[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Pages 5136-5148]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          IMPROVING AMERICA'S SECURITY ACT OF 2007--Continued


                           Amendment No. 298

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, at 4:45, there will be a vote on or 
in relation to the amendment offered by Senator Schumer and Senator 
Menendez. I wish to explain very briefly--and Senator Collins will 
speak later--on why we did not include this provision in the committee 
bill.
  This provision which Senators Schumer and Menendez have offered 
mirrors the section of the House-passed 9/11 bill. It was not actually 
called for by the 9/11 Commission, specifically, but it obviously 
relates to security and our concern about nuclear weapons or dirty 
bombs coming in through the thousands of containers that enter our 
ports every day.
  The reasons our committee in its deliberation in bringing this bill 
to the floor did not include language similar to the House bill is, 
first, the 9/11 Commission didn't ask for it, and most of what we have 
done, though not all, was included in that report; but, secondly, we 
acted last year in adopting the SAFE Port Act, enacted into law on 
October 13, 2006.
  It does provide for a pilot program at three foreign ports to provide 
for the scanning of cargo containers by radiation detection monitors 
and x-ray devices required under this proposal. There will be a report 
coming 6 months after the end of that one year pilot program. Among 
other responsibilities dictated by the law, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security will be required to report not only on how the pilot program 
went, but when we will achieve the goal of which--reading from the law, 
section 232--``all containers entering the United States, before such 
containers arrive in the United States, shall as soon as possible be 
scanned using nonintrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection 
equipment.''
  In other words, existing law requires that we move--and I quote 
again--``as soon as possible to 100 percent scanning of all of the 
containers coming into the country.'' It requires the Secretary to 
report on how we are moving toward that goal, and when he thinks we can 
achieve it, every 6 months.
  In my opinion, existing law has a 100-percent goal right now, with 
reporting every 6 months to the relevant committees. Senators Schumer 
and Menendez have asked that it occur within 5 years and actually give 
a 1-year waiver opportunity to the Secretary.
  At this point, I say respectfully that this requirement is premature. 
I hope that under current law, ``as soon as possible'' will occur 
before 5 years time. To my friends who offer the amendment, if after 
the first 6-month report, due next April, or the second 6-month report, 
it looks like, based on what the Secretary reports, 100 percent 
scanning of containers coming into the country is to be much more 
delayed than I had hoped it would be, then I will join them in offering 
an amendment that will have a definite date by which 100 percent 
scanning should occur. It is for that reason that our committee did not 
include this section. We talked about it and decided not to include 
it--as it was in the House bill, because we think existing law does at 
least as good, and perhaps a better job. I will respectfully oppose the 
amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, I know the time is divided equally. How 
much time does each side have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York has 16 minutes. The 
Senator from Connecticut has 7 minutes 21 seconds.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, I have a great deal of respect for my 
colleague, and I know he cares a great deal about protecting our 
country. But with all due respect, I cannot stand here and say that the 
SAFE Port Act does enough. The SAFE Port Act says that 100 percent 
scanning must be imposed ``as soon as possible.'' It might as well say 
whenever DHS feels like it.
  For somebody like myself and my colleague from New Jersey and my 
colleague from New York, we have been waiting for DHS to do this ``as 
soon as possible'' for 4 years. We have been alerting DHS to this 
terrible potential tragedy we face--a nuclear weapon being smuggled 
into our harbors, a nuclear weapon exploding on a ship right off our 
harbors--for years. DHS just slow-walks it. Why?
  Part of the reason is that they are never adequately funded, which is 
no fault of my colleague from Connecticut. But the administration does 
not like to spend money on anything domestic. They never put the 
adequate money into it. It is amazing to me that they will spend 
everything it takes to fight a war on terror overseas. Some of that is 
well spent and some, I argue, is not. Nonetheless, they spend it. They 
won't spend hardly a nickel, figuratively speaking, to protect us on 
defense at home. So the progress has been slow.
  This is not the first time I have offered amendments to prod DHS to 
do more on nuclear detection devices, on port security. I don't know 
why anyone in this Chamber, faced with the potential tragedy that we 
have, would decide to leave it up to DHS. But that is just what this 
base bill does. I don't know what people are afraid of. Yes, we have 
people with shipping interests who say don't do this, it will cost a 
little bit more. Terrorism costs all of us more. To allow a narrow band 
of shippers to prevail on an issue that affects our security is beyond 
me.
  Is the technology available? I will be honest with you that there is 
a dispute. Either way, the amendment the Senator from New Jersey and I 
have introduced makes sense. If it is available, they will implement 
it. If it is not available, they will perfect it and get it working 
because they have a deadline. Nothing will concentrate the mind of DHS 
like a deadline. But vague, amorphous language that says ``as soon as 
possible''--their view of ``as soon as possible'' is not enough to 
safeguard America.
  Very few things that we do in the Senate frustrate me more than this. 
Why don't we force DHS and force the administration to make us safe 
against arguably the greatest disaster that could befall us--one that 
we know al-Qaida and other terrorists would like to pursue? Why do we 
allow laxity, just obliviousness, and a narrow special interest to 
prevail over what seems to be so much the common good?
  I am aghast. This amendment should not even be debated by now. Maybe 
in 2003, maybe in 2004. But it is now 2007, and we are still not doing 
close to what we should be doing. Just last night, I spoke to an expert 
who said the technology is there. If there is a will, there is a way. 
Again, I say if you believe the technology isn't there, the answer 
isn't to let DHS proceed at the same lackadaisical pace, when one of 
the greatest dangers that could befall us could happen.
  My colleagues, nobody wants to wake up in a ``what if'' scenario. 
After 9/11 occurred, we were all ``what-ifing''--what if we had done 
this or what if we had done that. It was hard before that because 
nobody envisioned that somebody would fly a whole bunch of airplanes 
into our buildings. We know the terrorists want to explode a nuclear 
device in America or off our shores. That is not a secret. I argue that 
that is as great a danger to us as is what is happening in Iraq. Will 
my colleagues say we should not spend all the money when it comes to 
fighting a war on terror overseas? Of course not.
  The other side of the aisle says spend every nickel we need. Here, 
when it comes to homeland security, they are either defending an 
administration that has botched this issue like they botched so many 
others or because maybe some shipping interests complain or because 
they truly believe the technology is not available, and we continue to 
slow-walk this issue.
  I will have more to say in a few minutes. I will yield the floor so 
my colleague from Maine and my colleague from New Jersey can have a 
chance to speak.

[[Page 5137]]

  I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of my time be reserved.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Very briefly, the Senator from New York has spoken 
passionately. I agree with everything he said about the urgency of the 
threat and the need to protect our people from weapons of mass 
destruction, which may arrive in containers. But I want to come back to 
what I said for a few moments. There is existing law that sets up a 
process that compels the Secretary of Homeland Security to achieve 100 
percent cargo scanning as soon as possible, based on the outcome of the 
three port pilot projects that are occurring this year.
  My friend from New York has said that ``as soon as possible'' could 
be whenever the Department of Homeland Security wants, that they have 
been doing nothing for the 5\1/2\ years since 
9/11. However, this law, the SAFE Ports Act, just became law last 
October 13, 2006. So the pilot programs at the three ports have just 
started in the last 5 months.
  At the end of the year, the Secretary will make a report to Congress 
about how those pilots are going. Again, he is required by the law to 
state to the appropriate Congressional committees in April of next 
year, and every 6 months thereafter, the status of full-scale 
deployment under subsection (b), which is basically saying how soon can 
we get to exactly what Senators Schumer, Menendez, Collins, and I and I 
presume everybody--wants, which is 100 percent cargo container 
scanning.
  So, again, we think we have a mechanism. We share the same goal. If 
for some reason after the first 6 month report, or the second one, we 
are dissatisfied with the pace of implementation by the Secretary, I am 
sure we will all join to set a deadline. For now, the committee has 
decided that it is not necessary.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Will my colleague yield for a question on my time?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Certainly.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Again, I have great respect for my colleague and all he 
has done in homeland security. But I don't get the argument. My 
colleague just said they will report to us, and if we are not satisfied 
we can later impose a deadline. Given the urgency, why not do it the 
other way? Put in a deadline, and if 2 years from now they say they 
cannot do it, they will come back to us and we can remove the deadline. 
It seems to me that would get them to act more quickly than the 
approach my colleague has suggested.
  I yield for an answer.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank my friend from New York. Of course, I send 
back the same respect to him, truly, coming from New York, particularly 
after 9/11, he has been an effective advocate for homeland security. My 
answer is this: Maybe history will show me to be an unjustified 
optimist. I hope ``as soon as possible,'' as stated in the law, means 
that we should have 100 percent scanning sooner than 5 years. I will 
not have a real sense of that until we get the first 6 month report, or 
maybe the second. So to me, again, it is the judgment of the committee 
to not include the House-passed provision, not recommended by the 9/11 
Commission, and to give the system time to work.
  Mr. SCHUMER. I yield 5 minutes of our remaining time to my colleague 
and fellow sponsor, Senator Menendez.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. I appreciate the leadership and advocacy of my 
colleague from New York to work with us on this issue. Look, the 
question is, On what side do we err? It seems to me we should err on 
the side of having a deadline that moves the Department of Homeland 
Security and us as a nation toward having the greatest possibility of 
security in a post-September 11 world.
  If this was pre-September 11 and we were arguing that a conventional 
means of transportation--in this case a cargo ship--could, in fact, be 
used as a weapon of mass destruction and we hadn't had that experience, 
I could see the skepticism. But the reality is we are in a post-
September 11 world. Five years after we saw a traditional form of 
transportation be used as a weapon of mass destruction, as we saw a 
simple envelope be tainted ultimately and be used as a weapon against 
an individual, as we saw someone who boarded an aircraft and tried to 
ignite his shoes, the reality is it doesn't take a lot to be convinced 
you can take 95 percent of the cargo, which goes unscanned, comes into 
this country, and have a great shot of including something in there, 
particularly a nuclear device, that would cost us far more--far more--
than what we are talking about proceeding on today. Three years for 
major ports, 5 years for other ports--that is too fast? Ten years after 
September 11, that is too fast? I can't comprehend it.
  There are those who say we already have a risk-based approach, it is 
layered, it is whatnot. That is great if you trust algorithms to 
ultimately protect the Nation. I don't trust algorithms to ultimately 
protect the Nation. I want real scanning, and the technology is there. 
It seems to me if Hong Kong can do it and other places in the world can 
do it, we can expect it as well.
  There is also the suggestion of cost. How much did we spend after 
September 11? How much will we spend in lives and national treasure if 
we make a mistake by not ensuring that the traffic that comes into the 
ports of this country is as secure as it can be? And who among us is 
willing to look at the sons and daughters of those who work on the 
docks or the communities that surround these ports--most were built in 
a way where communities surround them--and what will we do about the 
national economy, because it won't be just a regional economy that will 
be affected but a ripple effect in the national economy? How much will 
we spend? Far more. The lives that will be lost are incalculable and 
priceless.
  I argue that, in fact, what we saw in the SAFE Port Act got the 
Department to act because they, in essence, had a deadline. So when we 
have deadlines, we see the Department acting. In my mind, all the more 
reason to have what I think is a very reasonable deadline--3 years for 
major ports, 5 years on all other ports, and even with the ability to 
extend beyond that by virtue of the Secretary making a determination. 
That moves the Department to understanding where we want to be.
  But ultimately, I don't believe the present risk-based approach that 
lets 95 percent of all the cargo coming into this country go unscanned, 
that we depend on algorithms, that we use the costs supposedly to 
achieve 100-percent scanning is something that is acceptable.
  The question is: How much greater will the costs be? Look at the 
costs we are incurring in aviation. They are enormous.
  Then we won't be able to get host nations to agree: The reality is 
those host nations want access to the greatest market in the world, the 
United States of America. I cannot fathom that they won't do something 
that is necessary to try to get access to the greatest market in the 
world, the most prosperous market in the world. I think they will.
  As someone who represents a State that lost 700 residents on 
September 11, I am not ready--I certainly am not ready--to take the 
position that we will do less than what we can do to achieve the 
security of our people. That is what this amendment is all about. It is 
structured in a reasonable way.
  We have seen deadlines generate the Department of Homeland Security 
activity we want to see. We give time frames that are reasonable, 
technology that is available. We have incentives for all the right 
reasons for the marketplace and, above all, we can look at our citizens 
and say, in fact, they are protected.
  I yield any time remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I yield such time to the Senator from 
Maine as she desires of the time I have remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 8 minutes 5 seconds remaining.

