[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 9]
[House]
[Pages 12086-12100]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




 PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 2082, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION 
                        ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee 
on Rules, I call up House Resolution 388 and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 388

       Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule 
     XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
     Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 
     the bill (H.R. 2082) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2008 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government, the Community 
     Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The 
     first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points 
     of order against consideration of the bill are waived except 
     those arising under clause 9 of rule XXI. General debate 
     shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour 
     equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking 
     minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence. After general debate the bill shall be 
     considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall 
     be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose 
     of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the 
     nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The 
     committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be 
     considered as read. All points of order against the committee 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived except 
     those arising under clause 9 of rule XXI. Notwithstanding 
     clause 11 of rule XVIII, no amendment to the committee 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in order 
     except those printed in the report of the Committee on Rules 
     accompanying this resolution. Each such amendment may be 
     offered only in the order printed in the report, may be 
     offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be 
     considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified 
     in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent 
     and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall 
     not be subject to a demand for division of the question in 
     the House or in the Committee of the Whole. All points of 
     order against such amendments are waived except those arising 
     under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI. At the conclusion of 
     consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall 
     rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as 
     may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote 
     in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the 
     Whole to the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature 
     of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as 
     ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage 
     without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with 
     or without instructions.
       Sec. 2. During consideration in the House of H.R. 2082 
     pursuant to this resolution, notwithstanding the operation of 
     the previous question, the Chair may postpone further 
     consideration of the bill to such time as may be designated 
     by the Speaker.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) is 
recognized for 1 hour.

                              {time}  1330

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, 
I yield the customary 30 minutes to my friend from Washington (Mr. 
Hastings). All time yielded during consideration of the rule is for 
debate only.


                             General Leave

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that 
all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend 
their remarks and insert extraneous materials into the Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Florida?

[[Page 12087]]

  There was no objection.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, as the Clerk just read, House Resolution 388 provides 
for consideration of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008 under a structured rule.
  The rule makes in order a total of ten amendments, almost half of 
which will be offered by Members of the minority, including one which 
will be offered by the ranking member of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Representative Hoekstra.
  The rule also makes in order an amendment that I offered, along with 
my colleague on the Intelligence Committee, Representative Rogers of 
Michigan, and our bipartisan amendment is a commonsense solution to 
holding the Office of National Director of intelligence accountable for 
its actions.
  The House will have a chance to debate our amendment later today, and 
I hope my colleagues will support it.
  I would like to point out that Members who wish to do so, as the 
Chair of the Intelligence Committee has pointed out previously, can go 
to the Intelligence Committee office to examine the classified schedule 
of authorizations for the programs and activities of the intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the national and military 
intelligence programs.
  The importance of the intelligence community touches all Americans as 
our Nation's first line of defense against increasing world threats. 
Effective intelligence is the first method to protect our citizens and 
prevent debacles like the war in Iraq.
  The underlying legislation authorizes funding for all United States 
intelligence agencies, including the national and military intelligence 
programs. It is the largest intelligence authorization bill ever 
considered by the House and takes significant steps to eliminate 
duplication and ineffectiveness in our intelligence agencies.
  The bill increases funding to improve human intelligence, training 
and send additional intelligence analysts overseas to maximize their 
abilities. It also requires additional intelligence reports on North 
Korea and Iranian efforts to become nuclear capable. We also take 
significant steps to improve the collecting, deciphering and 
understanding of intelligence.
  The effectiveness of our intelligence community is significantly 
jeopardized when the diversity of the intelligence community does not 
reflect the diverse world in which we live. Women and minorities 
continue to be disproportionately underrepresented in the senior ranks 
and the core mission areas of analysis, human intelligence collection, 
and science and technology.
  Simply put, we still do not have an intelligence community that looks 
like our country or the world. Minorities make up 37 percent of the 
American population, yet only 21 percent of the intelligence community, 
and the numbers for African-Americans and Latinos is woefully below 
that number. This is a problem that is addressed in the underlying 
bill, which requires the development of a strategic plan to increase 
diversity within the intelligence community and mandates increased 
diversity among the rank and file of the community.
  I am fond of saying in the Intelligence Committee hearings that it 
doesn't take more degrees than the thermometer to be a spy, but 
somebody back there decided that that must have been the case.
  Another significant concern exacerbated by this lack of diversity is 
a deficiency of linguist abilities in the intelligence community. There 
are countless stories of intelligence tapes that had piled up in the 
months leading up to September 11 when the terrorist attacks occurred 
here. That was done because we didn't have anyone to translate them.
  Experts and administrators lament the fact that we don't have enough 
Arabic, Farsi, Urdu or Dari speakers, and we always go in that 
direction, but we don't have enough Asian language speakers, either, in 
the intelligence community and the military.
  How can we expect to completely correct that course without 
thoroughly modernizing the recruitment, selection and security 
clearance processes to quickly bring on board people with these 
critical skills? The underlying bill provides for the commonsense 
modernization of our security clearance procedures to address this 
growing problem, requiring that the system make more efficient use of 
those who are proficient in foreign languages or with cultural, 
linguistic or other subject matter expertise that is critical to 
national security. We must make these necessary modernizations to adapt 
to the ever-changing threats around us.
  Finally, following the recommendations of 11 three- and four-star 
generals, the bill requests that the National Intelligence Council 
produce a National Intelligence Estimate on the national security 
impact of global climate change. Some of my colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle have expressed discontent with this provision, 
because they believe that enough research is currently under way about 
climate change. In doing so, in my judgment, they failed to recognize 
that climate change is impacting global security.
  Just look at the Middle East, the battle for scarce resources among 
those who have been displaced, particularly in Iraq, has the potential 
to generate sociopolitical environments that foster the creation of 
terrorist cells. If we can't even agree on the implications of climate 
change, it is obvious that more research is necessary, especially 
observing the impact of climate change on the movement of people and 
resources, and how that connects to terrorism.
  Footnote right there, I pointed out in the Rules Committee that Iraq 
would be the classic example of what I am talking about. There are 2 
million refugees, and it is almost like it is kind of hidden, that are 
displaced from their homes in Iraq. There are 400,000 to 500,000 
internally displaced in Iraq. Yet, what we find is they are being 
pushed into Syria, Jordan and Egypt where there are already significant 
water resource problems. Someone tell me how that doesn't equate to an 
environment where terrorists will be produced.
  If we can't agree on this, I can assure you that we are going to have 
significant problems in the future. Even the National Defense 
University has recognized these implications by prioritizing response 
to large-scale national disasters in some of its most recent training 
simulations. As scientists explore the connection between such 
disasters and climate change, it is imperative that the national 
security implications of such events be thoroughly understood.
  I am glad that our committee addresses this issue in the bill. If we 
have learned anything from the failures of the war in Iraq, it is that 
reliable intelligence is critical to ensuring America's national 
security.
  I am pleased to support this rule and urge my colleagues to do the 
same.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. I want to thank the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Hastings) for yielding me the customary 30 minutes, and I 
yield myself as much time as I may consume.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition 
to this restrictive rule.
  The Intelligence Authorization Act generally receives strong 
bipartisan support. But let me be clear that the underlying bill does 
contain bipartisan provisions that are important to protecting our 
national security, make no bones about that.
  However, the bill also contains a number of provisions that are of 
concern and could weaken our national security and intelligence 
capabilities by providing less than adequate resources and placing 
restrictions on our intelligence operations.
  I am concerned that the Democratic leadership chose to include 
section 407 in the underlying bill. My friend from Florida talked at 
length about that provision, which would require our Nation's 
intelligence community to direct its limited resources to a National 
Intelligence Estimate on global climate change.

[[Page 12088]]

  I have to ask, what message are we sending to our allies and our 
enemies when Congress instructs our intelligence experts to stop what 
they are doing on issues that threaten American lives and, instead, 
focus on theoretical risks from global warming.
  Furthermore, earlier this year, this House created a new Select 
Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming to focus on the 
risks of global warming. This is in addition to several Federal 
agencies that are already analyzing climate change. Congress should let 
this panel that was created, and existing Federal agencies, focus on 
climate change so that our intelligence analysts can focus on materials 
of classified information and work to prevent threats against American 
lives.
  But I am pleased, I have to say, with the Rules Committee last night 
because they made in order an amendment to be offered by the ranking 
member, Mr. Hoekstra, of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, that will strike section 407 and allow our spies to be 
spies. I think we can have a very good debate on that. I think we ought 
to have that debate. I am pleased that the Rules Committee made that 
amendment in order.
  However, the Democratic leadership did deny several thoughtful 
amendments offered by Mr. Castle, Mr. Flake, Mr. Rogers of Michigan and 
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose this restrictive rule, which only 
allows 10 out of 433 Members of the House to offer their ideas on how 
to better strengthen our intelligence community.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1345

