit 
by a party-line vote in committee with no substantive explanation. My 
amendment requiring the audit also was blocked by the Rules Committee. 
It shouldn't be controversial that these funds could be put to far 
better use in human intelligence. In numerous important respects, this 
bill fails to provide adequate support to the Intelligence Community's 
activities on the forefront of its ability to protect our national 
security.
  In a classified annex, the majority cuts human intelligence programs, 
counter to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission; and 
significantly cuts certain specific initiatives related to American 
efforts to counter radical jihadists and to support our Nation's 
objectives in Iraq.
  A review of just this center, and why this $23 million is so 
important, it is going to human collection. A review of the NDIC, U.S. 
News & World Report in 2005 concluded: ``It is a boondoggle,'' and 
``rocked by scandal and subject to persistent criticism that it should 
never have been created at all.''
  You know, sometimes, and God love us all, we get pretty myopic on our 
districts. This is the time that we need to look outward to the rest of 
the country. We are United States Members of Congress. What is good for 
our backyard may not be good for the rest of the country.
  There is a Marine right now that is counting on human intelligence to 
tell us if there is an IED on the road, if al Qaeda is around the 
corner. If we don't want to stand up for this motion to recommit, we 
will endorse the boondoggles of the past at the expense of our soldiers 
in the field. I would urge support of the motion to recommit.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to 
recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I oppose this motion to recommit because it 
would cut a program that makes valuable contributions to the war on 
drugs and to homeland security, first and foremost.
  This motion is also misleading because the underlying bill provides 
our intelligence officers everything they need. It adds funds to the 
CIA and Defense Department for human intelligence training so that our 
operators can be more effective. It invests in language training for 
case officers so they can operate effectively overseas.
  My colleague talks about following the rules. One of the premier 
rules that we have is we never mention a number in classified programs; 
$23 million telegraphs our enemies what we are doing.
  The motion to recommit asks for a study. This program has been 
studied before. I just want to quote the White House drug czar. When 
the White House drug czar toured the NDIC in 2003, he said: ``The 
National Drug Intelligence Center provides us with vital information we 
need to disrupt the market for illegal drugs in America.''
  Also, a White House press release asserted that the drug czar's 
office uses NDIC-produced intelligence to help guide its ongoing 
counterdrug policy agenda as outlined in the President's national drug 
control strategy. NDIC information bulletins every day warn law 
enforcement officers around our country and intelligence agencies 
around the world of emerging threats in drug trafficking and trends in 
use.
  But the motion to recommit would silence this added and vital voice, 
a voice that the minority was more than happy to fund when they were in 
charge of this body. The Republican-led Congress appropriated more than 
$160 million for NDIC over the past 4 years. It funded the National 
Drug Intelligence Center with $39 million in fiscal years 2005, 2006 
and 2007, and more than $44 million in 2004.
  If it was such a good idea then, if it was such a good idea back when 
you were in charge, why in the heck is it such a bad idea now when we 
see the trends we are seeing around the country?
  Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to defeat this motion to 
recommit.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the motion to recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair 
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on 
the question of passing of the bill.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 181, 
noes 241, not voting 10, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 340]

                               AYES--181

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Cooper
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Deal (GA)
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Jindal
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kirk
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pence
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Ramstad
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)

                               NOES--241

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney

[[Page 12221]]


     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     Davis, Tom
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dent
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     English (PA)
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gerlach
     Giffords
     Gilchrest
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hirono
     Hobson
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Kingston
     Klein (FL)
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Platts
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Regula
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Shuster
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Brady (PA)
     Cleaver
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Engel
     Fattah
     Hinojosa
     McMorris Rodgers
     Peterson (PA)
     Radanovich
     Souder


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there 
are 2 minutes remaining.

                              {time}  0123

  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 225, 
noes 197, not voting 10, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 341]

                               AYES--225

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Giffords
     Gilchrest
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Klein (FL)
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth

                               NOES--197

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Jindal
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kucinich
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lee
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Paul
     Payne
     Pearce
     Pence
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Stark
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Brady (PA)
     Cleaver
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Engel
     Fattah
     Hinojosa
     McMorris Rodgers
     Peterson (PA)
     Radanovich
     Souder


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there 
are 2 minutes remaining.

                              {time}  0130

  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________