[[Page 5138]]

  The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I thank the chairman of the committee 
for yielding time to me.
  You can read the entire 567 pages of the ``9/11 Commission Report'' 
as I have and you will not find a recommendation to undertake 100-
percent scanning of cargo containers. This bill's purpose--the bill 
before us--is to finish the business of implementing the 9/11 
Commission Report recommendations. Senator Schumer's and Senator 
Menendez's amendment is not one of the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission.
  Further, I want to address what has been said about our system for 
improving the security of our seaports by focusing on cargo container 
security.
  The fact is a great deal has been done since the attacks on our 
country on September 11, 2001. We have a layered approach to cargo 
security. It balances security interests against the need for efficient 
movement of millions of containers through our seaports each year--11 
million, in fact, last year alone.
  One layer is the screening of all cargo manifests at least 24 hours 
before the cargo is loaded onto ships bound for our shores. That 
screening, along with work done by the Coast Guard, is used in DHS's 
automated targeting system which identifies high-risk containers.
  As a result of the cargo security bill that we passed last fall, we 
have a requirement that 100 percent of all high-risk cargo be subjected 
to scanning and that is appropriate. We want to focus our resources on 
the cargo that is of highest risk. But that is only one layer in the 
process.
  Another layer is the Container Security Initiative. This program 
stations Customs and Border Protection officers at foreign ports. CSI 
will be operational in 58 foreign ports by the end of this year, 
covering approximately 85 percent of all containerized cargo headed to 
the United States by sea. That is another layer of security.
  There is yet another one. It is the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism Program, known as C-TPAT. This program is a cooperative 
effort between the Government and the private sector to secure the 
entire supply chain. It is a result of the legislation Senator Murray, 
Senator Coleman, Senator Lieberman, and I authored last year.
  Firms that participate in C-TPAT and secure their supply chain are 
given certain advantages when it comes to scanning cargo because DHS 
will have certified that they have met certain standards. That is an 
important layer of security.
  There is another important safeguard that is a result of the SAFE 
Port Act, and that is the law requires by the end of this year that the 
22 largest American ports must have radiation scanners which will 
ensure that 98 percent--98 percent--of inbound containers are scanned 
for radiation. That is because we do have the technology to do scanning 
for radiation. We have these radiation portal monitors that trucks can 
drive through with the containers loaded on them and be scanned for 
radiation. There is a problem with some false positives. I was 
describing earlier that for some reason, marble and kitty litter tend 
to cause false positives. But at least we identify these containers 
that are giving off alarms, and then they are subject to further 
inspection and search, and that makes sense.
  I should mention we are also installing these overseas as part of the 
Department of Energy's Megaports Initiative.
  The idea that nothing has been done to secure our seaports since 9/11 
is demonstrably false. We took a giant step forward last year with the 
passage of the SAFE Port Act.
  There is more that is being done, however, and that is, as Senator 
Lieberman and Senator Coleman have explained, the new law authorizes 
pilot programs to test 100-percent integrated scanning programs.
  We keep hearing Hong Kong brought up, but the fact is, in Hong Kong, 
there is scanning being done on only 2 of 40 lines, and the images are 
not being read. What good is it to take the picture, the X-ray, 
essentially, but then not have anyone analyzing the images? How does 
that increase security?
  We still will learn something from the Hong Kong project, but I think 
we are going to learn even more from the three projects the Department 
has started already as a result of the SAFE Port Act.
  There have been allegations that somehow the Department is sitting on 
its hands. That is not true. In fact, three ports--one in the United 
Kingdom, one in Honduras, and one in Pakistan--have been selected 
already and the projects are going forward to test these pilot 
programs. I think that is important to know.
  So we have made a great deal of progress. We are going to make more 
as a result of these pilot projects. But the whole point is until we 
have the technology in place to do this effectively and efficiently, it 
will cause a massive backup in our ports if we are trying to scan 11 
million containers--low-risk containers, containers that pose 
absolutely no threat to the security of this country--and that approach 
does not make sense.
  Finally, let me read something from the Chamber of Commerce which has 
sent around an alert on this issue because I think this summarizes the 
issue:

       The Chamber points out that more than 11 million containers 
     arrive at our Nation's seaports each year and 95 percent of 
     our Nation's trade flows through our seaports.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be given 
45 additional seconds.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. I continuing quoting the Chamber of Commerce:

       If adopted, the Schumer amendment would significantly 
     disrupt the flow of trade and impose costly mandates on 
     American businesses without providing additional security.

  That is the bottom line. I urge the rejection of the Schumer 
amendment, and when the time has expired, I will move to table the 
amendment.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, what is the status of the time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized. There 
is 3 minutes 1 second remaining.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, first, I thank my colleague from Maine 
for helping make our case. She says the technology for detecting 
radiation is available. Who in God's name thinks if we didn't set a 
deadline or if the President didn't order DHS to make it the highest 
priority that we wouldn't find a way to scan all containers within 5 
years? Of course we would. This is just defense of DHS. I say to my 
colleagues, DHS has a terrible track record in this area, like so many 
others. They have been asked to do this for years already, and they are 
nowhere.
  Now, my good friend from Connecticut says: Well, on October 13, we 
passed legislation. Well, that is 3 years after 9/11. What is wrong, my 
colleagues? Why isn't everything right with a deadline that says you 
better move as quickly as you can? Yes, if they should need, if they 
come to us 3 years from now and we are convinced that they have done 
everything they can, that the money has been spent, that the experts 
have been contacted and used appropriately, then we can delay it. 
Instead, we have this approach which seems to me to be backward--let us 
delay another 2 or 3 years, and if they do not do a good job, we can 
then put in a deadline.
  No one is arguing we shouldn't have deadlines. The argument boils 
down to, do you trust DHS to do the job or would you rather have an 
immutable deadline on something which is the most damaging thing? I 
can't think of anything worse or close to it than a nuclear weapon 
exploding in America or off our shores. The technology is there, my 
colleagues. Yes, DHS doesn't want to spend the money necessary. Yes, 
DHS has not had very good people in this Department.
  How are my colleagues going to go home and tell their constituents 
that when there was a chance to really move an agency and set a 
deadline, as the House did--this is not some crazy

[[Page 5139]]

idea; the House voted by a significant majority for it--that they 
didn't do it, they didn't do it because they had faith in DHS? I don't 
know who does. How do my colleagues say they didn't do it because their 
port or a shipping company said they didn't want to do it or they 
didn't do it because they didn't think it was that big a problem? I 
don't think any of those reasons stand up. I don't think any of them 
stand up.
  I have to say I have listened carefully to my colleagues, and I have 
great respect for them and the jobs they do, but their arguments just 
don't wash: Let's give them another chance. My colleagues, when it 
comes to this problem, we can't afford to give them another chance.
  I urge a vote for the amendment.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators Kennedy, 
Lautenberg, and Biden be added as cosponsors.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The time of the Senator from New York has expired. The Senator from 
Maine is recognized.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, has all time expired?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 15 seconds remaining.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Madam President, I move to table the Schumer amendment, and I request 
the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the motion.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. 
Johnson) is necessarily absent.
  Mr. LOTT. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Idaho (Mr. Crapo), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain), and the 
Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Vitter).
  Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Idaho (Mr. Crapo) 
would have voted ``yea.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Whitehouse). Are there any other Senators 
in the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 58, nays 38, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 56 Leg.]