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. At this time, I am very pleased to yield 2 
minutes to the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, my good friend from Texas (Mr. Reyes).
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague and good friend from 
Florida for yielding me time on this very important rule.
  I rise in support of this rule. The terrorist plot that was recently 
uncovered in New Jersey this past week shows that we cannot let our 
guard down in the effort to learn the plans and intentions of people 
who would do us grave harm.
  The underlying bill, H.R. 2082, provides funding for the brave women 
and men of our intelligence community. I have visited with them in 
every corner of the world, and I am constantly amazed by their 
patriotism, their dedication to mission, and their commitment to doing 
our Nation's most sensitive and dangerous business, often without 
public acknowledgement or recognition.
  Today, the United States faces a dynamic set of threats, challenges, 
and opportunities. We are at war in Iraq and Afghanistan. We face a 
growing terrorist threat. Countries like Iran and North Korea are 
working towards a nuclear bomb. And we face a number of other key 
challenges in Africa, Latin America, and from rising powers like Russia 
and China. These major challenges require a major effort by our 
government to collect, to analyze, and to disseminate intelligence, and 
to do so within the legal bounds of our Constitution and our national 
values.
  This bill invests in human intelligence. It invests in analysis and 
analysts. It funds key counterterrorism operations and sensitive 
collection programs. And it improves critical oversight in key areas 
such as the overuse of contractors and the lack of qualified linguists 
in the intelligence business.
  This bill was developed on a bipartisan basis. And although there may 
not be agreement on every single point, there is agreement on all the 
major points. This rule will allow a full debate on many of the key 
issues before us, and I, along with my colleagues, should welcome this 
debate. So I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on the rule.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 6 
minutes to the gentlelady from New Mexico, a member of the Intelligence 
Committee, Mrs. Wilson.
  Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Mr. Speaker, I am here to urge my 
colleagues to oppose the rule and to oppose the previous question on 
the rule for the Intelligence authorization bill today.
  I offered an amendment in the Rules Committee that was similar to one 
that I offered in the Intelligence Committee that would modernize our 
foreign intelligence surveillance laws so that we can listen to the 
terrorists trying to kill us, while protecting Americans' civil 
liberties.
  Every member of the House Intelligence Committee knows that the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is not working, and so does the 
Speaker of the House. In fact, she has been briefed on this earlier 
than any of us have, since shortly after 9/11.
  Last week, in unclassified session in front of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, Admiral Mike McConnell, the Director of 
National Intelligence, urged the Congress to modernize our intelligence 
surveillance laws. He told us and the world, ``We are actually missing 
a significant portion of what we should be getting.'' We are missing a 
significant portion of what we should be getting.
  In January of this year, the Attorney General of the United States 
wrote to the Congress and said there were new Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court orders that were innovative, that would put the 
President's terrorist surveillance program underneath the auspices of a 
judge in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. They are 
innovative, because the court is stretching the law like a twin sheet 
over a king-sized bed. And every member of the Intelligence Committee 
knows just how fragile the legal framework is in this arrangement. Yet, 
a single judge in a nonadversarial secret setting has said it is okay 
to go forward on this basis because it is important to the country, and 
the Congress has failed to act. Will the next judge go along?
  Every one of us knows there is a problem. Here is the problem:
  In 1978, almost all local calls were on wire and almost all long 
distance calls were transmitted by microwave over the air. The FISA law 
distinguishes between collection over a wire and collection over the 
air. You don't need a FISA warrant to collect signals over the air. And 
that is where long-haul communications were in 1978.
  Now, in 21st-century communications, the situation is completely 
reversed. Most long-haul communications are on wire and most local 
calls are over the air. 230 million Americans have cell phones, but the 
FISA law we operate under is stuck in the 1970s, while we are trying to 
protect this country from terrorists who are exploiting the 21st-
century technology that was invented by this great country. We are 
tying the hands of our intelligence agencies while our enemies are 
using these communication systems to plot to kill Americans.
  But the rule is even worse than that. The committee has ruled in 
order an amendment by Mr. Flake and Mr. Schiff that insists, insists 
that our intelligence agencies must use this outdated 1978 law. What do 
you think the FISA judges are going to think when they see that pass 
the House of Representatives?
  We are actually missing a significant portion of what we should be 
getting. What did we miss today? What are the terrorists plotting 
today? What are they talking about that is flowing over the wires that 
America built today? Who is going to die tomorrow because you won't let 
our Intelligence Committees listen to the foreign communications on a 
wire and you will not allow a debate on this floor on this very 
important issue?
  I pray to God that we don't need another 9/11 Commission to look at 
what our failures were in intelligence. Because if we have to look at 
failures, if we have to look at whether we should have done something 
when we had a chance, then mark this vote on this day in history, when 
the Democrat majority in this House chose to tie our hands in the face 
of a determined enemy.
  If we defeat the previous question on this rule, we will offer the 
amendment

[[Page 12089]]

to modernize our intelligence surveillance laws to update them for 
21st-century technology. A vote in favor of the previous question on 
this rule is a vote to keep the FISA law frozen in time in 1978, while 
our enemies use 21st-century communications to plot to kill Americans.
  I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the previous question and 
``no'' on the rule.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose the Rule for debate and 
the previous question on the Intelligence Authorization Bill today.
  This vote is more important than most procedural things we do around 
here.
  I offered an amendment in the Rules Committee that would modernize 
our Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Laws so that we can listen to the 
terrorists trying to kill us and protect the civil liberties of 
Americans.
  Every member of the House Intelligence Committee knows that the FISA 
law is not working, and so does the Speaker of the House. She has been 
briefed on these matters since shortly after 9/11--long before any of 
us were.
  Last week, in unclassified session in front of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, Admiral Mike McConnell, the Director of 
National Intelligence urged the Congress to modernize this law. He told 
us and the world, ``We are actually missing a significant portion of 
what we should be getting.''
  In classified session, the details of the problems are even worse.
  On January 17, 2007 the Attorney General told the Congress that there 
were new Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders that are 
``innovative''.
  They are ``innovative'' because the court is stretching the law like 
a twin sized sheet to cover a king sized bed.
  And every member of the Intelligence Committee knows just how fragile 
this legal arrangement is.
  Yet, a single judge in a non-adversarial secret session allowed it is 
important to the security of the country and because the Congress has 
failed to act.
  Will the next judge continue to stretch the law?


                              The Problem

  In 1978 almost all local calls were on wire and almost all long-haul 
calls were over the air.
  The FISA law distinguishes between collection on a wire and 
collection out of the air.
  You don't need a FISA warrant to collect foreign intelligence over 
the air.
  Now, in 21st century communications, the situation is completely 
reverse.
  Most long-haul communications are on a wire and local calls are in 
the air.
  But the calls we want, for foreign intelligence information, are on 
the wires and fiber optic cables.
  The FISA law we operate under is stuck in the 1970s while we are 
trying to protect this country from enemies that use 21st century 
communications.
  We're tying the hands of our intelligence agencies while our enemies 
are using the communications systems we built to plot to kill us.


                           But It Gets Worse

  But the rule is even worse than that.
  The committee has ruled in order an amendment by Mr. Flake and Mr. 
Schiff that says our agencies must use this outdated 1978 law.
  The Democrat leadership will insist that we turn our backs on 21st 
century terrorists, using 21st century communications and pretend we 
can be frozen in a 1978 world.
  ``We are actually missing a significant portion of what we should be 
getting,'' said our Director of National Intelligence.
  What did we miss today?
  What are the terrorists plotting today?
  Who is going to die tomorrow because you won't let our intelligence 
agencies listen to foreign communications on a wire?
  I pray to God we never need another ``9/11 Commission'' that looks at 
how we failed to protect ourselves when we could have done something.
  If we do, mark this vote, this day in history, when the Democrat 
majority in this House chose to tie our hands in the face of a 
determined enemy.
  A vote in favor of the previous question on this rule is a vote to 
keep the FISA law frozen in time in 1978 while our enemies use 21st 
century communications to plot to kill Americans.
  I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the previous question and 
``no'' on the rule.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 5 
minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from California, my friend Ms. 
Harman, who is the previous ranking member of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and is a member of the newly appointed Special 
Intelligence Oversight Panel.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. Hastings for yielding to me and 
commend him for his continued service both on the Intelligence 
Committee and on the Rules Committee.
  As you heard, I served the past 8 years on the Intelligence 
Committee, the last 4 as ranking member. I loved that opportunity, and 
I remain passionate about the issues. I believe that there is nothing 
more central to our roles in Congress than to keep our country safe. 
And that committee has crucial jurisdiction.
  I would respectfully disagree with the comments of the last speaker, 
Mrs. Wilson. I have been briefed longer than she has on how the so-
called NSA program operates. I believed then and I believe now that it 
can and must fully comply with FISA, a law that has been modernized 12 
times since 9/11 through changes we have made which I supported in the 
PATRIOT Act.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule and of H.R. 2082. In my 
current role as Chair of the Homeland Security Intelligence Information 
Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee, I continue to 
review intelligence reports and to talk to our key security 
professionals. And, Mr. Speaker, I am concerned. We have surged our 
intelligence resources into Iraq, where they are necessarily focused on 
the tactical needs of warfighters. Meanwhile, al Qaeda has gained 
strength and is inspiring new cells worldwide. We have taken our eye 
off the ball. That ball is al Qaeda.
  Mr. Speaker, we should all be worried that terrorist cells are here 
in the United States, right now, waiting for the right moment to 
strike. We have yet to develop a truly effective system for sharing 
time-sensitive intelligence about terror plots with first responders, 
whom I would like to believe could be first preventers.
  Even at the Federal level, a variety of data bases, classifications, 
and pseudo-classification systems could still, 5\1/2\ years after 9/11, 
prevent us from connecting the dots. We have yet to develop an adequate 
strategy to counter radicalization in our prisons and in our 
communities. The events at Cherry Hill, New Jersey, earlier this week 
are the latest example. And we have not yet broken into the inner 
circle of the senior al Qaeda leadership even though we have been at 
this for more than 5 years. These problems are urgent as we could be 
attacked at any time.
  I recently reviewed the classified annex to this bill and continue to 
pay special attention to our technical satellite programs. Changes to 
these programs cannot be discussed in an unclassified setting such as 
this; but I want to reiterate my long-held view that the women and men 
who build these systems constitute a major strategic asset of the 
United States. Rocket scientists do not grow on trees, and we must keep 
them highly trained and highly motivated. Without their help, we could 
literally lose our ability to see, hear, and communicate.
  Finally, I strongly support the effort to develop a National 
Intelligence Estimate on climate change. Changes in our climate will 
affect critical resources such as water, food, and arable land, as we 
are seeing now in Darfur and in many parts of Africa. Droughts affect 
the stability of governments, and the stability of governments is one 
of the key things we need to know about through our intelligence. This 
isn't bugs and bunnies, or even Bugs Bunny. It is survival or 
destruction. And if we make responsible moves now, our grandchildren 
will benefit.
  Mr. Speaker, by supporting this legislation, the Congress stands with 
the extraordinary women and men of our intelligence community who often 
serve in austere locations on unaccompanied assignments. I am one of 
the few here who know these people and know where they serve. I say to 
them, our Nation owes you our gratitude; hopefully, this bill provides 
the support and tools you need as well as honors your sacrifice.
  I urge support of the rule. I urge support of the underlying 
legislation, and

[[Page 12090]]

I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 
minutes to the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle).
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H. Res. 388, the rule for 
consideration of the fiscal year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act.
  As a former member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, I 
strongly believe we must enact all of the 9/11 Commission's 
intelligence recommendations, even those that apply to our own 
congressional committees.
  In its final report, the 9/11 Commission concluded that: ``Of all our 
recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the 
most difficult and important. So long as oversight is governed by the 
current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American 
people will not get the security they want and need.''
  The bipartisan 9/11 Commission Report and the subsequent 9/11 Public 
Disclosure Project recommended three alternatives for reforming 
congressional oversight of intelligence. These options include: one, 
establishing a Joint Committee on Intelligence modeled after the old 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; two, establishing House and Senate 
Committees on Intelligence with authorizing and appropriating 
authority; or, three, establishes a new Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Intelligence.