                                YEAS--58

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Allard
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Brown
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burr
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Craig
     DeMint
     Dole
     Domenici
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Thomas
     Thune
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--38

     Baucus
     Bayh
     Biden
     Boxer
     Cardin
     Casey
     Clinton
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Harkin
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lincoln
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Nelson (FL)
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Salazar
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Webb
     Whitehouse

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Crapo
     Johnson
     McCain
     Vitter
  The motion was agreed to.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, more than 11 million cargo containers enter 
the United States each year. One hundred percent of the shipping 
manifests are screened to determine their risk. Approximately 17 to 19 
percent of those containers determined to be high risk are examined by 
screening machines using xray or gamma ray technology, and only 5 
percent of containers are physically opened and examined. This is not 
satisfactory. Clearly, much more needs to be done to increase the 
number of containers that are screened prior to entering this country. 
Only a more robust system will provide the deterrence necessary to make 
America safer.
  I have been a leader in the effort to provide additional funding to 
purchase screening equipment and hire the personnel to perform these 
inspections. Nevertheless, I voted to table the amendment of the 
Senator from New York, Mr. Schumer. I believe we must set realistic 
goals. There is a process which has been set in place by the SAFE Port 
Act to get us to the ability to conduct 100 percent inspections. I will 
continue to do all in my power to provide the funds to ensure that we 
reach an achievable goal as rapidly as possible.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  (The remarks of Mrs. Hutchison are printed in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  (The remarks of Mr. SPECTER pertaining to the introduction of S. 734 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. SPECTER. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum 
call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I note the presence of a friend and 
colleague from Hawaii, a distinguished member of our Homeland Security 
Committee. I yield the floor to him.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii is recognized.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 10 
minutes as in morning business on the REAL ID Act, and I thank the 
chairman for his agreement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, today the Department of Homeland Security 
released its much anticipated proposed regulations implementing the 
REAL ID Act of 2005. Although I am still reviewing the 162 pages of 
regulations, I note that the regulations address the problems with the 
statutory May 11, 2008, deadline for compliance. However, the 
regulations remain troublesome because they reflect the problems of the 
underlying statute.
  I intend to ensure that these problems are resolved, which is why I 
reintroduced the Identity Security Enhancement Act, S. 717, to repeal 
REAL ID and replace it with the negotiated rulemaking process and the 
more reasonable guidelines established in the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
  I am pleased to be joined ``by Senators Sununu, Leahy, and Tester. I 
also thank Senator Collins for her work on this issue.
  From its inception, REAL ID has been surrounded in controversy and 
subject to criticism from both ends of the political spectrum. The act 
places a significant unfunded mandate on States and is a serious threat 
to privacy and civil liberties.
  I support the goal of making our identification cards and driver's 
licenses more secure, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission. However, 
the massive amounts of personal information that would be stored in 
interconnected databases, as well as on the card, could provide one-
stop shopping for identity thieves. As a result, REAL ID could make us 
less secure by giving us a false sense of security.
  Nearly half of our Nation's State legislatures--22--have acted to 
introduce or to pass legislation to condemn REAL ID since the beginning 
of the year. In some cases, States would be prohibited from spending 
money to implement the act. Two bills have been

[[Page 5140]]

introduced in the Hawaii State legislature, one supporting the repeal 
of REAL ID and the other supporting passage of my legislation.
  As I noted earlier, DHS has acknowledged the implementation problems 
and the need to help address the burdens on States. Secretary Chertoff 
announced today that States could easily apply for a waiver from the 
compliance deadline and could use up to 20 percent of the State's 
Homeland Security Grant Program, SHSGP, funds to pay for REAL ID 
implementation. But this is a hollow solution. The President's fiscal 
year 2008 budget proposes to cut SHSGP by $835 million. I fail to see 
how States are able to implement an $11 billion program with Federal 
homeland security grants that the Bush administration continues to cut.
  Moreover, the regulations proposed today fail to address several of 
the most critical privacy and civil liberties issues raised by REAL ID, 
which essentially creates a national ID. No hearings were held on REAL 
ID when it was passed as part of the Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami 
Relief Act in 2005. I think this is part of the problem and is where I 
hope to bring forth a solution.
  As chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 
Management, I plan to hold hearings in the near future to review the 
proposed regulations and how DHS plans to implement this costly and 
controversial law. Unfunded mandates and the lack of privacy and 
security requirements are real problems that deserve real consideration 
and real solutions. Congress has a responsibility to ensure that 
driver's licenses and ID cards issued in the United States are 
affordable, practical, and secure--both from would-be terrorists and 
identity thieves.
  I look forward to working with my colleagues--Senators Sununu, Leahy, 
Tester, Collins and others--to address the real problems with REAL ID.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I ask unanimous consent to talk as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Grassley are printed in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the 
absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Menendez). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, what is the pending business before the 
Senate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Salazar amendment is the pending amendment 
before the Senate.


                 Amendment No. 314 to Amendment No. 275

  Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be set aside and I be allowed to offer an amendment, which I 
am sending to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. DeMint] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 314 to amendment No. 275.

  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To strike the provision that revises the personnel management 
        practices of the Transportation Security Administration)

       On page 215, strike line 6 and all that follows through 
     page 219, line 7.


                 Amendment No. 315 to Amendment No. 275

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I have an amendment that I send to the 
desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Lieberman] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 315 to Amendment No. 275.

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To provide appeal rights and employee engagement mechanisms 
                 for passenger and property screeners)

       In the language proposed to be stricken:
       On page 215, strike line 22 and all that follows through 
     page 219, line 7, and insert the following:

     SEC. __. APPEAL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT MECHANISM FOR 
                   PASSENGER AND PROPERTY SCREENERS.

       (a) Appeal Rights for Screeners.--
       (1) In general.--Section 111(d) of the Aviation and 
     Transportation Security Act (49 U.S.C. 44935 note) is 
     amended--
       (A) by striking ``Notwithstanding'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and 
     (3) notwithstanding''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Right to appeal adverse action.--The provisions of 
     chapters 75 and 77 of title 5, United States Code, shall 
     apply to an individual employed or appointed to carry out the 
     screening functions of the Administrator under section 44901 
     of title 49, United States Code.
       ``(3) Employee engagement mechanism for addressing 
     workplace issues.--The Under Secretary of Transportation 
     shall provide a collaborative, integrated, employee 
     engagement mechanism, subject to chapter 71 of title 5, 
     United States Code, at every airport to address workplace 
     issues, except that collective bargaining over working 
     conditions shall not extend to pay. Employees shall not have 
     the right to engage in a strike and the Under Secretary may 
     take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the 
     agency mission during emergencies, newly imminent threats, or 
     intelligence indicating a newly imminent emergency risk. No 
     properly classified information shall be divulged in any non-
     authorized forum.''.
       (2) Conforming amendments.--Section 111(d)(1) of the 
     Aviation and Transportation Security Act, as amended by 
     paragraph (1)(A), is amended--
       (A) by striking ``Under Secretary of Transportation for 
     Security'' and inserting ``Administrator of the 
     Transportation Security Administration''; and
       (B) by striking ``Under Secretary'' each place such appears 
     and inserting ``Administrator''.
       (b) Whistleblower Protections.--Section 883 of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 463) is amended, in the matter 
     preceding paragraph (1), by inserting ``, or section 111(d) 
     of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,'' after 
     ``this Act''.
       (c) Report to Congress.--
       (1) Report required.--Not later than 6 months after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the 
     United States shall submit to the Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives a report on--
       (A) the pay system that applies with respect to TSA 
     employees as of the date of enactment of this Act; and
       (B) any changes to such system which would be made under 
     any regulations which have been prescribed under chapter 97 
     of title 5, United States Code.
       (2) Matters for inclusion.--The report required under 
     paragraph (1) shall include--
       (A) a brief description of each pay system described in 
     paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B), respectively;
       (B) a comparison of the relative advantages and 
     disadvantages of each of those pay systems; and
       (C) such other matters as the Comptroller General 
     determines appropriate.


                 Amendment No. 316 to Amendment No. 315

  Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Missouri [Mrs. McCASKILL] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 316 to amendment No. 315.

  Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To provide appeal rights and employee engagement mechanisms 
                 for passenger and property screeners)

       In the Amendment strike all after ``SEC.'' on page 1, line 
     3 and insert the following:

     APPEAL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT MECHANISM FOR PASSENGER 
                   AND PROPERTY SCREENERS.

       (a) Appeal Rights for Screeners.--
       (1) In general.--Section 111(d) of the Aviation and 
     Transportation Security Act (49 U.S.C. 44935 note) is 
     amended--
       (A) by striking ``Notwithstanding'' and inserting the 
     following:

[[Page 5141]]

       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and 
     (3) notwithstanding''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Right to appeal adverse action.--The provisions of 
     chapters 75 and 77 of title 5, United States Code, shall 
     apply to an individual employed or appointed to carry out the 
     screening functions of the Administrator under section 44901 
     of title 49, United States Code.
       ``(3) Employee engagement mechanism for addressing 
     workplace issues.--The Under Secretary of Transportation 
     shall provide a collaborative, integrated, employee 
     engagement mechanism, subject to chapter 71 of title 5, 
     United States Code, at every airport to address workplace 
     issues, except that collective bargaining over working 
     conditions shall not extend to pay. Employees shall not have 
     the right to engage in a strike and the Under Secretary may 
     take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the 
     agency mission during emergencies, newly imminent threats, or 
     intelligence indicating a newly imminent emergency risk. No 
     properly classified information shall be divulged in any non-
     authorized forum.''.
       (2) Conforming amendments.--Section 111(d)(1) of the 
     Aviation and Transportation Security Act, as amended by 
     paragraph (1)(A), is amended--
       (A) by striking ``Under Secretary of Transportation for 
     Security'' and inserting ``Administrator of the 
     Transportation Security Administration''; and
       (B) by striking ``Under Secretary'' each place such appears 
     and inserting ``Administrator''.
       (b) Whistleblower Protections.--Section 883 of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 463) is amended, in the matter 
     preceding paragraph (1), by inserting ``, or section 111(d) 
     of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,'' after 
     ``this Act''.
       (c) Report to Congress.--
       (1) Report Required.--Not later than 6 months after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the 
     United States shall submit to the Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives a report on--
       (A) the pay system that applies with respect to TSA 
     employees as of the date of enactment of this Act; and
       (B) any changes to such system which would be made under 
     any regulations which have been prescribed under chapter 97 
     of title 5, United States Code.
       (2) Matters for inclusion.--The report required under 
     paragraph (1) shall include--
       (A) a brief description of each pay system described in 
     paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B), respectively;
       (B) a comparison of the relative advantages and 
     disadvantages of each of those pay systems; and
       (C) such other matters as the Comptroller General 
     determines appropriate.
       (d) This section shall take effect one day after date of 
     enactment.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 314

  Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I thank the managers for their hard work. 
They sincerely want to strengthen homeland security and want to keep 
this bill focused on that goal and not allow it to be tangled up in 
partisan issues. That is my goal, too. That is why I am offering this 
amendment today.
  The provision in this bill, found on page 215, that reverses a 
critical homeland security policy and introduces collective bargaining 
for airport screeners who work at the Transportation Security 
Administration, or what we call the TSA, has nothing to do with 
improving our homeland security. It was certainly not recommended by 
the 9/11 Commission. My amendment would strike this provision so TSA 
can continue to protect us from another terrorist attack.
  It may be helpful to review the history of this debate so my 
colleagues understand how we got here. Just 5 years ago, Congress voted 
in favor of a flexible personnel management system at TSA in 
recognition that special flexibility is necessary to protect American 
passengers from terrorists. This system allows security screeners to 
join a union, but it doesn't tie the hands of TSA when it comes to 
managing its workforce and protecting the American people.
  Collective bargaining, however, would allow labor unions to stand 
between TSA and its employees in ways that would make the agency less 
flexible and less nimble and create an operational and security 
disaster. Mr. President, collective bargaining has been a topic of 
discussion since TSA's inception. It is important that my colleagues 
know that it has been evaluated and rejected in every instance as 
something that would be harmful to our safety.
  First, in 2001, collective bargaining was not included in the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act when TSA was first created.
  Second, in 2003, collective bargaining was rejected by the TSA 
Administrator for security reasons.
  Third, in 2004, collective bargaining was not recommended by the 9/11 
Commission.
  I need to repeat that because it is important. This whole bill is 
designed to fulfill the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and 
they did not mention anything about collective bargaining.
  Finally, the decision against collective bargaining at TSA has been 
upheld by multiple Federal and labor relations courts between 2002 and 
2006.
  Now I will outline six of the negative security consequences of this 
dramatic change in policy. First, TSA currently uses a security 
strategy as recommended by the 9/11 Commission that is based on 
flexible, random, and unpredictable methods. This approach keeps would-
be attackers off guard.
  Under collective bargaining, TSA will have to negotiate a 
predetermined framework within which the agency will be required to 
operate. This policy was not recommended in the 9/11 Commission Report, 
and it goes directly against the Commission's recommendations. This 
will weaken our security.
  Second, TSA currently establishes security protocols on a national 
and international basis without having to bargain in advance over the 
impact of these protocols.
  Under collective bargaining, TSA will be required to negotiate on 
every security protocol with multiple unions on an airport-by-airport 
basis. At its worst, this could stop many critical new security 
protocols, but even at its best it will slow them down. This will 
weaken our security.
  Third, TSA currently shifts resources in real time without having to 
inform any entity. Under collective bargaining, redeployment decisions 
will be subject to binding arbitration review by a third party who has 
no Government or security experience but has authority to reverse TSA 
security decisions.
  As my colleagues know, arbitration can take months or even years to 
resolve. This will weaken our security.
  Fourth, TSA currently moves, upgrades, replaces, and repositions 
equipment to stay in tune with operational requirements. Under 
collective bargaining, equipment deployment will be subject to a 60- to 
180-day negotiation process. All information, including standard 
operating procedures and tactics, will also be subject to union 
negotiation. This will weaken our security.
  Fifth, TSA currently protects sensitive security information, such as 
the security resources at a particular site, and releases this 
information only to those who need to know.
  Under collective bargaining, TSA will be required to disclose 
security information to third party negotiators and arbitrators, 
increasing the risk of unauthorized information release. This will 
weaken our security.
  Sixth, and finally, TSA currently deploys many innovative security 
programs within weeks. Under collective bargaining, new positions and 
promotions will all be subject to months, or years, of impact in 
implementation.
  TSA provided just-in-time explosive training to more than 38,000 
security screeners in less than 3 weeks in November of 2005. Under 
collective bargaining, training is subject to negotiation on the need, 
design, order of training delivered, and method of delivery. This 
process could add 60 to 180 days to security training programs and 
weaken our security.
  I know my colleagues understand the need for TSA to be able to move 
quickly, so I want to make sure everyone knows how slow and how 
cumbersome collective bargaining will be. Let's please keep in mind as 
we look at this situation the whole purpose of TSA is to protect our 
country. That is their first priority. We cannot allow the unionization 
and union requirements to preempt this first priority of TSA.

[[Page 5142]]

  Today, TSA--and I know this is very difficult to read--can implement 
its changes in 1 day or less, and we will talk about some of those 
examples. But under collective bargaining, it can take up to 568 days 
to work out the negotiations and possible litigation that could occur 
when they are trying to establish new protocols. This is not acceptable 
when it comes to protecting our country.
  If we introduce collective bargaining at TSA as proposed in this 
bill, changes could take, as I said, up to 568 days. My colleagues can 
see a collective bargaining process starts with up to 14 days of 
advance notice, up to 14 days for the union to decide how they are 
going to negotiate, plus up to 180 days to negotiate, and followed by 7 
days to implement.
  This whole process does not fit with national security interests. I 
hope my colleagues agree that this is too long and too cumbersome to 
subject our Nation's security to.
  I wish to share with my colleagues several real-world examples of how 
TSA has been able to rapidly respond to security threats. I will point 
the attention of my colleagues to the United Kingdom bomb plot, of 
which we are all aware, last August in 2006. On August 10 of last year, 
information about one of the most spectacular terrorist plots since 9/
11 was shared with TSA. TSA worked very quickly to develop a plan that 
would, over the course of 12 hours, ban all liquids beyond the security 
checkpoint and enact the quickest changes to the prohibited items list 
in history. It was simply the most drastic change airport security had 
ever undergone, and it happened in less than 6 hours from the time the 
arrest of the alleged terrorists was revealed.
  I understand one of my colleagues has offered an amendment that would 
undercut the whole idea of this bill and force TSA to prove it is an 
emergency or an imminent threat in order to take the action we did when 
this plot was revealed.
  What will TSA have to go through to prove there is an emergency? What 
kind of court case, what kind of litigation, what kind of hearings in 
Congress will they have to go through to prove it is an emergency? This 
attempt to gut this bill makes it worse than the underlying bill 
because it subjects our security to constant litigation and second-
guessing.
  The success of this operation--this United Kingdom bomb plot--was 
based on a number of factors, including a nimble and professional 
workforce who is highly trained and rewarded for their performance: an 
ability to change procedures within hours, expertise in dealing with 
the public to educate, inform, and help them handle the changes, and a 
commitment to security in the face of emerging threats. This is a clear 
example of why we should not tie TSA's hands and prevent it from 
accomplishing its security mission.
  Another example of how TSA has been able to react quickly happened 
last July, when Lebanon erupted into violence and fighting broke out, 
leaving thousands of Americans trapped in between the warring factions. 
The Government of the United States safely evacuated these Americans 
and thousands of other refugees.
  From July 22 to July 31, TSA officers helped to secure 58 chartered 
flights from Cypress to the United States and screened over 11,000 
passengers. The overseas and domestic deployment was the first of its 
kind, and it demonstrated TSA's ability to use its flexible structure 
to appropriately respond to both domestic and overseas needs.
  TSA delivered on its security mission and ensured the security of 
arriving airplanes and passengers. The mission was designed, executed, 
and people were being screened overseas within 96 hours, which is 
remarkable for a Government agency that had never deployed overseas and 
had not envisioned a need to do so.
  It is important for us to remember at this point the amendment that 
has been offered to change my amendment would likely have resulted by 
now with TSA being in court, being challenged as to whether the 
situation in Lebanon was an imminent threat to our country, which is 
the language of the amendment that has been offered to change this 
bill.
  We cannot water down our Nation's security by allowing TSA to have to 
follow collective bargaining rules or, which has been proposed, prove 
it is an emergency or an imminent threat. This would create a heyday 
for lawyers.
  If these operations had been subject to arbitration and review 
required by collective bargaining, changes in deployments of personnel 
would have required notification on TSA's management to the collective 
bargaining unit, followed by a response accepting the changes in 
employment conditions or proposing modifications. This process would 
have created time-consuming rounds of negotiation, even using an 
expedited process.
  TSA's response to the United Kingdom terrorist plot was developed in 
12 hours, and the screeners were deployed to Lebanon and Cypress within 
96 hours, response times that would have been significantly delayed by 
days and weeks, if not made impossible, had the notification and 
negotiation requirements in this bill been in effect. We cannot allow 
that to happen to our Nation's security.
  I would now like to outline three ways collective bargaining will 
negatively affect workforce performance.
  First, TSA currently uses a paid-for performance system that is based 
on technical competence, readiness for duty, and operational 
performance. Top security screeners receive a 5-percent base pay 
increase on top of a 2.1-percent cost-of-living adjustment and a $3,000 
bonus.
  Under collective bargaining, this paid-for performance system will be 
replaced with a pass-fail system based heavily on seniority that will 
not adequately assess technical skills. The collective bargaining 
system will not reward screening performance or good customer service, 
and it will reduce standards. This will weaken workforce performance.
  Second, TSA can also currently remove ineffective security screeners 
within 72 hours. Imagine that: The frontline security of our country 
can identify someone who is not doing their job and remove them so our 
country and the airline passengers can be safe.
  Under collective bargaining, however, arbitration proceedings will 
retain substandard employees for months, preventing the hiring of 
replacement officers. This process could take 90 to 240 days and will 
reduce overall workforce performance. This will weaken workforce 
performance.
  Third, TSA currently uses multiple screening disciplines, adding 
interlocking layers of security. Under collective bargaining, employees 
will be able to refuse multidisciplinary jobs resulting in fewer 
resources to serve passenger checkpoints. This will weaken workforce 
performance.
  My colleagues should know exactly how this weakened workforce 
performance affects air travelers in our country, and we can have a 
good look at how that is going to affect us by looking at Canada. A 
recent incident in Canada provides a great example.
  Canada's air security system does not have the flexibility that TSA 
enjoys. Last Thanksgiving, as part of a labor dispute, passenger 
luggage was not properly screened and sometimes not screened at all as 
airport screeners engaged in a work-to-rule campaign, as they called 
it, creating long lines at the Toronto airport.
  A government report found that to clear the lines, about 250,000 
passengers were rushed through with minimal or no screening whatsoever. 
One Canadian security expert was quoted as saying that if terrorists 
had known that in those 3 days their baggage wasn't going to be 
searched, that would have been bad. That is an understatement of the 
year. We cannot afford to have this kind of union-sponsored disruption 
at our airports. The Canadian union's airport security was not allowed 
to strike either, but we can see what they did in order to disrupt the 
proper screening of baggage there. This would happen in our country as 
well.
  I think it is also important that people know how collective 
bargaining will impact passenger service. I know that for most 
Americans, security is