                              {time}  1400

  In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 2001, Congress enacted a 
large majority of the Commission's recommendations. However, as it 
turns out, it has been those recommendations that apply directly to the 
tangled rules and procedures here in the United States Congress that 
have been left unfinished.
  Earlier this year the Democratic leadership attempted to apply a 
Band-Aid to this problem by creating a powerless Intelligence Oversight 
Panel that has very little control over actual funding decisions. This 
is clearly not what the 9/11 Commission recommended. In fact, its 
report plainly states that, ``tinkering with the existing committee 
structure is not sufficient.''
  This week I offered a simple amendment to the bill before us, calling 
for a sense of Congress that this House should act to implement these 
crucial 9/11 recommendations, but it was denied under this rule.
  Mr. Speaker, the American people have insisted that we implement all 
of these important recommendations, even those that are difficult. We 
will be doing this country a disservice until we put in place an 
effective committee structure capable of giving our national 
intelligence agencies the oversight, support and leadership they need.
  I urge the defeat of the rule.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, would you be so kind as to 
inform each side of the remaining amount of time?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida has 14\1/2\ 
minutes, and the gentleman from Washington has 19 minutes.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased at this time 
to yield 4 minutes to my good friend from New Jersey, with whom I serve 
on the Select Committee on Intelligence, and he is the Chair of the 
Special Intelligence Oversight Panel, Mr. Holt.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend and colleague from Florida. 
It is indeed a pleasure and an education to serve with him on the 
Intelligence Committee.
  And I rise today in support of this rule and the underlying bill. 
Although this bill is not the full reform that I think is needed, it 
does contain many features that, if enacted, will improve the operation 
and oversight of the intelligence community.
  I'd like to address one amendment that has been made in order, and I 
thank the Rules Committee for accepting for consideration an amendment 
that I offer that seeks to address an issue that's been one of the 
highest concerns for both this committee and the Congress, and that is, 
protecting the security and the cover of intelligence officers.
  This grows out, in part, of the well publicized outing of a former 
CIA officer. For nearly 4 years, I have led the effort within the 
committee and in this body to determine the facts surrounding this 
case, as well as its consequences for the security of our Nation.
  In previous Congresses, on eight separate occasions, in committee and 
on this floor, the then majority voted down every effort to obtain 
information on the matter. As I repeatedly noted at the time, Mr. 
Fitzgerald's criminal inquiry could never address some of the key 
questions that we sought to have answers for.
  For example, how and why did Ms. Plame's cover status become known to 
those with no legitimate need to know?
  How much damage was done to our intelligence collection efforts as a 
result of the outing of Ms. Plame?
  What measures has the CIA and has the now Director of National 
Intelligence taken to prevent similar compromises in the future?
  We still need answers to these and other questions. The amendment I 
am offering today that I will offer, would require the President, 
through the Director of National Intelligence, to report annually to 
the Congress on the need for any modification to the Intelligence 
Identities Protection Act to improve the legal protections for covert 
agents. This report, along with other oversight that the committee will 
undertake, and that I hope to undertake through the Select Intelligence 
Oversight Panel, will help us establish exactly what measures need to 
be taken to minimize the chances of such compromises of the identities 
of covert operatives in the future.
  These men and women take enormous risks on our behalf. We owe it to 
them to ensure their identities are protected from the exposure, both 
from hostile intelligence services but even from those within our own 
government who would seek to retaliate against them for speaking truth 
to power.
  This reporting requirement would be an amended version of what the 
President is already required to do, but has failed to do every year. 
We seek to have the President show more diligence in protecting the 
cover of these employees.
  Let me reiterate that this amendment represents only one step in the 
process. The chairman of the committee has assured me that there will 
be oversight and legislative action on this issue in addition to that 
which we are taking today.
  I would also like to comment that it is astonishing in the debates 
leading up to this in committee and here on the floor today that there 
would be so much attention being paid to the request for a national 
intelligence estimate on climate change. A preliminary assessment is 
already in the works. We should want the intelligence community to be 
considering everything that affects our national security, be it 
demographics or climate or droughts. I am astonished that there would 
be any resistance to having such a national intelligence estimate. So I 
am pleased that the committee has put that in this bill, and I look 
forward to its passage.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 
minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon).
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
  I rise to commend the majority for including, under the rule, the 
amendment that will be offered later by Mr. Hoekstra, the ranking 
minority member, former chairman of the committee, to strike section 
407 of the bill. This is the section of the bill that so many people 
have commented on so far today that will now task our national 
intelligence resources to start looking at the issue of climate change.
  To me there is a great irony in this happening here today because for 
many years we have heard criticism from Democrats over and over again 
on the so-called inefficiencies, inadequacies of our national 
intelligence capabilities,

[[Page 12091]]

specially as it related to WMD in Iraq and their failure to get an 
accurate picture of that. And now we see today an expansion of their 
duties and responsibilities.
  I believe most Americans look for our intelligence agencies not to be 
engaged on the issue of climate change but more directly to be involved 
in the business of protecting American safety and security, protecting 
our national assets, protecting the American people.
  Furthermore, one of the other things that strikes me as greatly 
ironic about this is, we have an extensive array of Federal agencies 
currently studying this issue. We have NOAA, the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, which has a wide array of satellites and 
scientists that are constantly studying both short-term and long-term 
implications of climate change.
  We have, additionally, NASA engaged on this issue, with three major 
Earth-observing satellites on orbit studying the issue of the Earth's 
climate.
  And as well, there are multiple programs run by the National Science 
Foundation; they have the Geosciences Directorate (GEO), the Office of 
Polar Programs (OPP), the Atmospheric Science Subactivity, the ATM. 
And, ladies and gentlemen, I haven't even touched on the EPA and all 
the work that they are doing on this issue.
  To me, this issue is controversial. There is a sizeable number of 
Americans who feel that the severity of the problem of climate change 
does not justify some of the extreme actions that many people in the 
radical environmental community are trying to propose today, and I just 
can't help but feel this is a political issue to try to hijack our 
intelligence assets to get them on the global warming bandwagon so we 
could have draconian changes in American policy that could adversely 
affect our economy and our Nation.
  So I thank the majority for putting the Hoekstra amendment in order. 
Mr. Hoekstra, the former chairman, now ranking member, is very 
knowledgeable on intelligence policy.
  I intend on supporting the Hoekstra amendment. I encourage all my 
colleagues to listen carefully to that debate.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I now yield 2\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. I appreciate the gentleman's courtesy in extending 
time.
  I, too, am perplexed by the debate that is being advanced in terms of 
being able to focus on the national security implications of the threat 
of global warming. I sat on the committee, the Special Committee on 
Global Warming and Energy Independence, as we listened to three and 
four star admirals and generals, as we listened to the former head of 
the CIA talking about the defense implications for the United States of 
Global Warming.
  These men were not radical environmentalists. These are respected 
experts who have led a lifetime of service to protecting the integrity, 
the defense, the security of the United States. They are deeply 
concerned that our dependence on foreign oil from unstable areas of the 
world. The overwhelming scientific consensus that climate change, 
global warming is a reality, led them to argue in the most strong terms 
that we need to be serious about it. Item after item, about the 
strategic implications, about what happens to defenses of the United 
States, to instability around the world of water-stressed areas, to new 
disease patterns, these are not arcane, philosophical issues. This 
isn't environmental fringe. This is the nuts, and bolts of the future, 
of our country.
  It has already been made clear that we already have a great deal of 
work that is underway. What this would require is assembling it under 
the guise and guidance of people who are experts in national security 
to put it in the national security context.
  Other major countries around the world are grappling with this. I 
think the Rules Committee was entirely appropriate to put what I think 
is a misguided amendment on the floor because I think it is time for 
people who care about the future of the country, who are looking at the 
evidence, to have an honest and thoughtful debate.
  But to somehow dismiss this as the province of radical 
environmentalism or a detraction from the hard work of planning for 
America's security future is, I think, sadly misplaced.
  I appreciate what the Rules Committee has done. I support the rule 
and look forward to the debate later.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 
minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Flake).
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, we have a process here with regard to 
legislation and how it moves through the Congress. In particular, the 
rules were changed in January, some very welcome changes to the rules 
with regard to earmarks.
  We said that if you are going to have an earmark in a bill, or in a 
report, that you need to state that you do not have a financial 
interest in that earmark, and then you need to submit that earmark, or 
it has to be submitted with the report so that Members can actually see 
that and see that there is no financial interest, see if it has merit 
or warrant.
  This process is not being followed here. We were told initially that 
there were no earmarks in the bill, and then those of us who went up to 
view the classified annex did not see a list. There was no list 
available there. We were told later that it was with the Clerk's 
Office. Then with the Parliamentarians.
  It turned out that we finally did get the list, and here it is, 26 
earmarks in the bill. But the list was not made public. It was not 
given to us until 5 hours after the deadline that the Rules Committee 
had established to submit your amendments.
  So somebody who wanted to amend the bill or actually challenge or to 
highlight or to discuss the earmarks that are mentioned here and listed 
here did not have an opportunity to craft an amendment.
  Again, this list was received, it was made public 5 hours after the 
Rules Committee already shut down the amendment process. This rule 
cannot go forward like this. We cannot continue to do business like 
this.