[[Page 5143]]

the No. 1 goal when it comes to air travel, but they also want security 
operations to be efficient and not needlessly disrupt their schedules.
  I know my colleagues would be pleased to know that TSA has managed 
the growth of passenger travel and kept average peak wait times to less 
than 12 minutes. Under collective bargaining, TSA will have to pull at 
least 3,500 screeners, or 8 percent of the total workforce, off a line 
to fulfill the needs of the new labor-management infrastructure. This 
would close at least 250 screening lanes, causing longer lines at 
checkpoints.
  Under these circumstances, average wait times would increase from 12 
minutes at peak to more than 30 minutes. This is something that will be 
very unpopular, especially given the fact that these longer wait lines 
come with less security.
  TSA is also currently capable of relocating security screeners to 
enable on-time aircraft departures. Under collective bargaining, 
negotiating job stations and functions will result in poor staffing, 
leading to longer lines, late flight departures, and other adverse 
industry impacts. Americans want to make their flights, and they will 
not support needless delays that come at the expense of their security.
  I think it is also important that my colleagues understand what I am 
talking about and how it could play out in real terms.
  During Hurricane Katrina, TSA deployed security officers from around 
the country to New Orleans to screen evacuees during the aftermath of 
the storm. This response allowed them to evacuate 22,000 men, women, 
and children through the airport safely and securely. Several weeks 
later, TSA responded the same in response to Hurricane Rita in Houston. 
Security screeners left their home airports with little notice to fly 
to Houston to help those in need.
  Another example of how TSA has been able to react quickly to weather-
related events occurred this past December when a big snowstorm hit 
Denver. Because local TSA employees were unable to get to the airport, 
TSA responded quickly by deploying 55 officers from Las Vegas, Salt 
Lake City, and Colorado Springs to Denver. The deployment allowed TSA 
to open every security lane around the clock at the airport until they 
were back to normal operations.
  Should we force TSA to prove this was an imminent danger or an 
emergency before they respond to the needs of the American people? That 
is what the second-degree amendment is intended to do. We cannot allow 
that. That will weaken our security.
  These operations have been subject to arbitration review required by 
collective bargaining. Changes in deployment of personnel would have 
required notification by TSA management to the collective bargaining 
unit, followed by a response accepting the changes in employment 
conditions or proposing modifications. This process would have created 
time-consuming rounds of negotiations, even using an expedited process. 
Americans do not want needless bureaucracy in our airports, especially 
when it comes at the expense of our safety.
  I also want my colleagues to understand the amount of money 
collective bargaining is going to cost and how it will impact TSA's 
operation in air travel security.
  The first year startup costs of creating a collective bargaining 
infrastructure is conservatively estimated at $160 million, forcing TSA 
to relocate thousands of screeners currently working on aviation 
security. Since there is no money allocated for this change, this 
mandate would force TSA to pull 3,500 transportation security officers, 
or 8 percent of the total workforce, off the checkpoints.
  These officers equate to 250 of the 2,054 active screening lanes 
across the Nation at any given time, closing 250 lanes. This impact is 
equivalent to closing all the checkpoint screening lanes in Chicago, 
Los Angeles, Boston, and New York. This impact is the equivalent of 
closing all screening operations across the system 1 day every week. 
This impact would result in failing to screen 300,000 passengers every 
day.
  Some may say we should increase spending for TSA by $160 million. But 
if we have this money, why use it to pay for redtape? Let's use it for 
security.
  I also want to address some of the objections to TSA's flexible 
management. First, those who want collective bargaining at TSA say they 
want screeners to be treated as every other Federal employee. That 
would be fine, except for the fact they are not like every other 
Federal employee. They have a mission to protect the American people, 
and collective bargaining will prevent them from accomplishing this 
mission.
  Second, those who want collective bargaining at TSA say it will lead 
to lower attrition and, therefore, more safety. Collective bargaining 
may lead to lower rates of attrition, but it will not lead to more 
security.
  I am sure there are security screeners who would like to be 
guaranteed lifetime employment, but that would prohibit TSA from 
keeping America safe. TSA currently has the ability to reward screeners 
based on their performance and to remove those screeners who are not 
performing. That is what ensures safety, not a workforce that is 
rewarded for seniority and is not accountable.
  We have also heard the supporters of collective bargaining at TSA say 
it is working at Customs and border control. First, I take issue with 
the claim it is working with Customs or working at our borders. Our 
Customs agency has experienced numerous delays and complications in 
securing our borders that have been caused by collective bargaining. I 
think our Customs agency and border security should have the same 
flexibility TSA enjoys, and it is a debate we should have as we look at 
ways to better secure our borders.
  Let's make sure we understand what we are saying. Advocates of 
collective bargaining for airport security are saying our border 
security has worked well. It is hard to look at 10 to 12 million 
illegal aliens in our country and say our border security is working 
well. It is not working well.
  We are also hearing increasingly from all over the world that our 
customs process is among the worst in the world. Our tourism is down 
and our business visits are down because we are making it harder and 
harder for people from around the world to get into our country. Our 
customs system doesn't work and neither does our border security.
  The supporters of collective bargaining at TSA also believe our 
screeners are lacking important protections to address their 
grievances. I hope my colleagues know TSA has given screeners the 
ability to have their whistleblower complaints reviewed by the Office 
of the Independent Counsel, even though it is not required in law. 
Critics also claim screeners do not have the ability to appeal adverse 
actions against them, such as suspensions and terminations, through the 
Merit System Protection Board. This is true, but TSA has created its 
own disciplinary review board that provides workers with relief faster 
than the Merit System Protection Board.
  I want my colleagues to understand what all of this means for unions, 
because I am afraid that is what this policy is all about. Unionizing 
the 48,000 workers at TSA will give labor unions a $17 million annual 
windfall in dues from these new union workers. Let me share a quote. 
For my colleagues who doubt this policy is being driven by unions, I 
want them to hear what was said earlier this week by two leaders of the 
American Federation of Government Employees, which is affiliated with 
the AFL-CIO. They said:

       We must gain 40,000 new members a year to break even today. 
     But because of the age of our members and pending 
     retirements, that number will grow to 50,000 in 2 years and 
     probably 60,000 a few years after that.

  An additional comment:

       This campaign is the perfect opportunity to convince TSA 
     employees to join our union and become activist volunteers in 
     our one great union.

  The purpose of TSA is not to create activist volunteers for unions. 
It is to protect our country. Again, I need to

[[Page 5144]]

remind my colleagues the top priority of Homeland Security and TSA is 
to protect Americans.
  I conclude by saying this is a very serious issue, and I encourage 
all my colleagues to think about it carefully. We all want workers to 
have better benefits, but that is not what this debate is about. TSA 
offers great benefits and important protections to its workforce. This 
debate is about how to keep our country safe, and we cannot tie TSA up 
in knots of redtape.
  I understand the unions want this new policy because it will add 
thousands of new dues-paying members to their rolls, but they are going 
to have to live without it in order to keep our country safe. This bill 
is about doing things that will prevent another 9/11 attack. Adding an 
earmark for labor unions that prevents TSA from doing its job is the 
last thing we should do.
  I realize the Senator from Connecticut feels strongly about this 
issue, and I know I probably haven't changed his mind. Unionizing the 
Federal workforce is something that is very important to him, and it is 
something he has worked on for many years, most notably when Congress 
created the new Department of Homeland Security in 2002. I also realize 
the majority leader has impressed upon the Senators on the other side 
of the aisle to stick together in supporting this destructive policy. 
This is very disappointing, because it shows the majority may be more 
interested in having a political showdown than they are in 
strengthening our security.
  The President has issued a veto threat on this bill if it creates 
collective bargaining at TSA, and there are enough Senators to sustain 
it. That leaves us with two options: We can remove this misguided 
position and preserve the bill or we can let the bill die. I simply ask 
my colleagues: Is this union earmark worth killing this bill for? I 
don't think so.
  I think it is important to also note the second-degree amendment that 
is being offered to change my amendment is not supported by Homeland 
Security. In fact, they believe it will make this bill worse than it is 
right now.
  My colleagues, I ask everyone to set aside the partisan politics, set 
aside special interests, and let us continue to improve TSA, our 
Transportation Security Agency. They have demonstrated that while there 
have been a lot of problems with starting up a new agency, each year 
they have gotten better. Each year their workforce has gotten better 
trained. Each year we are moving passengers through with less and less 
inconvenience and better and better security. This is not the time to 
turn back. This is not the time to play politics and payback with our 
security.
  I encourage everyone to take a careful look at this amendment and I 
ask my colleagues to support it.
  With that, Mr. President, I yield back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
  Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I have listened to the arguments of my 
colleague on the other side of the aisle, and I believe the amendment I 
have offered answers many of his concerns but also provides basic 
rights for our 40,000-some TSA officers across this country.
  Let us first talk about what this amendment does that I have offered. 
It does three things, three simple things. First, it gives them 
whistleblower protection.
  As somebody who has spent 8 years as an auditor, as someone who has 
spent a great deal of time figuring out where Government is doing its 
job well and not so well, I understand the importance of whistleblower 
protection. The best information you get as an auditor comes from the 
employees of the Government, and they all must be reassured, especially 
those working on the front line of security, that they will be 
protected if they tell things they see that need to be fixed. That is 
important.
  Secondly, this bill gives them the right to appeal suspensions of 14 
days or more to an independent board, as other Federal workers.
  It also gives them the right to collectively bargain, like the Border 
Patrol, like the Capitol Police, like FEMA employees, and like 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
  What does this amendment not do? It is important to understand the 
limitations in this amendment. First, it makes sure they do not have 
the right to strike.
  Secondly, it prohibits them from bargaining for higher pay. They 
cannot bargain for higher pay. This is important, because my colleagues 
spent a great deal of time talking about safety. It explicitly states 
that no classified or sensitive intelligence can be divulged or 
released during any grievance process.
  It goes further than the original legislation and the original 
amendment by saying the TSA Administrator or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security can take whatever actions necessary to carry out an agency 
mission during emergencies and whenever needed to address newly 
imminent threats. No questions asked. These employees have to follow 
orders. In any emergency, the director has the complete and immediate 
control over these workers. Let me emphasize that again. In any 
emergency the director, the administrator have complete control over 
anything these workers should do.
  By the way, as an aside, having talked with and been around these 
screening officers many times as I move through the airports, I think 
it is a little insulting to them to act as if they would not respond 
when directed to an emergency. Americans across the board want to do 
what is right in times of crisis for our country. To indicate these 
Americans would not do what was asked of them in time of an emergency, 
and that they would try to rely on some kind of right under the law to 
not do what is necessary in an emergency, frankly, I think, is unfair 
to them.
  What does collective bargaining get these workers? It provides a 
structure for quick and fair resolution of grievances and workplace 
disputes. It provides a forum to discuss health and safety issues, 
which will reduce the number of on-the-job injuries suffered by TSOs. 
It reduces the high TSO turnover rate.
  Let's talk about that turnover rate. Talk about saving money. Think 
of the money we are investing in these officers that is wasted right 
now. We have a 23-percent annual turnover among these screening 
officers. Among the part-time officers, it is 50 percent. As somebody 
who has worried about the bottom line in a private business, that kind 
of turnover is completely unacceptable in terms of the costs.
  Let's look at the safety issue. The experience we are losing by that 
kind of turnover--and I am not talking about people being dismissed for 
bad conduct or getting rid of bad screeners; I am talking about people 
who are leaving. That turnover rate, if you don't consider anything 
else, should tell my colleagues something is wrong. I believe what is 
wrong is they do not have the basic rights and protections other 
Federal workers have.
  It increases public safety by allowing the TSOs to go through their 
union to expose threats to aviation security without fear of 
retaliation. It addresses procedures for emergency and security 
situations so workers are fully aware of their duties in the event of 
an emergency.
  This is a good amendment for everyone. It puts these workers on equal 
footing with other Federal workers. It does not give them the right to 
strike. It does not give them the right to refuse to be deployed in 
case of an emergency. It does not allow them to negotiate for higher 
pay.
  I was not a Senator at the time, but I understand that the Department 
of Homeland Security needed the flexibility to get up and running when 
the agency was first created years ago--5 years ago; more than 5 years 
ago.
  But they are no longer processing 5,000 more screener applications 
per month in order to transition from a private force to a Federal 
force. We are no longer scrambling to create a Department of Homeland 
Security. We are now in a position to professionalize. We are now in a 
position to professionalize airport officers and give them basic worker 
protections and, as a result, we will have a seasoned staff and much 
better security.

[[Page 5145]]

  My colleague mentioned the threatened veto. That is kind of hard to 
figure out. It is hard to imagine that the President would use a veto 
to veto legislation that is all about making our country safer, all of 
the provisions that this bill will contain, that will go directly to 
the heart of the matter of the safety of our Nation, that will do what 
the 9/11 Commission wanted. It is hard to imagine, because the 
President does not like unions, that he would threaten to veto this 
bill just because we want to give the same basic worker protections to 
the screeners at airports that the Border Patrol, the Capitol Police, 
and immigration officials currently have.
  I cannot imagine that the President would veto under those 
circumstances. I can't imagine that the American public would think 
that is a good use of a veto pen. I can't imagine that some of our 
colleagues who think that unions are the enemy would use the collective 
bargaining rights--that are so limited in scope in this amendment--as 
an excuse to stop this concerted effort that we are all making to do 
what we must do to improve homeland security.
  If we continue to treat our TSA officers different from their 
colleagues in the Border Patrol and their colleagues in homeland 
security, we will never have the seasoned and professional and 
experienced staff in place as part of our important effort to protect 
the Nation's transportation system and the people who live and work and 
care about the United States of America.
  Mr. DeMINT. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mrs. McCASKILL. Sure.
  Mr. DeMINT. I want to make sure I understand the provisions in the 
Senator's amendment. I know one of them is TSA, in order to act quickly 
and make changes rapidly, would need to establish that there is an 
emergency.
  My question is, Would the ongoing global war on terror be considered 
an emergency?
  Mrs. McCASKILL. I do not believe declaring that we have a problem 
with terrorism worldwide, that is a status quo day in and day out, 
would be considered a day-to-day emergency. The examples you used, 
however, of Hurricane Katrina or the necessity to respond in Lebanon--I 
think those issues certainly would be issues that the professionals at 
TSA, the officers, would want to respond to quickly.
  Mr. DeMINT. I know another criterion is that if they could establish 
that we have a newly imminent threat they could act quickly to respond 
and not go through the collective bargaining process. Would al-Qaida be 
considered a newly imminent threat?
  Mrs. McCASKILL. I understand the point my colleague is trying to 
make. I would say there are a whole lot of things that some are trying 
to put under the rubric of a continuing threat against America. There 
have been proposals to take away some basic constitutional rights. 
There have been proposals to change the way we view some of the rights 
and privileges that Americans have.
  I think to say that these workers don't get the same benefits as the 
Border Patrol or Customs agents just because they are screening in 
airports, under this rubric that we have to be concerned about 
worldwide terror, is specious reasoning.
  Mr. DeMINT. If I could make one last appeal? This document is the 
collective bargaining procedures the border agents have for just one 
unit. This bill opens the possibility of literally hundreds of unions 
in every airport. I appeal to my colleagues. If every airport has to 
deal with separate collective bargaining arrangements and has to 
establish an emergency or imminent threat on every occasion, and we can 
second-guess them in Congress--and lawyers will--I think we need to 
work together to make sure we come to the best conclusion. I know the 
amendment of the Senator is well intended. Hopefully we can discuss it 
more on the floor tomorrow or next week.
  Mrs. McCASKILL. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to speak against the amendment 
offered by my colleague, Senator DeMint, and in support of employee 
protections for Transportation Security Officers TSOs at the 
Transportation Security Administration
  It is only fair to give TSOs the same rights and protections as other 
employees at the Department of Homeland Security.
  The provision in S. 4 would allow the President to put TSOs in the 
same personnel system that President Bush argued was needed for 
homeland security employees in 2002 in order to put the right people in 
the right jobs at the right pay--to hold employees accountable--and to 
reorganize and quickly shift resources to meet new terrorist threats.
  Although DHS was authorized to waive certain provisions of title 5 
related to pay, labor relations, and employee appeals in order to 
protect the U.S. from terrorists attacks, other employee rights and 
protections remained--veterans preference, collective bargaining, and 
full whistleblower rights with appeal to the Merit Systems Protection 
Board, MSPB.
  It is wrong to deny these basic rights and protections to TSOs--who 
work for DHS.
  Because TSOs lack employee protections, they have one of the largest 
attrition rates, one of the highest workers compensation claims, and 
one of the lowest levels of morale among Federal employees.
  I recognize the efforts by TSA to address these issues, but I firmly 
believe that the gains made by those efforts are only temporary if 
employees continually feel threatened by retaliatory action or that 
they cannot bring their concerns to management.
  National security is jeopardized if agencies charged with protecting 
our Nation continually lose trained and talented employees due to 
workplace injuries and a lack of employee protections--including 
protection against retaliation for blowing the whistle on security 
breaches.
  Moreover, the whole point of creating DHS was to consolidate 22 
agencies into one entity in order to prevent and respond to terrorist 
attacks. By denying TSOs the same rights provided to other DHS 
employees, we are reinforcing the very stovepipes we sought to tear 
down with the Homeland Security Act.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, this is a very difficult issue that is 
now before the Senate. The Aviation Transportation Security Act 
provided TSA with flexibility with respect to the critical national 
security mission of TSA security officers. These management authorities 
allow TSA to shift resources and implement new procedures daily, in 
some cases hourly, to respond to critical intelligence and to meet an 
ever-changing airline schedule. This was made very clear to us in a 
classified briefing that I attended yesterday. Sometimes these 
situations can be classified as emergencies. Other times the day-to-day 
situations, such as a flight gets canceled, still require extensive 
modifications that may not constitute emergencies.
  I think, however, that there is a middle ground in this debate. I 
think we can find a solution, and I am working with Senators on both 
sides of the aisle to try to see if there is a middle ground. It seems 
to me that TSA does need some flexibility to allow it to adjust the 
workforce in order to provide additional security. That happened in 
response to the United Kingdom air bombing plot last summer. In that 
case, TSA changed the nature of employees' work and even the location 
of their work to respond to that emergency.
  But I see no reason TSA employees cannot have the protections of the 
Whistleblower Protection Act, for example. There is no reason they 
should not have the same protections as other Federal employees and be 
brought under that law.
  Similarly, I think there should be some way for TSA employees to have 
the right to appeal adverse actions, such as a removal, a suspension 
action, a reduction in grade level or pay that has been taken away from 
them. I am