                              {time}  1415

  We all know the problems that we have had with the appropriations 
process with the earmarking, the scandals that have gone on. The 
earmarking process is secretive enough, it seems, in the Congress 
without adding the layer of the Intelligence Committee. Then there are 
things that you can't even discuss on the floor, that we can't discuss 
openly; so it makes it even more difficult.
  Members need not be reminded that Duke Cunningham now sits in prison 
because of earmarks he largely got in the intelligence process, in the 
Intelligence Committee. We cannot allow that to happen again. We have 
to have a process that makes sure that that cannot happen. And that 
process is not happening right now, when you don't get lists until long 
after the process, when you can't challenge them on the floor. And then 
we have the problem here in open session where you can't even challenge 
the earmark and talk about what the earmark is actually about because 
you are in open session and you might be talking about classified 
things.
  So for that reason I am announcing now that I will offer a motion to 
move into secret session after these votes are concluded.
  Let me just remind the Members, if you want a process where you know 
what is going on, we have to move into secret session. If you vote 
against the motion to go into secret session, you are, in essence, 
saying let's just let it go; I don't care what is in there.
  I would challenge those who want to see what is going on to go up and 
view the classified annex. You may or may not be able to find out what 
these earmarks are about. But with this process, the way it is, we will 
never know, and we can't continue this.
  I applauded the majority's move to new earmark rules in January. They

[[Page 12092]]

were, I felt, stronger than what we did when we were in the majority. I 
think they should have been stronger, but they were better than what we 
did, and I said so. But we aren't following those rules.
  We have already highlighted a few times that if the majority submits 
a list of earmarks, incomplete or complete, or simply states there are 
no earmarks in a bill, there is no parliamentary recourse for the 
minority or for anyone on the floor. We have to accept at face value 
that there are no earmarks or that the list is complete. That is wrong. 
That is something that has to change.
  But when we are dealing with the Intelligence Committee on something 
this important, we can't let this process go forward without adopting 
some of the reforms that we have said that we are going to adopt.
  So for that reason I will offer a motion for a secret session at the 
appropriate time, and I would urge a vote against this rule.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I say through the Chair to my 
friend from Washington that I thought that we were having our last 
speakers but I didn't know the nature and substance of his last 
speaker's remarks toward that end.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes now to the distinguished Chair of the 
Select Committee on Intelligence, who has comments regarding Mr. 
Flake's comments.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I just wanted to assure my friend and colleague from Arizona that, 
being sensitive to the issues that he mentioned about one of our former 
colleagues that, regrettably, now sits in prison, the Intelligence 
Committee worked very closely with the Parliamentarians, the Committee 
on Standards and Official Conduct, and other committees of the House on 
earmark disclosures.
  I am at a loss as to who informed the gentleman that there would be 
no earmarks, but I think the gentleman now knows that the Government 
Printing Office made an error in omitting the earmarks and that is why 
the delay in putting them up on their Web site.
  Be that as it may, this committee followed the requirements of the 
House for each Member receiving an earmark to certify that neither he 
or she nor his or her spouse would benefit financially from any kind of 
action. We complied with all the requirements, all the rules, and all 
the regulations.
  As I said, we did this in a very transparent and bipartisan way 
because we did not want to leave any impressions that things were not 
done according to the rules that had been set out. Everything that we 
did with this process followed the rules and the process. Where the 
glitch came was where the printing was done. There was an error 
committed by the Government Printing Office, and that is why there was 
a delay in posting the earmarks.
  Again, I am at a loss as to who informed the gentleman that there 
were no earmarks, because it certainly wasn't anyone from the committee 
that I am aware of.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. REYES. I would be glad to yield to the gentleman.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I believe the requirement in the House rules 
is that the report be filed 72 hours before it is brought up. Actually, 
those of us who went up to view the classified annex, I asked for the 
list, if there was a list of earmarks, and I was told there was none.
  Mr. REYES. Reclaiming my time just to explain to you that our process 
in the committee is that you would be provided support from the 
Republican staff.
  If they misinformed the gentleman about the issue of earmarks, I 
don't know why they would do that because clearly staff on both sides 
knew that there were earmarks.
  I will continue to yield.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Yes, I reviewed and asked during that time if there were. I would say 
if it is the case that a computer glitch led to no printing of the 
list, then you would think that the Rules Committee would say, okay, 
maybe we should move the process back and allow Members to offer 
amendments on specific earmarks.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, it is my understanding 
that the gentleman was offered an opportunity to do that and rejected 
it.
  Mr. FLAKE. An unspecified opportunity. If the gentleman will continue 
to yield, Mr. Speaker, I actually offered an amendment that was 
rejected by the Rules Committee just encompassing all earmarks that 
might be in the bill because I wasn't given a list. I had no idea if 
there were any earmarks. And that was rejected.
  The problem we have here in open session and the reason I will be 
calling to move into secret session is that in open session it is 
difficult to actually discuss what the earmark might be about.
  Mr. REYES. I am being again reassured by staff, reclaiming my time, 
Mr. Speaker, that the gentleman was offered, less than an hour ago, 
unanimous consent to allow him to have an amendment.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the 
gentleman from Arizona.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, what I was offered about 30 minutes ago was 
an opportunity to offer perhaps a few amendments with regard to 
specific earmarks. It was never clear how many amendments I would be 
allowed to offer or on which of these earmarks. Until that is 
clarified, there is no reason to move forward.
  And, also, let me point out again unless you are in secret session, 
you can't discuss exactly what the earmark might be about; so you might 
run afoul of any statements that you have signed or any confidentiality 
agreements that we are under in terms of classified information. And 
when I actually went up with the list to look at the classified annex 
again and pointed at certain earmarks, I was told that we are not sure 
what that was about. That was requested by a Member who is not on the 
committee. We don't know. And until we can have that Member actually 
stand up and be able to say what that earmark is about, whether it goes 
to a private company, whether it goes to an agency, we just don't know.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FLAKE. Yes.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, let me again reassure the gentleman that 
every single earmark here followed the House rules. Every Member that 
has an earmark certified, like every Member is required to in the 
House, that they had no specific interest, that the spouse had no 
specific interest with the company or companies where the money was 
going.
  Mr. FLAKE. I don't sit on the Intelligence Committee; so there may be 
some disagreement there about whether the ranking member was informed 
or not, and I think that will probably come to light later.
  But in this case, if we had followed the rules, we would have had the 
list before the Rules Committee shut down the amendment process because 
you need to be able to offer amendments on specific earmarks. And in 
this case, unless a Member can go up and view the classified annex and 
come away with an assurance or some kind of comfort level that the 
earmark under question is for the intended purpose or it should be in 
the intelligence bill, then we are at a loss when we come to vote. I 
think our constituents expect us to be informed, and when we can't even 
go up and view the classified annex and be informed, then there is a 
problem.
  Mr. REYES. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FLAKE. Yes, I will yield.
  Mr. REYES. Once again, Mr. Speaker, let me reassure my good friend 
and colleague from Arizona that the report, along with all the listing 
of earmarks, was filed appropriately, timely with the Rules Committee. 
Where the glitch occurred was in the printing.
  But be that as it may, I want to tell you again, reassure you, that 
we did not handle the process in the Intelligence Committee any 
different than any other committee in the House, and I would hope the 
gentleman would understand that.

[[Page 12093]]


  Mr. FLAKE. My office has a timeline, actually, if anyone is 
interested, and when we requested the list of earmarks, when we finally 
got it, what we were told by which office, and I can tell you this is 
no way to run a process, particularly given the recent history of 
problems that we have had in this regard. And that is why I am 
concerned, and that is why I feel we can't do that in an open session 
like this. We have to go to secret session.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FLAKE. Yes, I will.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, does the gentleman have now an 
amendment prepared that he is ready to offer?
  Perhaps it would be that we could ask unanimous consent that your 
amendment be allowed to go forward.
  Mr. FLAKE. Reclaiming my time, I would not, given that I cannot 
discuss some of what I need to discuss in open session, given what has 
transpired. I don't think that we can. That is why we need a closed 
session.
  I will offer the motion, and if you don't feel that we need to go 
into closed session, then you can vote against it.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance 
of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, I will be asking for a ``no'' vote on the previous 
question so that I can amend this rule to allow the House to consider 
an amendment offered by Representative Heather Wilson of New Mexico and 
provide the appropriate waivers for that amendment.
  The Wilson amendment would modernize the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act to enhance the ability of our Nation to protect itself 
in times of war and elevated national security threats. And I think 
that point was made very, very eloquently by the gentlewoman from New 
Mexico.
  Yesterday, the Rules Committee met and rejected on a party-line vote 
the Wilson amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to advise my friend from Florida that I just got 
a request for time here, and that is being discussed right now, that I 
was not aware of.
  Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Washington has 7\1/2\ 
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Florida has 4 minutes remaining.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the 
balance of my time.