[[Page 5146]]

still exploring this issue, but it seems to me that they should have 
the right to appeal adverse employment actions to the Merit System 
Protection Board.
  I know there is another one of my colleagues waiting to speak, so I 
am not going to go into great detail tonight. But let me say that I do 
not think this is an all-or-nothing situation as, unfortunately, much 
of the debate suggested tonight. I do not think that we have to deny 
TSA employees whistleblower protections and the right to appeal adverse 
employment actions in the name of security. I think we can still 
achieve our vital security goals while affording TSA employees 
employment rights when an adverse action is taken, appellate rights. I 
also believe there is absolutely no reason they can't be brought under 
the Whistleblower Protection Act.
  I ask my colleagues to take a close look at this issue. I think it is 
unfortunate that the debate has been so polarized on this issue and 
that it is being portrayed as whether you appreciate the work done by 
the TSO's or whether you don't appreciate it or whether you are pro-
union or anti-union. That does not do justice to the debate before us. 
I believe we can come up with a middle ground that gives TSA the 
flexibility it truly needs to be able to change working conditions, 
working hours, unexpectedly to respond to critical intelligence and new 
threats, or canceled flights for that matter, without depriving TSA 
employees of other rights that Federal employees enjoy and that they 
should enjoy, too.
  Part of the problem is--and then I am going to yield to my colleague 
who I see is waiting--we have not had the kind of thorough review of 
this issue that is needed. I hope Senator Akaka and Senator Voinovich, 
who are the leaders on civil service issues on the Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs Committee, might hold hearings to take a close 
look at this and to bring in the experts and hear from the employees, 
hear from the employees' representatives, the unions, TSA; to have the 
kind of information that Kip Holly, the head of TSA, has provided us in 
the past few days.
  I think that while it is premature to do what the committee did on 
the spur of the moment, I also am not enamored of the idea of just 
striking all of that.
  I think there is a middle ground and with goodwill and a sincere 
effort we can find it. I hope we would avoid what I saw tonight--where 
the tree was filled up instantly to block alternatives, to block an 
attempt, a good-faith attempt to find that middle ground.
  I am going to keep working on that along with interested colleagues, 
and I hope that, in fact, maybe we can find a compromise that achieves 
our goals.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sanders). The Senator from North Dakota.


                 Amendment No. 313 to Amendment No. 275

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Maine.
  I have an amendment at the desk on behalf of myself and Senator 
Conrad. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set 
aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. I call up my amendment and ask for its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan], for himself and 
     Mr. Conrad, proposes an amendment numbered 313 to amendment 
     No. 275.

  Mr. DORGAN. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

  (Purpose: To require a report to Congress on the hunt for Osama Bin 
       Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the leadership of al Qaeda)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. REPORT ON THE HUNT FOR OSAMA BIN LADEN, AYMAN AL-
                   ZAWAHIRI, AND THE LEADERSHIP OF AL QAEDA.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of 
     Defense jointly shall submit to Congress a report describing 
     the status of their efforts to capture Osama Bin Laden, Ayman 
     al-Zawahiri, and the leadership of al Qaeda.
       (b) Contents.--Each report required by subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) A statement whether or not the January 11, 2007, 
     assessment provided by Director of National Intelligence John 
     Negroponte to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate that the top leadership of al Qaeda has a ``secure 
     hideout in Pakistan'' was applicable during the reporting 
     period and, if not, a description of the current whereabouts 
     of that leadership.
       (2) A statement identifying each country where Osama bin 
     Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the leadership of al Qaeda are 
     or may be hiding, including an assessment whether or not the 
     government of each country so identified has fully cooperated 
     in the efforts to capture them, and, if not, a description of 
     the actions, if any, being taken or to be taken to obtain the 
     full cooperation of each country so identified in the efforts 
     to capture them.
       (3) A description of the additional resources required to 
     promptly capture Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the 
     leadership of al Qaeda.

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this is an amendment which is similar to 
one Senator Conrad and I have offered previously. It deals with the 
issue of al-Qaeda and its leadership. It has been now 5\1/2\ years 
since that fateful morning with the bright sunshine and the blue sky 
here in Washington, DC, when I was looking out the window of the 
leadership meeting which I was attending that Tuesday. We could see the 
smoke rising from the Pentagon because of the attacks. We watched on 
television the collapse of the World Trade towers, attacked by 
commercial airplanes being used as guided missiles full of fuel. None 
of us will ever forget that morning. More than 3,000 innocent Americans 
were murdered. Shortly after that period, we heard people boast about 
orchestrating the murder of those innocent Americans. Osama bin Laden, 
Mr. al-Zawahiri, his chief lieutenant, and al-Qaeda have boasted about 
orchestrating the attacks against our country that murdered innocent 
Americans.
  The legislation before the Senate deals with the 9/11 Commission 
Report. That Commission did an extraordinary job. I appreciate Senator 
Reid bringing this to the floor and the work that has been done by the 
committees. These are recommendations which are long overdue. They 
should have been dealt with previously by the Congress, but they have 
not been.
  Now we have legislation on the Senate floor, recommendations on how 
to provide for this country's protection, how to provide security, how 
to prevent another attack by al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations. 
It is very important legislation. We do need to protect our country 
from attacks. But there is something else that is long overdue; that 
is, we have taken our eye off the greatest threat. That is not me 
saying so. Let me tell my colleagues what the greatest threat to our 
country is. This is testimony on January 11, a month and a half or so 
ago, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by Mr. 
Negroponte, who was a top intelligence chief.
  Here is what he said:

       Al Qaeda continues to plot attacks against our homeland and 
     other targets with the objective of inflicting mass 
     casualties. And they continue to maintain active connections 
     and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders' 
     secure hideout in Pakistan to affiliates throughout the 
     Middle East, northern Africa and Europe.

  Mr. Negroponte continued by saying:

       Al Qaeda is the terrorist organizations that poses the 
     greatest threat to US interests, including to the Homeland.

  That is from the top intelligence expert in our Government. He says 
the terrorist organization that poses the greatest threat to U.S. 
interests is al-Qaeda; the greatest threat to our homeland is from al-
Qaeda. He says they are in a secure hideout in Pakistan.
  Tuesday of this week, the new Director of Intelligence, Mike 
McConnell, said almost exactly the same thing.
  We also read in the New York Times a week or so ago the following:

       Senior leaders of Al Qaeda operating from Pakistan over the 
     past year have set up a band of training camps in the tribal 
     regions near the Afghan border, according to American 
     intelligence and counterterrorism officials.

[[Page 5147]]

       American officials said there was mounting evidence that 
     Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, have been 
     steadily building an operations hub in the mountainous 
     Pakistani tribal area of North Waziristan.

  Now, let me go back to 4 days after 
9/11. President Bush said the following in an address to a joint 
session of Congress. I was sitting near the front row. The President 
said:

       We will not only deal with those who dare attack America. 
     We will deal with those who harbor them and feed them and 
     house them.

  In his State of the Union Address several months later, he said:

       As part of our offensive against terror, we are also 
     confronting the regimes that harbor and support terrorists.