                              {time}  1430

  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Let me say, then, Mr. Speaker, I will be 
asking for my colleagues to defeat the previous question so we will 
have an opportunity to vote on the merits of this amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert the text of the 
amendment and extraneous material immediately prior to the vote on the 
previous question.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Washington?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 6 
minutes to the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee (Mr. 
Hoekstra).
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I just need to clarify that the process that was used 
for the earmarks on this bill did not follow all of the rules that we 
had agreed upon in the committee and perhaps inconsistent with the 
Rules of the House. But I do know that they were inconsistent with the 
agreement that we have in the Intelligence Committee, which is that on 
a bipartisan basis the chairman and the ranking member would review 
earmarks, their content, the Member, and would sign off on the 
appropriateness of each of those earmarks.
  With the filing of the bill to the Rules Committee, there was at 
least one earmark that was never brought to my attention and for which 
I never received a copy of the request from the Member identifying the 
earmark or a statement from the Member indicating that there was no 
financial interest along with the earmark. Now, that does not say the 
earmark is bad. It does not say it was wrong. It is just a process foul 
in terms of what we had agreed to.
  Mr. REYES. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield to the chairman.
  Mr. REYES. I thank you for yielding, because one of the fundamental 
points I want to make is that we wanted to err on the side of 
transparency. Staff tells me that the issue of that particular earmark, 
weeks before we marked up the bill, was fully discussed on a bipartisan 
basis. I know it was discussed when we marked it up because there were 
a number of amendments that were brought to the markup.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. It is clear that there may be some confusion as to 
exactly what was or what was not discussed, but the process between 
staff, the process that is outlined in the committee is clearly that 
the chairman and the ranking member will go through and review those 
items that are identified as earmarks, and we will agree on them, and 
we will agree upon their inclusion in the bill.
  The bill that was submitted and filed with Rules had at least one, I 
don't know about the full details, but had at least one earmark that 
the chairman and myself never discussed and also that, as a ranking 
member, I had never received what would have been identified as the 
paperwork that went along with it. The chairman knows that that 
particular earmark was one that was not discussed as an earmark. I 
don't think the inclusion and the identification of it as being an 
earmark in committee when we debated this specific provision was 
brought up.
  And so it is a cause of concern. And building on what happened with 
my colleague from Arizona (Mr. Flake), where the Rules Committee did 
not identify the earmarks that were part of that bill until 5 hours 
after the deadline for the Rules Committee, for Members to submit 
amendments.
  Mr. REYES. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I will yield.
  Mr. REYES. Those are two different issues. The time was an issue of 
Government Printing Office error. That is a different issue.
  I would just hope that my good friend and colleague and ranking 
member would agree that we sat down and agreed to bring transparency so 
that the issues that came up when the gentleman was the chair of the 
committee would not recur.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. That is exactly the point, that whatever abuses, 
whatever we wanted transparency, these were guidelines and rules that 
we agreed upon in the previous Congress, where I am glad that they were 
carried over into this Congress. I am disappointed that they were not 
followed the way that they were outlined in the committee process.
  Mr. REYES. If the gentleman would yield.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I will yield.
  Mr. REYES. I would just again take issue with that point because we 
followed the process. Staff consulted on a bipartisan basis.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Reclaiming my time.
  Mr. Chairman, no, that does not follow. The measure that we had, you 
and I sat in a conference room; we went through the list with staff 
discussing specifically each and every earmark. And that earmark was 
not part of that process. When we got the report that accompanied this 
bill to the Rules Committee, all of a sudden there was a new earmark 
that you and I had not gone through. You can talk to staff and those 
types of things. I was never aware and neither were they that it was an 
earmark.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am going to once again 
urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the previous question so the House 
can consider the amendment that I submitted from Heather Wilson of New 
Mexico.
  Mr. Speaker, with that, I yield back the balance of my time.

[[Page 12094]]


  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining 
portion of my time.
  I am fascinated by my colleagues' arguments on the other side. We did 
have a Rules Committee hearing on this matter, and there are four 
members of the Rules Committee on the minority, none of whom raised any 
of the issues that we have heard here today on the floor; understanding 
full well that Mr. Flake comes now and says that we should have a 
special session.
  I also know that here on the floor I offered to Mr. Flake an 
opportunity, by unanimous consent, to offer any amendment he may have, 
and he didn't have an amendment at that time. I assume his argument is 
that we would need to be in what he says a ``secret session.''
  But one thing I do know, being one of the few Members that does serve 
on the Rules Committee and on the Intelligence Committee, and that is 
that everyone knew the funding level of the issue that is being 
discussed. Mr. Flake may not have, but I can assure you that the 
remaining Members on the Intelligence Committee knew that the mark was 
included in our draft and the Community Management Account making that 
minority staff certainly aware at the time between the chairman and Mr. 
Hoekstra.
  Now, today more than ever, we must make the creation of a strong and 
flexible intelligence apparatus one of the highest, highest priorities 
of this body. The terrorist attacks of September 11, combined with the 
continuing threat of further attacks, underscore the importance of this 
legislation.
  When the American people elected Democrats to the majority, they sent 
a very clear message that ``business as usual'' is no longer accepted. 
They said to all of us, Republican and Democrat alike, that there are 
problems in the way we operate, and we need to change how we do 
business. We must, in my opinion, congratulate our intelligence 
community for its successes, but we also must hold them accountable for 
their failures. Rubber-stamping the administration's every action is 
not acceptable. Democrats are working every day, as are Republicans, to 
make America a safer place for all.
  I genuinely urge my colleagues to support this measure.
  I heard arguments about the climate change requirements put forward 
for there to be a national intelligence estimate in that regard. And 
there are arguments against it. I do not quite understand those 
arguments. We made it clear that much of the information is collectable 
by analysts at this time and that it would help prevent future 
terrorist developments. And the way the argument has been couched on 
the minority is as if this largest ever intelligence budget, largest in 
the history of the Congress, is not doing everything that is needed to 
be done because someone requested that there be a national intelligence 
estimate with reference to climate change. One day, some people in this 
body are going to get their head out of the sand and understand that 
something is changing in this climate of ours, in this world and that 
we all owe it as much as we can afford to make sure that we pass on a 
safe environment to all our children.
  With that, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the rule. I 
urge a ``yes'' vote on the previous question.
  The material previously referred to by Mr. Hastings of Washington is 
as follows:

                        Amendment to H. Res. 388

                 Offered by Rep. Hastings of Washington

       At the end of the resolution, add the following:
       Sec. 3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
     resolution, the amendment printed in section 4 shall be in 
     order as though printed as the last amendment in the report 
     of the Committee on Rules if offered by Representative Wilson 
     of New Mexico or a designee. That amendment shall be 
     debatable for 30 minutes equally divided and controlled by 
     the proponent and an opponent.
       Sec. 4. The amendment referred to in section 3 is as 
     follows:
       At the end of the bill, add the following new title:

            TITLE VI--ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MODERNIZATION

     SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Electronic Surveillance 
     Modernization Act''.

     SEC. 602. FISA DEFINITIONS.

       (a) Agent of a Foreign Power.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 
     101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; or'' and inserting 
     ``;''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(D) is reasonably expected to possess, control, transmit, 
     or receive foreign intelligence information while such person 
     is in the United States, provided that the official making 
     the certification required by section 104(a)(7) deems such 
     foreign intelligence information to be significant; or''.
       (b) Electronic Surveillance.--Subsection (f) of such 
     section is amended to read as follows:
       ``(f) `Electronic surveillance' means--
       ``(1) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, 
     or other surveillance device for acquiring information by 
     intentionally directing surveillance at a particular known 
     person who is reasonably believed to be in the United States 
     under circumstances in which that person has a reasonable 
     expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for 
     law enforcement purposes; or
       ``(2) the intentional acquisition of the contents of any 
     communication under circumstances in which a person has a 
     reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be 
     required for law enforcement purposes, if both the sender and 
     all intended recipients are reasonably believed to be located 
     within the United States.''.
       (c) Minimization Procedures.--Subsection (h) of such 
     section is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``importance;'' and 
     inserting ``importance; and'';
       (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and'' and inserting 
     ``.''; and
       (3) by striking paragraph (4).
       (d) Wire Communication and Surveillance Device.--Subsection 
     (l) of such section is amended to read as follows:
       ``(l) `Surveillance device' is a device that allows 
     surveillance by the Federal Government, but excludes any 
     device that extracts or analyzes information from data that 
     has already been acquired by the Federal Government by lawful 
     means.''.
       (e) Contents.--Subsection (n) of such section is amended to 
     read as follows:
       ``(n) `Contents', when used with respect to a 
     communication, includes any information concerning the 
     substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.''.

     SEC. 603. AUTHORIZATION FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND OTHER 
                   ACQUISITIONS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES.

       (a) In General.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended by 
     striking section 102 and inserting the following:


 ``AUTHORIZATION FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                                PURPOSES

       ``Sec. 102.  (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other 
     law, the President, acting through the Attorney General, may 
     authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under 
     this title to acquire foreign intelligence information for 
     periods of up to one year if the Attorney General certifies 
     in writing under oath that--
       ``(1) the electronic surveillance is directed at--
       ``(A) the acquisition of the contents of communications of 
     foreign powers, as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of 
     section 101(a), or an agent of a foreign power, as defined in 
     subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 101(b)(1); or
       ``(B) the acquisition of technical intelligence, other than 
     the spoken communications of individuals, from property or 
     premises under the open and exclusive control of a foreign 
     power, as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 
     101(a); and
       ``(2) the proposed minimization procedures with respect to 
     such surveillance meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures under section 101(h);

     if the Attorney General reports such minimization procedures 
     and any changes thereto to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate at least 30 days 
     prior to the effective date of such minimization procedures, 
     unless the Attorney General determines immediate action is 
     required and notifies the committees immediately of such 
     minimization procedures and the reason for their becoming 
     effective immediately.
       ``(b) Minimization Procedures.--An electronic surveillance 
     authorized by this subsection may be conducted only in 
     accordance with the Attorney General's certification and the 
     minimization procedures. The Attorney General shall assess 
     compliance with such procedures and shall report such 
     assessments to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
     of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate under the provisions of section 
     108(a).
       ``(c) Submission of Certification.--The Attorney General 
     shall immediately transmit under seal to the court 
     established under section 103(a) a copy of his certification. 
     Such certification shall be maintained under security 
     measures established by the Chief

[[Page 12095]]

     Justice with the concurrence of the Attorney General, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, and 
     shall remain sealed unless--
       ``(1) an application for a court order with respect to the 
     surveillance is made under section 104; or
       ``(2) the certification is necessary to determine the 
     legality of the surveillance under section 106(f).


  ``AUTHORIZATION FOR ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

       ``Sec. 102A.  (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other 
     law, the President, acting through the Attorney General may, 
     for periods of up to one year, authorize the acquisition of 
     foreign intelligence information concerning a person 
     reasonably believed to be outside the United States if the 
     Attorney General certifies in writing under oath that--
       ``(1) the acquisition does not constitute electronic 
     surveillance;
       ``(2) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign 
     intelligence information from or with the assistance of a 
     wire or electronic communications service provider, 
     custodian, or other person (including any officer, employee, 
     agent, or other specified person of such service provider, 
     custodian, or other person) who has access to wire or 
     electronic communications, either as they are transmitted or 
     while they are stored, or equipment that is being or may be 
     used to transmit or store such communications;
       ``(3) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
     foreign intelligence information; and
       ``(4) the proposed minimization procedures with respect to 
     such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures under section 101(h).
       ``(b) Specific Place Not Required.--A certification under 
     subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific 
     facilities, places, premises, or property at which the 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be 
     directed.
       ``(c) Submission of Certification.--The Attorney General 
     shall immediately transmit under seal to the court 
     established under section 103(a) a copy of a certification 
     made under subsection (a). Such certification shall be 
     maintained under security measures established by the Chief 
     Justice of the United States and the Attorney General, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, and 
     shall remain sealed unless the certification is necessary to 
     determine the legality of the acquisition under section 102B.
       ``(d) Minimization Procedures.--An acquisition under this 
     section may be conducted only in accordance with the 
     certification of the Attorney General and the minimization 
     procedures adopted by the Attorney General. The Attorney 
     General shall assess compliance with such procedures and 
     shall report such assessments to the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate under 
     section 108(a).


``DIRECTIVES RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND OTHER ACQUISITIONS 
                  OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

       ``Sec. 102B.  (a) Directive.--With respect to an 
     authorization of electronic surveillance under section 102 or 
     an authorization of an acquisition under section 102A, the 
     Attorney General may direct a person to--
       ``(1) immediately provide the Government with all 
     information, facilities, and assistance necessary to 
     accomplish the acquisition of foreign intelligence 
     information in such a manner as will protect the secrecy of 
     the electronic surveillance or acquisition and produce a 
     minimum of interference with the services that such person is 
     providing to the target; and
       ``(2) maintain under security procedures approved by the 
     Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
     any records concerning the electronic surveillance or 
     acquisition or the aid furnished that such person wishes to 
     maintain.
       ``(b) Compensation.--The Government shall compensate, at 
     the prevailing rate, a person for providing information, 
     facilities, or assistance pursuant to subsection (a).
       ``(c) Failure to Comply.--In the case of a failure to 
     comply with a directive issued pursuant to subsection (a), 
     the Attorney General may petition the court established under 
     section 103(a) to compel compliance with the directive. The 
     court shall issue an order requiring the person or entity to 
     comply with the directive if it finds that the directive was 
     issued in accordance with section 102(a) or 102A(a) and is 
     otherwise lawful. Failure to obey an order of the court may 
     be punished by the court as contempt of court. Any process 
     under this section may be served in any judicial district in 
     which the person or entity may be found.
       ``(d) Review of Petitions.--(1) In general.--(A) 
     Challenge.--A person receiving a directive issued pursuant to 
     subsection (a) may challenge the legality of that directive 
     by filing a petition with the pool established under section 
     103(e)(1).
       ``(B) Assignment of judge.--The presiding judge designated 
     pursuant to section 103(b) shall assign a petition filed 
     under subparagraph (A) to one of the judges serving in the 
     pool established by section 103(e)(1). Not later than 24 
     hours after the assignment of such petition, the assigned 
     judge shall conduct an initial review of the directive. If 
     the assigned judge determines that the petition is frivolous, 
     the assigned judge shall deny the petition and affirm the 
     directive or any part of the directive that is the subject of 
     the petition. If the assigned judge determines the petition 
     is not frivolous, the assigned judge shall, within 72 hours, 
     consider the petition in accordance with the procedures 
     established under section 103(e)(2) and provide a written 
     statement for the record of the reasons for any determination 
     under this subsection.
       ``(2) Standard of review.--A judge considering a petition 
     to modify or set aside a directive may grant such petition 
     only if the judge finds that such directive does not meet the 
     requirements of this section or is otherwise unlawful. If the 
     judge does not modify or set aside the directive, the judge 
     shall affirm such directive, and order the recipient to 
     comply with such directive.
       ``(3) Directives not modified.--Any directive not 
     explicitly modified or set aside under this subsection shall 
     remain in full effect.
       ``(e) Appeals.--The Government or a person receiving a 
     directive reviewed pursuant to subsection (d) may file a 
     petition with the court of review established under section 
     103(b) for review of the decision issued pursuant to 
     subsection (d) not later than 7 days after the issuance of 
     such decision. Such court of review shall have jurisdiction 
     to consider such petitions and shall provide for the record a 
     written statement of the reasons for its decision. On 
     petition by the Government or any person receiving such 
     directive for a writ of certiorari, the record shall be 
     transmitted under seal to the Supreme Court, which shall have 
     jurisdiction to review such decision.
       ``(f) Proceedings.--Judicial proceedings under this section 
     shall be concluded as expeditiously as possible. The record 
     of proceedings, including petitions filed, orders granted, 
     and statements of reasons for decision, shall be maintained 
     under security measures established by the Chief Justice of 
     the United States, in consultation with the Attorney General 
     and the Director of National Intelligence.
       ``(g) Sealed Petitions.--All petitions under this section 
     shall be filed under seal. In any proceedings under this 
     section, the court shall, upon request of the Government, 
     review ex parte and in camera any Government submission, or 
     portions of a submission, which may include classified 
     information.
       ``(h) Liability.--No cause of action shall lie in any court 
     against any person for providing any information, facilities, 
     or assistance in accordance with a directive under this 
     section.
       ``(i) Use of Information.--Information acquired pursuant to 
     a directive by the Attorney General under this section 
     concerning any United States person may be used and disclosed 
     by Federal officers and employees without the consent of the 
     United States person only in accordance with the minimization 
     procedures required by section 102(a) or 102A(a). No 
     otherwise privileged communication obtained in accordance 
     with, or in violation of, the provisions of this section 
     shall lose its privileged character. No information from an 
     electronic surveillance under section 102 or an acquisition 
     pursuant to section 102A may be used or disclosed by Federal 
     officers or employees except for lawful purposes.
       ``(j) Use in Law Enforcement.--No information acquired 
     pursuant to this section shall be disclosed for law 
     enforcement purposes unless such disclosure is accompanied by 
     a statement that such information, or any information derived 
     from such information, may only be used in a criminal 
     proceeding with the advance authorization of the Attorney 
     General.
       ``(k) Disclosure in Trial.--If the Government intends to 
     enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any 
     trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, 
     department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other 
     authority of the United States, against an aggrieved person, 
     any information obtained or derived from an electronic 
     surveillance conducted under section 102 or an acquisition 
     authorized pursuant to section 102A, the Government shall, 
     prior to the trial, hearing, or other proceeding or at a 
     reasonable time prior to an effort to disclose or use that 
     information or submit it in evidence, notify the aggrieved 
     person and the court or other authority in which the 
     information is to be disclosed or used that the Government 
     intends to disclose or use such information.
       ``(l) Disclosure in State Trials.--If a State or political 
     subdivision of a State intends to enter into evidence or 
     otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other 
     proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, 
     agency, regulatory body, or other authority of a State or a 
     political subdivision of a State, against an aggrieved 
     person, any information obtained or derived from an 
     electronic surveillance authorized pursuant to section 102 or 
     an acquisition authorized pursuant to section 102A, the State 
     or political subdivision of such State shall

[[Page 12096]]

     notify the aggrieved person, the court, or other authority in 
     which the information is to be disclosed or used and the 
     Attorney General that the State or political subdivision 
     intends to disclose or use such information.
       ``(m) Motion to Exclude Evidence.--(1) In General.--Any 
     person against whom evidence obtained or derived from an 
     electronic surveillance authorized pursuant to section 102 or 
     an acquisition authorized pursuant to section 102A is to be, 
     or has been, used or disclosed in any trial, hearing, or 
     other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, 
     agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United 
     States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move 
     to suppress the evidence obtained or derived from such 
     electronic surveillance or such acquisition on the grounds 
     that--
       ``(A) the information was unlawfully acquired; or
       ``(B) the electronic surveillance or acquisition was not 
     properly made in conformity with an authorization under 
     section 102(a) or 102A(a).
       ``(2) Timing.--A person moving to suppress evidence under 
     paragraph (1) shall make the motion to suppress the evidence 
     before the trial, hearing, or other proceeding unless there 
     was no opportunity to make such a motion or the person was 
     not aware of the grounds of the motion.
       ``(n) Review of Motions.--If a court or other authority is 
     notified pursuant to subsection (k) or (l), a motion is made 
     pursuant to subsection (m), or a motion or request is made by 
     an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute or rule of 
     the United States or any State before any court or other 
     authority of the United States or any State--
       ``(1) to discover or obtain an Attorney General directive 
     or other materials relating to an electronic surveillance 
     authorized pursuant to section 102 or an acquisition 
     authorized pursuant to section 102A, or
       ``(2) to discover, obtain, or suppress evidence or 
     information obtained or derived from an electronic 
     surveillance authorized pursuant to section 102 or an 
     acquisition authorized pursuant to section 102A,

     the United States district court or, where the motion is made 
     before another authority, the United States district court in 
     the same district as the authority, shall, notwithstanding 
     any other law, if the Attorney General files an affidavit 
     under oath that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm 
     the national security of the United States, review in camera 
     and ex parte the application, order, and such other materials 
     relating to such electronic surveillance or such acquisition 
     as may be necessary to determine whether such electronic 
     surveillance or such acquisition authorized under this 
     section was lawfully authorized and conducted. In making this 
     determination, the court may disclose to the aggrieved 
     person, under appropriate security procedures and protective 
     orders, portions of the directive or other materials relating 
     to the acquisition only where such disclosure is necessary to 
     make an accurate determination of the legality of the 
     acquisition.
       ``(o) Determinations.--If, pursuant to subsection (n), a 
     United States district court determines that the acquisition 
     authorized under this section was not lawfully authorized or 
     conducted, it shall, in accordance with the requirements of 
     law, suppress the evidence which was unlawfully obtained or 
     derived or otherwise grant the motion of the aggrieved 
     person. If the court determines that such acquisition was 
     lawfully authorized and conducted, it shall deny the motion 
     of the aggrieved person except to the extent that due process 
     requires discovery or disclosure.
       ``(p) Binding Orders.--Orders granting motions or requests 
     under subsection (m), decisions under this section that an 
     electronic surveillance or an acquisition was not lawfully 
     authorized or conducted, and orders of the United States 
     district court requiring review or granting disclosure of 
     directives, orders, or other materials relating to such 
     acquisition shall be final orders and binding upon all courts 
     of the United States and the several States except a United 
     States court of appeals and the Supreme Court.
       ``(q) Coordination.--(1) In general.--Federal officers who 
     acquire foreign intelligence information may consult with 
     Federal law enforcement officers or law enforcement personnel 
     of a State or political subdivision of a State, including the 
     chief executive officer of that State or political 
     subdivision who has the authority to appoint or direct the 
     chief law enforcement officer of that State or political 
     subdivision, to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect 
     against--
       ``(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile 
     acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
       ``(B) sabotage, international terrorism, or the development 
     or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by a foreign 
     power or an agent of a foreign power; or
       ``(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an 
     intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an 
     agent of a foreign power.
       ``(2) Certification required.--Coordination authorized 
     under paragraph (1) shall not preclude the certification 
     required by section 102(a) or 102A(a).
       ``(r) Retention of Directives and Orders.--A directive made 
     or an order granted under this section shall be retained for 
     a period of not less than 10 years from the date on which 
     such directive or such order is made.''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the 
     item relating to section 102 the following:

``102A. Authorization for acquisition of foreign intelligence 
              information.
``102B. Directives relating to electronic surveillance and other 
              acquisitions of foreign intelligence information.''.

     SEC. 604. JURISDICTION OF FISA COURT.

       Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(g) Applications for a court order under this title are 
     authorized if the President has, by written authorization, 
     empowered the Attorney General to approve applications to the 
     court having jurisdiction under this section, and a judge to 
     whom an application is made may, notwithstanding any other 
     law, grant an order, in conformity with section 105, 
     approving electronic surveillance of a foreign power or an 
     agent of a foreign power for the purpose of obtaining foreign 
     intelligence information.''.

     SEC. 605. APPLICATIONS FOR COURT ORDERS.

       Section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in paragraph (6), by striking ``detailed description'' 
     and inserting ``summary description'';
       (B) in paragraph (7)--
       (i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking 
     ``or officials designated'' and all that follows through 
     ``consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``designated by the 
     President to authorize electronic surveillance for foreign 
     intelligence purposes'';
       (ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``techniques;'' and 
     inserting ``techniques; and'';
       (iii) by striking subparagraph (D); and
       (iv) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (D);
       (C) in paragraph (8), by striking ``a statement of the 
     means'' and inserting ``a summary statement of the means'';
       (D) in paragraph (9)--
       (i) by striking ``a statement'' and inserting ``a summary 
     statement''; and
       (ii) by striking ``application;'' and inserting 
     ``application; and'';
       (E) in paragraph (10), by striking ``thereafter; and'' and 
     inserting ``thereafter.''; and
       (F) by striking paragraph (11).
       (2) by striking subsection (b);
       (3) by redesignating subsections (c) through (e) as 
     subsections (b) through (d), respectively; and
       (4) in paragraph (1)(A) of subsection (d), as redesignated 
     by paragraph (3), by striking ``or the Director of National 
     Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Director of National 
     Intelligence, or the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency''.

     SEC. 606. ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER.

       Section 105 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking paragraph (1); and
       (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (5) as 
     paragraphs (1) through (4), respectively;
       (2) in subsection (c)(1)--
       (A) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``surveillance;'' and 
     inserting ``surveillance; and'';
       (B) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``approved; and'' and 
     inserting ``approved.''; and
       (C) by striking subparagraph (F);
       (3) by striking subsection (d);
       (4) by redesignating subsections (e) through (i) as 
     subsections (d) through (h), respectively;
       (5) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (4), by 
     amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:
       ``(2) Extensions of an order issued under this title may be 
     granted on the same basis as an original order upon an 
     application for an extension and new findings made in the 
     same manner as required for an original order and may be for 
     a period not to exceed one year.'';
       (6) in subsection (e), as redesignated by paragraph (4), to 
     read as follows:
       ``(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, 
     the Attorney General may authorize the emergency employment 
     of electronic surveillance if the Attorney General--
       ``(1) determines that an emergency situation exists with 
     respect to the employment of electronic surveillance to 
     obtain foreign intelligence information before an order 
     authorizing such surveillance can with due diligence be 
     obtained;
       ``(2) determines that the factual basis for issuance of an 
     order under this title to approve such electronic 
     surveillance exists;
       ``(3) informs a judge having jurisdiction under section 103 
     at the time of such authorization that the decision has been 
     made to employ emergency electronic surveillance; and
       ``(4) makes an application in accordance with this title to 
     a judge having jurisdiction

[[Page 12097]]

     under section 103 as soon as practicable, but not more than 
     168 hours after the Attorney General authorizes such 
     surveillance.

     If the Attorney General authorizes such emergency employment 
     of electronic surveillance, the Attorney General shall 
     require that the minimization procedures required by this 
     title for the issuance of a judicial order be followed. In 
     the absence of a judicial order approving such electronic 
     surveillance, the surveillance shall terminate when the 
     information sought is obtained, when the application for the 
     order is denied, or after the expiration of 168 hours from 
     the time of authorization by the Attorney General, whichever 
     is earliest. In the event that such application for approval 
     is denied, or in any other case where the electronic 
     surveillance is terminated and no order is issued approving 
     the surveillance, no information obtained or evidence derived 
     from such surveillance shall be received in evidence or 
     otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other 
     proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, 
     office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or 
     other authority of the United States, a State, or political 
     subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any United 
     States person acquired from such surveillance shall 
     subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner by 
     Federal officers or employees without the consent of such 
     person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if 
     the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily 
     harm to any person. A denial of the application made under 
     this subsection may be reviewed as provided in section 
     103.'';
       (7) in subsection (h), as redesignated by paragraph (4)--
       (A) by striking ``a wire or'' and inserting ``an''; and
       (B) by striking ``physical search'' and inserting 
     ``physical search or in response to a certification by the 
     Attorney General or a designee of the Attorney General 
     seeking information, facilities, or technical assistance from 
     such person under section 102B''; and
       (8) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(i) In any case in which the Government makes an 
     application to a judge under this title to conduct electronic 
     surveillance involving communications and the judge grants 
     such application, the judge shall also authorize the 
     installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace 
     devices to acquire dialing, routing, addressing, and 
     signaling information related to such communications and such 
     dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information shall 
     not be subject to minimization procedures.''.

     SEC. 607. USE OF INFORMATION.

       Section 106(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1806(i)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``radio communication'' and inserting 
     ``communication''; and
       (2) by striking ``contents indicates'' and inserting 
     ``contents contain significant foreign intelligence 
     information or indicate''.

     SEC. 608. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.

       (a) Electronic Surveillance Under FISA.--Section 108 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1808) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(2)--
       (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(D) the authority under which the electronic surveillance 
     is conducted.''; and
       (2) by striking subsection (b) and inserting the following:
       ``(b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General 
     additionally shall fully inform the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on 
     electronic surveillance conducted without a court order.''.
       (b) Intelligence Activities.--The National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) in section 501 (50 U.S.C. 413)--
       (A) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and
       (B) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(f) The Chair of each of the congressional intelligence 
     committees, in consultation with the ranking member of the 
     committee for which the person is Chair, may inform--
       ``(1) on a bipartisan basis, all members or any individual 
     members of such committee, and
       ``(2) any essential staff of such committee,

     of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) or subsection 
     (b) as such Chair considers necessary.'';
       (2) in section 502 (50 U.S.C. 414), by adding at the end 
     the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Informing of Committee Members.--The Chair of each of 
     the congressional intelligence committees, in consultation 
     with the ranking member of the committee for which the person 
     is Chair, may inform--
       ``(1) on a bipartisan basis, all members or any individual 
     members of such committee, and
       ``(2) any essential staff of such committee,

     of a report submitted under subsection (a) as such Chair 
     considers necessary.''; and
       (3) in section 503 (50 U.S.C. 415), by adding at the end 
     the following new subsection:
       ``(g) The Chair of each of the congressional intelligence 
     committees, in consultation with the ranking member of the 
     committee for which the person is Chair, may inform--
       ``(1) on a bipartisan basis, all members or any individual 
     members of such committee, and
       ``(2) any essential staff of such committee,

     of a report submitted under subsection (b), (c), or (d) as 
     such Chair considers necessary.''.

     SEC. 609. INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF TARGETS.

       (a) Electronic Surveillance.--Section 105(d) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(d)), as 
     redesignated by section 606(4), is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) An order issued under this section shall remain in 
     force during the authorized period of surveillance 
     notwithstanding the absence of the target from the United 
     States, unless the Government files a motion to extinguish 
     the order and the court grants the motion.''.
       (b) Physical Search.--Section 304(d) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1824(d)) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) An order issued under this section shall remain in 
     force during the authorized period of surveillance 
     notwithstanding the absence of the target from the United 
     States, unless the Government files a motion to extinguish 
     the order and the court grants the motion.''.

     SEC. 610. COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS AND ANTITERRORISM 
                   PROGRAMS.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, and in addition to the immunities, privileges, and 
     defenses provided by any other provision of law, no action, 
     claim, or proceeding shall lie or be maintained in any court, 
     and no penalty, sanction, or other form of remedy or relief 
     shall be imposed by any court or any other body, against any 
     person for an activity arising from or relating to the 
     provision to an element of the intelligence community of any 
     information (including records or other information 
     pertaining to a customer), facilities, or assistance during 
     the period of time beginning on September 11, 2001, and 
     ending on the date that is 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, in connection with any alleged 
     communications intelligence program that the Attorney General 
     or a designee of the Attorney General certifies, in a manner 
     consistent with the protection of State secrets, is, was, or 
     would be intended to protect the United States from a 
     terrorist attack. This section shall apply to all actions, 
     claims, or proceedings pending on or after the effective date 
     of this Act.
       (b) Jurisdiction.--Any action, claim, or proceeding 
     described in subsection (a) that is brought in a State court 
     shall be deemed to arise under the Constitution and laws of 
     the United States and shall be removable pursuant to section 
     1441 of title 28, United States Code.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
       (2) Person.--The term ``person'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 2510(6) of title 18, United States Code.