  So the head of our intelligence services, the Directors of 
Intelligence, know that the leadership of al-Qaeda, including Osama bin 
Laden--or ``Osama bin Forgotten,'' as some have suggested in recent 
years--are in a secure hideaway in Pakistan. At the same time, we have 
21,000 troops sent on a surge elsewhere. And so I ask: Why are we not 
making a greater effort to capture the leadership of the biggest 
terrorist threat to this country, as described by the Directors of 
Intelligence, past and current? Are they being harbored?
  We read that there has been an agreement of sorts between the 
Government of Pakistan and al-Qaeda and those who harbor al-Qaeda in 
Pakistan. We know there are training organizations now. We see the 
examples of them in the film and video on our television sets, more 
sophisticated attacks, additional techniques about terrorist attacks.
  So we offer an amendment that is very simple. It is an amendment that 
says: We want every 6 months from this administration a classified 
report to the Congress that tells us several things: First, where is 
the al-Qaeda leadership? If they know they are in Pakistan, reaffirm 
that. If they are not in Pakistan, tell us where they are, each 
country, and whether those countries are harboring these terrorists.
  Second, we deserve to know whether these countries in which these 
terrorists reside are helping us. Are they helping us bring to justice 
and capture the leadership of the greatest terrorist threat to our 
country? We deserve to know that.
  And third, if Osama bin Laden and the other top leaders are still at 
large, we need a report describing what resources are needed to hunt 
them down and finally capture them.
  I don't understand at all why year after year passes and those who 
directed the attacks against this country that killed thousands of 
innocent Americans are not brought to justice.
  It is perfectly appropriate--in fact, it is essential--that we bring 
to the floor of the Senate a 9/11 Commission bill that helps protect 
this country. I commend the managers of the bill for it. I want to be 
out here helping pass this legislation. But that is one part of 
providing security.
  Another part of providing security is to apprehend those who 
perpetrated the most aggressive attacks ever launched against this 
country. Apparently, based on the testimony of the heads of 
intelligence on two occasions in the last month, we know where they 
are. Yet they remain at large.
  I asked a question the other day of the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when 
they testified. I asked the question: If we know where the leadership 
of al-Qaeda is and if this is the greatest threat to our country's 
security and our homeland, then why on Earth, if we have soldiers to 
surge, are we not trying to apprehend and bring to justice the 
leadership of al-Qaeda to destroy the leadership? I was told: Well, we 
can't just invade some other country to go find them.
  I thought we were getting cooperation from this other country. If 
they are in Pakistan, are the Pakistanis cooperating with us? If not, 
are they harboring al-Qaeda? If they are not harboring them, then how 
about allowing us to work with them to bring to justice the leadership 
of the organization that poses the most significant terrorist threat to 
this country? When will that happen?
  There are some who have said Osama bin Laden and the leadership of 
al-Qaeda do not matter. They are dead wrong. I think the intelligence 
community knows that. The question is, When will this country, with its 
capability, decide to eliminate the greatest terrorist threat to 
America?
  Let me again quote what Mr. Negroponte said on January 11 of this 
year:

       Al Qaeda is the terrorist organization that poses the 
     greatest threat to U.S. interests, including to the Homeland.

  How long will it be before this Congress can expect the same 
aggressive activity against the leadership of al-Qaeda as President 
Bush decided to take against Saddam Hussein? Saddam Hussein has been 
executed. He is gone. We understand this was a brutal dictator. We have 
unearthed mass graves with apparently somewhere near 400,000 skeletons 
of human beings murdered by that dictator. But he is executed; he is 
gone. Iraq has its own Constitution. They have their own Government. 
The question is, Do they have the will to provide for their security? 
That is another issue, and an important one.
  We have American soldiers in harm's way in the middle of sectarian 
violence, in the middle of what clearly is now a civil war in Iraq. But 
when we talk about committing America's soldiers for this country's 
security, when will this President and this Congress decide to confront 
the greatest terrorist threat to our country and to our homeland--the 
leadership of al-Qaeda in a secure hideaway in Pakistan? Four days 
after 9/11, our President said that those who harbor terrorists are 
just like the terrorists. So let's decide to ask those in whose 
countries terrorists now reside to work with us to bring them to 
justice, to capture them, and to eliminate the leadership of the 
greatest terrorist threat to this country.
  My colleague, Senator Conrad, and I have offered an amendment. We 
will hope it will be given a vote next week. It ought not be a 
controversial amendment for anybody in this Chamber. It is a deep 
reservoir of common sense, for a change, for us to do what we ought to 
do, and protect this country.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I strongly support the Improving 
America's Security Act.
  The 9/11 Commission released its report in July 2004. But more than 2 
years have now passed, and many of its recommendations still haven't 
been implemented. The Nation remains seriously unprepared for another 
terrorist strike.
  I commend Senator Reid for making these recommendations a top 
priority. Democrats are committed to implementing the Commission's 
recommendations and we intend to honor that commitment.
  The Commission urged Congress to prevent further attacks by stopping 
terrorists before they reach our shores. This bill includes practical 
steps using technology and diplomacy to keep terrorists out of the 
country. It provides greater security for the visa waiver program, by 
authorizing the Department of Homeland Security to establish a 
simplified online electronic visa application to visitors before they 
enter the United States. It also improves the reporting of lost and 
stolen passports and the exchange of information about prospective 
visitors who may be a security threat. The visa waiver program is 
worthwhile, but we need to make it as secure as possible.
  I commend the committee for including in the bill an amendment 
granting collective bargaining and appeal rights to Transportation 
Security Administration officers. These men and women are on the 
frontlines of our effort to keep America safe. But for years, they have 
been treated as second-class citizens, lacking basic workplace rights. 
The agency has higher injury and attrition rates than any other Federal 
agency. It is vital to our national security to minimize turnover in 
this important profession and give these workers a voice on the job to 
speak out on safety

[[Page 5148]]

issues without fear of reprisal or retaliation. Granting them these 
fundamental rights will stabilize this essential workforce, increase 
its morale, and improve our national security.
  In addition, the bill establishes a dedicated funding stream to 
promote communications interoperability. This was one of the hard 
lessons we learned on 9/11 and also during Katrina. The lack of funding 
for interoperable communications is one of the highest concerns I hear 
from first responders in Massachusetts. They shouldn't have to rely on 
uncertain funding from the overburdened and underfunded FIRE grants 
program to achieve such communications. The committee correctly 
recognized that this is a national goal and it has proposed a $3.3 
billion grant program over 5 years to achieve it.
  This bill makes real progress in another key area that the Commission 
identified for improvement: intelligence sharing at all levels of 
Government, in order to disrupt terrorist networks before their plan is 
carried out. Information sharing is vital so that analysts have all 
available information to ``connect the dots'' before an attack is 
launched. The bill orders a homeland security advisory system to alert 
State and local governments about threats, and authorizes a training 
program for State and local law enforcement in handling intelligence. 
It also establishes homeland security fusion centers to bring Federal, 
State and local antiterrorism efforts under the same roof and promote 
further information sharing.
  The bill makes progress in other areas identified by the 9/11 
Commission as needing improvement. It provides support to State and 
local governments to establish incident command stations to coordinate 
response efforts during a terrorist attack or other disasters. It calls 
for a national strategy for transportation security to provide transit 
system operators with guidance to protect passengers and 
infrastructure. It calls on the Department of Homeland Security to make 
annual risk assessments of critical infrastructure, and to make 
recommendations for hardening those targets and putting other 
countermeasures in place.
  The bill also strengthens the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board in 
significant ways. It requires Senate confirmation of all of its members 
and ensures that no more than three members will be of the same party. 
Importantly, it requires that the Board expand its public activities, 
which will allow for greater accountability. It also gives the Board 
authority to request that the Attorney General issue a subpoena and 
requires that the Attorney General notify Congress if he does not do 
so. Finally, it includes a $30 million authorization over the next 4 
years to ensure that it has the resources to carry out its important 
responsibilities.
  In some areas, the bill could be improved. The 9/11 Commission 
recommended that homeland security funds be allocated strictly on the 
basis of risk. While all States may bear some degree of risk, our 
experience on 9/11 suggests that terrorists are most likely to target 
areas that will produce the greatest loss of life or property or 
national symbols. The bill improves on current law in allocating 
resources under the largest of the homeland security grant programs---
the State homeland security grants. Currently, each State is guaranteed 
at least three-quarters of 1 percent of the total appropriated for the 
program. That may seem like a relatively modest amount, but when you 
multiply it 50 times, it represents nearly 40 percent of the total 
appropriation. The bill lowers the minimum guarantee to 0.45 percent, 
allowing more of the overall sum to be allocated based purely on actual 
risk. The House bill lowers that amount even further to one-quarter of 
1 percent. The issue is how best to allocate these limited resources, 
and I believe the House funding formula more faithfully reflects the 9/
11 Commission's recommendation and is the wisest use of limited 
resources.
  On the bill's proposal for a National Bioterrorism Integration 
Center, I agree that the Nation must be able to rapidly identify and 
localize biological threats, but I am concerned that this new system 
will duplicate existing disease monitoring systems. I appreciate the 
chairman's willingness to work out ways to minimize duplication and 
allow a flow of information between the new system proposed in the bill 
and existing disease monitoring systems.
  One issue not addressed in this legislation is the health needs of 
first responders, volunteers, and residents of New York City harmed by 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. On that day, valiant police officers, 
firefighters and health care workers rushed to the site, and many lost 
their lives. Many others today are sick, and growing sicker, because of 
their heroism. Tens of thousands of others who worked to clean up and 
rebuild downtown Manhattan were also exposed to a toxic mix of dust and 
chemicals whose effects are just beginning to be understood. This is an 
issue we will be taking up in the coming weeks in the HELP Committee, 
with the leadership of Senator Clinton, and I hope we can work together 
to enact legislation to help these brave men and women and their 
families as soon as possible.
  Again, I commend the committee for proposing this needed bipartisan 
bill.
  We also owe an immense debt to the members of the 9/11 Commission, 
especially Chairman Tom Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton, for never 
relenting in their mission to see that their recommendations are 
implemented to protect the Nation from future terrorist attacks. I have 
no doubt that their persistence is in no small part the reason this 
bill is being acted on today.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Order Of Business

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, for the information of our colleagues, I 
know the distinguished assistant leader is going to be making comments 
shortly about the schedule tomorrow, but it appears there may be two 
rollcall votes. It is still being negotiated as to exactly what they 
are going to be on. It looks as if they may be on amendments offered by 
Senators Salazar and Sununu.
  I want, for the record, to state those amendments are acceptable on 
this side of the aisle. I was prepared to accept them without the need 
for a rollcall vote, but at this point it is my understanding that 
rollcalls are likely for tomorrow. I am sure we will hear shortly from 
the leaders on that.
  Mr. President, I thank my colleague for allowing me to precede him.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I will speak to the schedule and 
adjournment in just a moment, but before that I ask unanimous consent 
to be recognized to speak as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________