     SEC. 611. REPORT ON MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES.

       (a) Report.--Not later than two years after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until December 
     31, 2012, the Director of the National Security Agency, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and 
     the Attorney General, shall submit to the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report 
     on the effectiveness and use of minimization procedures 
     applied to information concerning United States persons 
     acquired during the course of a communications activity 
     conducted by the National Security Agency.
       (b) Requirements.--A report submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall include--
       (1) a description of the implementation, during the course 
     of communications intelligence activities conducted by the 
     National Security Agency, of procedures established to 
     minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of 
     nonpublicly available information concerning United States 
     persons;
       (2) the number of significant violations, if any, of such 
     minimization procedures during the 18 months following the 
     effective date of this Act; and
       (3) summary descriptions of such violations.
       (c) Retention of Information.--Information concerning 
     United States persons shall not be retained solely for the 
     purpose of complying with the reporting requirements of this 
     section.

     SEC. 612. AUTHORIZATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE DUE TO 
                   IMMINENT THREAT.

       The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended--
       (1) by adding at the end of title I the following new 
     section:

[[Page 12098]]




                 ``AUTHORIZATION DUE TO IMMINENT THREAT

       ``Sec. 113.  (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, but subject to the provisions of this 
     section, the President, acting through the Attorney General, 
     may authorize electronic surveillance without an order under 
     this title to acquire foreign intelligence information for a 
     period not to exceed 90 days if the President submits to the 
     congressional leadership, the congressional intelligence 
     committees, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court a 
     written notification that the President has determined that 
     there exists an imminent threat of attack likely to cause 
     death, serious injury, or substantial economic damage to the 
     United States. Such notification--
       ``(1) shall be submitted as soon as practicable, but in no 
     case later than 5 days after the date on which the President 
     authorizes electronic surveillance under this section;
       ``(2) shall specify the entity responsible for the threat 
     and any affiliates of the entity;
       ``(3) shall state the reason to believe that the threat of 
     imminent attack exists;
       ``(4) shall state the reason the President needs broader 
     authority to conduct electronic surveillance in the United 
     States as a result of the threat of imminent attack;
       ``(5) shall include a description of the foreign 
     intelligence information that will be collected and the means 
     that will be used to collect such foreign intelligence 
     information; and
       ``(6) may be submitted in classified form.
       ``(b) Subsequent Certifications.--At the end of the 90-day 
     period described in subsection (a), and every 90 days 
     thereafter, the President may submit a subsequent written 
     notification to the congressional leadership, the 
     congressional intelligence committees, the other relevant 
     committees, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
     that the circumstances of the threat for which the President 
     submitted a written notification under subsection (a) require 
     the President to continue the authorization of electronic 
     surveillance under this section for an additional 90 days. 
     The President shall be authorized to conduct electronic 
     surveillance under this section for an additional 90 days 
     after each such subsequent written notification.
       ``(c) Electronic Surveillance of Individuals.--The 
     President, or an official designated by the President to 
     authorize electronic surveillance, may only conduct 
     electronic surveillance of a person under this section if the 
     President or such official determines that--
       ``(1) there is a reasonable belief that such person is 
     communicating with an entity or an affiliate of an entity 
     that is reasonably believed to be responsible for imminent 
     threat of attack; and
       ``(2) the information obtained from the electronic 
     surveillance may be foreign intelligence information.
       ``(d) Minimization Procedures.--The President may not 
     authorize electronic surveillance under this section until 
     the Attorney General approves minimization procedures for 
     electronic surveillance conducted under this section.
       ``(e) United States Persons.--Notwithstanding subsections 
     (a) and (b), the President may not authorize electronic 
     surveillance of a United States person under this section 
     without an order under this title for a period of more than 
     60 days unless the President, acting through the Attorney 
     General, submits a certification to the congressional 
     intelligence committees that--
       ``(1) the continued electronic surveillance of the United 
     States person is vital to the national security of the United 
     States;
       ``(2) describes the circumstances that have prevented the 
     Attorney General from obtaining an order under this title for 
     continued surveillance;
       ``(3) describes the reasons for believing the United States 
     person is affiliated with or in communication with an entity 
     or an affiliate of an entity that is reasonably believed to 
     be responsible for imminent threat of attack; and
       ``(4) describes the foreign intelligence information 
     derived from the electronic surveillance conducted under this 
     section.
       ``(f) Use of Information.--Information obtained pursuant to 
     electronic surveillance under this subsection may be used to 
     obtain an order authorizing subsequent electronic 
     surveillance under this title.
       ``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     `congressional intelligence committees' means the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate.
       ``(2) Congressional leadership.--The term `congressional 
     leadership' means the Speaker and minority leader of the 
     House of Representatives and the majority leader and minority 
     leader of the Senate.
       ``(3) Foreign intelligence surveillance court.--The term 
     `Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court' means the court 
     established under section 103(a).
       ``(4) Other relevant committees.--The term `other relevant 
     committees' means the Committees on Appropriations, the 
     Committees on Armed Services, and the Committees on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.''; 
     and
       (2) in the table of contents in the first section, by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 111 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 112. Authorization due to imminent threat.''.

     SEC. 613. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended--
       (1) in section 105(a)(4), as redesignated by section 
     606(1)(B)--
       (A) by striking ``104(a)(7)(E)'' and inserting 
     ``104(a)(7)(D)''; and
       (B) by striking ``104(d)'' and inserting ``104(c)'';
       (2) in section 106(j), in the matter preceding paragraph 
     (1), by striking ``105(e)'' and inserting ``105(d)''; and
       (3) in section 108(a)(2)(C), by striking ``105(f)'' and 
     inserting ``105(e)''.

       (The information contained herein was provided by 
     Democratic Minority on multiple occasions throughout the 
     109th Congress.)

        The Vote on the Previous Question: What It Really Means

       This vote, the vote on whether to order the previous 
     question on a special rule, is not merely a procedural vote. 
     A vote against ordering the previous question is a vote 
     against the Democratic majority agenda and a vote to allow 
     the opposition, at least for the moment, to offer an 
     alternative plan. It is a vote about what the House should be 
     debating.
       Mr. Clarence Cannon's Precedents of the House of 
     Representatives, (VI, 308-311) describes the vote on the 
     previous question on the rule as ``a motion to direct or 
     control the consideration of the subject before the House 
     being made by the Member in charge.'' To defeat the previous 
     question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the 
     subject before the House. Cannon cites the Speaker's ruling 
     of January 13, 1920, to the effect that ``the refusal of the 
     House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes 
     the control of the resolution to the opposition'' in order to 
     offer an amendment. On March 15, 1909, a member of the 
     majority party offered a rule resolution. The House defeated 
     the previous question and a member of the opposition rose to 
     a parliamentary inquiry, asking who was entitled to 
     recognition. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-Illinois) said: 
     ``The previous question having been refused, the gentleman 
     from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to 
     yield to him for an amendment, is entitled to the first 
     recognition.''
       Because the vote today may look bad for the Democratic 
     majority they will say ``the vote on the previous question is 
     simply a vote on whether to proceed to an immediate vote on 
     adopting the resolution . . . [and] has no substantive 
     legislative or policy implications whatsoever.'' But that is 
     not what they have always said. Listen to the definition of 
     the previous question used in the Floor Procedures Manual 
     published by the Rules Committee in the 109th Congress, (page 
     56). Here's how the Rules Committee described the rule using 
     information from Congressional Quarterly's ``American 
     Congressional Dictionary'': ``If the previous question is 
     defeated, control of debate shifts to the leading opposition 
     member (usually the minority Floor Manager) who then manages 
     an hour of debate and may offer a germane amendment to the 
     pending business.''
       Deschler's Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
     the subchapter titled ``Amending Special Rules'' states: ``a 
     refusal to order the previous question on such a rule [a 
     special rule reported from the Committee on Rules] opens the 
     resolution to amendment and further debate.'' (Chapter 21, 
     section 21.2) Section 21.3 continues: Upon rejection of the 
     motion for the previous question on a resolution reported 
     from the Committee on Rules, control shifts to the Member 
     leading the opposition to the previous question, who may 
     offer a proper amendment or motion and who controls the time 
     for debate thereon.''
       Clearly, the vote on the previous question on a rule does 
     have substantive policy implications. It is one of the only 
     available tools for those who oppose the Democratic 
     majority's agenda and allows those with alternative views the 
     opportunity to offer an alternative plan.

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my 
time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous 
question.
  The question was taken, and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the 
ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
quorum is not present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule XX, this 15-minute vote on 
ordering the previous question will be followed by 5-minute votes on 
adopting

[[Page 12099]]

House Resolution 388, if ordered; ordering the previous question on 
House Resolution 387; and adopting House Resolution 387, if ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 223, 
nays 199, not voting 10, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 324]

                               YEAS--223

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Filner
     Giffords
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Klein (FL)
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth

                               NAYS--199

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Jindal
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Brady (PA)
     Engel
     Fattah
     Frank (MA)
     McCrery
     McMorris Rodgers
     Rangel
     Souder
     Waters
     Watson

                              {time}  1506

  Mrs. CUBIN changed her vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Mr. CONYERS and Mr. RUSH changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the previous question was ordered.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 226, 
noes 198, not voting 8, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 325]

                               AYES--226

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Giffords
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Klein (FL)
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth

                               NOES--198

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)

[[Page 12100]]


     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Jindal
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--8

     Brady (PA)
     Engel
     Fattah
     McMorris Rodgers
     Sensenbrenner
     Souder
     Waters
     Watson


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised 2 
minutes remain in this vote.

                              {time}  1518

  So the resolution was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________